Commit Graph

1410 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Alexey Dobriyan
774636e19e proc: convert to kstrto*()/kstrto*_from_user()
Convert from manual allocation/copy_from_user/...  to kstrto*() family
which were designed for exactly that.

One case can not be converted to kstrto*_from_user() to make code even
more simpler because of whitespace stripping, oh well...

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 13:29:01 -07:00
Waiman Long
ecf1a3dfff proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock
The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make
change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information
in it.  However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by
more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update
calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement
respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates.

The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other
architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock.  So
unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion.

This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable
concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a
write lock:
 - proc_register()
 - remove_proc_entry()
 - remove_proc_subtree()

The following functions were modified to take a read lock:
 - xlate_proc_name()
 - proc_lookup_de()
 - proc_readdir_de()

A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads)
was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads).  Before the patch, the
parallel search took about 39s.  After the patch, the parallel find took
only 25s, a saving of about 14s.

The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to
reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application.  In
fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me.

Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com>
Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 13:29:01 -07:00
Calvin Owens
bdb4d100af procfs: always expose /proc/<pid>/map_files/ and make it readable
Currently, /proc/<pid>/map_files/ is restricted to CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and is
only exposed if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is set.

Each mapped file region gets a symlink in /proc/<pid>/map_files/
corresponding to the virtual address range at which it is mapped.  The
symlinks work like the symlinks in /proc/<pid>/fd/, so you can follow them
to the backing file even if that backing file has been unlinked.

Currently, files which are mapped, unlinked, and closed are impossible to
stat() from userspace.  Exposing /proc/<pid>/map_files/ closes this
functionality "hole".

Not being able to stat() such files makes noticing and explicitly
accounting for the space they use on the filesystem impossible.  You can
work around this by summing up the space used by every file in the
filesystem and subtracting that total from what statfs() tells you, but
that obviously isn't great, and it becomes unworkable once your filesystem
becomes large enough.

This patch moves map_files/ out from behind CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, and
adjusts the permissions enforced on it as follows:

* proc_map_files_lookup()
* proc_map_files_readdir()
* map_files_d_revalidate()

	Remove the CAP_SYS_ADMIN restriction, leaving only the current
	restriction requiring PTRACE_MODE_READ. The information made
	available to userspace by these three functions is already
	available in /proc/PID/maps with MODE_READ, so I don't see any
	reason to limit them any further (see below for more detail).

* proc_map_files_follow_link()

	This stub has been added, and requires that the user have
	CAP_SYS_ADMIN in order to follow the links in map_files/,
	since there was concern on LKML both about the potential for
	bypassing permissions on ancestor directories in the path to
	files pointed to, and about what happens with more exotic
	memory mappings created by some drivers (ie dma-buf).

In older versions of this patch, I changed every permission check in
the four functions above to enforce MODE_ATTACH instead of MODE_READ.
This was an oversight on my part, and after revisiting the discussion
it seems that nobody was concerned about anything outside of what is
made possible by ->follow_link(). So in this version, I've left the
checks for PTRACE_MODE_READ as-is.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: catch up with concurrent proc_pid_follow_link() changes]
Signed-off-by: Calvin Owens <calvinowens@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 13:29:01 -07:00
Vladimir Davydov
d3691d2c6d proc: add cond_resched to /proc/kpage* read/write loop
Reading/writing a /proc/kpage* file may take long on machines with a lot
of RAM installed.

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com>
Suggested-by: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 13:29:01 -07:00
Vladimir Davydov
f074a8f49e proc: export idle flag via kpageflags
As noted by Minchan, a benefit of reading idle flag from /proc/kpageflags
is that one can easily filter dirty and/or unevictable pages while
estimating the size of unused memory.

Note that idle flag read from /proc/kpageflags may be stale in case the
page was accessed via a PTE, because it would be too costly to iterate
over all page mappings on each /proc/kpageflags read to provide an
up-to-date value.  To make sure the flag is up-to-date one has to read
/sys/kernel/mm/page_idle/bitmap first.

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com>
Reviewed-by: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 13:29:01 -07:00
Vladimir Davydov
33c3fc71c8 mm: introduce idle page tracking
Knowing the portion of memory that is not used by a certain application or
memory cgroup (idle memory) can be useful for partitioning the system
efficiently, e.g.  by setting memory cgroup limits appropriately.
Currently, the only means to estimate the amount of idle memory provided
by the kernel is /proc/PID/{clear_refs,smaps}: the user can clear the
access bit for all pages mapped to a particular process by writing 1 to
clear_refs, wait for some time, and then count smaps:Referenced.  However,
this method has two serious shortcomings:

 - it does not count unmapped file pages
 - it affects the reclaimer logic

To overcome these drawbacks, this patch introduces two new page flags,
Idle and Young, and a new sysfs file, /sys/kernel/mm/page_idle/bitmap.
A page's Idle flag can only be set from userspace by setting bit in
/sys/kernel/mm/page_idle/bitmap at the offset corresponding to the page,
and it is cleared whenever the page is accessed either through page tables
(it is cleared in page_referenced() in this case) or using the read(2)
system call (mark_page_accessed()). Thus by setting the Idle flag for
pages of a particular workload, which can be found e.g.  by reading
/proc/PID/pagemap, waiting for some time to let the workload access its
working set, and then reading the bitmap file, one can estimate the amount
of pages that are not used by the workload.

The Young page flag is used to avoid interference with the memory
reclaimer.  A page's Young flag is set whenever the Access bit of a page
table entry pointing to the page is cleared by writing to the bitmap file.
If page_referenced() is called on a Young page, it will add 1 to its
return value, therefore concealing the fact that the Access bit was
cleared.

Note, since there is no room for extra page flags on 32 bit, this feature
uses extended page flags when compiled on 32 bit.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: kpageidle requires an MMU]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: decouple from page-flags rework]
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com>
Reviewed-by: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 13:29:01 -07:00
Vladimir Davydov
80ae2fdceb proc: add kpagecgroup file
/proc/kpagecgroup contains a 64-bit inode number of the memory cgroup each
page is charged to, indexed by PFN.  Having this information is useful for
estimating a cgroup working set size.

The file is present if CONFIG_PROC_PAGE_MONITOR && CONFIG_MEMCG.

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com>
Reviewed-by: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 13:29:01 -07:00
Minchan Kim
8334b96221 mm: /proc/pid/smaps:: show proportional swap share of the mapping
We want to know per-process workingset size for smart memory management
on userland and we use swap(ex, zram) heavily to maximize memory
efficiency so workingset includes swap as well as RSS.

On such system, if there are lots of shared anonymous pages, it's really
hard to figure out exactly how many each process consumes memory(ie, rss
+ wap) if the system has lots of shared anonymous memory(e.g, android).

This patch introduces SwapPss field on /proc/<pid>/smaps so we can get
more exact workingset size per process.

Bongkyu tested it. Result is below.

1. 50M used swap
SwapTotal: 461976 kB
SwapFree: 411192 kB

$ adb shell cat /proc/*/smaps | grep "SwapPss:" | awk '{sum += $2} END {print sum}';
48236
$ adb shell cat /proc/*/smaps | grep "Swap:" | awk '{sum += $2} END {print sum}';
141184

2. 240M used swap
SwapTotal: 461976 kB
SwapFree: 216808 kB

$ adb shell cat /proc/*/smaps | grep "SwapPss:" | awk '{sum += $2} END {print sum}';
230315
$ adb shell cat /proc/*/smaps | grep "Swap:" | awk '{sum += $2} END {print sum}';
1387744

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: simplify kunmap_atomic() call]
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Bongkyu Kim <bongkyu.kim@lge.com>
Tested-by: Bongkyu Kim <bongkyu.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-08 15:35:28 -07:00
Konstantin Khlebnikov
77bb499bb6 pagemap: add mmap-exclusive bit for marking pages mapped only here
This patch sets bit 56 in pagemap if this page is mapped only once.  It
allows to detect exclusively used pages without exposing PFN:

present file exclusive state
0       0    0         non-present
1       1    0         file page mapped somewhere else
1       1    1         file page mapped only here
1       0    0         anon non-CoWed page (shared with parent/child)
1       0    1         anon CoWed page (or never forked)

CoWed pages in (MAP_FILE | MAP_PRIVATE) areas are anon in this context.

MMap-exclusive bit doesn't reflect potential page-sharing via swapcache:
page could be mapped once but has several swap-ptes which point to it.
Application could detect that by swap bit in pagemap entry and touch that
pte via /proc/pid/mem to get real information.

See http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAEVpBa+_RyACkhODZrRvQLs80iy0sqpdrd0AaP_-tgnX3Y9yNQ@mail.gmail.com

Requested by Mark Williamson.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix spello]
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com>
Tested-by:  Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com>
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-08 15:35:28 -07:00
Konstantin Khlebnikov
1c90308e7a pagemap: hide physical addresses from non-privileged users
This patch makes pagemap readable for normal users and hides physical
addresses from them.  For some use-cases PFN isn't required at all.

See http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1425935472-17949-1-git-send-email-kirill@shutemov.name

Fixes: ab676b7d6f ("pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace")
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com>
Tested-by:  Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-08 15:35:28 -07:00
Konstantin Khlebnikov
356515e7b6 pagemap: rework hugetlb and thp report
This patch moves pmd dissection out of reporting loop: huge pages are
reported as bunch of normal pages with contiguous PFNs.

Add missing "FILE" bit in hugetlb vmas.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com>
Tested-by:  Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-08 15:35:28 -07:00
Konstantin Khlebnikov
deb945441b pagemap: switch to the new format and do some cleanup
This patch removes page-shift bits (scheduled to remove since 3.11) and
completes migration to the new bit layout.  Also it cleans messy macro.

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com>
Tested-by:  Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-08 15:35:28 -07:00
Konstantin Khlebnikov
a06db751c3 pagemap: check permissions and capabilities at open time
This patchset makes pagemap useable again in the safe way (after row
hammer bug it was made CAP_SYS_ADMIN-only).  This patchset restores access
for non-privileged users but hides PFNs from them.

Also it adds bit 'map-exclusive' which is set if page is mapped only here:
it helps in estimation of working set without exposing pfns and allows to
distinguish CoWed and non-CoWed private anonymous pages.

Second patch removes page-shift bits and completes migration to the new
pagemap format: flags soft-dirty and mmap-exclusive are available only in
the new format.

This patch (of 5):

This patch moves permission checks from pagemap_read() into pagemap_open().

Pointer to mm is saved in file->private_data. This reference pins only
mm_struct itself. /proc/*/mem, maps, smaps already work in the same way.

See http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFyKpWrt_Ajzh1rzp_GcwZ4=6Y=kOv8hBz172CFJp6L8Tg@mail.gmail.com

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com>
Tested-by:  Mark Williamson <mwilliamson@undo-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-08 15:35:28 -07:00
Andrea Arcangeli
16ba6f811d userfaultfd: add VM_UFFD_MISSING and VM_UFFD_WP
These two flags gets set in vma->vm_flags to tell the VM common code
if the userfaultfd is armed and in which mode (only tracking missing
faults, only tracking wrprotect faults or both). If neither flags is
set it means the userfaultfd is not armed on the vma.

Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Sanidhya Kashyap <sanidhya.gatech@gmail.com>
Cc: zhang.zhanghailiang@huawei.com
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Peter Feiner <pfeiner@google.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: "Huangpeng (Peter)" <peter.huangpeng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-04 16:54:41 -07:00
Andy Lutomirski
58319057b7 capabilities: ambient capabilities
Credit where credit is due: this idea comes from Christoph Lameter with
a lot of valuable input from Serge Hallyn.  This patch is heavily based
on Christoph's patch.

===== The status quo =====

On Linux, there are a number of capabilities defined by the kernel.  To
perform various privileged tasks, processes can wield capabilities that
they hold.

Each task has four capability masks: effective (pE), permitted (pP),
inheritable (pI), and a bounding set (X).  When the kernel checks for a
capability, it checks pE.  The other capability masks serve to modify
what capabilities can be in pE.

Any task can remove capabilities from pE, pP, or pI at any time.  If a
task has a capability in pP, it can add that capability to pE and/or pI.
If a task has CAP_SETPCAP, then it can add any capability to pI, and it
can remove capabilities from X.

Tasks are not the only things that can have capabilities; files can also
have capabilities.  A file can have no capabilty information at all [1].
If a file has capability information, then it has a permitted mask (fP)
and an inheritable mask (fI) as well as a single effective bit (fE) [2].
File capabilities modify the capabilities of tasks that execve(2) them.

A task that successfully calls execve has its capabilities modified for
the file ultimately being excecuted (i.e.  the binary itself if that
binary is ELF or for the interpreter if the binary is a script.) [3] In
the capability evolution rules, for each mask Z, pZ represents the old
value and pZ' represents the new value.  The rules are:

  pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
  pI' = pI
  pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0)
  X is unchanged

For setuid binaries, fP, fI, and fE are modified by a moderately
complicated set of rules that emulate POSIX behavior.  Similarly, if
euid == 0 or ruid == 0, then fP, fI, and fE are modified differently
(primary, fP and fI usually end up being the full set).  For nonroot
users executing binaries with neither setuid nor file caps, fI and fP
are empty and fE is false.

As an extra complication, if you execute a process as nonroot and fE is
set, then the "secure exec" rules are in effect: AT_SECURE gets set,
LD_PRELOAD doesn't work, etc.

This is rather messy.  We've learned that making any changes is
dangerous, though: if a new kernel version allows an unprivileged
program to change its security state in a way that persists cross
execution of a setuid program or a program with file caps, this
persistent state is surprisingly likely to allow setuid or file-capped
programs to be exploited for privilege escalation.

===== The problem =====

Capability inheritance is basically useless.

If you aren't root and you execute an ordinary binary, fI is zero, so
your capabilities have no effect whatsoever on pP'.  This means that you
can't usefully execute a helper process or a shell command with elevated
capabilities if you aren't root.

On current kernels, you can sort of work around this by setting fI to
the full set for most or all non-setuid executable files.  This causes
pP' = pI for nonroot, and inheritance works.  No one does this because
it's a PITA and it isn't even supported on most filesystems.

If you try this, you'll discover that every nonroot program ends up with
secure exec rules, breaking many things.

This is a problem that has bitten many people who have tried to use
capabilities for anything useful.

===== The proposed change =====

This patch adds a fifth capability mask called the ambient mask (pA).
pA does what most people expect pI to do.

pA obeys the invariant that no bit can ever be set in pA if it is not
set in both pP and pI.  Dropping a bit from pP or pI drops that bit from
pA.  This ensures that existing programs that try to drop capabilities
still do so, with a complication.  Because capability inheritance is so
broken, setting KEEPCAPS, using setresuid to switch to nonroot uids, and
then calling execve effectively drops capabilities.  Therefore,
setresuid from root to nonroot conditionally clears pA unless
SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP is set.  Processes that don't like this can
re-add bits to pA afterwards.

The capability evolution rules are changed:

  pA' = (file caps or setuid or setgid ? 0 : pA)
  pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA'
  pI' = pI
  pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA')
  X is unchanged

If you are nonroot but you have a capability, you can add it to pA.  If
you do so, your children get that capability in pA, pP, and pE.  For
example, you can set pA = CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, and your children can
automatically bind low-numbered ports.  Hallelujah!

Unprivileged users can create user namespaces, map themselves to a
nonzero uid, and create both privileged (relative to their namespace)
and unprivileged process trees.  This is currently more or less
impossible.  Hallelujah!

You cannot use pA to try to subvert a setuid, setgid, or file-capped
program: if you execute any such program, pA gets cleared and the
resulting evolution rules are unchanged by this patch.

Users with nonzero pA are unlikely to unintentionally leak that
capability.  If they run programs that try to drop privileges, dropping
privileges will still work.

It's worth noting that the degree of paranoia in this patch could
possibly be reduced without causing serious problems.  Specifically, if
we allowed pA to persist across executing non-pA-aware setuid binaries
and across setresuid, then, naively, the only capabilities that could
leak as a result would be the capabilities in pA, and any attacker
*already* has those capabilities.  This would make me nervous, though --
setuid binaries that tried to privilege-separate might fail to do so,
and putting CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE into pA could have
unexpected side effects.  (Whether these unexpected side effects would
be exploitable is an open question.) I've therefore taken the more
paranoid route.  We can revisit this later.

An alternative would be to require PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before setting
ambient capabilities.  I think that this would be annoying and would
make granting otherwise unprivileged users minor ambient capabilities
(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE or CAP_NET_RAW for example) much less useful than
it is with this patch.

===== Footnotes =====

[1] Files that are missing the "security.capability" xattr or that have
unrecognized values for that xattr end up with has_cap set to false.
The code that does that appears to be complicated for no good reason.

[2] The libcap capability mask parsers and formatters are dangerously
misleading and the documentation is flat-out wrong.  fE is *not* a mask;
it's a single bit.  This has probably confused every single person who
has tried to use file capabilities.

[3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the interpreter
if applicable, for reasons that elude me.  The results from thinking
about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid bits are mostly
discarded.

Preliminary userspace code is here, but it needs updating:
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/luto/util-linux-playground.git/commit/?h=cap_ambient&id=7f5afbd175d2

Here is a test program that can be used to verify the functionality
(from Christoph):

/*
 * Test program for the ambient capabilities. This program spawns a shell
 * that allows running processes with a defined set of capabilities.
 *
 * (C) 2015 Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
 * Released under: GPL v3 or later.
 *
 *
 * Compile using:
 *
 *	gcc -o ambient_test ambient_test.o -lcap-ng
 *
 * This program must have the following capabilities to run properly:
 * Permissions for CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_NICE
 *
 * A command to equip the binary with the right caps is:
 *
 *	setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin,cap_sys_nice+p ambient_test
 *
 *
 * To get a shell with additional caps that can be inherited by other processes:
 *
 *	./ambient_test /bin/bash
 *
 *
 * Verifying that it works:
 *
 * From the bash spawed by ambient_test run
 *
 *	cat /proc/$$/status
 *
 * and have a look at the capabilities.
 */

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <cap-ng.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>

/*
 * Definitions from the kernel header files. These are going to be removed
 * when the /usr/include files have these defined.
 */
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT 47
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET 1
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE 2
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3
#define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4

static void set_ambient_cap(int cap)
{
	int rc;

	capng_get_caps_process();
	rc = capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_INHERITABLE, cap);
	if (rc) {
		printf("Cannot add inheritable cap\n");
		exit(2);
	}
	capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS);

	/* Note the two 0s at the end. Kernel checks for these */
	if (prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE, cap, 0, 0)) {
		perror("Cannot set cap");
		exit(1);
	}
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	int rc;

	set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_RAW);
	set_ambient_cap(CAP_NET_ADMIN);
	set_ambient_cap(CAP_SYS_NICE);

	printf("Ambient_test forking shell\n");
	if (execv(argv[1], argv + 1))
		perror("Cannot exec");

	return 0;
}

Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> # Original author
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Aaron Jones <aaronmdjones@gmail.com>
Cc: Ted Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>
Cc: Markku Savela <msa@moth.iki.fi>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-04 16:54:41 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
73b6fa8e49 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
 "This finishes up the changes to ensure proc and sysfs do not start
  implementing executable files, as the there are application today that
  are only secure because such files do not exist.

  It akso fixes a long standing misfeature of /proc/<pid>/mountinfo that
  did not show the proper source for files bind mounted from
  /proc/<pid>/ns/*.

  It also straightens out the handling of clone flags related to user
  namespaces, fixing an unnecessary failure of unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER)
  when files such as /proc/<pid>/environ are read while <pid> is calling
  unshare.  This winds up fixing a minor bug in unshare flag handling
  that dates back to the first version of unshare in the kernel.

  Finally, this fixes a minor regression caused by the introduction of
  sysfs_create_mount_point, which broke someone's in house application,
  by restoring the size of /sys/fs/cgroup to 0 bytes.  Apparently that
  application uses the directory size to determine if a tmpfs is mounted
  on /sys/fs/cgroup.

  The bind mount escape fixes are present in Al Viros for-next branch.
  and I expect them to come from there.  The bind mount escape is the
  last of the user namespace related security bugs that I am aware of"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  fs: Set the size of empty dirs to 0.
  userns,pidns: Force thread group sharing, not signal handler sharing.
  unshare: Unsharing a thread does not require unsharing a vm
  nsfs: Add a show_path method to fix mountinfo
  mnt: fs_fully_visible enforce noexec and nosuid  if !SB_I_NOEXEC
  vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.
2015-09-01 16:13:25 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
0e1dbccd8f Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Two families of fixes:

   - Fix an FPU context related boot crash on newer x86 hardware with
     larger context sizes than what most people test.  To fix this
     without ugly kludges or extensive reverts we had to touch core task
     allocator, to allow x86 to determine the task size dynamically, at
     boot time.

     I've tested it on a number of x86 platforms, and I cross-built it
     to a handful of architectures:

                                        (warns)               (warns)
       testing     x86-64:  -git:  pass (    0),  -tip:  pass (    0)
       testing     x86-32:  -git:  pass (    0),  -tip:  pass (    0)
       testing        arm:  -git:  pass ( 1359),  -tip:  pass ( 1359)
       testing       cris:  -git:  pass ( 1031),  -tip:  pass ( 1031)
       testing       m32r:  -git:  pass ( 1135),  -tip:  pass ( 1135)
       testing       m68k:  -git:  pass ( 1471),  -tip:  pass ( 1471)
       testing       mips:  -git:  pass ( 1162),  -tip:  pass ( 1162)
       testing    mn10300:  -git:  pass ( 1058),  -tip:  pass ( 1058)
       testing     parisc:  -git:  pass ( 1846),  -tip:  pass ( 1846)
       testing      sparc:  -git:  pass ( 1185),  -tip:  pass ( 1185)

     ... so I hope the cross-arch impact 'none', as intended.

     (by Dave Hansen)

   - Fix various NMI handling related bugs unearthed by the big asm code
     rewrite and generally make the NMI code more robust and more
     maintainable while at it.  These changes are a bit late in the
     cycle, I hope they are still acceptable.

     (by Andy Lutomirski)"

* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/fpu, sched: Introduce CONFIG_ARCH_WANTS_DYNAMIC_TASK_STRUCT and use it on x86
  x86/fpu, sched: Dynamically allocate 'struct fpu'
  x86/entry/64, x86/nmi/64: Add CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY NMI testing code
  x86/nmi/64: Make the "NMI executing" variable more consistent
  x86/nmi/64: Minor asm simplification
  x86/nmi/64: Use DF to avoid userspace RSP confusing nested NMI detection
  x86/nmi/64: Reorder nested NMI checks
  x86/nmi/64: Improve nested NMI comments
  x86/nmi/64: Switch stacks on userspace NMI entry
  x86/nmi/64: Remove asm code that saves CR2
  x86/nmi: Enable nested do_nmi() handling for 64-bit kernels
2015-07-18 10:49:57 -07:00
Ingo Molnar
5aaeb5c01c x86/fpu, sched: Introduce CONFIG_ARCH_WANTS_DYNAMIC_TASK_STRUCT and use it on x86
Don't burden architectures without dynamic task_struct sizing
with the overhead of dynamic sizing.

Also optimize the x86 code a bit by caching task_struct_size.

Acked-and-Tested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1437128892-9831-3-git-send-email-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-07-18 03:42:51 +02:00
Dave Hansen
0c8c0f03e3 x86/fpu, sched: Dynamically allocate 'struct fpu'
The FPU rewrite removed the dynamic allocations of 'struct fpu'.
But, this potentially wastes massive amounts of memory (2k per
task on systems that do not have AVX-512 for instance).

Instead of having a separate slab, this patch just appends the
space that we need to the 'task_struct' which we dynamically
allocate already.  This saves from doing an extra slab
allocation at fork().

The only real downside here is that we have to stick everything
and the end of the task_struct.  But, I think the
BUILD_BUG_ON()s I stuck in there should keep that from being too
fragile.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1437128892-9831-2-git-send-email-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-07-18 03:42:35 +02:00
Alexey Dobriyan
3581d458c3 /proc/$PID/cmdline: fixup empty ARGV case
/proc/*/cmdline code checks if it should look at ENVP area by checking
last byte of ARGV area:

	rv = access_remote_vm(mm, arg_end - 1, &c, 1, 0);
	if (rv <= 0)
		goto out_free_page;

If ARGV is somehow made empty (by doing execve(..., NULL, ...) or
manually setting ->arg_start and ->arg_end to equal values), the decision
will be based on byte which doesn't even belong to ARGV/ENVP.

So, quickly check if ARGV area is empty and report 0 to match previous
behaviour.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-07-17 16:39:54 -07:00
Iago López Galeiras
db5d5b3665 fs, proc: add help for CONFIG_PROC_CHILDREN
The purpose of the option was documented in
Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt but the help text was missing.

Add small help text that also points to the documentation.

Signed-off-by: Iago López Galeiras <iago@endocode.com>
Reviewed-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-07-17 16:39:52 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman
90f8572b0f vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.
Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files.  Several
applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and
then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs.
Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause
a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems.

Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by
adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and
enforce that flag.

Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user
visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the
execute bit is cleared.

The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any
executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects.

This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for
adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify
existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will
not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs.

Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we
are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the
implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables
on proc.  Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create
a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of
some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions).

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-07-10 10:39:25 -05:00
Linus Torvalds
1dc51b8288 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull more vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "Assorted VFS fixes and related cleanups (IMO the most interesting in
  that part are f_path-related things and Eric's descriptor-related
  stuff).  UFS regression fixes (it got broken last cycle).  9P fixes.
  fs-cache series, DAX patches, Jan's file_remove_suid() work"

[ I'd say this is much more than "fixes and related cleanups".  The
  file_table locking rule change by Eric Dumazet is a rather big and
  fundamental update even if the patch isn't huge.   - Linus ]

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (49 commits)
  9p: cope with bogus responses from server in p9_client_{read,write}
  p9_client_write(): avoid double p9_free_req()
  9p: forgetting to cancel request on interrupted zero-copy RPC
  dax: bdev_direct_access() may sleep
  block: Add support for DAX reads/writes to block devices
  dax: Use copy_from_iter_nocache
  dax: Add block size note to documentation
  fs/file.c: __fget() and dup2() atomicity rules
  fs/file.c: don't acquire files->file_lock in fd_install()
  fs:super:get_anon_bdev: fix race condition could cause dev exceed its upper limitation
  vfs: avoid creation of inode number 0 in get_next_ino
  namei: make set_root_rcu() return void
  make simple_positive() public
  ufs: use dir_pages instead of ufs_dir_pages()
  pagemap.h: move dir_pages() over there
  remove the pointless include of lglock.h
  fs: cleanup slight list_entry abuse
  xfs: Correctly lock inode when removing suid and file capabilities
  fs: Call security_ops->inode_killpriv on truncate
  fs: Provide function telling whether file_remove_privs() will do anything
  ...
2015-07-04 19:36:06 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
22a093b2fb Merge branch 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull scheduler fixes from Ingo Molnar:
 "Debug info and other statistics fixes and related enhancements"

* 'sched-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  sched/numa: Fix numa balancing stats in /proc/pid/sched
  sched/numa: Show numa_group ID in /proc/sched_debug task listings
  sched/debug: Move print_cfs_rq() declaration to kernel/sched/sched.h
  sched/stat: Expose /proc/pid/schedstat if CONFIG_SCHED_INFO=y
  sched/stat: Simplify the sched_info accounting dependency
2015-07-04 08:56:53 -07:00
Naveen N. Rao
5968cecedd sched/stat: Expose /proc/pid/schedstat if CONFIG_SCHED_INFO=y
Expand /proc/pid/schedstat output:

 - enable it on CONFIG_TASK_DELAY_ACCT=y && !CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS kernels.

 - dump all zeroes on kernels that are booted with the 'nodelayacct'
   option, which boot option disables delay accounting on
   CONFIG_TASK_DELAY_ACCT=y kernels.

Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl
Cc: ricklind@us.ibm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5ccbef17d4bc841084ea6e6421d4e4a23b7b806f.1435654789.git.naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-07-04 10:04:31 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
0cbee99269 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull user namespace updates from Eric Biederman:
 "Long ago and far away when user namespaces where young it was realized
  that allowing fresh mounts of proc and sysfs with only user namespace
  permissions could violate the basic rule that only root gets to decide
  if proc or sysfs should be mounted at all.

  Some hacks were put in place to reduce the worst of the damage could
  be done, and the common sense rule was adopted that fresh mounts of
  proc and sysfs should allow no more than bind mounts of proc and
  sysfs.  Unfortunately that rule has not been fully enforced.

  There are two kinds of gaps in that enforcement.  Only filesystems
  mounted on empty directories of proc and sysfs should be ignored but
  the test for empty directories was insufficient.  So in my tree
  directories on proc, sysctl and sysfs that will always be empty are
  created specially.  Every other technique is imperfect as an ordinary
  directory can have entries added even after a readdir returns and
  shows that the directory is empty.  Special creation of directories
  for mount points makes the code in the kernel a smidge clearer about
  it's purpose.  I asked container developers from the various container
  projects to help test this and no holes were found in the set of mount
  points on proc and sysfs that are created specially.

  This set of changes also starts enforcing the mount flags of fresh
  mounts of proc and sysfs are consistent with the existing mount of
  proc and sysfs.  I expected this to be the boring part of the work but
  unfortunately unprivileged userspace winds up mounting fresh copies of
  proc and sysfs with noexec and nosuid clear when root set those flags
  on the previous mount of proc and sysfs.  So for now only the atime,
  read-only and nodev attributes which userspace happens to keep
  consistent are enforced.  Dealing with the noexec and nosuid
  attributes remains for another time.

  This set of changes also addresses an issue with how open file
  descriptors from /proc/<pid>/ns/* are displayed.  Recently readlink of
  /proc/<pid>/fd has been triggering a WARN_ON that has not been
  meaningful since it was added (as all of the code in the kernel was
  converted) and is not now actively wrong.

  There is also a short list of issues that have not been fixed yet that
  I will mention briefly.

  It is possible to rename a directory from below to above a bind mount.
  At which point any directory pointers below the renamed directory can
  be walked up to the root directory of the filesystem.  With user
  namespaces enabled a bind mount of the bind mount can be created
  allowing the user to pick a directory whose children they can rename
  to outside of the bind mount.  This is challenging to fix and doubly
  so because all obvious solutions must touch code that is in the
  performance part of pathname resolution.

  As mentioned above there is also a question of how to ensure that
  developers by accident or with purpose do not introduce exectuable
  files on sysfs and proc and in doing so introduce security regressions
  in the current userspace that will not be immediately obvious and as
  such are likely to require breaking userspace in painful ways once
  they are recognized"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  vfs: Remove incorrect debugging WARN in prepend_path
  mnt: Update fs_fully_visible to test for permanently empty directories
  sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point
  sysfs: Add support for permanently empty directories to serve as mount points.
  kernfs: Add support for always empty directories.
  proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount points
  sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints.
  fs: Add helper functions for permanently empty directories.
  vfs: Ignore unlocked mounts in fs_fully_visible
  mnt: Modify fs_fully_visible to deal with locked ro nodev and atime
  mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace
2015-07-03 15:20:57 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman
eb6d38d542 proc: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mount points
Add a new function proc_create_mount_point that when used to creates a
directory that can not be added to.

Add a new function is_empty_pde to test if a function is a mount
point.

Update the code to use make_empty_dir_inode when reporting
a permanently empty directory to the vfs.

Update the code to not allow adding to permanently empty directories.

Update /proc/openprom and /proc/fs/nfsd to be permanently empty directories.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-07-01 10:36:41 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman
f9bd6733d3 sysctl: Allow creating permanently empty directories that serve as mountpoints.
Add a magic sysctl table sysctl_mount_point that when used to
create a directory forces that directory to be permanently empty.

Update the code to use make_empty_dir_inode when accessing permanently
empty directories.

Update the code to not allow adding to permanently empty directories.

Update /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc to be a permanently empty directory.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-07-01 10:36:39 -05:00
Iago López Galeiras
2e13ba54a2 fs, proc: introduce CONFIG_PROC_CHILDREN
Commit 818411616b ("fs, proc: introduce /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children
entry") introduced the children entry for checkpoint restore and the
file is only available on kernels configured with CONFIG_EXPERT and
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.

This is available in most distributions (Fedora, Debian, Ubuntu, CoreOS)
because they usually enable CONFIG_EXPERT and CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
But Arch does not enable CONFIG_EXPERT or CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.

However, the children proc file is useful outside of checkpoint restore.
I would like to use it in rkt.  The rkt process exec() another program
it does not control, and that other program will fork()+exec() a child
process.  I would like to find the pid of the child process from an
external tool without iterating in /proc over all processes to find
which one has a parent pid equal to rkt.

This commit introduces CONFIG_PROC_CHILDREN and makes
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE select it.  This allows enabling
/proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children without needing to enable
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE and CONFIG_EXPERT.

Alban tested that /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/children is present when the
kernel is configured with CONFIG_PROC_CHILDREN=y but without
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE

Signed-off-by: Iago López Galeiras <iago@endocode.com>
Tested-by: Alban Crequy <alban@endocode.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Djalal Harouni <djalal@endocode.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 17:00:37 -07:00
Alexey Dobriyan
c2c0bb4462 proc: fix PAGE_SIZE limit of /proc/$PID/cmdline
/proc/$PID/cmdline truncates output at PAGE_SIZE. It is easy to see with

	$ cat /proc/self/cmdline $(seq 1037) 2>/dev/null

However, command line size was never limited to PAGE_SIZE but to 128 KB
and relatively recently limitation was removed altogether.

People noticed and ask questions:
http://stackoverflow.com/questions/199130/how-do-i-increase-the-proc-pid-cmdline-4096-byte-limit

seq file interface is not OK, because it kmalloc's for whole output and
open + read(, 1) + sleep will pin arbitrary amounts of kernel memory.  To
not do that, limit must be imposed which is incompatible with arbitrary
sized command lines.

I apologize for hairy code, but this it direct consequence of command line
layout in memory and hacks to support things like "init [3]".

The loops are "unrolled" otherwise it is either macros which hide control
flow or functions with 7-8 arguments with equal line count.

There should be real setproctitle(2) or something.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix a billion min() warnings]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 17:00:37 -07:00
Chris Metcalf
f51c0eaee3 procfs: treat parked tasks as sleeping for task state
Allowing watchdog threads to be parked means that we now have the
opportunity of actually seeing persistent parked threads in the output
of /proc/<pid>/stat and /proc/<pid>/status.  The existing code reported
such threads as "Running", which is kind-of true if you think of the
case where we park them as part of taking cpus offline.  But if we allow
parking them indefinitely, "Running" is pretty misleading, so we report
them as "Sleeping" instead.

We could simply report them with a new string, "Parked", but it feels
like it's a bit risky for userspace to see unexpected new values; the
output is already documented in Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt, and
it seems like a mistake to change that lightly.

The scheduler does report parked tasks with a "P" in debugging output
from sched_show_task() or dump_cpu_task(), but that's a different API.
Similarly, the trace_ctxwake_* routines report a "P" for parked tasks,
but again, different API.

This change seemed slightly cleaner than updating the task_state_array
to have additional rows.  TASK_DEAD should be subsumed by the exit_state
bits; TASK_WAKEKILL is just a modifier; and TASK_WAKING can very
reasonably be reported as "Running" (as it is now).  Only TASK_PARKED
shows up with unreasonable output here.

Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-24 17:49:40 -07:00
Miklos Szeredi
2726d56620 vfs: add seq_file_path() helper
Turn
	seq_path(..., &file->f_path, ...);
into
	seq_file_path(..., file, ...);

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-06-23 18:01:07 -04:00
Eric W. Biederman
1b852bceb0 mnt: Refactor the logic for mounting sysfs and proc in a user namespace
Fresh mounts of proc and sysfs are a very special case that works very
much like a bind mount.  Unfortunately the current structure can not
preserve the MNT_LOCK... mount flags.  Therefore refactor the logic
into a form that can be modified to preserve those lock bits.

Add a new filesystem flag FS_USERNS_VISIBLE that requires some mount
of the filesystem be fully visible in the current mount namespace,
before the filesystem may be mounted.

Move the logic for calling fs_fully_visible from proc and sysfs into
fs/namespace.c where it has greater access to mount namespace state.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2015-05-13 21:44:11 -05:00
Al Viro
5f2c4179e1 switch ->put_link() from dentry to inode
only one instance looks at that argument at all; that sole
exception wants inode rather than dentry.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-05-11 08:13:12 -04:00
Al Viro
6e77137b36 don't pass nameidata to ->follow_link()
its only use is getting passed to nd_jump_link(), which can obtain
it from current->nameidata

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-05-10 22:20:15 -04:00
Al Viro
680baacbca new ->follow_link() and ->put_link() calling conventions
a) instead of storing the symlink body (via nd_set_link()) and returning
an opaque pointer later passed to ->put_link(), ->follow_link() _stores_
that opaque pointer (into void * passed by address by caller) and returns
the symlink body.  Returning ERR_PTR() on error, NULL on jump (procfs magic
symlinks) and pointer to symlink body for normal symlinks.  Stored pointer
is ignored in all cases except the last one.

Storing NULL for opaque pointer (or not storing it at all) means no call
of ->put_link().

b) the body used to be passed to ->put_link() implicitly (via nameidata).
Now only the opaque pointer is.  In the cases when we used the symlink body
to free stuff, ->follow_link() now should store it as opaque pointer in addition
to returning it.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-05-10 22:19:45 -04:00
Linus Torvalds
9ec3a646fe Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull fourth vfs update from Al Viro:
 "d_inode() annotations from David Howells (sat in for-next since before
  the beginning of merge window) + four assorted fixes"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  RCU pathwalk breakage when running into a symlink overmounting something
  fix I_DIO_WAKEUP definition
  direct-io: only inc/dec inode->i_dio_count for file systems
  fs/9p: fix readdir()
  VFS: assorted d_backing_inode() annotations
  VFS: fs/inode.c helpers: d_inode() annotations
  VFS: fs/cachefiles: d_backing_inode() annotations
  VFS: fs library helpers: d_inode() annotations
  VFS: assorted weird filesystems: d_inode() annotations
  VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotations
  VFS: security/: d_inode() annotations
  VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations
  VFS: net/: d_inode() annotations
  VFS: net/unix: d_backing_inode() annotations
  VFS: kernel/: d_inode() annotations
  VFS: audit: d_backing_inode() annotations
  VFS: Fix up some ->d_inode accesses in the chelsio driver
  VFS: Cachefiles should perform fs modifications on the top layer only
  VFS: AF_UNIX sockets should call mknod on the top layer only
2015-04-26 17:22:07 -07:00
Andrey Vagin
6c8c90319c proc: show locks in /proc/pid/fdinfo/X
Let's show locks which are associated with a file descriptor in
its fdinfo file.

Currently we don't have a reliable way to determine who holds a lock.  We
can find some information in /proc/locks, but PID which is reported there
can be wrong.  For example, a process takes a lock, then forks a child and
dies.  In this case /proc/locks contains the parent pid, which can be
reused by another process.

$ cat /proc/locks
...
6: FLOCK  ADVISORY  WRITE 324 00:13:13431 0 EOF
...

$ ps -C rpcbind
  PID TTY          TIME CMD
  332 ?        00:00:00 rpcbind

$ cat /proc/332/fdinfo/4
pos:	0
flags:	0100000
mnt_id:	22
lock:	1: FLOCK  ADVISORY  WRITE 324 00:13:13431 0 EOF

$ ls -l /proc/332/fd/4
lr-x------ 1 root root 64 Mar  5 14:43 /proc/332/fd/4 -> /run/rpcbind.lock

$ ls -l /proc/324/fd/
total 0
lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:50 0 -> /dev/pts/0
lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:50 1 -> /dev/pts/0
lrwx------ 1 root root 64 Feb 27 14:49 2 -> /dev/pts/0

You can see that the process with the 324 pid doesn't hold the lock.

This information is required for proper dumping and restoring file
locks.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net>
Acked-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-17 09:04:12 -04:00
Joe Perches
25ce319167 proc: remove use of seq_printf return value
The seq_printf return value, because it's frequently misused,
will eventually be converted to void.

See: commit 1f33c41c03 ("seq_file: Rename seq_overflow() to
     seq_has_overflowed() and make public")

Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 16:35:25 -07:00
Rasmus Villemoes
41416f2330 lib/string_helpers.c: change semantics of string_escape_mem
The current semantics of string_escape_mem are inadequate for one of its
current users, vsnprintf().  If that is to honour its contract, it must
know how much space would be needed for the entire escaped buffer, and
string_escape_mem provides no way of obtaining that (short of allocating a
large enough buffer (~4 times input string) to let it play with, and
that's definitely a big no-no inside vsnprintf).

So change the semantics for string_escape_mem to be more snprintf-like:
Return the size of the output that would be generated if the destination
buffer was big enough, but of course still only write to the part of dst
it is allowed to, and (contrary to snprintf) don't do '\0'-termination.
It is then up to the caller to detect whether output was truncated and to
append a '\0' if desired.  Also, we must output partial escape sequences,
otherwise a call such as snprintf(buf, 3, "%1pE", "\123") would cause
printf to write a \0 to buf[2] but leaving buf[0] and buf[1] with whatever
they previously contained.

This also fixes a bug in the escaped_string() helper function, which used
to unconditionally pass a length of "end-buf" to string_escape_mem();
since the latter doesn't check osz for being insanely large, it would
happily write to dst.  For example, kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "something and
then %pE", ...); is an easy way to trigger an oops.

In test-string_helpers.c, the -ENOMEM test is replaced with testing for
getting the expected return value even if the buffer is too small.  We
also ensure that nothing is written (by relying on a NULL pointer deref)
if the output size is 0 by passing NULL - this has to work for
kasprintf("%pE") to work.

In net/sunrpc/cache.c, I think qword_add still has the same semantics.
Someone should definitely double-check this.

In fs/proc/array.c, I made the minimum possible change, but longer-term it
should stop poking around in seq_file internals.

[andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com: simplify qword_add]
[andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com: add missed curly braces]
Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 16:35:24 -07:00
Chen Hanxiao
e4bc332451 /proc/PID/status: show all sets of pid according to ns
If some issues occurred inside a container guest, host user could not know
which process is in trouble just by guest pid: the users of container
guest only knew the pid inside containers.  This will bring obstacle for
trouble shooting.

This patch adds four fields: NStgid, NSpid, NSpgid and NSsid:

a) In init_pid_ns, nothing changed;

b) In one pidns, will tell the pid inside containers:
  NStgid: 21776   5       1
  NSpid:  21776   5       1
  NSpgid: 21776   5       1
  NSsid:  21729   1       0
  ** Process id is 21776 in level 0, 5 in level 1, 1 in level 2.

c) If pidns is nested, it depends on which pidns are you in.
  NStgid: 5       1
  NSpid:  5       1
  NSpgid: 5       1
  NSsid:  1       0
  ** Views from level 1

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add CONFIG_PID_NS ifdef]
Signed-off-by: Chen Hanxiao <chenhanxiao@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Tested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Nathan Scott <nathans@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 16:35:22 -07:00
David Howells
2b0143b5c9 VFS: normal filesystems (and lustre): d_inode() annotations
that's the bulk of filesystem drivers dealing with inodes of their own

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-04-15 15:06:57 -04:00
Kirill A. Shutemov
ab676b7d6f pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.

This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.

[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html

[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
  this is the simple model.   - Linus ]

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-03-17 09:31:30 -07:00
Al Viro
7e0e953bb0 procfs: fix race between symlink removals and traversals
use_pde()/unuse_pde() in ->follow_link()/->put_link() resp.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2015-02-22 11:43:12 -05:00
Linus Torvalds
50652963ea Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull misc VFS updates from Al Viro:
 "This cycle a lot of stuff sits on topical branches, so I'll be sending
  more or less one pull request per branch.

  This is the first pile; more to follow in a few.  In this one are
  several misc commits from early in the cycle (before I went for
  separate branches), plus the rework of mntput/dput ordering on umount,
  switching to use of fs_pin instead of convoluted games in
  namespace_unlock()"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  switch the IO-triggering parts of umount to fs_pin
  new fs_pin killing logics
  allow attaching fs_pin to a group not associated with some superblock
  get rid of the second argument of acct_kill()
  take count and rcu_head out of fs_pin
  dcache: let the dentry count go down to zero without taking d_lock
  pull bumping refcount into ->kill()
  kill pin_put()
  mode_t whack-a-mole: chelsio
  file->f_path.dentry is pinned down for as long as the file is open...
  get rid of lustre_dump_dentry()
  gut proc_register() a bit
  kill d_validate()
  ncpfs: get rid of d_validate() nonsense
  selinuxfs: don't open-code d_genocide()
2015-02-17 14:56:45 -08:00
WANG Chao
34b4776429 vmcore: fix PT_NOTE n_namesz, n_descsz overflow issue
When updating PT_NOTE header size (ie.  p_memsz), an overflow issue
happens with the following bogus note entry:

  n_namesz = 0xFFFFFFFF
  n_descsz = 0x0
  n_type   = 0x0

This kind of note entry should be dropped during updating p_memsz.  But
because n_namesz is 32bit, after (n_namesz + 3) & (~3), it's overflow to
0x0, the note entry size looks sane and reserved.

When userspace (eg.  crash utility) is trying to access such bogus note,
it could lead to an unexpected behavior (eg.  crash utility segment fault
because it's reading bogus address).

The source of bogus note hasn't been identified yet.  At least we could
drop the bogus note so user space wouldn't be surprised.

Signed-off-by: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Anderson <anderson@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Randy Wright <rwright@hp.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Rashika Kheria <rashika.kheria@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Pearson <greg.pearson@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-17 14:34:52 -08:00
Tejun Heo
a0c2e07d6d proc: use %*pb[l] to print bitmaps including cpumasks and nodemasks
printk and friends can now format bitmaps using '%*pb[l]'.  cpumask
and nodemask also provide cpumask_pr_args() and nodemask_pr_args()
respectively which can be used to generate the two printf arguments
necessary to format the specified cpu/nodemask.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-13 21:21:38 -08:00
Andy Shevchenko
edc924e023 fs/proc/array.c: convert to use string_escape_str()
Instead of custom approach let's use string_escape_str() to escape a given
string (task_name in this case).

Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-12 18:54:12 -08:00
Rafael Aquini
198d1597cc fs: proc: task_mmu: show page size in /proc/<pid>/numa_maps
The output of /proc/$pid/numa_maps is in terms of number of pages like
anon=22 or dirty=54.  Here's some output:

  7f4680000000 default file=/hugetlb/bigfile anon=50 dirty=50 N0=50
  7f7659600000 default file=/anon_hugepage\040(deleted) anon=50 dirty=50 N0=50
  7fff8d425000 default stack anon=50 dirty=50 N0=50

Looks like we have a stack and a couple of anonymous hugetlbfs
areas page which both use the same amount of memory.  They don't.

The 'bigfile' uses 1GB pages and takes up ~50GB of space.  The
anon_hugepage uses 2MB pages and takes up ~100MB of space while the stack
uses normal 4k pages.  You can go over to smaps to figure out what the
page size _really_ is with KernelPageSize or MMUPageSize.  But, I think
this is a pretty nasty and counterintuitive interface as it stands.

This patch introduces 'kernelpagesize_kB' line element to
/proc/<pid>/numa_maps report file in order to help identifying the size of
pages that are backing memory areas mapped by a given task.  This is
specially useful to help differentiating between HUGE and GIGANTIC page
backed VMAs.

This patch is based on Dave Hansen's proposal and reviewer's follow-ups
taken from the following dicussion threads:
 * https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/9/21/454
 * https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/12/20/66

Signed-off-by: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-12 18:54:12 -08:00
Alexander Kuleshov
6bee55f94f fs: proc: use PDE() to get proc_dir_entry
Use the PDE() helper to get proc_dir_entry instead of coding it directly.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-12 18:54:12 -08:00