API:
- Add virtual-address based lskcipher interface.
- Optimise ahash/shash performance in light of costly indirect calls.
- Remove ahash alignmask attribute.
Algorithms:
- Improve AES/XTS performance of 6-way unrolling for ppc.
- Remove some uses of obsolete algorithms (md4, md5, sha1).
- Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 support in pkcs1pad.
- Add fast path for single-page messages in adiantum.
- Remove zlib-deflate.
Drivers:
- Add support for S4 in meson RNG driver.
- Add STM32MP13x support in stm32.
- Add hwrng interface support in qcom-rng.
- Add support for deflate algorithm in hisilicon/zip.
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Merge tag 'v6.7-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Add virtual-address based lskcipher interface
- Optimise ahash/shash performance in light of costly indirect calls
- Remove ahash alignmask attribute
Algorithms:
- Improve AES/XTS performance of 6-way unrolling for ppc
- Remove some uses of obsolete algorithms (md4, md5, sha1)
- Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 support in pkcs1pad
- Add fast path for single-page messages in adiantum
- Remove zlib-deflate
Drivers:
- Add support for S4 in meson RNG driver
- Add STM32MP13x support in stm32
- Add hwrng interface support in qcom-rng
- Add support for deflate algorithm in hisilicon/zip"
* tag 'v6.7-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (283 commits)
crypto: adiantum - flush destination page before unmapping
crypto: testmgr - move pkcs1pad(rsa,sha3-*) to correct place
Documentation/module-signing.txt: bring up to date
module: enable automatic module signing with FIPS 202 SHA-3
crypto: asymmetric_keys - allow FIPS 202 SHA-3 signatures
crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 support
crypto: FIPS 202 SHA-3 register in hash info for IMA
x509: Add OIDs for FIPS 202 SHA-3 hash and signatures
crypto: ahash - optimize performance when wrapping shash
crypto: ahash - check for shash type instead of not ahash type
crypto: hash - move "ahash wrapping shash" functions to ahash.c
crypto: talitos - stop using crypto_ahash::init
crypto: chelsio - stop using crypto_ahash::init
crypto: ahash - improve file comment
crypto: ahash - remove struct ahash_request_priv
crypto: ahash - remove crypto_ahash_alignmask
crypto: gcm - stop using alignmask of ahash
crypto: chacha20poly1305 - stop using alignmask of ahash
crypto: ccm - stop using alignmask of ahash
net: ipv6: stop checking crypto_ahash_alignmask
...
Originally the secondary trusted keyring provided a keyring to which extra
keys may be added, provided those keys were not blacklisted and were
vouched for by a key built into the kernel or already in the secondary
trusted keyring.
On systems with the machine keyring configured, additional keys may also
be vouched for by a key on the machine keyring.
Prevent loading additional certificates directly onto the secondary
keyring, vouched for by keys on the machine keyring, yet allow these
certificates to be loaded onto other trusted keyrings.
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Add Kconfig options to use SHA-3 for kernel module signing. 256 size
for RSA only, and higher sizes for RSA and NIST P-384.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
NIST FIPS 186-5 states that it is recommended that the security
strength associated with the bit length of n and the security strength
of the hash function be the same, or higher upon agreement. Given NIST
P384 curve is used, force using either SHA384 or SHA512.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Commit e90886291c ("certs: make system keyring depend on x509 parser")
is not the right fix because x509_load_certificate_list() can be modular.
The combination of CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y and
CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER=m still results in the following error:
LD .tmp_vmlinux.kallsyms1
ld: certs/system_keyring.o: in function `load_system_certificate_list':
system_keyring.c:(.init.text+0x8c): undefined reference to `x509_load_certificate_list'
make: *** [Makefile:1169: vmlinux] Error 1
Fixes: e90886291c ("certs: make system keyring depend on x509 parser")
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Adam Borowski <kilobyte@angband.pl>
Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user
to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring. This enables to
invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or
from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain. This also enables to
add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.
Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been
trusted is a sensitive operation. This is why adding new hashes to the
blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and
vouched by the builtin trusted keyring. A blacklist hash is stored as a
key description. The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be
provided as the key payload.
Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system
is running. It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.
Update blacklist keyring, blacklist key and revoked certificate access
rights:
* allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which
make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
* forbids key update (blacklist and asymmetric ones);
* restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the
root user rights.
See help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-6-mic@digikod.net
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Add and use a check-blacklist-hashes.awk script to make sure that the
builtin blacklist hashes set with CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST will
effectively be taken into account as blacklisted hashes. This is useful
to debug invalid hash formats, and it make sure that previous hashes
which could have been loaded in the kernel, but silently ignored, are
now noticed and deal with by the user at kernel build time.
This also prevent stricter blacklist key description checking (provided
by following commits) to failed for builtin hashes.
Update CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST help to explain the content of
a hash string and how to generate certificate ones.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-3-mic@digikod.net
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
When the condition "MODULE_SIG || (IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG && MODULES)"
is unmet, you cannot choose anything in the choice, but the choice
menu is still displayed in the menuconfig etc.
Move the 'depends on' to the choice to hide the meaningless menu.
Also delete the redundant 'default'. In a choice, the first entry is
the default.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Add support for using elliptic curve keys for signing modules. It uses
a NIST P384 (secp384r1) key if the user chooses an elliptic curve key
and will have ECDSA support built into the kernel.
Note: A developer choosing an ECDSA key for signing modules should still
delete the signing key (rm certs/signing_key.*) when building an older
version of a kernel that only supports RSA keys. Unless kbuild automati-
cally detects and generates a new kernel module key, ECDSA-signed kernel
modules will fail signature verification.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
"In addition to loading the kernel module signing key onto the builtin
keyring, load it onto the IMA keyring as well.
Also six trivial changes and bug fixes"
* tag 'integrity-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: ensure IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG has necessary dependencies
ima: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
integrity: Add declarations to init_once void arguments.
ima: Fix function name error in comment.
ima: enable loading of build time generated key on .ima keyring
ima: enable signing of modules with build time generated key
keys: cleanup build time module signing keys
ima: Fix the error code for restoring the PCR value
ima: without an IMA policy loaded, return quickly
IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG is used for verifying the integrity of both kernel
and modules. Enabling IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG without MODULES causes a build
break.
Ensure the build time kernel signing key is only generated if both
IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG and MODULES are enabled.
Fixes: 0165f4ca22 ("ima: enable signing of modules with build time generated key")
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> # build-tested
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The kernel build process currently only signs kernel modules when
MODULE_SIG is enabled. Also, sign the kernel modules at build time when
IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
As we move stuff around, some doc references are broken. Fix some of
them via this script:
./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix
Manually checked if the produced result is valid, removing a few
false-positives.
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Acked-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Add the following:
(1) A new system keyring that is used to store information about
blacklisted certificates and signatures.
(2) A new key type (called 'blacklist') that is used to store a
blacklisted hash in its description as a hex string. The key accepts
no payload.
(3) The ability to configure a list of blacklisted hashes into the kernel
at build time. This is done by setting
CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST to the filename of a list of hashes
that are in the form:
"<hash>", "<hash>", ..., "<hash>"
where each <hash> is a hex string representation of the hash and must
include all necessary leading zeros to pad the hash to the right size.
The above are enabled with CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING.
Once the kernel is booted, the blacklist keyring can be listed:
root@andromeda ~]# keyctl show %:.blacklist
Keyring
723359729 ---lswrv 0 0 keyring: .blacklist
676257228 ---lswrv 0 0 \_ blacklist: 123412341234c55c1dcc601ab8e172917706aa32fb5eaf826813547fdf02dd46
The blacklist cannot currently be modified by userspace, but it will be
possible to load it, for example, from the UEFI blacklist database.
A later commit will make it possible to load blacklisted asymmetric keys in
here too.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to by root whilst the
system is running - provided the key being added is vouched for by a key
built into the kernel or already added to the secondary keyring.
Rename .system_keyring to .builtin_trusted_keys to distinguish it more
obviously from the new keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys).
The new keyring needs to be enabled with CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING.
If the secondary keyring is enabled, a link is created from that to
.builtin_trusted_keys so that the the latter will automatically be searched
too if the secondary keyring is searched.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Make the system trusted keyring depend on the asymmetric key type as
there's not a lot of point having it if you can't then load asymmetric keys
onto it.
This requires the ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE to be made a bool, not a tristate, as
the Kconfig language doesn't then correctly force ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE to
'y' rather than 'm' if SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING is 'y'.
Making SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING *select* ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE instead doesn't
work as the Kconfig interpreter then wrongly complains about dependency
loops.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Place a system_extra_cert buffer of configurable size, right after the
system_certificate_list, so that inserted keys can be readily processed by
the existing mechanism. Added script takes a key file and a kernel image
and inserts its contents to the reserved area. The
system_certificate_list_size is also adjusted accordingly.
Call the script as:
scripts/insert-sys-cert -b <vmlinux> -c <certfile>
If vmlinux has no symbol table, supply System.map file with -s flag.
Subsequent runs replace the previously inserted key, instead of appending
the new one.
Signed-off-by: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Move certificate handling out of the kernel/ directory and into a certs/
directory to get all the weird stuff in one place and move the generated
signing keys into this directory.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
