Commit Graph

23 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Linus Torvalds
3822a7c409 - Daniel Verkamp has contributed a memfd series ("mm/memfd: add
F_SEAL_EXEC") which permits the setting of the memfd execute bit at
   memfd creation time, with the option of sealing the state of the X bit.
 
 - Peter Xu adds a patch series ("mm/hugetlb: Make huge_pte_offset()
   thread-safe for pmd unshare") which addresses a rare race condition
   related to PMD unsharing.
 
 - Several folioification patch serieses from Matthew Wilcox, Vishal
   Moola, Sidhartha Kumar and Lorenzo Stoakes
 
 - Johannes Weiner has a series ("mm: push down lock_page_memcg()") which
   does perform some memcg maintenance and cleanup work.
 
 - SeongJae Park has added DAMOS filtering to DAMON, with the series
   "mm/damon/core: implement damos filter".  These filters provide users
   with finer-grained control over DAMOS's actions.  SeongJae has also done
   some DAMON cleanup work.
 
 - Kairui Song adds a series ("Clean up and fixes for swap").
 
 - Vernon Yang contributed the series "Clean up and refinement for maple
   tree".
 
 - Yu Zhao has contributed the "mm: multi-gen LRU: memcg LRU" series.  It
   adds to MGLRU an LRU of memcgs, to improve the scalability of global
   reclaim.
 
 - David Hildenbrand has added some userfaultfd cleanup work in the
   series "mm: uffd-wp + change_protection() cleanups".
 
 - Christoph Hellwig has removed the generic_writepages() library
   function in the series "remove generic_writepages".
 
 - Baolin Wang has performed some maintenance on the compaction code in
   his series "Some small improvements for compaction".
 
 - Sidhartha Kumar is doing some maintenance work on struct page in his
   series "Get rid of tail page fields".
 
 - David Hildenbrand contributed some cleanup, bugfixing and
   generalization of pte management and of pte debugging in his series "mm:
   support __HAVE_ARCH_PTE_SWP_EXCLUSIVE on all architectures with swap
   PTEs".
 
 - Mel Gorman and Neil Brown have removed the __GFP_ATOMIC allocation
   flag in the series "Discard __GFP_ATOMIC".
 
 - Sergey Senozhatsky has improved zsmalloc's memory utilization with his
   series "zsmalloc: make zspage chain size configurable".
 
 - Joey Gouly has added prctl() support for prohibiting the creation of
   writeable+executable mappings.  The previous BPF-based approach had
   shortcomings.  See "mm: In-kernel support for memory-deny-write-execute
   (MDWE)".
 
 - Waiman Long did some kmemleak cleanup and bugfixing in the series
   "mm/kmemleak: Simplify kmemleak_cond_resched() & fix UAF".
 
 - T.J.  Alumbaugh has contributed some MGLRU cleanup work in his series
   "mm: multi-gen LRU: improve".
 
 - Jiaqi Yan has provided some enhancements to our memory error
   statistics reporting, mainly by presenting the statistics on a per-node
   basis.  See the series "Introduce per NUMA node memory error
   statistics".
 
 - Mel Gorman has a second and hopefully final shot at fixing a CPU-hog
   regression in compaction via his series "Fix excessive CPU usage during
   compaction".
 
 - Christoph Hellwig does some vmalloc maintenance work in the series
   "cleanup vfree and vunmap".
 
 - Christoph Hellwig has removed block_device_operations.rw_page() in ths
   series "remove ->rw_page".
 
 - We get some maple_tree improvements and cleanups in Liam Howlett's
   series "VMA tree type safety and remove __vma_adjust()".
 
 - Suren Baghdasaryan has done some work on the maintainability of our
   vm_flags handling in the series "introduce vm_flags modifier functions".
 
 - Some pagemap cleanup and generalization work in Mike Rapoport's series
   "mm, arch: add generic implementation of pfn_valid() for FLATMEM" and
   "fixups for generic implementation of pfn_valid()"
 
 - Baoquan He has done some work to make /proc/vmallocinfo and
   /proc/kcore better represent the real state of things in his series
   "mm/vmalloc.c: allow vread() to read out vm_map_ram areas".
 
 - Jason Gunthorpe rationalized the GUP system's interface to the rest of
   the kernel in the series "Simplify the external interface for GUP".
 
 - SeongJae Park wishes to migrate people from DAMON's debugfs interface
   over to its sysfs interface.  To support this, we'll temporarily be
   printing warnings when people use the debugfs interface.  See the series
   "mm/damon: deprecate DAMON debugfs interface".
 
 - Andrey Konovalov provided the accurately named "lib/stackdepot: fixes
   and clean-ups" series.
 
 - Huang Ying has provided a dramatic reduction in migration's TLB flush
   IPI rates with the series "migrate_pages(): batch TLB flushing".
 
 - Arnd Bergmann has some objtool fixups in "objtool warning fixes".
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Merge tag 'mm-stable-2023-02-20-13-37' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm

Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton:

 - Daniel Verkamp has contributed a memfd series ("mm/memfd: add
   F_SEAL_EXEC") which permits the setting of the memfd execute bit at
   memfd creation time, with the option of sealing the state of the X
   bit.

 - Peter Xu adds a patch series ("mm/hugetlb: Make huge_pte_offset()
   thread-safe for pmd unshare") which addresses a rare race condition
   related to PMD unsharing.

 - Several folioification patch serieses from Matthew Wilcox, Vishal
   Moola, Sidhartha Kumar and Lorenzo Stoakes

 - Johannes Weiner has a series ("mm: push down lock_page_memcg()")
   which does perform some memcg maintenance and cleanup work.

 - SeongJae Park has added DAMOS filtering to DAMON, with the series
   "mm/damon/core: implement damos filter".

   These filters provide users with finer-grained control over DAMOS's
   actions. SeongJae has also done some DAMON cleanup work.

 - Kairui Song adds a series ("Clean up and fixes for swap").

 - Vernon Yang contributed the series "Clean up and refinement for maple
   tree".

 - Yu Zhao has contributed the "mm: multi-gen LRU: memcg LRU" series. It
   adds to MGLRU an LRU of memcgs, to improve the scalability of global
   reclaim.

 - David Hildenbrand has added some userfaultfd cleanup work in the
   series "mm: uffd-wp + change_protection() cleanups".

 - Christoph Hellwig has removed the generic_writepages() library
   function in the series "remove generic_writepages".

 - Baolin Wang has performed some maintenance on the compaction code in
   his series "Some small improvements for compaction".

 - Sidhartha Kumar is doing some maintenance work on struct page in his
   series "Get rid of tail page fields".

 - David Hildenbrand contributed some cleanup, bugfixing and
   generalization of pte management and of pte debugging in his series
   "mm: support __HAVE_ARCH_PTE_SWP_EXCLUSIVE on all architectures with
   swap PTEs".

 - Mel Gorman and Neil Brown have removed the __GFP_ATOMIC allocation
   flag in the series "Discard __GFP_ATOMIC".

 - Sergey Senozhatsky has improved zsmalloc's memory utilization with
   his series "zsmalloc: make zspage chain size configurable".

 - Joey Gouly has added prctl() support for prohibiting the creation of
   writeable+executable mappings.

   The previous BPF-based approach had shortcomings. See "mm: In-kernel
   support for memory-deny-write-execute (MDWE)".

 - Waiman Long did some kmemleak cleanup and bugfixing in the series
   "mm/kmemleak: Simplify kmemleak_cond_resched() & fix UAF".

 - T.J. Alumbaugh has contributed some MGLRU cleanup work in his series
   "mm: multi-gen LRU: improve".

 - Jiaqi Yan has provided some enhancements to our memory error
   statistics reporting, mainly by presenting the statistics on a
   per-node basis. See the series "Introduce per NUMA node memory error
   statistics".

 - Mel Gorman has a second and hopefully final shot at fixing a CPU-hog
   regression in compaction via his series "Fix excessive CPU usage
   during compaction".

 - Christoph Hellwig does some vmalloc maintenance work in the series
   "cleanup vfree and vunmap".

 - Christoph Hellwig has removed block_device_operations.rw_page() in
   ths series "remove ->rw_page".

 - We get some maple_tree improvements and cleanups in Liam Howlett's
   series "VMA tree type safety and remove __vma_adjust()".

 - Suren Baghdasaryan has done some work on the maintainability of our
   vm_flags handling in the series "introduce vm_flags modifier
   functions".

 - Some pagemap cleanup and generalization work in Mike Rapoport's
   series "mm, arch: add generic implementation of pfn_valid() for
   FLATMEM" and "fixups for generic implementation of pfn_valid()"

 - Baoquan He has done some work to make /proc/vmallocinfo and
   /proc/kcore better represent the real state of things in his series
   "mm/vmalloc.c: allow vread() to read out vm_map_ram areas".

 - Jason Gunthorpe rationalized the GUP system's interface to the rest
   of the kernel in the series "Simplify the external interface for
   GUP".

 - SeongJae Park wishes to migrate people from DAMON's debugfs interface
   over to its sysfs interface. To support this, we'll temporarily be
   printing warnings when people use the debugfs interface. See the
   series "mm/damon: deprecate DAMON debugfs interface".

 - Andrey Konovalov provided the accurately named "lib/stackdepot: fixes
   and clean-ups" series.

 - Huang Ying has provided a dramatic reduction in migration's TLB flush
   IPI rates with the series "migrate_pages(): batch TLB flushing".

 - Arnd Bergmann has some objtool fixups in "objtool warning fixes".

* tag 'mm-stable-2023-02-20-13-37' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (505 commits)
  include/linux/migrate.h: remove unneeded externs
  mm/memory_hotplug: cleanup return value handing in do_migrate_range()
  mm/uffd: fix comment in handling pte markers
  mm: change to return bool for isolate_movable_page()
  mm: hugetlb: change to return bool for isolate_hugetlb()
  mm: change to return bool for isolate_lru_page()
  mm: change to return bool for folio_isolate_lru()
  objtool: add UACCESS exceptions for __tsan_volatile_read/write
  kmsan: disable ftrace in kmsan core code
  kasan: mark addr_has_metadata __always_inline
  mm: memcontrol: rename memcg_kmem_enabled()
  sh: initialize max_mapnr
  m68k/nommu: add missing definition of ARCH_PFN_OFFSET
  mm: percpu: fix incorrect size in pcpu_obj_full_size()
  maple_tree: reduce stack usage with gcc-9 and earlier
  mm: page_alloc: call panic() when memoryless node allocation fails
  mm: multi-gen LRU: avoid futile retries
  migrate_pages: move THP/hugetlb migration support check to simplify code
  migrate_pages: batch flushing TLB
  migrate_pages: share more code between _unmap and _move
  ...
2023-02-23 17:09:35 -08:00
Suren Baghdasaryan
1c71222e5f mm: replace vma->vm_flags direct modifications with modifier calls
Replace direct modifications to vma->vm_flags with calls to modifier
functions to be able to track flag changes and to keep vma locking
correctness.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix drivers/misc/open-dice.c, per Hyeonggon Yoo]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230126193752.297968-5-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjun Roy <arjunroy@google.com>
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Cc: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@google.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Oskolkov <posk@google.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@bytedance.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-09 16:51:39 -08:00
Colin Ian King
98001fd63d mm/secretmem: remove redundant initiialization of pointer file
The pointer file is being initialized with a value that is never read, it
is being re-assigned later on.  Clean up code by removing the redundant
initialization.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230116164332.79500-1-colin.i.king@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.i.king@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foudation.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 22:33:21 -08:00
Christian Brauner
c1632a0f11
fs: port ->setattr() to pass mnt_idmap
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.

Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.

Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.

Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.

Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-01-19 09:24:02 +01:00
Xiu Jianfeng
f7c5b1aab5 mm/secretmem: remove reduntant return value
The return value @ret is always 0, so remove it and return 0 directly.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220920012205.246217-1-xiujianfeng@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-10-03 14:03:36 -07:00
Xiu Jianfeng
1ea41595f6 mm/secretmem: add __init annotation to secretmem_init()
It's a fs_initcall entry, add __init annotation to it.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915011602.176967-1-xiujianfeng@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-10-03 14:03:27 -07:00
Binyi Han
4eb5bbde3c mm: fix dereferencing possible ERR_PTR
Smatch checker complains that 'secretmem_mnt' dereferencing possible
ERR_PTR().  Let the function return if 'secretmem_mnt' is ERR_PTR, to
avoid deferencing it.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220904074647.GA64291@cloud-MacBookPro
Fixes: 1507f51255 ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas")
Signed-off-by: Binyi Han <dantengknight@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foudation.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Ammar Faizi <ammarfaizi2@gnuweeb.org>
Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-11 16:22:31 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
f00654007f Folio changes for 6.0
- Fix an accounting bug that made NR_FILE_DIRTY grow without limit
    when running xfstests
 
  - Convert more of mpage to use folios
 
  - Remove add_to_page_cache() and add_to_page_cache_locked()
 
  - Convert find_get_pages_range() to filemap_get_folios()
 
  - Improvements to the read_cache_page() family of functions
 
  - Remove a few unnecessary checks of PageError
 
  - Some straightforward filesystem conversions to use folios
 
  - Split PageMovable users out from address_space_operations into their
    own movable_operations
 
  - Convert aops->migratepage to aops->migrate_folio
 
  - Remove nobh support (Christoph Hellwig)
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Merge tag 'folio-6.0' of git://git.infradead.org/users/willy/pagecache

Pull folio updates from Matthew Wilcox:

 - Fix an accounting bug that made NR_FILE_DIRTY grow without limit
   when running xfstests

 - Convert more of mpage to use folios

 - Remove add_to_page_cache() and add_to_page_cache_locked()

 - Convert find_get_pages_range() to filemap_get_folios()

 - Improvements to the read_cache_page() family of functions

 - Remove a few unnecessary checks of PageError

 - Some straightforward filesystem conversions to use folios

 - Split PageMovable users out from address_space_operations into
   their own movable_operations

 - Convert aops->migratepage to aops->migrate_folio

 - Remove nobh support (Christoph Hellwig)

* tag 'folio-6.0' of git://git.infradead.org/users/willy/pagecache: (78 commits)
  fs: remove the NULL get_block case in mpage_writepages
  fs: don't call ->writepage from __mpage_writepage
  fs: remove the nobh helpers
  jfs: stop using the nobh helper
  ext2: remove nobh support
  ntfs3: refactor ntfs_writepages
  mm/folio-compat: Remove migration compatibility functions
  fs: Remove aops->migratepage()
  secretmem: Convert to migrate_folio
  hugetlb: Convert to migrate_folio
  aio: Convert to migrate_folio
  f2fs: Convert to filemap_migrate_folio()
  ubifs: Convert to filemap_migrate_folio()
  btrfs: Convert btrfs_migratepage to migrate_folio
  mm/migrate: Add filemap_migrate_folio()
  mm/migrate: Convert migrate_page() to migrate_folio()
  nfs: Convert to migrate_folio
  btrfs: Convert btree_migratepage to migrate_folio
  mm/migrate: Convert expected_page_refs() to folio_expected_refs()
  mm/migrate: Convert buffer_migrate_page() to buffer_migrate_folio()
  ...
2022-08-03 10:35:43 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
79802ada87 selinux/stable-6.0 PR 20220801
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20220801' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux

Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
 "A relatively small set of patches for SELinux this time, eight patches
  in total with really only one significant change.

  The highlights are:

   - Add support for proper labeling of memfd_secret anonymous inodes.

     This will allow LSMs that implement the anonymous inode hooks to
     apply security policy to memfd_secret() fds.

   - Various small improvements to memory management: fixed leaks, freed
     memory when needed, boundary checks.

   - Hardened the selinux_audit_data struct with __randomize_layout.

   - A minor documentation tweak to fix a formatting/style issue"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20220801' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: selinux_add_opt() callers free memory
  selinux: Add boundary check in put_entry()
  selinux: fix memleak in security_read_state_kernel()
  docs: selinux: add '=' signs to kernel boot options
  mm: create security context for memfd_secret inodes
  selinux: fix typos in comments
  selinux: drop unnecessary NULL check
  selinux: add __randomize_layout to selinux_audit_data
2022-08-02 14:51:47 -07:00
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)
5409548df3 secretmem: Convert to migrate_folio
This is little more than changing the types over; there's no real work
being done in this function.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
2022-08-02 12:34:04 -04:00
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)
81218f80a7 secretmem: Remove isolate_page
The isolate_page operation is never called for filesystems, only
for device drivers which call SetPageMovable.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
2022-08-02 12:34:03 -04:00
Mike Rapoport
84ac013046 secretmem: fix unhandled fault in truncate
syzkaller reports the following issue:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888021f7e005
PGD 11401067 P4D 11401067 PUD 11402067 PMD 21f7d063 PTE 800fffffde081060
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 3761 Comm: syz-executor281 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-syzkaller-00014-g941e3e791269 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10 arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S:64
Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000329fa90 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000001000 RCX: 0000000000000ffb
RDX: 0000000000000ffb RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888021f7e005
RBP: ffffea000087df80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888021f7e005
R10: ffffed10043efdff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: 0000000000000ffb
FS:  00007fb29d8b2700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffff888021f7e005 CR3: 0000000026e7b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 zero_user_segments include/linux/highmem.h:272 [inline]
 folio_zero_range include/linux/highmem.h:428 [inline]
 truncate_inode_partial_folio+0x76a/0xdf0 mm/truncate.c:237
 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x83b/0x1530 mm/truncate.c:381
 truncate_inode_pages mm/truncate.c:452 [inline]
 truncate_pagecache+0x63/0x90 mm/truncate.c:753
 simple_setattr+0xed/0x110 fs/libfs.c:535
 secretmem_setattr+0xae/0xf0 mm/secretmem.c:170
 notify_change+0xb8c/0x12b0 fs/attr.c:424
 do_truncate+0x13c/0x200 fs/open.c:65
 do_sys_ftruncate+0x536/0x730 fs/open.c:193
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x7fb29d900899
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 11 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fb29d8b2318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004d
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb29d988408 RCX: 00007fb29d900899
RDX: 00007fb29d900899 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fb29d988400 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fb29d98840c
R13: 00007ffca01a23bf R14: 00007fb29d8b2400 R15: 0000000000022000
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:
CR2: ffff888021f7e005
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Eric Biggers suggested that this happens when
secretmem_setattr()->simple_setattr() races with secretmem_fault() so that
a page that is faulted in by secretmem_fault() (and thus removed from the
direct map) is zeroed by inode truncation right afterwards.

Use mapping->invalidate_lock to make secretmem_fault() and
secretmem_setattr() mutually exclusive.

[rppt@linux.ibm.com: v3]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220714091337.412297-1-rppt@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220707165650.248088-1-rppt@kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+9bd2b7adbd34b30b87e4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-07-18 15:07:51 -07:00
Christian Göttsche
2bfe15c526 mm: create security context for memfd_secret inodes
Create a security context for the inodes created by memfd_secret(2) via
the LSM hook inode_init_security_anon to allow a fine grained control.
As secret memory areas can affect hibernation and have a global shared
limit access control might be desirable.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-06-13 14:15:23 -04:00
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)
6612ed24a2 secretmem: Convert to free_folio
Prepare for any size of folio, even though secretmem only uses order-0
folios for now.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
2022-05-09 23:12:53 -04:00
Axel Rasmussen
f9b141f936 mm/secretmem: fix panic when growing a memfd_secret
When one tries to grow an existing memfd_secret with ftruncate, one gets
a panic [1].  For example, doing the following reliably induces the
panic:

    fd = memfd_secret();

    ftruncate(fd, 10);
    ptr = mmap(NULL, 10, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
    strcpy(ptr, "123456789");

    munmap(ptr, 10);
    ftruncate(fd, 20);

The basic reason for this is, when we grow with ftruncate, we call down
into simple_setattr, and then truncate_inode_pages_range, and eventually
we try to zero part of the memory.  The normal truncation code does this
via the direct map (i.e., it calls page_address() and hands that to
memset()).

For memfd_secret though, we specifically don't map our pages via the
direct map (i.e.  we call set_direct_map_invalid_noflush() on every
fault).  So the address returned by page_address() isn't useful, and
when we try to memset() with it we panic.

This patch avoids the panic by implementing a custom setattr for
memfd_secret, which detects resizes specifically (setting the size for
the first time works just fine, since there are no existing pages to try
to zero), and rejects them with EINVAL.

One could argue growing should be supported, but I think that will
require a significantly more lengthy change.  So, I propose a minimal
fix for the benefit of stable kernels, and then perhaps to extend
memfd_secret to support growing in a separate patch.

[1]:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa0a889277028
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
  PGD afa01067 P4D afa01067 PUD 83f909067 PMD 83f8bf067 PTE 800ffffef6d88060
  Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 281 Comm: repro Not tainted 5.17.0-dbg-DEV #1
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:memset_erms+0x9/0x10
  Code: c1 e9 03 40 0f b6 f6 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 48 0f af c6 f3 48 ab 89 d1 f3 aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 f9 40 88 f0 48 89 d1 <f3> aa 4c 89 c8 c3 90 49 89 fa 40 0f b6 ce 48 b8 01 01 01 01 01 01
  RSP: 0018:ffffb932c09afbf0 EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffda63c4249dc0 RCX: 0000000000000fd8
  RDX: 0000000000000fd8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffa0a889277028
  RBP: ffffb932c09afc00 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: ffffa0a889277028
  R10: 0000000000020023 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffda63c4249dc0
  R13: ffffa0a890d70d98 R14: 0000000000000028 R15: 0000000000000fd8
  FS:  00007f7294899580(0000) GS:ffffa0af9bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: ffffa0a889277028 CR3: 0000000107ef6006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  Call Trace:
   ? zero_user_segments+0x82/0x190
   truncate_inode_partial_folio+0xd4/0x2a0
   truncate_inode_pages_range+0x380/0x830
   truncate_setsize+0x63/0x80
   simple_setattr+0x37/0x60
   notify_change+0x3d8/0x4d0
   do_sys_ftruncate+0x162/0x1d0
   __x64_sys_ftruncate+0x1c/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
  Modules linked in: xhci_pci xhci_hcd virtio_net net_failover failover virtio_blk virtio_balloon uhci_hcd ohci_pci ohci_hcd evdev ehci_pci ehci_hcd 9pnet_virtio 9p netfs 9pnet
  CR2: ffffa0a889277028

[lkp@intel.com: secretmem_iops can be static]
  Signed-off-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
[axelrasmussen@google.com: return EINVAL]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220324210909.1843814-1-axelrasmussen@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220412193023.279320-1-axelrasmussen@google.com
Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-15 14:49:54 -07:00
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)
46de8b9794 fs: Convert __set_page_dirty_no_writeback to noop_dirty_folio
This is a mechanical change.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com>
Acked-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com>
Tested-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com> # orangefs
Tested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> # afs
2022-03-16 13:37:05 -04:00
Kees Cook
855d44434f mm/secretmem: avoid letting secretmem_users drop to zero
Quoting Dmitry:
 "refcount_inc() needs to be done before fd_install(). After
  fd_install() finishes, the fd can be used by userspace and
  we can have secret data in memory before the refcount_inc().

  A straightforward misuse where a user will predict the returned
  fd in another thread before the syscall returns and will use it
  to store secret data is somewhat dubious because such a user just
  shoots themself in the foot.

  But a more interesting misuse would be to close the predicted fd
  and decrement the refcount before the corresponding refcount_inc,
  this way one can briefly drop the refcount to zero while there are
  other users of secretmem."

Move fd_install() after refcount_inc().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211021154046.880251-1-keescook@chromium.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CACT4Y+b1sW6-Hkn8HQYw_SsT7X3tp-CJNh2ci0wG3ZnQz9jjig@mail.gmail.com
Fixes: 9a436f8ff6 ("PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordy Zomer <jordy@pwning.systems>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-10-28 17:18:55 -07:00
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)
cb68543239 secretmem: Prevent secretmem_users from wrapping to zero
Commit 110860541f ("mm/secretmem: use refcount_t instead of atomic_t")
attempted to fix the problem of secretmem_users wrapping to zero and
allowing suspend once again.

But it was reverted in commit 87066fdd2e ("Revert 'mm/secretmem: use
refcount_t instead of atomic_t'") because of the problems it caused - a
refcount_t was not semantically the right type to use.

Instead prevent secretmem_users from wrapping to zero by forbidding new
users if the number of users has wrapped from positive to negative.
This stops a long way short of reaching the necessary 4 billion users
where it wraps to zero again, so there's no need to be clever with
special anti-wrap types or checking the return value from atomic_inc().

Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Jordy Zomer <jordy@pwning.systems>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-10-25 11:27:31 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
87066fdd2e Revert "mm/secretmem: use refcount_t instead of atomic_t"
This reverts commit 110860541f.

Converting the "secretmem_users" counter to a refcount is incorrect,
because a refcount is special in zero and can't just be incremented (but
a count of users is not, and "no users" is actually perfectly valid and
not a sign of a free'd resource).

Reported-by: syzbot+75639e6a0331cd61d3e2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Jordy Zomer <jordy@pwning.systems>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Cc: Jordy Zomer <jordy@jordyzomer.github.io>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-10-24 09:48:33 -10:00
Jordy Zomer
110860541f mm/secretmem: use refcount_t instead of atomic_t
When a secret memory region is active, memfd_secret disables hibernation.
One of the goals is to keep the secret data from being written to
persistent-storage.

It accomplishes this by maintaining a reference count to
`secretmem_users`.  Once this reference is held your system can not be
hibernated due to the check in `hibernation_available()`.  However,
because `secretmem_users` is of type `atomic_t`, reference counter
overflows are possible.

As you can see there's an `atomic_inc` for each `memfd` that is opened in
the `memfd_secret` syscall.  If a local attacker succeeds to open 2^32
memfd's, the counter will wrap around to 0.  This implies that you may
hibernate again, even though there are still regions of this secret
memory, thereby bypassing the security check.

In an attempt to fix this I have used `refcount_t` instead of `atomic_t`
which prevents reference counter overflows.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210820043339.2151352-1-jordy@pwning.systems
Signed-off-by: Jordy Zomer <jordy@pwning.systems>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Cc: Jordy Zomer <jordy@jordyzomer.github.io>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-08 11:50:24 -07:00
Mike Rapoport
af64237461 mm/secretmem: wire up ->set_page_dirty
Make secretmem up to date with the changes done in commit 0af573780b
("mm: require ->set_page_dirty to be explicitly wired up") so that
unconditional call to this method won't cause crashes.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210716063933.31633-1-rppt@kernel.org
Fixes: 0af573780b ("mm: require ->set_page_dirty to be explicitly wired up")
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-23 17:43:28 -07:00
Mike Rapoport
9a436f8ff6 PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation
snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially
will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings.

Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-6-rppt@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 11:48:21 -07:00
Mike Rapoport
1507f51255 mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory
areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not
only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well.

The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly
enable it at the boot time.

Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file
descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call.  The memory areas created
by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel
direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes
that have access to the file descriptor.

Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections:

* Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel
  attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks.  Seceretmem makes
  "simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the
  required complexity of the attack.  Along with other protections like
  the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which
  make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive
  for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work.
  Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing
  mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert
  a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents.  That
  takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most
  standard attacks.

* Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures.  Once the
  secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the
  kernel to be transmitted somewhere.  The secreremem pages cannot be
  accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP.

* Harden against exploited kernel flaws.  In order to access secretmem,
  a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and
  create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform
  secrets exfiltration using ptrace.

The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the
"traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise().  File
descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory
areas, it allows to seal the operations.  Besides, file descriptor based
memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the
userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU.  Andy Lutomirski says:

  "Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major
  work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without
  mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse."

memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to
memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more
secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to
the memory.  Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way
simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a
multiplexer or an overloaded syscall.  Moreover, the initial
implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from
memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to
begin with.  If there will be a need for code sharing between these
implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user
visible APIs.

The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess
primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory
areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the
follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that
belongs to the secret memory area.

Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the
kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user
would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel.

Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on
architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which
affects the system performance.  However, the original Kconfig text for
CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "...  can
improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e057
("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "...
although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling
evidence that it must be the only choice".  Hence, it is sufficient to
have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system
administrator to enable it at boot time.

Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid
accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page
migration.

Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed
RLIMIT_MEMLOCK.  Since these mappings are already locked independently
from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail
and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings.

However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like
long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed
by user space.  With default limits, there is no excessive use of
secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with
ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow
balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA.

A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is
freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page.

The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error
handling is omitted):

	fd = memfd_secret(0);
	ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE);
	ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
		   MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 11:48:21 -07:00