The -EKEYREJECTED error returned by existing is_hash_blacklisted() is
misleading when called for checking against blacklisted hash of a
binary.
This patch adds a wrapper function is_binary_blacklisted() to return
-EPERM error if binary is blacklisted.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-7-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
IMA will need to verify a PKCS#7 signature which has already been parsed.
For this reason, factor out the code which does that from
verify_pkcs7_signature() into a new function which takes a struct
pkcs7_message instead of a data buffer.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keyring ACL support from David Howells:
"This changes the permissions model used by keys and keyrings to be
based on an internal ACL by the following means:
- Replace the permissions mask internally with an ACL that contains a
list of ACEs, each with a specific subject with a permissions mask.
Potted default ACLs are available for new keys and keyrings.
ACE subjects can be macroised to indicate the UID and GID specified
on the key (which remain). Future commits will be able to add
additional subject types, such as specific UIDs or domain
tags/namespaces.
Also split a number of permissions to give finer control. Examples
include splitting the revocation permit from the change-attributes
permit, thereby allowing someone to be granted permission to revoke
a key without allowing them to change the owner; also the ability
to join a keyring is split from the ability to link to it, thereby
stopping a process accessing a keyring by joining it and thus
acquiring use of possessor permits.
- Provide a keyctl to allow the granting or denial of one or more
permits to a specific subject. Direct access to the ACL is not
granted, and the ACL cannot be viewed"
* tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION
keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
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Merge tag 'keys-namespace-20190627' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keyring namespacing from David Howells:
"These patches help make keys and keyrings more namespace aware.
Firstly some miscellaneous patches to make the process easier:
- Simplify key index_key handling so that the word-sized chunks
assoc_array requires don't have to be shifted about, making it
easier to add more bits into the key.
- Cache the hash value in the key so that we don't have to calculate
on every key we examine during a search (it involves a bunch of
multiplications).
- Allow keying_search() to search non-recursively.
Then the main patches:
- Make it so that keyring names are per-user_namespace from the point
of view of KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING so that they're not
accessible cross-user_namespace.
keyctl_capabilities() shows KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEYRING_NAME for this.
- Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace
rather than the user_struct. This prevents them propagating
directly across user_namespaces boundaries (ie. the KEY_SPEC_*
flags will only pick from the current user_namespace).
- Make it possible to include the target namespace in which the key
shall operate in the index_key. This will allow the possibility of
multiple keys with the same description, but different target
domains to be held in the same keyring.
keyctl_capabilities() shows KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEY_TAG for this.
- Make it so that keys are implicitly invalidated by removal of a
domain tag, causing them to be garbage collected.
- Institute a network namespace domain tag that allows keys to be
differentiated by the network namespace in which they operate. New
keys that are of a type marked 'KEY_TYPE_NET_DOMAIN' are assigned
the network domain in force when they are created.
- Make it so that the desired network namespace can be handed down
into the request_key() mechanism. This allows AFS, NFS, etc. to
request keys specific to the network namespace of the superblock.
This also means that the keys in the DNS record cache are
thenceforth namespaced, provided network filesystems pass the
appropriate network namespace down into dns_query().
For DNS, AFS and NFS are good, whilst CIFS and Ceph are not. Other
cache keyrings, such as idmapper keyrings, also need to set the
domain tag - for which they need access to the network namespace of
the superblock"
* tag 'keys-namespace-20190627' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
keys: Pass the network namespace into request_key mechanism
keys: Network namespace domain tag
keys: Garbage collect keys for which the domain has been removed
keys: Include target namespace in match criteria
keys: Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace
keys: Namespace keyring names
keys: Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches
keys: Cache the hash value to avoid lots of recalculation
keys: Simplify key description management
Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow
the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a
greater range of subjects to represented.
============
WHY DO THIS?
============
The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of
which should be grouped together.
For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a
key:
(1) Changing a key's ownership.
(2) Changing a key's security information.
(3) Setting a keyring's restriction.
And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime:
(4) Setting an expiry time.
(5) Revoking a key.
and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache:
(6) Invalidating a key.
Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with
controlling access to that key.
Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content
and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however,
be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token
for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a
key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is
probably okay.
As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers:
(1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search.
(2) Permitting keyrings to be joined.
(3) Invalidation.
But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really
need to be controlled separately.
Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the
administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like
to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks.
===============
WHAT IS CHANGED
===============
The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions:
(1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be
changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring.
(2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked.
The SEARCH permission is split to create:
(1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found.
(2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring.
(3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated.
The WRITE permission is also split to create:
(1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be
added, removed and replaced in a keyring.
(2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is
split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator.
(3) REVOKE - see above.
Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are
unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as:
(*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key
(*) Owner - permitted to the key owner
(*) Group - permitted to the key group
(*) Everyone - permitted to everyone
Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that
you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to
everyone else.
Further subjects may be made available by later patches.
The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now:
VIEW Can view the key metadata
READ Can read the key content
WRITE Can update/modify the key content
SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting
LINK Can make a link to the key
SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry
INVAL Can invalidate
REVOKE Can revoke
JOIN Can join this keyring
CLEAR Can clear this keyring
The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated.
The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set,
or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token.
The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL.
The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE.
The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an
existing keyring.
The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually
created keyrings only.
======================
BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY
======================
To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the
permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless
KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be
returned.
It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate
ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero.
SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE
permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned
on if a keyring is being altered.
The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions
mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs.
It will make the following mappings:
(1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH
(2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR
(3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set
(4) CLEAR -> WRITE
Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match
the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR.
=======
TESTING
=======
This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests:
(1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now
returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed
if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the
key.
(2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't
work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches so that the flag can be omitted
and recursion disabled, thereby allowing just the nominated keyring to be
searched and none of the children.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public licence as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the licence or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 114 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.552531963@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This patch allows the kexec_file_load syscall to verify the PE signed
kernel image signature based on the preboot keys stored in the .platform
keyring, as fall back, if the signature verification failed due to not
finding the public key in the secondary or builtin keyrings.
This commit adds a VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING similar to previous
VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING indicating that verify_pkcs7_signature
should verify the signature using platform keyring. Also, decrease
the error message log level when verification failed with -ENOKEY,
so that if called tried multiple time with different keyring it
won't generate extra noises.
Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> (for kexec_file_load part)
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: tweaked the first paragraph of the patch description,
and fixed checkpatch warning.]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
commit 9dc92c4517 ("integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring")
introduced a .platform keyring for storing preboot keys, used for
verifying kernel image signatures. Currently only IMA-appraisal is able
to use the keyring to verify kernel images that have their signature
stored in xattr.
This patch exposes the .platform keyring, making it accessible for
verifying PE signed kernel images as well.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: fixed checkpatch errors, squashed with patch fix]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Since commit 9c2af1c737 ("kbuild: add .DELETE_ON_ERROR special
target"), the target file is automatically deleted on failure.
The boilerplate code
... || { rm -f $@; false; }
is unneeded.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
With the special case handling for Blackfin and Metag was removed by
commit 94e58e0ac3 ("export.h: remove code for prefixing symbols with
underscore"), VMLINUX_SYMBOL() is no-op.
Replace the remaining usages, then remove the definition of
VMLINUX_SYMBOL() and VMLINUX_SYMBOL_STR().
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Replace the use of a magic number that indicates that verify_*_signature()
should use the secondary keyring with a symbol.
Signed-off-by: Yannik Sembritzki <yannik@sembritzki.me>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
As we move stuff around, some doc references are broken. Fix some of
them via this script:
./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix
Manually checked if the produced result is valid, removing a few
false-positives.
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Acked-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
const must be marked __initconst, not __initdata.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171222001335.1987-1-andi@firstfloor.org
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
It's a bit hard for eye to track certs/Makefile if you are not
accustomed to it. This commit adds comments to key endif statements in
order to help to keep the context while reading this file.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Fix typos and add the following to the scripts/spelling.txt:
intialisation||initialisation
intialised||initialised
intialise||initialise
This commit does not intend to change the British spelling itself.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1481573103-11329-18-git-send-email-yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Replace struct key's restrict_link function pointer with a pointer to
the new struct key_restriction. The structure contains pointers to the
restriction function as well as relevant data for evaluating the
restriction.
The garbage collector checks restrict_link->keytype when key types are
unregistered. Restrictions involving a removed key type are converted
to use restrict_link_reject so that restrictions cannot be removed by
unregistering key types.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
The first argument to the restrict_link_func_t functions was a keyring
pointer. These functions are called by the key subsystem with this
argument set to the destination keyring, but restrict_link_by_signature
expects a pointer to the relevant trusted keyring.
Restrict functions may need something other than a single struct key
pointer to allow or reject key linkage, so the data used to make that
decision (such as the trust keyring) is moved to a new, fourth
argument. The first argument is now always the destination keyring.
Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Add the following:
(1) A new system keyring that is used to store information about
blacklisted certificates and signatures.
(2) A new key type (called 'blacklist') that is used to store a
blacklisted hash in its description as a hex string. The key accepts
no payload.
(3) The ability to configure a list of blacklisted hashes into the kernel
at build time. This is done by setting
CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST to the filename of a list of hashes
that are in the form:
"<hash>", "<hash>", ..., "<hash>"
where each <hash> is a hex string representation of the hash and must
include all necessary leading zeros to pad the hash to the right size.
The above are enabled with CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING.
Once the kernel is booted, the blacklist keyring can be listed:
root@andromeda ~]# keyctl show %:.blacklist
Keyring
723359729 ---lswrv 0 0 keyring: .blacklist
676257228 ---lswrv 0 0 \_ blacklist: 123412341234c55c1dcc601ab8e172917706aa32fb5eaf826813547fdf02dd46
The blacklist cannot currently be modified by userspace, but it will be
possible to load it, for example, from the UEFI blacklist database.
A later commit will make it possible to load blacklisted asymmetric keys in
here too.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to by root whilst the
system is running - provided the key being added is vouched for by a key
built into the kernel or already added to the secondary keyring.
Rename .system_keyring to .builtin_trusted_keys to distinguish it more
obviously from the new keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys).
The new keyring needs to be enabled with CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING.
If the secondary keyring is enabled, a link is created from that to
.builtin_trusted_keys so that the the latter will automatically be searched
too if the secondary keyring is searched.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED as they're no longer
meaningful. Also we can drop the trusted flag from the preparse structure.
Given this, we no longer need to pass the key flags through to
restrict_link().
Further, we can now get rid of keyring_restrict_trusted_only() also.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to
__key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to
to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not.
What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring.
Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that
point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted
keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the
trustworthiness of a new key.
With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the
trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through
one of the contained keys.
Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant
trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically
grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could
be secondarily linked.
To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source
must now be retained. For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the
AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data.
If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted()
resolves to restrict_link_reject(). The integrity digital signature code
still works correctly with this as it was previously using
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there
is no system keyring against which trust can be determined.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Make the system trusted keyring depend on the asymmetric key type as
there's not a lot of point having it if you can't then load asymmetric keys
onto it.
This requires the ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE to be made a bool, not a tristate, as
the Kconfig language doesn't then correctly force ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE to
'y' rather than 'm' if SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING is 'y'.
Making SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING *select* ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE instead doesn't
work as the Kconfig interpreter then wrongly complains about dependency
loops.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be
vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary. This can be used to
block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which
the signature verification fails. It could also be used to provide
blacklisting.
This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.
To this end:
(1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to
the vetting function. This is called as:
int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
const struct key_type *key_type,
unsigned long key_flags,
const union key_payload *key_payload),
where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and
key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be
AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED.
[*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed.
The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an
error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the
link.
The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set
through keyring_alloc().
Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this
method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function
is called.
(2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added. This can be passed to
key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the
restriction check.
(3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed. The entire contents of a keyring
with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by
virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted.
(4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be
used to set restrict_link in the new key. This ensures that the
pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window
of unrestrictedness. Normally this argument will be NULL.
(5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added. It
should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of
setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring. This will be replaced in
a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for
authoritative keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Make the determination of the trustworthiness of a key dependent on whether
a key that can verify it is present in the supplied ring of trusted keys
rather than whether or not the verifying key has KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED set.
verify_pkcs7_signature() will return -ENOKEY if the PKCS#7 message trust
chain cannot be verified.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content
through a callback. This allows all the PKCS#7 stuff to be hidden inside
this function and removed from the PE file parser and the PKCS#7 test key.
If external content is not required, NULL should be passed as data to the
function. If the callback is not required, that can be set to NULL.
The function is now called verify_pkcs7_signature() to contrast with
verify_pefile_signature() and the definitions of both have been moved into
linux/verification.h along with the key_being_used_for enum.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Fix the following warning found by kbuild:
certs/system_certificates.S:24: Error: misaligned data
because:
KEYS: Reserve an extra certificate symbol for inserting without recompiling
doesn't correctly align system_extra_cert_used.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Place a system_extra_cert buffer of configurable size, right after the
system_certificate_list, so that inserted keys can be readily processed by
the existing mechanism. Added script takes a key file and a kernel image
and inserts its contents to the reserved area. The
system_certificate_list_size is also adjusted accordingly.
Call the script as:
scripts/insert-sys-cert -b <vmlinux> -c <certfile>
If vmlinux has no symbol table, supply System.map file with -s flag.
Subsequent runs replace the previously inserted key, instead of appending
the new one.
Signed-off-by: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
When a user calls 'make -s', we can assume they don't want to
see any output except for warnings and errors, but instead
they see this for a warning free build:
###
### Now generating an X.509 key pair to be used for signing modules.
###
### If this takes a long time, you might wish to run rngd in the
### background to keep the supply of entropy topped up. It
### needs to be run as root, and uses a hardware random
### number generator if one is available.
###
Generating a 4096 bit RSA private key
.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................++
..............................................................................................................................++
writing new private key to 'certs/signing_key.pem'
-----
###
### Key pair generated.
###
The output can confuse simple build testing scripts that just check
for an empty build log.
This patch silences all the output:
- "echo" is changed to "@$(kecho)", which is dropped when "-s" gets
passed
- the openssl command itself is only printed with V=1, using the
$(Q) macro
- The output of openssl gets redirected to /dev/null on "-s" builds.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Add KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN to convey that a key should have KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN
set rather than setting it after the fact.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Currently we see this in "git status" if we build in the source dir:
Untracked files:
(use "git add <file>..." to include in what will be committed)
certs/x509_certificate_list
It looks like it used to live in kernel/ so we squash that .gitignore
entry at the same time. I didn't bother to dig through git history to
see when it moved, since it is just a minor annoyance at most.
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: keyrings@linux-nfs.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Since commit 1329e8cc69 ("modsign: Extract signing cert from
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY if needed"), the build system has carefully coped
with the signing key being specified as a relative path in either the
source or or the build trees.
However, the actual signing of modules has not worked if the filename
is relative to the source tree.
Fix that by moving the config_filename helper into scripts/Kbuild.include
so that it can be used from elsewhere, and then using it in the top-level
Makefile to find the signing key file.
Kill the intermediate $(MODPUBKEY) and $(MODSECKEY) variables too, while
we're at it. There's no need for them.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
We couldn't use if_changed for this before, because it didn't live in
the kernel/ directory so we couldn't add it to $(targets). It was easier
just to leave it as it was.
Now it's in the certs/ directory we can use if_changed, the same as we
do for the trusted certificate list.
Aside from making things consistent, this means we don't need to depend
explicitly on the include/config/module/sig/key.h file. And we also get
to automatically do the right thing and re-extract the cert if the user
does odd things like using a relative filename and then playing silly
buggers with adding/removing that file in both the source and object
trees. We always favour the one in the object tree if it exists, and
now we'll correctly re-extract the cert when it changes. Previously we'd
*only* re-extract the cert if the config option changed, even if the
actual file we're using did change.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Move certificate handling out of the kernel/ directory and into a certs/
directory to get all the weird stuff in one place and move the generated
signing keys into this directory.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
