diff --git a/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c b/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c
index 897634d0a67c..a951276f0547 100644
--- a/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c
+++ b/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c
@@ -1602,6 +1602,9 @@ exit:
 		rn = arm_bpf_get_reg32(src_lo, tmp2[1], ctx);
 		emit_ldx_r(dst, rn, off, ctx, BPF_SIZE(code));
 		break;
+	/* speculation barrier */
+	case BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC:
+		break;
 	/* ST: *(size *)(dst + off) = imm */
 	case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W:
 	case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H:
diff --git a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index dccf98a37283..41c23f474ea6 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -823,6 +823,19 @@ emit_cond_jmp:
 			return ret;
 		break;
 
+	/* speculation barrier */
+	case BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC:
+		/*
+		 * Nothing required here.
+		 *
+		 * In case of arm64, we rely on the firmware mitigation of
+		 * Speculative Store Bypass as controlled via the ssbd kernel
+		 * parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled, it works
+		 * for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any
+		 * additional instructions.
+		 */
+		break;
+
 	/* ST: *(size *)(dst + off) = imm */
 	case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W:
 	case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H:
diff --git a/arch/mips/net/ebpf_jit.c b/arch/mips/net/ebpf_jit.c
index 939dd06764bc..3a73e9375712 100644
--- a/arch/mips/net/ebpf_jit.c
+++ b/arch/mips/net/ebpf_jit.c
@@ -1355,6 +1355,9 @@ jeq_common:
 		}
 		break;
 
+	case BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC: /* speculation barrier */
+		break;
+
 	case BPF_ST | BPF_B | BPF_MEM:
 	case BPF_ST | BPF_H | BPF_MEM:
 	case BPF_ST | BPF_W | BPF_MEM:
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
index 34bb1583fc0c..beb12cbc8c29 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
@@ -737,6 +737,12 @@ int bpf_jit_build_body(struct bpf_prog *fp, u32 *image, struct codegen_context *
 			}
 			break;
 
+		/*
+		 * BPF_ST NOSPEC (speculation barrier)
+		 */
+		case BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC:
+			break;
+
 		/*
 		 * BPF_ST(X)
 		 */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c
index de8595880fee..b87a63dba9c8 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c
@@ -627,6 +627,12 @@ emit_clear:
 			}
 			break;
 
+		/*
+		 * BPF_ST NOSPEC (speculation barrier)
+		 */
+		case BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC:
+			break;
+
 		/*
 		 * BPF_ST(X)
 		 */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c b/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
index 81de865f4c7c..e6497424cbf6 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
@@ -1251,6 +1251,10 @@ int bpf_jit_emit_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn, struct rv_jit_context *ctx,
 			return -1;
 		break;
 
+	/* speculation barrier */
+	case BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC:
+		break;
+
 	case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B:
 	case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H:
 	case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W:
diff --git a/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c b/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c
index 87e3bf5b9086..3af4131c22c7 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c
@@ -939,6 +939,10 @@ out_be:
 		emit_ld(rd, 0, RV_REG_T1, ctx);
 		break;
 
+	/* speculation barrier */
+	case BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC:
+		break;
+
 	/* ST: *(size *)(dst + off) = imm */
 	case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B:
 		emit_imm(RV_REG_T1, imm, ctx);
diff --git a/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index 2ae419f5115a..88419263a89a 100644
--- a/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/s390/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -1153,6 +1153,11 @@ static noinline int bpf_jit_insn(struct bpf_jit *jit, struct bpf_prog *fp,
 			break;
 		}
 		break;
+	/*
+	 * BPF_NOSPEC (speculation barrier)
+	 */
+	case BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC:
+		break;
 	/*
 	 * BPF_ST(X)
 	 */
diff --git a/arch/sparc/net/bpf_jit_comp_64.c b/arch/sparc/net/bpf_jit_comp_64.c
index 4b8d3c65d266..9a2f20cbd48b 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/net/bpf_jit_comp_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/net/bpf_jit_comp_64.c
@@ -1287,6 +1287,9 @@ static int build_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx)
 			return 1;
 		break;
 	}
+	/* speculation barrier */
+	case BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC:
+		break;
 	/* ST: *(size *)(dst + off) = imm */
 	case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_W:
 	case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H:
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index 4b951458c9fc..16d76f814e9b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -1219,6 +1219,13 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *addrs, u8 *image,
 			}
 			break;
 
+			/* speculation barrier */
+		case BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC:
+			if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM2))
+				/* Emit 'lfence' */
+				EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8);
+			break;
+
 			/* ST: *(u8*)(dst_reg + off) = imm */
 		case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B:
 			if (is_ereg(dst_reg))
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
index 3da88ded6ee3..3bfda5f502cb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
@@ -1886,6 +1886,12 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *addrs, u8 *image,
 			i++;
 			break;
 		}
+		/* speculation barrier */
+		case BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC:
+			if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM2))
+				/* Emit 'lfence' */
+				EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8);
+			break;
 		/* ST: *(u8*)(dst_reg + off) = imm */
 		case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_H:
 		case BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_B:
diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h
index 472f97074da0..83b896044e79 100644
--- a/include/linux/filter.h
+++ b/include/linux/filter.h
@@ -73,6 +73,11 @@ struct ctl_table_header;
 /* unused opcode to mark call to interpreter with arguments */
 #define BPF_CALL_ARGS	0xe0
 
+/* unused opcode to mark speculation barrier for mitigating
+ * Speculative Store Bypass
+ */
+#define BPF_NOSPEC	0xc0
+
 /* As per nm, we expose JITed images as text (code) section for
  * kallsyms. That way, tools like perf can find it to match
  * addresses.
@@ -390,6 +395,16 @@ static inline bool insn_is_zext(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
 		.off   = 0,					\
 		.imm   = 0 })
 
+/* Speculation barrier */
+
+#define BPF_ST_NOSPEC()						\
+	((struct bpf_insn) {					\
+		.code  = BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC,			\
+		.dst_reg = 0,					\
+		.src_reg = 0,					\
+		.off   = 0,					\
+		.imm   = 0 })
+
 /* Internal classic blocks for direct assignment */
 
 #define __BPF_STMT(CODE, K)					\
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 9b1577498373..b1a5fc04492b 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
 #include <linux/perf_event.h>
 #include <linux/extable.h>
 #include <linux/log2.h>
+
+#include <asm/barrier.h>
 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
 
 /* Registers */
@@ -1377,6 +1379,7 @@ static u64 ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn)
 		/* Non-UAPI available opcodes. */
 		[BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL_ARGS] = &&JMP_CALL_ARGS,
 		[BPF_JMP | BPF_TAIL_CALL] = &&JMP_TAIL_CALL,
+		[BPF_ST  | BPF_NOSPEC] = &&ST_NOSPEC,
 		[BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM | BPF_B] = &&LDX_PROBE_MEM_B,
 		[BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM | BPF_H] = &&LDX_PROBE_MEM_H,
 		[BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM | BPF_W] = &&LDX_PROBE_MEM_W,
@@ -1621,7 +1624,21 @@ out:
 	COND_JMP(s, JSGE, >=)
 	COND_JMP(s, JSLE, <=)
 #undef COND_JMP
-	/* STX and ST and LDX*/
+	/* ST, STX and LDX*/
+	ST_NOSPEC:
+		/* Speculation barrier for mitigating Speculative Store Bypass.
+		 * In case of arm64, we rely on the firmware mitigation as
+		 * controlled via the ssbd kernel parameter. Whenever the
+		 * mitigation is enabled, it works for all of the kernel code
+		 * with no need to provide any additional instructions here.
+		 * In case of x86, we use 'lfence' insn for mitigation. We
+		 * reuse preexisting logic from Spectre v1 mitigation that
+		 * happens to produce the required code on x86 for v4 as well.
+		 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+		barrier_nospec();
+#endif
+		CONT;
 #define LDST(SIZEOP, SIZE)						\
 	STX_MEM_##SIZEOP:						\
 		*(SIZE *)(unsigned long) (DST + insn->off) = SRC;	\
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/disasm.c b/kernel/bpf/disasm.c
index bbfc6bb79240..ca3cd9aaa6ce 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/disasm.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/disasm.c
@@ -206,15 +206,17 @@ void print_bpf_insn(const struct bpf_insn_cbs *cbs,
 			verbose(cbs->private_data, "BUG_%02x\n", insn->code);
 		}
 	} else if (class == BPF_ST) {
-		if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
+		if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM) {
+			verbose(cbs->private_data, "(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n",
+				insn->code,
+				bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
+				insn->dst_reg,
+				insn->off, insn->imm);
+		} else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == 0xc0 /* BPF_NOSPEC, no UAPI */) {
+			verbose(cbs->private_data, "(%02x) nospec\n", insn->code);
+		} else {
 			verbose(cbs->private_data, "BUG_st_%02x\n", insn->code);
-			return;
 		}
-		verbose(cbs->private_data, "(%02x) *(%s *)(r%d %+d) = %d\n",
-			insn->code,
-			bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
-			insn->dst_reg,
-			insn->off, insn->imm);
 	} else if (class == BPF_LDX) {
 		if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM) {
 			verbose(cbs->private_data, "BUG_ldx_%02x\n", insn->code);