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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Two small fixes for SELinux in v5.1: one adds a buffer length check to
the SELinux SCTP code, the other ensures that the SELinux labeling for
a NFS mount is not disabled if the filesystem is mounted twice"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190312' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
security/selinux: fix SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS on reused superblock
selinux: add the missing walk_size + len check in selinux_sctp_bind_connect
- fix double when failing to unpack secmark rules in policy
- fix leak of dentry when profile is removed
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Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2019-03-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor fixes from John Johansen:
- fix double when failing to unpack secmark rules in policy
- fix leak of dentry when profile is removed
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2019-03-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: fix double free when unpack of secmark rules fails
apparmor: delete the dentry in aafs_remove() to avoid a leak
apparmor: Fix warning about unused function apparmor_ipv6_postroute
Pull vfs mount infrastructure updates from Al Viro:
"The rest of core infrastructure; no new syscalls in that pile, but the
old parts are switched to new infrastructure. At that point
conversions of individual filesystems can happen independently; some
are done here (afs, cgroup, procfs, etc.), there's also a large series
outside of that pile dealing with NFS (quite a bit of option-parsing
stuff is getting used there - it's one of the most convoluted
filesystems in terms of mount-related logics), but NFS bits are the
next cycle fodder.
It got seriously simplified since the last cycle; documentation is
probably the weakest bit at the moment - I considered dropping the
commit introducing Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt (cutting
the size increase by quarter ;-), but decided that it would be better
to fix it up after -rc1 instead.
That pile allows to do followup work in independent branches, which
should make life much easier for the next cycle. fs/super.c size
increase is unpleasant; there's a followup series that allows to
shrink it considerably, but I decided to leave that until the next
cycle"
* 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (41 commits)
afs: Use fs_context to pass parameters over automount
afs: Add fs_context support
vfs: Add some logging to the core users of the fs_context log
vfs: Implement logging through fs_context
vfs: Provide documentation for new mount API
vfs: Remove kern_mount_data()
hugetlbfs: Convert to fs_context
cpuset: Use fs_context
kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support fs_context
cgroup: store a reference to cgroup_ns into cgroup_fs_context
cgroup1_get_tree(): separate "get cgroup_root to use" into a separate helper
cgroup_do_mount(): massage calling conventions
cgroup: stash cgroup_root reference into cgroup_fs_context
cgroup2: switch to option-by-option parsing
cgroup1: switch to option-by-option parsing
cgroup: take options parsing into ->parse_monolithic()
cgroup: fold cgroup1_mount() into cgroup1_get_tree()
cgroup: start switching to fs_context
ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context
proc: Add fs_context support to procfs
...
The flex arrays were being used for constant sized arrays, so there's no
benefit to using flex_arrays over something simpler.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181217131929.11727-4-kent.overstreet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@ovn.org>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Although the apparmorfs dentries are always dropped from the dentry cache
when the usage count drops to zero, there is no guarantee that this will
happen in aafs_remove(), as another thread might still be using it. In
this scenario, this means that the dentry will temporarily continue to
appear in the results of lookups, even after the call to aafs_remove().
In the case of removal of a profile - it also causes simple_rmdir()
on the profile directory to fail, as the directory won't be empty until
the usage counts of all child dentries have decreased to zero. This
results in the dentry for the profile directory leaking and appearing
empty in the file system tree forever.
Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
In the case when we're reusing a superblock, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts()
fails to set set_kern_flags, with the result that
nfs_clone_sb_security() incorrectly clears NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL.
The result is that if you mount the same NFS filesystem twice, NFS
security labels are turned off, even if they would work fine if you
mounted the filesystem only once.
("fixes" may be not exactly the right tag, it may be more like
"fixed-other-cases-but-missed-this-one".)
Cc: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0b4d3452b8 "security/selinux: allow security_sb_clone_mnt_opts..."
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
As does in __sctp_connect(), when checking addrs in a while loop, after
get the addr len according to sa_family, it's necessary to do the check
walk_size + af->sockaddr_len > addrs_size to make sure it won't access
an out-of-bounds addr.
The same thing is needed in selinux_sctp_bind_connect(), otherwise an
out-of-bounds issue can be triggered:
[14548.772313] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in selinux_sctp_bind_connect+0x1aa/0x1f0
[14548.927083] Call Trace:
[14548.938072] dump_stack+0x9a/0xe9
[14548.953015] print_address_description+0x65/0x22e
[14548.996524] kasan_report.cold.6+0x92/0x1a6
[14549.015335] selinux_sctp_bind_connect+0x1aa/0x1f0
[14549.036947] security_sctp_bind_connect+0x58/0x90
[14549.058142] __sctp_setsockopt_connectx+0x5a/0x150 [sctp]
[14549.081650] sctp_setsockopt.part.24+0x1322/0x3ce0 [sctp]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d452930fd3 ("selinux: Add SCTP support")
Reported-by: Chunyu Hu <chuhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Pull tpm updates from James Morris:
- Clean up the transmission flow
Cleaned up the whole transmission flow. Locking of the chip is now
done in the level of tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops() instead
taking the chip lock inside tpm_transmit(). The nested calls inside
tpm_transmit(), used with the resource manager, have been refactored
out.
Should make easier to perform more complex transactions with the TPM
without making the subsystem a bigger mess (e.g. encrypted channel
patches by James Bottomley).
- PPI 1.3 support
TPM PPI 1.3 introduces an additional optional command parameter that
may be needed for some commands. Display the parameter if the command
requires such a parameter. Only command 23 (SetPCRBanks) needs one.
The PPI request file will show output like this then:
# echo "23 16" > request
# cat request
23 16
# echo "5" > request
# cat request
5
- Extend all PCR banks in IMA
Instead of static PCR banks array, the array of available PCR banks
is now allocated dynamically. The digests sizes are determined
dynamically using a probe PCR read without relying crypto's static
list of hash algorithms.
This should finally make sealing of measurements in IMA safe and
secure.
- TPM 2.0 selftests
Added a test suite to tools/testing/selftests/tpm2 previously outside
of the kernel tree: https://github.com/jsakkine-intel/tpm2-scripts
* 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (37 commits)
tpm/ppi: Enable submission of optional command parameter for PPI 1.3
tpm/ppi: Possibly show command parameter if TPM PPI 1.3 is used
tpm/ppi: Display up to 101 operations as define for version 1.3
tpm/ppi: rename TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID to TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID_1
tpm/ppi: pass function revision ID to tpm_eval_dsm()
tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()
KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip()
tpm: move tpm_chip definition to include/linux/tpm.h
tpm: retrieve digest size of unknown algorithms with PCR read
tpm: rename and export tpm2_digest and tpm2_algorithms
tpm: dynamically allocate the allocated_banks array
tpm: remove @flags from tpm_transmit()
tpm: take TPM chip power gating out of tpm_transmit()
tpm: introduce tpm_chip_start() and tpm_chip_stop()
tpm: remove TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED flag
tpm: use tpm_try_get_ops() in tpm-sysfs.c.
tpm: remove @space from tpm_transmit()
tpm: move TPM space code out of tpm_transmit()
tpm: move tpm_validate_commmand() to tpm2-space.c
tpm: clean up tpm_try_transmit() error handling flow
...
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"Mimi Zohar says:
'Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA
kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys. This pull
request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for
verifying the PE kernel image signature.
Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp
files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated.
The remaining patches are cleanup'"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
evm: Use defined constant for UUID representation
ima: define ima_post_create_tmpfile() hook and add missing call
evm: remove set but not used variable 'xattr'
encrypted-keys: fix Opt_err/Opt_error = -1
kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify
integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
and more translations. There's also some LICENSES adjustments from
Thomas.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.1' of git://git.lwn.net/linux
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"A fairly routine cycle for docs - lots of typo fixes, some new
documents, and more translations. There's also some LICENSES
adjustments from Thomas"
* tag 'docs-5.1' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (74 commits)
docs: Bring some order to filesystem documentation
Documentation/locking/lockdep: Drop last two chars of sample states
doc: rcu: Suspicious RCU usage is a warning
docs: driver-api: iio: fix errors in documentation
Documentation/process/howto: Update for 4.x -> 5.x versioning
docs: Explicitly state that the 'Fixes:' tag shouldn't split lines
doc: security: Add kern-doc for lsm_hooks.h
doc: sctp: Merge and clean up rst files
Docs: Correct /proc/stat path
scripts/spdxcheck.py: fix C++ comment style detection
doc: fix typos in license-rules.rst
Documentation: fix admin-guide/README.rst minimum gcc version requirement
doc: process: complete removal of info about -git patches
doc: translations: sync translations 'remove info about -git patches'
perf-security: wrap paragraphs on 72 columns
perf-security: elaborate on perf_events/Perf privileged users
perf-security: document collected perf_events/Perf data categories
perf-security: document perf_events/Perf resource control
sysfs.txt: add note on available attribute macros
docs: kernel-doc: typo "if ... if" -> "if ... is"
...
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"A lucky 13 audit patches for v5.1.
Despite the rather large diffstat, most of the changes are from two
bug fix patches that move code from one Kconfig option to another.
Beyond that bit of churn, the remaining changes are largely cleanups
and bug-fixes as we slowly march towards container auditing. It isn't
all boring though, we do have a couple of new things: file
capabilities v3 support, and expanded support for filtering on
filesystems to solve problems with remote filesystems.
All changes pass the audit-testsuite. Please merge for v5.1"
* tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: mark expected switch fall-through
audit: hide auditsc_get_stamp and audit_serial prototypes
audit: join tty records to their syscall
audit: remove audit_context when CONFIG_ AUDIT and not AUDITSYSCALL
audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match
audit: ignore fcaps on umount
audit: clean up AUDITSYSCALL prototypes and stubs
audit: more filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic
audit: add support for fcaps v3
audit: move loginuid and sessionid from CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to CONFIG_AUDIT
audit: add syscall information to CONFIG_CHANGE records
audit: hand taken context to audit_kill_trees for syscall logging
audit: give a clue what CONFIG_CHANGE op was involved
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Nine SELinux patches for v5.1, all bug fixes.
As far as I'm concerned, nothing really jumps out as risky or special
to me, but each commit has a decent description so you can judge for
yourself. As usual, everything passes the selinux-testsuite; please
merge for v5.1"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix avc audit messages
selinux: replace BUG_ONs with WARN_ONs in avc.c
selinux: log invalid contexts in AVCs
selinux: replace some BUG_ON()s with a WARN_ON()
selinux: inline some AVC functions used only once
selinux: do not override context on context mounts
selinux: never allow relabeling on context mounts
selinux: stop passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK to the AVC upon follow_link
selinux: avoid silent denials in permissive mode under RCU walk
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
- Extend LSM stacking to allow sharing of cred, file, ipc, inode, and
task blobs. This paves the way for more full-featured LSMs to be
merged, and is specifically aimed at LandLock and SARA LSMs. This
work is from Casey and Kees.
- There's a new LSM from Micah Morton: "SafeSetID gates the setid
family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID transitions from a given
UID/GID to only those approved by a system-wide whitelist." This
feature is currently shipping in ChromeOS.
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (62 commits)
keys: fix missing __user in KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY
LSM: Update list of SECURITYFS users in Kconfig
LSM: Ignore "security=" when "lsm=" is specified
LSM: Update function documentation for cap_capable
security: mark expected switch fall-throughs and add a missing break
tomoyo: Bump version.
LSM: fix return value check in safesetid_init_securityfs()
LSM: SafeSetID: add selftest
LSM: SafeSetID: remove unused include
LSM: SafeSetID: 'depend' on CONFIG_SECURITY
LSM: Add 'name' field for SafeSetID in DEFINE_LSM
LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls
LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls
tomoyo: Allow multiple use_group lines.
tomoyo: Coding style fix.
tomoyo: Swicth from cred->security to task_struct->security.
security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs
security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs
security: keys: annotate implicit fall through
capabilities:: annotate implicit fall through
...
The arg5 of KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY should have a __user pointer tag on
it as it is a user pointer. This clears the following sparse warning
for this:
security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43: warning: incorrect type in argument 3 (different address spaces)
security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43: expected struct keyctl_pkey_query [noderef] <asn:1>*<noident>
security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43: got struct keyctl_pkey_query *<noident>
Signed-off-by: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Every in-kernel use of this function defined it to KERNEL_DS (either as
an actual define, or as an inline function). It's an entirely
historical artifact, and long long long ago used to actually read the
segment selector valueof '%ds' on x86.
Which in the kernel is always KERNEL_DS.
Inspired by a patch from Jann Horn that just did this for a very small
subset of users (the ones in fs/), along with Al who suggested a script.
I then just took it to the logical extreme and removed all the remaining
gunk.
Roughly scripted with
git grep -l '(get_ds())' -- :^tools/ | xargs sed -i 's/(get_ds())/(KERNEL_DS)/'
git grep -lw 'get_ds' -- :^tools/ | xargs sed -i '/^#define get_ds()/d'
plus manual fixups to remove a few unusual usage patterns, the couple of
inline function cases and to fix up a comment that had become stale.
The 'get_ds()' function remains in an x86 kvm selftest, since in user
space it actually does something relevant.
Inspired-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Inspired-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Remove modules not using it (SELinux and SMACK aren't
the only ones not using it).
Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
new primitive: vfs_dup_fs_context(). Comes with fs_context
method (->dup()) for copying the filesystem-specific parts
of fs_context, along with LSM one (->fs_context_dup()) for
doing the same to LSM parts.
[needs better commit message, and change of Author:, anyway]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Implement the new mount API LSM hooks for SELinux. At some point the old
hooks will need to be removed.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add LSM hooks for use by the new mount API and filesystem context code.
This includes:
(1) Hooks to handle allocation, duplication and freeing of the security
record attached to a filesystem context.
(2) A hook to snoop source specifications. There may be multiple of these
if the filesystem supports it. They will to be local files/devices if
fs_context::source_is_dev is true and will be something else, possibly
remote server specifications, if false.
(3) A hook to snoop superblock configuration options in key[=val] form.
If the LSM decides it wants to handle it, it can suppress the option
being passed to the filesystem. Note that 'val' may include commas
and binary data with the fsopen patch.
(4) A hook to perform validation and allocation after the configuration
has been done but before the superblock is allocated and set up.
(5) A hook to transfer the security from the context to a newly created
superblock.
(6) A hook to rule on whether a path point can be used as a mountpoint.
These are intended to replace:
security_sb_copy_data
security_sb_kern_mount
security_sb_mount
security_sb_set_mnt_opts
security_sb_clone_mnt_opts
security_sb_parse_opts_str
[AV -- some of the methods being replaced are already gone, some of the
methods are not added for the lack of need]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To avoid potential confusion, explicitly ignore "security=" when "lsm=" is
used on the command line, and report that it is happening.
Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
This should have gone in with commit
c1a85a00ea.
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
"Hopefully the last pull request for this release. Fingers crossed:
1) Only refcount ESP stats on full sockets, from Martin Willi.
2) Missing barriers in AF_UNIX, from Al Viro.
3) RCU protection fixes in ipv6 route code, from Paolo Abeni.
4) Avoid false positives in untrusted GSO validation, from Willem de
Bruijn.
5) Forwarded mesh packets in mac80211 need more tailroom allocated,
from Felix Fietkau.
6) Use operstate consistently for linkup in team driver, from George
Wilkie.
7) ThunderX bug fixes from Vadim Lomovtsev. Mostly races between VF
and PF code paths.
8) Purge ipv6 exceptions during netdevice removal, from Paolo Abeni.
9) nfp eBPF code gen fixes from Jiong Wang.
10) bnxt_en firmware timeout fix from Michael Chan.
11) Use after free in udp/udpv6 error handlers, from Paolo Abeni.
12) Fix a race in x25_bind triggerable by syzbot, from Eric Dumazet"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (65 commits)
net: phy: realtek: Dummy IRQ calls for RTL8366RB
tcp: repaired skbs must init their tso_segs
net/x25: fix a race in x25_bind()
net: dsa: Remove documentation for port_fdb_prepare
Revert "bridge: do not add port to router list when receives query with source 0.0.0.0"
selftests: fib_tests: sleep after changing carrier. again.
net: set static variable an initial value in atl2_probe()
net: phy: marvell10g: Fix Multi-G advertisement to only advertise 10G
bpf, doc: add bpf list as secondary entry to maintainers file
udp: fix possible user after free in error handler
udpv6: fix possible user after free in error handler
fou6: fix proto error handler argument type
udpv6: add the required annotation to mib type
mdio_bus: Fix use-after-free on device_register fails
net: Set rtm_table to RT_TABLE_COMPAT for ipv6 for tables > 255
bnxt_en: Wait longer for the firmware message response to complete.
bnxt_en: Fix typo in firmware message timeout logic.
nfp: bpf: fix ALU32 high bits clearance bug
nfp: bpf: fix code-gen bug on BPF_ALU | BPF_XOR | BPF_K
Documentation: networking: switchdev: Update port parent ID section
...
syzbot hit the 'BUG_ON(index_key->desc_len == 0);' in __key_link_begin()
called from construct_alloc_key() during sys_request_key(), because the
length of the key description was never calculated.
The problem is that we rely on ->desc_len being initialized by
search_process_keyrings(), specifically by search_nested_keyrings().
But, if the process isn't subscribed to any keyrings that never happens.
Fix it by always initializing keyring_index_key::desc_len as soon as the
description is set, like we already do in some places.
The following program reproduces the BUG_ON() when it's run as root and
no session keyring has been installed. If it doesn't work, try removing
pam_keyinit.so from /etc/pam.d/login and rebooting.
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(void)
{
int id = add_key("keyring", "syz", NULL, 0, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
keyctl_setperm(id, KEY_OTH_WRITE);
setreuid(5000, 5000);
request_key("user", "desc", "", id);
}
Reported-by: syzbot+ec24e95ea483de0a24da@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: b2a4df200d ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch
cases where we are expecting to fall through.
This patch fixes the following warnings:
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c:85:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:940:18: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:943:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:972:21: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:974:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:3391:9: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/apparmor/domain.c:569:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3
Also, add a missing break statement to fix the following warning:
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c:116:26: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
The SCTP sections were ending up at the top-level table of contents
under the security section when they should have be sections with the
SCTP chapters. In addition to correcting the section and subsection
headings, this merges the SCTP documents into a single file to organize
the chapters more clearly, internally linkifies them, and adds the
missing SPDX header.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Several u->addr and u->path users are not holding any locks in
common with unix_bind(). unix_state_lock() is useless for those
purposes.
u->addr is assign-once and *(u->addr) is fully set up by the time
we set u->addr (all under unix_table_lock). u->path is also
set in the same critical area, also before setting u->addr, and
any unix_sock with ->path filled will have non-NULL ->addr.
So setting ->addr with smp_store_release() is all we need for those
"lockless" users - just have them fetch ->addr with smp_load_acquire()
and don't even bother looking at ->path if they see NULL ->addr.
Users of ->addr and ->path fall into several classes now:
1) ones that do smp_load_acquire(u->addr) and access *(u->addr)
and u->path only if smp_load_acquire() has returned non-NULL.
2) places holding unix_table_lock. These are guaranteed that
*(u->addr) is seen fully initialized. If unix_sock is in one of the
"bound" chains, so's ->path.
3) unix_sock_destructor() using ->addr is safe. All places
that set u->addr are guaranteed to have seen all stores *(u->addr)
while holding a reference to u and unix_sock_destructor() is called
when (atomic) refcount hits zero.
4) unix_release_sock() using ->path is safe. unix_bind()
is serialized wrt unix_release() (normally - by struct file
refcount), and for the instances that had ->path set by unix_bind()
unix_release_sock() comes from unix_release(), so they are fine.
Instances that had it set in unix_stream_connect() either end up
attached to a socket (in unix_accept()), in which case the call
chain to unix_release_sock() and serialization are the same as in
the previous case, or they never get accept'ed and unix_release_sock()
is called when the listener is shut down and its queue gets purged.
In that case the listener's queue lock provides the barriers needed -
unix_stream_connect() shoves our unix_sock into listener's queue
under that lock right after having set ->path and eventual
unix_release_sock() caller picks them from that queue under the
same lock right before calling unix_release_sock().
5) unix_find_other() use of ->path is pointless, but safe -
it happens with successful lookup by (abstract) name, so ->path.dentry
is guaranteed to be NULL there.
earlier-variant-reviewed-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Set the timestamp on new keys rather than leaving it unset.
Fixes: 31d5a79d7f ("KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
In the request_key() upcall mechanism there's a dependency loop by which if
a key type driver overrides the ->request_key hook and the userspace side
manages to lose the authorisation key, the auth key and the internal
construction record (struct key_construction) can keep each other pinned.
Fix this by the following changes:
(1) Killing off the construction record and using the auth key instead.
(2) Including the operation name in the auth key payload and making the
payload available outside of security/keys/.
(3) The ->request_key hook is given the authkey instead of the cons
record and operation name.
Changes (2) and (3) allow the auth key to naturally be cleaned up if the
keyring it is in is destroyed or cleared or the auth key is unlinked.
Fixes: 7ee02a316600 ("keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
If the sysctl 'kernel.keys.maxkeys' is set to some number n, then
actually users can only add up to 'n - 1' keys. Likewise for
'kernel.keys.maxbytes' and the root_* versions of these sysctls. But
these sysctls are apparently supposed to be *maximums*, as per their
names and all documentation I could find -- the keyrings(7) man page,
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst, and all the mentions of EDQUOT
meaning that the key quota was *exceeded* (as opposed to reached).
Thus, fix the code to allow reaching the quotas exactly.
Fixes: 0b77f5bfb4 ("keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA
kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys. This pull
request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for
verifying the PE kernel image signature.*
Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp
files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated.
The remaining patches are cleanup.
*Upstream commit "993a110319a4 (x86/kexec: Fix a kexec_file_load()
failure)" is required for testing.
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Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-20190213' of git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/linux-tpmdd into next-tpm
tpmdd updates for Linux v5.1
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Clean up the transmission flow
==============================
Cleaned up the whole transmission flow. Locking of the chip is now done in
the level of tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops() instead taking the chip
lock inside tpm_transmit(). The nested calls inside tpm_transmit(), used
with the resource manager, have been refactored out.
Should make easier to perform more complex transactions with the TPM
without making the subsystem a bigger mess (e.g. encrypted channel patches
by James Bottomley).
PPI 1.3 support
===============
TPM PPI 1.3 introduces an additional optional command parameter that may be
needed for some commands. Display the parameter if the command requires
such a parameter. Only command 23 (SetPCRBanks) needs one.
The PPI request file will show output like this then:
# echo "23 16" > request
# cat request
23 16
# echo "5" > request
# cat request
5
Extend all PCR banks in IMA
===========================
Instead of static PCR banks array, the array of available PCR banks is now
allocated dynamically. The digests sizes are determined dynamically using a
probe PCR read without relying crypto's static list of hash algorithms.
This should finally make sealing of measurements in IMA safe and secure.
TPM 2.0 selftests
=================
Added a test suite to tools/testing/selftests/tpm2 previously outside of
the kernel tree: https://github.com/jsakkine-intel/tpm2-scripts.
Currently, tpm_pcr_extend() accepts as an input only a SHA1 digest.
This patch replaces the hash parameter of tpm_pcr_extend() with an array of
tpm_digest structures, so that the caller can provide a digest for each PCR
bank currently allocated in the TPM.
tpm_pcr_extend() will not extend banks for which no digest was provided,
as it happened before this patch, but instead it requires that callers
provide the full set of digests. Since the number of digests will always be
chip->nr_allocated_banks, the count parameter has been removed.
Due to the API change, ima_pcr_extend() and pcrlock() have been modified.
Since the number of allocated banks is not known in advance, the memory for
the digests must be dynamically allocated. To avoid performance degradation
and to avoid that a PCR extend is not done due to lack of memory, the array
of tpm_digest structures is allocated by the users of the TPM driver at
initialization time.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (on x86 for TPM 1.2 & PTT TPM 2.0)
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
When crypto agility support will be added to the TPM driver, users of the
driver have to retrieve the allocated banks from chip->allocated_banks and
use this information to prepare the array of tpm_digest structures to be
passed to tpm_pcr_extend().
This patch retrieves a tpm_chip pointer from tpm_default_chip() so that the
pointer can be used to prepare the array of tpm_digest structures.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Currently, the TPM driver retrieves the digest size from a table mapping
TPM algorithms identifiers to identifiers defined by the crypto subsystem.
If the algorithm is not defined by the latter, the digest size can be
retrieved from the output of the PCR read command.
The patch modifies the definition of tpm_pcr_read() and tpm2_pcr_read() to
pass the desired hash algorithm and obtain the digest size at TPM startup.
Algorithms and corresponding digest sizes are stored in the new structure
tpm_bank_info, member of tpm_chip, so that the information can be used by
other kernel subsystems.
tpm_bank_info contains: the TPM algorithm identifier, necessary to generate
the event log as defined by Trusted Computing Group (TCG); the digest size,
to pad/truncate a digest calculated with a different algorithm; the crypto
subsystem identifier, to calculate the digest of event data.
This patch also protects against data corruption that could happen in the
bus, by checking that the digest size returned by the TPM during a PCR read
matches the size of the algorithm passed to tpm2_pcr_read().
For the initial PCR read, when digest sizes are not yet available, this
patch ensures that the amount of data copied from the output returned by
the TPM does not exceed the size of the array data are copied to.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
In case of error, the function securityfs_create_dir() returns ERR_PTR()
and never returns NULL. The NULL test in the return value check should
be replaced with IS_ERR().
Fixes: aeca4e2ca6 ("LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
commit a2c513835b ("selinux: inline some AVC functions used only once")
introduced usage of audit_log_string() in place of audit_log_format()
for fixed strings. However, audit_log_string() quotes the string.
This breaks the avc audit message format and userspace audit parsers.
Switch back to using audit_log_format().
Fixes: a2c513835b ("selinux: inline some AVC functions used only once")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Instead of sizeof use pre-defined constant for UUID representation.
While here, drop the implementation details of uuid_t type.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
If tmpfiles can be made persistent, then newly created tmpfiles need to
be treated like any other new files in policy.
This patch indicates which newly created tmpfiles are in policy, causing
the file hash to be calculated on __fput().
Reported-by: Ignaz Forster <ignaz.forster@gmx.de>
[rgoldwyn@suse.com: Call ima_post_create_tmpfile() in vfs_tmpfile() as
opposed to do_tmpfile(). This will help the case for overlayfs where
copy_up is denied while overwriting a file.]
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c: In function 'init_evm':
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c:566:21: warning:
variable 'xattr' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
Commit 21af766314 ("EVM: turn evm_config_xattrnames into a list")
defined and set "xattr", but never used it.
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: tweaked the patch description explanation]
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Properly start the enumeration associated with match_table_t at zero,
making Opt_err/Opt_error the last enumeration value.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
commit 9dc92c4517 ("integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring")
introduced a .platform keyring for storing preboot keys, used for
verifying kernel image signatures. Currently only IMA-appraisal is able
to use the keyring to verify kernel images that have their signature
stored in xattr.
This patch exposes the .platform keyring, making it accessible for
verifying PE signed kernel images as well.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: fixed checkpatch errors, squashed with patch fix]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
aa_label_merge() can return NULL for memory allocations failures
make sure to handle and set the correct error in this case.
Reported-by: Peng Hao <peng.hao2@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
when compiled without CONFIG_IPV6:
security/apparmor/lsm.c:1601:21: warning: ‘apparmor_ipv6_postroute’ defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
static unsigned int apparmor_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Reported-by: Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>
Tested-by: Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>
Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The audit_rule_match() struct audit_context *actx parameter is not used
by any in-tree consumers (selinux, apparmour, integrity, smack).
The audit context is an internal audit structure that should only be
accessed by audit accessor functions.
It was part of commit 03d37d25e0 ("LSM/Audit: Introduce generic
Audit LSM hooks") but appears to have never been used.
Remove it.
Please see the github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/107
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: fixed the referenced commit title]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The include for asm/syscall.h was needed in a prior version of lsm.c
that checked return values of syscall_get_nr, but since we did away with
that part of the code this include is no longer necessary. Take out this
include since it breaks builds for certain architectures. We no longer
have any arch-specific code in SafeSetID.
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
This patch changes the Kconfig file for the SafeSetID LSM to depend on
CONFIG_SECURITY as well as select CONFIG_SECURITYFS, since the policies
for the LSM are configured through writing to securityfs.
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
These checks are only guarding against programming errors that could
silently grant too many permissions. These cases are better handled with
WARN_ON(), since it doesn't really help much to crash the machine in
this case.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
