Commit Graph

4920 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Tianjia Zhang
0b7e44d39c integrity: Asymmetric digsig supports SM2-with-SM3 algorithm
Asymmetric digsig supports SM2-with-SM3 algorithm combination,
so that IMA can also verify SM2's signature data.

Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Tested-by: Xufeng Zhang <yunbo.xufeng@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-09-25 17:48:55 +10:00
David S. Miller
3ab0a7a0c3 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Two minor conflicts:

1) net/ipv4/route.c, adding a new local variable while
   moving another local variable and removing it's
   initial assignment.

2) drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz9477.c, overlapping changes.
   One pretty prints the port mode differently, whilst another
   changes the driver to try and obtain the port mode from
   the port node rather than the switch node.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-22 16:45:34 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
bf0afe673b Smack: Fix build when NETWORK_SECMARK is not set
Use proper conditional compilation for the secmark field in
the network skb.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-09-22 14:59:31 -07:00
KP Singh
aa662fc04f ima: Fix NULL pointer dereference in ima_file_hash
ima_file_hash can be called when there is no iint->ima_hash available
even though the inode exists in the integrity cache. It is fairly
common for a file to not have a hash. (e.g. an mknodat, prior to the
file being closed).

Another example where this can happen (suggested by Jann Horn):

Process A does:

	while(1) {
		unlink("/tmp/imafoo");
		fd = open("/tmp/imafoo", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0700);
		if (fd == -1) {
			perror("open");
			continue;
		}
		write(fd, "A", 1);
		close(fd);
	}

and Process B does:

	while (1) {
		int fd = open("/tmp/imafoo", O_RDONLY);
		if (fd == -1)
			continue;
    		char *mapping = mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC,
			 	     MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
		if (mapping != MAP_FAILED)
			munmap(mapping, 0x1000);
		close(fd);
  	}

Due to the race to get the iint->mutex between ima_file_hash and
process_measurement iint->ima_hash could still be NULL.

Fixes: 6beea7afcc ("ima: add the ability to query the cached hash of a given file")
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-09-16 17:43:02 -04:00
Lenny Szubowicz
726bd8965a integrity: Load certs from the EFI MOK config table
Because of system-specific EFI firmware limitations, EFI volatile
variables may not be capable of holding the required contents of
the Machine Owner Key (MOK) certificate store when the certificate
list grows above some size. Therefore, an EFI boot loader may pass
the MOK certs via a EFI configuration table created specifically for
this purpose to avoid this firmware limitation.

An EFI configuration table is a much more primitive mechanism
compared to EFI variables and is well suited for one-way passage
of static information from a pre-OS environment to the kernel.

This patch adds the support to load certs from the MokListRT
entry in the MOK variable configuration table, if it's present.
The pre-existing support to load certs from the MokListRT EFI
variable remains and is used if the EFI MOK configuration table
isn't present or can't be successfully used.

Signed-off-by: Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200905013107.10457-4-lszubowi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
2020-09-16 18:53:42 +03:00
Lenny Szubowicz
38a1f03aa2 integrity: Move import of MokListRT certs to a separate routine
Move the loading of certs from the UEFI MokListRT into a separate
routine to facilitate additional MokList functionality.

There is no visible functional change as a result of this patch.
Although the UEFI dbx certs are now loaded before the MokList certs,
they are loaded onto different key rings. So the order of the keys
on their respective key rings is the same.

Signed-off-by: Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200905013107.10457-3-lszubowi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
2020-09-16 18:53:42 +03:00
Linus Torvalds
1e484d3887 device_cgroup RCU warning fix from Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEgycj0O+d1G2aycA8rZhLv9lQBTwFAl9hIXMACgkQrZhLv9lQ
 BTy34RAAkt6BAcEPA9hSMkvRCrA44Doq6jaK45vmMExuWh2/QMvfK1E4KjxXGn0U
 e74TcCPgh+AuSWQABAuZrMVx4Ai9fyDBWkhtzwz7XsHeUtUvEMUkb2fzKRGoBg6h
 6WvYtzdO4NHEcy3Lf59EYW2Hm08eEjZfmVMRlCF6MoLmsj/ifh+yQ3Xxy0RAd/Jo
 X4IvSwan6EitXNEHy7onmpDjL7BvncXs1dXpGXqHzhLF8W4EtFmIZGH3T5/W82n0
 IgtEqqsCw5MY5mSIixjUPcRxbi+NUkymEzYQyvceVU0W+voMITQ8Qb/NkGMklMLE
 KUHwP1r4q1XR1WVFqHxRCPB4c+njNwiTUtAO44ODNNgC1R+wT70CGhujP1bSW6Eo
 Gf5DWJniD9I8viBWD5tYBFWPBlH+DfURY8wqkrEEC8fntsIDkSWf2XK2dVBrDxMM
 PxXOYEKfZVIRQTRAz/HJmCAoW8rVkCa5ptpKFJzWvoLqS3FclFRg0i1FZ6fcMuz1
 4phZCL+pGDSp3yhSi6lamdhPhRPq9Pbk4ZVSPK2gAg4VzhI6w7TY/zicZapaRQ0g
 hScOmTk4YKqLhUbcWiBErH/AwV6op+H4DwG/A1z8ASUxQST5oiJk0d7dMGCF9cgG
 VuHXj/dQbtymUMjo7MSqLqpx0ieEarEqZ2BOgn1DVTYgn4c1yms=
 =DgJN
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'fixes-v5.9a' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security layer fix from James  Morris:
 "A device_cgroup RCU warning fix from Amol Grover"

* tag 'fixes-v5.9a' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  device_cgroup: Fix RCU list debugging warning
2020-09-15 16:26:57 -07:00
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
8861d0af64 selinux: Add helper functions to get and set checkreqprot
checkreqprot data member in selinux_state struct is accessed directly by
SELinux functions to get and set. This could cause unexpected read or
write access to this data member due to compiler optimizations and/or
compiler's reordering of access to this field.

Add helper functions to get and set checkreqprot data member in
selinux_state struct. These helper functions use READ_ONCE and
WRITE_ONCE macros to ensure atomic read or write of memory for
this data member.

Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-09-15 14:36:28 -04:00
Roberto Sassu
455b6c9112 evm: Check size of security.evm before using it
This patch checks the size for the EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG and
EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG types to ensure that the algorithm is read from
the buffer returned by vfs_getxattr_alloc().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19.x
Fixes: 5feeb61183 ("evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-09-15 13:47:42 -04:00
Roberto Sassu
4be92db3b5 ima: Remove semicolon at the end of ima_get_binary_runtime_size()
This patch removes the unnecessary semicolon at the end of
ima_get_binary_runtime_size().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d158847ae8 ("ima: maintain memory size needed for serializing the measurement list")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-09-15 13:47:41 -04:00
Roberto Sassu
60386b8540 ima: Don't ignore errors from crypto_shash_update()
Errors returned by crypto_shash_update() are not checked in
ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm() and thus can be overwritten at the next
iteration of the loop. This patch adds a check after calling
crypto_shash_update() and returns immediately if the result is not zero.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3323eec921 ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-09-15 13:47:37 -04:00
Alex Dewar
f60c826d03 ima: Use kmemdup rather than kmalloc+memcpy
Issue identified with Coccinelle.

Signed-off-by: Alex Dewar <alex.dewar90@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-09-15 09:57:48 -04:00
Casey Schaufler
322dd63c7f Smack: Use the netlabel cache
Utilize the Netlabel cache mechanism for incoming packet matching.
Refactor the initialization of secattr structures, as it was being
done in two places.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-09-11 15:31:31 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
a2af031885 Smack: Set socket labels only once
Refactor the IP send checks so that the netlabel value
is set only when necessary, not on every send. Some functions
get renamed as the changes made the old name misleading.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-09-11 15:31:30 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
36be81293d Smack: Consolidate uses of secmark into a function
Add a function smack_from_skb() that returns the Smack label
identified by a network secmark. Replace the explicit uses of
the secmark with this function.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-09-11 15:31:30 -07:00
Stephen Smalley
e8ba53d002 selinux: access policycaps with READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE
Use READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE for all accesses to the
selinux_state.policycaps booleans to prevent compiler
mischief.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-09-11 10:08:51 -04:00
Bruno Meneguele
8c2f516c99 integrity: include keyring name for unknown key request
Depending on the IMA policy rule a key may be searched for in multiple
keyrings (e.g. .ima and .platform) and possibly not found.  This patch
improves feedback by including the keyring "description" (name) in the
error message.

Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated commit message]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-09-09 20:05:28 -04:00
Bruno Meneguele
e4d7e2df3a ima: limit secure boot feedback scope for appraise
Only emit an unknown/invalid message when setting the IMA appraise mode
to anything other than "enforce", when secureboot is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated commit message]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-09-09 20:01:55 -04:00
Bruno Meneguele
7fe2bb7e7e integrity: invalid kernel parameters feedback
Don't silently ignore unknown or invalid ima_{policy,appraise,hash} and evm
kernel boot command line options.

Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-09-08 22:03:50 -04:00
Bruno Meneguele
4afb28ab03 ima: add check for enforced appraise option
The "enforce" string is allowed as an option for ima_appraise= kernel
paramenter per kernel-paramenters.txt and should be considered on the
parameter setup checking as a matter of completeness. Also it allows futher
checking on the options being passed by the user.

Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-09-08 22:02:57 -04:00
Jakub Kicinski
44a8c4f33c Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
We got slightly different patches removing a double word
in a comment in net/ipv4/raw.c - picked the version from net.

Simple conflict in drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c. Use cached
values instead of VNIC login response buffer (following what
commit 507ebe6444 ("ibmvnic: Fix use-after-free of VNIC login
response buffer") did).

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2020-09-04 21:28:59 -07:00
Denis Efremov
e44f128768 integrity: Use current_uid() in integrity_audit_message()
Modify integrity_audit_message() to use current_uid().

Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-08-31 17:46:50 -04:00
Tyler Hicks
48ce1ddce1 ima: Fail rule parsing when asymmetric key measurement isn't supportable
Measuring keys is currently only supported for asymmetric keys. In the
future, this might change.

For now, the "func=KEY_CHECK" and "keyrings=" options are only
appropriate when CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Make
this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that
these policy language constructs are supported.

Fixes: 2b60c0eced ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Fixes: 5808611ccc ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")
Suggested-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-08-31 17:45:14 -04:00
Tyler Hicks
176377d97d ima: Pre-parse the list of keyrings in a KEY_CHECK rule
The ima_keyrings buffer was used as a work buffer for strsep()-based
parsing of the "keyrings=" option of an IMA policy rule. This parsing
was re-performed each time an asymmetric key was added to a kernel
keyring for each loaded policy rule that contained a "keyrings=" option.

An example rule specifying this option is:

 measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=a|b|c

The rule says to measure asymmetric keys added to any of the kernel
keyrings named "a", "b", or "c". The size of the buffer size was
equal to the size of the largest "keyrings=" value seen in a previously
loaded rule (5 + 1 for the NUL-terminator in the previous example) and
the buffer was pre-allocated at the time of policy load.

The pre-allocated buffer approach suffered from a couple bugs:

1) There was no locking around the use of the buffer so concurrent key
   add operations, to two different keyrings, would result in the
   strsep() loop of ima_match_keyring() to modify the buffer at the same
   time. This resulted in unexpected results from ima_match_keyring()
   and, therefore, could cause unintended keys to be measured or keys to
   not be measured when IMA policy intended for them to be measured.

2) If the kstrdup() that initialized entry->keyrings in ima_parse_rule()
   failed, the ima_keyrings buffer was freed and set to NULL even when a
   valid KEY_CHECK rule was previously loaded. The next KEY_CHECK event
   would trigger a call to strcpy() with a NULL destination pointer and
   crash the kernel.

Remove the need for a pre-allocated global buffer by parsing the list of
keyrings in a KEY_CHECK rule at the time of policy load. The
ima_rule_entry will contain an array of string pointers which point to
the name of each keyring specified in the rule. No string processing
needs to happen at the time of asymmetric key add so iterating through
the list and doing a string comparison is all that's required at the
time of policy check.

In the process of changing how the "keyrings=" policy option is handled,
a couple additional bugs were fixed:

1) The rule parser accepted rules containing invalid "keyrings=" values
   such as "a|b||c", "a|b|", or simply "|".

2) The /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy file did not display the entire
   "keyrings=" value if the list of keyrings was longer than what could
   fit in the fixed size tbuf buffer in ima_policy_show().

Fixes: 5c7bac9fb2 ("IMA: pre-allocate buffer to hold keyrings string")
Fixes: 2b60c0eced ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-08-31 17:45:02 -04:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
66ccd2560a selinux: simplify away security_policydb_len()
Remove the security_policydb_len() calls from sel_open_policy() and
instead update the inode size from the size returned from
security_read_policy().

Since after this change security_policydb_len() is only called from
security_load_policy(), remove it entirely and just open-code it there.

Also, since security_load_policy() is always called with policy_mutex
held, make it dereference the policy pointer directly and drop the
unnecessary RCU locking.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-08-31 10:00:14 -04:00
Stephen Smalley
9ff9abc4c6 selinux: move policy mutex to selinux_state, use in lockdep checks
Move the mutex used to synchronize policy changes (reloads and setting
of booleans) from selinux_fs_info to selinux_state and use it in
lockdep checks for rcu_dereference_protected() calls in the security
server functions.  This makes the dependency on the mutex explicit
in the code rather than relying on comments.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-08-27 09:52:47 -04:00
Dan Carpenter
0256b0aa80 selinux: fix error handling bugs in security_load_policy()
There are a few bugs in the error handling for security_load_policy().

1) If the newpolicy->sidtab allocation fails then it leads to a NULL
   dereference.  Also the error code was not set to -ENOMEM on that
   path.
2) If policydb_read() failed then we call policydb_destroy() twice
   which meands we call kvfree(p->sym_val_to_name[i]) twice.
3) If policydb_load_isids() failed then we call sidtab_destroy() twice
   and that results in a double free in the sidtab_destroy_tree()
   function because entry.ptr_inner and entry.ptr_leaf are not set to
   NULL.

One thing that makes this code nice to deal with is that none of the
functions return partially allocated data.  In other words, the
policydb_read() either allocates everything successfully or it frees
all the data it allocates.  It never returns a mix of allocated and
not allocated data.

I re-wrote this to only free the successfully allocated data which
avoids the double frees.  I also re-ordered selinux_policy_free() so
it's in the reverse order of the allocation function.

Fixes: c7c556f1e8 ("selinux: refactor changing booleans")
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
[PM: partially merged by hand due to merge fuzz]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-08-26 10:19:08 -04:00
KP Singh
8ea636848a bpf: Implement bpf_local_storage for inodes
Similar to bpf_local_storage for sockets, add local storage for inodes.
The life-cycle of storage is managed with the life-cycle of the inode.
i.e. the storage is destroyed along with the owning inode.

The BPF LSM allocates an __rcu pointer to the bpf_local_storage in the
security blob which are now stackable and can co-exist with other LSMs.

Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200825182919.1118197-6-kpsingh@chromium.org
2020-08-25 15:00:04 -07:00
Stephen Smalley
1b8b31a2e6 selinux: convert policy read-write lock to RCU
Convert the policy read-write lock to RCU.  This is significantly
simplified by the earlier work to encapsulate the policy data
structures and refactor the policy load and boolean setting logic.
Move the latest_granting sequence number into the selinux_policy
structure so that it can be updated atomically with the policy.
Since removing the policy rwlock and moving latest_granting reduces
the selinux_ss structure to nothing more than a wrapper around the
selinux_policy pointer, get rid of the extra layer of indirection.

At present this change merely passes a hardcoded 1 to
rcu_dereference_check() in the cases where we know we do not need to
take rcu_read_lock(), with the preceding comment explaining why.
Alternatively we could pass fsi->mutex down from selinuxfs and
apply a lockdep check on it instead.

Based in part on earlier attempts to convert the policy rwlock
to RCU by Kaigai Kohei [1] and by Peter Enderborg [2].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/6e2f9128-e191-ebb3-0e87-74bfccb0767f@tycho.nsa.gov/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20180530141104.28569-1-peter.enderborg@sony.com/

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-08-25 08:34:47 -04:00
Randy Dunlap
c76a2f9ecd selinux: delete repeated words in comments
Drop a repeated word in comments.
{open, is, then}

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
[PM: fix subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-08-24 09:03:14 -04:00
Gustavo A. R. Silva
df561f6688 treewide: Use fallthrough pseudo-keyword
Replace the existing /* fall through */ comments and its variants with
the new pseudo-keyword macro fallthrough[1]. Also, remove unnecessary
fall-through markings when it is the case.

[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.7/process/deprecated.html?highlight=fallthrough#implicit-switch-case-fall-through

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
2020-08-23 17:36:59 -05:00
Peter Enderborg
30969bc8e0 selinux: add basic filtering for audit trace events
This patch adds further attributes to the event. These attributes are
helpful to understand the context of the message and can be used
to filter the events.

There are three common items. Source context, target context and tclass.
There are also items from the outcome of operation performed.

An event is similar to:
           <...>-1309  [002] ....  6346.691689: selinux_audited:
       requested=0x4000000 denied=0x4000000 audited=0x4000000
       result=-13
       scontext=system_u:system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
       tcontext=system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 tclass=file

With systems where many denials are occurring, it is useful to apply a
filter. The filtering is a set of logic that is inserted with
the filter file. Example:
 echo "tclass==\"file\" " > events/avc/selinux_audited/filter

This adds that we only get tclass=file.

The trace can also have extra properties. Adding the user stack
can be done with
   echo 1 > options/userstacktrace

Now the output will be
         runcon-1365  [003] ....  6960.955530: selinux_audited:
     requested=0x4000000 denied=0x4000000 audited=0x4000000
     result=-13
     scontext=system_u:system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
     tcontext=system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 tclass=file
          runcon-1365  [003] ....  6960.955560: <user stack trace>
 =>  <00007f325b4ce45b>
 =>  <00005607093efa57>

Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-08-21 17:07:29 -04:00
Thiébaud Weksteen
dd8166212d selinux: add tracepoint on audited events
The audit data currently captures which process and which target
is responsible for a denial. There is no data on where exactly in the
process that call occurred. Debugging can be made easier by being able to
reconstruct the unified kernel and userland stack traces [1]. Add a
tracepoint on the SELinux denials which can then be used by userland
(i.e. perf).

Although this patch could manually be added by each OS developer to
trouble shoot a denial, adding it to the kernel streamlines the
developers workflow.

It is possible to use perf for monitoring the event:
  # perf record -e avc:selinux_audited -g -a
  ^C
  # perf report -g
  [...]
      6.40%     6.40%  audited=800000 tclass=4
               |
                  __libc_start_main
                  |
                  |--4.60%--__GI___ioctl
                  |          entry_SYSCALL_64
                  |          do_syscall_64
                  |          __x64_sys_ioctl
                  |          ksys_ioctl
                  |          binder_ioctl
                  |          binder_set_nice
                  |          can_nice
                  |          capable
                  |          security_capable
                  |          cred_has_capability.isra.0
                  |          slow_avc_audit
                  |          common_lsm_audit
                  |          avc_audit_post_callback
                  |          avc_audit_post_callback
                  |

It is also possible to use the ftrace interface:
  # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/avc/selinux_audited/enable
  # cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace
  tracer: nop
  entries-in-buffer/entries-written: 1/1   #P:8
  [...]
  dmesg-3624  [001] 13072.325358: selinux_denied: audited=800000 tclass=4

The tclass value can be mapped to a class by searching
security/selinux/flask.h. The audited value is a bit field of the
permissions described in security/selinux/av_permissions.h for the
corresponding class.

[1] https://source.android.com/devices/tech/debug/native_stack_dump

Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
Suggested-by: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-08-21 17:05:22 -04:00
Daniel Burgener
0eea609153 selinux: Create new booleans and class dirs out of tree
In order to avoid concurrency issues around selinuxfs resource availability
during policy load, we first create new directories out of tree for
reloaded resources, then swap them in, and finally delete the old versions.

This fix focuses on concurrency in each of the two subtrees swapped, and
not concurrency between the trees.  This means that it is still possible
that subsequent reads to eg the booleans directory and the class directory
during a policy load could see the old state for one and the new for the other.
The problem of ensuring that policy loads are fully atomic from the perspective
of userspace is larger than what is dealt with here.  This commit focuses on
ensuring that the directories contents always match either the new or the old
policy state from the perspective of userspace.

In the previous implementation, on policy load /sys/fs/selinux is updated
by deleting the previous contents of
/sys/fs/selinux/{class,booleans} and then recreating them.  This means
that there is a period of time when the contents of these directories do not
exist which can cause race conditions as userspace relies on them for
information about the policy.  In addition, it means that error recovery in
the event of failure is challenging.

In order to demonstrate the race condition that this series fixes, you
can use the following commands:

while true; do cat /sys/fs/selinux/class/service/perms/status
>/dev/null; done &
while true; do load_policy; done;

In the existing code, this will display errors fairly often as the class
lookup fails.  (In normal operation from systemd, this would result in a
permission check which would be allowed or denied based on policy settings
around unknown object classes.) After applying this patch series you
should expect to no longer see such error messages.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Burgener <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-08-21 09:41:31 -04:00
Daniel Burgener
613ba18798 selinux: Standardize string literal usage for selinuxfs directory names
Switch class and policy_capabilities directory names to be referred to with
global constants, consistent with booleans directory name.  This will allow
for easy consistency of naming in future development.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Burgener <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-08-21 09:39:10 -04:00
Daniel Burgener
66ec384ad3 selinux: Refactor selinuxfs directory populating functions
Make sel_make_bools and sel_make_classes take the specific elements of
selinux_fs_info that they need rather than the entire struct.

This will allow a future patch to pass temporary elements that are not in
the selinux_fs_info struct to these functions so that the original elements
can be preserved until we are ready to perform the switch over.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Burgener <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-08-21 09:37:12 -04:00
Daniel Burgener
aeecf4a3fb selinux: Create function for selinuxfs directory cleanup
Separating the cleanup from the creation will simplify two things in
future patches in this series.  First, the creation can be made generic,
to create directories not tied to the selinux_fs_info structure.  Second,
we will ultimately want to reorder creation and deletion so that the
deletions aren't performed until the new directory structures have already
been moved into place.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Burgener <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-08-21 09:35:59 -04:00
Stephen Smalley
9530a3e004 selinux: permit removing security.selinux xattr before policy load
Currently SELinux denies attempts to remove the security.selinux xattr
always, even when permissive or no policy is loaded.  This was originally
motivated by the view that all files should be labeled, even if that label
is unlabeled_t, and we shouldn't permit files that were once labeled to
have their labels removed entirely.  This however prevents removing
SELinux xattrs in the case where one "disables" SELinux by not loading
a policy (e.g. a system where runtime disable is removed and selinux=0
was not specified).  Allow removing the xattr before SELinux is
initialized.  We could conceivably permit it even after initialization
if permissive, or introduce a separate permission check here.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-08-20 21:55:31 -04:00
Amol Grover
bc62d68e2a device_cgroup: Fix RCU list debugging warning
exceptions may be traversed using list_for_each_entry_rcu()
outside of an RCU read side critical section BUT under the
protection of decgroup_mutex. Hence add the corresponding
lockdep expression to fix the following false-positive
warning:

[    2.304417] =============================
[    2.304418] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[    2.304420] 5.5.4-stable #17 Tainted: G            E
[    2.304422] -----------------------------
[    2.304424] security/device_cgroup.c:355 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

Signed-off-by: Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2020-08-20 11:25:03 -07:00
kernel test robot
879229311b selinux: fix memdup.cocci warnings
Use kmemdup rather than duplicating its implementation

Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/api/memdup.cocci

Fixes: c7c556f1e8 ("selinux: refactor changing booleans")
CC: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@inria.fr>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-08-20 08:39:05 -04:00
Stephen Smalley
37ea433c66 selinux: avoid dereferencing the policy prior to initialization
Certain SELinux security server functions (e.g. security_port_sid,
called during bind) were not explicitly testing to see if SELinux
has been initialized (i.e. initial policy loaded) and handling
the no-policy-loaded case.  In the past this happened to work
because the policydb was statically allocated and could always
be accessed, but with the recent encapsulation of policy state
and conversion to dynamic allocation, we can no longer access
the policy state prior to initialization.  Add a test of
!selinux_initialized(state) to all of the exported functions that
were missing them and handle appropriately.

Fixes: 461698026f ("selinux: encapsulate policy state, refactor policy load")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-08-19 21:14:41 -04:00
Colin Ian King
69ea651c40 selinux: fix allocation failure check on newpolicy->sidtab
The allocation check of newpolicy->sidtab is null checking if
newpolicy is null and not newpolicy->sidtab. Fix this.

Addresses-Coverity: ("Logically dead code")
Fixes: c7c556f1e8 ("selinux: refactor changing booleans")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-08-19 09:14:04 -04:00
Stephen Smalley
c7c556f1e8 selinux: refactor changing booleans
Refactor the logic for changing SELinux policy booleans in a similar
manner to the refactoring of policy load, thereby reducing the
size of the critical section when the policy write-lock is held
and making it easier to convert the policy rwlock to RCU in the
future.  Instead of directly modifying the policydb in place, modify
a copy and then swap it into place through a single pointer update.
Only fully copy the portions of the policydb that are affected by
boolean changes to avoid the full cost of a deep policydb copy.
Introduce another level of indirection for the sidtab since changing
booleans does not require updating the sidtab, unlike policy load.
While we are here, create a common helper for notifying
other kernel components and userspace of a policy change and call it
from both security_set_bools() and selinux_policy_commit().

Based on an old (2004) patch by Kaigai Kohei [1] to convert the policy
rwlock to RCU that was deferred at the time since it did not
significantly improve performance and introduced complexity. Peter
Enderborg later submitted a patch series to convert to RCU [2] that
would have made changing booleans a much more expensive operation
by requiring a full policydb_write();policydb_read(); sequence to
deep copy the entire policydb and also had concerns regarding
atomic allocations.

This change is now simplified by the earlier work to encapsulate
policy state in the selinux_policy struct and to refactor
policy load.  After this change, the last major obstacle to
converting the policy rwlock to RCU is likely the sidtab live
convert support.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/6e2f9128-e191-ebb3-0e87-74bfccb0767f@tycho.nsa.gov/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20180530141104.28569-1-peter.enderborg@sony.com/

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-08-17 21:00:33 -04:00
Stephen Smalley
02a52c5c8c selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs
With the refactoring of the policy load logic in the security
server from the previous change, it is now possible to split out
the committing of the new policy from security_load_policy() and
perform it only after successful updating of selinuxfs.  Change
security_load_policy() to return the newly populated policy
data structures to the caller, export selinux_policy_commit()
for external callers, and introduce selinux_policy_cancel() to
provide a way to cancel the policy load in the event of an error
during updating of the selinuxfs directory tree.  Further, rework
the interfaces used by selinuxfs to get information from the policy
when creating the new directory tree to take and act upon the
new policy data structure rather than the current/active policy.
Update selinuxfs to use these updated and new interfaces.  While
we are here, stop re-creating the policy_capabilities directory
on each policy load since it does not depend on the policy, and
stop trying to create the booleans and classes directories during
the initial creation of selinuxfs since no information is available
until first policy load.

After this change, a failure while updating the booleans and class
directories will cause the entire policy load to be canceled, leaving
the original policy intact, and policy load notifications to userspace
will only happen after a successful completion of updating those
directories.  This does not (yet) provide full atomicity with respect
to the updating of the directory trees themselves.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-08-17 20:50:22 -04:00
Stephen Smalley
461698026f selinux: encapsulate policy state, refactor policy load
Encapsulate the policy state in its own structure (struct
selinux_policy) that is separately allocated but referenced from the
selinux_ss structure.  The policy state includes the SID table
(particularly the context structures), the policy database, and the
mapping between the kernel classes/permissions and the policy values.
Refactor the security server portion of the policy load logic to
cleanly separate loading of the new structures from committing the new
policy.  Unify the initial policy load and reload code paths as much
as possible, avoiding duplicated code.  Make sure we are taking the
policy read-lock prior to any dereferencing of the policy.  Move the
copying of the policy capability booleans into the state structure
outside of the policy write-lock because they are separate from the
policy and are read outside of any policy lock; possibly they should
be using at least READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE or smp_load_acquire/store_release.

These changes simplify the policy loading logic, reduce the size of
the critical section while holding the policy write-lock, and should
facilitate future changes to e.g. refactor the entire policy reload
logic including the selinuxfs code to make the updating of the policy
and the selinuxfs directory tree atomic and/or to convert the policy
read-write lock to RCU.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-08-17 20:48:57 -04:00
Stephen Smalley
339949be25 scripts/selinux,selinux: update mdp to enable policy capabilities
Presently mdp does not enable any SELinux policy capabilities
in the dummy policy it generates. Thus, policies derived from
it will by default lack various features commonly used in modern
policies such as open permission, extended socket classes, network
peer controls, etc.  Split the policy capability definitions out into
their own headers so that we can include them into mdp without pulling in
other kernel headers and extend mdp generate policycap statements for the
policy capabilities known to the kernel.  Policy authors may wish to
selectively remove some of these from the generated policy.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-08-17 20:42:00 -04:00
Linus Torvalds
9ad57f6dfc Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)
Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:

 - most of the rest of MM (memcg, hugetlb, vmscan, proc, compaction,
   mempolicy, oom-kill, hugetlbfs, migration, thp, cma, util,
   memory-hotplug, cleanups, uaccess, migration, gup, pagemap),

 - various other subsystems (alpha, misc, sparse, bitmap, lib, bitops,
   checkpatch, autofs, minix, nilfs, ufs, fat, signals, kmod, coredump,
   exec, kdump, rapidio, panic, kcov, kgdb, ipc).

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (164 commits)
  mm/gup: remove task_struct pointer for all gup code
  mm: clean up the last pieces of page fault accountings
  mm/xtensa: use general page fault accounting
  mm/x86: use general page fault accounting
  mm/sparc64: use general page fault accounting
  mm/sparc32: use general page fault accounting
  mm/sh: use general page fault accounting
  mm/s390: use general page fault accounting
  mm/riscv: use general page fault accounting
  mm/powerpc: use general page fault accounting
  mm/parisc: use general page fault accounting
  mm/openrisc: use general page fault accounting
  mm/nios2: use general page fault accounting
  mm/nds32: use general page fault accounting
  mm/mips: use general page fault accounting
  mm/microblaze: use general page fault accounting
  mm/m68k: use general page fault accounting
  mm/ia64: use general page fault accounting
  mm/hexagon: use general page fault accounting
  mm/csky: use general page fault accounting
  ...
2020-08-12 11:24:12 -07:00
Peter Xu
64019a2e46 mm/gup: remove task_struct pointer for all gup code
After the cleanup of page fault accounting, gup does not need to pass
task_struct around any more.  Remove that parameter in the whole gup
stack.

Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200707225021.200906-26-peterx@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-12 10:58:04 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
ce13266d97 Minor fixes for v5.9.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEgycj0O+d1G2aycA8rZhLv9lQBTwFAl8xl0QACgkQrZhLv9lQ
 BTzEUA/+Muf7gha2mtxGJ49ZX/AsUOi/feHFDjt+NEA6lQTIaaqU5LxXNdtARu/5
 j+RlJkrw8+3QGJ4h544HIJodbLZHghWpp15AxBAy+1BaeAoswEnrW2/6mD1iUBEH
 pFI0P2OjnVYxEPJGubLhp4qQ0lnqVKwzciNbBDLMydr6SerwoPDz9h0h5SMDoOxF
 m4f1/dsoXrpyp86GSvHDVa9NRs/GMKz/qIeC6DXuMRoqGX15EZVV1iABC7vPd2we
 84IacCRIE/DO1M1rmbNBSpeErmvkxRo00Qjupl0XGf7D4aazxnQl+RpaLdHAtBI1
 ubzU/76DCkaCO1x+3KPHyQUHZvXa3dt0/n4yEkOv01RIzivKZZz6jahsCrbX6lzX
 Dq4n0zg8sA7vh/T7aNX77z0FU1TuFBpiJ8dn/0vUgJPxDwt2V9F2k9jyV1pUeK1V
 yvSkIleIQmwmuT0p2nB/1g7yE5xkvWTM5WOy8/zIQj2aCvuo3ToY06Qc0rNOKTa8
 6Qi/Byi/5S1bBwYQqrAyrd5GhPVdZ8oNZyaUu8Mpm+4P0+2CquvDfN3ZHUxwILNX
 /TMVTVMu1PQQIltWANA0L0BjGIjSGxutisEUQL7o24566GXA3wTQd8HoKRBc6h+p
 DGeVMehPG7GIwoCIvuzdahSRdzzI/iBG3P10TZ5u+3BwTL0OUNY=
 =s2Jw
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'for-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "A couple of minor documentation updates only for this release"

* tag 'for-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  LSM: drop duplicated words in header file comments
  Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones: security
2020-08-11 14:30:36 -07:00
Waiman Long
453431a549 mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
As said by Linus:

  A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
  Otherwise it's actively misleading.

  In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
  caller wants.

  In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
  future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
  something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.

The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.

Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently
added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit.
In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure
that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.

The renaming is done by using the command sequence:

  git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
  xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/'

followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding
a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more]

Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 11:33:22 -07:00
Alexander A. Klimov
c9fecf505a Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones: security
Rationale:
Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM
as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate.

Deterministic algorithm:
For each file:
  If not .svg:
    For each line:
      If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`:
        For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`:
          If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions
          return 200 OK and serve the same content:
            Replace HTTP with HTTPS.

Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov <grandmaster@al2klimov.de>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2020-08-06 12:00:05 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
4cec929370 integrity-v5.9
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJIBAABCAAyFiEEjSMCCC7+cjo3nszSa3kkZrA+cVoFAl8puJgUHHpvaGFyQGxp
 bnV4LmlibS5jb20ACgkQa3kkZrA+cVq47w//VDg2pTD+/fPadleRJkKVSPaKJu4k
 N/gAVPxhYpJVJ+BTZKMFzTjX3kjfQG7udjORzC+saEdii7W1EfJJqHabLEnihfxd
 VDUS0RQndMwOkioAAZOsy5dFE84wUOX8O1kq31Aw2G+QLCYhn1dNMg10j6SBM034
 cJbS59k3w+lyqFy/Fje8e7aO1xmc/83x9MfLgzZTscCZqzf1vIJY8onwfTxRVBpQ
 QS0AZJM+b0+9MlJxpzBYxZARwYb5cXBLh07W/vBFmJRh15n0e20uWM4YFkBixicX
 gi3LtXd/75hFIHgm6QqbwDJrrA45zOJs5YsOudCctWVAe5k5mV0H7ysJ6phcRI9E
 uQvBb7Z+0viQXis6Cjx4gYSYAcAJPcDrfcjR4itQSOj5anUFBvCju+Jr373S0Vn8
 3eXGyimRAc33vEFkI7RJNfExkGh7pkYWzcruk90bHD6dAKuki/tisIs7ZvhTuFOp
 eyWt7hbctqbt/gESop3zXjUDRJsX9GyAA4OvJwFGRfRJ4ziQ5w8LGc+VendSWald
 1zjkJxXAZLjDPQlYv2074PYeIguTbcDkjeRVxUD9mWvdi0tyXK+r2qC+PeX7Rs71
 y1aGIT/NX9qYI2H0xIm3ettztdIE8F1tnAn2ziNkQiXEzCrEqKtAAxxSErTQuB78
 LMgCDPF8y06ZjD8=
 =M/tq
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'integrity-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "The nicest change is the IMA policy rule checking. The other changes
  include allowing the kexec boot cmdline line measure policy rules to
  be defined in terms of the inode associated with the kexec kernel
  image, making the IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM, which governs the IMA
  appraise mode (log, fix, enforce), a runtime decision based on the
  secure boot mode of the system, and including errno in the audit log"

* tag 'integrity-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  integrity: remove redundant initialization of variable ret
  ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime
  ima: AppArmor satisfies the audit rule requirements
  ima: Rename internal filter rule functions
  ima: Support additional conditionals in the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function
  ima: Use the common function to detect LSM conditionals in a rule
  ima: Move comprehensive rule validation checks out of the token parser
  ima: Use correct type for the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements
  ima: Shallow copy the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements
  ima: Fail rule parsing when appraise_flag=blacklist is unsupportable
  ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEY_CHECK hook is combined with an invalid cond
  ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook is combined with an invalid cond
  ima: Fail rule parsing when buffer hook functions have an invalid action
  ima: Free the entire rule if it fails to parse
  ima: Free the entire rule when deleting a list of rules
  ima: Have the LSM free its audit rule
  IMA: Add audit log for failure conditions
  integrity: Add errno field in audit message
2020-08-06 11:35:57 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
bfdd5aaa54 Smack fixes for 5.9
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJLBAABCAA1FiEEC+9tH1YyUwIQzUIeOKUVfIxDyBEFAl8pmVMXHGNhc2V5QHNj
 aGF1Zmxlci1jYS5jb20ACgkQOKUVfIxDyBE4tA/7BvMGZjrGVu7F8oOJGam6xiQ+
 iVczarvuH9HUfIWWKytgAZXaNf8/lQvpTGYjJFdLGVaLVfB4CSrrrdOGlfvZGpZ/
 5CXeSMAAUOAmYnqjSXFuLqp0NJEEwBg0L7/YWGbp/fq7t8WcY73esDRpVw/R78fV
 rOSMq+qt+IKRERUZWHa3gY7/FDA1/KnEkXjcMViM9PN3Gi5u2Fw6IMVWugPYJYrh
 86jlrDxYV3ceqDpoiHGyulMcBk/f/GppjIWz4ihZ0YShn+ZgAXsnJGjEhGxsoSXb
 CdG0O0y/m6y/+ekyovhvL8+AymfVWbK3qzE8IxWp8Xbrd882naur0c0vTG6y2eF7
 Z2HnI3ivusNrKTkXQnzC86YJ0T96Pg9OCab5poSIsWK5bM542dKZ/7KoSDfzIfBH
 uPhTY2PyRSiUiCWpt7esHtp4mYwCGqUs2j80TZDb8ptAZbYKxzC0pFIDoFeEyOM4
 FDBXjH8Bo+eEG9V8OgGeVvluYaat+C00dba9fiOT7/Tm0F9KqOJEOO9uJPV9CuJN
 +jrL90mopy8T0bygqMjp+GB5V13IGL5+NDHZcnO3Ij5jI/7q0TQ6FlFZ4tg4o4yM
 Y7FyMF+ybUlRod0ayYgurtxn91c0E/PTOPSqtL/RKtRLbLdGrOM3Rfbxn9rREONY
 h1/RmmX5jSBQOKNq9/Y=
 =ZoLN
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'Smack-for-5.9' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next

Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
 "Minor fixes to Smack for the v5.9 release.

  All were found by automated checkers and have straightforward
  resolution"

* tag 'Smack-for-5.9' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
  Smack: prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso()
  Smack: fix another vsscanf out of bounds
  Smack: fix use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self()
2020-08-06 11:02:23 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
74858abbb1 cap-checkpoint-restore-v5.9
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iHUEABYKAB0WIQRAhzRXHqcMeLMyaSiRxhvAZXjcogUCXygegQAKCRCRxhvAZXjc
 olWZAQCMPbhI/20LA3OYJ6s+BgBEnm89PymvlHcym6Z4AvTungD+KqZonIYuxWgi
 6Ttlv/fzgFFbXgJgbuass5mwFVoN5wM=
 =oK7d
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'cap-checkpoint-restore-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux

Pull checkpoint-restore updates from Christian Brauner:
 "This enables unprivileged checkpoint/restore of processes.

  Given that this work has been going on for quite some time the first
  sentence in this summary is hopefully more exciting than the actual
  final code changes required. Unprivileged checkpoint/restore has seen
  a frequent increase in interest over the last two years and has thus
  been one of the main topics for the combined containers &
  checkpoint/restore microconference since at least 2018 (cf. [1]).

  Here are just the three most frequent use-cases that were brought forward:

   - The JVM developers are integrating checkpoint/restore into a Java
     VM to significantly decrease the startup time.

   - In high-performance computing environment a resource manager will
     typically be distributing jobs where users are always running as
     non-root. Long-running and "large" processes with significant
     startup times are supposed to be checkpointed and restored with
     CRIU.

   - Container migration as a non-root user.

  In all of these scenarios it is either desirable or required to run
  without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. The userspace implementation of
  checkpoint/restore CRIU already has the pull request for supporting
  unprivileged checkpoint/restore up (cf. [2]).

  To enable unprivileged checkpoint/restore a new dedicated capability
  CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is introduced. This solution has last been
  discussed in 2019 in a talk by Google at Linux Plumbers (cf. [1]
  "Update on Task Migration at Google Using CRIU") with Adrian and
  Nicolas providing the implementation now over the last months. In
  essence, this allows the CRIU binary to be installed with the
  CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE vfs capability set thereby enabling
  unprivileged users to restore processes.

  To make this possible the following permissions are altered:

   - Selecting a specific PID via clone3() set_tid relaxed from userns
     CAP_SYS_ADMIN to CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.

   - Selecting a specific PID via /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid relaxed
     from userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN to CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.

   - Accessing /proc/pid/map_files relaxed from init userns
     CAP_SYS_ADMIN to init userns CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.

   - Changing /proc/self/exe from userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN to userns
     CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.

  Of these four changes the /proc/self/exe change deserves a few words
  because the reasoning behind even restricting /proc/self/exe changes
  in the first place is just full of historical quirks and tracking this
  down was a questionable version of fun that I'd like to spare others.

  In short, it is trivial to change /proc/self/exe as an unprivileged
  user, i.e. without userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN right now. Either via ptrace()
  or by simply intercepting the elf loader in userspace during exec.
  Nicolas was nice enough to even provide a POC for the latter (cf. [3])
  to illustrate this fact.

  The original patchset which introduced PR_SET_MM_MAP had no
  permissions around changing the exe link. They too argued that it is
  trivial to spoof the exe link already which is true. The argument
  brought up against this was that the Tomoyo LSM uses the exe link in
  tomoyo_manager() to detect whether the calling process is a policy
  manager. This caused changing the exe links to be guarded by userns
  CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

  All in all this rather seems like a "better guard it with something
  rather than nothing" argument which imho doesn't qualify as a great
  security policy. Again, because spoofing the exe link is possible for
  the calling process so even if this were security relevant it was
  broken back then and would be broken today. So technically, dropping
  all permissions around changing the exe link would probably be
  possible and would send a clearer message to any userspace that relies
  on /proc/self/exe for security reasons that they should stop doing
  this but for now we're only relaxing the exe link permissions from
  userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN to userns CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.

  There's a final uapi change in here. Changing the exe link used to
  accidently return EINVAL when the caller lacked the necessary
  permissions instead of the more correct EPERM. This pr contains a
  commit fixing this. I assume that userspace won't notice or care and
  if they do I will revert this commit. But since we are changing the
  permissions anyway it seems like a good opportunity to try this fix.

  With these changes merged unprivileged checkpoint/restore will be
  possible and has already been tested by various users"

[1] LPC 2018
     1. "Task Migration at Google Using CRIU"
        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yI_1cuhoDgA&t=12095
     2. "Securely Migrating Untrusted Workloads with CRIU"
        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yI_1cuhoDgA&t=14400
     LPC 2019
     1. "CRIU and the PID dance"
         https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LN2CUgp8deo&list=PLVsQ_xZBEyN30ZA3Pc9MZMFzdjwyz26dO&index=9&t=2m48s
     2. "Update on Task Migration at Google Using CRIU"
        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LN2CUgp8deo&list=PLVsQ_xZBEyN30ZA3Pc9MZMFzdjwyz26dO&index=9&t=1h2m8s

[2] https://github.com/checkpoint-restore/criu/pull/1155

[3] https://github.com/nviennot/run_as_exe

* tag 'cap-checkpoint-restore-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
  selftests: add clone3() CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE test
  prctl: exe link permission error changed from -EINVAL to -EPERM
  prctl: Allow local CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to change /proc/self/exe
  proc: allow access in init userns for map_files with CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
  pid_namespace: use checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() for ns_last_pid
  pid: use checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() for set_tid
  capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
2020-08-04 15:02:07 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
3950e97543 Merge branch 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull execve updates from Eric Biederman:
 "During the development of v5.7 I ran into bugs and quality of
  implementation issues related to exec that could not be easily fixed
  because of the way exec is implemented. So I have been diggin into
  exec and cleaning up what I can.

  This cycle I have been looking at different ideas and different
  implementations to see what is possible to improve exec, and cleaning
  the way exec interfaces with in kernel users. Only cleaning up the
  interfaces of exec with rest of the kernel has managed to stabalize
  and make it through review in time for v5.9-rc1 resulting in 2 sets of
  changes this cycle.

   - Implement kernel_execve

   - Make the user mode driver code a better citizen

  With kernel_execve the code size got a little larger as the copying of
  parameters from userspace and copying of parameters from userspace is
  now separate. The good news is kernel threads no longer need to play
  games with set_fs to use exec. Which when combined with the rest of
  Christophs set_fs changes should security bugs with set_fs much more
  difficult"

* 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (23 commits)
  exec: Implement kernel_execve
  exec: Factor bprm_stack_limits out of prepare_arg_pages
  exec: Factor bprm_execve out of do_execve_common
  exec: Move bprm_mm_init into alloc_bprm
  exec: Move initialization of bprm->filename into alloc_bprm
  exec: Factor out alloc_bprm
  exec: Remove unnecessary spaces from binfmts.h
  umd: Stop using split_argv
  umd: Remove exit_umh
  bpfilter: Take advantage of the facilities of struct pid
  exit: Factor thread_group_exited out of pidfd_poll
  umd: Track user space drivers with struct pid
  bpfilter: Move bpfilter_umh back into init data
  exec: Remove do_execve_file
  umh: Stop calling do_execve_file
  umd: Transform fork_usermode_blob into fork_usermode_driver
  umd: Rename umd_info.cmdline umd_info.driver_name
  umd: For clarity rename umh_info umd_info
  umh: Separate the user mode driver and the user mode helper support
  umh: Remove call_usermodehelper_setup_file.
  ...
2020-08-04 14:27:25 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
fd76a74d94 audit/stable-5.9 PR 20200803
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAl8okpIUHHBhdWxAcGF1
 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXNqOQ/8D+m9Ykcby3csEKsp8YtsaukEu62U
 lRVaxzRNO9wwB24aFwDFuJnIkmsSi/s/O4nBsy2mw+Apn+uDCvHQ9tBU07vlNn2f
 lu27YaTya7YGlqoe315xijd8tyoX99k8cpQeixvAVr9/jdR09yka7SJ8O7X9mjV7
 +SUVDiKCplPKpiwCCRS9cqD7F64T6y35XKzbrzYqdP0UOF2XelZo/Evt5rDRvWUf
 5qDN2tP+iM/Fvu5lCfczFwAeivfAdxjQ11n783hx8Ms2qyiaKQCzbEwjqAslmkbs
 1k/+ED0NjzXX1ne0JZaz/bk0wsMnmOoa8o+NDcyd7Za/cj5prUZi7kBy+xry4YV8
 qKJ40Lk0flCWgUpm6bkYVOByIYHk0gmfBNvjilqf25NR/eOC/9e9ir8PywvYUW/7
 kvVK37+N/a3LnFj80sZpIeqqnNU8z9PV1i7//5/kDuKvz94Bq83TJDO6pPKvqDtC
 njQfCFoHwdEeF8OalK793lIiYaoODqvbkWKChKMqziODJ4ZP8AW06gXpEbEWn7G3
 TTnJx7hqzR9t90vBQJeO3Fromfn+9TDlZVdX+EGO8gIqUiLGr0r7LPPep4VkDbNw
 LxMYKeC2cgRp8Z+XXPDxfXSDL2psTwg6CXcDrXcYnUyBo/yerpBvbJkeaR0h+UR0
 j6cvMX+T39X2JXM=
 =Xs3M
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'audit-pr-20200803' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit

Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
 "Aside from some smaller bug fixes, here are the highlights:

   - add a new backlog wait metric to the audit status message, this is
     intended to help admins determine how long processes have been
     waiting for the audit backlog queue to clear

   - generate audit records for nftables configuration changes

   - generate CWD audit records for for the relevant LSM audit records"

* tag 'audit-pr-20200803' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
  audit: report audit wait metric in audit status reply
  audit: purge audit_log_string from the intra-kernel audit API
  audit: issue CWD record to accompany LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* records
  audit: use the proper gfp flags in the audit_log_nfcfg() calls
  audit: remove unused !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL __audit_inode* stubs
  audit: add gfp parameter to audit_log_nfcfg
  audit: log nftables configuration change events
  audit: Use struct_size() helper in alloc_chunk
2020-08-04 14:20:26 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
49e917deeb selinux/stable-5.9 PR 20200803
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAl8okmsUHHBhdWxAcGF1
 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXMaRA//XO7JKJEyLcpqRzhQP/QY50JXdQtE
 c9vKeb7y4wlfbTozRgjBN3Xj+tFbqANzX/rVsR1aKV+hExyEuUfNZ0Fl8MbPEccQ
 1RUCW2808/YRTYsl0g0DDZsc+vxVosfouk91pZfld9ZRnZbrNTGXFP7vuVyFKdBy
 wBX1FCL9q31wLc8Jk7f6otSbBvSCG0YXjkkxEM7LQx3oQ59s8dfOed41kDGpLoNk
 TS5BN/W3uuYEDIsIwTRZjU4h42dpc/wbxVMJhBg85rU/2bF4u5sDs2qgwqaa1tXs
 aRDH5J+eBMZRCkF4shxlDrrOWeXvEEtal9yYzQUx664tWDjZazoTLctCAe3PWI1i
 q61cG8PXw/5/oB6RyvPkRMLc5pU8P6/Xdfg6R6kOsGSq8bj+g30J6jqGXnW9FIVr
 5rIaooiw19vqH+ASVuq9oLmhuWJQyn6ImFqOkREJFWVaqufglWw9RWDCGFsLq9Tr
 w6HbA9UYCoWpdQBfRXpa086sSQm1wuCP39fIcY64uHpR5gPJuzyd8Tswz3tbEAtg
 v7vgIRtBpghhdcBLzIJgSIXJKR7W/Y49eFwNf3x0OTSeAIia6Z9paaQjXYl71I9V
 6oUiQgVE3lX2SkgMbOK2V5UsjbVkpjjv7MWxdm0mPQCU0Fmb8W2FN/wVR7FBlCZc
 yhde+bs4zTmPNFw=
 =ocPe
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200803' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux

Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
 "Beyond the usual smattering of bug fixes, we've got three small
  improvements worth highlighting:

   - improved SELinux policy symbol table performance due to a reworking
     of the insert and search functions

   - allow reading of SELinux labels before the policy is loaded,
     allowing for some more "exotic" initramfs approaches

   - improved checking an error reporting about process
     class/permissions during SELinux policy load"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20200803' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: complete the inlining of hashtab functions
  selinux: prepare for inlining of hashtab functions
  selinux: specialize symtab insert and search functions
  selinux: Fix spelling mistakes in the comments
  selinux: fixed a checkpatch warning with the sizeof macro
  selinux: log error messages on required process class / permissions
  scripts/selinux/mdp: fix initial SID handling
  selinux: allow reading labels before policy is loaded
2020-08-04 14:18:01 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
5b5d3be5d6 Automatic variable initialization updates for v5.9-rc1
- Introduce CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO (Alexander Potapenko)
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJKBAABCgA0FiEEpcP2jyKd1g9yPm4TiXL039xtwCYFAl8oXX4WHGtlZXNjb29r
 QGNocm9taXVtLm9yZwAKCRCJcvTf3G3AJt/FD/wJISl6Va3UvJrwGWcjLqb3iQh/
 38Nq7LV9ysUStpi5ibxhiB95uawFtAUsBLKyBKLtOERUz5RXiHrR9MI4UWNPBgNc
 7/H5ZAkkD21LpzC76FH+a4SWQp1kQTiyu/iONn03LE8p4vSwSVZzoGqA1r4fpzGY
 Np++2Ym/bzWV7R0Xdq/LI5oH9109dm75PhcCqCZPAtlIq+USXpyNAozimgREplVl
 /clYmj7oruoRYiF5uheOlbpCEXYlybwVHfDKE2Uh5IcXcpm3OYZU9HEK5ot5oudJ
 Z7bIcMeS2mMtSH/hhyjFbi0cZBVtJFc9exHRmuiDiYzNkWzaT2/5xAMUzw65q7Yk
 BTpr5AU+nkVQwuAmkN3AyBLrqQYyhWL0+xnWRmbbjt2yoqCx5x3AyxaBgHDV4vgF
 sTNhczFQdGqhlmvbxOw93PARV+lU9pozcc6b8TpXVdsE+bFFN5mBuRljIOTCRvke
 yxFsLF9olfNB3CXTHXAWLC/RuqdH/Vk7zC0vS34tlmvWgVC07P9QXyWciqcldAgL
 BsFXsRt6bRvOukyunhRfQkLVRxsOCLhQuYC33cRX9xY9vwCkM5v6TQH5WRcfxK7Q
 swujqqvozYZ/njblBTeagg8sGg0OiqxpCvJZD6qA6s1mO3lG58CDqqwxd4DemIDF
 /BxVarzUtmvBuiMBSQ==
 =c2Rf
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'var-init-v5.9-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull automatic variable initialization updates from Kees Cook:
 "This adds the "zero" init option from Clang, which is being used
  widely in production builds of Android and Chrome OS (though it also
  keeps the "pattern" init, which is better for debug builds).

   - Introduce CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO (Alexander Potapenko)"

* tag 'var-init-v5.9-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  security: allow using Clang's zero initialization for stack variables
2020-08-04 13:38:35 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
382625d0d4 for-5.9/block-20200802
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJEBAABCAAuFiEEwPw5LcreJtl1+l5K99NY+ylx4KYFAl8m7YwQHGF4Ym9lQGtl
 cm5lbC5kawAKCRD301j7KXHgpt+dEAC7a0HYuX2OrkyawBnsgd1QQR/soC7surec
 yDDa7SMM8cOq3935bfzcYHV9FWJszEGIknchiGb9R3/T+vmSohbvDsM5zgwya9u/
 FHUIuTq324I6JWXKl30k4rwjiX9wQeMt+WZ5gC8KJYCWA296i2IpJwd0A45aaKuS
 x4bTjxqknE+fD4gQiMUSt+bmuOUAp81fEku3EPapCRYDPAj8f5uoY7R2arT/POwB
 b+s+AtXqzBymIqx1z0sZ/XcdZKmDuhdurGCWu7BfJFIzw5kQ2Qe3W8rUmrQ3pGut
 8a21YfilhUFiBv+B4wptfrzJuzU6Ps0BXHCnBsQjzvXwq5uFcZH495mM/4E4OJvh
 SbjL2K4iFj+O1ngFkukG/F8tdEM1zKBYy2ZEkGoWKUpyQanbAaGI6QKKJA+DCdBi
 yPEb7yRAa5KfLqMiocm1qCEO1I56HRiNHaJVMqCPOZxLmpXj19Fs71yIRplP1Trv
 GGXdWZsccjuY6OljoXWdEfnxAr5zBsO3Yf2yFT95AD+egtGsU1oOzlqAaU1mtflw
 ABo452pvh6FFpxGXqz6oK4VqY4Et7WgXOiljA4yIGoPpG/08L1Yle4eVc2EE01Jb
 +BL49xNJVeUhGFrvUjPGl9kVMeLmubPFbmgrtipW+VRg9W8+Yirw7DPP6K+gbPAR
 RzAUdZFbWw==
 =abJG
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'for-5.9/block-20200802' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block

Pull core block updates from Jens Axboe:
 "Good amount of cleanups and tech debt removals in here, and as a
  result, the diffstat shows a nice net reduction in code.

   - Softirq completion cleanups (Christoph)

   - Stop using ->queuedata (Christoph)

   - Cleanup bd claiming (Christoph)

   - Use check_events, moving away from the legacy media change
     (Christoph)

   - Use inode i_blkbits consistently (Christoph)

   - Remove old unused writeback congestion bits (Christoph)

   - Cleanup/unify submission path (Christoph)

   - Use bio_uninit consistently, instead of bio_disassociate_blkg
     (Christoph)

   - sbitmap cleared bits handling (John)

   - Request merging blktrace event addition (Jan)

   - sysfs add/remove race fixes (Luis)

   - blk-mq tag fixes/optimizations (Ming)

   - Duplicate words in comments (Randy)

   - Flush deferral cleanup (Yufen)

   - IO context locking/retry fixes (John)

   - struct_size() usage (Gustavo)

   - blk-iocost fixes (Chengming)

   - blk-cgroup IO stats fixes (Boris)

   - Various little fixes"

* tag 'for-5.9/block-20200802' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: (135 commits)
  block: blk-timeout: delete duplicated word
  block: blk-mq-sched: delete duplicated word
  block: blk-mq: delete duplicated word
  block: genhd: delete duplicated words
  block: elevator: delete duplicated word and fix typos
  block: bio: delete duplicated words
  block: bfq-iosched: fix duplicated word
  iocost_monitor: start from the oldest usage index
  iocost: Fix check condition of iocg abs_vdebt
  block: Remove callback typedefs for blk_mq_ops
  block: Use non _rcu version of list functions for tag_set_list
  blk-cgroup: show global disk stats in root cgroup io.stat
  blk-cgroup: make iostat functions visible to stat printing
  block: improve discard bio alignment in __blkdev_issue_discard()
  block: change REQ_OP_ZONE_RESET and REQ_OP_ZONE_RESET_ALL to be odd numbers
  block: defer flush request no matter whether we have elevator
  block: make blk_timeout_init() static
  block: remove retry loop in ioc_release_fn()
  block: remove unnecessary ioc nested locking
  block: integrate bd_start_claiming into __blkdev_get
  ...
2020-08-03 11:57:03 -07:00
Colin Ian King
3db0d0c276 integrity: remove redundant initialization of variable ret
The variable ret is being initialized with a value that is never read
and it is being updated later with a new value.  The initialization is
redundant and can be removed.

Fixes: eb5798f2e2 ("integrity: convert digsig to akcipher api")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Addresses-Coverity: ("Unused value")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-07-27 16:52:09 -04:00
Dan Carpenter
42a2df3e82 Smack: prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso()
We have an upper bound on "maplevel" but forgot to check for negative
values.

Fixes: e114e47377 ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-07-27 13:35:12 -07:00
Dan Carpenter
a6bd4f6d9b Smack: fix another vsscanf out of bounds
This is similar to commit 84e99e58e8 ("Smack: slab-out-of-bounds in
vsscanf") where we added a bounds check on "rule".

Reported-by: syzbot+a22c6092d003d6fe1122@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: f7112e6c9a ("Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-07-27 13:35:03 -07:00
Richard Guy Briggs
f1d9b23cab audit: purge audit_log_string from the intra-kernel audit API
audit_log_string() was inteded to be an internal audit function and
since there are only two internal uses, remove them.  Purge all external
uses of it by restructuring code to use an existing audit_log_format()
or using audit_log_format().

Please see the upstream issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/84

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-07-21 11:12:31 -04:00
Eric W. Biederman
be619f7f06 exec: Implement kernel_execve
To allow the kernel not to play games with set_fs to call exec
implement kernel_execve.  The function kernel_execve takes pointers
into kernel memory and copies the values pointed to onto the new
userspace stack.

The calls with arguments from kernel space of do_execve are replaced
with calls to kernel_execve.

The calls do_execve and do_execveat are made static as there are now
no callers outside of exec.

The comments that mention do_execve are updated to refer to
kernel_execve or execve depending on the circumstances.  In addition
to correcting the comments, this makes it easy to grep for do_execve
and verify it is not used.

Inspired-by: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200627072704.2447163-1-hch@lst.de
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87wo365ikj.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2020-07-21 08:24:52 -05:00
Bruno Meneguele
311aa6aafe ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime
The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different "ima_appraise="
modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but not when IMA architecture
specific policies are enabled.  This prevents properly labeling the
filesystem on systems where secure boot is supported, but not enabled on the
platform.  Only when secure boot is actually enabled should these IMA
appraise modes be disabled.

This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a runtime
decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.

Test results as follows:

-> x86-64 with secure boot enabled

[    0.015637] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
[    0.015668] ima: Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=fix boot parameter option

-> powerpc with secure boot disabled

[    0.000000] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
[    0.000000] Secure boot mode disabled

-> Running the system without secure boot and with both options set:

CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM=y
CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY=y

Audit prompts "missing-hash" but still allow execution and, consequently,
filesystem labeling:

type=INTEGRITY_DATA msg=audit(07/09/2020 12:30:27.778:1691) : pid=4976
uid=root auid=root ses=2
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=appraise_data
cause=missing-hash comm=bash name=/usr/bin/evmctl dev="dm-0" ino=493150
res=no

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d958083a8f ("x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86")
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-07-20 18:18:49 -04:00
Tyler Hicks
1768215a65 ima: AppArmor satisfies the audit rule requirements
AppArmor meets all the requirements for IMA in terms of audit rules
since commit e79c26d040 ("apparmor: Add support for audit rule
filtering"). Update IMA's Kconfig section for CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES to
reflect this.

Fixes: e79c26d040 ("apparmor: Add support for audit rule filtering")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-07-20 18:18:37 -04:00
Tyler Hicks
b8867eedcf ima: Rename internal filter rule functions
Rename IMA's internal filter rule functions from security_filter_rule_*()
to ima_filter_rule_*(). This avoids polluting the security_* namespace,
which is typically reserved for general security subsystem
infrastructure.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: reword using the term "filter", not "audit"]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-07-20 18:18:23 -04:00
Tyler Hicks
4834177e63 ima: Support additional conditionals in the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function
Take the properties of the kexec kernel's inode and the current task
ownership into consideration when matching a KEXEC_CMDLINE operation to
the rules in the IMA policy. This allows for some uniformity when
writing IMA policy rules for KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
and KEXEC_CMDLINE operations.

Prior to this patch, it was not possible to write a set of rules like
this:

 dont_measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK obj_type=foo_t
 dont_measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK obj_type=foo_t
 dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t
 measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
 measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
 measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE

The inode information associated with the kernel being loaded by a
kexec_kernel_load(2) syscall can now be included in the decision to
measure or not

Additonally, the uid, euid, and subj_* conditionals can also now be
used in KEXEC_CMDLINE rules. There was no technical reason as to why
those conditionals weren't being considered previously other than
ima_match_rules() didn't have a valid inode to use so it immediately
bailed out for KEXEC_CMDLINE operations rather than going through the
full list of conditional comparisons.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-07-20 13:28:16 -04:00
Tyler Hicks
592b24cbdc ima: Use the common function to detect LSM conditionals in a rule
Make broader use of ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond() to check if a given
rule contains an LSM conditional. This is a code cleanup and has no
user-facing change.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-07-20 13:28:16 -04:00
Tyler Hicks
30031b0ec8 ima: Move comprehensive rule validation checks out of the token parser
Use ima_validate_rule(), at the end of the token parsing stage, to
verify combinations of actions, hooks, and flags. This is useful to
increase readability by consolidating such checks into a single function
and also because rule conditionals can be specified in arbitrary order
making it difficult to do comprehensive rule validation until the entire
rule has been parsed.

This allows for the check that ties together the "keyrings" conditional
with the KEY_CHECK function hook to be moved into the final rule
validation.

The modsig check no longer needs to compiled conditionally because the
token parser will ensure that modsig support is enabled before accepting
"imasig|modsig" appraise type values. The final rule validation will
ensure that appraise_type and appraise_flag options are only present in
appraise rules.

Finally, this allows for the check that ties together the "pcr"
conditional with the measure action to be moved into the final rule
validation.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-07-20 13:28:15 -04:00
Tyler Hicks
aa0c0227d3 ima: Use correct type for the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements
Make args_p be of the char pointer type rather than have it be a void
pointer that gets casted to char pointer when it is used. It is a simple
NUL-terminated string as returned by match_strdup().

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-07-20 13:28:14 -04:00
Tyler Hicks
39e5993d0d ima: Shallow copy the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements
The args_p member is a simple string that is allocated by
ima_rule_init(). Shallow copy it like other non-LSM references in
ima_rule_entry structs.

There are no longer any necessary error path cleanups to do in
ima_lsm_copy_rule().

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-07-20 13:28:13 -04:00
Tyler Hicks
5f3e92657b ima: Fail rule parsing when appraise_flag=blacklist is unsupportable
Verifying that a file hash is not blacklisted is currently only
supported for files with appended signatures (modsig).  In the future,
this might change.

For now, the "appraise_flag" option is only appropriate for appraise
actions and its "blacklist" value is only appropriate when
CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG is enabled and "appraise_flag=blacklist" is
only appropriate when "appraise_type=imasig|modsig" is also present.
Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume
that other uses of "appraise_flag=blacklist" are supported.

Fixes: 273df864cf ("ima: Check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reivewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-07-20 13:06:26 -04:00
Adrian Reber
124ea650d3 capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
This patch introduces CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, a new capability facilitating
checkpoint/restore for non-root users.

Over the last years, The CRIU (Checkpoint/Restore In Userspace) team has
been asked numerous times if it is possible to checkpoint/restore a
process as non-root. The answer usually was: 'almost'.

The main blocker to restore a process as non-root was to control the PID
of the restored process. This feature available via the clone3 system
call, or via /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid is unfortunately guarded by
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

In the past two years, requests for non-root checkpoint/restore have
increased due to the following use cases:
* Checkpoint/Restore in an HPC environment in combination with a
  resource manager distributing jobs where users are always running as
  non-root. There is a desire to provide a way to checkpoint and
  restore long running jobs.
* Container migration as non-root
* We have been in contact with JVM developers who are integrating
  CRIU into a Java VM to decrease the startup time. These
  checkpoint/restore applications are not meant to be running with
  CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

We have seen the following workarounds:
* Use a setuid wrapper around CRIU:
  See https://github.com/FredHutch/slurm-examples/blob/master/checkpointer/lib/checkpointer/checkpointer-suid.c
* Use a setuid helper that writes to ns_last_pid.
  Unfortunately, this helper delegation technique is impossible to use
  with clone3, and is thus prone to races.
  See https://github.com/twosigma/set_ns_last_pid
* Cycle through PIDs with fork() until the desired PID is reached:
  This has been demonstrated to work with cycling rates of 100,000 PIDs/s
  See https://github.com/twosigma/set_ns_last_pid
* Patch out the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check from the kernel
* Run the desired application in a new user and PID namespace to provide
  a local CAP_SYS_ADMIN for controlling PIDs. This technique has limited
  use in typical container environments (e.g., Kubernetes) as /proc is
  typically protected with read-only layers (e.g., /proc/sys) for
  hardening purposes. Read-only layers prevent additional /proc mounts
  (due to proc's SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE property), making the use of new
  PID namespaces limited as certain applications need access to /proc
  matching their PID namespace.

The introduced capability allows to:
* Control PIDs when the current user is CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable
  for the corresponding PID namespace via ns_last_pid/clone3.
* Open files in /proc/pid/map_files when the current user is
  CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable in the root namespace, useful for
  recovering files that are unreachable via the file system such as
  deleted files, or memfd files.

See corresponding selftest for an example with clone3().

Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200719100418.2112740-2-areber@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2020-07-19 20:14:42 +02:00
Tyler Hicks
eb624fe214 ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEY_CHECK hook is combined with an invalid cond
The KEY_CHECK function only supports the uid, pcr, and keyrings
conditionals. Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors
don't assume that other conditionals are supported.

Fixes: 5808611ccc ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-07-16 21:53:55 -04:00
Tyler Hicks
db2045f589 ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook is combined with an invalid cond
The KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function only supports the pcr conditional. Make
this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that
other conditionals are supported.

Since KEXEC_CMDLINE's inception, ima_match_rules() has always returned
true on any loaded KEXEC_CMDLINE rule without any consideration for
other conditionals present in the rule. Make it clear that pcr is the
only supported KEXEC_CMDLINE conditional by returning an error during
policy load.

An example of why this is a problem can be explained with the following
rule:

 dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t

An IMA policy author would have assumed that rule is valid because the
parser accepted it but the result was that measurements for all
KEXEC_CMDLINE operations would be disabled.

Fixes: b0935123a1 ("IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-07-16 21:53:55 -04:00
Tyler Hicks
712183437e ima: Fail rule parsing when buffer hook functions have an invalid action
Buffer based hook functions, such as KEXEC_CMDLINE and KEY_CHECK, can
only measure. The process_buffer_measurement() function quietly ignores
all actions except measure so make this behavior clear at the time of
policy load.

The parsing of the keyrings conditional had a check to ensure that it
was only specified with measure actions but the check should be on the
hook function and not the keyrings conditional since
"appraise func=KEY_CHECK" is not a valid rule.

Fixes: b0935123a1 ("IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments")
Fixes: 5808611ccc ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-07-16 21:53:55 -04:00
Tyler Hicks
2bdd737c56 ima: Free the entire rule if it fails to parse
Use ima_free_rule() to fix memory leaks of allocated ima_rule_entry
members, such as .fsname and .keyrings, when an error is encountered
during rule parsing.

Set the args_p pointer to NULL after freeing it in the error path of
ima_lsm_rule_init() so that it isn't freed twice.

This fixes a memory leak seen when loading an rule that contains an
additional piece of allocated memory, such as an fsname, followed by an
invalid conditional:

 # echo "measure fsname=tmpfs bad=cond" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
 -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
 # echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
 # cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
 unreferenced object 0xffff98e7e4ece6c0 (size 8):
   comm "bash", pid 672, jiffies 4294791843 (age 21.855s)
   hex dump (first 8 bytes):
     74 6d 70 66 73 00 6b a5                          tmpfs.k.
   backtrace:
     [<00000000abab7413>] kstrdup+0x2e/0x60
     [<00000000f11ede32>] ima_parse_add_rule+0x7d4/0x1020
     [<00000000f883dd7a>] ima_write_policy+0xab/0x1d0
     [<00000000b17cf753>] vfs_write+0xde/0x1d0
     [<00000000b8ddfdea>] ksys_write+0x68/0xe0
     [<00000000b8e21e87>] do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0
     [<0000000089ea7b98>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: f1b08bbcbd ("ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem name")
Fixes: 2b60c0eced ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-07-16 21:53:55 -04:00
Tyler Hicks
465aee77aa ima: Free the entire rule when deleting a list of rules
Create a function, ima_free_rule(), to free all memory associated with
an ima_rule_entry. Use the new function to fix memory leaks of allocated
ima_rule_entry members, such as .fsname and .keyrings, when deleting a
list of rules.

Make the existing ima_lsm_free_rule() function specific to the LSM
audit rule array of an ima_rule_entry and require that callers make an
additional call to kfree to free the ima_rule_entry itself.

This fixes a memory leak seen when loading by a valid rule that contains
an additional piece of allocated memory, such as an fsname, followed by
an invalid rule that triggers a policy load failure:

 # echo -e "dont_measure fsname=securityfs\nbad syntax" > \
    /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
 -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
 # echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
 # cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
 unreferenced object 0xffff9bab67ca12c0 (size 16):
   comm "bash", pid 684, jiffies 4295212803 (age 252.344s)
   hex dump (first 16 bytes):
     73 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 66 73 00 6b 6b 6b 6b a5  securityfs.kkkk.
   backtrace:
     [<00000000adc80b1b>] kstrdup+0x2e/0x60
     [<00000000d504cb0d>] ima_parse_add_rule+0x7d4/0x1020
     [<00000000444825ac>] ima_write_policy+0xab/0x1d0
     [<000000002b7f0d6c>] vfs_write+0xde/0x1d0
     [<0000000096feedcf>] ksys_write+0x68/0xe0
     [<0000000052b544a2>] do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0
     [<000000007ead1ba7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: f1b08bbcbd ("ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem name")
Fixes: 2b60c0eced ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-07-16 21:53:55 -04:00
Tyler Hicks
9ff8a616df ima: Have the LSM free its audit rule
Ask the LSM to free its audit rule rather than directly calling kfree().
Both AppArmor and SELinux do additional work in their audit_rule_free()
hooks. Fix memory leaks by allowing the LSMs to perform necessary work.

Fixes: b169424551 ("ima: use the lsm policy update notifier")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-07-16 21:53:55 -04:00
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
34e980bb83 IMA: Add audit log for failure conditions
process_buffer_measurement() and ima_alloc_key_entry() functions need to
log an audit message for auditing integrity measurement failures.

Add audit message in these two functions. Remove "pr_devel" log message
in process_buffer_measurement().

Sample audit messages:

[    6.303048] audit: type=1804 audit(1592506281.627:2): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=kernel op=measuring_key cause=ENOMEM comm="swapper/0" name=".builtin_trusted_keys" res=0 errno=-12

[    8.019432] audit: type=1804 audit(1592506283.344:10): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 op=measuring_kexec_cmdline cause=hashing_error comm="systemd" name="kexec-cmdline" res=0 errno=-22

Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-07-16 21:48:36 -04:00
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2f845882ec integrity: Add errno field in audit message
Error code is not included in the audit messages logged by
the integrity subsystem.

Define a new function integrity_audit_message() that takes error code
in the "errno" parameter. Add "errno" field in the audit messages logged
by the integrity subsystem and set the value passed in the "errno"
parameter.

[    6.303048] audit: type=1804 audit(1592506281.627:2): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=kernel op=measuring_key cause=ENOMEM comm="swapper/0" name=".builtin_trusted_keys" res=0 errno=-12

[    7.987647] audit: type=1802 audit(1592506283.312:9): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 op=policy_update cause=completed comm="systemd" res=1 errno=0

[    8.019432] audit: type=1804 audit(1592506283.344:10): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 op=measuring_kexec_cmdline cause=hashing_error comm="systemd" name="kexec-cmdline" res=0 errno=-22

Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-07-16 21:48:11 -04:00
Eric Biggers
beb4ee6770 Smack: fix use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self()
smk_write_relabel_self() frees memory from the task's credentials with
no locking, which can easily cause a use-after-free because multiple
tasks can share the same credentials structure.

Fix this by using prepare_creds() and commit_creds() to correctly modify
the task's credentials.

Reproducer for "BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self":

	#include <fcntl.h>
	#include <pthread.h>
	#include <unistd.h>

	static void *thrproc(void *arg)
	{
		int fd = open("/sys/fs/smackfs/relabel-self", O_WRONLY);
		for (;;) write(fd, "foo", 3);
	}

	int main()
	{
		pthread_t t;
		pthread_create(&t, NULL, thrproc, NULL);
		thrproc(NULL);
	}

Reported-by: syzbot+e6416dabb497a650da40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 38416e5393 ("Smack: limited capability for changing process label")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.4+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-07-14 11:19:58 -07:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
54b27f9287 selinux: complete the inlining of hashtab functions
Move (most of) the definitions of hashtab_search() and hashtab_insert()
to the header file. In combination with the previous patch, this avoids
calling the callbacks indirectly by function pointers and allows for
better optimization, leading to a drastic performance improvement of
these operations.

With this patch, I measured a speed up in the following areas (measured
on x86_64 F32 VM with 4 CPUs):
  1. Policy load (`load_policy`) - takes ~150 ms instead of ~230 ms.
  2. `chcon -R unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0:c381,c519 /tmp/linux-src`
     where /tmp/linux-src is an extracted linux-5.7 source tarball -
     takes ~522 ms instead of ~576 ms. This is because of many
     symtab_search() calls in string_to_context_struct() when there are
     many categories specified in the context.
  3. `stress-ng --msg 1 --msg-ops 10000000` - takes 12.41 s instead of
     13.95 s (consumes 18.6 s of kernel CPU time instead of 21.6 s).
     This is thanks to security_transition_sid() being ~43% faster after
     this patch.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-07-09 19:08:16 -04:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
24def7bb92 selinux: prepare for inlining of hashtab functions
Refactor searching and inserting into hashtabs to pave the way for
converting hashtab_search() and hashtab_insert() to inline functions in
the next patch. This will avoid indirect calls and allow the compiler to
better optimize individual callers, leading to a significant performance
improvement.

In order to avoid the indirect calls, the key hashing and comparison
callbacks need to be extracted from the hashtab struct and passed
directly to hashtab_search()/_insert() by the callers so that the
callback address is always known at compile time. The kernel's
rhashtable library (<linux/rhashtable*.h>) does the same thing.

This of course makes the hashtab functions slightly easier to misuse by
passing a wrong callback set, but unfortunately there is no better way
to implement a hash table that is both generic and efficient in C. This
patch tries to somewhat mitigate this by only calling the hashtab
functions in the same file where the corresponding callbacks are
defined (wrapping them into more specialized functions as needed).

Note that this patch doesn't bring any benefit without also moving the
definitions of hashtab_search() and -_insert() to the header file, which
is done in a follow-up patch for easier review of the hashtab.c changes
in this patch.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-07-09 19:05:36 -04:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
237389e301 selinux: specialize symtab insert and search functions
This encapsulates symtab a little better and will help with further
refactoring later.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-07-08 20:21:43 -04:00
Richard Guy Briggs
d7481b24b8 audit: issue CWD record to accompany LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* records
The LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* records for PATH, FILE, IOCTL_OP, DENTRY and INODE
are incomplete without the task context of the AUDIT Current Working
Directory record.  Add it.

This record addition can't use audit_dummy_context to determine whether
or not to store the record information since the LSM_AUDIT_DATA_*
records are initiated by various LSMs independent of any audit rules.
context->in_syscall is used to determine if it was called in user
context like audit_getname.

Please see the upstream issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/96

Adapted from Vladis Dronov's v2 patch.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-07-08 19:02:11 -04:00
lihao
2c3d8dfece selinux: Fix spelling mistakes in the comments
Fix spelling mistakes in the comments
    quering==>querying

Signed-off-by: lihao <fly.lihao@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-07-08 12:15:52 -04:00
Christoph Hellwig
a1f9b1c043 integrity/ima: switch to using __kernel_read
__kernel_read has a bunch of additional sanity checks, and this moves
the set_fs out of non-core code.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
2020-07-08 08:27:57 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
615bc218d6 Two simple fixes for v5.8:
1) Fix hook iteration and default value for inode_copy_up_xattr
 	from KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
 
 2) Fix the key_permission LSM hook function type
 	from Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEgycj0O+d1G2aycA8rZhLv9lQBTwFAl76VWoACgkQrZhLv9lQ
 BTzA7hAAoOtVwDy0eop24cCmBnJZBk234oyEB/2Qer7F66TbXJsbRtDN2Pmo9H8T
 SKVkg1LpeDdwAlByAThalTiJeZSSK6p3t7Yhhd0FmZpUKv+/WyAyWy8m2KmBF1M6
 xq2Sa9GzBFOm96vJlSRIMlpvpeVClY6soCiKowSdLXZ/Bqeg1daHEGXGnTTtC7Sg
 ju4aW/BylJzF9XhMBlcK3qLCd26FX2qPnqtTR0XeNLA+kX007lA2MyJ79xnnj2zb
 mWslT0e/z3xF3b1fGXLr16ELHIaK0+Nu5S5S1Y8OJdTqpL+fKmV68rePrDX2VCrB
 H0fdHXuVwMTP1SEimItTHsYsFXZuS8rjV5IgMPwiih3u5tUki/1C/4uQqbkXx5Uv
 ele7QBOgq48nKv1/tIp/7CnfS7SWsJVMYvVIYpBp6Svvguih4Ud+bksVQx9evYR5
 74ZFJXWMiLeXEdbPeVqaFCHrDggYpCV8Gcqnq+v2fn1R5mEK4tB9Y/xYGXGPt5QN
 CuoACM83B1PsYFhTHiLaEnVTe3ToAtgth3cm0PbfkPXmyGzwlf1ANNIaRpBkoJh7
 9Ms1B97EBsI4smkriv0WbmfAydJSVoqJaUOFqnTSLLwMivLJtCkQbxB44SxSV9AP
 tLEgvTn/CaY/O1nZ98ALtLMNlmj5Q2AhUkd3J/Hobl+oQzvb++8=
 =SToQ
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'fixes-v5.8-rc3-a' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem fixes from James Morris:
 "Two simple fixes for v5.8:

   - Fix hook iteration and default value for inode_copy_up_xattr
     (KP Singh)

   - Fix the key_permission LSM hook function type (Sami Tolvanen)"

* tag 'fixes-v5.8-rc3-a' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  security: Fix hook iteration and default value for inode_copy_up_xattr
  security: fix the key_permission LSM hook function type
2020-06-30 12:21:53 -07:00
Ethan Edwards
65d96351b1 selinux: fixed a checkpatch warning with the sizeof macro
`sizeof buf` changed to `sizeof(buf)`

Signed-off-by: Ethan Edwards <ethancarteredwards@gmail.com>
[PM: rewrote the subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-06-29 19:26:17 -04:00
Maurizio Drocco
20c59ce010 ima: extend boot_aggregate with kernel measurements
Registers 8-9 are used to store measurements of the kernel and its
command line (e.g., grub2 bootloader with tpm module enabled). IMA
should include them in the boot aggregate. Registers 8-9 should be
only included in non-SHA1 digests to avoid ambiguity.

Signed-off-by: Maurizio Drocco <maurizio.drocco@ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>  (TPM 1.2, TPM 2.0)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-06-24 20:47:24 -04:00
Christoph Hellwig
3f1266f1f8 block: move block-related definitions out of fs.h
Move most of the block related definition out of fs.h into more suitable
headers.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2020-06-24 09:16:02 -06:00
Stephen Smalley
7383c0f94d selinux: log error messages on required process class / permissions
In general SELinux no longer treats undefined object classes or permissions
in the policy as a fatal error, instead handling them in accordance with
handle_unknown. However, the process class and process transition and
dyntransition permissions are still required to be defined due to
dependencies on these definitions for default labeling behaviors,
role and range transitions in older policy versions that lack an explicit
class field, and role allow checking.  Log error messages in these cases
since otherwise the policy load will fail silently with no indication
to the user as to the underlying cause.  While here, fix the checking for
process transition / dyntransition so that omitting either permission is
handled as an error; both are needed in order to ensure that role allow
checking is consistently applied.

Reported-by: bauen1 <j2468h@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-06-23 20:57:01 -04:00
Jonathan Lebon
c8e222616c selinux: allow reading labels before policy is loaded
This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b420 ("selinux: allow
labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows
querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded.

One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this
patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be
able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID,
on first boot, at initrd time.[1]

Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be
able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply
them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the
second part of this process; this commit enables the first part.

[1] https://github.com/coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker/issues/94

Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-06-23 20:42:38 -04:00
KP Singh
23e390cdbe security: Fix hook iteration and default value for inode_copy_up_xattr
inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 to indicate the acceptance of the xattr
and 1 to reject it. If the LSM does not know about the xattr, it's
expected to return -EOPNOTSUPP, which is the correct default value for
this hook. BPF LSM, currently, uses 0 as the default value and thereby
falsely allows all overlay fs xattributes to be copied up.

The iteration logic is also updated from the "bail-on-fail"
call_int_hook to continue on the non-decisive -EOPNOTSUPP and bail out
on other values.

Fixes: 98e828a065 ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks")
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2020-06-23 16:39:23 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
817d914d17 selinux/stable-5.8 PR 20200621
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAl7vxoUUHHBhdWxAcGF1
 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXOs3Q/+JSNYoKZiOJax5u1ePEwk5JRasRij
 JkKNjspXueVcoVkVF8lOiSOmQm/7FyfDUi2Qk8U5Gmx7Pr6vQJZgghHxdPMsemCz
 mNbbR8UMm6ssTim19ULBQ3S0Sc1QMQvQCLNDZcv24ne2K8d9HTBrFGenqlLU4UtZ
 JrMLircBt39fVonooMrf9ycGlM8tUZwm8te+Jp7KL18GUKZT8hr0HKzu2WE6/qT4
 WBGNaWxqnfbajnDb41ix2rL+lb8Snqn94cxCjp248rn7M5fJRSCKmYaumBh5ViJ2
 VuD/ZQsTX5SSnc9YDpkUDXya9M1wzFwf64ku6Avga1BXS6lNWB1wqWueSTMfggiL
 2B+LVANWkGFfHtVAVA5xsxXjeJnYmIj/g8qSiHS/RSFJazr1b/cXWedvyewll/Nv
 rFRBsVzktV6BBrlTclcrsu9FmlZRAThNC3uYs/s5vbAja+wHEhCLuacO+jiducRP
 fqQCP2iF6MqC6B2I8WzVp3jU8k2t02i6ySaXmXjzrwOZSLvnOdvDBzE7e95yNLRg
 WLeGd/o2PdLpVoSNVHelFrqm8VZKYSCkWty9WppklnrIVVydKMJ3bgihXY4pADyf
 1ABtKUZgySZKZOpr1pQBqIivHuvKqUGFynj6PSRsngQBoq6V3XpJ7ZCBhuG7cNAT
 9BfnUkhFW7lW70I=
 =nILH
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200621' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux

Pull SELinux fixes from Paul Moore:
 "Three small patches to fix problems in the SELinux code, all found via
  clang.

  Two patches fix potential double-free conditions and one fixes an
  undefined return value"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20200621' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: fix undefined return of cond_evaluate_expr
  selinux: fix a double free in cond_read_node()/cond_read_list()
  selinux: fix double free
2020-06-21 15:41:24 -07:00
Tom Rix
8231b0b9c3 selinux: fix undefined return of cond_evaluate_expr
clang static analysis reports an undefined return

security/selinux/ss/conditional.c:79:2: warning: Undefined or garbage value returned to caller [core.uninitialized.UndefReturn]
        return s[0];
        ^~~~~~~~~~~

static int cond_evaluate_expr( ...
{
	u32 i;
	int s[COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH];

	for (i = 0; i < expr->len; i++)
	  ...

	return s[0];

When expr->len is 0, the loop which sets s[0] never runs.

So return -1 if the loop never runs.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-06-17 17:36:40 -04:00
Tom Rix
aa449a7965 selinux: fix a double free in cond_read_node()/cond_read_list()
Clang static analysis reports this double free error

security/selinux/ss/conditional.c:139:2: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc]
        kfree(node->expr.nodes);
        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

When cond_read_node fails, it calls cond_node_destroy which frees the
node but does not poison the entry in the node list.  So when it
returns to its caller cond_read_list, cond_read_list deletes the
partial list.  The latest entry in the list will be deleted twice.

So instead of freeing the node in cond_read_node, let list freeing in
code_read_list handle the freeing the problem node along with all of the
earlier nodes.

Because cond_read_node no longer does any error handling, the goto's
the error case are redundant.  Instead just return the error code.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 60abd3181d ("selinux: convert cond_list to array")
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-06-16 20:25:19 -04:00
glider@google.com
f0fe00d497 security: allow using Clang's zero initialization for stack variables
In addition to -ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern (used by
CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL now) Clang also supports zero initialization for
locals enabled by -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero. The future of this flag
is still being debated (see https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=45497).
Right now it is guarded by another flag,
-enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang,
which means it may not be supported by future Clang releases. Another
possible resolution is that -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero will persist
(as certain users have already started depending on it), but the name
of the guard flag will change.

In the meantime, zero initialization has proven itself as a good
production mitigation measure against uninitialized locals. Unlike pattern
initialization, which has a higher chance of triggering existing bugs,
zero initialization provides safe defaults for strings, pointers, indexes,
and sizes. On the other hand, pattern initialization remains safer for
return values. Chrome OS and Android are moving to using zero
initialization for production builds.

Performance-wise, the difference between pattern and zero initialization
is usually negligible, although the generated code for zero
initialization is more compact.

This patch renames CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL to CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN
and introduces another config option, CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO, that
enables zero initialization for locals if the corresponding flags are
supported by Clang.

Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200616083435.223038-1-glider@google.com
Reviewed-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2020-06-16 02:06:23 -07:00
Gustavo A. R. Silva
eb492c627a ima: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array
There is a regular need in the kernel to provide a way to declare having a
dynamically sized set of trailing elements in a structure. Kernel code should
always use “flexible array members”[1] for these cases. The older style of
one-element or zero-length arrays should no longer be used[2].

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
2020-06-15 23:08:32 -05:00
Linus Torvalds
4a87b197c1 Add additional LSM hooks for SafeSetID
SafeSetID is capable of making allow/deny decisions for set*uid calls
 on a system, and we want to add similar functionality for set*gid
 calls. The work to do that is not yet complete, so probably won't make
 it in for v5.8, but we are looking to get this simple patch in for
 v5.8 since we have it ready. We are planning on the rest of the work
 for extending the SafeSetID LSM being merged during the v5.9 merge
 window.
 
 This patch was sent to the security mailing list and there were no objections.
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEgvWslnM+qUy+sgVg5n2WYw6TPBAFAl7mZCoACgkQ5n2WYw6T
 PBAk1RAAl8t3/m3lELf8qIir4OAd4nK0kc4e+7W8WkznX2ljUl2IetlNxDCBmEXr
 T5qoW6uPsr6kl5AKnbl9Ii7WpW/halsslpKSUNQCs6zbecoVdxekJ8ISW7xHuboZ
 SvS1bqm+t++PM0c0nWSFEr7eXYmPH8OGbCqu6/+nnbxPZf2rJX03e5LnHkEFDFnZ
 0D/rsKgzMt01pdBJQXeoKk79etHO5MjuAkkYVEKJKCR1fM16lk7ECaCp0KJv1Mmx
 I88VncbLvI+um4t82d1Z8qDr2iLgogjJrMZC4WKfxDTmlmxox2Fz9ZJo+8sIWk6k
 T3a95x0s/mYCO4gWtpCVICt9+71Z3ie9T2iaI+CIe/kJvI/ysb+7LSkF+PD33bdz
 0yv6Y9+VMRdzb3pW69R28IoP4wdYQOJRomsY49z6ypH0RgBWcBvyE6e4v+WJGRNK
 E164Imevf6rrZeqJ0kGSBS1nL9WmQHMaXabAwxg1jK1KRZD+YZj3EKC9S/+PAkaT
 1qXUgvGuXHGjQrwU0hclQjgc6BAudWfAGdfrVr7IWwNKJmjgBf6C35my/azrkOg9
 wHCEpUWVmZZLIZLM69/6QXdmMA+iR+rPz5qlVnWhWTfjRYJUXM455Zk+aNo+Qnwi
 +saCcdU+9xqreLeDIoYoebcV/ctHeW0XCQi/+ebjexXVlyeSfYs=
 =I+0L
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'LSM-add-setgid-hook-5.8-author-fix' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux

Pull SafeSetID update from Micah Morton:
 "Add additional LSM hooks for SafeSetID

  SafeSetID is capable of making allow/deny decisions for set*uid calls
  on a system, and we want to add similar functionality for set*gid
  calls.

  The work to do that is not yet complete, so probably won't make it in
  for v5.8, but we are looking to get this simple patch in for v5.8
  since we have it ready.

  We are planning on the rest of the work for extending the SafeSetID
  LSM being merged during the v5.9 merge window"

* tag 'LSM-add-setgid-hook-5.8-author-fix' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux:
  security: Add LSM hooks to set*gid syscalls
2020-06-14 11:39:31 -07:00
Thomas Cedeno
39030e1351 security: Add LSM hooks to set*gid syscalls
The SafeSetID LSM uses the security_task_fix_setuid hook to filter
set*uid() syscalls according to its configured security policy. In
preparation for adding analagous support in the LSM for set*gid()
syscalls, we add the requisite hook here. Tested by putting print
statements in the security_task_fix_setgid hook and seeing them get hit
during kernel boot.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
2020-06-14 10:52:02 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
6adc19fd13 Kbuild updates for v5.8 (2nd)
- fix build rules in binderfs sample
 
  - fix build errors when Kbuild recurses to the top Makefile
 
  - covert '---help---' in Kconfig to 'help'
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJJBAABCgAzFiEEbmPs18K1szRHjPqEPYsBB53g2wYFAl7lBuYVHG1hc2FoaXJv
 eUBrZXJuZWwub3JnAAoJED2LAQed4NsGHvIP/3iErjPshpg/phwH8NTCS4SFkiti
 BZRM+2lupSn7Qs53BTpVzIkXoHBJQZlJxlQ5HY8ScO+fiz28rKZr+b40us+je1Q+
 SkvSPfwZzxjEg7lAZutznG4KgItJLWJKmDyh9T8Y8TAuG4f8WO0hKnXoAp3YorS2
 zppEIxso8O5spZPjp+fF/fPbxPjIsabGK7Jp2LpSVFR5pVDHI/ycTlKQS+MFpMEx
 6JIpdFRw7TkvKew1dr5uAWT5btWHatEqjSR3JeyVHv3EICTGQwHmcHK67cJzGInK
 T51+DT7/CpKtmRgGMiTEu/INfMzzoQAKl6Fcu+vMaShTN97Hk9DpdtQyvA6P/h3L
 8GA4UBct05J7fjjIB7iUD+GYQ0EZbaFujzRXLYk+dQqEJRbhcCwvdzggGp0WvGRs
 1f8/AIpgnQv8JSL/bOMgGMS5uL2dSLsgbzTdr6RzWf1jlYdI1i4u7AZ/nBrwWP+Z
 iOBkKsVceEoJrTbaynl3eoYqFLtWyDau+//oBc2gUvmhn8ioM5dfqBRiJjxJnPG9
 /giRj6xRIqMMEw8Gg8PCG7WebfWxWyaIQwlWBbPok7DwISURK5mvOyakZL+Q25/y
 6MBr2H8NEJsf35q0GTINpfZnot7NX4JXrrndJH8NIRC7HEhwd29S041xlQJdP0rs
 E76xsOr3hrAmBu4P
 =1NIT
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'kbuild-v5.8-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild

Pull more Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada:

 - fix build rules in binderfs sample

 - fix build errors when Kbuild recurses to the top Makefile

 - covert '---help---' in Kconfig to 'help'

* tag 'kbuild-v5.8-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild:
  treewide: replace '---help---' in Kconfig files with 'help'
  kbuild: fix broken builds because of GZIP,BZIP2,LZOP variables
  samples: binderfs: really compile this sample and fix build issues
2020-06-13 13:29:16 -07:00
Masahiro Yamada
a7f7f6248d treewide: replace '---help---' in Kconfig files with 'help'
Since commit 84af7a6194 ("checkpatch: kconfig: prefer 'help' over
'---help---'"), the number of '---help---' has been gradually
decreasing, but there are still more than 2400 instances.

This commit finishes the conversion. While I touched the lines,
I also fixed the indentation.

There are a variety of indentation styles found.

  a) 4 spaces + '---help---'
  b) 7 spaces + '---help---'
  c) 8 spaces + '---help---'
  d) 1 space + 1 tab + '---help---'
  e) 1 tab + '---help---'    (correct indentation)
  f) 1 tab + 1 space + '---help---'
  g) 1 tab + 2 spaces + '---help---'

In order to convert all of them to 1 tab + 'help', I ran the
following commend:

  $ find . -name 'Kconfig*' | xargs sed -i 's/^[[:space:]]*---help---/\thelp/'

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
2020-06-14 01:57:21 +09:00
Linus Torvalds
6c32978414 Notifications over pipes + Keyring notifications
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEqG5UsNXhtOCrfGQP+7dXa6fLC2sFAl7U/i8ACgkQ+7dXa6fL
 C2u2eg/+Oy6ybq0hPovYVkFI9WIG7ZCz7w9Q6BEnfYMqqn3dnfJxKQ3l4pnQEOWw
 f4QfvpvevsYfMtOJkYcG6s66rQgbFdqc5TEyBBy0QNp3acRolN7IXkcopvv9xOpQ
 JxedpbFG1PTFLWjvBpyjlrUPouwLzq2FXAf1Ox0ZIMw6165mYOMWoli1VL8dh0A0
 Ai7JUB0WrvTNbrwhV413obIzXT/rPCdcrgbQcgrrLPex8lQ47ZAE9bq6k4q5HiwK
 KRzEqkQgnzId6cCNTFBfkTWsx89zZunz7jkfM5yx30MvdAtPSxvvpfIPdZRZkXsP
 E2K9Fk1/6OQZTC0Op3Pi/bt+hVG/mD1p0sQUDgo2MO3qlSS+5mMkR8h3mJEgwK12
 72P4YfOJkuAy2z3v4lL0GYdUDAZY6i6G8TMxERKu/a9O3VjTWICDOyBUS6F8YEAK
 C7HlbZxAEOKTVK0BTDTeEUBwSeDrBbvH6MnRlZCG5g1Fos2aWP0udhjiX8IfZLO7
 GN6nWBvK1fYzfsUczdhgnoCzQs3suoDo04HnsTPGJ8De52T4x2RsjV+gPx0nrNAq
 eWChl1JvMWsY2B3GLnl9XQz4NNN+EreKEkk+PULDGllrArrPsp5Vnhb9FJO1PVCU
 hMDJHohPiXnKbc8f4Bd78OhIvnuoGfJPdM5MtNe2flUKy2a2ops=
 =YTGf
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs

Pull notification queue from David Howells:
 "This adds a general notification queue concept and adds an event
  source for keys/keyrings, such as linking and unlinking keys and
  changing their attributes.

  Thanks to Debarshi Ray, we do have a pull request to use this to fix a
  problem with gnome-online-accounts - as mentioned last time:

     https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-online-accounts/merge_requests/47

  Without this, g-o-a has to constantly poll a keyring-based kerberos
  cache to find out if kinit has changed anything.

  [ There are other notification pending: mount/sb fsinfo notifications
    for libmount that Karel Zak and Ian Kent have been working on, and
    Christian Brauner would like to use them in lxc, but let's see how
    this one works first ]

  LSM hooks are included:

   - A set of hooks are provided that allow an LSM to rule on whether or
     not a watch may be set. Each of these hooks takes a different
     "watched object" parameter, so they're not really shareable. The
     LSM should use current's credentials. [Wanted by SELinux & Smack]

   - A hook is provided to allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a
     particular message may be posted to a particular queue. This is
     given the credentials from the event generator (which may be the
     system) and the watch setter. [Wanted by Smack]

  I've provided SELinux and Smack with implementations of some of these
  hooks.

  WHY
  ===

  Key/keyring notifications are desirable because if you have your
  kerberos tickets in a file/directory, your Gnome desktop will monitor
  that using something like fanotify and tell you if your credentials
  cache changes.

  However, we also have the ability to cache your kerberos tickets in
  the session, user or persistent keyring so that it isn't left around
  on disk across a reboot or logout. Keyrings, however, cannot currently
  be monitored asynchronously, so the desktop has to poll for it - not
  so good on a laptop. This facility will allow the desktop to avoid the
  need to poll.

  DESIGN DECISIONS
  ================

   - The notification queue is built on top of a standard pipe. Messages
     are effectively spliced in. The pipe is opened with a special flag:

        pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE);

     The special flag has the same value as O_EXCL (which doesn't seem
     like it will ever be applicable in this context)[?]. It is given up
     front to make it a lot easier to prohibit splice&co from accessing
     the pipe.

     [?] Should this be done some other way?  I'd rather not use up a new
         O_* flag if I can avoid it - should I add a pipe3() system call
         instead?

     The pipe is then configured::

        ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, queue_depth);
        ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, &filter);

     Messages are then read out of the pipe using read().

   - It should be possible to allow write() to insert data into the
     notification pipes too, but this is currently disabled as the
     kernel has to be able to insert messages into the pipe *without*
     holding pipe->mutex and the code to make this work needs careful
     auditing.

   - sendfile(), splice() and vmsplice() are disabled on notification
     pipes because of the pipe->mutex issue and also because they
     sometimes want to revert what they just did - but one or more
     notification messages might've been interleaved in the ring.

   - The kernel inserts messages with the wait queue spinlock held. This
     means that pipe_read() and pipe_write() have to take the spinlock
     to update the queue pointers.

   - Records in the buffer are binary, typed and have a length so that
     they can be of varying size.

     This allows multiple heterogeneous sources to share a common
     buffer; there are 16 million types available, of which I've used
     just a few, so there is scope for others to be used. Tags may be
     specified when a watchpoint is created to help distinguish the
     sources.

   - Records are filterable as types have up to 256 subtypes that can be
     individually filtered. Other filtration is also available.

   - Notification pipes don't interfere with each other; each may be
     bound to a different set of watches. Any particular notification
     will be copied to all the queues that are currently watching for it
     - and only those that are watching for it.

   - When recording a notification, the kernel will not sleep, but will
     rather mark a queue as having lost a message if there's
     insufficient space. read() will fabricate a loss notification
     message at an appropriate point later.

   - The notification pipe is created and then watchpoints are attached
     to it, using one of:

        keyctl_watch_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, fds[1], 0x01);
        watch_mount(AT_FDCWD, "/", 0, fd, 0x02);
        watch_sb(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", 0, fd, 0x03);

     where in both cases, fd indicates the queue and the number after is
     a tag between 0 and 255.

   - Watches are removed if either the notification pipe is destroyed or
     the watched object is destroyed. In the latter case, a message will
     be generated indicating the enforced watch removal.

  Things I want to avoid:

   - Introducing features that make the core VFS dependent on the
     network stack or networking namespaces (ie. usage of netlink).

   - Dumping all this stuff into dmesg and having a daemon that sits
     there parsing the output and distributing it as this then puts the
     responsibility for security into userspace and makes handling
     namespaces tricky. Further, dmesg might not exist or might be
     inaccessible inside a container.

   - Letting users see events they shouldn't be able to see.

  TESTING AND MANPAGES
  ====================

   - The keyutils tree has a pipe-watch branch that has keyctl commands
     for making use of notifications. Proposed manual pages can also be
     found on this branch, though a couple of them really need to go to
     the main manpages repository instead.

     If the kernel supports the watching of keys, then running "make
     test" on that branch will cause the testing infrastructure to spawn
     a monitoring process on the side that monitors a notifications pipe
     for all the key/keyring changes induced by the tests and they'll
     all be checked off to make sure they happened.

        https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/log/?h=pipe-watch

   - A test program is provided (samples/watch_queue/watch_test) that
     can be used to monitor for keyrings, mount and superblock events.
     Information on the notifications is simply logged to stdout"

* tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks
  selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook
  keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask
  pipe: Add notification lossage handling
  pipe: Allow buffers to be marked read-whole-or-error for notifications
  Add sample notification program
  watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility
  security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch
  pipe: Add general notification queue support
  pipe: Add O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE
  security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion
  uapi: General notification queue definitions
2020-06-13 09:56:21 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
923ea1631e ima: mprotect performance fix
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQIcBAABAgAGBQJe46D/AAoJEGt5JGawPnFaIQsQALJSQjR9xxnWjoriSAEoo6wb
 6PdIZkHyDJvpX7ZFZAjHN6ntipY4I7+TlSeAn31XPgjrmQICfaP6LldHwlap2iI+
 0Ty/0E+aLcsfUJvuDd6YaOTQzKoefZyAD5jIHuhgVqYUQlZ77+7Ouht8HOh5zLHw
 w7IYTrs4V3ckd6KF2kZ3k+7Bbeod2EXXBwL7E3D9a8gIk4vAWo7+ONHI0h75kHKZ
 u+g/n/3hXv0wDDDRH2bwQg2XkMknkw63SMOwDm8UvwjIzVj8Xyoo3g7fJJOt8kOj
 edH1zndn5QL6GXsbv3Au0VSWXfizjbqUIxPv/GZaLLm0hM5c0rSRnV0F356huamb
 F5iS1i5b+iIaOoKMAiJbD2C3cMQ1ssTU2y4W3B43xx/yR6TNIGWR60efj5NN8fYN
 oNSBMf7ARelDSa696wpL6W5yZ598CzgK/WTvLHwQkZJrwXwifFNvK7T2AkggWpFf
 sICQEjJjwICAqIgbjVGM+cBXr9050nq/HGADhGOdgshl2iLPd0iqhHGFyWbDs3JI
 kscF9I/JooZ2tj1UrTGJRZSudd8fTZOoTpGrTUNPMm5ib68/ObYriAIOMEmaoYEu
 9X8FFJDJSZg5Efg+Orx5ju2iJaO+LUSp+/hyWrE9c4m2ZtAKK/s5WFU/dzeQcYC6
 uHGvXLE+Eh/qvgoYfQnv
 =QV8/
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'integrity-v5.8-fix' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

Pull integrity fix from Mimi Zohar:
 "ima mprotect performance fix"

* tag 'integrity-v5.8-fix' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  ima: fix mprotect checking
2020-06-12 12:02:41 -07:00
Mimi Zohar
4235b1a4ef ima: fix mprotect checking
Make sure IMA is enabled before checking mprotect change.  Addresses
report of a 3.7% regression of boot-time.dhcp.

Fixes: 8eb613c0b8 ("ima: verify mprotect change is consistent with mmap policy")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Xing Zhengjun <zhengjun.xing@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-06-12 11:30:18 -04:00
Tom Rix
65de50969a selinux: fix double free
Clang's static analysis tool reports these double free memory errors.

security/selinux/ss/services.c:2987:4: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc]
                        kfree(bnames[i]);
                        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2990:2: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc]
        kfree(bvalues);
        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~

So improve the security_get_bools error handling by freeing these variables
and setting their return pointers to NULL and the return len to 0

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-06-10 22:10:35 -04:00
Linus Torvalds
52435c86bf overlayfs update for 5.8
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iHUEABYIAB0WIQSQHSd0lITzzeNWNm3h3BK/laaZPAUCXt9klAAKCRDh3BK/laaZ
 PBeeAP9GRI0yajPzBzz2ZK9KkDc6A7wPiaAec+86Q+c02VncVwEAvq5Pi4um5RTZ
 7SVv56ggKO3Cqx779zVyZTRYDs3+YA4=
 =bpKI
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'ovl-update-5.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs

Pull overlayfs updates from Miklos Szeredi:
 "Fixes:

   - Resolve mount option conflicts consistently

   - Sync before remount R/O

   - Fix file handle encoding corner cases

   - Fix metacopy related issues

   - Fix an unintialized return value

   - Add missing permission checks for underlying layers

  Optimizations:

   - Allow multipe whiteouts to share an inode

   - Optimize small writes by inheriting SB_NOSEC from upper layer

   - Do not call ->syncfs() multiple times for sync(2)

   - Do not cache negative lookups on upper layer

   - Make private internal mounts longterm"

* tag 'ovl-update-5.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs: (27 commits)
  ovl: remove unnecessary lock check
  ovl: make oip->index bool
  ovl: only pass ->ki_flags to ovl_iocb_to_rwf()
  ovl: make private mounts longterm
  ovl: get rid of redundant members in struct ovl_fs
  ovl: add accessor for ofs->upper_mnt
  ovl: initialize error in ovl_copy_xattr
  ovl: drop negative dentry in upper layer
  ovl: check permission to open real file
  ovl: call secutiry hook in ovl_real_ioctl()
  ovl: verify permissions in ovl_path_open()
  ovl: switch to mounter creds in readdir
  ovl: pass correct flags for opening real directory
  ovl: fix redirect traversal on metacopy dentries
  ovl: initialize OVL_UPPERDATA in ovl_lookup()
  ovl: use only uppermetacopy state in ovl_lookup()
  ovl: simplify setting of origin for index lookup
  ovl: fix out of bounds access warning in ovl_check_fb_len()
  ovl: return required buffer size for file handles
  ovl: sync dirty data when remounting to ro mode
  ...
2020-06-09 15:40:50 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
595a56ac1b linux-kselftest-kunit-5.8-rc1
This Kunit update for Linux 5.8-rc1 consists of:
 
 - Several config fragment fixes from Anders Roxell to improve
   test coverage.
 - Improvements to kunit run script to use defconfig as default and
   restructure the code for config/build/exec/parse from Vitor Massaru Iha
   and David Gow.
 - Miscellaneous documentation warn fix.
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEPZKym/RZuOCGeA/kCwJExA0NQxwFAl7etrcACgkQCwJExA0N
 QxzGYg/+KHpPhB31IAjNFKCRqwDooftst3dohhzguxJLpDHdEmVJ4moQhLr4gL+/
 qpi3T9hr4Rx++n/A5NoxDvyJvGr+FAL40U+Of7F2UyHpqQmfKPj37I+yvyeR1JEL
 z4+yXEpfQLZaQkmZ7f3GWHyqN3+xwvyTEy7NYUad7xMxLF/99No+I6RMD6yp3srS
 wUUeuBIesSFT0LXYrgI+wgsNGUESlj/McjiP5eMj6UtlMgKpzmfzH56Fia8uw1pw
 6QtpntxDHjtxVfp8YKM4qExI54YI2t6sgHTIoOUsMWD5Q2kHd8kNf1L+lb1sKYUF
 j7lzol5nuqqchAVQYjHzNHa8XKndvexGyWMsPz1gAnkpgVrvBTSFcavdDpDuDZ0T
 HoJZnk9XPsguBQjDxapzPYfAQ81Un/rEmZQ8/X2TaNjdSIH1hHljhaP2OZ6eND/Q
 iobq9x8nC9D95TIqjDbRw3Sp2na/pZLN8Gp27hmKlc+L1XzV8NuZe/WGOUe3lsrq
 fG1ZSLo/iRau8gHuF6fRSrGIzQSCEMGKl3jlQ28OT9HGMAgTlncEwVzQId48/AsS
 UOY+bIAnRZuK+B5F/vw6L3o1e3c17z5bruVlb0M0alP5b7P9/3WLNHsHA3r8haZF
 F6PwIWu41wdRjJf2HI7zD5LaQe/7oU3jfwvuA7n2z8Py+zGx7m4=
 =S+HY
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'linux-kselftest-kunit-5.8-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest

Pull Kunit updates from Shuah Khan:
 "This consists of:

   - Several config fragment fixes from Anders Roxell to improve test
     coverage.

   - Improvements to kunit run script to use defconfig as default and
     restructure the code for config/build/exec/parse from Vitor Massaru
     Iha and David Gow.

   - Miscellaneous documentation warn fix"

* tag 'linux-kselftest-kunit-5.8-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/shuah/linux-kselftest:
  security: apparmor: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
  fs: ext4: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
  drivers: base: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
  lib: Kconfig.debug: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
  kunit: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
  kunit: Kconfig: enable a KUNIT_ALL_TESTS fragment
  kunit: Fix TabError, remove defconfig code and handle when there is no kunitconfig
  kunit: use KUnit defconfig by default
  kunit: use --build_dir=.kunit as default
  Documentation: test.h - fix warnings
  kunit: kunit_tool: Separate out config/build/exec/parse
2020-06-09 10:04:47 -07:00
Michel Lespinasse
c1e8d7c6a7 mmap locking API: convert mmap_sem comments
Convert comments that reference mmap_sem to reference mmap_lock instead.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix up linux-next leftovers]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/lockaphore/lock/, per Vlastimil]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: more linux-next fixups, per Michel]

Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Liam Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200520052908.204642-13-walken@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-09 09:39:14 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
a2b447066c Tag summary
+ Features
   - Replace zero-length array with flexible-array
   - add a valid state flags check
   - add consistency check between state and dfa diff encode flags
   - add apparmor subdir to proc attr interface
   - fail unpack if profile mode is unknown
   - add outofband transition and use it in xattr match
   - ensure that dfa state tables have entries
 
 + Cleanups
   - Use true and false for bool variable
   - Remove semicolon
   - Clean code by removing redundant instructions
   - Replace two seq_printf() calls by seq_puts() in aa_label_seq_xprint()
   - remove duplicate check of xattrs on profile attachment
   - remove useless aafs_create_symlink
 
 + Bug fixes
   - Fix memory leak of profile proxy
   - fix introspection of of task mode for unconfined tasks
   - fix nnp subset test for unconfined
   - check/put label on apparmor_sk_clone_security()
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE7cSDD705q2rFEEf7BS82cBjVw9gFAl7dUf4ACgkQBS82cBjV
 w9j8rA//R3qbVeiN3SJtxLhiF3AAdP2cVbZ/mAhQLwYObI6flb1bliiahJHRf8Ey
 FaVb4srOH8NlmzNINZehXOvD3UDwX/sbpw8h0Y0JolO+v1m3UXkt/eRoMt6gRz7I
 jtaImY1/V+G4O5rV5fGA1HQI8Geg+W9Abt32d16vyKIIpnBS/Pfv8ppM0NcHCZ4G
 e8935T/dMNK5K0Y7HNb1nMjyzEr0LtEXvXznBOrGVpCtDQ45m0/NBvAqpfhuKsVm
 FE5Na8rgtiB9sU72LaoNXNr8Y5LVgkXPmBr/e1FqZtF01XEarKb7yJDGOLrLpp1o
 rGYpY9DQSBT/ZZrwMaLFqCd1XtnN1BAmhlM6TXfnm25ArEnQ49ReHFc7ZHZRSTZz
 LWVBD6atZbapvqckk1SU49eCLuGs5wmRj/CmwdoQUbZ+aOfR68zF+0PANbP5xDo4
 862MmeMsm8JHndeCelpZQRbhtXt0t9MDzwMBevKhxV9hbpt4g8DcnC5tNUc9AnJi
 qJDsMkytYhazIW+/4MsnLTo9wzhqzXq5kBeE++Xl7vDE/V+d5ocvQg73xtwQo9sx
 LzMlh3cPmBvOnlpYfnONZP8pJdjDAuESsi/H5+RKQL3cLz7NX31CLWR8dXLBHy80
 Dvxqvy84Cf7buigqwSzgAGKjDI5HmeOECAMjpLbEB2NS9xxQYuk=
 =U7d2
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2020-06-07' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor

Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
 "Features:
   - Replace zero-length array with flexible-array
   - add a valid state flags check
   - add consistency check between state and dfa diff encode flags
   - add apparmor subdir to proc attr interface
   - fail unpack if profile mode is unknown
   - add outofband transition and use it in xattr match
   - ensure that dfa state tables have entries

  Cleanups:
   - Use true and false for bool variable
   - Remove semicolon
   - Clean code by removing redundant instructions
   - Replace two seq_printf() calls by seq_puts() in aa_label_seq_xprint()
   - remove duplicate check of xattrs on profile attachment
   - remove useless aafs_create_symlink

  Bug fixes:
   - Fix memory leak of profile proxy
   - fix introspection of of task mode for unconfined tasks
   - fix nnp subset test for unconfined
   - check/put label on apparmor_sk_clone_security()"

* tag 'apparmor-pr-2020-06-07' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
  apparmor: Fix memory leak of profile proxy
  apparmor: fix introspection of of task mode for unconfined tasks
  apparmor: check/put label on apparmor_sk_clone_security()
  apparmor: Use true and false for bool variable
  security/apparmor/label.c: Clean code by removing redundant instructions
  apparmor: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array
  apparmor: ensure that dfa state tables have entries
  apparmor: remove duplicate check of xattrs on profile attachment.
  apparmor: add outofband transition and use it in xattr match
  apparmor: fail unpack if profile mode is unknown
  apparmor: fix nnp subset test for unconfined
  apparmor: remove useless aafs_create_symlink
  apparmor: add proc subdir to attrs
  apparmor: add consistency check between state and dfa diff encode flags
  apparmor: add a valid state flags check
  AppArmor: Remove semicolon
  apparmor: Replace two seq_printf() calls by seq_puts() in aa_label_seq_xprint()
2020-06-07 16:04:49 -07:00
Roberto Sassu
8b8c704d91 ima: Remove __init annotation from ima_pcrread()
Commit 6cc7c266e5 ("ima: Call ima_calc_boot_aggregate() in
ima_eventdigest_init()") added a call to ima_calc_boot_aggregate() so that
the digest can be recalculated for the boot_aggregate measurement entry if
the 'd' template field has been requested. For the 'd' field, only SHA1 and
MD5 digests are accepted.

Given that ima_eventdigest_init() does not have the __init annotation, all
functions called should not have it. This patch removes __init from
ima_pcrread().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:  6cc7c266e5 ("ima: Call ima_calc_boot_aggregate() in ima_eventdigest_init()")
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-07 16:03:09 -07:00
John Johansen
3622ad25d4 apparmor: Fix memory leak of profile proxy
When the proxy isn't replaced and the profile is removed, the proxy
is being leaked resulting in a kmemleak check message of

unreferenced object 0xffff888077a3a490 (size 16):
  comm "apparmor_parser", pid 128041, jiffies 4322684109 (age 1097.028s)
  hex dump (first 16 bytes):
    03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 b0 92 fd 4b 81 88 ff ff  ...........K....
  backtrace:
    [<0000000084d5daf2>] aa_alloc_proxy+0x58/0xe0
    [<00000000ecc0e21a>] aa_alloc_profile+0x159/0x1a0
    [<000000004cc9ce15>] unpack_profile+0x275/0x1c40
    [<000000007332b3ca>] aa_unpack+0x1e7/0x7e0
    [<00000000e25e31bd>] aa_replace_profiles+0x18a/0x1d10
    [<00000000350d9415>] policy_update+0x237/0x650
    [<000000003fbf934e>] profile_load+0x122/0x160
    [<0000000047f7b781>] vfs_write+0x139/0x290
    [<000000008ad12358>] ksys_write+0xcd/0x170
    [<000000001a9daa7b>] do_syscall_64+0x70/0x310
    [<00000000b9efb0cf>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3

Make sure to cleanup the profile's embedded label which will result
on the proxy being properly freed.

Fixes: 637f688dc3 ("apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-06-07 13:38:55 -07:00
John Johansen
dd2569fbb0 apparmor: fix introspection of of task mode for unconfined tasks
Fix two issues with introspecting the task mode.

1. If a task is attached to a unconfined profile that is not the
   ns->unconfined profile then. Mode the mode is always reported
   as -

      $ ps -Z
      LABEL                               PID TTY          TIME CMD
      unconfined                         1287 pts/0    00:00:01 bash
      test (-)                           1892 pts/0    00:00:00 ps

   instead of the correct value of (unconfined) as shown below

      $ ps -Z
      LABEL                               PID TTY          TIME CMD
      unconfined                         2483 pts/0    00:00:01 bash
      test (unconfined)                  3591 pts/0    00:00:00 ps

2. if a task is confined by a stack of profiles that are unconfined
   the output of label mode is again the incorrect value of (-) like
   above, instead of (unconfined). This is because the visibile
   profile count increment is skipped by the special casing of
   unconfined.

Fixes: f1bd904175 ("apparmor: add the base fns() for domain labels")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-06-07 13:38:55 -07:00
Mauricio Faria de Oliveira
3b646abc5b apparmor: check/put label on apparmor_sk_clone_security()
Currently apparmor_sk_clone_security() does not check for existing
label/peer in the 'new' struct sock; it just overwrites it, if any
(with another reference to the label of the source sock.)

    static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
                                           struct sock *newsk)
    {
            struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
            struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);

            new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
            new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
    }

This might leak label references, which might overflow under load.
Thus, check for and put labels, to prevent such errors.

Note this is similarly done on:

    static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, ...)
    ...
            if (sock->sk) {
                    struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);

                    aa_put_label(ctx->label);
                    ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
            }
    ...

Context:
-------

The label reference count leak is observed if apparmor_sock_graft()
is called previously: this sets the 'ctx->label' field by getting
a reference to the current label (later overwritten, without put.)

    static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, ...)
    {
            struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);

            if (!ctx->label)
                    ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
    }

And that is the case on crypto/af_alg.c:af_alg_accept():

    int af_alg_accept(struct sock *sk, struct socket *newsock, ...)
    ...
            struct sock *sk2;
            ...
            sk2 = sk_alloc(...);
            ...
            security_sock_graft(sk2, newsock);
            security_sk_clone(sk, sk2);
    ...

Apparently both calls are done on their own right, especially for
other LSMs, being introduced in 2010/2014, before apparmor socket
mediation in 2017 (see commits [1,2,3,4]).

So, it looks OK there! Let's fix the reference leak in apparmor.

Test-case:
---------

Exercise that code path enough to overflow label reference count.

    $ cat aa-refcnt-af_alg.c
    #include <stdio.h>
    #include <string.h>
    #include <unistd.h>
    #include <sys/socket.h>
    #include <linux/if_alg.h>

    int main() {
            int sockfd;
            struct sockaddr_alg sa;

            /* Setup the crypto API socket */
            sockfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
            if (sockfd < 0) {
                    perror("socket");
                    return 1;
            }

            memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
            sa.salg_family = AF_ALG;
            strcpy((char *) sa.salg_type, "rng");
            strcpy((char *) sa.salg_name, "stdrng");

            if (bind(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *) &sa, sizeof(sa)) < 0) {
                    perror("bind");
                    return 1;
            }

            /* Accept a "connection" and close it; repeat. */
            while (!close(accept(sockfd, NULL, 0)));

            return 0;
    }

    $ gcc -o aa-refcnt-af_alg aa-refcnt-af_alg.c

    $ ./aa-refcnt-af_alg
    <a few hours later>

    [ 9928.475953] refcount_t overflow at apparmor_sk_clone_security+0x37/0x70 in aa-refcnt-af_alg[1322], uid/euid: 1000/1000
    ...
    [ 9928.507443] RIP: 0010:apparmor_sk_clone_security+0x37/0x70
    ...
    [ 9928.514286]  security_sk_clone+0x33/0x50
    [ 9928.514807]  af_alg_accept+0x81/0x1c0 [af_alg]
    [ 9928.516091]  alg_accept+0x15/0x20 [af_alg]
    [ 9928.516682]  SYSC_accept4+0xff/0x210
    [ 9928.519609]  SyS_accept+0x10/0x20
    [ 9928.520190]  do_syscall_64+0x73/0x130
    [ 9928.520808]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2

Note that other messages may be seen, not just overflow, depending on
the value being incremented by kref_get(); on another run:

    [ 7273.182666] refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.
    ...
    [ 7273.185789] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.

Kprobes:
-------

Using kprobe events to monitor sk -> sk_security -> label -> count (kref):

Original v5.7 (one reference leak every iteration)

 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd2
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd4
 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd3
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd5
 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd4
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd6

Patched v5.7 (zero reference leak per iteration)

 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x593
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x594
 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x593
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x594
 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x593
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x594

Commits:
-------

[1] commit 507cad355f ("crypto: af_alg - Make sure sk_security is initialized on accept()ed sockets")
[2] commit 4c63f83c2c ("crypto: af_alg - properly label AF_ALG socket")
[3] commit 2acce6aa9f ("Networking") a.k.a ("crypto: af_alg - Avoid sock_graft call warning)
[4] commit 56974a6fcf ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation")

Fixes: 56974a6fcf ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation")
Reported-by: Brian Moyles <bmoyles@netflix.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mfo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-06-07 13:38:56 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
3c0ad98c2e integrity-v5.8
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQIcBAABAgAGBQJe2nHRAAoJEGt5JGawPnFagTMP/jMdo7DzOJYxALQ+HQPZ1cO+
 tyZdEoVeO/I6LeKWR3emf53ingH/KAL0PdxPAGfo/DBwSpdlkmd/WmKXYQWQbOk+
 s8MtRfAV1Fra4ON6KsuI2frBMtQrPNIzjRVDU4dQr/Ogo7ZUQnWK+36s0yT8vvfg
 jZ40UKpy3Om78OYSlH55KncVFxUOZrLpjFC9yPvrdo7hrhLsS+lp4qvpuoY9vPHf
 2r9/T7OBbUlavzGwRmJO0Rphimm9ZvgBmcyB2Y4H00m0KqN3uxPRMRvs2lRX1SyQ
 C8k5qg18HsdHVomQ7J/wx6w7vxy4bOThbBLWDL2OgnHFt5ZXMDj7pwkO+fmOFFIh
 bdAFXb5SiZu/Y5gHOamthr0ylfyGFhmRjJXvznLbTy3/PrJE0giuOEOEV+1qpYVf
 Ds0j6uYV5ZVbPpSzRay7aWispxQ6EBPwN+qp74x/moM5gctBdNm6HskRxOyy8IH3
 ZWmd3y902rwLl0Eaz9rETU5Wf7NyWtdQwateLzeVBcLRd+bqaqfdQXi1MFEzx23/
 V87FMmdQ8aoEjO9jgRSilYTs2VVHkcprw/uqr6ooQHTer8fLs292z/Rh8McncqpF
 /ptJZ6blRERlaKqEcefXYjP8xYTnGiLDA5LZM5Ko5NB71RyEDeDYUxaJLBPlYuP7
 oO5Gj38zD2VGjz1xDKgA
 =G3xj
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'integrity-v5.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "The main changes are extending the TPM 2.0 PCR banks with bank
  specific file hashes, calculating the "boot_aggregate" based on other
  TPM PCR banks, using the default IMA hash algorithm, instead of SHA1,
  as the basis for the cache hash table key, and preventing the mprotect
  syscall to circumvent an IMA mmap appraise policy rule.

   - In preparation for extending TPM 2.0 PCR banks with bank specific
     digests, commit 0b6cf6b97b ("tpm: pass an array of
     tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()") modified
     tpm_pcr_extend(). The original SHA1 file digests were
     padded/truncated, before being extended into the other TPM PCR
     banks. This pull request calculates and extends the TPM PCR banks
     with bank specific file hashes completing the above change.

   - The "boot_aggregate", the first IMA measurement list record, is the
     "trusted boot" link between the pre-boot environment and the
     running OS. With TPM 2.0, the "boot_aggregate" record is not
     limited to being based on the SHA1 TPM PCR bank, but can be
     calculated based on any enabled bank, assuming the hash algorithm
     is also enabled in the kernel.

  Other changes include the following and five other bug fixes/code
  clean up:

   - supporting both a SHA1 and a larger "boot_aggregate" digest in a
     custom template format containing both the the SHA1 ('d') and
     larger digests ('d-ng') fields.

   - Initial hash table key fix, but additional changes would be good"

* tag 'integrity-v5.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  ima: Directly free *entry in ima_alloc_init_template() if digests is NULL
  ima: Call ima_calc_boot_aggregate() in ima_eventdigest_init()
  ima: Directly assign the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rules
  ima: verify mprotect change is consistent with mmap policy
  evm: Fix possible memory leak in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash()
  ima: Set again build_ima_appraise variable
  ima: Remove redundant policy rule set in add_rules()
  ima: Fix ima digest hash table key calculation
  ima: Use ima_hash_algo for collision detection in the measurement list
  ima: Calculate and extend PCR with digests in ima_template_entry
  ima: Allocate and initialize tfm for each PCR bank
  ima: Switch to dynamically allocated buffer for template digests
  ima: Store template digest directly in ima_template_entry
  ima: Evaluate error in init_ima()
  ima: Switch to ima_hash_algo for boot aggregate
2020-06-06 09:39:05 -07:00
Roberto Sassu
42413b4980 ima: Directly free *entry in ima_alloc_init_template() if digests is NULL
To support multiple template digests, the static array entry->digest has
been replaced with a dynamically allocated array in commit aa724fe18a
("ima: Switch to dynamically allocated buffer for template digests"). The
array is allocated in ima_alloc_init_template() and if the returned pointer
is NULL, ima_free_template_entry() is called.

However, (*entry)->template_desc is not yet initialized while it is used by
ima_free_template_entry(). This patch fixes the issue by directly freeing
*entry without calling ima_free_template_entry().

Fixes: aa724fe18a ("ima: Switch to dynamically allocated buffer for template digests")
Reported-by: syzbot+223310b454ba6b75974e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-06-05 06:04:11 -04:00
Linus Torvalds
886d7de631 Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)
Merge yet more updates from Andrew Morton:

 - More MM work. 100ish more to go. Mike Rapoport's "mm: remove
   __ARCH_HAS_5LEVEL_HACK" series should fix the current ppc issue

 - Various other little subsystems

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (127 commits)
  lib/ubsan.c: fix gcc-10 warnings
  tools/testing/selftests/vm: remove duplicate headers
  selftests: vm: pkeys: fix multilib builds for x86
  selftests: vm: pkeys: use the correct page size on powerpc
  selftests/vm/pkeys: override access right definitions on powerpc
  selftests/vm/pkeys: test correct behaviour of pkey-0
  selftests/vm/pkeys: introduce a sub-page allocator
  selftests/vm/pkeys: detect write violation on a mapped access-denied-key page
  selftests/vm/pkeys: associate key on a mapped page and detect write violation
  selftests/vm/pkeys: associate key on a mapped page and detect access violation
  selftests/vm/pkeys: improve checks to determine pkey support
  selftests/vm/pkeys: fix assertion in test_pkey_alloc_exhaust()
  selftests/vm/pkeys: fix number of reserved powerpc pkeys
  selftests/vm/pkeys: introduce powerpc support
  selftests/vm/pkeys: introduce generic pkey abstractions
  selftests: vm: pkeys: use the correct huge page size
  selftests/vm/pkeys: fix alloc_random_pkey() to make it really random
  selftests/vm/pkeys: fix assertion in pkey_disable_set/clear()
  selftests/vm/pkeys: fix pkey_disable_clear()
  selftests: vm: pkeys: add helpers for pkey bits
  ...
2020-06-04 19:18:29 -07:00
Waiman Long
d4eaa28378 mm: add kvfree_sensitive() for freeing sensitive data objects
For kvmalloc'ed data object that contains sensitive information like
cryptographic keys, we need to make sure that the buffer is always cleared
before freeing it.  Using memset() alone for buffer clearing may not
provide certainty as the compiler may compile it away.  To be sure, the
special memzero_explicit() has to be used.

This patch introduces a new kvfree_sensitive() for freeing those sensitive
data objects allocated by kvmalloc().  The relevant places where
kvfree_sensitive() can be used are modified to use it.

Fixes: 4f0882491a ("KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key read")
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200407200318.11711-1-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-04 19:06:22 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
15a2bc4dbb Merge branch 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull execve updates from Eric Biederman:
 "Last cycle for the Nth time I ran into bugs and quality of
  implementation issues related to exec that could not be easily be
  fixed because of the way exec is implemented. So I have been digging
  into exec and cleanup up what I can.

  I don't think I have exec sorted out enough to fix the issues I
  started with but I have made some headway this cycle with 4 sets of
  changes.

   - promised cleanups after introducing exec_update_mutex

   - trivial cleanups for exec

   - control flow simplifications

   - remove the recomputation of bprm->cred

  The net result is code that is a bit easier to understand and work
  with and a decrease in the number of lines of code (if you don't count
  the added tests)"

* 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (24 commits)
  exec: Compute file based creds only once
  exec: Add a per bprm->file version of per_clear
  binfmt_elf_fdpic: fix execfd build regression
  selftests/exec: Add binfmt_script regression test
  exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler
  exec: Generic execfd support
  exec/binfmt_script: Don't modify bprm->buf and then return -ENOEXEC
  exec: Move the call of prepare_binprm into search_binary_handler
  exec: Allow load_misc_binary to call prepare_binprm unconditionally
  exec: Convert security_bprm_set_creds into security_bprm_repopulate_creds
  exec: Factor security_bprm_creds_for_exec out of security_bprm_set_creds
  exec: Teach prepare_exec_creds how exec treats uids & gids
  exec: Set the point of no return sooner
  exec: Move handling of the point of no return to the top level
  exec: Run sync_mm_rss before taking exec_update_mutex
  exec: Fix spelling of search_binary_handler in a comment
  exec: Move the comment from above de_thread to above unshare_sighand
  exec: Rename flush_old_exec begin_new_exec
  exec: Move most of setup_new_exec into flush_old_exec
  exec: In setup_new_exec cache current in the local variable me
  ...
2020-06-04 14:07:08 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
9ff7258575 Merge branch 'proc-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull proc updates from Eric Biederman:
 "This has four sets of changes:

   - modernize proc to support multiple private instances

   - ensure we see the exit of each process tid exactly

   - remove has_group_leader_pid

   - use pids not tasks in posix-cpu-timers lookup

  Alexey updated proc so each mount of proc uses a new superblock. This
  allows people to actually use mount options with proc with no fear of
  messing up another mount of proc. Given the kernel's internal mounts
  of proc for things like uml this was a real problem, and resulted in
  Android's hidepid mount options being ignored and introducing security
  issues.

  The rest of the changes are small cleanups and fixes that came out of
  my work to allow this change to proc. In essence it is swapping the
  pids in de_thread during exec which removes a special case the code
  had to handle. Then updating the code to stop handling that special
  case"

* 'proc-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  proc: proc_pid_ns takes super_block as an argument
  remove the no longer needed pid_alive() check in __task_pid_nr_ns()
  posix-cpu-timers: Replace __get_task_for_clock with pid_for_clock
  posix-cpu-timers: Replace cpu_timer_pid_type with clock_pid_type
  posix-cpu-timers: Extend rcu_read_lock removing task_struct references
  signal: Remove has_group_leader_pid
  exec: Remove BUG_ON(has_group_leader_pid)
  posix-cpu-timer:  Unify the now redundant code in lookup_task
  posix-cpu-timer: Tidy up group_leader logic in lookup_task
  proc: Ensure we see the exit of each process tid exactly once
  rculist: Add hlists_swap_heads_rcu
  proc: Use PIDTYPE_TGID in next_tgid
  Use proc_pid_ns() to get pid_namespace from the proc superblock
  proc: use named enums for better readability
  proc: use human-readable values for hidepid
  docs: proc: add documentation for "hidepid=4" and "subset=pid" options and new mount behavior
  proc: add option to mount only a pids subset
  proc: instantiate only pids that we can ptrace on 'hidepid=4' mount option
  proc: allow to mount many instances of proc in one pid namespace
  proc: rename struct proc_fs_info to proc_fs_opts
2020-06-04 13:54:34 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
acf25aa663 Smack changes for 5.8
Clean out dead code and repair an out-of-bounds warning.
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJLBAABCAA1FiEEC+9tH1YyUwIQzUIeOKUVfIxDyBEFAl7VYkUXHGNhc2V5QHNj
 aGF1Zmxlci1jYS5jb20ACgkQOKUVfIxDyBGiTg/9GK5Ca2J89EXL3S/c5kyf1m3G
 aJFgg778zAp7UyWiCu8BE6+wlMnutt4yKmLmysN1+lT2RnYaytQCpvtpE5MMAiVy
 q0foK+g3+JakmC838Ng/RkHxbq0n61bDKlnh9D044Tq85U8CxVh1not4E13ZiAS/
 +iTS1sneWjtMVmkTB0MgXDT5QaVbJ2EkwQS62MhBfU6a0Tg+m0K+t1enX5oeG0cy
 OewK2grQPmZeqJDVuMr7Naqny/2740loRclI6f5PxjvGCVfbbOPqUTtcst4wLXtC
 B1S3rkN+8PXn45ixd3BKAZ8ghMKJKz4x9AzxU8rcg49Oxpczp9zV/jjF29ly4gHk
 rM/EmIIQNf2rM88K7hm8D0IaDX1lpg1n5B9sRvbn8tY/r/JilU6lxGIHpA81nHRy
 lcp5D9i60ajhLx0FcqgPNxn6/osFrcYlFd0HxPYXEF7XjoCaxuTSEzTMxnXAnCG5
 y9o4YJtBYB9HhgUk22e85p+tdAHZ3avG18GAqIt467lpp3/W2jp/nGR9QeoTgE/5
 l0qxMfG9d+SBviYJJ38mtB3mJf0pESZA6h8QzupgPSbw49DvWLBT9eTC5JxLbvWW
 bpydDsl0R7niZFYw2+Z4c07qt/I8cFzuOdbe8NMdEDYV2FxluqBpM9WKsW+EXdak
 gH0+ydyh8qBCLIaQprQ=
 =je/v
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'Smack-for-5.8' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next

Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
 "Clean out dead code and repair an out-of-bounds warning"

* tag 'Smack-for-5.8' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
  Smack: Remove unused inline function smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt
  Smack:- Remove redundant inode_smack cache
  Smack:- Remove mutex lock "smk_lock" from inode_smack
  Smack: slab-out-of-bounds in vsscanf
  smack: remove redundant structure variable from header.
  smack: avoid unused 'sip' variable warning
2020-06-04 10:31:05 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
a484a497c9 Keyrings changes
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEqG5UsNXhtOCrfGQP+7dXa6fLC2sFAl7WfNsACgkQ+7dXa6fL
 C2t5ag//Qn+FR6IGeGOig9mDE5IVqY/CUB15xjYYO28aV5bjOBFmwhFVKjbJfzX5
 jOO11pGMbVkkNavsEXxw4DA5LXXpFG7frub9DysO5xDU8dTvHB2Cov1jQOFP76Hf
 Gx91Xq0W8FE51genxy7Wp1BFxU/OPX3K1+LoE7ocDKTq5ctdZhZP8Fgr6Ip+1Tdi
 ECbRGpWP54V6+KO8RfayiEF4E7Hry+NT/5ogSbAMTHLnZyMpqjCPGxhEa11vfr/v
 ZVQ0Esp7rBJdLw6gYWf6TDYuwARiKo2LDQFQnGyvf0QUZSfDtoTdQihszHmalcBE
 Uh+6B+BlKQX8VPqsgw8yEgXqFzf8sw5WpwfeQFkS3Pn8J90R9S3q//4kNfNOgeZV
 ydqWG1VCORwm+X/8rAy8l0lXlA/JR++B7T7kvdM6Yslt5SB/4KQigS7n2tlp6+Ms
 9SwUf2GnGBJWS4kFCgEkSP6QAP9wimGkqZx+rwYytqnjCc/X18FUrRge99o2MHcs
 kHGHvok4dy/BPHap4GAoFZbfvg7LuU2SwRfNdMRB87sUi7dqqYvUiy0OGLmDuK3X
 7lvuJpmEjKkHFSUXRlV9yvvZdciJ/k+VoKOZf/oEQE4t2m0rsCQcCOlljwpLKaED
 m1dQzEq1OkgA2goCnHehR+Fkq61JWkUGrM+jbPmu8Chg9psuqIs=
 =RnLl
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'keys-next-20200602' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs

Pull keyring updates from David Howells:

 - Fix a documentation warning.

 - Replace a zero-length array with a flexible one

 - Make the big_key key type use ChaCha20Poly1305 and use the crypto
   algorithm directly rather than going through the crypto layer.

 - Implement the update op for the big_key type.

* tag 'keys-next-20200602' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  keys: Implement update for the big_key type
  security/keys: rewrite big_key crypto to use library interface
  KEYS: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array
  Documentation: security: core.rst: add missing argument
2020-06-04 10:27:07 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
cb8e59cc87 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from David Miller:

 1) Allow setting bluetooth L2CAP modes via socket option, from Luiz
    Augusto von Dentz.

 2) Add GSO partial support to igc, from Sasha Neftin.

 3) Several cleanups and improvements to r8169 from Heiner Kallweit.

 4) Add IF_OPER_TESTING link state and use it when ethtool triggers a
    device self-test. From Andrew Lunn.

 5) Start moving away from custom driver versions, use the globally
    defined kernel version instead, from Leon Romanovsky.

 6) Support GRO vis gro_cells in DSA layer, from Alexander Lobakin.

 7) Allow hard IRQ deferral during NAPI, from Eric Dumazet.

 8) Add sriov and vf support to hinic, from Luo bin.

 9) Support Media Redundancy Protocol (MRP) in the bridging code, from
    Horatiu Vultur.

10) Support netmap in the nft_nat code, from Pablo Neira Ayuso.

11) Allow UDPv6 encapsulation of ESP in the ipsec code, from Sabrina
    Dubroca. Also add ipv6 support for espintcp.

12) Lots of ReST conversions of the networking documentation, from Mauro
    Carvalho Chehab.

13) Support configuration of ethtool rxnfc flows in bcmgenet driver,
    from Doug Berger.

14) Allow to dump cgroup id and filter by it in inet_diag code, from
    Dmitry Yakunin.

15) Add infrastructure to export netlink attribute policies to
    userspace, from Johannes Berg.

16) Several optimizations to sch_fq scheduler, from Eric Dumazet.

17) Fallback to the default qdisc if qdisc init fails because otherwise
    a packet scheduler init failure will make a device inoperative. From
    Jesper Dangaard Brouer.

18) Several RISCV bpf jit optimizations, from Luke Nelson.

19) Correct the return type of the ->ndo_start_xmit() method in several
    drivers, it's netdev_tx_t but many drivers were using
    'int'. From Yunjian Wang.

20) Add an ethtool interface for PHY master/slave config, from Oleksij
    Rempel.

21) Add BPF iterators, from Yonghang Song.

22) Add cable test infrastructure, including ethool interfaces, from
    Andrew Lunn. Marvell PHY driver is the first to support this
    facility.

23) Remove zero-length arrays all over, from Gustavo A. R. Silva.

24) Calculate and maintain an explicit frame size in XDP, from Jesper
    Dangaard Brouer.

25) Add CAP_BPF, from Alexei Starovoitov.

26) Support terse dumps in the packet scheduler, from Vlad Buslov.

27) Support XDP_TX bulking in dpaa2 driver, from Ioana Ciornei.

28) Add devm_register_netdev(), from Bartosz Golaszewski.

29) Minimize qdisc resets, from Cong Wang.

30) Get rid of kernel_getsockopt and kernel_setsockopt in order to
    eliminate set_fs/get_fs calls. From Christoph Hellwig.

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2517 commits)
  selftests: net: ip_defrag: ignore EPERM
  net_failover: fixed rollback in net_failover_open()
  Revert "tipc: Fix potential tipc_aead refcnt leak in tipc_crypto_rcv"
  Revert "tipc: Fix potential tipc_node refcnt leak in tipc_rcv"
  vmxnet3: allow rx flow hash ops only when rss is enabled
  hinic: add set_channels ethtool_ops support
  selftests/bpf: Add a default $(CXX) value
  tools/bpf: Don't use $(COMPILE.c)
  bpf, selftests: Use bpf_probe_read_kernel
  s390/bpf: Use bcr 0,%0 as tail call nop filler
  s390/bpf: Maintain 8-byte stack alignment
  selftests/bpf: Fix verifier test
  selftests/bpf: Fix sample_cnt shared between two threads
  bpf, selftests: Adapt cls_redirect to call csum_level helper
  bpf: Add csum_level helper for fixing up csum levels
  bpf: Fix up bpf_skb_adjust_room helper's skb csum setting
  sfc: add missing annotation for efx_ef10_try_update_nic_stats_vf()
  crypto/chtls: IPv6 support for inline TLS
  Crypto/chcr: Fixes a coccinile check error
  Crypto/chcr: Fixes compilations warnings
  ...
2020-06-03 16:27:18 -07:00
Roberto Sassu
6cc7c266e5 ima: Call ima_calc_boot_aggregate() in ima_eventdigest_init()
If the template field 'd' is chosen and the digest to be added to the
measurement entry was not calculated with SHA1 or MD5, it is
recalculated with SHA1, by using the passed file descriptor. However, this
cannot be done for boot_aggregate, because there is no file descriptor.

This patch adds a call to ima_calc_boot_aggregate() in
ima_eventdigest_init(), so that the digest can be recalculated also for the
boot_aggregate entry.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.13.x
Fixes: 3ce1217d6c ("ima: define template fields library and new helpers")
Reported-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-06-03 17:20:43 -04:00
Roberto Sassu
067a436b1b ima: Directly assign the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rules
This patch prevents the following oops:

[   10.771813] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000
[...]
[   10.779790] RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0xf7/0xb80
[...]
[   10.798576] Call Trace:
[   10.798993]  ? ima_lsm_policy_change+0x2b0/0x2b0
[   10.799753]  ? inode_init_owner+0x1a0/0x1a0
[   10.800484]  ? _raw_spin_lock+0x7a/0xd0
[   10.801592]  ima_must_appraise.part.0+0xb6/0xf0
[   10.802313]  ? ima_fix_xattr.isra.0+0xd0/0xd0
[   10.803167]  ima_must_appraise+0x4f/0x70
[   10.804004]  ima_post_path_mknod+0x2e/0x80
[   10.804800]  do_mknodat+0x396/0x3c0

It occurs when there is a failure during IMA initialization, and
ima_init_policy() is not called. IMA hooks still call ima_match_policy()
but ima_rules is NULL. This patch prevents the crash by directly assigning
the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rules when ima_rules is defined. This
wouldn't alter the existing behavior, as ima_rules is always set at the end
of ima_init_policy().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.7.x
Fixes: 07f6a79415 ("ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules")
Reported-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-06-03 14:54:35 -04:00
Miklos Szeredi
292f902a40 ovl: call secutiry hook in ovl_real_ioctl()
Verify LSM permissions for underlying file, since vfs_ioctl() doesn't do
it.

[Stephen Rothwell] export security_file_ioctl

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2020-06-03 09:45:18 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
d9afbb3509 Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull lockdown update from James Morris:
 "An update for the security subsystem to allow unprivileged users
  to see the status of the lockdown feature. From Jeremy Cline"

Also an added comment to describe CAP_SETFCAP.

* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  capabilities: add description for CAP_SETFCAP
  lockdown: Allow unprivileged users to see lockdown status
2020-06-02 17:36:24 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
f41030a20b selinux/stable-5.8 PR 20200601
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAl7VnLoUHHBhdWxAcGF1
 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXPkjA//fHFbgHBbiZrS7v/vi61wdpEtGzmn
 /hr4Z5DpFmJdCTGeGItST8Xq4KEqlLGrMclk+PsG0H7BMJEEp+0XJ+begqNvC8PF
 +JzP+oBqoO0SoF5z0jOnBBtzK8R3vmVgcPO3dNdEgNBQG3T7/GQLUTX8DylBDOI1
 yFeuewRD7sK/rIg/S6t+B0ut7Uer5CjEIed4iQZ3eKIUqE6/C1zpmQj98MH9L5uh
 yN0tdF8aOZvgD6v1bfmvgAnnODFvvKcogDn+hvbqRhrDdhgt1DAErIjYeqRemQRc
 g7Xve4i7VivXC4o8nhUy00FWqzCB5tcydR0cwgg4iR/JgKvn18s0vRQV9SU7Nt+o
 pXOex6qHlFCJpjTop+DCBEkGK9V7UBMM6t6gwR/bpkDMYkgIjJrCIQTyw8/HrKKt
 fntryXf9juM0Owh/YOp5jKXPddhkfuztViJ+FnxsI2sho643Gg6/Wfy2slvJ0udH
 i0bnnacW/6pysf/eLrPsF89IacAGydkhdZwaSno3GLyCtXxrqJU4cs2wSpUq0Wiz
 g4kB4hpPXgrQszLriEsF0gRVcRu2nOF4ISXlUqfSw7i/nFT7+axYUjgBg9PpV1Mj
 GyLBSOQp1xs4S/oglfJ5nE4UtS4m187t4JVWOxfqqyWE/O2cqUPtaS+52m0aIWTH
 6HFWbmL5+Dxsm+4=
 =A+bX
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux

Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
 "The highlights:

   - A number of improvements to various SELinux internal data
     structures to help improve performance. We move the role
     transitions into a hash table. In the content structure we shift
     from hashing the content string (aka SELinux label) to the
     structure itself, when it is valid. This last change not only
     offers a speedup, but it helps us simplify the code some as well.

   - Add a new SELinux policy version which allows for a more space
     efficient way of storing the filename transitions in the binary
     policy. Given the default Fedora SELinux policy with the unconfined
     module enabled, this change drops the policy size from ~7.6MB to
     ~3.3MB. The kernel policy load time dropped as well.

   - Some fixes to the error handling code in the policy parser to
     properly return error codes when things go wrong"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: netlabel: Remove unused inline function
  selinux: do not allocate hashtabs dynamically
  selinux: fix return value on error in policydb_read()
  selinux: simplify range_write()
  selinux: fix error return code in policydb_read()
  selinux: don't produce incorrect filename_trans_count
  selinux: implement new format of filename transitions
  selinux: move context hashing under sidtab
  selinux: hash context structure directly
  selinux: store role transitions in a hash table
  selinux: drop unnecessary smp_load_acquire() call
  selinux: fix warning Comparison to bool
2020-06-02 17:16:47 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
91681e8480 One patch for suppressing coccicheck's warning.
tomoyo: use true for bool variable
 
  security/tomoyo/common.c |    2 +-
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)
 
 iQIcBAABAgAGBQJe1Gl6AAoJEEJfEo0MZPUqLeEQAIzmGMKXvt1eFtJzpBWDJe6K
 Z9IPCZ2LvNKuY/Ph8pDhv49PzhbBwpyW/z9ixLjShZXfqPPUkhepBbsM5HU0IgbQ
 bAUGFEd2YTYKZmLArVghzP9jxaKohUnU4d6XsEzvXdcZ9r5yZuTf3QnTlM+DI6Ht
 11tOp8ybG/D1y1LsuLvDvSq4Z7y45ZE6aGD/JosjrIjJTsXqiLmbPvC5f2XL3/jH
 7B0i5QAyv4egj4YtWwY7kY0mLj/6U596pSCakalyvJV30L3r42LddVwSN14uvKxY
 K+OyVJ23B7ytqYynKQVLleY70fhoN3v52D20BQ/IpFkgvD9wMjXariLrNcJPGcPH
 vA/iZZ/Bawc2XUIB5a2Q7K2TjiDQa2RMTJCWouEJm67ybaG+cDnmn/3OG9YXR5Yi
 joJ7F9eIXWtINee8lE9kRzSHsDqA06bYkY+MncoLtzXhzOfFDbrKIoNiRnyuI0qb
 Rr+AUCCigcEjQFz0bc/I3Z+Ab94BaZovO0iELQvsdiMtnvA4wzmG8zddHUOH089z
 UcGEXMknut6ioMZqZWt+FDd4Is5oeqySfv1XvXEY6bui5qbVtXNxfZSj6HctvzJX
 AtJ8/9Tuf/82e5Fs1Sqmzo1hKE4qi8VJWdAGCe2dwcwdgR1vrbimDUMvg0DomAIf
 +Ap0aHQMV5b3pjbMuq91
 =VyNS
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'tomoyo-pr-20200601' of git://git.osdn.net/gitroot/tomoyo/tomoyo-test1

Pull tomoyo update from Tetsuo Handa:
 "One patch for suppressing coccicheck's warning"

* tag 'tomoyo-pr-20200601' of git://git.osdn.net/gitroot/tomoyo/tomoyo-test1:
  tomoyo: use true for bool variable
2020-06-02 17:12:07 -07:00
David Howells
b6f61c3146 keys: Implement update for the big_key type
Implement the ->update op for the big_key type.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2020-06-02 17:22:31 +01:00
Jason A. Donenfeld
521fd61c84 security/keys: rewrite big_key crypto to use library interface
A while back, I noticed that the crypto and crypto API usage in big_keys
were entirely broken in multiple ways, so I rewrote it. Now, I'm
rewriting it again, but this time using the simpler ChaCha20Poly1305
library function. This makes the file considerably more simple; the
diffstat alone should justify this commit. It also should be faster,
since it no longer requires a mutex around the "aead api object" (nor
allocations), allowing us to encrypt multiple items in parallel. We also
benefit from being able to pass any type of pointer, so we can get rid
of the ridiculously complex custom page allocator that big_key really
doesn't need.

[DH: Change the select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305 to a depends on as
 select doesn't propagate and the build can end up with an =y dependending
 on some =m pieces.

 The depends on CRYPTO also had to be removed otherwise the configurator
 complains about a recursive dependency.]

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2020-06-02 17:22:31 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
e0cd920687 Merge branch 'uaccess.access_ok' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull uaccess/access_ok updates from Al Viro:
 "Removals of trivially pointless access_ok() calls.

  Note: the fiemap stuff was removed from the series, since they are
  duplicates with part of ext4 series carried in Ted's tree"

* 'uaccess.access_ok' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  vmci_host: get rid of pointless access_ok()
  hfi1: get rid of pointless access_ok()
  usb: get rid of pointless access_ok() calls
  lpfc_debugfs: get rid of pointless access_ok()
  efi_test: get rid of pointless access_ok()
  drm_read(): get rid of pointless access_ok()
  via-pmu: don't bother with access_ok()
  drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c: get rid of pointless access_ok()
  omapfb: get rid of pointless access_ok() calls
  amifb: get rid of pointless access_ok() calls
  drivers/fpga/dfl-afu-dma-region.c: get rid of pointless access_ok()
  drivers/fpga/dfl-fme-pr.c: get rid of pointless access_ok()
  cm4000_cs.c cmm_ioctl(): get rid of pointless access_ok()
  nvram: drop useless access_ok()
  n_hdlc_tty_read(): remove pointless access_ok()
  tomoyo_write_control(): get rid of pointless access_ok()
  btrfs_ioctl_send(): don't bother with access_ok()
  fat_dir_ioctl(): hadn't needed that access_ok() for more than a decade...
  dlmfs_file_write(): get rid of pointless access_ok()
2020-06-01 16:09:43 -07:00
Anders Roxell
6d6861d45e security: apparmor: default KUNIT_* fragments to KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
This makes it easier to enable all KUnit fragments.

Adding 'if !KUNIT_ALL_TESTS' so individual tests can not be turned off.
Therefore if KUNIT_ALL_TESTS is enabled that will hide the prompt in
menuconfig.

Reviewed-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-01 14:25:15 -06:00
Linus Torvalds
a7092c8204 Kernel side changes:
- Add AMD Fam17h RAPL support
   - Introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space
   - Add Zhaoxin CPU support
   - Misc fixes and cleanups
 
 Tooling changes:
 
   perf record:
 
     - Introduce --switch-output-event to use arbitrary events to be setup
       and read from a side band thread and, when they take place a signal
       be sent to the main 'perf record' thread, reusing the --switch-output
       code to take perf.data snapshots from the --overwrite ring buffer, e.g.:
 
 	# perf record --overwrite -e sched:* \
 		      --switch-output-event syscalls:*connect* \
 		      workload
 
       will take perf.data.YYYYMMDDHHMMSS snapshots up to around the
       connect syscalls.
 
     - Add --num-synthesize-threads option to control degree of parallelism of the
       synthesize_mmap() code which is scanning /proc/PID/task/PID/maps and can be
       time consuming. This mimics pre-existing behaviour in 'perf top'.
 
   perf bench:
 
     - Add a multi-threaded synthesize benchmark.
     - Add kallsyms parsing benchmark.
 
   Intel PT support:
 
     - Stitch LBR records from multiple samples to get deeper backtraces,
       there are caveats, see the csets for details.
     - Allow using Intel PT to synthesize callchains for regular events.
     - Add support for synthesizing branch stacks for regular events (cycles,
       instructions, etc) from Intel PT data.
 
   Misc changes:
 
     - Updated perf vendor events for power9 and Coresight.
     - Add flamegraph.py script via 'perf flamegraph'
     - Misc other changes, fixes and cleanups - see the Git log for details.
 
 Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJFBAABCgAvFiEEBpT5eoXrXCwVQwEKEnMQ0APhK1gFAl7VJAcRHG1pbmdvQGtl
 cm5lbC5vcmcACgkQEnMQ0APhK1hAYw/8DFtzGkMaaWkrDSj62LXtWQiqr1l01ZFt
 9GzV4aN4/go+K4BQtsQN8cUjOkRHFnOryLuD9LfSBfqsdjuiyTynV/cJkeUGQBck
 TT/GgWf3XKJzTUBRQRk367Gbqs9UKwBP8CdFhOXcNzGEQpjhbwwIDPmem94U4L1N
 XLsysgC45ejWL1kMTZKmk6hDIidlFeDg9j70WDPX1nNfCeisk25rxwTpdgvjsjcj
 3RzPRt2EGS+IkuF4QSCT5leYSGaCpVDHCQrVpHj57UoADfWAyC71uopTLG4OgYSx
 PVd9gvloMeeqWmroirIxM67rMd/TBTfVekNolhnQDjqp60Huxm+gGUYmhsyjNqdx
 Pb8HRZCBAudei9Ue4jNMfhCRK2Ug1oL5wNvN1xcSteAqrwMlwBMGHWns6l12x0ks
 BxYhyLvfREvnKijXc1o8D5paRgqohJgfnHlrUZeacyaw5hQCbiVRpwg0T1mWAF53
 u9hfWLY0Oy+Qs2C7EInNsWSYXRw8oPQNTFVx2I968GZqsEn4DC6Pt3ovWrDKIDnz
 ugoZJQkJ3/O8stYSMiyENehdWlo575NkapCTDwhLWnYztrw4skqqHE8ighU/e8ug
 o/Kx7ANWN9OjjjQpq2GVUeT0jCaFO+OMiGMNEkKoniYgYjogt3Gw5PeedBMtY07p
 OcWTiQZamjU=
 =i27M
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'perf-core-2020-06-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull perf updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "Kernel side changes:

   - Add AMD Fam17h RAPL support

   - Introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space

   - Add Zhaoxin CPU support

   - Misc fixes and cleanups

  Tooling changes:

   - perf record:

     Introduce '--switch-output-event' to use arbitrary events to be
     setup and read from a side band thread and, when they take place a
     signal be sent to the main 'perf record' thread, reusing the core
     for '--switch-output' to take perf.data snapshots from the ring
     buffer used for '--overwrite', e.g.:

	# perf record --overwrite -e sched:* \
		      --switch-output-event syscalls:*connect* \
		      workload

     will take perf.data.YYYYMMDDHHMMSS snapshots up to around the
     connect syscalls.

     Add '--num-synthesize-threads' option to control degree of
     parallelism of the synthesize_mmap() code which is scanning
     /proc/PID/task/PID/maps and can be time consuming. This mimics
     pre-existing behaviour in 'perf top'.

   - perf bench:

     Add a multi-threaded synthesize benchmark and kallsyms parsing
     benchmark.

   - Intel PT support:

     Stitch LBR records from multiple samples to get deeper backtraces,
     there are caveats, see the csets for details.

     Allow using Intel PT to synthesize callchains for regular events.

     Add support for synthesizing branch stacks for regular events
     (cycles, instructions, etc) from Intel PT data.

  Misc changes:

   - Updated perf vendor events for power9 and Coresight.

   - Add flamegraph.py script via 'perf flamegraph'

   - Misc other changes, fixes and cleanups - see the Git log for details

  Also, since over the last couple of years perf tooling has matured and
  decoupled from the kernel perf changes to a large degree, going
  forward Arnaldo is going to send perf tooling changes via direct pull
  requests"

* tag 'perf-core-2020-06-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (163 commits)
  perf/x86/rapl: Add AMD Fam17h RAPL support
  perf/x86/rapl: Make perf_probe_msr() more robust and flexible
  perf/x86/rapl: Flip logic on default events visibility
  perf/x86/rapl: Refactor to share the RAPL code between Intel and AMD CPUs
  perf/x86/rapl: Move RAPL support to common x86 code
  perf/core: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array
  perf/x86: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array
  perf/x86/intel: Add more available bits for OFFCORE_RESPONSE of Intel Tremont
  perf/x86/rapl: Add Ice Lake RAPL support
  perf flamegraph: Use /bin/bash for report and record scripts
  perf cs-etm: Move definition of 'traceid_list' global variable from header file
  libsymbols kallsyms: Move hex2u64 out of header
  libsymbols kallsyms: Parse using io api
  perf bench: Add kallsyms parsing
  perf: cs-etm: Update to build with latest opencsd version.
  perf symbol: Fix kernel symbol address display
  perf inject: Rename perf_evsel__*() operating on 'struct evsel *' to evsel__*()
  perf annotate: Rename perf_evsel__*() operating on 'struct evsel *' to evsel__*()
  perf trace: Rename perf_evsel__*() operating on 'struct evsel *' to evsel__*()
  perf script: Rename perf_evsel__*() operating on 'struct evsel *' to evsel__*()
  ...
2020-06-01 13:23:59 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
81e8c10dac Merge branch 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
 "API:
   - Introduce crypto_shash_tfm_digest() and use it wherever possible.
   - Fix use-after-free and race in crypto_spawn_alg.
   - Add support for parallel and batch requests to crypto_engine.

  Algorithms:
   - Update jitter RNG for SP800-90B compliance.
   - Always use jitter RNG as seed in drbg.

  Drivers:
   - Add Arm CryptoCell driver cctrng.
   - Add support for SEV-ES to the PSP driver in ccp"

* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (114 commits)
  crypto: hisilicon - fix driver compatibility issue with different versions of devices
  crypto: engine - do not requeue in case of fatal error
  crypto: cavium/nitrox - Fix a typo in a comment
  crypto: hisilicon/qm - change debugfs file name from qm_regs to regs
  crypto: hisilicon/qm - add DebugFS for xQC and xQE dump
  crypto: hisilicon/zip - add debugfs for Hisilicon ZIP
  crypto: hisilicon/hpre - add debugfs for Hisilicon HPRE
  crypto: hisilicon/sec2 - add debugfs for Hisilicon SEC
  crypto: hisilicon/qm - add debugfs to the QM state machine
  crypto: hisilicon/qm - add debugfs for QM
  crypto: stm32/crc32 - protect from concurrent accesses
  crypto: stm32/crc32 - don't sleep in runtime pm
  crypto: stm32/crc32 - fix multi-instance
  crypto: stm32/crc32 - fix run-time self test issue.
  crypto: stm32/crc32 - fix ext4 chksum BUG_ON()
  crypto: hisilicon/zip - Use temporary sqe when doing work
  crypto: hisilicon - add device error report through abnormal irq
  crypto: hisilicon - remove codes of directly report device errors through MSI
  crypto: hisilicon - QM memory management optimization
  crypto: hisilicon - unify initial value assignment into QM
  ...
2020-06-01 12:00:10 -07:00
David S. Miller
1806c13dc2 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
xdp_umem.c had overlapping changes between the 64-bit math fix
for the calculation of npgs and the removal of the zerocopy
memory type which got rid of the chunk_size_nohdr member.

The mlx5 Kconfig conflict is a case where we just take the
net-next copy of the Kconfig entry dependency as it takes on
the ESWITCH dependency by one level of indirection which is
what the 'net' conflicting change is trying to ensure.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-05-31 17:48:46 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman
56305aa9b6 exec: Compute file based creds only once
Move the computation of creds from prepare_binfmt into begin_new_exec
so that the creds need only be computed once.  This is just code
reorganization no semantic changes of any kind are made.

Moving the computation is safe.  I have looked through the kernel and
verified none of the binfmts look at bprm->cred directly, and that
there are no helpers that look at bprm->cred indirectly.  Which means
that it is not a problem to compute the bprm->cred later in the
execution flow as it is not used until it becomes current->cred.

A new function bprm_creds_from_file is added to contain the work that
needs to be done.  bprm_creds_from_file first computes which file
bprm->executable or most likely bprm->file that the bprm->creds
will be computed from.

The funciton bprm_fill_uid is updated to receive the file instead of
accessing bprm->file.  The now unnecessary work needed to reset the
bprm->cred->euid, and bprm->cred->egid is removed from brpm_fill_uid.
A small comment to document that bprm_fill_uid now only deals with the
work to handle suid and sgid files.  The default case is already
heandled by prepare_exec_creds.

The function security_bprm_repopulate_creds is renamed
security_bprm_creds_from_file and now is explicitly passed the file
from which to compute the creds.  The documentation of the
bprm_creds_from_file security hook is updated to explain when the hook
is called and what it needs to do.  The file is passed from
cap_bprm_creds_from_file into get_file_caps so that the caps are
computed for the appropriate file.  The now unnecessary work in
cap_bprm_creds_from_file to reset the ambient capabilites has been
removed.  A small comment to document that the work of
cap_bprm_creds_from_file is to read capabilities from the files
secureity attribute and derive capabilities from the fact the
user had uid 0 has been added.

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2020-05-29 22:00:54 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman
a7868323c2 exec: Add a per bprm->file version of per_clear
There is a small bug in the code that recomputes parts of bprm->cred
for every bprm->file.  The code never recomputes the part of
clear_dangerous_personality_flags it is responsible for.

Which means that in practice if someone creates a sgid script
the interpreter will not be able to use any of:
	READ_IMPLIES_EXEC
	ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE
	ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT
	MMAP_PAGE_ZERO.

This accentially clearing of personality flags probably does
not matter in practice because no one has complained
but it does make the code more difficult to understand.

Further remaining bug compatible prevents the recomputation from being
removed and replaced by simply computing bprm->cred once from the
final bprm->file.

Making this change removes the last behavior difference between
computing bprm->creds from the final file and recomputing
bprm->cred several times.  Which allows this behavior change
to be justified for it's own reasons, and for any but hunts
looking into why the behavior changed to wind up here instead
of in the code that will follow that computes bprm->cred
from the final bprm->file.

This small logic bug appears to have existed since the code
started clearing dangerous personality bits.

History Tree: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
Fixes: 1bb0fa189c6a ("[PATCH] NX: clean up legacy binary support")
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2020-05-29 21:06:48 -05:00
Al Viro
00fca6b53a tomoyo_write_control(): get rid of pointless access_ok()
address is passed only to get_user()

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-05-29 11:02:29 -04:00
Ingo Molnar
0bffedbce9 Linux 5.7-rc7
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQFSBAABCAA8FiEEq68RxlopcLEwq+PEeb4+QwBBGIYFAl7K9iEeHHRvcnZhbGRz
 QGxpbnV4LWZvdW5kYXRpb24ub3JnAAoJEHm+PkMAQRiGzTAH/0ifZEG4BQ8x/WlB
 8YLSLE6QQTSXYi25nyExuJbFkkKY5Tik8M2HD/36xwY/HnZOlH9jH6m0ntqZxpaA
 3EU9lr1ct79nCBMYhiJssvz8d9AOZXlyogFW9y2y9pmPjlmUtseZ7yGh1xD465cj
 B5Ty2w2W34cs7zF3og2xn5agOJMtWWXLXZ5mRa9EOquKC5zeYyRicmd0T+plYQD6
 hbRYmxFfDfppVnBCBARPNN0+NU5JJD94H+8bOuf1tl48XNrLiZMOicmtohKNQ6+W
 rZNpJNEGEp7KMtqWH0Nl3hmy3yfZHMwe1DXM/AZDqR7jTHZY4mZ0GEpLyfI9AU4n
 34jVHwU=
 =SmJ9
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'v5.7-rc7' into perf/core, to pick up fixes

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2020-05-28 07:58:12 +02:00
Eric W. Biederman
e32f887901 Merge commit a4ae32c71f ("exec: Always set cap_ambient in cap_bprm_set_creds")
This is a bug fix and one of two places where I have found that the
result of calling security_bprm_repopulate_creds more than once on
different bprm->files depends on all of the bprm->files not just the
file bprm->file.

I intend to fix both of those cases and then modify the code to
only call security_bprm_repopulate_creds on the final bprm file.

So merge this change in so I hopefully reduce conflicts for others
and I make it possible to build on top of this change.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2020-05-27 22:37:33 -05:00
Linus Torvalds
3301f6ae2d Merge branch 'for-5.7-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup
Pull cgroup fixes from Tejun Heo:

 - Reverted stricter synchronization for cgroup recursive stats which
   was prepping it for event counter usage which never got merged. The
   change was causing performation regressions in some cases.

 - Restore bpf-based device-cgroup operation even when cgroup1 device
   cgroup is disabled.

 - An out-param init fix.

* 'for-5.7-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
  device_cgroup: Cleanup cgroup eBPF device filter code
  xattr: fix uninitialized out-param
  Revert "cgroup: Add memory barriers to plug cgroup_rstat_updated() race window"
2020-05-27 10:58:19 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
006f38a1c3 Merge branch 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull execve fix from Eric Biederman:
 "While working on my exec cleanups I found a bug in exec that winds up
  miscomputing the ambient credentials during exec. Andy appears to have
  to been confused as to why credentials are computed for both the
  script and the interpreter

  From the original patch description:

   [3] Linux very confusingly processes both the script and the
       interpreter if applicable, for reasons that elude me. The results
       from thinking about a script's file capabilities and/or setuid
       bits are mostly discarded.

  The only value in struct cred that gets changed in cap_bprm_set_creds
  that I could find that might persist between the script and the
  interpreter was cap_ambient. Which is fixed with this trivial change"

* 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  exec: Always set cap_ambient in cap_bprm_set_creds
2020-05-27 09:53:25 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman
a4ae32c71f exec: Always set cap_ambient in cap_bprm_set_creds
An invariant of cap_bprm_set_creds is that every field in the new cred
structure that cap_bprm_set_creds might set, needs to be set every
time to ensure the fields does not get a stale value.

The field cap_ambient is not set every time cap_bprm_set_creds is
called, which means that if there is a suid or sgid script with an
interpreter that has neither the suid nor the sgid bits set the
interpreter should be able to accept ambient credentials.
Unfortuantely because cap_ambient is not reset to it's original value
the interpreter can not accept ambient credentials.

Given that the ambient capability set is expected to be controlled by
the caller, I don't think this is particularly serious.  But it is
definitely worth fixing so the code works correctly.

I have tested to verify my reading of the code is correct and the
interpreter of a sgid can receive ambient capabilities with this
change and cannot receive ambient capabilities without this change.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Fixes: 58319057b7 ("capabilities: ambient capabilities")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2020-05-26 13:11:00 -05:00
David S. Miller
13209a8f73 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
The MSCC bug fix in 'net' had to be slightly adjusted because the
register accesses are done slightly differently in net-next.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-05-24 13:47:27 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
caffb99b69 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:

 1) Fix RCU warnings in ipv6 multicast router code, from Madhuparna
    Bhowmik.

 2) Nexthop attributes aren't being checked properly because of
    mis-initialized iterator, from David Ahern.

 3) Revert iop_idents_reserve() change as it caused performance
    regressions and was just working around what is really a UBSAN bug
    in the compiler. From Yuqi Jin.

 4) Read MAC address properly from ROM in bmac driver (double iteration
    proceeds past end of address array), from Jeremy Kerr.

 5) Add Microsoft Surface device IDs to r8152, from Marc Payne.

 6) Prevent reference to freed SKB in __netif_receive_skb_core(), from
    Boris Sukholitko.

 7) Fix ACK discard behavior in rxrpc, from David Howells.

 8) Preserve flow hash across packet scrubbing in wireguard, from Jason
    A. Donenfeld.

 9) Cap option length properly for SO_BINDTODEVICE in AX25, from Eric
    Dumazet.

10) Fix encryption error checking in kTLS code, from Vadim Fedorenko.

11) Missing BPF prog ref release in flow dissector, from Jakub Sitnicki.

12) dst_cache must be used with BH disabled in tipc, from Eric Dumazet.

13) Fix use after free in mlxsw driver, from Jiri Pirko.

14) Order kTLS key destruction properly in mlx5 driver, from Tariq
    Toukan.

15) Check devm_platform_ioremap_resource() return value properly in
    several drivers, from Tiezhu Yang.

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (71 commits)
  net: smsc911x: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error
  net/mlx4_core: fix a memory leak bug.
  net: ethernet: ti: cpsw: fix ASSERT_RTNL() warning during suspend
  net: phy: mscc: fix initialization of the MACsec protocol mode
  net: stmmac: don't attach interface until resume finishes
  net: Fix return value about devm_platform_ioremap_resource()
  net/mlx5: Fix error flow in case of function_setup failure
  net/mlx5e: CT: Correctly get flow rule
  net/mlx5e: Update netdev txq on completions during closure
  net/mlx5: Annotate mutex destroy for root ns
  net/mlx5: Don't maintain a case of del_sw_func being null
  net/mlx5: Fix cleaning unmanaged flow tables
  net/mlx5: Fix memory leak in mlx5_events_init
  net/mlx5e: Fix inner tirs handling
  net/mlx5e: kTLS, Destroy key object after destroying the TIS
  net/mlx5e: Fix allowed tc redirect merged eswitch offload cases
  net/mlx5: Avoid processing commands before cmdif is ready
  net/mlx5: Fix a race when moving command interface to events mode
  net/mlx5: Add command entry handling completion
  rxrpc: Fix a memory leak in rxkad_verify_response()
  ...
2020-05-23 17:16:18 -07:00
Mimi Zohar
8eb613c0b8 ima: verify mprotect change is consistent with mmap policy
Files can be mmap'ed read/write and later changed to execute to circumvent
IMA's mmap appraise policy rules.  Due to locking issues (mmap semaphore
would be taken prior to i_mutex), files can not be measured or appraised at
this point.  Eliminate this integrity gap, by denying the mprotect
PROT_EXECUTE change, if an mmap appraise policy rule exists.

On mprotect change success, return 0.  On failure, return -EACESS.

Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-05-22 14:41:04 -04:00
Navid Emamdoost
c54d481d71 apparmor: Fix use-after-free in aa_audit_rule_init
In the implementation of aa_audit_rule_init(), when aa_label_parse()
fails the allocated memory for rule is released using
aa_audit_rule_free(). But after this release, the return statement
tries to access the label field of the rule which results in
use-after-free. Before releasing the rule, copy errNo and return it
after release.

Fixes: 52e8c38001 ("apparmor: Fix memory leak of rule on error exit path")
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-05-21 15:25:51 -07:00
Xiyu Yang
c6b39f0707 apparmor: Fix aa_label refcnt leak in policy_update
policy_update() invokes begin_current_label_crit_section(), which
returns a reference of the updated aa_label object to "label" with
increased refcount.

When policy_update() returns, "label" becomes invalid, so the refcount
should be decreased to keep refcount balanced.

The reference counting issue happens in one exception handling path of
policy_update(). When aa_may_manage_policy() returns not NULL, the
refcnt increased by begin_current_label_crit_section() is not decreased,
causing a refcnt leak.

Fix this issue by jumping to "end_section" label when
aa_may_manage_policy() returns not NULL.

Fixes: 5ac8c355ae ("apparmor: allow introspecting the loaded policy pre internal transform")
Signed-off-by: Xiyu Yang <xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Xin Tan <tanxin.ctf@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-05-21 15:25:51 -07:00
Xiyu Yang
a0b845ffa0 apparmor: fix potential label refcnt leak in aa_change_profile
aa_change_profile() invokes aa_get_current_label(), which returns
a reference of the current task's label.

According to the comment of aa_get_current_label(), the returned
reference must be put with aa_put_label().
However, when the original object pointed by "label" becomes
unreachable because aa_change_profile() returns or a new object
is assigned to "label", reference count increased by
aa_get_current_label() is not decreased, causing a refcnt leak.

Fix this by calling aa_put_label() before aa_change_profile() return
and dropping unnecessary aa_get_current_label().

Fixes: 9fcf78cca1 ("apparmor: update domain transitions that are subsets of confinement at nnp")
Signed-off-by: Xiyu Yang <xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Xin Tan <tanxin.ctf@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-05-21 15:25:51 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman
112b714759 exec: Convert security_bprm_set_creds into security_bprm_repopulate_creds
Rename bprm->cap_elevated to bprm->active_secureexec and initialize it
in prepare_binprm instead of in cap_bprm_set_creds.  Initializing
bprm->active_secureexec in prepare_binprm allows multiple
implementations of security_bprm_repopulate_creds to play nicely with
each other.

Rename security_bprm_set_creds to security_bprm_reopulate_creds to
emphasize that this path recomputes part of bprm->cred.  This
recomputation avoids the time of check vs time of use problems that
are inherent in unix #! interpreters.

In short two renames and a move in the location of initializing
bprm->active_secureexec.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87o8qkzrxp.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2020-05-21 10:16:50 -05:00
KP Singh
0550cfe8c2 security: Fix hook iteration for secid_to_secctx
secid_to_secctx is not stackable, and since the BPF LSM registers this
hook by default, the call_int_hook logic is not suitable which
"bails-on-fail" and casues issues when other LSMs register this hook and
eventually breaks Audit.

In order to fix this, directly iterate over the security hooks instead
of using call_int_hook as suggested in:

https: //lore.kernel.org/bpf/9d0eb6c6-803a-ff3a-5603-9ad6d9edfc00@schaufler-ca.com/#t

Fixes: 98e828a065 ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks")
Fixes: 625236ba38 ("security: Fix the default value of secid_to_secctx hook")
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200520125616.193765-1-kpsingh@chromium.org
2020-05-20 20:12:07 -07:00
Eric W. Biederman
b8bff59926 exec: Factor security_bprm_creds_for_exec out of security_bprm_set_creds
Today security_bprm_set_creds has several implementations:
apparmor_bprm_set_creds, cap_bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds,
smack_bprm_set_creds, and tomoyo_bprm_set_creds.

Except for cap_bprm_set_creds they all test bprm->called_set_creds and
return immediately if it is true.  The function cap_bprm_set_creds
ignores bprm->calld_sed_creds entirely.

Create a new LSM hook security_bprm_creds_for_exec that is called just
before prepare_binprm in __do_execve_file, resulting in a LSM hook
that is called exactly once for the entire of exec.  Modify the bits
of security_bprm_set_creds that only want to be called once per exec
into security_bprm_creds_for_exec, leaving only cap_bprm_set_creds
behind.

Remove bprm->called_set_creds all of it's former users have been moved
to security_bprm_creds_for_exec.

Add or upate comments a appropriate to bring them up to date and
to reflect this change.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87v9kszrzh.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> # For the LSM and Smack bits
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2020-05-20 14:45:31 -05:00
David Howells
a8478a6029 smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks
Implement the watch_key security hook in Smack to make sure that a key
grants the caller Read permission in order to set a watch on a key.

Also implement the post_notification security hook to make sure that the
notification source is granted Write permission by the watch queue.

For the moment, the watch_devices security hook is left unimplemented as
it's not obvious what the object should be since the queue is global and
didn't previously exist.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-05-19 15:47:38 +01:00
David Howells
3e412ccc22 selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook
Implement the watch_key security hook to make sure that a key grants the
caller View permission in order to set a watch on a key.

For the moment, the watch_devices security hook is left unimplemented as
it's not obvious what the object should be since the queue is global and
didn't previously exist.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2020-05-19 15:47:15 +01:00
David Howells
8c0637e950 keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask
Since the meaning of combining the KEY_NEED_* constants is undefined, make
it so that you can't do that by turning them into an enum.

The enum is also given some extra values to represent special
circumstances, such as:

 (1) The '0' value is reserved and causes a warning to trap the parameter
     being unset.

 (2) The key is to be unlinked and we require no permissions on it, only
     the keyring, (this replaces the KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK flag).

 (3) An override due to CAP_SYS_ADMIN.

 (4) An override due to an instantiation token being present.

 (5) The permissions check is being deferred to later key_permission()
     calls.

The extra values give the opportunity for LSMs to audit these situations.

[Note: This really needs overhauling so that lookup_user_key() tells
 key_task_permission() and the LSM what operation is being done and leaves
 it to those functions to decide how to map that onto the available
 permits.  However, I don't really want to make these change in the middle
 of the notifications patchset.]

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
2020-05-19 15:42:22 +01:00
David Howells
f7e47677e3 watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility
Add a key/keyring change notification facility whereby notifications about
changes in key and keyring content and attributes can be received.

Firstly, an event queue needs to be created:

	pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE);
	ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, 256);

then a notification can be set up to report notifications via that queue:

	struct watch_notification_filter filter = {
		.nr_filters = 1,
		.filters = {
			[0] = {
				.type = WATCH_TYPE_KEY_NOTIFY,
				.subtype_filter[0] = UINT_MAX,
			},
		},
	};
	ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, &filter);
	keyctl_watch_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, fds[1], 0x01);

After that, records will be placed into the queue when events occur in
which keys are changed in some way.  Records are of the following format:

	struct key_notification {
		struct watch_notification watch;
		__u32	key_id;
		__u32	aux;
	} *n;

Where:

	n->watch.type will be WATCH_TYPE_KEY_NOTIFY.

	n->watch.subtype will indicate the type of event, such as
	NOTIFY_KEY_REVOKED.

	n->watch.info & WATCH_INFO_LENGTH will indicate the length of the
	record.

	n->watch.info & WATCH_INFO_ID will be the second argument to
	keyctl_watch_key(), shifted.

	n->key will be the ID of the affected key.

	n->aux will hold subtype-dependent information, such as the key
	being linked into the keyring specified by n->key in the case of
	NOTIFY_KEY_LINKED.

Note that it is permissible for event records to be of variable length -
or, at least, the length may be dependent on the subtype.  Note also that
the queue can be shared between multiple notifications of various types.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2020-05-19 15:19:06 +01:00
David Howells
998f50407f security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch
Add security hooks that will allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a watch
may be set.  More than one hook is required as the watches watch different
types of object.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
2020-05-19 15:16:08 +01:00
David Howells
344fa64ef8 security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion
Add a security hook that allows an LSM to rule on whether a notification
message is allowed to be inserted into a particular watch queue.

The hook is given the following information:

 (1) The credentials of the triggerer (which may be init_cred for a system
     notification, eg. a hardware error).

 (2) The credentials of the whoever set the watch.

 (3) The notification message.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
2020-05-19 15:08:23 +01:00
Alexey Gladkov
9d78edeaec proc: proc_pid_ns takes super_block as an argument
syzbot found that

  touch /proc/testfile

causes NULL pointer dereference at tomoyo_get_local_path()
because inode of the dentry is NULL.

Before c59f415a7c, Tomoyo received pid_ns from proc's s_fs_info
directly. Since proc_pid_ns() can only work with inode, using it in
the tomoyo_get_local_path() was wrong.

To avoid creating more functions for getting proc_ns, change the
argument type of the proc_pid_ns() function. Then, Tomoyo can use
the existing super_block to get pid_ns.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0000000000002f0c7505a5b0e04c@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200518180738.2939611-1-gladkov.alexey@gmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+c1af344512918c61362c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: c59f415a7c ("Use proc_pid_ns() to get pid_namespace from the proc superblock")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2020-05-19 07:07:50 -05:00
Linus Torvalds
642b151f45 Merge branch 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity fixes from Mimi Zohar:
 "A couple of miscellaneous bug fixes for the integrity subsystem:

  IMA:

   - Properly modify the open flags in order to calculate the file hash.

   - On systems requiring the IMA policy to be signed, the policy is
     loaded differently. Don't differentiate between "enforce" and
     either "log" or "fix" modes how the policy is loaded.

  EVM:

   - Two patches to fix an EVM race condition, normally the result of
     attempting to load an unsupported hash algorithm.

   - Use the lockless RCU version for walking an append only list"

* 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  evm: Fix a small race in init_desc()
  evm: Fix RCU list related warnings
  ima: Fix return value of ima_write_policy()
  evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()
  ima: Set file->f_mode instead of file->f_flags in ima_calc_file_hash()
2020-05-18 11:29:21 -07:00
Zou Wei
e37986097b apparmor: Use true and false for bool variable
Fixes coccicheck warnings:

security/apparmor/file.c:162:9-10: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'is_deleted' with return type bool
security/apparmor/file.c:362:9-10: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'xindex_is_subset' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:246:9-10: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'unpack_X' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:292:9-10: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'unpack_nameX' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:646:8-9: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'unpack_rlimits' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:604:8-9: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'unpack_secmark' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:538:8-9: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'unpack_trans_table' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:327:9-10: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'unpack_u32' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:345:9-10: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'unpack_u64' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:309:9-10: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'unpack_u8' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:568:8-9: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'unpack_xattrs' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:1007:10-11: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'verify_dfa_xindex' with return type bool
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:997:9-10: WARNING: return of 0/1 in function 'verify_xindex' with return type bool

Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zou Wei <zou_wei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-05-15 14:26:33 -07:00
Mateusz Nosek
c84b80cd41 security/apparmor/label.c: Clean code by removing redundant instructions
Previously 'label->proxy->label' value checking
and conditional reassigning were done twice in the same function.
The second one is redundant and can be removed.

Signed-off-by: Mateusz Nosek <mateusznosek0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-05-15 14:22:40 -07:00
Gustavo A. R. Silva
fe9fd23e3b apparmor: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array
The current codebase makes use of the zero-length array language
extension to the C90 standard, but the preferred mechanism to declare
variable-length types such as these ones is a flexible array member[1][2],
introduced in C99:

struct foo {
        int stuff;
        struct boo array[];
};

By making use of the mechanism above, we will get a compiler warning
in case the flexible array does not occur last in the structure, which
will help us prevent some kind of undefined behavior bugs from being
inadvertently introduced[3] to the codebase from now on.

Also, notice that, dynamic memory allocations won't be affected by
this change:

"Flexible array members have incomplete type, and so the sizeof operator
may not be applied. As a quirk of the original implementation of
zero-length arrays, sizeof evaluates to zero."[1]

sizeof(flexible-array-member) triggers a warning because flexible array
members have incomplete type[1]. There are some instances of code in
which the sizeof operator is being incorrectly/erroneously applied to
zero-length arrays and the result is zero. Such instances may be hiding
some bugs. So, this work (flexible-array member conversions) will also
help to get completely rid of those sorts of issues.

This issue was found with the help of Coccinelle.

[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Zero-Length.html
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21
[3] commit 7649773293 ("cxgb3/l2t: Fix undefined behaviour")

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-05-15 13:04:55 -07:00
Alexei Starovoitov
a17b53c4a4 bpf, capability: Introduce CAP_BPF
Split BPF operations that are allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN into
combination of CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN.
For backward compatibility include them in CAP_SYS_ADMIN as well.

The end result provides simple safety model for applications that use BPF:
- to load tracing program types
  BPF_PROG_TYPE_{KPROBE, TRACEPOINT, PERF_EVENT, RAW_TRACEPOINT, etc}
  use CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON
- to load networking program types
  BPF_PROG_TYPE_{SCHED_CLS, XDP, SK_SKB, etc}
  use CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN

There are few exceptions from this rule:
- bpf_trace_printk() is allowed in networking programs, but it's using
  tracing mechanism, hence this helper needs additional CAP_PERFMON
  if networking program is using this helper.
- BPF_F_ZERO_SEED flag for hash/lru map is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only
  to discourage production use.
- BPF HW offload is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
- bpf_probe_write_user() is allowed under CAP_SYS_ADMIN only.

CAPs are not checked at attach/detach time with two exceptions:
- loading BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB is allowed for unprivileged users,
  hence CAP_NET_ADMIN is required at attach time.
- flow_dissector detach doesn't check prog FD at detach,
  hence CAP_NET_ADMIN is required at detach time.

CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to iterate BPF objects (progs, maps, links) via get_next_id
command and convert them to file descriptor via GET_FD_BY_ID command.
This restriction guarantees that mutliple tasks with CAP_BPF are not able to
affect each other. That leads to clean isolation of tasks. For example:
task A with CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN loads and attaches a firewall via bpf_link.
task B with the same capabilities cannot detach that firewall unless
task A explicitly passed link FD to task B via scm_rights or bpffs.
CAP_SYS_ADMIN can still detach/unload everything.

Two networking user apps with CAP_SYS_ADMIN and CAP_NET_ADMIN can
accidentely mess with each other programs and maps.
Two networking user apps with CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_BPF cannot affect each other.

CAP_NET_ADMIN + CAP_BPF allows networking programs access only packet data.
Such networking progs cannot access arbitrary kernel memory or leak pointers.

bpftool, bpftrace, bcc tools binaries should NOT be installed with
CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON, since unpriv users will be able to read kernel secrets.
But users with these two permissions will be able to use these tracing tools.

CAP_PERFMON is least secure, since it allows kprobes and kernel memory access.
CAP_NET_ADMIN can stop network traffic via iproute2.
CAP_BPF is the safest from security point of view and harmless on its own.

Having CAP_BPF and/or CAP_NET_ADMIN is not enough to write into arbitrary map
and if that map is used by firewall-like bpf prog.
CAP_BPF allows many bpf prog_load commands in parallel. The verifier
may consume large amount of memory and significantly slow down the system.

Existing unprivileged BPF operations are not affected.
In particular unprivileged users are allowed to load socket_filter and cg_skb
program types and to create array, hash, prog_array, map-in-map map types.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200513230355.7858-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
2020-05-15 17:29:41 +02:00
David S. Miller
d00f26b623 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Alexei Starovoitov says:

====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2020-05-14

The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.

The main changes are:

1) Merged tag 'perf-for-bpf-2020-05-06' from tip tree that includes CAP_PERFMON.

2) support for narrow loads in bpf_sock_addr progs and additional
   helpers in cg-skb progs, from Andrey.

3) bpf benchmark runner, from Andrii.

4) arm and riscv JIT optimizations, from Luke.

5) bpf iterator infrastructure, from Yonghong.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-05-14 20:31:21 -07:00
Dan Carpenter
8433856947 evm: Fix a small race in init_desc()
The IS_ERR_OR_NULL() function has two conditions and if we got really
unlucky we could hit a race where "ptr" started as an error pointer and
then was set to NULL.  Both conditions would be false even though the
pointer at the end was NULL.

This patch fixes the problem by ensuring that "*tfm" can only be NULL
or valid.  I have introduced a "tmp_tfm" variable to make that work.  I
also reversed a condition and pulled the code in one tab.

Reported-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Fixes: 53de3b080d ("evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-05-14 19:55:54 -04:00
Jeremy Cline
60cf7c5ed5 lockdown: Allow unprivileged users to see lockdown status
A number of userspace tools, such as systemtap, need a way to see the
current lockdown state so they can gracefully deal with the kernel being
locked down. The state is already exposed in
/sys/kernel/security/lockdown, but is only readable by root. Adjust the
permissions so unprivileged users can read the state.

Fixes: 000d388ed3 ("security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM")
Cc: Frank Ch. Eigler <fche@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2020-05-14 10:23:05 -07:00
YueHaibing
fe5a90b8c1 selinux: netlabel: Remove unused inline function
There's no callers in-tree.

Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-05-12 20:16:33 -04:00
Zou Wei
27acbf41be tomoyo: use true for bool variable
Fixes coccicheck warning:

security/tomoyo/common.c:1028:2-13: WARNING: Assignment of 0/1 to bool variable

Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zou Wei <zou_wei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
2020-05-12 08:39:53 +09:00
YueHaibing
ef26650a20 Smack: Remove unused inline function smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt
commit a269434d2f ("LSM: separate LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY from LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH")
left behind this, remove it.

Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-05-11 10:25:37 -07:00
Eric Biggers
bce395eea0 KEYS: encrypted: use crypto_shash_tfm_digest()
Instead of manually allocating a 'struct shash_desc' on the stack and
calling crypto_shash_digest(), switch to using the new helper function
crypto_shash_tfm_digest() which does this for us.

Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-05-08 15:32:15 +10:00
Roberto Sassu
0c4395fb2a evm: Fix possible memory leak in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash()
Don't immediately return if the signature is portable and security.ima is
not present. Just set error so that memory allocated is freed before
returning from evm_calc_hmac_or_hash().

Fixes: 50b977481f ("EVM: Add support for portable signature format")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-05-07 23:36:25 -04:00
Krzysztof Struczynski
b59fda449c ima: Set again build_ima_appraise variable
After adding the new add_rule() function in commit c52657d93b
("ima: refactor ima_init_policy()"), all appraisal flags are added to the
temp_ima_appraise variable. Revert to the previous behavior instead of
removing build_ima_appraise, to benefit from the protection offered by
__ro_after_init.

The mentioned commit introduced a bug, as it makes all the flags
modifiable, while build_ima_appraise flags can be protected with
__ro_after_init.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0.x
Fixes: c52657d93b ("ima: refactor ima_init_policy()")
Co-developed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-05-07 22:54:09 -04:00
Krzysztof Struczynski
6ee28442a4 ima: Remove redundant policy rule set in add_rules()
Function ima_appraise_flag() returns the flag to be set in
temp_ima_appraise depending on the hook identifier passed as an argument.
It is not necessary to set the flag again for the POLICY_CHECK hook.

Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-05-07 22:54:08 -04:00
Krzysztof Struczynski
1129d31b55 ima: Fix ima digest hash table key calculation
Function hash_long() accepts unsigned long, while currently only one byte
is passed from ima_hash_key(), which calculates a key for ima_htable.

Given that hashing the digest does not give clear benefits compared to
using the digest itself, remove hash_long() and return the modulus
calculated on the first two bytes of the digest with the number of slots.
Also reduce the depth of the hash table by doubling the number of slots.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3323eec921 ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider")
Co-developed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Acked-by: David.Laight@aculab.com (big endian system concerns)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-05-07 22:54:07 -04:00
Madhuparna Bhowmik
770f60586d evm: Fix RCU list related warnings
This patch fixes the following warning and few other instances of
traversal of evm_config_xattrnames list:

[   32.848432] =============================
[   32.848707] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[   32.848966] 5.7.0-rc1-00006-ga8d5875ce5f0b #1 Not tainted
[   32.849308] -----------------------------
[   32.849567] security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c:231 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

Since entries are only added to the list and never deleted, use
list_for_each_entry_lockless() instead of list_for_each_entry_rcu for
traversing the list.  Also, add a relevant comment in evm_secfs.c to
indicate this fact.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik <madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> (RCU viewpoint)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-05-07 21:36:32 -04:00
Roberto Sassu
2e3a34e9f4 ima: Fix return value of ima_write_policy()
This patch fixes the return value of ima_write_policy() when a new policy
is directly passed to IMA and the current policy requires appraisal of the
file containing the policy. Currently, if appraisal is not in ENFORCE mode,
ima_write_policy() returns 0 and leads user space applications to an
endless loop. Fix this issue by denying the operation regardless of the
appraisal mode.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.10.x
Fixes: 19f8a84713 ("ima: measure and appraise the IMA policy itself")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-05-07 21:36:31 -04:00
Roberto Sassu
53de3b080d evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()
This patch avoids a kernel panic due to accessing an error pointer set by
crypto_alloc_shash(). It occurs especially when there are many files that
require an unsupported algorithm, as it would increase the likelihood of
the following race condition:

Task A: *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash() <= error pointer
Task B: if (*tfm == NULL) <= *tfm is not NULL, use it
Task B: rc = crypto_shash_init(desc) <= panic
Task A: *tfm = NULL

This patch uses the IS_ERR_OR_NULL macro to determine whether or not a new
crypto context must be created.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d46eb36995 ("evm: crypto hash replaced by shash")
Co-developed-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-05-07 21:30:58 -04:00
Roberto Sassu
0014cc04e8 ima: Set file->f_mode instead of file->f_flags in ima_calc_file_hash()
Commit a408e4a86b ("ima: open a new file instance if no read
permissions") tries to create a new file descriptor to calculate a file
digest if the file has not been opened with O_RDONLY flag. However, if a
new file descriptor cannot be obtained, it sets the FMODE_READ flag to
file->f_flags instead of file->f_mode.

This patch fixes this issue by replacing f_flags with f_mode as it was
before that commit.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.20.x
Fixes: a408e4a86b ("ima: open a new file instance if no read permissions")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-05-07 21:30:58 -04:00
David S. Miller
3793faad7b Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Conflicts were all overlapping changes.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-05-06 22:10:13 -07:00
Alexei Starovoitov
f87b87a1c9 CAP_PERFMON for BPF
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJHBAABCgAxFiEEQp8+kY+LLUocC4bMphj1TA10mKEFAl6zMIUTHHRnbHhAbGlu
 dXRyb25peC5kZQAKCRCmGPVMDXSYoTEOEACWUbZlswquZqSAr6pESTjAbjSPZ58s
 QfmiY218aXvyvwJeINfJduYIjtVjPL9F0qbqmm5Sh4CFflgF9QRUZLxsyuu6K7uY
 Bsy7hjHWUCO79anxgjie1rqhCxT/orW39E0nlDW72AlrebVwPRc4PmERsV9bl/9z
 Z7M7aJzza60938K8qN24A63Q4wb3uCfygUYDGkeaN46jmwlHLj8Qwu/L2pVv2/3O
 7FHEHYFK0UuvVw6byRpbPoHDbBEGApYszRlEUMRtkk/7zsvdIQJGHQpPMD5PkGY1
 kS6x1a7sdnA7++A7Oin7Uq+0y7sgVNeJyPO9o+u9wZgePZL4t87YZlwIL5NlyXIL
 JHDrz0DAckSYEAYuPnFrXtYW2AQ9TZxVuIHGsJdKW8KOdkHkYUqtXwLuj+0xf8v/
 szeJR+l6mOJzDHML7W7KzZdl+AJB/+GE55cLaRPs0bBFyLpUs/vL8BjkoDiDm3/i
 okGIWQkh8PwpujiS/mHDHqoXuVpVHYAcHD0X+zuLIUVCzKf71Kq7y2fIiHyTR4Wo
 +x5aeOFWHYOC2DwFdUQ1EiOUCtLbORqq1CDsnIE4KCtsfx1K6IHmqI8X77D8CTEp
 oSPz0kd8kgBfHwPhCepQ7DnBA1cJTiRbs6/++frU0S5R2HhIOGeLN6hrhrMjNhYD
 07jorSqL6hjjog==
 =+J1X
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'perf-for-bpf-2020-05-06' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip into bpf-next

CAP_PERFMON for BPF
2020-05-06 17:12:44 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
4ca7528706 Smack:- Remove redundant inode_smack cache
The inode_smack cache is no longer used.
Remove it.

Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-05-06 14:46:26 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
921bb1cbb3 Smack:- Remove mutex lock "smk_lock" from inode_smack
"smk_lock" mutex is used during inode instantiation in
smack_d_instantiate()function. It has been used to avoid
simultaneous access on same inode security structure.
Since smack related initialization is done only once i.e during
inode creation. If the inode has already been instantiated then
smack_d_instantiate() function just returns without doing
anything.

So it means mutex lock is required only during inode creation.
But since 2 processes can't create same inodes or files
simultaneously. Also linking or some other file operation can't
be done simultaneously when the file is getting created since
file lookup will fail before dentry inode linkup which is done
after smack initialization.
So no mutex lock is required in inode_smack structure.

It will save memory as well as improve some performance.
If 40000 inodes are created in system, it will save 1.5 MB on
32-bit systems & 2.8 MB on 64-bit systems.

Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-05-06 14:46:26 -07:00
Casey Schaufler
84e99e58e8 Smack: slab-out-of-bounds in vsscanf
Add barrier to soob. Return -EOVERFLOW if the buffer
is exceeded.

Suggested-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+bfdd4a2f07be52351350@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-05-06 14:46:26 -07:00
Maninder Singh
092c94aed3 smack: remove redundant structure variable from header.
commit afb1cbe374 ("LSM: Infrastructure management
of the inode security") removed usage of smk_rcu,
thus removing it from structure.

Signed-off-by: Maninder Singh <maninder1.s@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Vaneet Narang <v.narang@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-05-06 14:46:26 -07:00
Arnd Bergmann
00720f0e7f smack: avoid unused 'sip' variable warning
The mix of IS_ENABLED() and #ifdef checks has left a combination
that causes a warning about an unused variable:

security/smack/smack_lsm.c: In function 'smack_socket_connect':
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:2838:24: error: unused variable 'sip' [-Werror=unused-variable]
 2838 |   struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;

Change the code to use C-style checks consistently so the compiler
can handle it correctly.

Fixes: 87fbfffcc8 ("broken ping to ipv6 linklocal addresses on debian buster")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-05-06 14:46:26 -07:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
03414a49ad selinux: do not allocate hashtabs dynamically
It is simpler to allocate them statically in the corresponding
structure, avoiding unnecessary kmalloc() calls and pointer
dereferencing.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: manual merging required in policydb.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-05-01 16:34:57 -04:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
46619b44e4 selinux: fix return value on error in policydb_read()
The value of rc is still zero from the last assignment when the error
path is taken. Fix it by setting it to -ENOMEM before the
hashtab_create() call.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: e67b2ec9f6 ("selinux: store role transitions in a hash table")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-05-01 16:08:46 -04:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
3348bd33e8 selinux: simplify range_write()
No need to traverse the hashtab to count its elements, hashtab already
tracks it for us.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-05-01 16:08:04 -04:00
Wei Yongjun
4c09f8b691 selinux: fix error return code in policydb_read()
Fix to return negative error code -ENOMEM from the kvcalloc() error
handling case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.

Fixes: acdf52d97f ("selinux: convert to kvmalloc")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-05-01 15:02:14 -04:00
Linus Torvalds
39e16d9342 selinux/stable-5.7 PR 20200430
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAl6rPswUHHBhdWxAcGF1
 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXMJBQ//dAU7VS01kQUUsFjd8xUIOk9aSbNy
 gjFkzcpbTsS4Mhqk0FSP3mfqDWP3lvxt9gx6WfnCf+a2KE3eTtf9bISW2OB2evIl
 9ydae6frJLiP6yIeAEZBb1PBQ6AxwBT8j8drKi57sOBC8rkmF66wiMaG2nybYW/j
 rvkOQCFtWj/A3b+Y7y8fVs8sjTHWvcsvkN7kwYmmdjyn7h/C1Tqc6TOOrt1jtLUG
 dgeak9bCIvK7JB/W6squ1iKqvkJhld7h5fZn6WB/6Xd1DKD1LVjGT8HsKpI/ei49
 0tAybqaLv8WxVc5ZGcAGoTt/X0hq3lXRiMG1Qgmed85wxjrLEpU12L6yprEtgtao
 0yY1JNizuC3Ehbi02o4gHf+RffLPWDrT8Kmu00/IuridCesNZCrEFpbAZmOwPU67
 nFufU0YlSnsVJ63C8TMhkI2eg/VejGjN4I2PEgcxEbZKBBW+nAcJfoKl1y2tzEo9
 ZNdZcetY9yJdpewjsF6VgsXs4qUrm1NUiG8pCXdK23+w/qYvZ4UqoYfoRNYIuRS0
 nRN40OkRYN6GzDZ+NCPYqgIhoEpps0p96VYQI6mp+PyOpwlCq8epKVjXD/TkteVG
 mevM2Ffy8xVaL47ufXxAHn+pA6F6Mdmo/rIwe+U5Olase96DTcFr90JPmVz58mcP
 6lWZhje3wS3mSpk=
 =HTrZ
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200430' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux

Pull SELinux fixes from Paul Moore:
 "Two more SELinux patches to fix problems in the v5.7-rcX releases.

  Wei Yongjun's patch fixes a return code in an error path, and my patch
  fixes a problem where we were not correctly applying access controls
  to all of the netlink messages in the netlink_send LSM hook"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20200430' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: properly handle multiple messages in selinux_netlink_send()
  selinux: fix error return code in cond_read_list()
2020-04-30 16:35:45 -07:00
Paul Moore
fb73974172 selinux: properly handle multiple messages in selinux_netlink_send()
Fix the SELinux netlink_send hook to properly handle multiple netlink
messages in a single sk_buff; each message is parsed and subject to
SELinux access control.  Prior to this patch, SELinux only inspected
the first message in the sk_buff.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-04-30 16:18:37 -04:00
Daniel Borkmann
0b54142e4b Merge branch 'work.sysctl' of ssh://gitolite.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull in Christoph Hellwig's series that changes the sysctl's ->proc_handler
methods to take kernel pointers instead. It gets rid of the set_fs address
space overrides used by BPF. As per discussion, pull in the feature branch
into bpf-next as it relates to BPF sysctl progs.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200427071508.GV23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk/T/
2020-04-28 21:23:38 +02:00
Wei Yongjun
292fed1fc8 selinux: fix error return code in cond_read_list()
Fix to return negative error code -ENOMEM from the error handling
case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function.

Fixes: 60abd3181d ("selinux: convert cond_list to array")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-04-27 17:44:39 -04:00
Christoph Hellwig
32927393dc sysctl: pass kernel pointers to ->proc_handler
Instead of having all the sysctl handlers deal with user pointers, which
is rather hairy in terms of the BPF interaction, copy the input to and
from  userspace in common code.  This also means that the strings are
always NUL-terminated by the common code, making the API a little bit
safer.

As most handler just pass through the data to one of the common handlers
a lot of the changes are mechnical.

Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2020-04-27 02:07:40 -04:00
Alexey Gladkov
c59f415a7c Use proc_pid_ns() to get pid_namespace from the proc superblock
To get pid_namespace from the procfs superblock should be used a special
helper. This will avoid errors when s_fs_info will change the type.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200423200316.164518-3-gladkov.alexey@gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200423112858.95820-1-gladkov.alexey@gmail.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/06B50A1C-406F-4057-BFA8-3A7729EA7469@lca.pw/
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2020-04-24 16:38:30 -05:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
9521eb3ea1 selinux: don't produce incorrect filename_trans_count
I thought I fixed the counting in filename_trans_read_helper() to count
the compat rule count correctly in the final version, but it's still
wrong. To really count the same thing as in the compat path, we'd need
to add up the cardinalities of stype bitmaps of all datums.

Since the kernel currently doesn't implement an ebitmap_cardinality()
function (and computing the proper count would just waste CPU cycles
anyway), just document that we use the field only in case of the old
format and stop updating it in filename_trans_read_helper().

Fixes: 4300590243 ("selinux: implement new format of filename transitions")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-04-22 15:38:10 -04:00
Ingo Molnar
87cfeb1920 perf/core fixes and improvements:
kernel + tools/perf:
 
   Alexey Budankov:
 
   - Introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space.
 
 callchains:
 
   Adrian Hunter:
 
   - Allow using Intel PT to synthesize callchains for regular events.
 
   Kan Liang:
 
   - Stitch LBR records from multiple samples to get deeper backtraces,
     there are caveats, see the csets for details.
 
 perf script:
 
   Andreas Gerstmayr:
 
   - Add flamegraph.py script
 
 BPF:
 
   Jiri Olsa:
 
   - Synthesize bpf_trampoline/dispatcher ksymbol events.
 
 perf stat:
 
   Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo:
 
   - Honour --timeout for forked workloads.
 
   Stephane Eranian:
 
   - Force error in fallback on :k events, to avoid counting nothing when
     the user asks for kernel events but is not allowed to.
 
 perf bench:
 
   Ian Rogers:
 
   - Add event synthesis benchmark.
 
 tools api fs:
 
   Stephane Eranian:
 
  - Make xxx__mountpoint() more scalable
 
 libtraceevent:
 
   He Zhe:
 
   - Handle return value of asprintf.
 
 Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iHUEABYIAB0WIQR2GiIUctdOfX2qHhGyPKLppCJ+JwUCXp2LlQAKCRCyPKLppCJ+
 J95oAP0ZihVUhESv/gdeX0IDE5g6Rd2V6LNcRj+jb7gX9NlQkwD/UfS454WV1ftQ
 qTwrkKPzY/5Tm2cLuVE7r7fJ6naDHgU=
 =FHm4
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'perf-core-for-mingo-5.8-20200420' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux into perf/core

Pull perf/core fixes and improvements from Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo:

kernel + tools/perf:

  Alexey Budankov:

  - Introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space.

callchains:

  Adrian Hunter:

  - Allow using Intel PT to synthesize callchains for regular events.

  Kan Liang:

  - Stitch LBR records from multiple samples to get deeper backtraces,
    there are caveats, see the csets for details.

perf script:

  Andreas Gerstmayr:

  - Add flamegraph.py script

BPF:

  Jiri Olsa:

  - Synthesize bpf_trampoline/dispatcher ksymbol events.

perf stat:

  Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo:

  - Honour --timeout for forked workloads.

  Stephane Eranian:

  - Force error in fallback on :k events, to avoid counting nothing when
    the user asks for kernel events but is not allowed to.

perf bench:

  Ian Rogers:

  - Add event synthesis benchmark.

tools api fs:

  Stephane Eranian:

 - Make xxx__mountpoint() more scalable

libtraceevent:

  He Zhe:

  - Handle return value of asprintf.

Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2020-04-22 14:08:28 +02:00
Roberto Sassu
2592677c04 ima: Use ima_hash_algo for collision detection in the measurement list
Before calculating a digest for each PCR bank, collisions were detected
with a SHA1 digest. This patch includes ima_hash_algo among the algorithms
used to calculate the template digest and checks collisions on that digest.

The position in the measurement entry array of the template digest
calculated with the IMA default hash algorithm is stored in the
ima_hash_algo_idx global variable and is determined at IMA initialization
time.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-04-19 22:03:39 -04:00
Roberto Sassu
1ea973df6e ima: Calculate and extend PCR with digests in ima_template_entry
This patch modifies ima_calc_field_array_hash() to calculate a template
digest for each allocated PCR bank and SHA1. It also passes the tpm_digest
array of the template entry to ima_pcr_extend() or in case of a violation,
the pre-initialized digests array filled with 0xff.

Padding with zeros is still done if the mapping between TPM algorithm ID
and crypto ID is unknown.

This patch calculates again the template digest when a measurement list is
restored. Copying only the SHA1 digest (due to the limitation of the
current measurement list format) is not sufficient, as hash collision
detection will be done on the digest calculated with the IMA default hash
algorithm.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-04-19 22:03:39 -04:00
Roberto Sassu
6d94809af6 ima: Allocate and initialize tfm for each PCR bank
This patch creates a crypto_shash structure for each allocated PCR bank and
for SHA1 if a bank with that algorithm is not currently allocated.

Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-04-19 22:03:39 -04:00
Roberto Sassu
aa724fe18a ima: Switch to dynamically allocated buffer for template digests
This patch dynamically allocates the array of tpm_digest structures in
ima_alloc_init_template() and ima_restore_template_data(). The size of the
array is equal to the number of PCR banks plus ima_extra_slots, to make
room for SHA1 and the IMA default hash algorithm, when PCR banks with those
algorithms are not allocated.

Calculating the SHA1 digest is mandatory, as SHA1 still remains the default
hash algorithm for the measurement list. When IMA will support the Crypto
Agile format, remaining digests will be also provided.

The position in the measurement entry array of the SHA1 digest is stored in
the ima_sha1_idx global variable and is determined at IMA initialization
time.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-04-19 22:03:39 -04:00
Roberto Sassu
7ca79645a1 ima: Store template digest directly in ima_template_entry
In preparation for the patch that calculates a digest for each allocated
PCR bank, this patch passes to ima_calc_field_array_hash() the
ima_template_entry structure, so that digests can be directly stored in
that structure instead of ima_digest_data.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-04-19 22:03:39 -04:00
Roberto Sassu
e144d6b265 ima: Evaluate error in init_ima()
Evaluate error in init_ima() before register_blocking_lsm_notifier() and
return if not zero.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.3.x
Fixes: b169424551 ("ima: use the lsm policy update notifier")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-04-19 22:03:39 -04:00
Roberto Sassu
6f1a1d103b ima: Switch to ima_hash_algo for boot aggregate
boot_aggregate is the first entry of IMA measurement list. Its purpose is
to link pre-boot measurements to IMA measurements. As IMA was designed to
work with a TPM 1.2, the SHA1 PCR bank was always selected even if a
TPM 2.0 with support for stronger hash algorithms is available.

This patch first tries to find a PCR bank with the IMA default hash
algorithm. If it does not find it, it selects the SHA256 PCR bank for
TPM 2.0 and SHA1 for TPM 1.2. Ultimately, it selects SHA1 also for TPM 2.0
if the SHA256 PCR bank is not found.

If none of the PCR banks above can be found, boot_aggregate file digest is
filled with zeros, as for TPM bypass, making it impossible to perform a
remote attestation of the system.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.1.x
Fixes: 879b589210 ("tpm: retrieve digest size of unknown algorithms with PCR read")
Reported-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-04-19 22:03:39 -04:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
4300590243 selinux: implement new format of filename transitions
Implement a new, more space-efficient way of storing filename
transitions in the binary policy. The internal structures have already
been converted to this new representation; this patch just implements
reading/writing an equivalent represntation from/to the binary policy.

This new format reduces the size of Fedora policy from 7.6 MB to only
3.3 MB (with policy optimization enabled in both cases). With the
unconfined module disabled, the size is reduced from 3.3 MB to 2.4 MB.

The time to load policy into kernel is also shorter with the new format.
On Fedora Rawhide x86_64 it dropped from 157 ms to 106 ms; without the
unconfined module from 115 ms to 105 ms.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-04-17 16:42:01 -04:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
225621c934 selinux: move context hashing under sidtab
Now that context hash computation no longer depends on policydb, we can
simplify things by moving the context hashing completely under sidtab.
The hash is still cached in sidtab entries, but not for the in-flight
context structures.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-04-17 16:04:38 -04:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
5007728980 selinux: hash context structure directly
Always hashing the string representation is inefficient. Just hash the
contents of the structure directly (using jhash). If the context is
invalid (str & len are set), then hash the string as before, otherwise
hash the structured data.

Since the context hashing function is now faster (about 10 times), this
patch decreases the overhead of security_transition_sid(), which is
called from many hooks.

The jhash function seemed as a good choice, since it is used as the
default hashing algorithm in rhashtable.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Tested-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
[PM: fixed some spelling errors in the comments pointed out by JVS]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-04-17 16:04:34 -04:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
e67b2ec9f6 selinux: store role transitions in a hash table
Currently, they are stored in a linked list, which adds significant
overhead to security_transition_sid(). On Fedora, with 428 role
transitions in policy, converting this list to a hash table cuts down
its run time by about 50%. This was measured by running 'stress-ng --msg
1 --msg-ops 100000' under perf with and without this patch.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-04-17 15:20:22 -04:00
Linus Torvalds
9786cab674 selinux/stable-5.7 PR 20200416
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAl6YmC0UHHBhdWxAcGF1
 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXPplBAAzu5Fi0grInLr/IGXQKN2ZWcnx6KC
 OIo28vpBhie0Q9tRtHTux2ec57IBYGAVomhZDGWcHvVHdm84T3/+/Fnb/cL9FIBy
 GX2XgQjvAIyIPsscnq47eHbGdAk8o9E1mxuGD7Sgyql5834j3XbRN1yoOMEXfIOg
 0sDjv7/4EzIymI/jiEaZ6LyVA/bXT2L0CcXEyLD4RSUJEgBaejrx8k1jAwz2w/De
 NoXUqSnRpzN+ti2T0u/kt77cnshmK7w5AyjedA340LAqtvpMIWseeFmeTvlxQeOK
 bIZaTmwgGdkKo8hdgayns1/A3FNSr9lnlOOfn04/SpGHpGOvmC/b+xrw3ENJLHJG
 r+hanFAKkUlYGVY3dK82g3gAbfRQL3n48Cb0qmujqlqfLLAwc5VG0AN8WfDm0c8D
 kZEe3Hbf7NAx9KUOIfclcqYvDaCE7F6DyXJs2ToO0rHDyuWXJ6T6kPQtSGdB7Qd3
 fzi8XsN6fS2yCxEDyymUxRt5V+cJ+eNUuc52p+RTes3xh+31TGeIWmRudeNFfDTx
 XawXjypvZTxOfoo+3WcLq0qPVp9bc3lzORKAX28nSGb/6Ytijctf5iS3f1VmZVM8
 whY7UiSkTCFwix4SE3MwzJ1+kzJVngHY2woYxC02E5Lw972tiVT8LORvLU6G6P2G
 Nf4aDz3SNGiYM3o=
 =/dym
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200416' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux

Pull SELinux fix from Paul Moore:
 "One small SELinux fix to ensure we cleanup properly on an error
  condition"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20200416' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: free str on error in str_read()
2020-04-16 10:45:47 -07:00
Vasily Averin
86d32f9a7c keys: Fix proc_keys_next to increase position index
If seq_file .next function does not change position index,
read after some lseek can generate unexpected output:

    $ dd if=/proc/keys bs=1  # full usual output
    0f6bfdf5 I--Q---     2 perm 3f010000  1000  1000 user      4af2f79ab8848d0a: 740
    1fb91b32 I--Q---     3 perm 1f3f0000  1000 65534 keyring   _uid.1000: 2
    27589480 I--Q---     1 perm 0b0b0000     0     0 user      invocation_id: 16
    2f33ab67 I--Q---   152 perm 3f030000     0     0 keyring   _ses: 2
    33f1d8fa I--Q---     4 perm 3f030000  1000  1000 keyring   _ses: 1
    3d427fda I--Q---     2 perm 3f010000  1000  1000 user      69ec44aec7678e5a: 740
    3ead4096 I--Q---     1 perm 1f3f0000  1000 65534 keyring   _uid_ses.1000: 1
    521+0 records in
    521+0 records out
    521 bytes copied, 0,00123769 s, 421 kB/s

But a read after lseek in middle of last line results in the partial
last line and then a repeat of the final line:

    $ dd if=/proc/keys bs=500 skip=1
    dd: /proc/keys: cannot skip to specified offset
    g   _uid_ses.1000: 1
    3ead4096 I--Q---     1 perm 1f3f0000  1000 65534 keyring   _uid_ses.1000: 1
    0+1 records in
    0+1 records out
    97 bytes copied, 0,000135035 s, 718 kB/s

and a read after lseek beyond end of file results in the last line being
shown:

    $ dd if=/proc/keys bs=1000 skip=1   # read after lseek beyond end of file
    dd: /proc/keys: cannot skip to specified offset
    3ead4096 I--Q---     1 perm 1f3f0000  1000 65534 keyring   _uid_ses.1000: 1
    0+1 records in
    0+1 records out
    76 bytes copied, 0,000119981 s, 633 kB/s

See https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283

Fixes: 1f4aace60b ("fs/seq_file.c: simplify seq_file iteration code ...")
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-04-16 10:10:50 -07:00
Alexey Budankov
9807372822 capabilities: Introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Introduce the CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system
performance monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON
can assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for
performance monitoring and observability subsystems.

CAP_PERFMON hardens system security and integrity during performance
monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack surface that
is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [2]. Providing the access
to system performance monitoring and observability operations under CAP_PERFMON
capability singly, without the rest of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes
chances to misuse the credentials and makes the operation more secure.

Thus, CAP_PERFMON implements the principle of least privilege for
performance monitoring and observability operations (POSIX IEEE 1003.1e:
2.2.2.39 principle of least privilege: A security design principle that
  states that a process or program be granted only those privileges
(e.g., capabilities) necessary to accomplish its legitimate function,
and only for the time that such privileges are actually required)

CAP_PERFMON meets the demand to secure system performance monitoring and
observability operations for adoption in security sensitive, restricted,
multiuser production environments (e.g. HPC clusters, cloud and virtual compute
environments), where root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials are not available to
mass users of a system, and securely unblocks applicability and scalability
of system performance monitoring and observability operations beyond root
and CAP_SYS_ADMIN use cases.

CAP_PERFMON takes over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to system performance
monitoring and observability operations and balances amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN
credentials following the recommendations in the capabilities man page [1]
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel
developers, below." For backward compatibility reasons access to system
performance monitoring and observability subsystems of the kernel remains
open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability
usage for secure system performance monitoring and observability operations
is discouraged with respect to the designed CAP_PERFMON capability.

Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance
of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues
following the official hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. The bugs
in the software itself can be fixed following the standard kernel development
process [3] to maintain and harden security of system performance monitoring
and observability operations.

[1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html
[2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html
[3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-man@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/5590d543-82c6-490a-6544-08e6a5517db0@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
2020-04-16 12:19:06 -03:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
433e3aa377 selinux: drop unnecessary smp_load_acquire() call
In commit 66f8e2f03c ("selinux: sidtab reverse lookup hash table") the
corresponding load is moved under the spin lock, so there is no race
possible and we can read the count directly. The smp_store_release() is
still needed to avoid racing with the lock-free readers.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-04-15 18:27:35 -04:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
af15f14c8c selinux: free str on error in str_read()
In [see "Fixes:"] I missed the fact that str_read() may give back an
allocated pointer even if it returns an error, causing a potential
memory leak in filename_trans_read_one(). Fix this by making the
function free the allocated string whenever it returns a non-zero value,
which also makes its behavior more obvious and prevents repeating the
same mistake in the future.

Reported-by: coverity-bot <keescook+coverity-bot@chromium.org>
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1461665 ("Resource leaks")
Fixes: c3a276111e ("selinux: optimize storage of filename transitions")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-04-15 17:23:16 -04:00
Zou Wei
4b8503967e selinux: fix warning Comparison to bool
fix below warnings reported by coccicheck

security/selinux/ss/mls.c:539:39-43: WARNING: Comparison to bool
security/selinux/ss/services.c:1815:46-50: WARNING: Comparison to bool
security/selinux/ss/services.c:1827:46-50: WARNING: Comparison to bool

Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zou Wei <zou_wei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-04-14 18:01:18 -04:00
Odin Ugedal
eec8fd0277 device_cgroup: Cleanup cgroup eBPF device filter code
Original cgroup v2 eBPF code for filtering device access made it
possible to compile with CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE=n and still use the eBPF
filtering. Change
commit 4b7d4d453f ("device_cgroup: Export devcgroup_check_permission")
reverted this, making it required to set it to y.

Since the device filtering (and all the docs) for cgroup v2 is no longer
a "device controller" like it was in v1, someone might compile their
kernel with CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE=n. Then (for linux 5.5+) the eBPF
filter will not be invoked, and all processes will be allowed access
to all devices, no matter what the eBPF filter says.

Signed-off-by: Odin Ugedal <odin@ugedal.com>
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
2020-04-13 14:41:54 -04:00
John Johansen
c27c6bd2c4 apparmor: ensure that dfa state tables have entries
Currently it is possible to specify a state machine table with 0 length,
this is not valid as optional tables are specified by not defining
the table as present. Further this allows by-passing the base tables
range check against the next/check tables.

Fixes: d901d6a298 ("apparmor: dfa split verification of table headers")
Reported-by: Mike Salvatore <mike.salvatore@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
2020-04-08 04:42:48 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
4c205c84e2 Keyrings fixes
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQIzBAABCAAdFiEEqG5UsNXhtOCrfGQP+7dXa6fLC2sFAl6AiV4ACgkQ+7dXa6fL
 C2uCDg/+NevZHjgevGpFS9WByBtzFXKbewSSO0VZqS8RcFcy7+jRdTkcP66HJkGD
 3JxfI4wQm2LOiaX8tHDlmWIPfp3G5Tnjae8peOEVBrCZ5WZMcD3CzquMv18kd8KK
 5iiFzsTYDCywP/BwHCJgVQjPNpSp9drNCL5T+oql0nWeEUVAmiVziTIZgM9cAiyj
 S/sfe76KxdNzaEEvpL5Mg/ieq1es/ssGA1jZ8jZI+YfN8mtBBH8KebckskKSgVTK
 OjBLQAEanCbq3UsEqSsvEqbBpK7JkQJPOE153VRr6Nq/0MDSniwZjqIYOkgeB9pR
 YStIrK9LyL/D0aMe8A52I7Ml1zuUUXb9zVAo3yLgubWPDYXvLs8n8Cgl8ZCQBFXy
 0t86rlSq9SooGf3M2ket8Gk/XgymcRNP9LHr6MUGEO23l2ELBoO8hsWvUTAHoKVx
 kn27S4YceW4+5UYfYm87ZQpUTbKPNATuBkts+QxiSrZMCnk82G6keA8JqNgKCe4d
 xvUJew/JEGx2J0T8vYiBfpB1zEbtYdluglYyyzHpl0wkafYGRj1tTvwRZwQNhxw5
 IFQvxEK2kVFTKcoLBGq909udb4QlQOfMAYal0u/4iCNiipNgxZawcWSfIMGN4qbG
 tPvvBL2ocRmycmoMS7EHwWUSWIzwggi7zosDsM8jfLHBshBLeAE=
 =vvN4
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'keys-fixes-20200329' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs

Pull keyrings fixes from David Howells:
 "Here's a couple of patches that fix a circular dependency between
  holding key->sem and mm->mmap_sem when reading data from a key.

  One potential issue is that a filesystem looking to use a key inside,
  say, ->readpages() could deadlock if the key being read is the key
  that's required and the buffer the key is being read into is on a page
  that needs to be fetched.

  The case actually detected is a bit more involved - with a filesystem
  calling request_key() and locking the target keyring for write - which
  could be being read"

* tag 'keys-fixes-20200329' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key read
  KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphore
2020-04-04 12:24:47 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
ff2ae607c6 SPDX patches for 5.7-rc1.
Here are 3 SPDX patches for 5.7-rc1.
 
 One fixes up the SPDX tag for a single driver, while the other two go
 through the tree and add SPDX tags for all of the .gitignore files as
 needed.
 
 Nothing too complex, but you will get a merge conflict with your current
 tree, that should be trivial to handle (one file modified by two things,
 one file deleted.)
 
 All 3 of these have been in linux-next for a while, with no reported
 issues other than the merge conflict.
 
 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iG0EABECAC0WIQT0tgzFv3jCIUoxPcsxR9QN2y37KQUCXodg5A8cZ3JlZ0Brcm9h
 aC5jb20ACgkQMUfUDdst+ykySQCgy9YDrkz7nWq6v3Gohl6+lW/L+rMAnRM4uTZm
 m5AuCzO3Azt9KBi7NL+L
 =2Lm5
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'spdx-5.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/spdx

Pull SPDX updates from Greg KH:
 "Here are three SPDX patches for 5.7-rc1.

  One fixes up the SPDX tag for a single driver, while the other two go
  through the tree and add SPDX tags for all of the .gitignore files as
  needed.

  Nothing too complex, but you will get a merge conflict with your
  current tree, that should be trivial to handle (one file modified by
  two things, one file deleted.)

  All three of these have been in linux-next for a while, with no
  reported issues other than the merge conflict"

* tag 'spdx-5.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/spdx:
  ASoC: MT6660: make spdxcheck.py happy
  .gitignore: add SPDX License Identifier
  .gitignore: remove too obvious comments
2020-04-03 13:12:26 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
7f218319ca Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "Just a couple of updates for linux-5.7:

   - A new Kconfig option to enable IMA architecture specific runtime
     policy rules needed for secure and/or trusted boot, as requested.

   - Some message cleanup (eg. pr_fmt, additional error messages)"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  ima: add a new CONFIG for loading arch-specific policies
  integrity: Remove duplicate pr_fmt definitions
  IMA: Add log statements for failure conditions
  IMA: Update KBUILD_MODNAME for IMA files to ima
2020-04-02 14:49:46 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
29d9f30d4c Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
 "Highlights:

   1) Fix the iwlwifi regression, from Johannes Berg.

   2) Support BSS coloring and 802.11 encapsulation offloading in
      hardware, from John Crispin.

   3) Fix some potential Spectre issues in qtnfmac, from Sergey
      Matyukevich.

   4) Add TTL decrement action to openvswitch, from Matteo Croce.

   5) Allow paralleization through flow_action setup by not taking the
      RTNL mutex, from Vlad Buslov.

   6) A lot of zero-length array to flexible-array conversions, from
      Gustavo A. R. Silva.

   7) Align XDP statistics names across several drivers for consistency,
      from Lorenzo Bianconi.

   8) Add various pieces of infrastructure for offloading conntrack, and
      make use of it in mlx5 driver, from Paul Blakey.

   9) Allow using listening sockets in BPF sockmap, from Jakub Sitnicki.

  10) Lots of parallelization improvements during configuration changes
      in mlxsw driver, from Ido Schimmel.

  11) Add support to devlink for generic packet traps, which report
      packets dropped during ACL processing. And use them in mlxsw
      driver. From Jiri Pirko.

  12) Support bcmgenet on ACPI, from Jeremy Linton.

  13) Make BPF compatible with RT, from Thomas Gleixnet, Alexei
      Starovoitov, and your's truly.

  14) Support XDP meta-data in virtio_net, from Yuya Kusakabe.

  15) Fix sysfs permissions when network devices change namespaces, from
      Christian Brauner.

  16) Add a flags element to ethtool_ops so that drivers can more simply
      indicate which coalescing parameters they actually support, and
      therefore the generic layer can validate the user's ethtool
      request. Use this in all drivers, from Jakub Kicinski.

  17) Offload FIFO qdisc in mlxsw, from Petr Machata.

  18) Support UDP sockets in sockmap, from Lorenz Bauer.

  19) Fix stretch ACK bugs in several TCP congestion control modules,
      from Pengcheng Yang.

  20) Support virtual functiosn in octeontx2 driver, from Tomasz
      Duszynski.

  21) Add region operations for devlink and use it in ice driver to dump
      NVM contents, from Jacob Keller.

  22) Add support for hw offload of MACSEC, from Antoine Tenart.

  23) Add support for BPF programs that can be attached to LSM hooks,
      from KP Singh.

  24) Support for multiple paths, path managers, and counters in MPTCP.
      From Peter Krystad, Paolo Abeni, Florian Westphal, Davide Caratti,
      and others.

  25) More progress on adding the netlink interface to ethtool, from
      Michal Kubecek"

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2121 commits)
  net: ipv6: rpl_iptunnel: Fix potential memory leak in rpl_do_srh_inline
  cxgb4/chcr: nic-tls stats in ethtool
  net: dsa: fix oops while probing Marvell DSA switches
  net/bpfilter: remove superfluous testing message
  net: macb: Fix handling of fixed-link node
  net: dsa: ksz: Select KSZ protocol tag
  netdevsim: dev: Fix memory leak in nsim_dev_take_snapshot_write
  net: stmmac: add EHL 2.5Gbps PCI info and PCI ID
  net: stmmac: add EHL PSE0 & PSE1 1Gbps PCI info and PCI ID
  net: stmmac: create dwmac-intel.c to contain all Intel platform
  net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Support specifying VLAN tag egress rule
  net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Add support for matching VLAN TCI
  net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Move writing of CFP_DATA(5) into slicing functions
  net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Check earlier for FLOW_EXT and FLOW_MAC_EXT
  net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Disable learning for ASP port
  net: dsa: b53: Deny enslaving port 7 for 7278 into a bridge
  net: dsa: b53: Prevent tagged VLAN on port 7 for 7278
  net: dsa: b53: Restore VLAN entries upon (re)configuration
  net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Fix overflow checks
  hv_netvsc: Remove unnecessary round_up for recv_completion_cnt
  ...
2020-03-31 17:29:33 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
b3aa112d57 selinux/stable-5.7 PR 20200330
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAl6Ch6wUHHBhdWxAcGF1
 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXPdcg/9FDMS/n0Xl1HQBUyu26EwLu3aUpNE
 BdghXW1LKSTp7MrOENE60PGzZSAiC07ci1DqFd7zfLPZf2q5IwPwOBa/Avy8z95V
 oHKqcMT6WO1SPOm/PxZn16FCKyET4gZDTXvHBAyiyFsbk36R522ZY615P9T3eLu/
 ZA1NFsSjj68SqMCUlAWfeqjcbQiX63bryEpugOIg0qWy7R/+rtWxj9TjriZ+v9tq
 uC45UcjBqphpmoPG8BifA3jjyclwO3DeQb5u7E8//HPPraGeB19ntsymUg7ljoGk
 NrqCkZtv6E+FRCDTR5f0O7M1T4BWJodxw2NwngnTwKByLC25EZaGx80o+VyMt0eT
 Pog+++JZaa5zZr2OYOtdlPVMLc2ALL6p/8lHOqFU3GKfIf04hWOm6/Lb2IWoXs3f
 CG2b6vzoXYyjbF0Q7kxadb8uBY2S1Ds+CVu2HMBBsXsPdwbbtFWOT/6aRAQu61qn
 PW+f47NR8By3SO6nMzWts2SZEERZNIEdSKeXHuR7As1jFMXrHLItreb4GCSPay5h
 2bzRpxt2br5CDLh7Jv2pZnHtUqBWOSbslTix77+Z/hPKaNowvD9v3tc5hX87rDmB
 dYXROD6/KoyXFYDcMdphlvORFhqGqd5bEYuHHum/VjSIRh237+/nxFY/vZ4i4bzU
 2fvpAmUlVX1c4rw=
 =LlWA
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200330' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux

Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
 "We've got twenty SELinux patches for the v5.7 merge window, the
  highlights are below:

   - Deprecate setting /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot to 1.

     This flag was originally created to deal with legacy userspace and
     the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag. We changed the default from
     1 to 0 back in Linux v4.4 and now we are taking the next step of
     deprecating it, at some point in the future we will take the final
     step of rejecting 1.

   - Allow kernfs symlinks to inherit the SELinux label of the parent
     directory. In order to preserve backwards compatibility this is
     protected by the genfs_seclabel_symlinks SELinux policy capability.

   - Optimize how we store filename transitions in the kernel, resulting
     in some significant improvements to policy load times.

   - Do a better job calculating our internal hash table sizes which
     resulted in additional policy load improvements and likely general
     SELinux performance improvements as well.

   - Remove the unused initial SIDs (labels) and improve how we handle
     initial SIDs.

   - Enable per-file labeling for the bpf filesystem.

   - Ensure that we properly label NFS v4.2 filesystems to avoid a
     temporary unlabeled condition.

   - Add some missing XFS quota command types to the SELinux quota
     access controls.

   - Fix a problem where we were not updating the seq_file position
     index correctly in selinuxfs.

   - We consolidate some duplicated code into helper functions.

   - A number of list to array conversions.

   - Update Stephen Smalley's email address in MAINTAINERS"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20200330' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: clean up indentation issue with assignment statement
  NFS: Ensure security label is set for root inode
  MAINTAINERS: Update my email address
  selinux: avtab_init() and cond_policydb_init() return void
  selinux: clean up error path in policydb_init()
  selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling
  selinux: reduce the use of hard-coded hash sizes
  selinux: Add xfs quota command types
  selinux: optimize storage of filename transitions
  selinux: factor out loop body from filename_trans_read()
  security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for bpffs
  selinux: generalize evaluate_cond_node()
  selinux: convert cond_expr to array
  selinux: convert cond_av_list to array
  selinux: convert cond_list to array
  selinux: sel_avc_get_stat_idx should increase position index
  selinux: allow kernfs symlinks to inherit parent directory context
  selinux: simplify evaluate_cond_node()
  Documentation,selinux: deprecate setting checkreqprot to 1
  selinux: move status variables out of selinux_ss
2020-03-31 15:07:55 -07:00
Colin Ian King
c753924b62 selinux: clean up indentation issue with assignment statement
The assignment of e->type_names is indented one level too deep,
clean this up by removing the extraneous tab.

Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-03-30 19:57:07 -04:00
Linus Torvalds
a776c270a0 Merge branch 'efi-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull EFI updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "The EFI changes in this cycle are much larger than usual, for two
  (positive) reasons:

   - The GRUB project is showing signs of life again, resulting in the
     introduction of the generic Linux/UEFI boot protocol, instead of
     x86 specific hacks which are increasingly difficult to maintain.
     There's hope that all future extensions will now go through that
     boot protocol.

   - Preparatory work for RISC-V EFI support.

  The main changes are:

   - Boot time GDT handling changes

   - Simplify handling of EFI properties table on arm64

   - Generic EFI stub cleanups, to improve command line handling, file
     I/O, memory allocation, etc.

   - Introduce a generic initrd loading method based on calling back
     into the firmware, instead of relying on the x86 EFI handover
     protocol or device tree.

   - Introduce a mixed mode boot method that does not rely on the x86
     EFI handover protocol either, and could potentially be adopted by
     other architectures (if another one ever surfaces where one
     execution mode is a superset of another)

   - Clean up the contents of 'struct efi', and move out everything that
     doesn't need to be stored there.

   - Incorporate support for UEFI spec v2.8A changes that permit
     firmware implementations to return EFI_UNSUPPORTED from UEFI
     runtime services at OS runtime, and expose a mask of which ones are
     supported or unsupported via a configuration table.

   - Partial fix for the lack of by-VA cache maintenance in the
     decompressor on 32-bit ARM.

   - Changes to load device firmware from EFI boot service memory
     regions

   - Various documentation updates and minor code cleanups and fixes"

* 'efi-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (114 commits)
  efi/libstub/arm: Fix spurious message that an initrd was loaded
  efi/libstub/arm64: Avoid image_base value from efi_loaded_image
  partitions/efi: Fix partition name parsing in GUID partition entry
  efi/x86: Fix cast of image argument
  efi/libstub/x86: Use ULONG_MAX as upper bound for all allocations
  efi: Fix a mistype in comments mentioning efivar_entry_iter_begin()
  efi/libstub: Avoid linking libstub/lib-ksyms.o into vmlinux
  efi/x86: Preserve %ebx correctly in efi_set_virtual_address_map()
  efi/x86: Ignore the memory attributes table on i386
  efi/x86: Don't relocate the kernel unless necessary
  efi/x86: Remove extra headroom for setup block
  efi/x86: Add kernel preferred address to PE header
  efi/x86: Decompress at start of PE image load address
  x86/boot/compressed/32: Save the output address instead of recalculating it
  efi/libstub/x86: Deal with exit() boot service returning
  x86/boot: Use unsigned comparison for addresses
  efi/x86: Avoid using code32_start
  efi/x86: Make efi32_pe_entry() more readable
  efi/x86: Respect 32-bit ABI in efi32_pe_entry()
  efi/x86: Annotate the LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL_GUID with SYM_DATA
  ...
2020-03-30 16:13:08 -07:00
KP Singh
520b7aa00d bpf: lsm: Initialize the BPF LSM hooks
* The hooks are initialized using the definitions in
  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h.
* The LSM can be enabled / disabled with CONFIG_BPF_LSM.

Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-6-kpsingh@chromium.org
2020-03-30 01:34:00 +02:00
KP Singh
98e828a065 security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks
The information about the different types of LSM hooks is scattered
in two locations i.e. union security_list_options and
struct security_hook_heads. Rather than duplicating this information
even further for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, define all the hooks with the
LSM_HOOK macro in lsm_hook_defs.h which is then used to generate all
the data structures required by the LSM framework.

The LSM hooks are defined as:

  LSM_HOOK(<return_type>, <default_value>, <hook_name>, args...)

with <default_value> acccessible in security.c as:

  LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>)

Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-3-kpsingh@chromium.org
2020-03-30 01:34:00 +02:00
Waiman Long
4f0882491a KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key read
By allocating a kernel buffer with a user-supplied buffer length, it
is possible that a false positive ENOMEM error may be returned because
the user-supplied length is just too large even if the system do have
enough memory to hold the actual key data.

Moreover, if the buffer length is larger than the maximum amount of
memory that can be returned by kmalloc() (2^(MAX_ORDER-1) number of
pages), a warning message will also be printed.

To reduce this possibility, we set a threshold (PAGE_SIZE) over which we
do check the actual key length first before allocating a buffer of the
right size to hold it. The threshold is arbitrary, it is just used to
trigger a buffer length check. It does not limit the actual key length
as long as there is enough memory to satisfy the memory request.

To further avoid large buffer allocation failure due to page
fragmentation, kvmalloc() is used to allocate the buffer so that vmapped
pages can be used when there is not a large enough contiguous set of
pages available for allocation.

In the extremely unlikely scenario that the key keeps on being changed
and made longer (still <= buflen) in between 2 __keyctl_read_key()
calls, the __keyctl_read_key() calling loop in keyctl_read_key() may
have to be iterated a large number of times, but definitely not infinite.

Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2020-03-29 12:40:41 +01:00
Waiman Long
d3ec10aa95 KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphore
A lockdep circular locking dependency report was seen when running a
keyutils test:

[12537.027242] ======================================================
[12537.059309] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[12537.088148] 4.18.0-147.7.1.el8_1.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G OE    --------- -  -
[12537.125253] ------------------------------------------------------
[12537.153189] keyctl/25598 is trying to acquire lock:
[12537.175087] 000000007c39f96c (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12537.208365]
[12537.208365] but task is already holding lock:
[12537.234507] 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220
[12537.270476]
[12537.270476] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[12537.270476]
[12537.307209]
[12537.307209] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[12537.340754]
[12537.340754] -> #3 (&type->lock_class){++++}:
[12537.367434]        down_write+0x4d/0x110
[12537.385202]        __key_link_begin+0x87/0x280
[12537.405232]        request_key_and_link+0x483/0xf70
[12537.427221]        request_key+0x3c/0x80
[12537.444839]        dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver]
[12537.468445]        dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs]
[12537.496731]        cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs]
[12537.519418]        cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs]
[12537.546263]        cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs]
[12537.573551]        cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs]
[12537.601045]        kthread+0x30c/0x3d0
[12537.617906]        ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[12537.636225]
[12537.636225] -> #2 (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.}:
[12537.664525]        __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0
[12537.683734]        request_key_and_link+0x35a/0xf70
[12537.705640]        request_key+0x3c/0x80
[12537.723304]        dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver]
[12537.746773]        dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs]
[12537.775607]        cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs]
[12537.798322]        cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs]
[12537.823369]        cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs]
[12537.847262]        cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs]
[12537.873477]        kthread+0x30c/0x3d0
[12537.890281]        ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[12537.908649]
[12537.908649] -> #1 (&tcp_ses->srv_mutex){+.+.}:
[12537.935225]        __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0
[12537.954450]        cifs_call_async+0x102/0x7f0 [cifs]
[12537.977250]        smb2_async_readv+0x6c3/0xc90 [cifs]
[12538.000659]        cifs_readpages+0x120a/0x1e50 [cifs]
[12538.023920]        read_pages+0xf5/0x560
[12538.041583]        __do_page_cache_readahead+0x41d/0x4b0
[12538.067047]        ondemand_readahead+0x44c/0xc10
[12538.092069]        filemap_fault+0xec1/0x1830
[12538.111637]        __do_fault+0x82/0x260
[12538.129216]        do_fault+0x419/0xfb0
[12538.146390]        __handle_mm_fault+0x862/0xdf0
[12538.167408]        handle_mm_fault+0x154/0x550
[12538.187401]        __do_page_fault+0x42f/0xa60
[12538.207395]        do_page_fault+0x38/0x5e0
[12538.225777]        page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[12538.243010]
[12538.243010] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}:
[12538.267875]        lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420
[12538.286848]        __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0
[12538.306006]        keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170
[12538.327936]        assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280
[12538.352154]        keyring_read+0xe9/0x110
[12538.370558]        keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220
[12538.391470]        do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0
[12538.410511]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf
[12538.435535]
[12538.435535] other info that might help us debug this:
[12538.435535]
[12538.472829] Chain exists of:
[12538.472829]   &mm->mmap_sem --> root_key_user.cons_lock --> &type->lock_class
[12538.472829]
[12538.524820]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[12538.524820]
[12538.551431]        CPU0                    CPU1
[12538.572654]        ----                    ----
[12538.595865]   lock(&type->lock_class);
[12538.613737]                                lock(root_key_user.cons_lock);
[12538.644234]                                lock(&type->lock_class);
[12538.672410]   lock(&mm->mmap_sem);
[12538.687758]
[12538.687758]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[12538.687758]
[12538.714455] 1 lock held by keyctl/25598:
[12538.732097]  #0: 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220
[12538.770573]
[12538.770573] stack backtrace:
[12538.790136] CPU: 2 PID: 25598 Comm: keyctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G
[12538.844855] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015
[12538.881963] Call Trace:
[12538.892897]  dump_stack+0x9a/0xf0
[12538.907908]  print_circular_bug.isra.25.cold.50+0x1bc/0x279
[12538.932891]  ? save_trace+0xd6/0x250
[12538.948979]  check_prev_add.constprop.32+0xc36/0x14f0
[12538.971643]  ? keyring_compare_object+0x104/0x190
[12538.992738]  ? check_usage+0x550/0x550
[12539.009845]  ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
[12539.025484]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x1e0
[12539.043555]  __lock_acquire+0x1f12/0x38d0
[12539.061551]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x10/0x10
[12539.080554]  lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420
[12539.100330]  ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12539.119079]  __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0
[12539.135869]  ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12539.153234]  keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170
[12539.172787]  ? keyring_read+0x110/0x110
[12539.190059]  assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280
[12539.211526]  keyring_read+0xe9/0x110
[12539.227561]  ? keyring_gc_check_iterator+0xc0/0xc0
[12539.249076]  keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220
[12539.266660]  do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0
[12539.283091]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf

One way to prevent this deadlock scenario from happening is to not
allow writing to userspace while holding the key semaphore. Instead,
an internal buffer is allocated for getting the keys out from the
read method first before copying them out to userspace without holding
the lock.

That requires taking out the __user modifier from all the relevant
read methods as well as additional changes to not use any userspace
write helpers. That is,

  1) The put_user() call is replaced by a direct copy.
  2) The copy_to_user() call is replaced by memcpy().
  3) All the fault handling code is removed.

Compiling on a x86-64 system, the size of the rxrpc_read() function is
reduced from 3795 bytes to 2384 bytes with this patch.

Fixes: ^1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2020-03-29 12:40:41 +01:00
Masahiro Yamada
d198b34f38 .gitignore: add SPDX License Identifier
Add SPDX License Identifier to all .gitignore files.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-03-25 11:50:48 +01:00
Masahiro Yamada
2985bed680 .gitignore: remove too obvious comments
Some .gitignore files have comments like "Generated files",
"Ignore generated files" at the header part, but they are
too obvious.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-03-25 11:50:28 +01:00
Yang Xu
2e356101e7 KEYS: reaching the keys quotas correctly
Currently, when we add a new user key, the calltrace as below:

add_key()
  key_create_or_update()
    key_alloc()
    __key_instantiate_and_link
      generic_key_instantiate
        key_payload_reserve
          ......

Since commit a08bf91ce2 ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly"),
we can reach max bytes/keys in key_alloc, but we forget to remove this
limit when we reserver space for payload in key_payload_reserve. So we
can only reach max keys but not max bytes when having delta between plen
and type->def_datalen. Remove this limit when instantiating the key, so we
can keep consistent with key_alloc.

Also, fix the similar problem in keyctl_chown_key().

Fixes: 0b77f5bfb4 ("keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys")
Fixes: a08bf91ce2 ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0.x
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2020-03-15 20:59:50 +02:00
Nayna Jain
9e2b4be377 ima: add a new CONFIG for loading arch-specific policies
Every time a new architecture defines the IMA architecture specific
functions - arch_ima_get_secureboot() and arch_ima_get_policy(), the IMA
include file needs to be updated. To avoid this "noise", this patch
defines a new IMA Kconfig IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT option, allowing
the different architectures to select it.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.ibm.com> (s390)
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-03-12 07:43:57 -04:00
Paul Moore
5e729e111e selinux: avtab_init() and cond_policydb_init() return void
The avtab_init() and cond_policydb_init() functions always return
zero so mark them as returning void and update the callers not to
check for a return value.

Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-03-05 14:55:43 -05:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
34a2dab488 selinux: clean up error path in policydb_init()
Commit e0ac568de1 ("selinux: reduce the use of hard-coded hash sizes")
moved symtab initialization out of policydb_init(), but left the cleanup
of symtabs from the error path. This patch fixes the oversight.

Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-03-05 14:49:15 -05:00
Tushar Sugandhi
555d6d71d5 integrity: Remove duplicate pr_fmt definitions
The #define for formatting log messages, pr_fmt, is duplicated in the
files under security/integrity.

This change moves the definition to security/integrity/integrity.h and
removes the duplicate definitions in the other files under
security/integrity.

With this change, the messages in the following files will be prefixed
with 'integrity'.

     security/integrity/platform_certs/platform_keyring.c
     security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
     security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
     security/integrity/iint.c

     e.g. "integrity: Error adding keys to platform keyring %s\n"

And the messages in the following file will be prefixed with 'ima'.

     security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c

     e.g. "ima: Allocating IMA blacklist keyring.\n"

For the rest of the files under security/integrity, there will be no
change in the message format.

Suggested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-02-28 14:32:58 -05:00
Tushar Sugandhi
72ec611c64 IMA: Add log statements for failure conditions
process_buffer_measurement() does not have log messages for failure
conditions.

This change adds a log statement in the above function.

Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-02-28 14:32:58 -05:00
Tushar Sugandhi
e2bf6814be IMA: Update KBUILD_MODNAME for IMA files to ima
The kbuild Makefile specifies object files for vmlinux in the $(obj-y)
lists. These lists depend on the kernel configuration[1].

The kbuild Makefile for IMA combines the object files for IMA into a
single object file namely ima.o. All the object files for IMA should be
combined into ima.o. But certain object files are being added to their
own $(obj-y). This results in the log messages from those modules getting
prefixed with their respective base file name, instead of "ima". This is
inconsistent with the log messages from the IMA modules that are combined
into ima.o.

This change fixes the above issue.

[1] Documentation\kbuild\makefiles.rst

Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-02-28 14:32:58 -05:00
Stephen Smalley
e3e0b582c3 selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling
Remove initial SIDs that have never been used or are no longer used by
the kernel from its string table, which is also used to generate the
SECINITSID_* symbols referenced in code.  Update the code to
gracefully handle the fact that these can now be NULL. Stop treating
it as an error if a policy defines additional initial SIDs unknown to
the kernel.  Do not load unused initial SID contexts into the sidtab.
Fix the incorrect usage of the name from the ocontext in error
messages when loading initial SIDs since these are not presently
written to the kernel policy and are therefore always NULL.

After this change, it is possible to safely reclaim and reuse some of
the unused initial SIDs without compatibility issues.  Specifically,
unused initial SIDs that were being assigned the same context as the
unlabeled initial SID in policies can be reclaimed and reused for
another purpose, with existing policies still treating them as having
the unlabeled context and future policies having the option of mapping
them to a more specific context.  For example, this could have been
used when the infiniband labeling support was introduced to define
initial SIDs for the default pkey and endport SIDs similar to the
handling of port/netif/node SIDs rather than always using
SECINITSID_UNLABELED as the default.

The set of safely reclaimable unused initial SIDs across all known
policies is igmp_packet (13), icmp_socket (14), tcp_socket (15), kmod
(24), policy (25), and scmp_packet (26); these initial SIDs were
assigned the same context as unlabeled in all known policies including
mls.  If only considering non-mls policies (i.e. assuming that mls
users always upgrade policy with their kernels), the set of safely
reclaimable unused initial SIDs further includes file_labels (6), init
(7), sysctl_modprobe (16), and sysctl_fs (18) through sysctl_dev (23).

Adding new initial SIDs beyond SECINITSID_NUM to policy unfortunately
became a fatal error in commit 24ed7fdae6 ("selinux: use separate
table for initial SID lookup") and even before that it could cause
problems on a policy reload (collision between the new initial SID and
one allocated at runtime) ever since commit 42596eafdd ("selinux:
load the initial SIDs upon every policy load") so we cannot safely
start adding new initial SIDs to policies beyond SECINITSID_NUM (27)
until such a time as all such kernels do not need to be supported and
only those that include this commit are relevant. That is not a big
deal since we haven't added a new initial SID since 2004 (v2.6.7) and
we have plenty of unused ones we can reclaim if we truly need one.

If we want to avoid the wasted storage in initial_sid_to_string[]
and/or sidtab->isids[] for the unused initial SIDs, we could introduce
an indirection between the kernel initial SID values and the policy
initial SID values and just map the policy SID values in the ocontexts
to the kernel values during policy_load_isids(). Originally I thought
we'd do this by preserving the initial SID names in the kernel policy
and creating a mapping at load time like we do for the security
classes and permissions but that would require a new kernel policy
format version and associated changes to libsepol/checkpolicy and I'm
not sure it is justified. Simpler approach is just to create a fixed
mapping table in the kernel from the existing fixed policy values to
the kernel values. Less flexible but probably sufficient.

A separate selinux userspace change was applied in
8677ce5e8f
to enable removal of most of the unused initial SID contexts from
policies, but there is no dependency between that change and this one.
That change permits removing all of the unused initial SID contexts
from policy except for the fs and sysctl SID contexts.  The initial
SID declarations themselves would remain in policy to preserve the
values of subsequent ones but the contexts can be dropped.  If/when
the kernel decides to reuse one of them, future policies can change
the name and start assigning a context again without breaking
compatibility.

Here is how I would envision staging changes to the initial SIDs in a
compatible manner after this commit is applied:

1. At any time after this commit is applied, the kernel could choose
to reclaim one of the safely reclaimable unused initial SIDs listed
above for a new purpose (i.e. replace its NULL entry in the
initial_sid_to_string[] table with a new name and start using the
newly generated SECINITSID_name symbol in code), and refpolicy could
at that time rename its declaration of that initial SID to reflect its
new purpose and start assigning it a context going
forward. Existing/old policies would map the reclaimed initial SID to
the unlabeled context, so that would be the initial default behavior
until policies are updated. This doesn't depend on the selinux
userspace change; it will work with existing policies and userspace.

2. In 6 months or so we'll have another SELinux userspace release that
will include the libsepol/checkpolicy support for omitting unused
initial SID contexts.

3. At any time after that release, refpolicy can make that release its
minimum build requirement and drop the sid context statements (but not
the sid declarations) for all of the unused initial SIDs except for
fs and sysctl, which must remain for compatibility on policy
reload with old kernels and for compatibility with kernels that were
still using SECINITSID_SYSCTL (< 2.6.39). This doesn't depend on this
kernel commit; it will work with previous kernels as well.

4. After N years for some value of N, refpolicy decides that it no
longer cares about policy reload compatibility for kernels that
predate this kernel commit, and refpolicy drops the fs and sysctl
SID contexts from policy too (but retains the declarations).

5. After M years for some value of M, the kernel decides that it no
longer cares about compatibility with refpolicies that predate step 4
(dropping the fs and sysctl SIDs), and those two SIDs also become
safely reclaimable.  This step is optional and need not ever occur unless
we decide that the need to reclaim those two SIDs outweighs the
compatibility cost.

6. After O years for some value of O, refpolicy decides that it no
longer cares about policy load (not just reload) compatibility for
kernels that predate this kernel commit, and both kernel and refpolicy
can then start adding and using new initial SIDs beyond 27. This does
not depend on the previous change (step 5) and can occur independent
of it.

Fixes: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/12
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-27 19:34:24 -05:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
e0ac568de1 selinux: reduce the use of hard-coded hash sizes
Instead allocate hash tables with just the right size based on the
actual number of elements (which is almost always known beforehand, we
just need to defer the hashtab allocation to the right time). The only
case when we don't know the size (with the current policy format) is the
new filename transitions hashtable. Here I just left the existing value.

After this patch, the time to load Fedora policy on x86_64 decreases
from 790 ms to 167 ms. If the unconfined module is removed, it decreases
from 750 ms to 122 ms. It is also likely that other operations are going
to be faster, mainly string_to_context_struct() or mls_compute_sid(),
but I didn't try to quantify that.

The memory usage of all hash table arrays increases from ~58 KB to
~163 KB (with Fedora policy on x86_64).

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-27 19:23:20 -05:00
Ingo Molnar
e9765680a3 EFI updates for v5.7:
This time, the set of changes for the EFI subsystem is much larger than
 usual. The main reasons are:
 - Get things cleaned up before EFI support for RISC-V arrives, which will
   increase the size of the validation matrix, and therefore the threshold to
   making drastic changes,
 - After years of defunct maintainership, the GRUB project has finally started
   to consider changes from the distros regarding UEFI boot, some of which are
   highly specific to the way x86 does UEFI secure boot and measured boot,
   based on knowledge of both shim internals and the layout of bootparams and
   the x86 setup header. Having this maintenance burden on other architectures
   (which don't need shim in the first place) is hard to justify, so instead,
   we are introducing a generic Linux/UEFI boot protocol.
 
 Summary of changes:
 - Boot time GDT handling changes (Arvind)
 - Simplify handling of EFI properties table on arm64
 - Generic EFI stub cleanups, to improve command line handling, file I/O,
   memory allocation, etc.
 - Introduce a generic initrd loading method based on calling back into
   the firmware, instead of relying on the x86 EFI handover protocol or
   device tree.
 - Introduce a mixed mode boot method that does not rely on the x86 EFI
   handover protocol either, and could potentially be adopted by other
   architectures (if another one ever surfaces where one execution mode
   is a superset of another)
 - Clean up the contents of struct efi, and move out everything that
   doesn't need to be stored there.
 - Incorporate support for UEFI spec v2.8A changes that permit firmware
   implementations to return EFI_UNSUPPORTED from UEFI runtime services at
   OS runtime, and expose a mask of which ones are supported or unsupported
   via a configuration table.
 - Various documentation updates and minor code cleanups (Heinrich)
 - Partial fix for the lack of by-VA cache maintenance in the decompressor
   on 32-bit ARM. Note that these patches were deliberately put at the
   beginning so they can be used as a stable branch that will be shared with
   a PR containing the complete fix, which I will send to the ARM tree.
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQEzBAABCgAdFiEEnNKg2mrY9zMBdeK7wjcgfpV0+n0FAl5S7WYACgkQwjcgfpV0
 +n1jmQgAmwV3V8pbgB4mi4P2Mv8w5Zj5feUe6uXnTR2AFv5nygLcTzdxN+TU/6lc
 OmZv2zzdsAscYlhuUdI/4t4cXIjHAZI39+UBoNRuMqKbkbvXCFscZANLxvJjHjZv
 FFbgUk0DXkF0BCEDuSLNavidAv4b3gZsOmHbPfwuB8xdP05LbvbS2mf+2tWVAi2z
 ULfua/0o9yiwl19jSS6iQEPCvvLBeBzTLW7x5Rcm/S0JnotzB59yMaeqD7jO8JYP
 5PvI4WM/l5UfVHnZp2k1R76AOjReALw8dQgqAsT79Q7+EH3sNNuIjU6omdy+DFf4
 tnpwYfeLOaZ1SztNNfU87Hsgnn2CGw==
 =pDE3
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'efi-next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi into efi/core

Pull EFI updates for v5.7 from Ard Biesheuvel:

This time, the set of changes for the EFI subsystem is much larger than
usual. The main reasons are:

 - Get things cleaned up before EFI support for RISC-V arrives, which will
   increase the size of the validation matrix, and therefore the threshold to
   making drastic changes,

 - After years of defunct maintainership, the GRUB project has finally started
   to consider changes from the distros regarding UEFI boot, some of which are
   highly specific to the way x86 does UEFI secure boot and measured boot,
   based on knowledge of both shim internals and the layout of bootparams and
   the x86 setup header. Having this maintenance burden on other architectures
   (which don't need shim in the first place) is hard to justify, so instead,
   we are introducing a generic Linux/UEFI boot protocol.

Summary of changes:

 - Boot time GDT handling changes (Arvind)

 - Simplify handling of EFI properties table on arm64

 - Generic EFI stub cleanups, to improve command line handling, file I/O,
   memory allocation, etc.

 - Introduce a generic initrd loading method based on calling back into
   the firmware, instead of relying on the x86 EFI handover protocol or
   device tree.

 - Introduce a mixed mode boot method that does not rely on the x86 EFI
   handover protocol either, and could potentially be adopted by other
   architectures (if another one ever surfaces where one execution mode
   is a superset of another)

 - Clean up the contents of struct efi, and move out everything that
   doesn't need to be stored there.

 - Incorporate support for UEFI spec v2.8A changes that permit firmware
   implementations to return EFI_UNSUPPORTED from UEFI runtime services at
   OS runtime, and expose a mask of which ones are supported or unsupported
   via a configuration table.

 - Various documentation updates and minor code cleanups (Heinrich)

 - Partial fix for the lack of by-VA cache maintenance in the decompressor
   on 32-bit ARM. Note that these patches were deliberately put at the
   beginning so they can be used as a stable branch that will be shared with
   a PR containing the complete fix, which I will send to the ARM tree.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2020-02-26 15:21:22 +01:00
Ard Biesheuvel
6b75d54d52 integrity: Check properly whether EFI GetVariable() is available
Testing the value of the efi.get_variable function pointer is not
the right way to establish whether the platform supports EFI
variables at runtime. Instead, use the newly added granular check
that can test for the presence of each EFI runtime service
individually.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
2020-02-23 21:59:42 +01:00
Richard Haines
e4cfa05e9b selinux: Add xfs quota command types
Add Q_XQUOTAOFF, Q_XQUOTAON and Q_XSETQLIM to trigger filesystem quotamod
permission check.

Add Q_XGETQUOTA, Q_XGETQSTAT, Q_XGETQSTATV and Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA to trigger
filesystem quotaget permission check.

Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-22 14:41:21 -05:00
Ondrej Mosnacek
c3a276111e selinux: optimize storage of filename transitions
In these rules, each rule with the same (target type, target class,
filename) values is (in practice) always mapped to the same result type.
Therefore, it is much more efficient to group the rules by (ttype,
tclass, filename).

Thus, this patch drops the stype field from the key and changes the
datum to be a linked list of one or more structures that contain a
result type and an ebitmap of source types that map the given target to
the given result type under the given filename. The size of the hash
table is also incremented to 2048 to be more optimal for Fedora policy
(which currently has ~2500 unique (ttype, tclass, filename) tuples,
regardless of whether the 'unconfined' module is enabled).

Not only does this dramtically reduce memory usage when the policy
contains a lot of unconfined domains (ergo a lot of filename based
transitions), but it also slightly reduces memory usage of strongly
confined policies (modeled on Fedora policy with 'unconfined' module
disabled) and significantly reduces lookup times of these rules on
Fedora (roughly matches the performance of the rhashtable conversion
patch [1] posted recently to selinux@vger.kernel.org).

An obvious next step is to change binary policy format to match this
layout, so that disk space is also saved. However, since that requires
more work (including matching userspace changes) and this patch is
already beneficial on its own, I'm posting it separately.

Performance/memory usage comparison:

Kernel           | Policy load | Policy load   | Mem usage | Mem usage     | openbench
                 |             | (-unconfined) |           | (-unconfined) | (createfiles)
-----------------|-------------|---------------|-----------|---------------|--------------
reference        |       1,30s |         0,91s |      90MB |          77MB | 55 us/file
rhashtable patch |       0.98s |         0,85s |      85MB |          75MB | 38 us/file
this patch       |       0,95s |         0,87s |      75MB |          75MB | 40 us/file

(Memory usage is measured after boot. With SELinux disabled the memory
usage was ~60MB on the same system.)

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20200116213937.77795-1-dev@lynxeye.de/T/

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2020-02-22 11:22:32 -05:00
Linus Torvalds
ebe7acadf5 Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull IMA fixes from Mimi Zohar:
 "Two bug fixes and an associated change for each.

  The one that adds SM3 to the IMA list of supported hash algorithms is
  a simple change, but could be considered a new feature"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  ima: add sm3 algorithm to hash algorithm configuration list
  crypto: rename sm3-256 to sm3 in hash_algo_name
  efi: Only print errors about failing to get certs if EFI vars are found
  x86/ima: use correct identifier for SetupMode variable
2020-02-20 15:15:16 -08:00
Tianjia Zhang
5780b9abd5 ima: add sm3 algorithm to hash algorithm configuration list
sm3 has been supported by the ima hash algorithm, but it is not
yet in the Kconfig configuration list. After adding, both ima and tpm2
can support sm3 well.

Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-02-18 07:35:49 -05:00
Javier Martinez Canillas
3be54d558c efi: Only print errors about failing to get certs if EFI vars are found
If CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS is enabled, the kernel attempts to load the certs
from the db, dbx and MokListRT EFI variables into the appropriate keyrings.

But it just assumes that the variables will be present and prints an error
if the certs can't be loaded, even when is possible that the variables may
not exist. For example the MokListRT variable will only be present if shim
is used.

So only print an error message about failing to get the certs list from an
EFI variable if this is found. Otherwise these printed errors just pollute
the kernel log ring buffer with confusing messages like the following:

[    5.427251] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
[    5.427261] MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list
[    5.428012] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e
[    5.428023] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT

Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2020-02-18 07:35:48 -05:00