cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory
available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further
restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to
whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from
userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches
that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their
objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy
operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant
sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass all
hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.)
This new check is WARN-by-default, so any mistakes can be found over the
next several releases without breaking anyone's system.
The series has roughly the following sections:
- remove %p and improve reporting with offset
- prepare infrastructure and whitelist kmalloc
- update VFS subsystem with whitelists
- update SCSI subsystem with whitelists
- update network subsystem with whitelists
- update process memory with whitelists
- update per-architecture thread_struct with whitelists
- update KVM with whitelists and fix ioctl bug
- mark all other allocations as not whitelisted
- update lkdtm for more sensible test overage
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Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull hardened usercopy whitelisting from Kees Cook:
"Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab
cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory
available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs.
To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates
a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for
copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access
control.
Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no
whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to
userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of
whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and
get_user()/put_user(); these bypass all hardened usercopy checks since
these sizes cannot change at runtime.)
This new check is WARN-by-default, so any mistakes can be found over
the next several releases without breaking anyone's system.
The series has roughly the following sections:
- remove %p and improve reporting with offset
- prepare infrastructure and whitelist kmalloc
- update VFS subsystem with whitelists
- update SCSI subsystem with whitelists
- update network subsystem with whitelists
- update process memory with whitelists
- update per-architecture thread_struct with whitelists
- update KVM with whitelists and fix ioctl bug
- mark all other allocations as not whitelisted
- update lkdtm for more sensible test overage"
* tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (38 commits)
lkdtm: Update usercopy tests for whitelisting
usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0
kvm: x86: fix KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl
kvm: whitelist struct kvm_vcpu_arch
arm: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
x86: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy
fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct
fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches
fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches
net: Restrict unwhitelisted proto caches to size 0
sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user()
sctp: Define usercopy region in SCTP proto slab cache
caif: Define usercopy region in caif proto slab cache
ip: Define usercopy region in IP proto slab cache
net: Define usercopy region in struct proto slab cache
scsi: Define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache slab cache
cifs: Define usercopy region in cifs_request slab cache
vxfs: Define usercopy region in vxfs_inode slab cache
ufs: Define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache slab cache
...
Pull poll annotations from Al Viro:
"This introduces a __bitwise type for POLL### bitmap, and propagates
the annotations through the tree. Most of that stuff is as simple as
'make ->poll() instances return __poll_t and do the same to local
variables used to hold the future return value'.
Some of the obvious brainos found in process are fixed (e.g. POLLIN
misspelled as POLL_IN). At that point the amount of sparse warnings is
low and most of them are for genuine bugs - e.g. ->poll() instance
deciding to return -EINVAL instead of a bitmap. I hadn't touched those
in this series - it's large enough as it is.
Another problem it has caught was eventpoll() ABI mess; select.c and
eventpoll.c assumed that corresponding POLL### and EPOLL### were
equal. That's true for some, but not all of them - EPOLL### are
arch-independent, but POLL### are not.
The last commit in this series separates userland POLL### values from
the (now arch-independent) kernel-side ones, converting between them
in the few places where they are copied to/from userland. AFAICS, this
is the least disruptive fix preserving poll(2) ABI and making epoll()
work on all architectures.
As it is, it's simply broken on sparc - try to give it EPOLLWRNORM and
it will trigger only on what would've triggered EPOLLWRBAND on other
architectures. EPOLLWRBAND and EPOLLRDHUP, OTOH, are never triggered
at all on sparc. With this patch they should work consistently on all
architectures"
* 'misc.poll' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (37 commits)
make kernel-side POLL... arch-independent
eventpoll: no need to mask the result of epi_item_poll() again
eventpoll: constify struct epoll_event pointers
debugging printk in sg_poll() uses %x to print POLL... bitmap
annotate poll(2) guts
9p: untangle ->poll() mess
->si_band gets POLL... bitmap stored into a user-visible long field
ring_buffer_poll_wait() return value used as return value of ->poll()
the rest of drivers/*: annotate ->poll() instances
media: annotate ->poll() instances
fs: annotate ->poll() instances
ipc, kernel, mm: annotate ->poll() instances
net: annotate ->poll() instances
apparmor: annotate ->poll() instances
tomoyo: annotate ->poll() instances
sound: annotate ->poll() instances
acpi: annotate ->poll() instances
crypto: annotate ->poll() instances
block: annotate ->poll() instances
x86: annotate ->poll() instances
...
After do_readv_writev, the inode cache is invalidated anyway, so i_size
will never be read. It will be fetched from the server which will also
know about updates from other machines.
Fixes deadlock on 32-bit SMP.
See https://marc.info/?l=linux-fsdevel&m=151268557427760&w=2
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In orangefs_devreq_read, there is a loop which picks an op off the list
of pending ops. If the loop fails to find an op, there is nothing to
read, and it returns EAGAIN. If the op has been given up on, the loop
is restarted via a goto. The bug is that the variable which the found
op is written to is not reinitialized, so if there are no more eligible
ops on the list, the code runs again on the already handled op.
This is triggered by interrupting a process while the op is being copied
to the client-core. It's a fairly small window, but it's there.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
set_op_state_purged can delete the op.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
orangefs symlink pathnames, stored in struct orangefs_inode_s.link_target
and therefore contained in the orangefs_inode_cache, need to be copied
to/from userspace.
cache object allocation:
fs/orangefs/super.c:
orangefs_alloc_inode(...):
...
orangefs_inode = kmem_cache_alloc(orangefs_inode_cache, ...);
...
return &orangefs_inode->vfs_inode;
fs/orangefs/orangefs-utils.c:
exofs_symlink(...):
...
inode->i_link = orangefs_inode->link_target;
example usage trace:
readlink_copy+0x43/0x70
vfs_readlink+0x62/0x110
SyS_readlinkat+0x100/0x130
fs/namei.c:
readlink_copy(..., link):
...
copy_to_user(..., link, len);
(inlined in vfs_readlink)
generic_readlink(dentry, ...):
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
const char *link = inode->i_link;
...
readlink_copy(..., link);
In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the
orangefs_inode_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are
allowed.
This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches
can now check that each dynamically sized copy operation involving
cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region.
This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY
whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my
understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are
mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net>
[kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace]
Cc: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This is a pure automated search-and-replace of the internal kernel
superblock flags.
The s_flags are now called SB_*, with the names and the values for the
moment mirroring the MS_* flags that they're equivalent to.
Note how the MS_xyz flags are the ones passed to the mount system call,
while the SB_xyz flags are what we then use in sb->s_flags.
The script to do this was:
# places to look in; re security/*: it generally should *not* be
# touched (that stuff parses mount(2) arguments directly), but
# there are two places where we really deal with superblock flags.
FILES="drivers/mtd drivers/staging/lustre fs ipc mm \
include/linux/fs.h include/uapi/linux/bfs_fs.h \
security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c security/apparmor/include/lib.h"
# the list of MS_... constants
SYMS="RDONLY NOSUID NODEV NOEXEC SYNCHRONOUS REMOUNT MANDLOCK \
DIRSYNC NOATIME NODIRATIME BIND MOVE REC VERBOSE SILENT \
POSIXACL UNBINDABLE PRIVATE SLAVE SHARED RELATIME KERNMOUNT \
I_VERSION STRICTATIME LAZYTIME SUBMOUNT NOREMOTELOCK NOSEC BORN \
ACTIVE NOUSER"
SED_PROG=
for i in $SYMS; do SED_PROG="$SED_PROG -e s/MS_$i/SB_$i/g"; done
# we want files that contain at least one of MS_...,
# with fs/namespace.c and fs/pnode.c excluded.
L=$(for i in $SYMS; do git grep -w -l MS_$i $FILES; done| sort|uniq|grep -v '^fs/namespace.c'|grep -v '^fs/pnode.c')
for f in $L; do sed -i $f $SED_PROG; done
Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull iov_iter updates from Al Viro:
- bio_{map,copy}_user_iov() series; those are cleanups - fixes from the
same pile went into mainline (and stable) in late September.
- fs/iomap.c iov_iter-related fixes
- new primitive - iov_iter_for_each_range(), which applies a function
to kernel-mapped segments of an iov_iter.
Usable for kvec and bvec ones, the latter does kmap()/kunmap() around
the callback. _Not_ usable for iovec- or pipe-backed iov_iter; the
latter is not hard to fix if the need ever appears, the former is by
design.
Another related primitive will have to wait for the next cycle - it
passes page + offset + size instead of pointer + size, and that one
will be usable for everything _except_ kvec. Unfortunately, that one
didn't get exposure in -next yet, so...
- a bit more lustre iov_iter work, including a use case for
iov_iter_for_each_range() (checksum calculation)
- vhost/scsi leak fix in failure exit
- misc cleanups and detritectomy...
* 'work.iov_iter' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (21 commits)
iomap_dio_actor(): fix iov_iter bugs
switch ksocknal_lib_recv_...() to use of iov_iter_for_each_range()
lustre: switch struct ksock_conn to iov_iter
vhost/scsi: switch to iov_iter_get_pages()
fix a page leak in vhost_scsi_iov_to_sgl() error recovery
new primitive: iov_iter_for_each_range()
lnet_return_rx_credits_locked: don't abuse list_entry
xen: don't open-code iov_iter_kvec()
orangefs: remove detritus from struct orangefs_kiocb_s
kill iov_shorten()
bio_alloc_map_data(): do bmd->iter setup right there
bio_copy_user_iov(): saner bio size calculation
bio_map_user_iov(): get rid of copying iov_iter
bio_copy_from_iter(): get rid of copying iov_iter
move more stuff down into bio_copy_user_iov()
blk_rq_map_user_iov(): move iov_iter_advance() down
bio_map_user_iov(): get rid of the iov_for_each()
bio_map_user_iov(): move alignment check into the main loop
don't rely upon subsequent bio_add_pc_page() calls failing
... and with iov_iter_get_pages_alloc() it becomes even simpler
...
Prevents holding an unnecessary op while the kernel processes another op
and yields the CPU.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
The previous code path was to mark the inode dirty, let
orangefs_inode_dirty set a flag in our private inode, then later during
inode release call orangefs_flush_inode which notices the flag and
writes the atime out.
The code path worked almost identically for mtime, ctime, and mode
except that those flags are set explicitly and not as side effects of
dirty.
Now orangefs_flush_inode is removed. Marking an inode dirty does not
imply an atime update. Any place where flags were set before is now
an explicit call to orangefs_inode_setattr. Since OrangeFS does not
utilize inode writeback, the attribute change should be written out
immediately.
Fixes generic/120.
In namei.c, there are several places where the directory mtime and ctime
are set, but only the mtime is sent to the server. These don't seem
right, but I've left them as is for now.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Using the ARRAY_SIZE macro improves the readability of the code.
Found with Coccinelle with the following semantic patch:
@r depends on (org || report)@
type T;
T[] E;
position p;
@@
(
(sizeof(E)@p /sizeof(*E))
|
(sizeof(E)@p /sizeof(E[...]))
|
(sizeof(E)@p /sizeof(T))
)
Signed-off-by: Jérémy Lefaure <jeremy.lefaure@lse.epita.fr>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The script “checkpatch.pl” pointed information out like the following.
Comparison to NULL could be written !…
Thus fix affected source code places.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
* A multiplication for the size determination of a memory allocation
indicated that an array data structure should be processed.
Thus use the corresponding function "kcalloc".
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
* Replace the specification of a data structure by a pointer dereference
to make the corresponding size determination a bit safer according to
the Linux coding style convention.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Omit an extra message for a memory allocation failure in these functions.
This issue was detected by using the Coccinelle software.
Signed-off-by: Markus Elfring <elfring@users.sourceforge.net>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
The xattr_handler structure is only stored in an array of const
structures. Thus the xattr_handler structure itself can be
const.
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Orangefs doesn't do buffered writes yet, so there's no point in
initiating and waiting for writeback.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
A previous patch which claimed to remove off by ones actually introduced
them.
strlen() returns the length of the string not including the NUL
character. We are using strcpy() to copy "name" into a buffer which is
ORANGEFS_MAX_XATTR_NAMELEN characters long. We should make sure to
leave space for the NUL, otherwise we're writing one character beyond
the end of the buffer.
Fixes: e675c5ec51 ("orangefs: clean up oversize xattr validation")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
posix_acl_update_mode checks to see if the permissions
described by the ACL can be encoded into the
object's mode. If so, it sets "acl" to NULL
and "mode" to the new desired value. Prior to this patch
we failed to actually propagate the new mode back to the
server.
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
When new directory 'DIR1' is created in a directory 'DIR0' with SGID bit
set, DIR1 is expected to have SGID bit set (and owning group equal to
the owning group of 'DIR0'). However when 'DIR0' also has some default
ACLs that 'DIR1' inherits, setting these ACLs will result in SGID bit on
'DIR1' to get cleared if user is not member of the owning group.
Fix the problem by creating __orangefs_set_acl() function that does not
call posix_acl_update_mode() and use it when inheriting ACLs. That
prevents SGID bit clearing and the mode has been properly set by
posix_acl_create() anyway.
Fixes: 073931017b
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
CC: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
CC: pvfs2-developers@beowulf-underground.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Pull ->s_options removal from Al Viro:
"Preparations for fsmount/fsopen stuff (coming next cycle). Everything
gets moved to explicit ->show_options(), killing ->s_options off +
some cosmetic bits around fs/namespace.c and friends. Basically, the
stuff needed to work with fsmount series with minimum of conflicts
with other work.
It's not strictly required for this merge window, but it would reduce
the PITA during the coming cycle, so it would be nice to have those
bits and pieces out of the way"
* 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
isofs: Fix isofs_show_options()
VFS: Kill off s_options and helpers
orangefs: Implement show_options
9p: Implement show_options
isofs: Implement show_options
afs: Implement show_options
affs: Implement show_options
befs: Implement show_options
spufs: Implement show_options
bpf: Implement show_options
ramfs: Implement show_options
pstore: Implement show_options
omfs: Implement show_options
hugetlbfs: Implement show_options
VFS: Don't use save/replace_mount_options if not using generic_show_options
VFS: Provide empty name qstr
VFS: Make get_filesystem() return the affected filesystem
VFS: Clean up whitespace in fs/namespace.c and fs/super.c
Provide a function to create a NUL-terminated string from unterminated data
Implement the show_options superblock op for orangefs as part of a bid to
rid of s_options and generic_show_options() to make it easier to implement
a context-based mount where the mount options can be passed individually
over a file descriptor.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
cc: pvfs2-developers@beowulf-underground.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
So I've noticed a number of instances where it was not obvious from the
code whether ->task_list was for a wait-queue head or a wait-queue entry.
Furthermore, there's a number of wait-queue users where the lists are
not for 'tasks' but other entities (poll tables, etc.), in which case
the 'task_list' name is actively confusing.
To clear this all up, name the wait-queue head and entry list structure
fields unambiguously:
struct wait_queue_head::task_list => ::head
struct wait_queue_entry::task_list => ::entry
For example, this code:
rqw->wait.task_list.next != &wait->task_list
... is was pretty unclear (to me) what it's doing, while now it's written this way:
rqw->wait.head.next != &wait->entry
... which makes it pretty clear that we are iterating a list until we see the head.
Other examples are:
list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, next, &x->task_list, task_list) {
list_for_each_entry(wq, &fence->wait.task_list, task_list) {
... where it's unclear (to me) what we are iterating, and during review it's
hard to tell whether it's trying to walk a wait-queue entry (which would be
a bug), while now it's written as:
list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, next, &x->head, entry) {
list_for_each_entry(wq, &fence->wait.head, entry) {
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Rename:
wait_queue_t => wait_queue_entry_t
'wait_queue_t' was always a slight misnomer: its name implies that it's a "queue",
but in reality it's a queue *entry*. The 'real' queue is the wait queue head,
which had to carry the name.
Start sorting this out by renaming it to 'wait_queue_entry_t'.
This also allows the real structure name 'struct __wait_queue' to
lose its double underscore and become 'struct wait_queue_entry',
which is the more canonical nomenclature for such data types.
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
remove unused get_fsid_from_ino
fix bounds check for listxattr
clean up oversize xattr validation
do not set getattr_time on orangefs_lookup
return from orangefs_devreq_read quickly if possible
do not wait for timeout if umounting
handle zero size write in debugfs
Bug fixes:
do not check possibly stale size on truncate
ensure the userspace component is unmounted if mount fails
total reimplementation of dir.c
New feature:
implement statx
The new implementation of dir.c is kind of a big deal, all new
code. It has been posted to fs-devel during the previous rc period,
we didn't get much review or feedback from there, but it has been reviewed
very heavily here, so much so that we have two entire versions of the
reimplementation. Not only does the new implementation fix some
xfstests, but it passes all the new tests we made here that involve
seeking and rewinding and giant directories and long file names.
The new dir code has three patches itself:
skip forward to the next directory entry if seek is short
invalidate stored directory on seek
count directory pieces correctly
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Merge tag 'for-linus-4.12-ofs-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hubcap/linux
Pull orangefs updates from Mike Marshall:
"Orangefs cleanups, fixes and statx support.
Some cleanups:
- remove unused get_fsid_from_ino
- fix bounds check for listxattr
- clean up oversize xattr validation
- do not set getattr_time on orangefs_lookup
- return from orangefs_devreq_read quickly if possible
- do not wait for timeout if umounting
- handle zero size write in debugfs
Bug fixes:
- do not check possibly stale size on truncate
- ensure the userspace component is unmounted if mount fails
- total reimplementation of dir.c
New feature:
- implement statx
The new implementation of dir.c is kind of a big deal, all new code.
It has been posted to fs-devel during the previous rc period, we
didn't get much review or feedback from there, but it has been
reviewed very heavily here, so much so that we have two entire
versions of the reimplementation.
Not only does the new implementation fix some xfstests, but it passes
all the new tests we made here that involve seeking and rewinding and
giant directories and long file names. The new dir code has three
patches itself:
- skip forward to the next directory entry if seek is short
- invalidate stored directory on seek
- count directory pieces correctly"
* tag 'for-linus-4.12-ofs-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hubcap/linux:
orangefs: count directory pieces correctly
orangefs: invalidate stored directory on seek
orangefs: skip forward to the next directory entry if seek is short
orangefs: handle zero size write in debugfs
orangefs: do not wait for timeout if umounting
orangefs: return from orangefs_devreq_read quickly if possible
orangefs: ensure the userspace component is unmounted if mount fails
orangefs: do not check possibly stale size on truncate
orangefs: implement statx
orangefs: remove ORANGEFS_READDIR macros
orangefs: support very large directories
orangefs: support llseek on directories
orangefs: rewrite readdir to fix several bugs
orangefs: do not set getattr_time on orangefs_lookup
orangefs: clean up oversize xattr validation
orangefs: fix bounds check for listxattr
orangefs: remove unused get_fsid_from_ino
A large directory full of differently sized file names triggered this.
Most directories, even very large directories with shorter names, would
be lucky enough to fit in one server response.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
If an application seeks to a position before the point which has been
read, it must want updates which have been made to the directory. So
delete the copy stored in the kernel so it will be fetched again.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
If userspace seeks to a position in the stream which is not correct, it
would have returned EIO because the data in the buffer at that offset
would be incorrect. This and the userspace daemon returning a corrupt
directory are indistinguishable.
Now if the data does not look right, skip forward to the next chunk and
try again. The motivation is that if the directory changes, an
application may seek to a position that was valid and no longer is valid.
It is not yet possible for a directory to change.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
If we write zero bytes to this debugfs file, then it will cause an
underflow when we do copy_from_user(buf, ubuf, count - 1). Debugfs can
normally only be written to by root so the impact of this is low.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
When the computer is turned off, all the processes are killed and then
all the filesystems are umounted. OrangeFS should not wait for the
userspace daemon to come back in that case.
This only works for plain umount(2). To actually take advantage of this
interactively, `umount -f' is needed; otherwise umount will issue a
statfs first, which will wait for the userspace daemon to come back.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
It is not necessary to take the lock and search through the request list
if the list is empty.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
If the mount is aborted after userspace has been asked to mount,
userspace must be told to unmount.
Ordinarily orangefs_kill_sb does the unmount. However it cannot be
called if the superblock has not been set up. This is a very narrow
window.
The NULL fs_id is not unmounted.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Let the server figure this out because our size might be out of date or
not present.
The bug was that
xfs_io -f -t -c "pread -v 0 100" /mnt/foo
echo "Test" > /mnt/foo
xfs_io -f -t -c "pread -v 0 100" /mnt/foo
fails because the second truncate did not happen if nothing had
requested the size after the write in echo. Thus i_size was zero (not
present) and the orangefs_setattr though i_size was zero and there was
nothing to do.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Fortunately OrangeFS has had a getattr request mask for a long time.
The server basically has two difficulty levels for attributes. Fetching
any attribute except size requires communicating with the metadata
server for that handle. Since all the attributes are right there, it
makes sense to return them all. Fetching the size requires
communicating with every I/O server (that the file is distributed
across). Therefore if asked for anything except size, get everything
except size, and if asked for size, get everything.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
They are clones of the ORANGEFS_ITERATE macros in use elsewhere. Delete
ORANGEFS_ITERATE_NEXT which is a hack previously used by readdir.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
This works by maintaining a linked list of pages which the directory
has been read into rather than one giant fixed-size buffer.
This replaces code which limits the total directory size to the total
amount that could be returned in one server request. Since filenames
are usually considerably shorter than the maximum, the old code could
usually handle several server requests before running out of space.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
This and the previous commit fix xfstests generic/257.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
In the past, readdir assumed that the user buffer will be large enough
that all entries from the server will fit. If this was not true,
entries would be skipped.
Since it works now, request 512 entries rather than 96 per server
operation.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Since orangefs_lookup calls orangefs_iget which calls
orangefs_inode_getattr, getattr_time will get set.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Also don't check flags as this has been validated by the VFS already.
Fix an off-by-one error in the max size checking.
Stop logging just because userspace wants to write attributes which do
not fit.
This and the previous commit fix xfstests generic/020.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
short copy here should mean instant EFAULT, not "move to the
next page and hope it fails there, this time with nothing
copied"
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Otherwise lockdep says:
[ 1337.483798] ================================================
[ 1337.483999] [ BUG: lock held when returning to user space! ]
[ 1337.484252] 4.11.0-rc6 #19 Not tainted
[ 1337.484423] ------------------------------------------------
[ 1337.484626] mount/14766 is leaving the kernel with locks still held!
[ 1337.484841] 1 lock held by mount/14766:
[ 1337.485017] #0: (&type->s_umount_key#33/1){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8124171f>] sget_userns+0x2af/0x520
Caught by xfstests generic/413 which tried to mount with the unsupported
mount option dax. Then xfstests generic/422 ran sync which deadlocks.
Signed-off-by: Martin Brandenburg <martin@omnibond.com>
Acked-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
