fs: use guard for namespace_sem in statmount()

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Christian Brauner 2024-06-25 14:33:45 +02:00
parent a7ebb0fe43
commit d842379313
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@ -5040,104 +5040,6 @@ static int copy_statmount_to_user(struct kstatmount *s)
return 0;
}
static int do_statmount(struct kstatmount *s)
{
struct mount *m = real_mount(s->mnt);
struct mnt_namespace *ns = m->mnt_ns;
int err;
/*
* Don't trigger audit denials. We just want to determine what
* mounts to show users.
*/
if (!is_path_reachable(m, m->mnt.mnt_root, &s->root) &&
!ns_capable_noaudit(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
err = security_sb_statfs(s->mnt->mnt_root);
if (err)
return err;
if (s->mask & STATMOUNT_SB_BASIC)
statmount_sb_basic(s);
if (s->mask & STATMOUNT_MNT_BASIC)
statmount_mnt_basic(s);
if (s->mask & STATMOUNT_PROPAGATE_FROM)
statmount_propagate_from(s);
if (s->mask & STATMOUNT_FS_TYPE)
err = statmount_string(s, STATMOUNT_FS_TYPE);
if (!err && s->mask & STATMOUNT_MNT_ROOT)
err = statmount_string(s, STATMOUNT_MNT_ROOT);
if (!err && s->mask & STATMOUNT_MNT_POINT)
err = statmount_string(s, STATMOUNT_MNT_POINT);
if (!err && s->mask & STATMOUNT_MNT_NS_ID)
statmount_mnt_ns_id(s, ns);
if (err)
return err;
return 0;
}
static inline bool retry_statmount(const long ret, size_t *seq_size)
{
if (likely(ret != -EAGAIN))
return false;
if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(*seq_size, 2, seq_size)))
return false;
if (unlikely(*seq_size > MAX_RW_COUNT))
return false;
return true;
}
static int prepare_kstatmount(struct kstatmount *ks, struct mnt_id_req *kreq,
struct statmount __user *buf, size_t bufsize,
size_t seq_size)
{
if (!access_ok(buf, bufsize))
return -EFAULT;
memset(ks, 0, sizeof(*ks));
ks->mask = kreq->param;
ks->buf = buf;
ks->bufsize = bufsize;
ks->seq.size = seq_size;
ks->seq.buf = kvmalloc(seq_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!ks->seq.buf)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
static int copy_mnt_id_req(const struct mnt_id_req __user *req,
struct mnt_id_req *kreq)
{
int ret;
size_t usize;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct mnt_id_req) != MNT_ID_REQ_SIZE_VER1);
ret = get_user(usize, &req->size);
if (ret)
return -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(usize > PAGE_SIZE))
return -E2BIG;
if (unlikely(usize < MNT_ID_REQ_SIZE_VER0))
return -EINVAL;
memset(kreq, 0, sizeof(*kreq));
ret = copy_struct_from_user(kreq, sizeof(*kreq), req, usize);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (kreq->spare != 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
static struct mount *listmnt_next(struct mount *curr, bool reverse)
{
struct rb_node *node;
@ -5177,6 +5079,130 @@ static int grab_requested_root(struct mnt_namespace *ns, struct path *root)
return 0;
}
static int do_statmount(struct kstatmount *s, u64 mnt_id, u64 mnt_ns_id,
struct mnt_namespace *ns)
{
struct path root __free(path_put) = {};
struct mount *m;
int err;
/* Has the namespace already been emptied? */
if (mnt_ns_id && RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&ns->mounts))
return -ENOENT;
s->mnt = lookup_mnt_in_ns(mnt_id, ns);
if (!s->mnt)
return -ENOENT;
err = grab_requested_root(ns, &root);
if (err)
return err;
/*
* Don't trigger audit denials. We just want to determine what
* mounts to show users.
*/
m = real_mount(s->mnt);
if (!is_path_reachable(m, m->mnt.mnt_root, &root) &&
!ns_capable_noaudit(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
err = security_sb_statfs(s->mnt->mnt_root);
if (err)
return err;
s->root = root;
if (s->mask & STATMOUNT_SB_BASIC)
statmount_sb_basic(s);
if (s->mask & STATMOUNT_MNT_BASIC)
statmount_mnt_basic(s);
if (s->mask & STATMOUNT_PROPAGATE_FROM)
statmount_propagate_from(s);
if (s->mask & STATMOUNT_FS_TYPE)
err = statmount_string(s, STATMOUNT_FS_TYPE);
if (!err && s->mask & STATMOUNT_MNT_ROOT)
err = statmount_string(s, STATMOUNT_MNT_ROOT);
if (!err && s->mask & STATMOUNT_MNT_POINT)
err = statmount_string(s, STATMOUNT_MNT_POINT);
if (!err && s->mask & STATMOUNT_MNT_NS_ID)
statmount_mnt_ns_id(s, ns);
if (err)
return err;
return 0;
}
static inline bool retry_statmount(const long ret, size_t *seq_size)
{
if (likely(ret != -EAGAIN))
return false;
if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(*seq_size, 2, seq_size)))
return false;
if (unlikely(*seq_size > MAX_RW_COUNT))
return false;
return true;
}
#define STATMOUNT_STRING_REQ (STATMOUNT_MNT_ROOT | STATMOUNT_MNT_POINT | \
STATMOUNT_FS_TYPE)
static int prepare_kstatmount(struct kstatmount *ks, struct mnt_id_req *kreq,
struct statmount __user *buf, size_t bufsize,
size_t seq_size)
{
if (!access_ok(buf, bufsize))
return -EFAULT;
memset(ks, 0, sizeof(*ks));
ks->mask = kreq->param;
ks->buf = buf;
ks->bufsize = bufsize;
if (ks->mask & STATMOUNT_STRING_REQ) {
if (bufsize == sizeof(ks->sm))
return -EOVERFLOW;
ks->seq.buf = kvmalloc(seq_size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!ks->seq.buf)
return -ENOMEM;
ks->seq.size = seq_size;
}
return 0;
}
static int copy_mnt_id_req(const struct mnt_id_req __user *req,
struct mnt_id_req *kreq)
{
int ret;
size_t usize;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct mnt_id_req) != MNT_ID_REQ_SIZE_VER1);
ret = get_user(usize, &req->size);
if (ret)
return -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(usize > PAGE_SIZE))
return -E2BIG;
if (unlikely(usize < MNT_ID_REQ_SIZE_VER0))
return -EINVAL;
memset(kreq, 0, sizeof(*kreq));
ret = copy_struct_from_user(kreq, sizeof(*kreq), req, usize);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (kreq->spare != 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
/*
* If the user requested a specific mount namespace id, look that up and return
* that, or if not simply grab a passive reference on our mount namespace and
@ -5195,9 +5221,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(statmount, const struct mnt_id_req __user *, req,
unsigned int, flags)
{
struct mnt_namespace *ns __free(mnt_ns_release) = NULL;
struct vfsmount *mnt;
struct kstatmount *ks __free(kfree) = NULL;
struct mnt_id_req kreq;
struct kstatmount ks;
/* We currently support retrieval of 3 strings. */
size_t seq_size = 3 * PATH_MAX;
int ret;
@ -5217,40 +5242,21 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(statmount, const struct mnt_id_req __user *, req,
!ns_capable_noaudit(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -ENOENT;
ks = kmalloc(sizeof(*ks), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!ks)
return -ENOMEM;
retry:
ret = prepare_kstatmount(&ks, &kreq, buf, bufsize, seq_size);
ret = prepare_kstatmount(ks, &kreq, buf, bufsize, seq_size);
if (ret)
return ret;
down_read(&namespace_sem);
/* Has the namespace already been emptied? */
if (kreq.mnt_ns_id && RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&ns->mounts)) {
up_read(&namespace_sem);
kvfree(ks.seq.buf);
return -ENOENT;
}
mnt = lookup_mnt_in_ns(kreq.mnt_id, ns);
if (!mnt) {
up_read(&namespace_sem);
kvfree(ks.seq.buf);
return -ENOENT;
}
ks.mnt = mnt;
ret = grab_requested_root(ns, &ks.root);
if (ret) {
up_read(&namespace_sem);
kvfree(ks.seq.buf);
return ret;
}
ret = do_statmount(&ks);
path_put(&ks.root);
up_read(&namespace_sem);
scoped_guard(rwsem_read, &namespace_sem)
ret = do_statmount(ks, kreq.mnt_id, kreq.mnt_ns_id, ns);
if (!ret)
ret = copy_statmount_to_user(&ks);
kvfree(ks.seq.buf);
ret = copy_statmount_to_user(ks);
kvfree(ks->seq.buf);
if (retry_statmount(ret, &seq_size))
goto retry;
return ret;