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nfsd: inherit required unset default acls from effective set
A well-formed NFSv4 ACL will always contain OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@ ACEs, but there is no requirement for inheritable entries for those entities. POSIX ACLs must always have owner/group/other entries, even for a default ACL. nfsd builds the default ACL from inheritable ACEs, but the current code just leaves any unspecified ACEs zeroed out. The result is that adding a default user or group ACE to an inode can leave it with unwanted deny entries. For instance, a newly created directory with no acl will look something like this: # NFSv4 translation by server A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy # POSIX ACL of underlying file user::rwx group::r-x other::r-x ...if I then add new v4 ACE: nfs4_setfacl -a A:fd:1000:rwx /mnt/local/test ...I end up with a result like this today: user::rwx user:1000:rwx group::r-x mask::rwx other::r-x default:user::--- default:user:1000:rwx default:group::--- default😷:rwx default:other::--- A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::1000:rwaDxtcy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy D:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDx A:fdi:OWNER@:tTcCy A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy A:fdi:GROUP@:tcy A:fdi:EVERYONE@:tcy ...which is not at all expected. Adding a single inheritable allow ACE should not result in everyone else losing access. The setfacl command solves a silimar issue by copying owner/group/other entries from the effective ACL when none of them are set: "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains no owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL. Having nfsd do the same provides a more sane result (with no deny ACEs in the resulting set): user::rwx user:1000:rwx group::r-x mask::rwx other::r-x default:user::rwx default:user:1000:rwx default:group::r-x default😷:rwx default:other::r-x A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::1000:rwaDxtcy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy A:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy A:fdi:GROUP@:rxtcy A:fdi:EVERYONE@:rxtcy Reported-by: Ondrej Valousek <ondrej.valousek@diasemi.com> Closes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2136452 Suggested-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ struct posix_ace_state_array {
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* calculated so far: */
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struct posix_acl_state {
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int empty;
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unsigned char valid;
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struct posix_ace_state owner;
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struct posix_ace_state group;
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struct posix_ace_state other;
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@ -457,7 +457,6 @@ init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt)
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int alloc;
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memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct posix_acl_state));
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state->empty = 1;
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/*
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* In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct
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* named user or group, but we don't know which, so we allocate
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@ -500,7 +499,7 @@ posix_state_to_acl(struct posix_acl_state *state, unsigned int flags)
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* and effective cases: when there are no inheritable ACEs,
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* calls ->set_acl with a NULL ACL structure.
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*/
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if (state->empty && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT))
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if (!state->valid && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT))
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return NULL;
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/*
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@ -622,11 +621,12 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,
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struct nfs4_ace *ace)
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{
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u32 mask = ace->access_mask;
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short type = ace2type(ace);
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int i;
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state->empty = 0;
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state->valid |= type;
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switch (ace2type(ace)) {
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switch (type) {
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case ACL_USER_OBJ:
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if (ace->type == NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE) {
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allow_bits(&state->owner, mask);
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@ -726,6 +726,30 @@ static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl,
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if (!(ace->flag & NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE))
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process_one_v4_ace(&effective_acl_state, ace);
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}
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/*
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* At this point, the default ACL may have zeroed-out entries for owner,
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* group and other. That usually results in a non-sensical resulting ACL
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* that denies all access except to any ACE that was explicitly added.
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*
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* The setfacl command solves a similar problem with this logic:
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*
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* "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains
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* no owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL
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* owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL."
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*
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* Copy any missing ACEs from the effective set, if any ACEs were
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* explicitly set.
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*/
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if (default_acl_state.valid) {
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if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_USER_OBJ))
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default_acl_state.owner = effective_acl_state.owner;
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if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_GROUP_OBJ))
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default_acl_state.group = effective_acl_state.group;
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if (!(default_acl_state.valid & ACL_OTHER))
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default_acl_state.other = effective_acl_state.other;
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}
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*pacl = posix_state_to_acl(&effective_acl_state, flags);
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if (IS_ERR(*pacl)) {
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ret = PTR_ERR(*pacl);
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