If something manages to set the maximum file size to MAX_OFFSET+1, this
can cause the xfs and ext4 filesystems at least to become corrupt.
Ordinarily, the kernel protects against userspace trying this by
checking the value early in the truncate() and ftruncate() system calls
calls - but there are at least two places that this check is bypassed:
(1) Cachefiles will round up the EOF of the backing file to DIO block
size so as to allow DIO on the final block - but this might push
the offset negative. It then calls notify_change(), but this
inadvertently bypasses the checking. This can be triggered if
someone puts an 8EiB-1 file on a server for someone else to try and
access by, say, nfs.
(2) ksmbd doesn't check the value it is given in set_end_of_file_info()
and then calls vfs_truncate() directly - which also bypasses the
check.
In both cases, it is potentially possible for a network filesystem to
cause a disk filesystem to be corrupted: cachefiles in the client's
cache filesystem; ksmbd in the server's filesystem.
nfsd is okay as it checks the value, but we can then remove this check
too.
Fix this by adding a check to inode_newsize_ok(), as called from
setattr_prepare(), thereby catching the issue as filesystems set up to
perform the truncate with minimal opportunity for bypassing the new
check.
Fixes: 1f08c925e7 ("cachefiles: Implement backing file wrangling")
Fixes: f441584858 ("cifsd: add file operations")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Acked-by: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
cc: Hyunchul Lee <hyc.lee@gmail.com>
cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
cc: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When building kernel documentation new warnings were generated because
the name in the parameter documentation didn't match the parameter name.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Now that we introduced new infrastructure to increase the type safety
for filesystems supporting idmapped mounts port the first part of the
vfs over to them.
This ports the attribute changes codepaths to rely on the new better
helpers using a dedicated type.
Before this change we used to take a shortcut and place the actual
values that would be written to inode->i_{g,u}id into struct iattr. This
had the advantage that we moved idmappings mostly out of the picture
early on but it made reasoning about changes more difficult than it
should be.
The filesystem was never explicitly told that it dealt with an idmapped
mount. The transition to the value that needed to be stored in
inode->i_{g,u}id appeared way too early and increased the probability of
bugs in various codepaths.
We know place the same value in struct iattr no matter if this is an
idmapped mount or not. The vfs will only deal with type safe
vfs{g,u}id_t. This makes it massively safer to perform permission checks
as the type will tell us what checks we need to perform and what helpers
we need to use.
Fileystems raising FS_ALLOW_IDMAP can't simply write ia_vfs{g,u}id to
inode->i_{g,u}id since they are different types. Instead they need to
use the dedicated vfs{g,u}id_to_k{g,u}id() helpers that map the
vfs{g,u}id into the filesystem.
The other nice effect is that filesystems like overlayfs don't need to
care about idmappings explicitly anymore and can simply set up struct
iattr accordingly directly.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=win6+ahs1EwLkcq8apqLi_1wXFWbrPf340zYEhObpz4jA@mail.gmail.com [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220621141454.2914719-9-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Before this change we used to take a shortcut and place the actual
values that would be written to inode->i_{g,u}id into struct iattr. This
had the advantage that we moved idmappings mostly out of the picture
early on but it made reasoning about changes more difficult than it
should be.
The filesystem was never explicitly told that it dealt with an idmapped
mount. The transition to the value that needed to be stored in
inode->i_{g,u}id appeared way too early and increased the probability of
bugs in various codepaths.
We know place the same value in struct iattr no matter if this is an
idmapped mount or not. The vfs will only deal with type safe
vfs{g,u}id_t. This makes it massively safer to perform permission checks
as the type will tell us what checks we need to perform and what helpers
we need to use.
Adapt the security_inode_setattr() helper to pass down the mount's
idmapping to account for that change.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220621141454.2914719-8-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Earlier we introduced new helpers to abstract ownership update and
remove code duplication. This converts all filesystems supporting
idmapped mounts to make use of these new helpers.
For now we always pass the initial idmapping which makes the idmapping
functions these helpers call nops.
This is done because we currently always pass the actual value to be
written to i_{g,u}id via struct iattr. While this allowed us to treat
the {g,u}id values in struct iattr as values that can be directly
written to inode->i_{g,u}id it also increases the potential for
confusion for filesystems.
Now that we are have dedicated types to prevent this confusion we will
ultimately only map the value from the idmapped mount into a filesystem
value that can be written to inode->i_{g,u}id when the filesystem
actually updates the inode. So pass down the initial idmapping until we
finished that conversion at which point we pass down the mount's
idmapping.
No functional changes intended.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220621141454.2914719-6-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
When calling setattr_prepare() to determine the validity of the
attributes the ia_{g,u}id fields contain the value that will be written
to inode->i_{g,u}id. This is exactly the same for idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts and allows callers to pass in the values they want
to see written to inode->i_{g,u}id.
When group ownership is changed a caller whose fsuid owns the inode can
change the group of the inode to any group they are a member of. When
searching through the caller's groups we need to use the gid mapped
according to the idmapped mount otherwise we will fail to change
ownership for unprivileged users.
Consider a caller running with fsuid and fsgid 1000 using an idmapped
mount that maps id 65534 to 1000 and 65535 to 1001. Consequently, a file
owned by 65534:65535 in the filesystem will be owned by 1000:1001 in the
idmapped mount.
The caller now requests the gid of the file to be changed to 1000 going
through the idmapped mount. In the vfs we will immediately map the
requested gid to the value that will need to be written to inode->i_gid
and place it in attr->ia_gid. Since this idmapped mount maps 65534 to
1000 we place 65534 in attr->ia_gid.
When we check whether the caller is allowed to change group ownership we
first validate that their fsuid matches the inode's uid. The
inode->i_uid is 65534 which is mapped to uid 1000 in the idmapped mount.
Since the caller's fsuid is 1000 we pass the check.
We now check whether the caller is allowed to change inode->i_gid to the
requested gid by calling in_group_p(). This will compare the passed in
gid to the caller's fsgid and search the caller's additional groups.
Since we're dealing with an idmapped mount we need to pass in the gid
mapped according to the idmapped mount. This is akin to checking whether
a caller is privileged over the future group the inode is owned by. And
that needs to take the idmapped mount into account. Note, all helpers
are nops without idmapped mounts.
New regression test sent to xfstests.
Link: https://github.com/lxc/lxd/issues/10537
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220613111517.2186646-1-brauner@kernel.org
Fixes: 2f221d6f7b ("attr: handle idmapped mounts")
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15+
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
When calling setattr_prepare() to determine the validity of the attributes the
ia_{g,u}id fields contain the value that will be written to inode->i_{g,u}id.
When the {g,u}id attribute of the file isn't altered and the caller's fs{g,u}id
matches the current {g,u}id attribute the attribute change is allowed.
The value in ia_{g,u}id does already account for idmapped mounts and will have
taken the relevant idmapping into account. So in order to verify that the
{g,u}id attribute isn't changed we simple need to compare the ia_{g,u}id value
against the inode's i_{g,u}id value.
This only has any meaning for idmapped mounts as idmapping helpers are
idempotent without them. And for idmapped mounts this really only has a meaning
when circular idmappings are used, i.e. mappings where e.g. id 1000 is mapped
to id 1001 and id 1001 is mapped to id 1000. Such ciruclar mappings can e.g. be
useful when sharing the same home directory between multiple users at the same
time.
As an example consider a directory with two files: /source/file1 owned by
{g,u}id 1000 and /source/file2 owned by {g,u}id 1001. Assume we create an
idmapped mount at /target with an idmapping that maps files owned by {g,u}id
1000 to being owned by {g,u}id 1001 and files owned by {g,u}id 1001 to being
owned by {g,u}id 1000. In effect, the idmapped mount at /target switches the
ownership of /source/file1 and source/file2, i.e. /target/file1 will be owned
by {g,u}id 1001 and /target/file2 will be owned by {g,u}id 1000.
This means that a user with fs{g,u}id 1000 must be allowed to setattr
/target/file2 from {g,u}id 1000 to {g,u}id 1000. Similar, a user with fs{g,u}id
1001 must be allowed to setattr /target/file1 from {g,u}id 1001 to {g,u}id
1001. Conversely, a user with fs{g,u}id 1000 must fail to setattr /target/file1
from {g,u}id 1001 to {g,u}id 1000. And a user with fs{g,u}id 1001 must fail to
setattr /target/file2 from {g,u}id 1000 to {g,u}id 1000. Both cases must fail
with EPERM for non-capable callers.
Before this patch we could end up denying legitimate attribute changes and
allowing invalid attribute changes when circular mappings are used. To even get
into this situation the caller must've been privileged both to create that
mapping and to create that idmapped mount.
This hasn't been seen in the wild anywhere but came up when expanding the
testsuite during work on a series of hardening patches. All idmapped fstests
pass without any regressions and we add new tests to verify the behavior of
circular mappings.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211109145713.1868404-1-brauner@kernel.org
Fixes: 2f221d6f7b ("attr: handle idmapped mounts")
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CC: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Move the permission checks in notify_change into a separate function to
make them available to filesystems.
When notify_change is called, the vfs performs those checks before
calling into iop->setattr. However, a filesystem like gfs2 can only
lock and revalidate the inode inside ->setattr, and it must then repeat
those checks to err on the safe side.
It would be nice to get rid of the double checking, but moving the
permission check into iop->setattr altogether isn't really an option.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
IMA does sometimes access the inode's i_uid and compares it against the
rules' fowner. Enable IMA to handle idmapped mounts by passing down the
mount's user namespace. We simply make use of the helpers we introduced
before. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so
non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-27-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Extend some inode methods with an additional user namespace argument. A
filesystem that is aware of idmapped mounts will receive the user
namespace the mount has been marked with. This can be used for
additional permission checking and also to enable filesystems to
translate between uids and gids if they need to. We have implemented all
relevant helpers in earlier patches.
As requested we simply extend the exisiting inode method instead of
introducing new ones. This is a little more code churn but it's mostly
mechanical and doesnt't leave us with additional inode methods.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-25-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware
filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to
determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the
caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main
infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are
called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not
technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks
security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(),
security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and
makes them aware of idmapped mounts.
In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the
capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper.
For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored
alongside the capabilities.
In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem
capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according
to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0
according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem
capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds
the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root
uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are
identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk
enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability
must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the
caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the
superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside
user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't
usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an
idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which
is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not
mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true
because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace.
If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped
mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
When file attributes are changed most filesystems rely on the
setattr_prepare(), setattr_copy(), and notify_change() helpers for
initialization and permission checking. Let them handle idmapped mounts.
If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the
mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to
non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Helpers that perform checks on the ia_uid and ia_gid fields in struct
iattr assume that ia_uid and ia_gid are intended values and have already
been mapped correctly at the userspace-kernelspace boundary as we
already do today. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing
changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-8-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The inode_owner_or_capable() helper determines whether the caller is the
owner of the inode or is capable with respect to that inode. Allow it to
handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped
mount it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks
are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is
passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical
behavior as before.
Similarly, allow the inode_init_owner() helper to handle idmapped
mounts. It initializes a new inode on idmapped mounts by mapping the
fsuid and fsgid of the caller from the mount's user namespace. If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-7-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The two helpers inode_permission() and generic_permission() are used by
the vfs to perform basic permission checking by verifying that the
caller is privileged over an inode. In order to handle idmapped mounts
we extend the two helpers with an additional user namespace argument.
On idmapped mounts the two helpers will make sure to map the inode
according to the mount's user namespace and then peform identical
permission checks to inode_permission() and generic_permission(). If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-6-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
In order to determine whether a caller holds privilege over a given
inode the capability framework exposes the two helpers
privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid() and capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(). The former
verifies that the inode has a mapping in the caller's user namespace and
the latter additionally verifies that the caller has the requested
capability in their current user namespace.
If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the
mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to
non-idmapped inodes. If the initial user namespace is passed all
operations are a nop so non-idmapped mounts will not see a change in
behavior.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-5-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Push clamping timestamps into notify_change(), so in-kernel
callers like nfsd and overlayfs will get similar timestamp
set behavior as utimes.
AV: get rid of clamping in ->setattr() instances; we don't need
to bother with that there, with notify_change() doing normalization
in all cases now (it already did for implicit case, since current_time()
clamps).
Suggested-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Fixes: 42e729b9dd ("utimes: Clamp the timestamps before update")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.4
Cc: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This is a late set of changes from Deepa Dinamani doing an automated
treewide conversion of the inode and iattr structures from 'timespec'
to 'timespec64', to push the conversion from the VFS layer into the
individual file systems.
There were no conflicts between this and the contents of linux-next
until just before the merge window, when we saw multiple problems:
- A minor conflict with my own y2038 fixes, which I could address
by adding another patch on top here.
- One semantic conflict with late changes to the NFS tree. I addressed
this by merging Deepa's original branch on top of the changes that
now got merged into mainline and making sure the merge commit includes
the necessary changes as produced by coccinelle.
- A trivial conflict against the removal of staging/lustre.
- Multiple conflicts against the VFS changes in the overlayfs tree.
These are still part of linux-next, but apparently this is no longer
intended for 4.18 [1], so I am ignoring that part.
As Deepa writes:
The series aims to switch vfs timestamps to use struct timespec64.
Currently vfs uses struct timespec, which is not y2038 safe.
The series involves the following:
1. Add vfs helper functions for supporting struct timepec64 timestamps.
2. Cast prints of vfs timestamps to avoid warnings after the switch.
3. Simplify code using vfs timestamps so that the actual
replacement becomes easy.
4. Convert vfs timestamps to use struct timespec64 using a script.
This is a flag day patch.
Next steps:
1. Convert APIs that can handle timespec64, instead of converting
timestamps at the boundaries.
2. Update internal data structures to avoid timestamp conversions.
Thomas Gleixner adds:
I think there is no point to drag that out for the next merge window.
The whole thing needs to be done in one go for the core changes which
means that you're going to play that catchup game forever. Let's get
over with it towards the end of the merge window.
[1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-fsdevel/msg128294.html
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Merge tag 'vfs-timespec64' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground
Pull inode timestamps conversion to timespec64 from Arnd Bergmann:
"This is a late set of changes from Deepa Dinamani doing an automated
treewide conversion of the inode and iattr structures from 'timespec'
to 'timespec64', to push the conversion from the VFS layer into the
individual file systems.
As Deepa writes:
'The series aims to switch vfs timestamps to use struct timespec64.
Currently vfs uses struct timespec, which is not y2038 safe.
The series involves the following:
1. Add vfs helper functions for supporting struct timepec64
timestamps.
2. Cast prints of vfs timestamps to avoid warnings after the switch.
3. Simplify code using vfs timestamps so that the actual replacement
becomes easy.
4. Convert vfs timestamps to use struct timespec64 using a script.
This is a flag day patch.
Next steps:
1. Convert APIs that can handle timespec64, instead of converting
timestamps at the boundaries.
2. Update internal data structures to avoid timestamp conversions'
Thomas Gleixner adds:
'I think there is no point to drag that out for the next merge
window. The whole thing needs to be done in one go for the core
changes which means that you're going to play that catchup game
forever. Let's get over with it towards the end of the merge window'"
* tag 'vfs-timespec64' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground:
pstore: Remove bogus format string definition
vfs: change inode times to use struct timespec64
pstore: Convert internal records to timespec64
udf: Simplify calls to udf_disk_stamp_to_time
fs: nfs: get rid of memcpys for inode times
ceph: make inode time prints to be long long
lustre: Use long long type to print inode time
fs: add timespec64_truncate()
Allow users with CAP_SYS_CHOWN over the superblock of a filesystem to
chown files when inode owner is invalid. Ordinarily the
capable_wrt_inode_uidgid check is sufficient to allow access to files
but when the underlying filesystem has uids or gids that don't map to
the current user namespace it is not enough, so the chown permission
checks need to be extended to allow this case.
Calling chown on filesystem nodes whose uid or gid don't map is
necessary if those nodes are going to be modified as writing back
inodes which contain uids or gids that don't map is likely to cause
filesystem corruption of the uid or gid fields.
Once chown has been called the existing capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
checks are sufficient to allow the owner of a superblock to do anything
the global root user can do with an appropriate set of capabilities.
An ordinary filesystem mountable by a userns root will limit all uids
and gids in s_user_ns or the INVALID_UID and INVALID_GID to flag all
others. So having this added permission limited to just INVALID_UID
and INVALID_GID is sufficient to handle every case on an ordinary filesystem.
Of the virtual filesystems at least proc is known to set s_user_ns to
something other than &init_user_ns, while at the same time presenting
some files owned by GLOBAL_ROOT_UID. Those files the mounter of proc
in a user namespace should not be able to chown to get access to.
Limiting the relaxation in permission to just the minimum of allowing
changing INVALID_UID and INVALID_GID prevents problems with cases like
that.
The original version of this patch was written by: Seth Forshee. I
have rewritten and rethought this patch enough so it's really not the
same thing (certainly it needs a different description), but he
deserves credit for getting out there and getting the conversation
started, and finding the potential gotcha's and putting up with my
semi-paranoid feedback.
Inspired-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
We are going to split <linux/sched/signal.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/signal.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull more vfs updates from Al Viro:
">rename2() work from Miklos + current_time() from Deepa"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fs: Replace current_fs_time() with current_time()
fs: Replace CURRENT_TIME_SEC with current_time() for inode timestamps
fs: Replace CURRENT_TIME with current_time() for inode timestamps
fs: proc: Delete inode time initializations in proc_alloc_inode()
vfs: Add current_time() api
vfs: add note about i_op->rename changes to porting
fs: rename "rename2" i_op to "rename"
vfs: remove unused i_op->rename
fs: make remaining filesystems use .rename2
libfs: support RENAME_NOREPLACE in simple_rename()
fs: support RENAME_NOREPLACE for local filesystems
ncpfs: fix unused variable warning
current_fs_time() uses struct super_block* as an argument.
As per Linus's suggestion, this is changed to take struct
inode* as a parameter instead. This is because the function
is primarily meant for vfs inode timestamps.
Also the function was renamed as per Arnd's suggestion.
Change all calls to current_fs_time() to use the new
current_time() function instead. current_fs_time() will be
deleted.
Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Currently, notify_change() clears capabilities or IMA attributes by
calling security_inode_killpriv() before calling into ->setattr. Thus it
happens before any other permission checks in inode_change_ok() and user
is thus allowed to trigger clearing of capabilities or IMA attributes
for any file he can look up e.g. by calling chown for that file. This is
unexpected and can lead to user DoSing a system.
Fix the problem by calling security_inode_killpriv() at the end of
inode_change_ok() instead of from notify_change(). At that moment we are
sure user has permissions to do the requested change.
References: CVE-2015-1350
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
inode_change_ok() will be resposible for clearing capabilities and IMA
extended attributes and as such will need dentry. Give it as an argument
to inode_change_ok() instead of an inode. Also rename inode_change_ok()
to setattr_prepare() to better relect that it does also some
modifications in addition to checks.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
This fixes a bug where the permission was not properly checked in
overlayfs. The testcase is ltp/utimensat01.
It is also cleaner and safer to do the permission checking in the vfs
helper instead of the caller.
This patch introduces an additional ia_valid flag ATTR_TOUCH (since
touch(1) is the most obvious user of utimes(NULL)) that is passed into
notify_change whenever the conditions for this special permission checking
mode are met.
Reported-by: Aihua Zhang <zhangaihua1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Aihua Zhang <zhangaihua1@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.18+
When a filesystem outside of init_user_ns is mounted it could have
uids and gids stored in it that do not map to init_user_ns.
The plan is to allow those filesystems to set i_uid to INVALID_UID and
i_gid to INVALID_GID for unmapped uids and gids and then to handle
that strange case in the vfs to ensure there is consistent robust
handling of the weirdness.
Upon a careful review of the vfs and filesystems about the only case
where there is any possibility of confusion or trouble is when the
inode is written back to disk. In that case filesystems typically
read the inode->i_uid and inode->i_gid and write them to disk even
when just an inode timestamp is being updated.
Which leads to a rule that is very simple to implement and understand
inodes whose i_uid or i_gid is not valid may not be written.
In dealing with access times this means treat those inodes as if the
inode flag S_NOATIME was set. Reads of the inodes appear safe and
useful, but any write or modification is disallowed. The only inode
write that is allowed is a chown that sets the uid and gid on the
inode to valid values. After such a chown the inode is normal and may
be treated as such.
Denying all writes to inodes with uids or gids unknown to the vfs also
prevents several oddball cases where corruption would have occurred
because the vfs does not have complete information.
One problem case that is prevented is attempting to use the gid of a
directory for new inodes where the directories sgid bit is set but the
directories gid is not mapped.
Another problem case avoided is attempting to update the evm hash
after setxattr, removexattr, and setattr. As the evm hash includeds
the inode->i_uid or inode->i_gid not knowning the uid or gid prevents
a correct evm hash from being computed. evm hash verification also
fails when i_uid or i_gid is unknown but that is essentially harmless
as it does not cause filesystem corruption.
Acked-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Add checks to notify_change to verify that uid and gid changes
will map into the superblock's user namespace. If they do not
fail with -EOVERFLOW.
This is mandatory so that fileystems don't have to even think
of dealing with ia_uid and ia_gid that
--EWB Moved the test from inode_change_ok to notify_change
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
parallel to mutex_{lock,unlock,trylock,is_locked,lock_nested},
inode_foo(inode) being mutex_foo(&inode->i_mutex).
Please, use those for access to ->i_mutex; over the coming cycle
->i_mutex will become rwsem, with ->lookup() done with it held
only shared.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently notify_change directly updates i_version for size updates,
which not only is counter to how all other fields are updated through
struct iattr, but also breaks XFS, which need inode updates to happen
under its own lock, and synchronized to the structure that gets written
to the log.
Remove the update in the common code, and it to btrfs and ext4,
XFS already does a proper updaste internally and currently gets a
double update with the existing code.
IMHO this is 3.13 and -stable material and should go in through the XFS
tree.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
NFSv4 uses leases to guarantee that clients can cache metadata as well
as data.
Cc: Mikulas Patocka <mikulas@artax.karlin.mff.cuni.cz>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@gazzang.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
- Allow chown if CAP_CHOWN is present in the current user namespace
and the uid of the inode maps into the current user namespace, and
the destination uid or gid maps into the current user namespace.
- Allow perserving setgid when changing an inode if CAP_FSETID is
present in the current user namespace and the owner of the file has
a mapping into the current user namespace.
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Changing an inode's metadata may result in our not needing to appraise
the file. In such cases, we must remove 'security.ima'.
Changelog v1:
- use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
When a file is truncated with truncate()/ftruncate() and then closed,
iversion is not updated. This patch uses ATTR_SIZE flag as an indication
to increment iversion.
Mimi said:
On fput(), i_version is used to detect and flag files that have changed
and need to be re-measured in the IMA measurement policy. When a file
is truncated with truncate()/ftruncate() and then closed, i_version is
not updated. As a result, although the file has changed, it will not be
re-measured and added to the IMA measurement list on subsequent access.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
For files only using THIS_MODULE and/or EXPORT_SYMBOL, map
them onto including export.h -- or if the file isn't even
using those, then just delete the include. Fix up any implicit
include dependencies that were being masked by module.h along
the way.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Let filesystems handle waiting for direct I/O requests themselves instead
of doing it beforehand. This means filesystem-specific locks to prevent
new dio referenes from appearing can be held. This is important to allow
generalizing i_dio_count to non-DIO_LOCKING filesystems.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
i_alloc_sem is a rather special rw_semaphore. It's the last one that may
be released by a non-owner, and it's write side is always mirrored by
real exclusion. It's intended use it to wait for all pending direct I/O
requests to finish before starting a truncate.
Replace it with a hand-grown construct:
- exclusion for truncates is already guaranteed by i_mutex, so it can
simply fall way
- the reader side is replaced by an i_dio_count member in struct inode
that counts the number of pending direct I/O requests. Truncate can't
proceed as long as it's non-zero
- when i_dio_count reaches non-zero we wake up a pending truncate using
wake_up_bit on a new bit in i_flags
- new references to i_dio_count can't appear while we are waiting for
it to read zero because the direct I/O count always needs i_mutex
(or an equivalent like XFS's i_iolock) for starting a new operation.
This scheme is much simpler, and saves the space of a spinlock_t and a
struct list_head in struct inode (typically 160 bits on a non-debug 64-bit
system).
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Changing the inode's metadata may require the 'security.evm' extended
attribute to be re-calculated and updated.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Some recent benchmarking on btrfs showed that a major scaling bottleneck
on large systems on btrfs is currently the xattr lookup on every write.
Why xattr lookup on every write I hear you ask?
write wants to drop suid and security related xattrs that could set o
capabilities for executables. To do that it currently looks up
security.capability on EVERY write (even for non executables) to decide
whether to drop it or not.
In btrfs this causes an additional tree walk, hitting some per file system
locks and quite bad scalability. In a simple read workload on a 8S
system I saw over 90% CPU time in spinlocks related to that.
Chris Mason tells me this is also a problem in ext4, where it hits
the global mbcache lock.
This patch adds a simple per inode to avoid this problem. We only
do the lookup once per file and then if there is no xattr cache
the decision. All xattr changes clear the flag.
I also used the same flag to avoid the suid check, although
that one is pretty cheap.
A file system can also set this flag when it creates the inode,
if it has a cheap way to do so. This is done for some common file systems
in followon patches.
With this patch a major part of the lock contention disappears
for btrfs. Some testing on smaller systems didn't show significant
performance changes, but at least it helps the larger systems
and is generally more efficient.
v2: Rename is_sgid. add file system helper.
Cc: chris.mason@oracle.com
Cc: josef@redhat.com
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: agruen@linbit.com
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
And give it a kernel-doc comment.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: btrfs changed in linux-next]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Make sure we check the truncate constraints early on in ->setattr by adding
those checks to inode_change_ok. Also clean up and document inode_change_ok
to make this obvious.
As a fallout we don't have to call inode_newsize_ok from simple_setsize and
simplify it down to a truncate_setsize which doesn't return an error. This
simplifies a lot of setattr implementations and means we use truncate_setsize
almost everywhere. Get rid of fat_setsize now that it's trivial and mark
ext2_setsize static to make the calling convention obvious.
Keep the inode_newsize_ok in vmtruncate for now as all callers need an
audit for its removal anyway.
Note: setattr code in ecryptfs doesn't call inode_change_ok at all and
needs a deeper audit, but that is left for later.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
