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admin-guide/hw-vuln: Rephrase a section of core-scheduling.rst
Rephrase the "For MDS" section in core-scheduling.rst for the purpose of making it clearer what is meant by "kernel memory is still considered untrusted". Suggested-by: Vineeth Pillai <Vineeth.Pillai@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Fabio M. De Francesco <fmdefrancesco@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joelaf@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210721190250.26095-1-fmdefrancesco@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
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@ -181,10 +181,12 @@ Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve
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--------------------------------------------------------
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1. For MDS
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~~~~~~~~~~
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Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between an HT running in
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user mode and another running in kernel mode. Even though both HTs run tasks
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which trust each other, kernel memory is still considered untrusted. Such
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attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode).
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Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between the siblings
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running in user mode and the others running in kernel mode. Even though all
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siblings run tasks which trust each other, when the kernel is executing
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code on behalf of a task, it cannot trust the code running in the
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sibling. Such attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes
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(host or guest mode).
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2. For L1TF
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~~~~~~~~~~~
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