Commit Graph

22 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Thorsten Blum
6e61ee1ca5 crypto: jitter - Use kvfree_sensitive() to fix Coccinelle warning
Replace memzero_explicit() and kvfree() with kvfree_sensitive() to fix
the following Coccinelle/coccicheck warning reported by
kfree_sensitive.cocci:

	WARNING opportunity for kfree_sensitive/kvfree_sensitive

Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@toblux.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2024-04-05 15:46:33 +08:00
Stephan Müller
8405ec8e3c crypto: jitter - reuse allocated entropy collector
In case a health test error occurs during runtime, the power-up health
tests are rerun to verify that the noise source is still good and
that the reported health test error was an outlier. For performing this
power-up health test, the already existing entropy collector instance
is used instead of allocating a new one. This change has the following
implications:

* The noise that is collected as part of the newly run health tests is
  inserted into the entropy collector and thus stirs the existing
  data present in there further. Thus, the entropy collected during
  the health test is not wasted. This is also allowed by SP800-90B.

* The power-on health test is not affected by the state of the entropy
  collector, because it resets the APT / RCT state. The remainder of
  the state is unrelated to the health test as it is only applied to
  newly obtained time stamps.

This change also fixes a bug report about an allocation while in an
atomic lock (the lock is taken in jent_kcapi_random, jent_read_entropy
is called and this can call jent_entropy_init).

Fixes: 04597c8dd6 ("jitter - add RCT/APT support for different OSRs")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2023-10-13 18:31:07 +08:00
Stephan Müller
0baa8fab33 crypto: jitter - Allow configuration of oversampling rate
The oversampling rate used by the Jitter RNG allows the configuration of
the heuristically implied entropy in one timing measurement. This
entropy rate is (1 / OSR) bits of entropy per time stamp.

Considering that the Jitter RNG now support APT/RCT health tests for
different OSRs, allow this value to be configured at compile time to
support systems with limited amount of entropy in their timer.

The allowed range of OSR values complies with the APT/RCT cutoff health
test values which range from 1 through 15.

The default value of the OSR selection support is left at 1 which is the
current default. Thus, the addition of the configuration support does
not alter the default Jitter RNG behavior.

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2023-10-01 16:28:15 +08:00
Stephan Müller
59bcfd7885 crypto: jitter - Allow configuration of memory size
The memory size consumed by the Jitter RNG is one contributing factor in
the amount of entropy that is gathered. As the amount of entropy
directly correlates with the distance of the memory from the CPU, the
caches that are possibly present on a given system have an impact on the
collected entropy.

Thus, the kernel compile time should offer a means to configure the
amount of memory used by the Jitter RNG. Although this option could be
turned into a runtime option (e.g. a kernel command line option), it
should remain a compile time option as otherwise adminsitrators who may
not have performed an entropy assessment may select a value that is
inappropriate.

The default value selected by the configuration is identical to the
current Jitter RNG value. Thus, the patch should not lead to any change
in the Jitter RNG behavior.

To accommodate larger memory buffers, kvzalloc / kvfree is used.

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2023-10-01 16:28:15 +08:00
Stephan Müller
04597c8dd6 crypto: jitter - add RCT/APT support for different OSRs
The oversampling rate (OSR) value specifies the heuristically implied
entropy in the recorded data - H_submitter = 1/osr. A different entropy
estimate implies a different APT/RCT cutoff value. This change adds
support for OSRs 1 through 15. This OSR can be selected by the caller
of the Jitter RNG.

For this patch, the caller still uses one hard-coded OSR. A subsequent
patch allows this value to be configured.

In addition, the power-up self test is adjusted as follows:

* It allows the caller to provide an oversampling rate that should be
tested with - commonly it should be the same as used for the actual
runtime operation. This makes the power-up testing therefore consistent
with the runtime operation.

* It calls now jent_measure_jitter (i.e. collects the full entropy
that can possibly be harvested by the Jitter RNG) instead of only
jent_condition_data (which only returns the entropy harvested from
the conditioning component). This should now alleviate reports where
the Jitter RNG initialization thinks there is too little entropy.

* The power-up test now solely relies on the (enhanced) APT and RCT
test that is used as a health test at runtime.

The code allowing the different OSRs as well as the power-up test
changes are present in the user space version of the Jitter RNG 3.4.1
and thus was already in production use for some time.

Reported-by "Ospan, Abylay" <aospan@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2023-10-01 16:28:15 +08:00
Stephan Müller
69f1c387ba crypto: jitter - add interface for gathering of raw entropy
The test interface allows a privileged process to capture the raw
unconditioned noise that is collected by the Jitter RNG for statistical
analysis. Such testing allows the analysis how much entropy
the Jitter RNG noise source provides on a given platform. The obtained
data is the time stamp sampled by the Jitter RNG. Considering that
the Jitter RNG inserts the delta of this time stamp compared to the
immediately preceding time stamp, the obtained data needs to be
post-processed accordingly to obtain the data the Jitter RNG inserts
into its entropy pool.

The raw entropy collection is provided to obtain the raw unmodified
time stamps that are about to be added to the Jitter RNG entropy pool
and are credited with entropy. Thus, this patch adds an interface
which renders the Jitter RNG insecure. This patch is NOT INTENDED
FOR PRODUCTION SYSTEMS, but solely for development/test systems to
verify the available entropy rate.

Access to the data is given through the jent_raw_hires debugfs file.
The data buffer should be multiples of sizeof(u32) to fill the entire
buffer. Using the option jitterentropy_testing.boot_raw_hires_test=1
the raw noise of the first 1000 entropy events since boot can be
sampled.

This test interface allows generating the data required for
analysis whether the Jitter RNG is in compliance with SP800-90B
sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4.

If the test interface is not compiled, its code is a noop which has no
impact on the performance.

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2023-05-12 18:48:01 +08:00
Stephan Müller
bb897c5504 crypto: jitter - replace LFSR with SHA3-256
Using the kernel crypto API, the SHA3-256 algorithm is used as
conditioning element to replace the LFSR in the Jitter RNG. All other
parts of the Jitter RNG are unchanged.

The application and use of the SHA-3 conditioning operation is identical
to the user space Jitter RNG 3.4.0 by applying the following concept:

- the Jitter RNG initializes a SHA-3 state which acts as the "entropy
  pool" when the Jitter RNG is allocated.

- When a new time delta is obtained, it is inserted into the "entropy
  pool" with a SHA-3 update operation. Note, this operation in most of
  the cases is a simple memcpy() onto the SHA-3 stack.

- To cause a true SHA-3 operation for each time delta operation, a
  second SHA-3 operation is performed hashing Jitter RNG status
  information. The final message digest is also inserted into the
  "entropy pool" with a SHA-3 update operation. Yet, this data is not
  considered to provide any entropy, but it shall stir the entropy pool.

- To generate a random number, a SHA-3 final operation is performed to
  calculate a message digest followed by an immediate SHA-3 init to
  re-initialize the "entropy pool". The obtained message digest is one
  block of the Jitter RNG that is returned to the caller.

Mathematically speaking, the random number generated by the Jitter RNG
is:

aux_t = SHA-3(Jitter RNG state data)

Jitter RNG block = SHA-3(time_i || aux_i || time_(i-1) || aux_(i-1) ||
                         ... || time_(i-255) || aux_(i-255))

when assuming that the OSR = 1, i.e. the default value.

This operation implies that the Jitter RNG has an output-blocksize of
256 bits instead of the 64 bits of the LFSR-based Jitter RNG that is
replaced with this patch.

The patch also replaces the varying number of invocations of the
conditioning function with one fixed number of invocations. The use
of the conditioning function consistent with the userspace Jitter RNG
library version 3.4.0.

The code is tested with a system that exhibited the least amount of
entropy generated by the Jitter RNG: the SiFive Unmatched RISC-V
system. The measured entropy rate is well above the heuristically
implied entropy value of 1 bit of entropy per time delta. On all other
tested systems, the measured entropy rate is even higher by orders
of magnitude. The measurement was performed using updated tooling
provided with the user space Jitter RNG library test framework.

The performance of the Jitter RNG with this patch is about en par
with the performance of the Jitter RNG without the patch.

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2023-05-12 18:48:01 +08:00
Stephan Müller
3fde2fe99a crypto: jitter - permanent and intermittent health errors
According to SP800-90B, two health failures are allowed: the intermittend
and the permanent failure. So far, only the intermittent failure was
implemented. The permanent failure was achieved by resetting the entire
entropy source including its health test state and waiting for two or
more back-to-back health errors.

This approach is appropriate for RCT, but not for APT as APT has a
non-linear cutoff value. Thus, this patch implements 2 cutoff values
for both RCT/APT. This implies that the health state is left untouched
when an intermittent failure occurs. The noise source is reset
and a new APT powerup-self test is performed. Yet, whith the unchanged
health test state, the counting of failures continues until a permanent
failure is reached.

Any non-failing raw entropy value causes the health tests to reset.

The intermittent error has an unchanged significance level of 2^-30.
The permanent error has a significance level of 2^-60. Considering that
this level also indicates a false-positive rate (see SP800-90B section 4.2)
a false-positive must only be incurred with a low probability when
considering a fleet of Linux kernels as a whole. Hitting the permanent
error may cause a panic(), the following calculation applies: Assuming
that a fleet of 10^9 Linux kernels run concurrently with this patch in
FIPS mode and on each kernel 2 health tests are performed every minute
for one year, the chances of a false positive is about 1:1000
based on the binomial distribution.

In addition, any power-up health test errors triggered with
jent_entropy_init are treated as permanent errors.

A permanent failure causes the entire entropy source to permanently
return an error. This implies that a caller can only remedy the situation
by re-allocating a new instance of the Jitter RNG. In a subsequent
patch, a transparent re-allocation will be provided which also changes
the implied heuristic entropy assessment.

In addition, when the kernel is booted with fips=1, the Jitter RNG
is defined to be part of a FIPS module. The permanent error of the
Jitter RNG is translated as a FIPS module error. In this case, the entire
FIPS module must cease operation. This is implemented in the kernel by
invoking panic().

The patch also fixes an off-by-one in the RCT cutoff value which is now
set to 30 instead of 31. This is because the counting of the values
starts with 0.

Reviewed-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2023-04-06 16:18:53 +08:00
Nicolai Stange
b454fb7025 crypto: jitter - don't limit ->health_failure check to FIPS mode
The jitterentropy's Repetition Count Test (RCT) as well as the Adaptive
Proportion Test (APT) are run unconditionally on any collected samples.
However, their result, i.e. ->health_failure, will only get checked if
fips_enabled is set, c.f. the jent_health_failure() wrapper.

I would argue that a RCT or APT failure indicates that something's
seriously off and that this should always be reported as an error,
independently of whether FIPS mode is enabled or not: it should be up to
callers whether or not and how to handle jitterentropy failures.

Make jent_health_failure() to unconditionally return ->health_failure,
independent of whether fips_enabled is set.

Note that fips_enabled isn't accessed from the jitterentropy code anymore
now. Remove the linux/fips.h include as well as the jent_fips_enabled()
wrapper.

Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2021-12-11 16:48:06 +11:00
Herbert Xu
0c3dc787a6 crypto: algapi - Remove skbuff.h inclusion
The header file algapi.h includes skbuff.h unnecessarily since
all we need is a forward declaration for struct sk_buff.  This
patch removes that inclusion.

Unfortunately skbuff.h pulls in a lot of things and drivers over
the years have come to rely on it so this patch adds a lot of
missing inclusions that result from this.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-08-20 14:04:28 +10:00
Waiman Long
453431a549 mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive()
As said by Linus:

  A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
  Otherwise it's actively misleading.

  In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
  caller wants.

  In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
  future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
  something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.

The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.

Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently
added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit.
In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure
that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.

The renaming is done by using the command sequence:

  git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
  xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/'

followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding
a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more]

Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 11:33:22 -07:00
Stephan Müller
764428fe99 crypto: jitter - SP800-90B compliance
SP800-90B specifies various requirements for the noise source(s) that
may seed any DRNG including SP800-90A DRBGs. In November 2020,
SP800-90B will be mandated for all noise sources that provide entropy
to DRBGs as part of a FIPS 140-[2|3] validation or other evaluation
types. Without SP800-90B compliance, a noise source is defined to always
deliver zero bits of entropy.

This patch ports the SP800-90B compliance from the user space Jitter RNG
version 2.2.0.

The following changes are applied:

- addition of (an enhanced version of) the repetitive count test (RCT)
  from SP800-90B section 4.4.1 - the enhancement is due to the fact of
  using the stuck test as input to the RCT.

- addition of the adaptive proportion test (APT) from SP800-90B section
  4.4.2

- update of the power-on self test to perform a test measurement of 1024
  noise samples compliant to SP800-90B section 4.3

- remove of the continuous random number generator test which is
  replaced by APT and RCT

Health test failures due to the SP800-90B operation are only enforced in
FIPS mode. If a runtime health test failure is detected, the Jitter RNG
is reset. If more than 1024 resets in a row are performed, a permanent
error is returned to the caller.

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-04-24 17:42:17 +10:00
Ben Dooks
965d7286d8 crypto: jitter - add header to fix buildwarnings
Fix the following build warnings by adding a header for
the definitions shared between jitterentropy.c and
jitterentropy-kcapi.c. Fixes the following:

crypto/jitterentropy.c:445:5: warning: symbol 'jent_read_entropy' was not declared. Should it be static?
crypto/jitterentropy.c:475:18: warning: symbol 'jent_entropy_collector_alloc' was not declared. Should it be static?
crypto/jitterentropy.c:509:6: warning: symbol 'jent_entropy_collector_free' was not declared. Should it be static?
crypto/jitterentropy.c:516:5: warning: symbol 'jent_entropy_init' was not declared. Should it be static?
crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c:59:6: warning: symbol 'jent_zalloc' was not declared. Should it be static?
crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c:64:6: warning: symbol 'jent_zfree' was not declared. Should it be static?
crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c:69:5: warning: symbol 'jent_fips_enabled' was not declared. Should it be static?
crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c:74:6: warning: symbol 'jent_panic' was not declared. Should it be static?
crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c:79:6: warning: symbol 'jent_memcpy' was not declared. Should it be static?
crypto/jitterentropy-kcapi.c:93:6: warning: symbol 'jent_get_nstime' was not declared. Should it be static?

Signed-off-by: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-10-18 18:49:40 +11:00
Herbert Xu
bdb275bb64 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Merge crypto tree to pick up vmx changes.
2019-06-20 14:17:24 +08:00
Stephan Müller
d9d67c87ad crypto: jitter - update implementation to 2.1.2
The Jitter RNG implementation is updated to comply with upstream version
2.1.2. The change covers the following aspects:

* Time variation measurement is conducted over the LFSR operation
instead of the XOR folding

* Invcation of stuck test during initialization

* Removal of the stirring functionality and the Von-Neumann
unbiaser as the LFSR using a primitive and irreducible polynomial
generates an identical distribution of random bits

This implementation was successfully used in FIPS 140-2 validations
as well as in German BSI evaluations.

This kernel implementation was tested as follows:

* The unchanged kernel code file jitterentropy.c is compiled as part
of user space application to generate raw unconditioned noise
data. That data is processed with the NIST SP800-90B non-IID test
tool to verify that the kernel code exhibits an equal amount of noise
as the upstream Jitter RNG version 2.1.2.

* Using AF_ALG with the libkcapi tool of kcapi-rng the Jitter RNG was
output tested with dieharder to verify that the output does not
exhibit statistical weaknesses. The following command was used:
kcapi-rng -n "jitterentropy_rng" -b 100000000000 | dieharder -a -g 200

* The unchanged kernel code file jitterentropy.c is compiled as part
of user space application to test the LFSR implementation. The
LFSR is injected a monotonically increasing counter as input and
the output is fed into dieharder to verify that the LFSR operation
does not exhibit statistical weaknesses.

* The patch was tested on the Muen separation kernel which returns
a more coarse time stamp to verify that the Jitter RNG does not cause
regressions with its initialization test considering that the Jitter
RNG depends on a high-resolution timer.

Tested-by: Reto Buerki <reet@codelabs.ch>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-06-06 14:38:57 +08:00
Eric Biggers
9c5b34c2f7 crypto: jitterentropy - change back to module_init()
"jitterentropy_rng" doesn't have any other implementations, nor is it
tested by the crypto self-tests.  So it was unnecessary to change it to
subsys_initcall.  Also it depends on the main clocksource being
initialized, which may happen after subsys_initcall, causing this error:

    jitterentropy: Initialization failed with host not compliant with requirements: 2

Change it back to module_init().

Fixes: c4741b2305 ("crypto: run initcalls for generic implementations earlier")
Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-05-30 15:25:57 +08:00
Eric Biggers
c4741b2305 crypto: run initcalls for generic implementations earlier
Use subsys_initcall for registration of all templates and generic
algorithm implementations, rather than module_init.  Then change
cryptomgr to use arch_initcall, to place it before the subsys_initcalls.

This is needed so that when both a generic and optimized implementation
of an algorithm are built into the kernel (not loadable modules), the
generic implementation is registered before the optimized one.
Otherwise, the self-tests for the optimized implementation are unable to
allocate the generic implementation for the new comparison fuzz tests.

Note that on arm, a side effect of this change is that self-tests for
generic implementations may run before the unaligned access handler has
been installed.  So, unaligned accesses will crash the kernel.  This is
arguably a good thing as it makes it easier to detect that type of bug.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-18 22:15:03 +08:00
Geliang Tang
e8b2fa476e crypto: jitterentropy - drop duplicate header module.h
Drop duplicate header module.h from jitterentropy-kcapi.c.

Signed-off-by: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-11-17 23:34:52 +08:00
Stephan Mueller
b578456c34 crypto: jitterentropy - use ktime_get_ns as fallback
As part of the Y2038 development, __getnstimeofday is not supposed to be
used any more. It is now replaced with ktime_get_ns. The Jitter RNG uses
the time stamp to measure the execution time of a given code path and
tries to detect variations in the execution time. Therefore, the only
requirement the Jitter RNG has, is a sufficient high resolution to
detect these variations.

The change was tested on x86 to show an identical behavior as RDTSC. The
used test code simply measures the execution time of the heart of the
RNG:

        jent_get_nstime(&time);
        jent_memaccess(ec, min);
        jent_fold_time(NULL, time, &folded, min);
        jent_get_nstime(&time2);
        return ((time2 - time));

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-06-24 21:24:58 +08:00
Alexander Kuleshov
f5128432b0 crypto: jitterentropy - remove unnecessary information from a comment
The clocksource does not provide clocksource_register() function since
f893598 commit (clocksource: Mostly kill clocksource_register()), so
let's remove unnecessary information about this function from a comment.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-10-14 22:23:16 +08:00
Kees Cook
0c5f0aa5dd crypto: jitterentropy - use safe format string parameters
Since the API for jent_panic() does not include format string parameters,
adjust the call to panic() to use a literal string to avoid any future
callers from leaking format strings into the panic message.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-07-28 15:03:34 +08:00
Stephan Mueller
dfc9fa9193 crypto: jitterentropy - avoid compiler warnings
The core of the Jitter RNG is intended to be compiled with -O0. To
ensure that the Jitter RNG can be compiled on all architectures,
separate out the RNG core into a stand-alone C file that can be compiled
with -O0 which does not depend on any kernel include file.

As no kernel includes can be used in the C file implementing the core
RNG, any dependencies on kernel code must be extracted.

A second file provides the link to the kernel and the kernel crypto API
that can be compiled with the regular compile options of the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-06-25 23:18:32 +08:00