security_inode_init_security previously returned -EOPNOTSUPP, for S_PRIVATE
inodes, and relied on the callers to change it to 0. As the callers do not
change the return code anymore, return 0, intead of -EOPNOTSUPP.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
pass mask instead; kill security_inode_exec_permission() since we can use
security_inode_permission() instead.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Permit changing of security.evm only when valid, unless in fixmode.
Reported-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Changelog v7:
- moved the initialization call to security_inode_init_security,
renaming evm_inode_post_init_security to evm_inode_init_security
- increase size of xattr array for EVM xattr
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Imbed the evm calls evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(),
evm_inode_removexattr() in the security hooks. evm_inode_setxattr()
protects security.evm xattr. evm_inode_post_setxattr() and
evm_inode_removexattr() updates the hmac associated with an inode.
(Assumes an LSM module protects the setting/removing of xattr.)
Changelog:
- Don't define evm_verifyxattr(), unless CONFIG_INTEGRITY is enabled.
- xattr_name is a 'const', value is 'void *'
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory
in order to share the iint among the different integrity models.
Changelog:
- don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
- rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs,
locks, etc to 'integrity_'
- replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
- reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles
- remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0
- rebased on current ima_iint.c
- define integrity_iint_store/lock as static
There should be no other functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
This patch changes the security_inode_init_security API by adding a
filesystem specific callback to write security extended attributes.
This change is in preparation for supporting the initialization of
multiple LSM xattrs and the EVM xattr. Initially the callback function
walks an array of xattrs, writing each xattr separately, but could be
optimized to write multiple xattrs at once.
For existing security_inode_init_security() calls, which have not yet
been converted to use the new callback function, such as those in
reiserfs and ocfs2, this patch defines security_old_inode_init_security().
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY
is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active.
This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails
RCU walks.
Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires
passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least
the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work
with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default
user namespace.
- Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default
user namespace.
The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new
namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with
only potential uid confusion issues left.
I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I
think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals.
Changelog:
11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor
12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces
Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have
capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we
were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps
he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether
he was the creator. Reverse those checks.
12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case
01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper
01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion
02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of
init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to
it! Fix the check in cap_capable().
02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable,
fixing a compile failure.
02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some
couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare
them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add
a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h
without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations
together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use
kernel-doc format.
02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable().
02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable.
(Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version
acked by him)
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs]
[serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6: (1480 commits)
bonding: enable netpoll without checking link status
xfrm: Refcount destination entry on xfrm_lookup
net: introduce rx_handler results and logic around that
bonding: get rid of IFF_SLAVE_INACTIVE netdev->priv_flag
bonding: wrap slave state work
net: get rid of multiple bond-related netdevice->priv_flags
bonding: register slave pointer for rx_handler
be2net: Bump up the version number
be2net: Copyright notice change. Update to Emulex instead of ServerEngines
e1000e: fix kconfig for crc32 dependency
netfilter ebtables: fix xt_AUDIT to work with ebtables
xen network backend driver
bonding: Improve syslog message at device creation time
bonding: Call netif_carrier_off after register_netdevice
bonding: Incorrect TX queue offset
net_sched: fix ip_tos2prio
xfrm: fix __xfrm_route_forward()
be2net: Fix UDP packet detected status in RX compl
Phonet: fix aligned-mode pipe socket buffer header reserve
netxen: support for GbE port settings
...
Fix up conflicts in drivers/staging/brcm80211/brcmsmac/wl_mac80211.c
with the staging updates.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (33 commits)
AppArmor: kill unused macros in lsm.c
AppArmor: cleanup generated files correctly
KEYS: Add an iovec version of KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE
KEYS: Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error code
KEYS: Add a key type op to permit the key description to be vetted
KEYS: Add an RCU payload dereference macro
AppArmor: Cleanup make file to remove cruft and make it easier to read
SELinux: implement the new sb_remount LSM hook
LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSM
SELinux: Compute SID for the newly created socket
SELinux: Socket retains creator role and MLS attribute
SELinux: Auto-generate security_is_socket_class
TOMOYO: Fix memory leak upon file open.
Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"
selinux: drop unused packet flow permissions
selinux: Fix packet forwarding checks on postrouting
selinux: Fix wrong checks for selinux_policycap_netpeer
selinux: Fix check for xfrm selinux context algorithm
ima: remove unnecessary call to ima_must_measure
IMA: remove IMA imbalance checking
...
* 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (62 commits)
posix-clocks: Check write permissions in posix syscalls
hrtimer: Remove empty hrtimer_init_hres_timer()
hrtimer: Update hrtimer->state documentation
hrtimer: Update base[CLOCK_BOOTTIME].offset correctly
timers: Export CLOCK_BOOTTIME via the posix timers interface
timers: Add CLOCK_BOOTTIME hrtimer base
time: Extend get_xtime_and_monotonic_offset() to also return sleep
time: Introduce get_monotonic_boottime and ktime_get_boottime
hrtimers: extend hrtimer base code to handle more then 2 clockids
ntp: Remove redundant and incorrect parameter check
mn10300: Switch do_timer() to xtimer_update()
posix clocks: Introduce dynamic clocks
posix-timers: Cleanup namespace
posix-timers: Add support for fd based clocks
x86: Add clock_adjtime for x86
posix-timers: Introduce a syscall for clock tuning.
time: Splitout compat timex accessors
ntp: Add ADJ_SETOFFSET mode bit
time: Introduce timekeeping_inject_offset
posix-timer: Update comment
...
Fix up new system-call-related conflicts in
arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S
arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_32.h
arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_64.h
arch/x86/kernel/syscall_table_32.S
(name_to_handle_at()/open_by_handle_at() vs clock_adjtime()), and some
due to movement of get_jiffies_64() in:
kernel/time.c
I intend to turn struct flowi into a union of AF specific flowi
structs. There will be a common structure that each variant includes
first, much like struct sock_common.
This is the first step to move in that direction.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The VFS mount code passes the mount options to the LSM. The LSM will remove
options it understands from the data and the VFS will then pass the remaining
options onto the underlying filesystem. This is how options like the
SELinux context= work. The problem comes in that -o remount never calls
into LSM code. So if you include an LSM specific option it will get passed
to the filesystem and will cause the remount to fail. An example of where
this is a problem is the 'seclabel' option. The SELinux LSM hook will
print this word in /proc/mounts if the filesystem is being labeled using
xattrs. If you pass this word on mount it will be silently stripped and
ignored. But if you pass this word on remount the LSM never gets called
and it will be passed to the FS. The FS doesn't know what seclabel means
and thus should fail the mount. For example an ext3 fs mounted over loop
# mount -o loop /tmp/fs /mnt/tmp
# cat /proc/mounts | grep /mnt/tmp
/dev/loop0 /mnt/tmp ext3 rw,seclabel,relatime,errors=continue,barrier=0,data=ordered 0 0
# mount -o remount /mnt/tmp
mount: /mnt/tmp not mounted already, or bad option
# dmesg
EXT3-fs (loop0): error: unrecognized mount option "seclabel" or missing value
This patch passes the remount mount options to an new LSM hook.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Expand security_capable() to include cred, so that it can be usable in a
wider range of call sites.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Both settimeofday() and clock_settime() promise with a 'const'
attribute not to alter the arguments passed in. This patch adds the
missing 'const' attribute into the various kernel functions
implementing these calls.
Signed-off-by: Richard Cochran <richard.cochran@omicron.at>
Acked-by: John Stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
LKML-Reference: <20110201134417.545698637@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
The only user for this hook was selinux. sysctl routes every call
through /proc/sys/. Selinux and other security modules use the file
system checks for sysctl too, so no need for this hook any more.
Signed-off-by: Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created
inodes. We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating
process. This new behavior would also take into account the name of the
new object when deciding the new label. This is not the (supposed) full path,
just the last component of the path.
This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating
/etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these
operations. We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some
difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops
to get things set up correctly. This patch does not implement new
behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it
does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook. If no such name
exists it is fine to pass NULL.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Add calls to path-based security hooks into CacheFiles as, unlike inode-based
security, these aren't implicit in the vfs_mkdir() and similar calls.
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Perform common cases of path lookups without any stores or locking in the
ancestor dentry elements. This is called rcu-walk, as opposed to the current
algorithm which is a refcount based walk, or ref-walk.
This results in far fewer atomic operations on every path element,
significantly improving path lookup performance. It also avoids cacheline
bouncing on common dentries, significantly improving scalability.
The overall design is like this:
* LOOKUP_RCU is set in nd->flags, which distinguishes rcu-walk from ref-walk.
* Take the RCU lock for the entire path walk, starting with the acquiring
of the starting path (eg. root/cwd/fd-path). So now dentry refcounts are
not required for dentry persistence.
* synchronize_rcu is called when unregistering a filesystem, so we can
access d_ops and i_ops during rcu-walk.
* Similarly take the vfsmount lock for the entire path walk. So now mnt
refcounts are not required for persistence. Also we are free to perform mount
lookups, and to assume dentry mount points and mount roots are stable up and
down the path.
* Have a per-dentry seqlock to protect the dentry name, parent, and inode,
so we can load this tuple atomically, and also check whether any of its
members have changed.
* Dentry lookups (based on parent, candidate string tuple) recheck the parent
sequence after the child is found in case anything changed in the parent
during the path walk.
* inode is also RCU protected so we can load d_inode and use the inode for
limited things.
* i_mode, i_uid, i_gid can be tested for exec permissions during path walk.
* i_op can be loaded.
When we reach the destination dentry, we lock it, recheck lookup sequence,
and increment its refcount and mountpoint refcount. RCU and vfsmount locks
are dropped. This is termed "dropping rcu-walk". If the dentry refcount does
not match, we can not drop rcu-walk gracefully at the current point in the
lokup, so instead return -ECHILD (for want of a better errno). This signals the
path walking code to re-do the entire lookup with a ref-walk.
Aside from the final dentry, there are other situations that may be encounted
where we cannot continue rcu-walk. In that case, we drop rcu-walk (ie. take
a reference on the last good dentry) and continue with a ref-walk. Again, if
we can drop rcu-walk gracefully, we return -ECHILD and do the whole lookup
using ref-walk. But it is very important that we can continue with ref-walk
for most cases, particularly to avoid the overhead of double lookups, and to
gain the scalability advantages on common path elements (like cwd and root).
The cases where rcu-walk cannot continue are:
* NULL dentry (ie. any uncached path element)
* parent with d_inode->i_op->permission or ACLs
* dentries with d_revalidate
* Following links
In future patches, permission checks and d_revalidate become rcu-walk aware. It
may be possible eventually to make following links rcu-walk aware.
Uncached path elements will always require dropping to ref-walk mode, at the
very least because i_mutex needs to be grabbed, and objects allocated.
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
unix_release() can asynchornously set socket->sk to NULL, and
it does so without holding the unix_state_lock() on "other"
during stream connects.
However, the reverse mapping, sk->sk_socket, is only transitioned
to NULL under the unix_state_lock().
Therefore make the security hooks follow the reverse mapping instead
of the forward mapping.
Reported-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The addition of CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT resulted in a build
failure when CONFIG_PRINTK=n. This is because the capabilities code
which used the new option was built even though the variable in question
didn't exist.
The patch here fixes this by moving the capabilities checks out of the
LSM and into the caller. All (known) LSMs should have been calling the
capabilities hook already so it actually makes the code organization
better to eliminate the hook altogether.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* ima-memory-use-fixes:
IMA: fix the ToMToU logic
IMA: explicit IMA i_flag to remove global lock on inode_delete
IMA: drop refcnt from ima_iint_cache since it isn't needed
IMA: only allocate iint when needed
IMA: move read counter into struct inode
IMA: use i_writecount rather than a private counter
IMA: use inode->i_lock to protect read and write counters
IMA: convert internal flags from long to char
IMA: use unsigned int instead of long for counters
IMA: drop the inode opencount since it isn't needed for operation
IMA: use rbtree instead of radix tree for inode information cache
IMA always allocates an integrity structure to hold information about
every inode, but only needed this structure to track the number of
readers and writers currently accessing a given inode. Since that
information was moved into struct inode instead of the integrity struct
this patch stops allocating the integrity stucture until it is needed.
Thus greatly reducing memory usage.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Right now secmark has lots of direct selinux calls. Use all LSM calls and
remove all SELinux specific knowledge. The only SELinux specific knowledge
we leave is the mode. The only point is to make sure that other LSMs at
least test this generic code before they assume it works. (They may also
have to make changes if they do not represent labels as strings)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
All security modules shouldn't change sched_param parameter of
security_task_setscheduler(). This is not only meaningless, but also
make a harmful result if caller pass a static variable.
This patch remove policy and sched_param parameter from
security_task_setscheduler() becuase none of security module is
using it.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
We can set default LSM module to DAC (which means "enable no LSM module").
If default LSM module was set to DAC, security_module_enable() must return 0
unless overridden via boot time parameter.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* 'writable_limits' of git://decibel.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/linux:
unistd: add __NR_prlimit64 syscall numbers
rlimits: implement prlimit64 syscall
rlimits: switch more rlimit syscalls to do_prlimit
rlimits: redo do_setrlimit to more generic do_prlimit
rlimits: add rlimit64 structure
rlimits: do security check under task_lock
rlimits: allow setrlimit to non-current tasks
rlimits: split sys_setrlimit
rlimits: selinux, do rlimits changes under task_lock
rlimits: make sure ->rlim_max never grows in sys_setrlimit
rlimits: add task_struct to update_rlimit_cpu
rlimits: security, add task_struct to setrlimit
Fix up various system call number conflicts. We not only added fanotify
system calls in the meantime, but asm-generic/unistd.h added a wait4
along with a range of reserved per-architecture system calls.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/notify: (132 commits)
fanotify: use both marks when possible
fsnotify: pass both the vfsmount mark and inode mark
fsnotify: walk the inode and vfsmount lists simultaneously
fsnotify: rework ignored mark flushing
fsnotify: remove global fsnotify groups lists
fsnotify: remove group->mask
fsnotify: remove the global masks
fsnotify: cleanup should_send_event
fanotify: use the mark in handler functions
audit: use the mark in handler functions
dnotify: use the mark in handler functions
inotify: use the mark in handler functions
fsnotify: send fsnotify_mark to groups in event handling functions
fsnotify: Exchange list heads instead of moving elements
fsnotify: srcu to protect read side of inode and vfsmount locks
fsnotify: use an explicit flag to indicate fsnotify_destroy_mark has been called
fsnotify: use _rcu functions for mark list traversal
fsnotify: place marks on object in order of group memory address
vfs/fsnotify: fsnotify_close can delay the final work in fput
fsnotify: store struct file not struct path
...
Fix up trivial delete/modify conflict in fs/notify/inotify/inotify.c.
When commit be6d3e56a6 "introduce new LSM hooks
where vfsmount is available." was proposed, regarding security_path_truncate(),
only "struct file *" argument (which AppArmor wanted to use) was removed.
But length and time_attrs arguments are not used by TOMOYO nor AppArmor.
Thus, let's remove these arguments.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
introduce a new fsnotify hook, fsnotify_perm(), which is called from the
security code. This hook is used to allow fsnotify groups to make access
control decisions about events on the system. We also must change the
generic fsnotify function to return an error code if we intend these hooks
to be in any way useful.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Add task_struct to task_setrlimit of security_operations to be able to set
rlimit of task other than current.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
register_security() became __init function.
So do verify() and security_fixup_ops().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
LSM framework doesn't allow to load a security module on runtime, it must be loaded on boot time.
but in security/security.c:
int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
{
...
if (security_ops != &default_security_ops)
return -EAGAIN;
...
}
if security_ops == &default_security_ops, it can access to register a security module. If selinux is enabled,
other security modules can't register, but if selinux is disabled on boot time, the security_ops was set to
default_security_ops, LSM allows other kernel modules to use register_security() to register a not trust
security module. For example:
disable selinux on boot time(selinux=0).
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/version.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR("wzt");
extern int register_security(struct security_operations *ops);
int (*new_register_security)(struct security_operations *ops);
int rootkit_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
return 0;
}
struct security_operations rootkit_ops = {
.bprm_check_security = rootkit_bprm_check_security,
};
static int rootkit_init(void)
{
printk("Load LSM rootkit module.\n");
/* cat /proc/kallsyms | grep register_security */
new_register_security = 0xc0756689;
if (new_register_security(&rootkit_ops)) {
printk("Can't register rootkit module.\n");
return 0;
}
printk("Register rootkit module ok.\n");
return 0;
}
static void rootkit_exit(void)
{
printk("Unload LSM rootkit module.\n");
}
module_init(rootkit_init);
module_exit(rootkit_exit);
Signed-off-by: Zhitong Wang <zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Enhance the security framework to support resetting the active security
module. This eliminates the need for direct use of the security_ops and
default_security_ops variables outside of security.c, so make security_ops
and default_security_ops static. Also remove the secondary_ops variable as
a cleanup since there is no use for that. secondary_ops was originally used by
SELinux to call the "secondary" security module (capability or dummy),
but that was replaced by direct calls to capability and the only
remaining use is to save and restore the original security ops pointer
value if SELinux is disabled by early userspace based on /etc/selinux/config.
Further, if we support this directly in the security framework, then we can
just use &default_security_ops for this purpose since that is now available.
Signed-off-by: Zhitong Wang <zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This allows the LSM to distinguish between syslog functions originating
from /proc/kmsg access and direct syscalls. By default, the commoncaps
will now no longer require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read an opened /proc/kmsg
file descriptor. For example the kernel syslog reader can now drop
privileges after opening /proc/kmsg, instead of staying privileged with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN. MAC systems that implement security_syslog have unchanged
behavior.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Currently, the getsecurity and setsecurity operations return zero for
kernel private inodes, where xattrs are not available directly to
userspace.
This confuses some applications, and does not conform to the
man page for getxattr(2) etc., which state that these syscalls
should return ENOTSUP if xattrs are not supported or disabled.
Note that in the listsecurity case, we still need to return zero
as we don't know which other xattr handlers may be active.
For discussion of userland confusion, see:
http://www.mail-archive.com/bug-coreutils@gnu.org/msg17988.html
This patch corrects the error returns so that ENOTSUP is reported
to userspace as required.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
include/linux/security.h and security/capability.c are using "struct path *dir"
but security/security.c was using "struct path *path" by error.
This patch renames "struct path *path" to "struct path *dir".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
For SELinux to do better filtering in userspace we send the name of the
module along with the AVC denial when a program is denied module_request.
Example output:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : arch=x86_64 syscall=write success=yes exit=2 a0=3 a1=7fc28c0d56c0 a2=2 a3=7fffca0d7440 items=0 ppid=1727 pid=1729 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=rpc.nfsd exe=/usr/sbin/rpc.nfsd subj=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(11/03/2009 10:59:43.510:9) : avc: denied { module_request } for pid=1729 comm=rpc.nfsd kmod="net-pf-10" scontext=system_u:system_r:nfsd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0 tclass=system
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The LSM currently requires setting a kernel parameter at boot to select
a specific LSM. This adds a config option that allows specifying a default
LSM that is used unless overridden with the security= kernel parameter.
If the the config option is not set the current behavior of first LSM
to register is used.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Based on discussions on LKML and LSM, where there are consecutive
security_ and ima_ calls in the vfs layer, move the ima_ calls to
the existing security_ hooks.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chroot() operations.
This hook is used by TOMOYO.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch allows pathname based LSM modules to check chmod()/chown()
operations. Since notify_change() does not receive "struct vfsmount *",
we add security_path_chmod() and security_path_chown() to the caller of
notify_change().
These hooks are used by TOMOYO.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch introduces three new hooks. The inode_getsecctx hook is used to get
all relevant information from an LSM about an inode. The inode_setsecctx is
used to set both the in-core and on-disk state for the inode based on a context
derived from inode_getsecctx.The final hook inode_notifysecctx will notify the
LSM of a change for the in-core state of the inode in question. These hooks are
for use in the labeled NFS code and addresses concerns of how to set security
on an inode in a multi-xattr LSM. For historical reasons Stephen Smalley's
explanation of the reason for these hooks is pasted below.
Quote Stephen Smalley
inode_setsecctx: Change the security context of an inode. Updates the
in core security context managed by the security module and invokes the
fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing
xattrs that represent the context. Example usage: NFS server invokes
this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the
backing file system to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR
operation.
inode_notifysecctx: Notify the security module of what the security
context of an inode should be. Initializes the incore security context
managed by the security module for this inode. Example usage: NFS
client invokes this hook to initialize the security context in its
incore inode to the value provided by the server for the file when the
server returned the file's attributes to the client.
Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This
replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.
To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.
The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.
Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.
This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18
#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
key_serial_t keyring, key;
long ret;
keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");
key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
OSERROR(key, "add_key");
ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");
return 0;
}
Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello
340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The TUN driver lacks any LSM hooks which makes it difficult for LSM modules,
such as SELinux, to enforce access controls on network traffic generated by
TUN users; this is particularly problematic for virtualization apps such as
QEMU and KVM. This patch adds three new LSM hooks designed to control the
creation and attachment of TUN devices, the hooks are:
* security_tun_dev_create()
Provides access control for the creation of new TUN devices
* security_tun_dev_post_create()
Provides the ability to create the necessary socket LSM state for newly
created TUN devices
* security_tun_dev_attach()
Provides access control for attaching to existing, persistent TUN devices
and the ability to update the TUN device's socket LSM state as necessary
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Calling request_module() will trigger a userspace upcall which will load a
new module into the kernel. This can be a dangerous event if the process
able to trigger request_module() is able to control either the modprobe
binary or the module binary. This patch adds a new security hook to
request_module() which can be used by an LSM to control a processes ability
to call request_module().
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The ->ptrace_may_access() methods are named confusingly - the real
ptrace_may_access() returns a bool, while these security checks have
a retval convention.
Rename it to ptrace_access_check, to reduce the confusion factor.
[ Impact: cleanup, no code changed ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch removes the dependency of mmap_min_addr on CONFIG_SECURITY.
It also sets a default mmap_min_addr of 4096.
mmapping of addresses below 4096 will only be possible for processes
with CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Looks-ok-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Export a number of functions for CacheFiles's use.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Tested-by: Daire Byrne <Daire.Byrne@framestore.com>
The socket_post_accept() hook is not currently used by any in-tree modules
and its existence continues to cause problems by confusing people about
what can be safely accomplished using this hook. If a legitimate need for
this hook arises in the future it can always be reintroduced.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix a regression in cap_capable() due to:
commit 3b11a1dece
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri Nov 14 10:39:26 2008 +1100
CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task
The problem is that the above patch allows a process to have two sets of
credentials, and for the most part uses the subjective credentials when
accessing current's creds.
There is, however, one exception: cap_capable(), and thus capable(), uses the
real/objective credentials of the target task, whether or not it is the current
task.
Ordinarily this doesn't matter, since usually the two cred pointers in current
point to the same set of creds. However, sys_faccessat() makes use of this
facility to override the credentials of the calling process to make its test,
without affecting the creds as seen from other processes.
One of the things sys_faccessat() does is to make an adjustment to the
effective capabilities mask, which cap_capable(), as it stands, then ignores.
The affected capability check is in generic_permission():
if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode))
if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
This change passes the set of credentials to be tested down into the commoncap
and SELinux code. The security functions called by capable() and
has_capability() select the appropriate set of credentials from the process
being checked.
This can be tested by compiling the following program from the XFS testsuite:
/*
* t_access_root.c - trivial test program to show permission bug.
*
* Written by Michael Kerrisk - copyright ownership not pursued.
* Sourced from: http://linux.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/Kernel/2003-10/6030.html
*/
#include <limits.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#define UID 500
#define GID 100
#define PERM 0
#define TESTPATH "/tmp/t_access"
static void
errExit(char *msg)
{
perror(msg);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} /* errExit */
static void
accessTest(char *file, int mask, char *mstr)
{
printf("access(%s, %s) returns %d\n", file, mstr, access(file, mask));
} /* accessTest */
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fd, perm, uid, gid;
char *testpath;
char cmd[PATH_MAX + 20];
testpath = (argc > 1) ? argv[1] : TESTPATH;
perm = (argc > 2) ? strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 8) : PERM;
uid = (argc > 3) ? atoi(argv[3]) : UID;
gid = (argc > 4) ? atoi(argv[4]) : GID;
unlink(testpath);
fd = open(testpath, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0);
if (fd == -1) errExit("open");
if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) == -1) errExit("fchown");
if (fchmod(fd, perm) == -1) errExit("fchmod");
close(fd);
snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ls -l %s", testpath);
system(cmd);
if (seteuid(uid) == -1) errExit("seteuid");
accessTest(testpath, 0, "0");
accessTest(testpath, R_OK, "R_OK");
accessTest(testpath, W_OK, "W_OK");
accessTest(testpath, X_OK, "X_OK");
accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK, "R_OK | W_OK");
accessTest(testpath, R_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | X_OK");
accessTest(testpath, W_OK | X_OK, "W_OK | X_OK");
accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | W_OK | X_OK");
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
} /* main */
This can be run against an Ext3 filesystem as well as against an XFS
filesystem. If successful, it will show:
[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043
---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 03:00 /tmp/xxx
access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
If unsuccessful, it will show:
[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043
---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 02:56 /tmp/xxx
access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
I've also tested the fix with the SELinux and syscalls LTP testsuites.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix a regression in cap_capable() due to:
commit 5ff7711e635b32f0a1e558227d030c7e45b4a465
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Wed Dec 31 02:52:28 2008 +0000
CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task
The problem is that the above patch allows a process to have two sets of
credentials, and for the most part uses the subjective credentials when
accessing current's creds.
There is, however, one exception: cap_capable(), and thus capable(), uses the
real/objective credentials of the target task, whether or not it is the current
task.
Ordinarily this doesn't matter, since usually the two cred pointers in current
point to the same set of creds. However, sys_faccessat() makes use of this
facility to override the credentials of the calling process to make its test,
without affecting the creds as seen from other processes.
One of the things sys_faccessat() does is to make an adjustment to the
effective capabilities mask, which cap_capable(), as it stands, then ignores.
The affected capability check is in generic_permission():
if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode))
if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
This change splits capable() from has_capability() down into the commoncap and
SELinux code. The capable() security op now only deals with the current
process, and uses the current process's subjective creds. A new security op -
task_capable() - is introduced that can check any task's objective creds.
strictly the capable() security op is superfluous with the presence of the
task_capable() op, however it should be faster to call the capable() op since
two fewer arguments need be passed down through the various layers.
This can be tested by compiling the following program from the XFS testsuite:
/*
* t_access_root.c - trivial test program to show permission bug.
*
* Written by Michael Kerrisk - copyright ownership not pursued.
* Sourced from: http://linux.derkeiler.com/Mailing-Lists/Kernel/2003-10/6030.html
*/
#include <limits.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#define UID 500
#define GID 100
#define PERM 0
#define TESTPATH "/tmp/t_access"
static void
errExit(char *msg)
{
perror(msg);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} /* errExit */
static void
accessTest(char *file, int mask, char *mstr)
{
printf("access(%s, %s) returns %d\n", file, mstr, access(file, mask));
} /* accessTest */
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fd, perm, uid, gid;
char *testpath;
char cmd[PATH_MAX + 20];
testpath = (argc > 1) ? argv[1] : TESTPATH;
perm = (argc > 2) ? strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 8) : PERM;
uid = (argc > 3) ? atoi(argv[3]) : UID;
gid = (argc > 4) ? atoi(argv[4]) : GID;
unlink(testpath);
fd = open(testpath, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0);
if (fd == -1) errExit("open");
if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) == -1) errExit("fchown");
if (fchmod(fd, perm) == -1) errExit("fchmod");
close(fd);
snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ls -l %s", testpath);
system(cmd);
if (seteuid(uid) == -1) errExit("seteuid");
accessTest(testpath, 0, "0");
accessTest(testpath, R_OK, "R_OK");
accessTest(testpath, W_OK, "W_OK");
accessTest(testpath, X_OK, "X_OK");
accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK, "R_OK | W_OK");
accessTest(testpath, R_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | X_OK");
accessTest(testpath, W_OK | X_OK, "W_OK | X_OK");
accessTest(testpath, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK, "R_OK | W_OK | X_OK");
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
} /* main */
This can be run against an Ext3 filesystem as well as against an XFS
filesystem. If successful, it will show:
[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043
---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 03:00 /tmp/xxx
access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
If unsuccessful, it will show:
[root@andromeda src]# ./t_access_root /tmp/xxx 0 4043 4043
---------- 1 dhowells dhowells 0 2008-12-31 02:56 /tmp/xxx
access(/tmp/xxx, 0) returns 0
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
access(/tmp/xxx, R_OK | W_OK | X_OK) returns -1
I've also tested the fix with the SELinux and syscalls LTP testsuites.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add new LSM hooks for path-based checks. Call them on directory-modifying
operations at the points where we still know the vfsmount involved.
Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pass mount flags to security_sb_kern_mount(), so security modules
can determine if a mount operation is being performed by the kernel.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Allow kernel services to override LSM settings appropriate to the actions
performed by a task by duplicating a set of credentials, modifying it and then
using task_struct::cred to point to it when performing operations on behalf of
a task.
This is used, for example, by CacheFiles which has to transparently access the
cache on behalf of a process that thinks it is doing, say, NFS accesses with a
potentially inappropriate (with respect to accessing the cache) set of
credentials.
This patch provides two LSM hooks for modifying a task security record:
(*) security_kernel_act_as() which allows modification of the security datum
with which a task acts on other objects (most notably files).
(*) security_kernel_create_files_as() which allows modification of the
security datum that is used to initialise the security data on a file that
a task creates.
The patch also provides four new credentials handling functions, which wrap the
LSM functions:
(1) prepare_kernel_cred()
Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service to use, based either on
a daemon's credentials or on init_cred. All the keyrings are cleared.
(2) set_security_override()
Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials to a specific security
context, assuming permission from the LSM policy.
(3) set_security_override_from_ctx()
As (2), but takes the security context as a string.
(4) set_create_files_as()
Set the file creation LSM security ID in a set of credentials to be the
same as that on a particular inode.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [Smack changes]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set
up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point
of no return.
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part,
replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that
all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point
of no return with no possibility of failure.
I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with:
cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective)
but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1
(they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd
be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()).
The following sequence of events now happens:
(a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is
locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of
creds that we make.
(a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current
task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to
bprm->cred.
This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free()
unnecessary, and so they've been removed.
(b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately
after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in
bprm->unsafe for future reference.
(c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times.
(i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds
attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded,
but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet
fail.
(ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should
calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred.
This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of
security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed).
Anything that might fail must be done at this point.
(iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1.
bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security
calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux
in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and
not on the interpreter.
(d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This
performs the following steps with regard to credentials:
(i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that
may not be covered by commit_creds().
(ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from
(c.i).
(e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the
new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to
credentials:
(i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security
requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that
must be done before the credentials are changed.
This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and
security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed.
This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail
must have been done in (c.ii).
(ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single
assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable
should be part of struct creds.
(iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing
PTRACE_ATTACH to take place.
(iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding
are now immutable.
(v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security
alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed.
SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers.
(f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds()
to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock
cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been
made.
(2) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security()
(*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security()
Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
(*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds()
Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(),
security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds().
(*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security()
Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds().
(*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds()
New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up
as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the
second and subsequent calls.
(*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds()
(*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds()
New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This
includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not
fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied
to the process; when the latter is called, they have.
The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not.
(3) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using
the credentials-under-construction approach.
(c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on
to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have
SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself
when it opens its null chardev.
The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the
dentry_open hook in struct security_operations.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Detach the credentials from task_struct, duplicating them in copy_process()
and releasing them in __put_task_struct().
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Constify the kernel_cap_t arguments to the capset LSM hooks.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Take away the ability for sys_capset() to affect processes other than current.
This means that current will not need to lock its own credentials when reading
them against interference by other processes.
This has effectively been the case for a while anyway, since:
(1) Without LSM enabled, sys_capset() is disallowed.
(2) With file-based capabilities, sys_capset() is neutered.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
make an A or B type decision instead of a security decision. Currently
this is the case at least for filesystems when deciding if a process can use
the reserved 'root' blocks and for the case of things like the oom
algorithm determining if processes are root processes and should be less
likely to be killed. These types of security system requests should not be
audited or logged since they are not really security decisions. It would be
possible to solve this problem like the vm_enough_memory security check did
by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into that
interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide complex
indirection.
This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and to not
flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not security decisions.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Junjiro R. Okajima reported a problem where knfsd crashes if you are
using it to export shmemfs objects and run strict overcommit. In this
situation the current->mm based modifier to the overcommit goes through a
NULL pointer.
We could simply check for NULL and skip the modifier but we've caught
other real bugs in the past from mm being NULL here - cases where we did
need a valid mm set up (eg the exec bug about a year ago).
To preserve the checks and get the logic we want shuffle the checking
around and add a new helper to the vm_ security wrappers
Also fix a current->mm reference in nommu that should use the passed mm
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
Reported-by: Junjiro R. Okajima <hooanon05@yahoo.co.jp>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add security/inode.c functions to the kernel-api docbook.
Use '%' on constants in kernel-doc notation.
Fix several typos/spellos in security function descriptions.
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags
the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to
change its own flags in a different way at the same time.
__capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags. This
patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set
PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried.
This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two:
(1) security_ptrace_may_access(). This passes judgement on whether one
process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and
PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process.
current is the parent.
(2) security_ptrace_traceme(). This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only,
and takes only a pointer to the parent process. current is the child.
In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether
the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail.
This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV.
Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have
been changed to calls to capable().
Of the places that were using __capable():
(1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a
process. All of these now use has_capability().
(2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see
whether the parent was allowed to trace any process. As mentioned above,
these have been split. For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now
used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used.
(3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable().
(4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just
after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been
switched and capable() is used instead.
(5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to
receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating.
(6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process,
whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged.
I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The FAT_IOCTL_SET_ATTRIBUTES ioctl() calls notify_change() to change
the file mode before changing the inode attributes. Replace with
explicit calls to security_inode_setattr(), fat_setattr() and
fsnotify_change().
This is equivalent to the original. The reason it is needed, is that
later in the series we move the immutable check into notify_change().
That would break the FAT_IOCTL_SET_ATTRIBUTES ioctl, as it needs to
perform the mode change regardless of the immutability of the file.
[Fix error if fat is built as a module. Thanks to OGAWA Hirofumi for
noticing.]
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Acked-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The register security hook is no longer required, as the capability
module is always registered. LSMs wishing to stack capability as
a secondary module should do so explicitly.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Remove the dummy module and make the "capability" module the default.
Compile and boot tested.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The sb_get_mnt_opts() hook is unused, and is superseded by the
sb_show_options() hook.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch causes SELinux mount options to show up in /proc/mounts. As
with other code in the area seq_put errors are ignored. Other LSM's
will not have their mount options displayed until they fill in their own
security_sb_show_options() function.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix several warnings generated by sparse of the form
"returning void-valued expression".
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Enable security modules to distinguish reading of process state via
proc from full ptrace access by renaming ptrace_may_attach to
ptrace_may_access and adding a mode argument indicating whether only
read access or full attach access is requested. This allows security
modules to permit access to reading process state without granting
full ptrace access. The base DAC/capability checking remains unchanged.
Read access to /proc/pid/mem continues to apply a full ptrace attach
check since check_mem_permission() already requires the current task
to already be ptracing the target. The other ptrace checks within
proc for elements like environ, maps, and fds are changed to pass the
read mode instead of attach.
In the SELinux case, we model such reading of process state as a
reading of a proc file labeled with the target process' label. This
enables SELinux policy to permit such reading of process state without
permitting control or manipulation of the target process, as there are
a number of cases where programs probe for such information via proc
but do not need to be able to control the target (e.g. procps,
lsof, PolicyKit, ConsoleKit). At present we have to choose between
allowing full ptrace in policy (more permissive than required/desired)
or breaking functionality (or in some cases just silencing the denials
via dontaudit rules but this can hide genuine attacks).
This version of the patch incorporates comments from Casey Schaufler
(change/replace existing ptrace_may_attach interface, pass access
mode), and Chris Wright (provide greater consistency in the checking).
Note that like their predecessors __ptrace_may_attach and
ptrace_may_attach, the __ptrace_may_access and ptrace_may_access
interfaces use different return value conventions from each other (0
or -errno vs. 1 or 0). I retained this difference to avoid any
changes to the caller logic but made the difference clearer by
changing the latter interface to return a bool rather than an int and
by adding a comment about it to ptrace.h for any future callers.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Make secctx_to_secid() take constant secdata.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add a keyctl() function to get the security label of a key.
The following is added to Documentation/keys.txt:
(*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key.
long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer,
size_t buflen)
This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context
attached to a key in the buffer provided.
Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could
produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more
than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy
will take place.
A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is
sufficiently big. This is included in the returned count. If no LSM is
in force then an empty string will be returned.
A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be
successful.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: declare keyctl_get_security()]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add missing consts to xattr function arguments.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Filesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0
based privilege and use capabilities instead. That is, with filesystem
support for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually)
possible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain
privilege via (set)uid-0.
Of course, conceptually isn't quite the same as currently possible since few
user applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently
prepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege. Further, many
applications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel
will continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs.
Where pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is
desirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their
privilege. In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable
sets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser
from the process' tree of children.
The feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege
associated with (set)uid-0. This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to
initiate, and only immediately affects the 'current' process (it is inherited
through fork()/exec()). This reimplementation differs significantly from the
historical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which
has ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel.
With this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop
all legacy privilege (through uid=0) for itself and all subsequently
fork()'d/exec()'d children with:
prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f);
This patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is
enabled at configure time.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning]
[serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6:
security: fix up documentation for security_module_enable
Security: Introduce security= boot parameter
Audit: Final renamings and cleanup
SELinux: use new audit hooks, remove redundant exports
Audit: internally use the new LSM audit hooks
LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks
SELinux: remove redundant exports
Netlink: Use generic LSM hook
Audit: use new LSM hooks instead of SELinux exports
SELinux: setup new inode/ipc getsecid hooks
LSM: Introduce inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid hooks
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6.26: (1090 commits)
[NET]: Fix and allocate less memory for ->priv'less netdevices
[IPV6]: Fix dangling references on error in fib6_add().
[NETLABEL]: Fix NULL deref in netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen() if ifindex not found
[PKT_SCHED]: Fix datalen check in tcf_simp_init().
[INET]: Uninline the __inet_inherit_port call.
[INET]: Drop the inet_inherit_port() call.
SCTP: Initialize partial_bytes_acked to 0, when all of the data is acked.
[netdrvr] forcedeth: internal simplifications; changelog removal
phylib: factor out get_phy_id from within get_phy_device
PHY: add BCM5464 support to broadcom PHY driver
cxgb3: Fix __must_check warning with dev_dbg.
tc35815: Statistics cleanup
natsemi: fix MMIO for PPC 44x platforms
[TIPC]: Cleanup of TIPC reference table code
[TIPC]: Optimized initialization of TIPC reference table
[TIPC]: Remove inlining of reference table locking routines
e1000: convert uint16_t style integers to u16
ixgb: convert uint16_t style integers to u16
sb1000.c: make const arrays static
sb1000.c: stop inlining largish static functions
...
Add the security= boot parameter. This is done to avoid LSM
registration clashes in case of more than one bult-in module.
User can choose a security module to enable at boot. If no
security= boot parameter is specified, only the first LSM
asking for registration will be loaded. An invalid security
module name will be treated as if no module has been chosen.
LSM modules must check now if they are allowed to register
by calling security_module_enable(ops) first. Modify SELinux
and SMACK to do so.
Do not let SMACK register smackfs if it was not chosen on
boot. Smackfs assumes that smack hooks are registered and
the initial task security setup (swapper->security) is done.
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Introduce a generic Audit interface for security modules
by adding the following new LSM hooks:
audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule)
audit_rule_known(krule)
audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, rule, actx)
audit_rule_free(rule)
Those hooks are only available if CONFIG_AUDIT is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Introduce inode_getsecid(inode, secid) and ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid)
LSM hooks. These hooks will be used instead of similar exported
SELinux interfaces.
Let {inode,ipc,task}_getsecid hooks set the secid to 0 by default
if CONFIG_SECURITY is not defined or if the hook is set to
NULL (dummy). This is done to notify the caller that no valid
secid exists.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
__FUNCTION__ is gcc-specific, use __func__
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The xfrm_get_policy() and xfrm_add_pol_expire() put some rather large structs
on the stack to work around the LSM API. This patch attempts to fix that
problem by changing the LSM API to require only the relevant "security"
pointers instead of the entire SPD entry; we do this for all of the
security_xfrm_policy*() functions to keep things consistent.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Introduce new LSM interfaces to allow an FS to deal with their own mount
options. This includes a new string parsing function exported from the
LSM that an FS can use to get a security data blob and a new security
data blob. This is particularly useful for an FS which uses binary
mount data, like NFS, which does not pass strings into the vfs to be
handled by the loaded LSM. Also fix a BUG() in both SELinux and SMACK
when dealing with binary mount data. If the binary mount data is less
than one page the copy_page() in security_sb_copy_data() can cause an
illegal page fault and boom. Remove all NFSisms from the SELinux code
since they were broken by past NFS changes.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Since it was decided that low memory protection from userspace couldn't
be turned on by default add a Kconfig option to allow users/distros to
set a default at compile time. This value is still tunable after boot
in /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr
Discussion:
http://www.mail-archive.com/linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org/msg02543.html
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch modifies the interface to inode_getsecurity to have the function
return a buffer containing the security blob and its length via parameters
instead of relying on the calling function to give it an appropriately sized
buffer.
Security blobs obtained with this function should be freed using the
release_secctx LSM hook. This alleviates the problem of the caller having to
guess a length and preallocate a buffer for this function allowing it to be
used elsewhere for Labeled NFS.
The patch also removed the unused err parameter. The conversion is similar to
the one performed by Al Viro for the security_getprocattr hook.
Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing
secid_to_secctx() LSM hook. This patch also includes the SELinux
implementation for this hook.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The security_sb_post_mountroot() hook is long-since obsolete, and is
fundamentally broken: it is never invoked if someone uses initramfs.
This is particularly damaging, because the existence of this hook has
been used as motivation for not using initramfs.
Stephen Smalley confirmed on 2007-07-19 that this hook was originally
used by SELinux but can now be safely removed:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=118485683612916&w=2
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and
security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux. This will allow
filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they
so choose. This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so
it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future.
Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of
them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with
SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has. I assume
future LSM's would do the same. NFS is the primary FS which does not use
text mount data and thus must make use of this interface.
An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time
options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=. If the LSM has no
mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops
take care of things.
An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in
security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would
need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM. This
is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to
understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in
the FS which owns the options.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch contains the following cleanups that are now possible:
- remove the unused security_operations->inode_xattr_getsuffix
- remove the no longer used security_operations->unregister_security
- remove some no longer required exit code
- remove a bunch of no longer used exports
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a
subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use
setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers.
This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at
http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this
patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at
http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Changelog:
Nov 27:
Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton
(security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and
security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix)
Fix Kconfig dependency.
Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in.
Nov 13:
Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from
capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t.
Nov 13:
Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey
Dobriyan.
Nov 09:
Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security
when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean
up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper
function.
Nov 08:
For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use
them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html.
Nov 07:
Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in
check_cap_sanity().
Nov 07:
Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since
capabilities are the default.
Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY.
Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce
audit messages.
Nov 05:
Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and
task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file
cap support can be stacked.
Sep 05:
As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place
for capability code.
Sep 01:
Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and
task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which
they called a program with some fscaps.
One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we
ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a
cpuset?
It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't
allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since
it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where
CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check,
fixing it might be tough.
task_setscheduler
note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with
CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset?
task_setioprio
task_setnice
sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another
process. Need same checks as setrlimit
Aug 21:
Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that
euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process
might still have elevated caps.
Aug 15:
Handle endianness of xattrs.
Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk.
Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are
set, else return -EPERM.
With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering
doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than
d_instantiate.
Aug 10:
Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than
caching it at d_instantiate.
[morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h]
[bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security
module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the
overall security architecture.
Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help reduce API
abuse.
Parameters for the capability and root_plug modules are now specified
at boot.
The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed.
In a nutshell, there is no safe way to unload an LSM. The modular interface
is thus unecessary and broken infrastructure. It is used only by out-of-tree
modules, which are often binary-only, illegal, abusive of the API and
dangerous, e.g. silently re-vectoring SELinux.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: USB Kconfig fix]
[randy.dunlap@oracle.com: fix LSM kernel-doc]
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add a new security check on mmap operations to see if the user is attempting
to mmap to low area of the address space. The amount of space protected is
indicated by the new proc tunable /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr and defaults to
0, preserving existing behavior.
This patch uses a new SELinux security class "memprotect." Policy already
contains a number of allow rules like a_t self:process * (unconfined_t being
one of them) which mean that putting this check in the process class (its
best current fit) would make it useless as all user processes, which we also
want to protect against, would be allowed. By taking the memprotect name of
the new class it will also make it possible for us to move some of the other
memory protect permissions out of 'process' and into the new class next time
we bump the policy version number (which I also think is a good future idea)
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
After Al Viro (finally) succeeded in removing the sched.h #include in module.h
recently, it makes sense again to remove other superfluous sched.h includes.
There are quite a lot of files which include it but don't actually need
anything defined in there. Presumably these includes were once needed for
macros that used to live in sched.h, but moved to other header files in the
course of cleaning it up.
To ease the pain, this time I did not fiddle with any header files and only
removed #includes from .c-files, which tend to cause less trouble.
Compile tested against 2.6.20-rc2 and 2.6.20-rc2-mm2 (with offsets) on alpha,
arm, i386, ia64, mips, powerpc, and x86_64 with allnoconfig, defconfig,
allmodconfig, and allyesconfig as well as a few randconfigs on x86_64 and all
configs in arch/arm/configs on arm. I also checked that no new warnings were
introduced by the patch (actually, some warnings are removed that were emitted
by unnecessarily included header files).
Signed-off-by: Tim Schmielau <tim@physik3.uni-rostock.de>
Acked-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Move capable() to kernel/capability.c and eliminate duplicate
implementations. Add __capable() function which can be used to check for
capabiilty of any process.
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
- Move capable() from sched.h to capability.h;
- Use <linux/capability.h> where capable() is used
(in include/, block/, ipc/, kernel/, a few drivers/,
mm/, security/, & sound/;
many more drivers/ to go)
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
