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selinux: Better local/forward check in selinux_ip_postroute()
It turns out that checking to see if skb->sk is NULL is not a very good indicator of a forwarded packet as some locally generated packets also have skb->sk set to NULL. Fix this by not only checking the skb->sk field but also the IP[6]CB(skb)->flags field for the IP[6]SKB_FORWARDED flag. While we are at it, we are calling selinux_parse_skb() much earlier than we really should resulting in potentially wasted cycles parsing packets for information we might no use; so shuffle the code around a bit to fix this. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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@ -4070,20 +4070,28 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
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}
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static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
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struct avc_audit_data *ad,
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u16 family, char *addrp)
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u16 family)
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{
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int err;
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struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
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u32 peer_sid;
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u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
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struct avc_audit_data ad;
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char *addrp;
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AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
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ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
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ad.u.net.family = family;
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err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
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if (err)
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return err;
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if (selinux_compat_net)
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err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, ad,
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err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
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family, addrp);
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else
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err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
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PACKET__RECV, ad);
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PACKET__RECV, &ad);
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if (err)
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return err;
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@ -4092,12 +4100,12 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
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if (err)
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return err;
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err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
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SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, ad);
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SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
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} else {
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err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, ad);
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err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
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if (err)
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return err;
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err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, ad);
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err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
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}
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return err;
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@ -4111,6 +4119,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
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u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
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struct avc_audit_data ad;
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char *addrp;
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u8 secmark_active;
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u8 peerlbl_active;
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if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
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return 0;
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@ -4119,6 +4129,18 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
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if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
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family = PF_INET;
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/* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
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* to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
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* special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
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* as fast and as clean as possible. */
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if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
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return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
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secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
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peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
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if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
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return 0;
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AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
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ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
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ad.u.net.family = family;
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@ -4126,15 +4148,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
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if (err)
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return err;
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/* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
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* to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
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* special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
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* as fast and as clean as possible. */
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if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
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return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
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family, addrp);
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if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) {
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if (peerlbl_active) {
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u32 peer_sid;
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err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
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@ -4148,7 +4162,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
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PEER__RECV, &ad);
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}
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if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
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if (secmark_active) {
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err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
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PACKET__RECV, &ad);
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if (err)
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@ -4396,15 +4410,15 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
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if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
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return NF_ACCEPT;
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if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
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return NF_DROP;
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AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
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ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
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ad.u.net.family = family;
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if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
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return NF_DROP;
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if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
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return NF_DROP;
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if (peerlbl_active)
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if (selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
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peer_sid, &ad) != 0)
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@ -4505,30 +4519,36 @@ static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
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static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
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int ifindex,
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struct avc_audit_data *ad,
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u16 family,
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char *addrp,
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u8 proto)
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u16 family)
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{
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struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
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struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
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struct avc_audit_data ad;
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char *addrp;
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u8 proto;
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if (sk == NULL)
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return NF_ACCEPT;
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sksec = sk->sk_security;
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AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
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ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
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ad.u.net.family = family;
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if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
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return NF_DROP;
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if (selinux_compat_net) {
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if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
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ad, family, addrp))
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&ad, family, addrp))
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return NF_DROP;
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} else {
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if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
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SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, ad))
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SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
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return NF_DROP;
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}
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if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
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if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, ad, proto))
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if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
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return NF_DROP;
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return NF_ACCEPT;
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@ -4542,23 +4562,15 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
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struct sock *sk;
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struct avc_audit_data ad;
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char *addrp;
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u8 proto;
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u8 secmark_active;
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u8 peerlbl_active;
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AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
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ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
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ad.u.net.family = family;
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if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
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return NF_DROP;
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/* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
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* to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
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* special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
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* as fast and as clean as possible. */
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if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
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return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, &ad,
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family, addrp, proto);
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return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
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/* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
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* packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
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@ -4574,21 +4586,45 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
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if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
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return NF_ACCEPT;
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/* if the packet is locally generated (skb->sk != NULL) then use the
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* socket's label as the peer label, otherwise the packet is being
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* forwarded through this system and we need to fetch the peer label
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* directly from the packet */
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/* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
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* packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
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* application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
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* from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
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sk = skb->sk;
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if (sk) {
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if (sk == NULL) {
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switch (family) {
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case PF_INET:
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if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
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secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
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else
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secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
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break;
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case PF_INET6:
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if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
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secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
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else
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secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
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break;
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default:
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return NF_DROP;
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}
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if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
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if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
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return NF_DROP;
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} else
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peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
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} else {
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struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
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peer_sid = sksec->sid;
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secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
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} else {
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if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
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return NF_DROP;
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secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
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}
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AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
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ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
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ad.u.net.family = family;
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if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
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return NF_DROP;
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if (secmark_active)
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if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
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SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
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