Commit Graph

427 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Oleg Nesterov
f7ec1cd5cc getrusage: use sig->stats_lock rather than lock_task_sighand()
lock_task_sighand() can trigger a hard lockup. If NR_CPUS threads call
getrusage() at the same time and the process has NR_THREADS, spin_lock_irq
will spin with irqs disabled O(NR_CPUS * NR_THREADS) time.

Change getrusage() to use sig->stats_lock, it was specifically designed
for this type of use. This way it runs lockless in the likely case.

TODO:
	- Change do_task_stat() to use sig->stats_lock too, then we can
	  remove spin_lock_irq(siglock) in wait_task_zombie().

	- Turn sig->stats_lock into seqcount_rwlock_t, this way the
	  readers in the slow mode won't exclude each other. See
	  https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230913154907.GA26210@redhat.com/

	- stats_lock has to disable irqs because ->siglock can be taken
	  in irq context, it would be very nice to change __exit_signal()
	  to avoid the siglock->stats_lock dependency.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240122155053.GA26214@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Dylan Hatch <dylanbhatch@google.com>
Tested-by: Dylan Hatch <dylanbhatch@google.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-02-07 21:20:32 -08:00
Oleg Nesterov
daa694e413 getrusage: move thread_group_cputime_adjusted() outside of lock_task_sighand()
Patch series "getrusage: use sig->stats_lock", v2.


This patch (of 2):

thread_group_cputime() does its own locking, we can safely shift
thread_group_cputime_adjusted() which does another for_each_thread loop
outside of ->siglock protected section.

This is also preparation for the next patch which changes getrusage() to
use stats_lock instead of siglock, thread_group_cputime() takes the same
lock.  With the current implementation recursive read_seqbegin_or_lock()
is fine, thread_group_cputime() can't enter the slow mode if the caller
holds stats_lock, yet this looks more safe and better performance-wise.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240122155023.GA26169@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240122155050.GA26205@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Dylan Hatch <dylanbhatch@google.com>
Tested-by: Dylan Hatch <dylanbhatch@google.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-02-07 21:20:32 -08:00
Helge Deller
793838138c prctl: Disable prctl(PR_SET_MDWE) on parisc
systemd-254 tries to use prctl(PR_SET_MDWE) for it's MemoryDenyWriteExecute
functionality, but fails on parisc which still needs executable stacks in
certain combinations of gcc/glibc/kernel.

Disable prctl(PR_SET_MDWE) by returning -EINVAL for now on parisc, until
userspace has catched up.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
Closes: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/29775
Tested-by: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/875y2jro9a.fsf@gentoo.org/
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.3+
2023-11-18 19:35:31 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
8f6f76a6a2 As usual, lots of singleton and doubleton patches all over the tree and
there's little I can say which isn't in the individual changelogs.
 
 The lengthier patch series are
 
 - "kdump: use generic functions to simplify crashkernel reservation in
   arch", from Baoquan He.  This is mainly cleanups and consolidation of
   the "crashkernel=" kernel parameter handling.
 
 - After much discussion, David Laight's "minmax: Relax type checks in
   min() and max()" is here.  Hopefully reduces some typecasting and the
   use of min_t() and max_t().
 
 - A group of patches from Oleg Nesterov which clean up and slightly fix
   our handling of reads from /proc/PID/task/...  and which remove
   task_struct.therad_group.
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Merge tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2023-11-02-14-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm

Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton:
 "As usual, lots of singleton and doubleton patches all over the tree
  and there's little I can say which isn't in the individual changelogs.

  The lengthier patch series are

   - 'kdump: use generic functions to simplify crashkernel reservation
     in arch', from Baoquan He. This is mainly cleanups and
     consolidation of the 'crashkernel=' kernel parameter handling

   - After much discussion, David Laight's 'minmax: Relax type checks in
     min() and max()' is here. Hopefully reduces some typecasting and
     the use of min_t() and max_t()

   - A group of patches from Oleg Nesterov which clean up and slightly
     fix our handling of reads from /proc/PID/task/... and which remove
     task_struct.thread_group"

* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2023-11-02-14-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (64 commits)
  scripts/gdb/vmalloc: disable on no-MMU
  scripts/gdb: fix usage of MOD_TEXT not defined when CONFIG_MODULES=n
  .mailmap: add address mapping for Tomeu Vizoso
  mailmap: update email address for Claudiu Beznea
  tools/testing/selftests/mm/run_vmtests.sh: lower the ptrace permissions
  .mailmap: map Benjamin Poirier's address
  scripts/gdb: add lx_current support for riscv
  ocfs2: fix a spelling typo in comment
  proc: test ProtectionKey in proc-empty-vm test
  proc: fix proc-empty-vm test with vsyscall
  fs/proc/base.c: remove unneeded semicolon
  do_io_accounting: use sig->stats_lock
  do_io_accounting: use __for_each_thread()
  ocfs2: replace BUG_ON() at ocfs2_num_free_extents() with ocfs2_error()
  ocfs2: fix a typo in a comment
  scripts/show_delta: add __main__ judgement before main code
  treewide: mark stuff as __ro_after_init
  fs: ocfs2: check status values
  proc: test /proc/${pid}/statm
  compiler.h: move __is_constexpr() to compiler.h
  ...
2023-11-02 20:53:31 -10:00
Florent Revest
24e41bf8a6 mm: add a NO_INHERIT flag to the PR_SET_MDWE prctl
This extends the current PR_SET_MDWE prctl arg with a bit to indicate that
the process doesn't want MDWE protection to propagate to children.

To implement this no-inherit mode, the tag in current->mm->flags must be
absent from MMF_INIT_MASK.  This means that the encoding for "MDWE but
without inherit" is different in the prctl than in the mm flags.  This
leads to a bit of bit-mangling in the prctl implementation.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230828150858.393570-6-revest@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Alexey Izbyshev <izbyshev@ispras.ru>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Ayush Jain <ayush.jain3@amd.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com>
Cc: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-10-06 14:44:11 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov
13b7bc60b5 getrusage: use __for_each_thread()
do/while_each_thread should be avoided when possible.

Plus this change allows to avoid lock_task_sighand(), we can use rcu
and/or sig->stats_lock instead.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230909172629.GA20454@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-10-04 10:41:57 -07:00
Oleg Nesterov
c7ac8231ac getrusage: add the "signal_struct *sig" local variable
No functional changes, cleanup/preparation.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230909172554.GA20441@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-10-04 10:41:57 -07:00
Miguel Ojeda
636e348353 prctl: move PR_GET_AUXV out of PR_MCE_KILL
Somehow PR_GET_AUXV got added into PR_MCE_KILL's switch when the patch was
applied [1].

Thus move it out of the switch, to the place the patch added it.

In the recently released v6.4 kernel some user could, in principle, be
already using this feature by mapping the right page and passing the
PR_GET_AUXV constant as a pointer:

    prctl(PR_MCE_KILL, PR_GET_AUXV, ...)

So this does change the behavior for users.  We could keep the bug since
the other subcases in PR_MCE_KILL (PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR and PR_MCE_KILL_SET)
do not overlap.

However, v6.4 may be recent enough (2 weeks old) that moving the lines
(rather than just adding a new case) does not break anybody?  Moreover,
the documentation in man-pages was just committed today [2].

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230708233344.361854-1-ojeda@kernel.org
Fixes: ddc65971bb ("prctl: add PR_GET_AUXV to copy auxv to userspace")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/d81864a7f7f43bca6afa2a09fc2e850e4050ab42.1680611394.git.josh@joshtriplett.org/ [1]
Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/docs/man-pages/man-pages.git/commit/?id=8cf0c06bfd3c2b219b044d4151c96f0da50af9ad [2]
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-07-17 12:53:21 -07:00
Andy Chiu
1fd96a3e9d
riscv: Add prctl controls for userspace vector management
This patch add two riscv-specific prctls, to allow usespace control the
use of vector unit:

 * PR_RISCV_V_SET_CONTROL: control the permission to use Vector at next,
   or all following execve for a thread. Turning off a thread's Vector
   live is not possible since libraries may have registered ifunc that
   may execute Vector instructions.
 * PR_RISCV_V_GET_CONTROL: get the same permission setting for the
   current thread, and the setting for following execve(s).

Signed-off-by: Andy Chiu <andy.chiu@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Greentime Hu <greentime.hu@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Vincent Chen <vincent.chen@sifive.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230605110724.21391-22-andy.chiu@sifive.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
2023-06-08 07:16:53 -07:00
David Hildenbrand
24139c07f4 mm/ksm: unmerge and clear VM_MERGEABLE when setting PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE=0
Patch series "mm/ksm: improve PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE=0 handling and cleanup
disabling KSM", v2.

(1) Make PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE=0 unmerge pages like setting MADV_UNMERGEABLE
does, (2) add a selftest for it and (3) factor out disabling of KSM from
s390/gmap code.


This patch (of 3):

Let's unmerge any KSM pages when setting PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE=0, and clear
the VM_MERGEABLE flag from all VMAs -- just like KSM would.  Of course,
only do that if we previously set PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE=1.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230422205420.30372-1-david@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230422205420.30372-2-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Roesch <shr@devkernel.io>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-05-02 17:21:49 -07:00
Stefan Roesch
d7597f59d1 mm: add new api to enable ksm per process
Patch series "mm: process/cgroup ksm support", v9.

So far KSM can only be enabled by calling madvise for memory regions.  To
be able to use KSM for more workloads, KSM needs to have the ability to be
enabled / disabled at the process / cgroup level.

Use case 1:
  The madvise call is not available in the programming language.  An
  example for this are programs with forked workloads using a garbage
  collected language without pointers.  In such a language madvise cannot
  be made available.

  In addition the addresses of objects get moved around as they are
  garbage collected.  KSM sharing needs to be enabled "from the outside"
  for these type of workloads.

Use case 2:
  The same interpreter can also be used for workloads where KSM brings
  no benefit or even has overhead.  We'd like to be able to enable KSM on
  a workload by workload basis.

Use case 3:
  With the madvise call sharing opportunities are only enabled for the
  current process: it is a workload-local decision.  A considerable number
  of sharing opportunities may exist across multiple workloads or jobs (if
  they are part of the same security domain).  Only a higler level entity
  like a job scheduler or container can know for certain if its running
  one or more instances of a job.  That job scheduler however doesn't have
  the necessary internal workload knowledge to make targeted madvise
  calls.

Security concerns:

  In previous discussions security concerns have been brought up.  The
  problem is that an individual workload does not have the knowledge about
  what else is running on a machine.  Therefore it has to be very
  conservative in what memory areas can be shared or not.  However, if the
  system is dedicated to running multiple jobs within the same security
  domain, its the job scheduler that has the knowledge that sharing can be
  safely enabled and is even desirable.

Performance:

  Experiments with using UKSM have shown a capacity increase of around 20%.

  Here are the metrics from an instagram workload (taken from a machine
  with 64GB main memory):

   full_scans: 445
   general_profit: 20158298048
   max_page_sharing: 256
   merge_across_nodes: 1
   pages_shared: 129547
   pages_sharing: 5119146
   pages_to_scan: 4000
   pages_unshared: 1760924
   pages_volatile: 10761341
   run: 1
   sleep_millisecs: 20
   stable_node_chains: 167
   stable_node_chains_prune_millisecs: 2000
   stable_node_dups: 2751
   use_zero_pages: 0
   zero_pages_sharing: 0

After the service is running for 30 minutes to an hour, 4 to 5 million
shared pages are common for this workload when using KSM.


Detailed changes:

1. New options for prctl system command
   This patch series adds two new options to the prctl system call. 
   The first one allows to enable KSM at the process level and the second
   one to query the setting.

The setting will be inherited by child processes.

With the above setting, KSM can be enabled for the seed process of a cgroup
and all processes in the cgroup will inherit the setting.

2. Changes to KSM processing
   When KSM is enabled at the process level, the KSM code will iterate
   over all the VMA's and enable KSM for the eligible VMA's.

   When forking a process that has KSM enabled, the setting will be
   inherited by the new child process.

3. Add general_profit metric
   The general_profit metric of KSM is specified in the documentation,
   but not calculated.  This adds the general profit metric to
   /sys/kernel/debug/mm/ksm.

4. Add more metrics to ksm_stat
   This adds the process profit metric to /proc/<pid>/ksm_stat.

5. Add more tests to ksm_tests and ksm_functional_tests
   This adds an option to specify the merge type to the ksm_tests. 
   This allows to test madvise and prctl KSM.

   It also adds a two new tests to ksm_functional_tests: one to test
   the new prctl options and the other one is a fork test to verify that
   the KSM process setting is inherited by client processes.


This patch (of 3):

So far KSM can only be enabled by calling madvise for memory regions.  To
be able to use KSM for more workloads, KSM needs to have the ability to be
enabled / disabled at the process / cgroup level.

1. New options for prctl system command

   This patch series adds two new options to the prctl system call.
   The first one allows to enable KSM at the process level and the second
   one to query the setting.

   The setting will be inherited by child processes.

   With the above setting, KSM can be enabled for the seed process of a
   cgroup and all processes in the cgroup will inherit the setting.

2. Changes to KSM processing

   When KSM is enabled at the process level, the KSM code will iterate
   over all the VMA's and enable KSM for the eligible VMA's.

   When forking a process that has KSM enabled, the setting will be
   inherited by the new child process.

  1) Introduce new MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY flag

     This introduces the new flag MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY flag.  When this flag
     is set, kernel samepage merging (ksm) gets enabled for all vma's of a
     process.

  2) Setting VM_MERGEABLE on VMA creation

     When a VMA is created, if the MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY flag is set, the
     VM_MERGEABLE flag will be set for this VMA.

  3) support disabling of ksm for a process

     This adds the ability to disable ksm for a process if ksm has been
     enabled for the process with prctl.

  4) add new prctl option to get and set ksm for a process

     This adds two new options to the prctl system call
     - enable ksm for all vmas of a process (if the vmas support it).
     - query if ksm has been enabled for a process.

3. Disabling MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY for storage keys in s390

   In the s390 architecture when storage keys are used, the
   MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY will be disabled.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230418051342.1919757-1-shr@devkernel.io
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230418051342.1919757-2-shr@devkernel.io
Signed-off-by: Stefan Roesch <shr@devkernel.io>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-04-21 14:52:03 -07:00
Josh Triplett
ddc65971bb prctl: add PR_GET_AUXV to copy auxv to userspace
If a library wants to get information from auxv (for instance,
AT_HWCAP/AT_HWCAP2), it has a few options, none of them perfectly reliable
or ideal:

- Be main or the pre-main startup code, and grub through the stack above
  main. Doesn't work for a library.
- Call libc getauxval. Not ideal for libraries that are trying to be
  libc-independent and/or don't otherwise require anything from other
  libraries.
- Open and read /proc/self/auxv. Doesn't work for libraries that may run
  in arbitrarily constrained environments that may not have /proc
  mounted (e.g. libraries that might be used by an init program or a
  container setup tool).
- Assume you're on the main thread and still on the original stack, and
  try to walk the stack upwards, hoping to find auxv. Extremely bad
  idea.
- Ask the caller to pass auxv in for you. Not ideal for a user-friendly
  library, and then your caller may have the same problem.

Add a prctl that copies current->mm->saved_auxv to a userspace buffer.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d81864a7f7f43bca6afa2a09fc2e850e4050ab42.1680611394.git.josh@joshtriplett.org
Signed-off-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-04-18 16:29:53 -07:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
659c0ce1cb kernel/sys.c: fix and improve control flow in __sys_setres[ug]id()
Linux Security Modules (LSMs) that implement the "capable" hook will
usually emit an access denial message to the audit log whenever they
"block" the current task from using the given capability based on their
security policy.

The occurrence of a denial is used as an indication that the given task
has attempted an operation that requires the given access permission, so
the callers of functions that perform LSM permission checks must take care
to avoid calling them too early (before it is decided if the permission is
actually needed to perform the requested operation).

The __sys_setres[ug]id() functions violate this convention by first
calling ns_capable_setid() and only then checking if the operation
requires the capability or not.  It means that any caller that has the
capability granted by DAC (task's capability set) but not by MAC (LSMs)
will generate a "denied" audit record, even if is doing an operation for
which the capability is not required.

Fix this by reordering the checks such that ns_capable_setid() is checked
last and -EPERM is returned immediately if it returns false.

While there, also do two small optimizations:
* move the capability check before prepare_creds() and
* bail out early in case of a no-op.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230217162154.837549-1-omosnace@redhat.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-04-18 14:22:12 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
3822a7c409 - Daniel Verkamp has contributed a memfd series ("mm/memfd: add
F_SEAL_EXEC") which permits the setting of the memfd execute bit at
   memfd creation time, with the option of sealing the state of the X bit.
 
 - Peter Xu adds a patch series ("mm/hugetlb: Make huge_pte_offset()
   thread-safe for pmd unshare") which addresses a rare race condition
   related to PMD unsharing.
 
 - Several folioification patch serieses from Matthew Wilcox, Vishal
   Moola, Sidhartha Kumar and Lorenzo Stoakes
 
 - Johannes Weiner has a series ("mm: push down lock_page_memcg()") which
   does perform some memcg maintenance and cleanup work.
 
 - SeongJae Park has added DAMOS filtering to DAMON, with the series
   "mm/damon/core: implement damos filter".  These filters provide users
   with finer-grained control over DAMOS's actions.  SeongJae has also done
   some DAMON cleanup work.
 
 - Kairui Song adds a series ("Clean up and fixes for swap").
 
 - Vernon Yang contributed the series "Clean up and refinement for maple
   tree".
 
 - Yu Zhao has contributed the "mm: multi-gen LRU: memcg LRU" series.  It
   adds to MGLRU an LRU of memcgs, to improve the scalability of global
   reclaim.
 
 - David Hildenbrand has added some userfaultfd cleanup work in the
   series "mm: uffd-wp + change_protection() cleanups".
 
 - Christoph Hellwig has removed the generic_writepages() library
   function in the series "remove generic_writepages".
 
 - Baolin Wang has performed some maintenance on the compaction code in
   his series "Some small improvements for compaction".
 
 - Sidhartha Kumar is doing some maintenance work on struct page in his
   series "Get rid of tail page fields".
 
 - David Hildenbrand contributed some cleanup, bugfixing and
   generalization of pte management and of pte debugging in his series "mm:
   support __HAVE_ARCH_PTE_SWP_EXCLUSIVE on all architectures with swap
   PTEs".
 
 - Mel Gorman and Neil Brown have removed the __GFP_ATOMIC allocation
   flag in the series "Discard __GFP_ATOMIC".
 
 - Sergey Senozhatsky has improved zsmalloc's memory utilization with his
   series "zsmalloc: make zspage chain size configurable".
 
 - Joey Gouly has added prctl() support for prohibiting the creation of
   writeable+executable mappings.  The previous BPF-based approach had
   shortcomings.  See "mm: In-kernel support for memory-deny-write-execute
   (MDWE)".
 
 - Waiman Long did some kmemleak cleanup and bugfixing in the series
   "mm/kmemleak: Simplify kmemleak_cond_resched() & fix UAF".
 
 - T.J.  Alumbaugh has contributed some MGLRU cleanup work in his series
   "mm: multi-gen LRU: improve".
 
 - Jiaqi Yan has provided some enhancements to our memory error
   statistics reporting, mainly by presenting the statistics on a per-node
   basis.  See the series "Introduce per NUMA node memory error
   statistics".
 
 - Mel Gorman has a second and hopefully final shot at fixing a CPU-hog
   regression in compaction via his series "Fix excessive CPU usage during
   compaction".
 
 - Christoph Hellwig does some vmalloc maintenance work in the series
   "cleanup vfree and vunmap".
 
 - Christoph Hellwig has removed block_device_operations.rw_page() in ths
   series "remove ->rw_page".
 
 - We get some maple_tree improvements and cleanups in Liam Howlett's
   series "VMA tree type safety and remove __vma_adjust()".
 
 - Suren Baghdasaryan has done some work on the maintainability of our
   vm_flags handling in the series "introduce vm_flags modifier functions".
 
 - Some pagemap cleanup and generalization work in Mike Rapoport's series
   "mm, arch: add generic implementation of pfn_valid() for FLATMEM" and
   "fixups for generic implementation of pfn_valid()"
 
 - Baoquan He has done some work to make /proc/vmallocinfo and
   /proc/kcore better represent the real state of things in his series
   "mm/vmalloc.c: allow vread() to read out vm_map_ram areas".
 
 - Jason Gunthorpe rationalized the GUP system's interface to the rest of
   the kernel in the series "Simplify the external interface for GUP".
 
 - SeongJae Park wishes to migrate people from DAMON's debugfs interface
   over to its sysfs interface.  To support this, we'll temporarily be
   printing warnings when people use the debugfs interface.  See the series
   "mm/damon: deprecate DAMON debugfs interface".
 
 - Andrey Konovalov provided the accurately named "lib/stackdepot: fixes
   and clean-ups" series.
 
 - Huang Ying has provided a dramatic reduction in migration's TLB flush
   IPI rates with the series "migrate_pages(): batch TLB flushing".
 
 - Arnd Bergmann has some objtool fixups in "objtool warning fixes".
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Merge tag 'mm-stable-2023-02-20-13-37' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm

Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton:

 - Daniel Verkamp has contributed a memfd series ("mm/memfd: add
   F_SEAL_EXEC") which permits the setting of the memfd execute bit at
   memfd creation time, with the option of sealing the state of the X
   bit.

 - Peter Xu adds a patch series ("mm/hugetlb: Make huge_pte_offset()
   thread-safe for pmd unshare") which addresses a rare race condition
   related to PMD unsharing.

 - Several folioification patch serieses from Matthew Wilcox, Vishal
   Moola, Sidhartha Kumar and Lorenzo Stoakes

 - Johannes Weiner has a series ("mm: push down lock_page_memcg()")
   which does perform some memcg maintenance and cleanup work.

 - SeongJae Park has added DAMOS filtering to DAMON, with the series
   "mm/damon/core: implement damos filter".

   These filters provide users with finer-grained control over DAMOS's
   actions. SeongJae has also done some DAMON cleanup work.

 - Kairui Song adds a series ("Clean up and fixes for swap").

 - Vernon Yang contributed the series "Clean up and refinement for maple
   tree".

 - Yu Zhao has contributed the "mm: multi-gen LRU: memcg LRU" series. It
   adds to MGLRU an LRU of memcgs, to improve the scalability of global
   reclaim.

 - David Hildenbrand has added some userfaultfd cleanup work in the
   series "mm: uffd-wp + change_protection() cleanups".

 - Christoph Hellwig has removed the generic_writepages() library
   function in the series "remove generic_writepages".

 - Baolin Wang has performed some maintenance on the compaction code in
   his series "Some small improvements for compaction".

 - Sidhartha Kumar is doing some maintenance work on struct page in his
   series "Get rid of tail page fields".

 - David Hildenbrand contributed some cleanup, bugfixing and
   generalization of pte management and of pte debugging in his series
   "mm: support __HAVE_ARCH_PTE_SWP_EXCLUSIVE on all architectures with
   swap PTEs".

 - Mel Gorman and Neil Brown have removed the __GFP_ATOMIC allocation
   flag in the series "Discard __GFP_ATOMIC".

 - Sergey Senozhatsky has improved zsmalloc's memory utilization with
   his series "zsmalloc: make zspage chain size configurable".

 - Joey Gouly has added prctl() support for prohibiting the creation of
   writeable+executable mappings.

   The previous BPF-based approach had shortcomings. See "mm: In-kernel
   support for memory-deny-write-execute (MDWE)".

 - Waiman Long did some kmemleak cleanup and bugfixing in the series
   "mm/kmemleak: Simplify kmemleak_cond_resched() & fix UAF".

 - T.J. Alumbaugh has contributed some MGLRU cleanup work in his series
   "mm: multi-gen LRU: improve".

 - Jiaqi Yan has provided some enhancements to our memory error
   statistics reporting, mainly by presenting the statistics on a
   per-node basis. See the series "Introduce per NUMA node memory error
   statistics".

 - Mel Gorman has a second and hopefully final shot at fixing a CPU-hog
   regression in compaction via his series "Fix excessive CPU usage
   during compaction".

 - Christoph Hellwig does some vmalloc maintenance work in the series
   "cleanup vfree and vunmap".

 - Christoph Hellwig has removed block_device_operations.rw_page() in
   ths series "remove ->rw_page".

 - We get some maple_tree improvements and cleanups in Liam Howlett's
   series "VMA tree type safety and remove __vma_adjust()".

 - Suren Baghdasaryan has done some work on the maintainability of our
   vm_flags handling in the series "introduce vm_flags modifier
   functions".

 - Some pagemap cleanup and generalization work in Mike Rapoport's
   series "mm, arch: add generic implementation of pfn_valid() for
   FLATMEM" and "fixups for generic implementation of pfn_valid()"

 - Baoquan He has done some work to make /proc/vmallocinfo and
   /proc/kcore better represent the real state of things in his series
   "mm/vmalloc.c: allow vread() to read out vm_map_ram areas".

 - Jason Gunthorpe rationalized the GUP system's interface to the rest
   of the kernel in the series "Simplify the external interface for
   GUP".

 - SeongJae Park wishes to migrate people from DAMON's debugfs interface
   over to its sysfs interface. To support this, we'll temporarily be
   printing warnings when people use the debugfs interface. See the
   series "mm/damon: deprecate DAMON debugfs interface".

 - Andrey Konovalov provided the accurately named "lib/stackdepot: fixes
   and clean-ups" series.

 - Huang Ying has provided a dramatic reduction in migration's TLB flush
   IPI rates with the series "migrate_pages(): batch TLB flushing".

 - Arnd Bergmann has some objtool fixups in "objtool warning fixes".

* tag 'mm-stable-2023-02-20-13-37' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (505 commits)
  include/linux/migrate.h: remove unneeded externs
  mm/memory_hotplug: cleanup return value handing in do_migrate_range()
  mm/uffd: fix comment in handling pte markers
  mm: change to return bool for isolate_movable_page()
  mm: hugetlb: change to return bool for isolate_hugetlb()
  mm: change to return bool for isolate_lru_page()
  mm: change to return bool for folio_isolate_lru()
  objtool: add UACCESS exceptions for __tsan_volatile_read/write
  kmsan: disable ftrace in kmsan core code
  kasan: mark addr_has_metadata __always_inline
  mm: memcontrol: rename memcg_kmem_enabled()
  sh: initialize max_mapnr
  m68k/nommu: add missing definition of ARCH_PFN_OFFSET
  mm: percpu: fix incorrect size in pcpu_obj_full_size()
  maple_tree: reduce stack usage with gcc-9 and earlier
  mm: page_alloc: call panic() when memoryless node allocation fails
  mm: multi-gen LRU: avoid futile retries
  migrate_pages: move THP/hugetlb migration support check to simplify code
  migrate_pages: batch flushing TLB
  migrate_pages: share more code between _unmap and _move
  ...
2023-02-23 17:09:35 -08:00
Joey Gouly
b507808ebc mm: implement memory-deny-write-execute as a prctl
Patch series "mm: In-kernel support for memory-deny-write-execute (MDWE)",
v2.

The background to this is that systemd has a configuration option called
MemoryDenyWriteExecute [2], implemented as a SECCOMP BPF filter.  Its aim
is to prevent a user task from inadvertently creating an executable
mapping that is (or was) writeable.  Since such BPF filter is stateless,
it cannot detect mappings that were previously writeable but subsequently
changed to read-only.  Therefore the filter simply rejects any
mprotect(PROT_EXEC).  The side-effect is that on arm64 with BTI support
(Branch Target Identification), the dynamic loader cannot change an ELF
section from PROT_EXEC to PROT_EXEC|PROT_BTI using mprotect().  For
libraries, it can resort to unmapping and re-mapping but for the main
executable it does not have a file descriptor.  The original bug report in
the Red Hat bugzilla - [3] - and subsequent glibc workaround for libraries
- [4].

This series adds in-kernel support for this feature as a prctl
PR_SET_MDWE, that is inherited on fork().  The prctl denies PROT_WRITE |
PROT_EXEC mappings.  Like the systemd BPF filter it also denies adding
PROT_EXEC to mappings.  However unlike the BPF filter it only denies it if
the mapping didn't previous have PROT_EXEC.  This allows to PROT_EXEC ->
PROT_EXEC | PROT_BTI with mprotect(), which is a problem with the BPF
filter.


This patch (of 2):

The aim of such policy is to prevent a user task from creating an
executable mapping that is also writeable.

An example of mmap() returning -EACCESS if the policy is enabled:

	mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);

Similarly, mprotect() would return -EACCESS below:

	addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
	mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC);

The BPF filter that systemd MDWE uses is stateless, and disallows
mprotect() with PROT_EXEC completely. This new prctl allows PROT_EXEC to
be enabled if it was already PROT_EXEC, which allows the following case:

	addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
	mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC | PROT_BTI);

where PROT_BTI enables branch tracking identification on arm64.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230119160344.54358-1-joey.gouly@arm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230119160344.54358-2-joey.gouly@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Co-developed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: nd <nd@arm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>
Cc: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
Cc: Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 22:33:24 -08:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman
7397906057 prlimit: do_prlimit needs to have a speculation check
do_prlimit() adds the user-controlled resource value to a pointer that
will subsequently be dereferenced.  In order to help prevent this
codepath from being used as a spectre "gadget" a barrier needs to be
added after checking the range.

Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com>
Tested-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-01-21 16:14:17 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
8adc0486f3 Random number generator updates for Linux 6.1-rc1.
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Merge tag 'random-6.1-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random

Pull random number generator updates from Jason Donenfeld:

 - Huawei reported that when they updated their kernel from 4.4 to
   something much newer, some userspace code they had broke, the culprit
   being the accidental removal of O_NONBLOCK from /dev/random way back
   in 5.6. It's been gone for over 2 years now and this is the first
   we've heard of it, but userspace breakage is userspace breakage, so
   O_NONBLOCK is now back.

 - Use randomness from hardware RNGs much more often during early boot,
   at the same interval that crng reseeds are done, from Dominik.

 - A semantic change in hardware RNG throttling, so that the hwrng
   framework can properly feed random.c with randomness from hardware
   RNGs that aren't specifically marked as creditable.

   A related patch coming to you via Herbert's hwrng tree depends on
   this one, not to compile, but just to function properly, so you may
   want to merge this PULL before that one.

 - A fix to clamp credited bits from the interrupts pool to the size of
   the pool sample. This is mainly just a theoretical fix, as it'd be
   pretty hard to exceed it in practice.

 - Oracle reported that InfiniBand TCP latency regressed by around
   10-15% after a change a few cycles ago made at the request of the RT
   folks, in which we hoisted a somewhat rare operation (1 in 1024
   times) out of the hard IRQ handler and into a workqueue, a pretty
   common and boring pattern.

   It turns out, though, that scheduling a worker from there has
   overhead of its own, whereas scheduling a timer on that same CPU for
   the next jiffy amortizes better and doesn't incur the same overhead.

   I also eliminated a cache miss by moving the work_struct (and
   subsequently, the timer_list) to below a critical cache line, so that
   the more critical members that are accessed on every hard IRQ aren't
   split between two cache lines.

 - The boot-time initialization of the RNG has been split into two
   approximate phases: what we can accomplish before timekeeping is
   possible and what we can accomplish after.

   This winds up being useful so that we can use RDRAND to seed the RNG
   before CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y systems initialize slabs, in
   addition to other early uses of randomness. The effect is that
   systems with RDRAND (or a bootloader seed) will never see any
   warnings at all when setting CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM=y. And
   kfence benefits from getting a better seed of its own.

 - Small systems without much entropy sometimes wind up putting some
   truncated serial number read from flash into hostname, so contribute
   utsname changes to the RNG, without crediting.

 - Add smaller batches to serve requests for smaller integers, and make
   use of them when people ask for random numbers bounded by a given
   compile-time constant. This has positive effects all over the tree,
   most notably in networking and kfence.

 - The original jitter algorithm intended (I believe) to schedule the
   timer for the next jiffy, not the next-next jiffy, yet it used
   mod_timer(jiffies + 1), which will fire on the next-next jiffy,
   instead of what I believe was intended, mod_timer(jiffies), which
   will fire on the next jiffy. So fix that.

 - Fix a comment typo, from William.

* tag 'random-6.1-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random:
  random: clear new batches when bringing new CPUs online
  random: fix typos in get_random_bytes() comment
  random: schedule jitter credit for next jiffy, not in two jiffies
  prandom: make use of smaller types in prandom_u32_max
  random: add 8-bit and 16-bit batches
  utsname: contribute changes to RNG
  random: use init_utsname() instead of utsname()
  kfence: use better stack hash seed
  random: split initialization into early step and later step
  random: use expired timer rather than wq for mixing fast pool
  random: avoid reading two cache lines on irq randomness
  random: clamp credited irq bits to maximum mixed
  random: throttle hwrng writes if no entropy is credited
  random: use hwgenerator randomness more frequently at early boot
  random: restore O_NONBLOCK support
2022-10-10 10:41:21 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
493ffd6605 ucounts: Split rlimit and ucount values and max values
After the ucount rlimit code was merged a bunch of small but
 siginificant bugs were found and fixed.  At the time it was realized
 that part of the problem was that while the ucount rlimits were very
 similar to the oridinary ucounts (in being nested counts with limits)
 the semantics were slightly different and the code would be less error
 prone if there was less sharing.  This is the long awaited cleanup
 that should hopefully keep things more comprehensible and less error
 prone for whoever needs to touch that code next.
 
 Alexey Gladkov (1):
       ucounts: Split rlimit and ucount values and max values
 
  fs/exec.c                      |  2 +-
  fs/proc/array.c                |  2 +-
  include/linux/user_namespace.h | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
  kernel/fork.c                  | 12 ++++++------
  kernel/sys.c                   |  2 +-
  kernel/ucount.c                | 34 +++++++++++++++-------------------
  kernel/user_namespace.c        | 10 +++++-----
  7 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
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Merge tag 'ucount-rlimits-cleanups-for-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace

Pull ucounts update from Eric Biederman:
 "Split rlimit and ucount values and max values

  After the ucount rlimit code was merged a bunch of small but
  siginificant bugs were found and fixed. At the time it was realized
  that part of the problem was that while the ucount rlimits were very
  similar to the oridinary ucounts (in being nested counts with limits)
  the semantics were slightly different and the code would be less error
  prone if there was less sharing.

  This is the long awaited cleanup that should hopefully keep things
  more comprehensible and less error prone for whoever needs to touch
  that code next"

* tag 'ucount-rlimits-cleanups-for-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  ucounts: Split rlimit and ucount values and max values
2022-10-09 16:24:05 -07:00
Jason A. Donenfeld
37608ba315 utsname: contribute changes to RNG
On some small machines with little entropy, a quasi-unique hostname is
sometimes a relevant factor. I've seen, for example, 8 character
alpha-numeric serial numbers. In addition, the time at which the hostname
is set is usually a decent measurement of how long early boot took. So,
call add_device_randomness() on new hostnames, which feeds its arguments
to the RNG in addition to a fresh cycle counter.

Low cost hooks like this never hurt and can only ever help, and since
this costs basically nothing for an operation that is never a fast path,
this is an overall easy win.

Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-09-29 21:37:27 +02:00
Alexey Gladkov
de399236e2 ucounts: Split rlimit and ucount values and max values
Since the semantics of maximum rlimit values are different, it would be
better not to mix ucount and rlimit values. This will prevent the error
of using inc_count/dec_ucount for rlimit parameters.

This patch also renames the functions to emphasize the lack of
connection between rlimit and ucount.

v3:
- Fix BUG:KASAN:use-after-free_in_dec_ucount.

v2:
- Fix the array-index-out-of-bounds that was found by the lkp project.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220518171730.l65lmnnjtnxnftpq@example.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2022-05-18 18:24:57 -05:00
Mark Brown
9e4ab6c891 arm64/sme: Implement vector length configuration prctl()s
As for SVE provide a prctl() interface which allows processes to
configure their SME vector length.

Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220419112247.711548-12-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2022-04-22 18:50:54 +01:00
Barret Rhoden
18c91bb2d8 prlimit: do not grab the tasklist_lock
Unnecessarily grabbing the tasklist_lock can be a scalability bottleneck
for workloads that also must grab the tasklist_lock for waiting,
killing, and cloning.

The tasklist_lock was grabbed to protect tsk->sighand from disappearing
(becoming NULL).  tsk->signal was already protected by holding a
reference to tsk.

update_rlimit_cpu() assumed tsk->sighand != NULL.  With this commit, it
attempts to lock_task_sighand().  However, this means that
update_rlimit_cpu() can fail.  This only happens when a task is exiting.
Note that during exec, sighand may *change*, but it will not be NULL.

Prior to this commit, the do_prlimit() ensured that update_rlimit_cpu()
would not fail by read locking the tasklist_lock and checking tsk->sighand
!= NULL.

If update_rlimit_cpu() fails, there may be other tasks that are not
exiting that share tsk->signal.  However, the group_leader is the last
task to be released, so if we cannot update_rlimit_cpu(group_leader),
then the entire process is exiting.

The only other caller of update_rlimit_cpu() is
selinux_bprm_committing_creds().  It has tsk == current, so
update_rlimit_cpu() cannot fail (current->sighand cannot disappear
until current exits).

This change resulted in a 14% speedup on a microbenchmark where parents
kill and wait on their children, and children getpriority, setpriority,
and getrlimit.

Signed-off-by: Barret Rhoden <brho@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220106172041.522167-4-brho@google.com
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2022-03-08 14:33:36 -06:00
Barret Rhoden
c57bef0287 prlimit: make do_prlimit() static
There are no other callers in the kernel.

Fixed up a comment format and whitespace issue when moving do_prlimit()
higher in sys.c.

Signed-off-by: Barret Rhoden <brho@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220106172041.522167-3-brho@google.com
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2022-03-08 14:33:36 -06:00
Suren Baghdasaryan
5c26f6ac94 mm: refactor vm_area_struct::anon_vma_name usage code
Avoid mixing strings and their anon_vma_name referenced pointers by
using struct anon_vma_name whenever possible.  This simplifies the code
and allows easier sharing of anon_vma_name structures when they
represent the same name.

[surenb@google.com: fix comment]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220223153613.835563-1-surenb@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220224231834.1481408-1-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Suggested-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Suggested-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Cc: Chris Hyser <chris.hyser@oracle.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Xiaofeng Cao <caoxiaofeng@yulong.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-03-05 11:08:32 -08:00
Eric W. Biederman
c923a8e7ed ucounts: Move RLIMIT_NPROC handling after set_user
During set*id() which cred->ucounts to charge the the current process
to is not known until after set_cred_ucounts.  So move the
RLIMIT_NPROC checking into a new helper flag_nproc_exceeded and call
flag_nproc_exceeded after set_cred_ucounts.

This is very much an arbitrary subset of the places where we currently
change the RLIMIT_NPROC accounting, designed to preserve the existing
logic.

Fixing the existing logic will be the subject of another series of
changes.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220216155832.680775-4-ebiederm@xmission.com
Fixes: 21d1c5e386 ("Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2022-02-17 09:11:26 -06:00
Eric W. Biederman
c16bdeb5a3 rlimit: Fix RLIMIT_NPROC enforcement failure caused by capability calls in set_user
Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> wrote:
> I'm not aware of anyone actually running into this issue and reporting
> it.  The systems that I personally know use suexec along with rlimits
> still run older/distro kernels, so would not yet be affected.
>
> So my mention was based on my understanding of how suexec works, and
> code review.  Specifically, Apache httpd has the setting RLimitNPROC,
> which makes it set RLIMIT_NPROC:
>
> https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/mod/core.html#rlimitnproc
>
> The above documentation for it includes:
>
> "This applies to processes forked from Apache httpd children servicing
> requests, not the Apache httpd children themselves. This includes CGI
> scripts and SSI exec commands, but not any processes forked from the
> Apache httpd parent, such as piped logs."
>
> In code, there are:
>
> ./modules/generators/mod_cgid.c:        ( (cgid_req.limits.limit_nproc_set) && ((rc = apr_procattr_limit_set(procattr, APR_LIMIT_NPROC,
> ./modules/generators/mod_cgi.c:        ((rc = apr_procattr_limit_set(procattr, APR_LIMIT_NPROC,
> ./modules/filters/mod_ext_filter.c:    rv = apr_procattr_limit_set(procattr, APR_LIMIT_NPROC, conf->limit_nproc);
>
> For example, in mod_cgi.c this is in run_cgi_child().
>
> I think this means an httpd child sets RLIMIT_NPROC shortly before it
> execs suexec, which is a SUID root program.  suexec then switches to the
> target user and execs the CGI script.
>
> Before 2863643fb8, the setuid() in suexec would set the flag, and the
> target user's process count would be checked against RLIMIT_NPROC on
> execve().  After 2863643fb8, the setuid() in suexec wouldn't set the
> flag because setuid() is (naturally) called when the process is still
> running as root (thus, has those limits bypass capabilities), and
> accordingly execve() would not check the target user's process count
> against RLIMIT_NPROC.

In commit 2863643fb8 ("set_user: add capability check when
rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) exceeds") capable calls were added to set_user to
make it more consistent with fork.  Unfortunately because of call site
differences those capable calls were checking the credentials of the
user before set*id() instead of after set*id().

This breaks enforcement of RLIMIT_NPROC for applications that set the
rlimit and then call set*id() while holding a full set of
capabilities.  The capabilities are only changed in the new credential
in security_task_fix_setuid().

The code in apache suexec appears to follow this pattern.

Commit 909cc4ae86f3 ("[PATCH] Fix two bugs with process limits
(RLIMIT_NPROC)") where this check was added describes the targes of this
capability check as:

  2/ When a root-owned process (e.g. cgiwrap) sets up process limits and then
      calls setuid, the setuid should fail if the user would then be running
      more than rlim_cur[RLIMIT_NPROC] processes, but it doesn't.  This patch
      adds an appropriate test.  With this patch, and per-user process limit
      imposed in cgiwrap really works.

So the original use case of this check also appears to match the broken
pattern.

Restore the enforcement of RLIMIT_NPROC by removing the bad capable
checks added in set_user.  This unfortunately restores the
inconsistent state the code has been in for the last 11 years, but
dealing with the inconsistencies looks like a larger problem.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210907213042.GA22626@openwall.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220212221412.GA29214@openwall.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220216155832.680775-1-ebiederm@xmission.com
Fixes: 2863643fb8 ("set_user: add capability check when rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) exceeds")
History-Tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
Reviewed-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2022-02-17 09:08:05 -06:00
Linus Torvalds
f4484d138b Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)
Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:
 "55 patches.

  Subsystems affected by this patch series: percpu, procfs, sysctl,
  misc, core-kernel, get_maintainer, lib, checkpatch, binfmt, nilfs2,
  hfs, fat, adfs, panic, delayacct, kconfig, kcov, and ubsan"

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (55 commits)
  lib: remove redundant assignment to variable ret
  ubsan: remove CONFIG_UBSAN_OBJECT_SIZE
  kcov: fix generic Kconfig dependencies if ARCH_WANTS_NO_INSTR
  lib/Kconfig.debug: make TEST_KMOD depend on PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_256KB
  btrfs: use generic Kconfig option for 256kB page size limit
  arch/Kconfig: split PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_256KB from PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_64KB
  configs: introduce debug.config for CI-like setup
  delayacct: track delays from memory compact
  Documentation/accounting/delay-accounting.rst: add thrashing page cache and direct compact
  delayacct: cleanup flags in struct task_delay_info and functions use it
  delayacct: fix incomplete disable operation when switch enable to disable
  delayacct: support swapin delay accounting for swapping without blkio
  panic: remove oops_id
  panic: use error_report_end tracepoint on warnings
  fs/adfs: remove unneeded variable make code cleaner
  FAT: use io_schedule_timeout() instead of congestion_wait()
  hfsplus: use struct_group_attr() for memcpy() region
  nilfs2: remove redundant pointer sbufs
  fs/binfmt_elf: use PT_LOAD p_align values for static PIE
  const_structs.checkpatch: add frequently used ops structs
  ...
2022-01-20 10:41:01 +02:00
Davidlohr Bueso
7f8ca0edfe kernel/sys.c: only take tasklist_lock for get/setpriority(PRIO_PGRP)
PRIO_PGRP needs the tasklist_lock mainly to serialize vs setpgid(2), to
protect against any concurrent change_pid(PIDTYPE_PGID) that can move
the task from one hlist to another while iterating.

However, the remaining can only rely only on RCU:

PRIO_PROCESS only does the task lookup and never iterates over tasklist
and we already have an rcu-aware stable pointer.

PRIO_USER is already racy vs setuid(2) so with creds being rcu
protected, we can end up seeing stale data.  When removing the
tasklist_lock there can be a race with (i) fork but this is benign as
the child's nice is inherited and the new task is not observable by the
user yet either, hence the return semantics do not differ.  And (ii) a
race with exit, which is a small window and can cause us to miss a task
which was removed from the list and it had the highest nice.

Similarly change the buggy do_each_thread/while_each_thread combo in
PRIO_USER for the rcu-safe for_each_process_thread flavor, which doesn't
make use of next_thread/p->thread_group.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211210182250.43734-1-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-20 08:52:53 +02:00
Colin Cross
9a10064f56 mm: add a field to store names for private anonymous memory
In many userspace applications, and especially in VM based applications
like Android uses heavily, there are multiple different allocators in
use.  At a minimum there is libc malloc and the stack, and in many cases
there are libc malloc, the stack, direct syscalls to mmap anonymous
memory, and multiple VM heaps (one for small objects, one for big
objects, etc.).  Each of these layers usually has its own tools to
inspect its usage; malloc by compiling a debug version, the VM through
heap inspection tools, and for direct syscalls there is usually no way
to track them.

On Android we heavily use a set of tools that use an extended version of
the logic covered in Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt to walk all pages
mapped in userspace and slice their usage by process, shared (COW) vs.
unique mappings, backing, etc.  This can account for real physical
memory usage even in cases like fork without exec (which Android uses
heavily to share as many private COW pages as possible between
processes), Kernel SamePage Merging, and clean zero pages.  It produces
a measurement of the pages that only exist in that process (USS, for
unique), and a measurement of the physical memory usage of that process
with the cost of shared pages being evenly split between processes that
share them (PSS).

If all anonymous memory is indistinguishable then figuring out the real
physical memory usage (PSS) of each heap requires either a pagemap
walking tool that can understand the heap debugging of every layer, or
for every layer's heap debugging tools to implement the pagemap walking
logic, in which case it is hard to get a consistent view of memory
across the whole system.

Tracking the information in userspace leads to all sorts of problems.
It either needs to be stored inside the process, which means every
process has to have an API to export its current heap information upon
request, or it has to be stored externally in a filesystem that somebody
needs to clean up on crashes.  It needs to be readable while the process
is still running, so it has to have some sort of synchronization with
every layer of userspace.  Efficiently tracking the ranges requires
reimplementing something like the kernel vma trees, and linking to it
from every layer of userspace.  It requires more memory, more syscalls,
more runtime cost, and more complexity to separately track regions that
the kernel is already tracking.

This patch adds a field to /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps to show a
userspace-provided name for anonymous vmas.  The names of named
anonymous vmas are shown in /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps as
[anon:<name>].

Userspace can set the name for a region of memory by calling

   prctl(PR_SET_VMA, PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME, start, len, (unsigned long)name)

Setting the name to NULL clears it.  The name length limit is 80 bytes
including NUL-terminator and is checked to contain only printable ascii
characters (including space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.

Ascii strings are being used to have a descriptive identifiers for vmas,
which can be understood by the users reading /proc/pid/maps or
/proc/pid/smaps.  Names can be standardized for a given system and they
can include some variable parts such as the name of the allocator or a
library, tid of the thread using it, etc.

The name is stored in a pointer in the shared union in vm_area_struct
that points to a null terminated string.  Anonymous vmas with the same
name (equivalent strings) and are otherwise mergeable will be merged.
The name pointers are not shared between vmas even if they contain the
same name.  The name pointer is stored in a union with fields that are
only used on file-backed mappings, so it does not increase memory usage.

CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME kernel configuration is introduced to enable this
feature.  It keeps the feature disabled by default to prevent any
additional memory overhead and to avoid confusing procfs parsers on
systems which are not ready to support named anonymous vmas.

The patch is based on the original patch developed by Colin Cross, more
specifically on its latest version [1] posted upstream by Sumit Semwal.
It used a userspace pointer to store vma names.  In that design, name
pointers could be shared between vmas.  However during the last
upstreaming attempt, Kees Cook raised concerns [2] about this approach
and suggested to copy the name into kernel memory space, perform
validity checks [3] and store as a string referenced from
vm_area_struct.

One big concern is about fork() performance which would need to strdup
anonymous vma names.  Dave Hansen suggested experimenting with
worst-case scenario of forking a process with 64k vmas having longest
possible names [4].  I ran this experiment on an ARM64 Android device
and recorded a worst-case regression of almost 40% when forking such a
process.

This regression is addressed in the followup patch which replaces the
pointer to a name with a refcounted structure that allows sharing the
name pointer between vmas of the same name.  Instead of duplicating the
string during fork() or when splitting a vma it increments the refcount.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200901161459.11772-4-sumit.semwal@linaro.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031031.D32EF57ED@keescook/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031022.3834F692@keescook/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/5d0358ab-8c47-2f5f-8e43-23b89d6a8e95@intel.com/

Changes for prctl(2) manual page (in the options section):

PR_SET_VMA
	Sets an attribute specified in arg2 for virtual memory areas
	starting from the address specified in arg3 and spanning the
	size specified	in arg4. arg5 specifies the value of the attribute
	to be set. Note that assigning an attribute to a virtual memory
	area might prevent it from being merged with adjacent virtual
	memory areas due to the difference in that attribute's value.

	Currently, arg2 must be one of:

	PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME
		Set a name for anonymous virtual memory areas. arg5 should
		be a pointer to a null-terminated string containing the
		name. The name length including null byte cannot exceed
		80 bytes. If arg5 is NULL, the name of the appropriate
		anonymous virtual memory areas will be reset. The name
		can contain only printable ascii characters (including
                space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.

                This feature is available only if the kernel is built with
                the CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME option enabled.

[surenb@google.com: docs: proc.rst: /proc/PID/maps: fix malformed table]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211123185928.2513763-1-surenb@google.com
[surenb: rebased over v5.15-rc6, replaced userpointer with a kernel copy,
 added input sanitization and CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME config. The bulk of the
 work here was done by Colin Cross, therefore, with his permission, keeping
 him as the author]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211019215511.3771969-2-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-15 16:30:27 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
2d338201d5 Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)
Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:
 "147 patches, based on 7d2a07b769.

  Subsystems affected by this patch series: mm (memory-hotplug, rmap,
  ioremap, highmem, cleanups, secretmem, kfence, damon, and vmscan),
  alpha, percpu, procfs, misc, core-kernel, MAINTAINERS, lib,
  checkpatch, epoll, init, nilfs2, coredump, fork, pids, criu, kconfig,
  selftests, ipc, and scripts"

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (94 commits)
  scripts: check_extable: fix typo in user error message
  mm/workingset: correct kernel-doc notations
  ipc: replace costly bailout check in sysvipc_find_ipc()
  selftests/memfd: remove unused variable
  Kconfig.debug: drop selecting non-existing HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH
  configs: remove the obsolete CONFIG_INPUT_POLLDEV
  prctl: allow to setup brk for et_dyn executables
  pid: cleanup the stale comment mentioning pidmap_init().
  kernel/fork.c: unexport get_{mm,task}_exe_file
  coredump: fix memleak in dump_vma_snapshot()
  fs/coredump.c: log if a core dump is aborted due to changed file permissions
  nilfs2: use refcount_dec_and_lock() to fix potential UAF
  nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_delete_snapshot_group
  nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_create_snapshot_group
  nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_delete_##name##_group
  nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_create_##name##_group
  nilfs2: fix NULL pointer in nilfs_##name##_attr_release
  nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_create_device_group
  trap: cleanup trap_init()
  init: move usermodehelper_enable() to populate_rootfs()
  ...
2021-09-08 12:55:35 -07:00
Cyrill Gorcunov
e1fbbd0731 prctl: allow to setup brk for et_dyn executables
Keno Fischer reported that when a binray loaded via ld-linux-x the
prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP) doesn't allow to setup brk value because it lays
before mm:end_data.

For example a test program shows

 | # ~/t
 |
 | start_code      401000
 | end_code        401a15
 | start_stack     7ffce4577dd0
 | start_data	   403e10
 | end_data        40408c
 | start_brk	   b5b000
 | sbrk(0)         b5b000

and when executed via ld-linux

 | # /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 ~/t
 |
 | start_code      7fc25b0a4000
 | end_code        7fc25b0c4524
 | start_stack     7fffcc6b2400
 | start_data	   7fc25b0ce4c0
 | end_data        7fc25b0cff98
 | start_brk	   55555710c000
 | sbrk(0)         55555710c000

This of course prevent criu from restoring such programs.  Looking into
how kernel operates with brk/start_brk inside brk() syscall I don't see
any problem if we allow to setup brk/start_brk without checking for
end_data.  Even if someone pass some weird address here on a purpose then
the worst possible result will be an unexpected unmapping of existing vma
(own vma, since prctl works with the callers memory) but test for
RLIMIT_DATA is still valid and a user won't be able to gain more memory in
case of expanding VMAs via new values shipped with prctl call.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210121221207.GB2174@grain
Fixes: bbdc6076d2 ("binfmt_elf: move brk out of mmap when doing direct loader exec")
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Keno Fischer <keno@juliacomputing.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <alexander.mikhalitsyn@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-08 11:50:28 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
49624efa65 Merge tag 'denywrite-for-5.15' of git://github.com/davidhildenbrand/linux
Pull MAP_DENYWRITE removal from David Hildenbrand:
 "Remove all in-tree usage of MAP_DENYWRITE from the kernel and remove
  VM_DENYWRITE.

  There are some (minor) user-visible changes:

   - We no longer deny write access to shared libaries loaded via legacy
     uselib(); this behavior matches modern user space e.g. dlopen().

   - We no longer deny write access to the elf interpreter after exec
     completed, treating it just like shared libraries (which it often
     is).

   - We always deny write access to the file linked via /proc/pid/exe:
     sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE) will fail if write access to the
     file cannot be denied, and write access to the file will remain
     denied until the link is effectivel gone (exec, termination,
     sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE)) -- just as if exec'ing the file.

  Cross-compiled for a bunch of architectures (alpha, microblaze, i386,
  s390x, ...) and verified via ltp that especially the relevant tests
  (i.e., creat07 and execve04) continue working as expected"

* tag 'denywrite-for-5.15' of git://github.com/davidhildenbrand/linux:
  fs: update documentation of get_write_access() and friends
  mm: ignore MAP_DENYWRITE in ksys_mmap_pgoff()
  mm: remove VM_DENYWRITE
  binfmt: remove in-tree usage of MAP_DENYWRITE
  kernel/fork: always deny write access to current MM exe_file
  kernel/fork: factor out replacing the current MM exe_file
  binfmt: don't use MAP_DENYWRITE when loading shared libraries via uselib()
2021-09-04 11:35:47 -07:00
David Hildenbrand
35d7bdc860 kernel/fork: factor out replacing the current MM exe_file
Let's factor the main logic out into replace_mm_exe_file(), such that
all mm->exe_file logic is contained in kernel/fork.c.

While at it, perform some simple cleanups that are possible now that
we're simplifying the individual functions.

Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
2021-09-03 18:42:01 +02:00
Ran Xiaokai
2863643fb8
set_user: add capability check when rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) exceeds
in copy_process(): non root users but with capability CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
or CAP_SYS_ADMIN will clean PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED flag even
rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) exceeds. Add the same capability check logic here.

Align the permission checks in copy_process() and set_user(). In
copy_process() CAP_SYS_RESOURCE or CAP_SYS_ADMIN capable users will be
able to circumvent and clear the PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED flag whereas they
aren't able to the same in set_user(). There's no obvious logic to this
and trying to unearth the reason in the thread didn't go anywhere.

The gist seems to be that this code wants to make sure that a program
can't successfully exec if it has gone through a set*id() transition
while exceeding its RLIMIT_NPROC.
A capable but non-INIT_USER caller getting PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED set during
a set*id() transition wouldn't be able to exec right away if they still
exceed their RLIMIT_NPROC at the time of exec. So their exec would fail
in fs/exec.c:

        if ((current->flags & PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED) &&
            is_ucounts_overlimit(current_ucounts(), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC))) {
                retval = -EAGAIN;
                goto out_ret;
        }

However, if the caller were to fork() right after the set*id()
transition but before the exec while still exceeding their RLIMIT_NPROC
then they would get PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED cleared (while the child would
inherit it):

        retval = -EAGAIN;
        if (is_ucounts_overlimit(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC))) {
                if (p->real_cred->user != INIT_USER &&
                    !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
                        goto bad_fork_free;
        }
        current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;

which means a subsequent exec by the capable caller would now succeed
even though they could still exceed their RLIMIT_NPROC limit. This seems
inconsistent. Allow a CAP_SYS_ADMIN or CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capable user to
avoid PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED as they already can in copy_process().

Cc: peterz@infradead.org, tglx@linutronix.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ran Xiaokai <ran.xiaokai@zte.com.cn>, , ,

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210728072629.530435-1-ran.xiaokai@zte.com.cn
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ran Xiaokai <ran.xiaokai@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-08-12 14:54:25 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
c54b245d01 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull user namespace rlimit handling update from Eric Biederman:
 "This is the work mainly by Alexey Gladkov to limit rlimits to the
  rlimits of the user that created a user namespace, and to allow users
  to have stricter limits on the resources created within a user
  namespace."

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  cred: add missing return error code when set_cred_ucounts() failed
  ucounts: Silence warning in dec_rlimit_ucounts
  ucounts: Set ucount_max to the largest positive value the type can hold
  kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces
  Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts
  Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts
  Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts
  Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
  Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
  Add a reference to ucounts for each cred
  Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t
2021-06-28 20:39:26 -07:00
Chris Hyser
7ac592aa35 sched: prctl() core-scheduling interface
This patch provides support for setting and copying core scheduling
'task cookies' between threads (PID), processes (TGID), and process
groups (PGID).

The value of core scheduling isn't that tasks don't share a core,
'nosmt' can do that. The value lies in exploiting all the sharing
opportunities that exist to recover possible lost performance and that
requires a degree of flexibility in the API.

From a security perspective (and there are others), the thread,
process and process group distinction is an existent hierarchal
categorization of tasks that reflects many of the security concerns
about 'data sharing'. For example, protecting against cache-snooping
by a thread that can just read the memory directly isn't all that
useful.

With this in mind, subcommands to CREATE/SHARE (TO/FROM) provide a
mechanism to create and share cookies. CREATE/SHARE_TO specify a
target pid with enum pidtype used to specify the scope of the targeted
tasks. For example, PIDTYPE_TGID will share the cookie with the
process and all of it's threads as typically desired in a security
scenario.

API:

  prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE, PR_SCHED_CORE_GET, tgtpid, pidtype, &cookie)
  prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE, PR_SCHED_CORE_CREATE, tgtpid, pidtype, NULL)
  prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE, PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_TO, tgtpid, pidtype, NULL)
  prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE, PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_FROM, srcpid, pidtype, NULL)

where 'tgtpid/srcpid == 0' implies the current process and pidtype is
kernel enum pid_type {PIDTYPE_PID, PIDTYPE_TGID, PIDTYPE_PGID, ...}.

For return values, EINVAL, ENOMEM are what they say. ESRCH means the
tgtpid/srcpid was not found. EPERM indicates lack of PTRACE permission
access to tgtpid/srcpid. ENODEV indicates your machines lacks SMT.

[peterz: complete rewrite]
Signed-off-by: Chris Hyser <chris.hyser@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Don Hiatt <dhiatt@digitalocean.com>
Tested-by: Hongyu Ning <hongyu.ning@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210422123309.039845339@infradead.org
2021-05-12 11:43:31 +02:00
Xiaofeng Cao
5afe69c2cc kernel/sys.c: fix typo
change 'infite'     to 'infinite'
change 'concurent'  to 'concurrent'
change 'memvers'    to 'members'
change 'decendants' to 'descendants'
change 'argumets'   to 'arguments'

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210316112904.10661-1-cxfcosmos@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xiaofeng Cao <caoxiaofeng@yulong.com>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-05-07 00:26:34 -07:00
Alexey Gladkov
21d1c5e386 Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
The rlimit counter is tied to uid in the user_namespace. This allows
rlimit values to be specified in userns even if they are already
globally exceeded by the user. However, the value of the previous
user_namespaces cannot be exceeded.

To illustrate the impact of rlimits, let's say there is a program that
does not fork. Some service-A wants to run this program as user X in
multiple containers. Since the program never fork the service wants to
set RLIMIT_NPROC=1.

service-A
 \- program (uid=1000, container1, rlimit_nproc=1)
 \- program (uid=1000, container2, rlimit_nproc=1)

The service-A sets RLIMIT_NPROC=1 and runs the program in container1.
When the service-A tries to run a program with RLIMIT_NPROC=1 in
container2 it fails since user X already has one running process.

We cannot use existing inc_ucounts / dec_ucounts because they do not
allow us to exceed the maximum for the counter. Some rlimits can be
overlimited by root or if the user has the appropriate capability.

Changelog

v11:
* Change inc_rlimit_ucounts() which now returns top value of ucounts.
* Drop inc_rlimit_ucounts_and_test() because the return code of
  inc_rlimit_ucounts() can be checked.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/c5286a8aa16d2d698c222f7532f3d735c82bc6bc.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-04-30 14:14:01 -05:00
Alexey Gladkov
905ae01c4a Add a reference to ucounts for each cred
For RLIMIT_NPROC and some other rlimits the user_struct that holds the
global limit is kept alive for the lifetime of a process by keeping it
in struct cred. Adding a pointer to ucounts in the struct cred will
allow to track RLIMIT_NPROC not only for user in the system, but for
user in the user_namespace.

Updating ucounts may require memory allocation which may fail. So, we
cannot change cred.ucounts in the commit_creds() because this function
cannot fail and it should always return 0. For this reason, we modify
cred.ucounts before calling the commit_creds().

Changelog

v6:
* Fix null-ptr-deref in is_ucounts_overlimit() detected by trinity. This
  error was caused by the fact that cred_alloc_blank() left the ucounts
  pointer empty.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b37aaef28d8b9b0d757e07ba6dd27281bbe39259.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-04-30 14:14:00 -05:00
Peter Collingbourne
201698626f arm64: Introduce prctl(PR_PAC_{SET,GET}_ENABLED_KEYS)
This change introduces a prctl that allows the user program to control
which PAC keys are enabled in a particular task. The main reason
why this is useful is to enable a userspace ABI that uses PAC to
sign and authenticate function pointers and other pointers exposed
outside of the function, while still allowing binaries conforming
to the ABI to interoperate with legacy binaries that do not sign or
authenticate pointers.

The idea is that a dynamic loader or early startup code would issue
this prctl very early after establishing that a process may load legacy
binaries, but before executing any PAC instructions.

This change adds a small amount of overhead to kernel entry and exit
due to additional required instruction sequences.

On a DragonBoard 845c (Cortex-A75) with the powersave governor, the
overhead of similar instruction sequences was measured as 4.9ns when
simulating the common case where IA is left enabled, or 43.7ns when
simulating the uncommon case where IA is disabled. These numbers can
be seen as the worst case scenario, since in more realistic scenarios
a better performing governor would be used and a newer chip would be
used that would support PAC unlike Cortex-A75 and would be expected
to be faster than Cortex-A75.

On an Apple M1 under a hypervisor, the overhead of the entry/exit
instruction sequences introduced by this patch was measured as 0.3ns
in the case where IA is left enabled, and 33.0ns in the case where
IA is disabled.

Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ibc41a5e6a76b275efbaa126b31119dc197b927a5
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d6609065f8f40397a4124654eb68c9f490b4d477.1616123271.git.pcc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2021-04-13 17:31:44 +01:00
Alexey Dobriyan
c995f12ad8 prctl: fix PR_SET_MM_AUXV kernel stack leak
Doing a

	prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_AUXV, addr, 1);

will copy 1 byte from userspace to (quite big) on-stack array
and then stash everything to mm->saved_auxv.
AT_NULL terminator will be inserted at the very end.

/proc/*/auxv handler will find that AT_NULL terminator
and copy original stack contents to userspace.

This devious scheme requires CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-03-14 14:33:27 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
6fbd6cf85a Kbuild updates for v5.12
- Fix false-positive build warnings for ARCH=ia64 builds
 
  - Optimize dictionary size for module compression with xz
 
  - Check the compiler and linker versions in Kconfig
 
  - Fix misuse of extra-y
 
  - Support DWARF v5 debug info
 
  - Clamp SUBLEVEL to 255 because stable releases 4.4.x and 4.9.x
    exceeded the limit
 
  - Add generic syscall{tbl,hdr}.sh for cleanups across arches
 
  - Minor cleanups of genksyms
 
  - Minor cleanups of Kconfig
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Merge tag 'kbuild-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild

Pull Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada:

 - Fix false-positive build warnings for ARCH=ia64 builds

 - Optimize dictionary size for module compression with xz

 - Check the compiler and linker versions in Kconfig

 - Fix misuse of extra-y

 - Support DWARF v5 debug info

 - Clamp SUBLEVEL to 255 because stable releases 4.4.x and 4.9.x
   exceeded the limit

 - Add generic syscall{tbl,hdr}.sh for cleanups across arches

 - Minor cleanups of genksyms

 - Minor cleanups of Kconfig

* tag 'kbuild-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (38 commits)
  initramfs: Remove redundant dependency of RD_ZSTD on BLK_DEV_INITRD
  kbuild: remove deprecated 'always' and 'hostprogs-y/m'
  kbuild: parse C= and M= before changing the working directory
  kbuild: reuse this-makefile to define abs_srctree
  kconfig: unify rule of config, menuconfig, nconfig, gconfig, xconfig
  kconfig: omit --oldaskconfig option for 'make config'
  kconfig: fix 'invalid option' for help option
  kconfig: remove dead code in conf_askvalue()
  kconfig: clean up nested if-conditionals in check_conf()
  kconfig: Remove duplicate call to sym_get_string_value()
  Makefile: Remove # characters from compiler string
  Makefile: reuse CC_VERSION_TEXT
  kbuild: check the minimum linker version in Kconfig
  kbuild: remove ld-version macro
  scripts: add generic syscallhdr.sh
  scripts: add generic syscalltbl.sh
  arch: syscalls: remove $(srctree)/ prefix from syscall tables
  arch: syscalls: add missing FORCE and fix 'targets' to make if_changed work
  gen_compile_commands: prune some directories
  kbuild: simplify access to the kernel's version
  ...
2021-02-25 10:17:31 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
7d6beb71da idmapped-mounts-v5.12
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Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux

Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
 "This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
  time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
  directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
  with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
  filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
  maintainers.

  Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
  are just a few:

   - Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
     multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
     scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
     implementation of portable home directories in
     systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
     directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
     computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
     effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
     login time.

   - It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
     containers without having to change ownership permanently through
     chown(2).

   - It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
     mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
     user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
     Linux subsystem.

   - It is possible to share files between containers with
     non-overlapping idmappings.

   - Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
     use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
     permission checking.

   - They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
     basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
     contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
     instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
     ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
     container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
     mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
     all files.

   - Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
     idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
     to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
     take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
     simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
     especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
     files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
     directory and container and vm scenario.

   - Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
     to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
     apply as long as the mount exists.

  Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
  pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
  this:

   - systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
     in their implementation of portable home directories.

         https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/

   - container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
     host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
     containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
     containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
     a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734

   - The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
     in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
     ported.

   - ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.

  I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
  here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
  mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
  talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:

      https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
      https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/

  This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
  xfs:

      https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts

  It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
  execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
  non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
  setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
  be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
  merge this.

  In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
  user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
  map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
  By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
  The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
  idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
  testsuite.

  Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
  and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
  the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
  introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
  the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
  to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
  whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
  currently marked with.

  The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
  passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
  argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
  MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
  of extensibility.

  The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
  mount:

   - The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
     user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.

   - The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.

   - The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
     idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.

   - The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
     been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
     and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.

  The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
  kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.

  By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
  behavioral or performance changes are observed.

  The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:

      1d7b902e28

  In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
  and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
  patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
  complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
  xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
  will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
  that port has been done correctly.

  The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
  mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
  valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
  mounts based on file descriptors only.

  Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
  RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
  we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
  path resolution.

  While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
  proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
  possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
  the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.

  With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
  restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
  covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
  crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
  tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
  syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
  projects.

  There is a simple tool available at

      https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped

  that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
  patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
  decide to pull this in the following weeks:

  Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
  directory:

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 4 root   root   4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x  2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 29 root  root  4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: mnt/my-file
	# owner: u1001
	# group: u1001
	user::rw-
	user:u1001:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
	# owner: ubuntu
	# group: ubuntu
	user::rw-
	user:ubuntu:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--"

* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
  xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
  xfs: support idmapped mounts
  ext4: support idmapped mounts
  fat: handle idmapped mounts
  tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
  fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
  fs: add mount_setattr()
  fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
  fs: split out functions to hold writers
  namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
  mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
  namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
  nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
  overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ima: handle idmapped mounts
  apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
  fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
  exec: handle idmapped mounts
  would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
  ...
2021-02-23 13:39:45 -08:00
Sasha Levin
88a686728b kbuild: simplify access to the kernel's version
Instead of storing the version in a single integer and having various
kernel (and userspace) code how it's constructed, export individual
(major, patchlevel, sublevel) components and simplify kernel code that
uses it.

This should also make it easier on userspace.

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
2021-02-16 12:01:45 +09:00
Viresh Kumar
be65de6b03 fs: Remove dcookies support
The dcookies stuff was only used by the kernel's old oprofile code. Now
that oprofile's support is removed from the kernel, there is no need for
dcookies as well. Remove it.

Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>
Acked-by: William Cohen <wcohen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2021-01-29 10:06:46 +05:30
Christian Brauner
02f92b3868
fs: add file and path permissions helpers
Add two simple helpers to check permissions on a file and path
respectively and convert over some callers. It simplifies quite a few
codepaths and also reduces the churn in later patches quite a bit.
Christoph also correctly points out that this makes codepaths (e.g.
ioctls) way easier to follow that would otherwise have to do more
complex argument passing than necessary.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-4-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-24 14:27:16 +01:00
Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
1446e1df9e kernel: Implement selective syscall userspace redirection
Introduce a mechanism to quickly disable/enable syscall handling for a
specific process and redirect to userspace via SIGSYS.  This is useful
for processes with parts that require syscall redirection and parts that
don't, but who need to perform this boundary crossing really fast,
without paying the cost of a system call to reconfigure syscall handling
on each boundary transition.  This is particularly important for Windows
games running over Wine.

The proposed interface looks like this:

  prctl(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH, <op>, <off>, <length>, [selector])

The range [<offset>,<offset>+<length>) is a part of the process memory
map that is allowed to by-pass the redirection code and dispatch
syscalls directly, such that in fast paths a process doesn't need to
disable the trap nor the kernel has to check the selector.  This is
essential to return from SIGSYS to a blocked area without triggering
another SIGSYS from rt_sigreturn.

selector is an optional pointer to a char-sized userspace memory region
that has a key switch for the mechanism. This key switch is set to
either PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ON, PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF to enable and disable the
redirection without calling the kernel.

The feature is meant to be set per-thread and it is disabled on
fork/clone/execv.

Internally, this doesn't add overhead to the syscall hot path, and it
requires very little per-architecture support.  I avoided using seccomp,
even though it duplicates some functionality, due to previous feedback
that maybe it shouldn't mix with seccomp since it is not a security
mechanism.  And obviously, this should never be considered a security
mechanism, since any part of the program can by-pass it by using the
syscall dispatcher.

For the sysinfo benchmark, which measures the overhead added to
executing a native syscall that doesn't require interception, the
overhead using only the direct dispatcher region to issue syscalls is
pretty much irrelevant.  The overhead of using the selector goes around
40ns for a native (unredirected) syscall in my system, and it is (as
expected) dominated by the supervisor-mode user-address access.  In
fact, with SMAP off, the overhead is consistently less than 5ns on my
test box.

Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127193238.821364-4-krisman@collabora.com
2020-12-02 15:07:56 +01:00
Rasmus Villemoes
986b9eacb2 kernel/sys.c: fix prototype of prctl_get_tid_address()
tid_addr is not a "pointer to (pointer to int in userspace)"; it is in
fact a "pointer to (pointer to int in userspace) in userspace".  So
sparse rightfully complains about passing a kernel pointer to
put_user().

Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-25 11:44:16 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
81ecf91eab SafeSetID changes for v5.10
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Merge tag 'safesetid-5.10' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux

Pull SafeSetID updates from Micah Morton:
 "The changes are mostly contained to within the SafeSetID LSM, with the
  exception of a few 1-line changes to change some ns_capable() calls to
  ns_capable_setid() -- causing a flag (CAP_OPT_INSETID) to be set that
  is examined by SafeSetID code and nothing else in the kernel.

  The changes to SafeSetID internally allow for setting up GID
  transition security policies, as already existed for UIDs"

* tag 'safesetid-5.10' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux:
  LSM: SafeSetID: Fix warnings reported by test bot
  LSM: SafeSetID: Add GID security policy handling
  LSM: Signal to SafeSetID when setting group IDs
2020-10-25 10:45:26 -07:00
Liao Pingfang
15ec0fcff6 kernel/sys.c: replace do_brk with do_brk_flags in comment of prctl_set_mm_map()
Replace do_brk with do_brk_flags in comment of prctl_set_mm_map(), since
do_brk was removed in following commit.

Fixes: bb177a732c ("mm: do not bug_on on incorrect length in __mm_populate()")
Signed-off-by: Liao Pingfang <liao.pingfang@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1600650751-43127-1-git-send-email-wang.yi59@zte.com.cn
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-16 11:11:19 -07:00