Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace

Pull (again) user namespace infrastructure changes from Eric Biederman:
 "Those bugs, those darn embarrasing bugs just want don't want to get
  fixed.

  Linus I just updated my mirror of your kernel.org tree and it appears
  you successfully pulled everything except the last 4 commits that fix
  those embarrasing bugs.

  When you get a chance can you please repull my branch"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  userns: Fix typo in description of the limitation of userns_install
  userns: Add a more complete capability subset test to commit_creds
  userns: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for most uses of setns.
  Fix cap_capable to only allow owners in the parent user namespace to have caps.

fs/namespace.c

@@ -2781,7 +2781,8 @@ static int mntns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
 	struct path root;
 
 	if (!ns_capable(mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
-	    !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
+	    !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_CHROOT) ||
+	    !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (fs->users != 1)

ipc/namespace.c

@@ -170,7 +170,8 @@ static void ipcns_put(void *ns)
 static int ipcns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *new)
 {
 	struct ipc_namespace *ns = new;
-	if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+	    !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/* Ditch state from the old ipc namespace */

kernel/cred.c

@@ -372,6 +372,31 @@ error_put:
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static bool cred_cap_issubset(const struct cred *set, const struct cred *subset)
+{
+	const struct user_namespace *set_ns = set->user_ns;
+	const struct user_namespace *subset_ns = subset->user_ns;
+
+	/* If the two credentials are in the same user namespace see if
+	 * the capabilities of subset are a subset of set.
+	 */
+	if (set_ns == subset_ns)
+		return cap_issubset(subset->cap_permitted, set->cap_permitted);
+
+	/* The credentials are in a different user namespaces
+	 * therefore one is a subset of the other only if a set is an
+	 * ancestor of subset and set->euid is owner of subset or one
+	 * of subsets ancestors.
+	 */
+	for (;subset_ns != &init_user_ns; subset_ns = subset_ns->parent) {
+		if ((set_ns == subset_ns->parent)  &&
+		    uid_eq(subset_ns->owner, set->euid))
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 /**
  * commit_creds - Install new credentials upon the current task
  * @new: The credentials to be assigned
@@ -410,7 +435,7 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
 	    !gid_eq(old->egid, new->egid) ||
 	    !uid_eq(old->fsuid, new->fsuid) ||
 	    !gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) ||
-	    !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) {
+	    !cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) {
 		if (task->mm)
 			set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable);
 		task->pdeath_signal = 0;

kernel/pid_namespace.c

@@ -325,7 +325,8 @@ static int pidns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
 	struct pid_namespace *active = task_active_pid_ns(current);
 	struct pid_namespace *ancestor, *new = ns;
 
-	if (!ns_capable(new->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!ns_capable(new->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+	    !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/*

kernel/user_namespace.c

@@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ static int userns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
 	if (user_ns == current_user_ns())
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	/* Threaded many not enter a different user namespace */
+	/* Threaded processes may not enter a different user namespace */
 	if (atomic_read(&current->mm->mm_users) > 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
 

kernel/utsname.c

@@ -113,7 +113,8 @@ static int utsns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *new)
 {
 	struct uts_namespace *ns = new;
 
-	if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+	    !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	get_uts_ns(ns);

net/core/net_namespace.c

@@ -649,7 +649,8 @@ static int netns_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, void *ns)
 {
 	struct net *net = ns;
 
-	if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+	    !nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	put_net(nsproxy->net_ns);

security/commoncap.c

@@ -76,24 +76,33 @@ int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
 		int cap, int audit)
 {
-	for (;;) {
-		/* The owner of the user namespace has all caps. */
-		if (targ_ns != &init_user_ns && uid_eq(targ_ns->owner, cred->euid))
-			return 0;
+	struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns;
 
+	/* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace
+	 * by examining the target user namespace and all of the target
+	 * user namespace's parents.
+	 */
+	for (;;) {
 		/* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */
-		if (targ_ns == cred->user_ns)
+		if (ns == cred->user_ns)
 			return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
 
 		/* Have we tried all of the parent namespaces? */
-		if (targ_ns == &init_user_ns)
+		if (ns == &init_user_ns)
 			return -EPERM;
 
+		/* 
+		 * The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the
+		 * user namespace has all caps.
+		 */
+		if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid))
+			return 0;
+
 		/*
-		 *If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have
+		 * If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have
 		 * it over all children user namespaces as well.
 		 */
-		targ_ns = targ_ns->parent;
+		ns = ns->parent;
 	}
 
 	/* We never get here */