its value depends only on inode and does not change; we might as
well store it in ->i_op->check_acl and be done with that.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
nothing blocking there, since all instances of sysctl
->permissions() method are non-blocking - both of them,
that is.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Don't call iput with the inode half setup to be a namespace filedescriptor.
Instead rearrange the code so that we don't initialize ei->ns_ops until
after I ns_ops->get succeeds, preventing us from invoking ns_ops->put
when ns_ops->get failed.
Reported-by: Ingo Saitz <Ingo.Saitz@stud.uni-hannover.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
This change introduces a few of the less controversial /proc and
/proc/sys interfaces for tile, along with sysfs attributes for
various things that were originally proposed as /proc/tile files.
It also adjusts the "hardwall" proc API.
Arnd Bergmann reviewed the initial arch/tile submission, which
included a complete set of all the /proc/tile and /proc/sys/tile
knobs that we had added in a somewhat ad hoc way during initial
development, and provided feedback on where most of them should go.
One knob turned out to be similar enough to the existing
/proc/sys/debug/exception-trace that it was re-implemented to use
that model instead.
Another knob was /proc/tile/grid, which reported the "grid" dimensions
of a tile chip (e.g. 8x8 processors = 64-core chip). Arnd suggested
looking at sysfs for that, so this change moves that information
to a pair of sysfs attributes (chip_width and chip_height) in the
/sys/devices/system/cpu directory. We also put the "chip_serial"
and "chip_revision" information from our old /proc/tile/board file
as attributes in /sys/devices/system/cpu.
Other information collected via hypervisor APIs is now placed in
/sys/hypervisor. We create a /sys/hypervisor/type file (holding the
constant string "tilera") to be parallel with the Xen use of
/sys/hypervisor/type holding "xen". We create three top-level files,
"version" (the hypervisor's own version), "config_version" (the
version of the configuration file), and "hvconfig" (the contents of
the configuration file). The remaining information from our old
/proc/tile/board and /proc/tile/switch files becomes an attribute
group appearing under /sys/hypervisor/board/.
Finally, after some feedback from Arnd Bergmann for the previous
version of this patch, the /proc/tile/hardwall file is split up into
two conceptual parts. First, a directory /proc/tile/hardwall/ which
contains one file per active hardwall, each file named after the
hardwall's ID and holding a cpulist that says which cpus are enclosed by
the hardwall. Second, a /proc/PID file "hardwall" that is either
empty (for non-hardwall-using processes) or contains the hardwall ID.
Finally, this change pushes the /proc/sys/tile/unaligned_fixup/
directory, with knobs controlling the kernel code for handling the
fixup of unaligned exceptions.
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>
The balloon driver in a Xen guest frees guest pages and marks them as
mmio. When the kernel crashes and the crash kernel attempts to read the
oldmem via /proc/vmcore a read from ballooned pages will generate 100%
load in dom0 because Xen asks qemu-dm for the page content. Since the
reads come in as 8byte requests each ballooned page is tried 512 times.
With this change a hook can be registered which checks wether the given
pfn is really ram. The hook has to return a value > 0 for ram pages, a
value < 0 on error (because the hypercall is not known) and 0 for non-ram
pages.
This will reduce the time to read /proc/vmcore. Without this change a
512M guest with 128M crashkernel region needs 200 seconds to read it, with
this change it takes just 2 seconds.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently, pagemap_read() has three error and/or corner case handling
mistake.
(1) If ppos parameter is wrong, mm refcount will be leak.
(2) If count parameter is 0, mm refcount will be leak too.
(3) If the current task is sleeping in kmalloc() and the system
is out of memory and oom-killer kill the proc associated task,
mm_refcount prevent the task free its memory. then system may
hang up.
<Quote Hugh's explain why we shold call kmalloc() before get_mm()>
check_mem_permission gets a reference to the mm. If we
__get_free_page after check_mem_permission, imagine what happens if the
system is out of memory, and the mm we're looking at is selected for
killing by the OOM killer: while we wait in __get_free_page for more
memory, no memory is freed from the selected mm because it cannot reach
exit_mmap while we hold that reference.
This patch fixes the above three.
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jovi Zhang <bookjovi@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
It whould be better if put check_mem_permission after __get_free_page in
mem_write, to be same as function mem_read.
Hugh Dickins explained the reason.
check_mem_permission gets a reference to the mm. If we __get_free_page
after check_mem_permission, imagine what happens if the system is out
of memory, and the mm we're looking at is selected for killing by the
OOM killer: while we wait in __get_free_page for more memory, no memory
is freed from the selected mm because it cannot reach exit_mmap while
we hold that reference.
Reported-by: Jovi Zhang <bookjovi@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There is a macro for the max size kmalloc can allocate, so use it instead
of a hardcoded number.
Signed-off-by: Yuanhan Liu <yuanhan.liu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
No need for this local array to be writable, so mark it const.
Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Setup and cleanup of mm_struct->exe_file is currently done in fs/proc/.
This was because exe_file was needed only for /proc/<pid>/exe. Since we
will need the exe_file functionality also for core dumps (so core name can
contain full binary path), built this functionality always into the
kernel.
To achieve that move that out of proc FS to the kernel/ where in fact it
should belong. By doing that we can make dup_mm_exe_file static. Also we
can drop linux/proc_fs.h inclusion in fs/exec.c and kernel/fork.c.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The type of vma->vm_flags is 'unsigned long'. Neither 'int' nor
'unsigned int'. This patch fixes such misuse.
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
[ Changed to use a typedef - we'll extend it to cover more cases
later, since there has been discussion about making it a 64-bit
type.. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/linux-2.6-nsfd:
net: fix get_net_ns_by_fd for !CONFIG_NET_NS
ns proc: Return -ENOENT for a nonexistent /proc/self/ns/ entry.
ns: Declare sys_setns in syscalls.h
net: Allow setting the network namespace by fd
ns proc: Add support for the ipc namespace
ns proc: Add support for the uts namespace
ns proc: Add support for the network namespace.
ns: Introduce the setns syscall
ns: proc files for namespace naming policy.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6: (89 commits)
bonding: documentation and code cleanup for resend_igmp
bonding: prevent deadlock on slave store with alb mode (v3)
net: hold rtnl again in dump callbacks
Add Fujitsu 1000base-SX PCI ID to tg3
bnx2x: protect sequence increment with mutex
sch_sfq: fix peek() implementation
isdn: netjet - blacklist Digium TDM400P
via-velocity: don't annotate MAC registers as packed
xen: netfront: hold RTNL when updating features.
sctp: fix memory leak of the ASCONF queue when free asoc
net: make dev_disable_lro use physical device if passed a vlan dev (v2)
net: move is_vlan_dev into public header file (v2)
bug.h: Fix build with CONFIG_PRINTK disabled.
wireless: fix fatal kernel-doc error + warning in mac80211.h
wireless: fix cfg80211.h new kernel-doc warnings
iwlagn: dbg_fixed_rate only used when CONFIG_MAC80211_DEBUGFS enabled
dst: catch uninitialized metrics
be2net: hash key for rss-config cmd not set
bridge: initialize fake_rtable metrics
net: fix __dst_destroy_metrics_generic()
...
Fix up trivial conflicts in drivers/staging/brcm80211/brcmfmac/wl_cfg80211.c
In show_numa_map() we collect statistics into a numa_maps structure.
Since the number of NUMA nodes can be very large, this structure is not a
candidate for stack allocation.
Instead of going thru a kmalloc()+kfree() cycle each time show_numa_map()
is invoked, perform the allocation just once when /proc/pid/numa_maps is
opened.
Performing the allocation when numa_maps is opened, and thus before a
reference to the target tasks mm is taken, eliminates a potential
stalemate condition in the oom-killer as originally described by Hugh
Dickins:
... imagine what happens if the system is out of memory, and the mm
we're looking at is selected for killing by the OOM killer: while
we wait in __get_free_page for more memory, no memory is freed
from the selected mm because it cannot reach exit_mmap while we hold
that reference.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <lee.schermerhorn@hp.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Now that mm/mempolicy.c is no longer implementing /proc/pid/numa_maps
there is no need to export struct proc_maps_private to the world. Move it
to fs/proc/internal.h instead.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <lee.schermerhorn@hp.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Moving show_numa_map() from mempolicy.c to task_mmu.c solves several
issues.
- Having the show() operation "miles away" from the corresponding
seq_file iteration operations is a maintenance burden.
- The need to export ad hoc info like struct proc_maps_private is
eliminated.
- The implementation of show_numa_map() can be improved in a simple
manner by cooperating with the other seq_file operations (start,
stop, etc) -- something that would be messy to do without this
change.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <lee.schermerhorn@hp.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* use proc_mkdir_mode() instead of create_proc_entry(S_IFDIR|...),
export proc_mkdir_mode() for that, oh well.
* don't supply S_IFREG to proc_create_data(), it's unnecessary
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Implementing file descriptors for the network namespace
is simple and straight forward.
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Create files under /proc/<pid>/ns/ to allow controlling the
namespaces of a process.
This addresses three specific problems that can make namespaces hard to
work with.
- Namespaces require a dedicated process to pin them in memory.
- It is not possible to use a namespace unless you are the child
of the original creator.
- Namespaces don't have names that userspace can use to talk about
them.
The namespace files under /proc/<pid>/ns/ can be opened and the
file descriptor can be used to talk about a specific namespace, and
to keep the specified namespace alive.
A namespace can be kept alive by either holding the file descriptor
open or bind mounting the file someplace else. aka:
mount --bind /proc/self/ns/net /some/filesystem/path
mount --bind /proc/self/fd/<N> /some/filesystem/path
This allows namespaces to be named with userspace policy.
It requires additional support to make use of these filedescriptors
and that will be comming in the following patches.
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Linux kernel excludes guard page when performing mlock on a VMA with
down-growing stack. However, some architectures have up-growing stack
and locking the guard page should be excluded in this case too.
This patch fixes lvm2 on PA-RISC (and possibly other architectures with
up-growing stack). lvm2 calculates number of used pages when locking and
when unlocking and reports an internal error if the numbers mismatch.
[ Patch changed fairly extensively to also fix /proc/<pid>/maps for the
grows-up case, and to move things around a bit to clean it all up and
share the infrstructure with the /proc bits.
Tested on ia64 that has both grow-up and grow-down segments - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mikulas@artax.karlin.mff.cuni.cz>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Rather than pass in some random truncated offset to the pid-related
functions, check that the offset is in range up-front.
This is just cleanup, the previous commit fixed the real problem.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When m_start returns an error, the seq_file logic will still call m_stop
with that error entry, so we'd better make sure that we check it before
using it as a vma.
Introduced by commit ec6fd8a435 ("report errors in /proc/*/*map*
sanely"), which replaced NULL with various ERR_PTR() cases.
(On ia64, you happen to get a unaligned fault instead of a page fault,
since the address used is generally some random error code like -EPERM)
Reported-by: Anca Emanuel <anca.emanuel@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Américo Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6:
deal with races in /proc/*/{syscall,stack,personality}
proc: enable writing to /proc/pid/mem
proc: make check_mem_permission() return an mm_struct on success
proc: hold cred_guard_mutex in check_mem_permission()
proc: disable mem_write after exec
mm: implement access_remote_vm
mm: factor out main logic of access_process_vm
mm: use mm_struct to resolve gate vma's in __get_user_pages
mm: arch: rename in_gate_area_no_task to in_gate_area_no_mm
mm: arch: make in_gate_area take an mm_struct instead of a task_struct
mm: arch: make get_gate_vma take an mm_struct instead of a task_struct
x86: mark associated mm when running a task in 32 bit compatibility mode
x86: add context tag to mark mm when running a task in 32-bit compatibility mode
auxv: require the target to be tracable (or yourself)
close race in /proc/*/environ
report errors in /proc/*/*map* sanely
pagemap: close races with suid execve
make sessionid permissions in /proc/*/task/* match those in /proc/*
fix leaks in path_lookupat()
Fix up trivial conflicts in fs/proc/base.c
After the previous cleanup in proc_get_sb() the global proc_mnt has no
reasons to exists, kill it.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reorganize proc_get_sb() so it can be called before the struct pid of the
first process is allocated.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
While mm->start_stack was protected from cross-uid viewing (commit
f83ce3e6b0 ("proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged
processes")), the start_code and end_code values were not. This would
allow the text location of a PIE binary to leak, defeating ASLR.
Note that the value "1" is used instead of "0" for a protected value since
"ps", "killall", and likely other readers of /proc/pid/stat, take
start_code of "0" to mean a kernel thread and will misbehave. Thanks to
Brad Spengler for pointing this out.
Addresses CVE-2011-0726
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
1. namelen is declared "unsigned short" which hints for "maybe space savings".
Indeed in 2.4 struct proc_dir_entry looked like:
struct proc_dir_entry {
unsigned short low_ino;
unsigned short namelen;
Now, low_ino is "unsigned int", all savings were gone for a long time.
"struct proc_dir_entry" is not that countless to worry about it's size,
anyway.
2. converting from unsigned short to int/unsigned int can only create
problems, we better play it safe.
Space is not really conserved, because of natural alignment for the next
field. sizeof(struct proc_dir_entry) remains the same.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The current code fails to print the "[heap]" marking if the heap is split
into multiple mappings.
Fix the check so that the marking is displayed in all possible cases:
1. vma matches exactly the heap
2. the heap vma is merged e.g. with bss
3. the heap vma is splitted e.g. due to locked pages
Test cases. In all cases, the process should have mapping(s) with
[heap] marking:
(1) vma matches exactly the heap
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
int main (void)
{
if (sbrk(4096) != (void *)-1) {
printf("check /proc/%d/maps\n", (int)getpid());
while (1)
sleep(1);
}
return 0;
}
# ./test1
check /proc/553/maps
[1] + Stopped ./test1
# cat /proc/553/maps | head -4
00008000-00009000 r-xp 00000000 01:00 3113640 /test1
00010000-00011000 rw-p 00000000 01:00 3113640 /test1
00011000-00012000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap]
4006f000-40070000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
(2) the heap vma is merged
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
char foo[4096] = "foo";
char bar[4096];
int main (void)
{
if (sbrk(4096) != (void *)-1) {
printf("check /proc/%d/maps\n", (int)getpid());
while (1)
sleep(1);
}
return 0;
}
# ./test2
check /proc/556/maps
[2] + Stopped ./test2
# cat /proc/556/maps | head -4
00008000-00009000 r-xp 00000000 01:00 3116312 /test2
00010000-00012000 rw-p 00000000 01:00 3116312 /test2
00012000-00014000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap]
4004a000-4004b000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
(3) the heap vma is splitted (this fails without the patch)
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
int main (void)
{
if ((sbrk(4096) != (void *)-1) && !mlockall(MCL_FUTURE) &&
(sbrk(4096) != (void *)-1)) {
printf("check /proc/%d/maps\n", (int)getpid());
while (1)
sleep(1);
}
return 0;
}
# ./test3
check /proc/559/maps
[1] + Stopped ./test3
# cat /proc/559/maps|head -4
00008000-00009000 r-xp 00000000 01:00 3119108 /test3
00010000-00011000 rw-p 00000000 01:00 3119108 /test3
00011000-00012000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap]
00012000-00013000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [heap]
It looks like the bug has been there forever, and since it only results in
some information missing from a procfile, it does not fulfil the -stable
"critical issue" criteria.
Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@nokia.com>
Reviewed-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This file is readable for the task owner. Hide kernel addresses from
unprivileged users, leave them function names and offsets.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
All of those are rw-r--r-- and all are broken for suid - if you open
a file before the target does suid-root exec, you'll be still able
to access it. For personality it's not a big deal, but for syscall
and stack it's a real problem.
Fix: check that task is tracable for you at the time of read().
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
With recent changes there is no longer a security hazard with writing to
/proc/pid/mem. Remove the #ifdef.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This change allows us to take advantage of access_remote_vm(), which in turn
eliminates a security issue with the mem_write() implementation.
The previous implementation of mem_write() was insecure since the target task
could exec a setuid-root binary between the permission check and the actual
write. Holding a reference to the target mm_struct eliminates this
vulnerability.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Avoid a potential race when task exec's and we get a new ->mm but check against
the old credentials in ptrace_may_access().
Holding of the mutex is implemented by factoring out the body of the code into a
helper function __check_mem_permission(). Performing this factorization now
simplifies upcoming changes and minimizes churn in the diff's.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This change makes mem_write() observe the same constraints as mem_read(). This
is particularly important for mem_write as an accidental leak of the fd across
an exec could result in arbitrary modification of the target process' memory.
IOW, /proc/pid/mem is implicitly close-on-exec.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Morally, the presence of a gate vma is more an attribute of a particular mm than
a particular task. Moreover, dropping the dependency on task_struct will help
make both existing and future operations on mm's more flexible and convenient.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
