Commit Graph

10 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Alan Cox
34b4e4aa3c fix NULL pointer dereference in __vm_enough_memory()
The new exec code inserts an accounted vma into an mm struct which is not
current->mm.  The existing memory check code has a hard coded assumption
that this does not happen as does the security code.

As the correct mm is known we pass the mm to the security method and the
helper function.  A new security test is added for the case where we need
to pass the mm and the existing one is modified to pass current->mm to
avoid the need to change large amounts of code.

(Thanks to Tobias for fixing rejects and testing)

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Cc: WU Fengguang <wfg@mail.ustc.edu.cn>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Cc: Tobias Diedrich <ranma+kernel@tdiedrich.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-08-22 19:52:45 -07:00
Kawai, Hidehiro
6c5d523826 coredump masking: reimplementation of dumpable using two flags
This patch changes mm_struct.dumpable to a pair of bit flags.

set_dumpable() converts three-value dumpable to two flags and stores it into
lower two bits of mm_struct.flags instead of mm_struct.dumpable.
get_dumpable() behaves in the opposite way.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export set_dumpable]
Signed-off-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-19 10:04:46 -07:00
Randy Dunlap
e63340ae6b header cleaning: don't include smp_lock.h when not used
Remove includes of <linux/smp_lock.h> where it is not used/needed.
Suggested by Al Viro.

Builds cleanly on x86_64, i386, alpha, ia64, powerpc, sparc,
sparc64, and arm (all 59 defconfigs).

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-08 11:15:07 -07:00
Sukadev Bhattiprolu
f400e198b2 [PATCH] pidspace: is_init()
This is an updated version of Eric Biederman's is_init() patch.
(http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/2/6/280).  It applies cleanly to 2.6.18-rc3 and
replaces a few more instances of ->pid == 1 with is_init().

Further, is_init() checks pid and thus removes dependency on Eric's other
patches for now.

Eric's original description:

	There are a lot of places in the kernel where we test for init
	because we give it special properties.  Most  significantly init
	must not die.  This results in code all over the kernel test
	->pid == 1.

	Introduce is_init to capture this case.

	With multiple pid spaces for all of the cases affected we are
	looking for only the first process on the system, not some other
	process that has pid == 1.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Cc: <lxc-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-09-29 09:18:12 -07:00
Jörn Engel
6ab3d5624e Remove obsolete #include <linux/config.h>
Signed-off-by: Jörn Engel <joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2006-06-30 19:25:36 +02:00
Darrel Goeddel
c7bdb545d2 [NETLINK]: Encapsulate eff_cap usage within security framework.
This patch encapsulates the usage of eff_cap (in netlink_skb_params) within
the security framework by extending security_netlink_recv to include a required
capability parameter and converting all direct usage of eff_caps outside
of the lsm modules to use the interface.  It also updates the SELinux
implementation of the security_netlink_send and security_netlink_recv
hooks to take advantage of the sid in the netlink_skb_params struct.
This also enables SELinux to perform auditing of netlink capability checks.
Please apply, for 2.6.18 if possible.

Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by:  James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-29 16:57:55 -07:00
Chris Wright
d4eb82c783 [PATCH] make cap_ptrace enforce PTRACE_TRACME checks
PTRACE_TRACEME doesn't have proper capabilities validation when parent is
less privileged than child.  Issue pointed out by Ram Gupta
<ram.gupta5@gmail.com>.

Note: I haven't identified a strong security issue, and it's a small ABI
change that could break apps that rely on existing behaviour (which allows
parent that is less privileged than child to ptrace when child does
PTRACE_TRACEME).

Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Ram Gupta <ram.gupta5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-03-25 08:22:56 -08:00
Randy.Dunlap
c59ede7b78 [PATCH] move capable() to capability.h
- Move capable() from sched.h to capability.h;

- Use <linux/capability.h> where capable() is used
	(in include/, block/, ipc/, kernel/, a few drivers/,
	mm/, security/, & sound/;
	many more drivers/ to go)

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-01-11 18:42:13 -08:00
Alan Cox
d6e7114481 [PATCH] setuid core dump
Add a new `suid_dumpable' sysctl:

This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid
or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are

0 - (default) - traditional behaviour.  Any process which has changed
    privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped

1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible.  The core dump is
    owned by the current user and no security is applied.  This is intended
    for system debugging situations only.  Ptrace is unchecked.

2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped
    readable by root only.  This allows the end user to remove such a dump but
    not access it directly.  For security reasons core dumps in this mode will
    not overwrite one another or other files.  This mode is appropriate when
    adminstrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal environment.

(akpm:

> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(suid_dumpable);
>
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL?

No problem to me.

> >  	if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid)
> >  		current->mm->dumpable = 1;
>
> Should this be SUID_DUMP_USER?

Actually the feedback I had from last time was that the SUID_ defines
should go because its clearer to follow the numbers. They can go
everywhere (and there are lots of places where dumpable is tested/used
as a bool in untouched code)

> Maybe this should be renamed to `dump_policy' or something.  Doing that
> would help us catch any code which isn't using the #defines, too.

Fair comment. The patch was designed to be easy to maintain for Red Hat
rather than for merging. Changing that field would create a gigantic
diff because it is used all over the place.

)

Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 09:45:26 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
1da177e4c3 Linux-2.6.12-rc2
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!
2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07:00