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tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_hmac_session*()
Unless tpm_chip_bootstrap() was called by the driver, !chip->auth can
cause a null derefence in tpm_buf_hmac_session*(). Thus, address
!chip->auth in tpm_buf_hmac_session*() and remove the fallback
implementation for !TCG_TPM2_HMAC.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.9+
Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com/
Fixes: 1085b8276b
("tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API")
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> # ppc
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
a61809a332
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7ca110f267
@ -272,6 +272,110 @@ void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name);
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/**
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* tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() - Append a TPM session element
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* @chip: the TPM chip structure
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* @buf: The buffer to be appended
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* @attributes: The session attributes
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* @passphrase: The session authority (NULL if none)
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* @passphrase_len: The length of the session authority (0 if none)
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*
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* This fills in a session structure in the TPM command buffer, except
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* for the HMAC which cannot be computed until the command buffer is
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* complete. The type of session is controlled by the @attributes,
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* the main ones of which are TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION which means the
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* session won't terminate after tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(),
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* TPM2_SA_DECRYPT which means this buffers first parameter should be
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* encrypted with a session key and TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, which means the
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* response buffer's first parameter needs to be decrypted (confusing,
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* but the defines are written from the point of view of the TPM).
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*
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* Any session appended by this command must be finalized by calling
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* tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() otherwise the HMAC will be incorrect
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* and the TPM will reject the command.
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*
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* As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure
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* will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a
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* kernel message.
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*/
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void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
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u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase,
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int passphrase_len)
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{
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#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
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u8 nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
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struct tpm2_auth *auth;
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u32 len;
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#endif
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if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
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/* offset tells us where the sessions area begins */
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int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
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u32 len = 9 + passphrase_len;
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if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != offset) {
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/* not the first session so update the existing length */
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len += get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[offset]);
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put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[offset]);
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} else {
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tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, len);
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}
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/* auth handle */
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tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RS_PW);
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/* nonce */
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tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0);
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/* attributes */
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tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, 0);
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/* passphrase */
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tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, passphrase_len);
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tpm_buf_append(buf, passphrase, passphrase_len);
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return;
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
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/*
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* The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros
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* before computing the HMAC
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*/
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while (passphrase && passphrase_len > 0 && passphrase[passphrase_len - 1] == '\0')
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passphrase_len--;
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auth = chip->auth;
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auth->attrs = attributes;
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auth->passphrase_len = passphrase_len;
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if (passphrase_len)
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memcpy(auth->passphrase, passphrase, passphrase_len);
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if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) {
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/* we're not the first session */
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len = get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[auth->session]);
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if (4 + len + auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) {
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WARN(1, "session length mismatch, cannot append");
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return;
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}
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/* add our new session */
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len += 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
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put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[auth->session]);
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} else {
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tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
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}
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/* random number for our nonce */
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get_random_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce));
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memcpy(auth->our_nonce, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
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tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, auth->handle);
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/* our new nonce */
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tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
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tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
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tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, auth->attrs);
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/* and put a placeholder for the hmac */
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tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
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tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
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#endif
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_hmac_session);
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#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
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static int tpm2_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 hierarchy,
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@ -457,82 +561,6 @@ static void tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip)
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crypto_free_kpp(kpp);
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}
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/**
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* tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() - Append a TPM session element
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* @chip: the TPM chip structure
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* @buf: The buffer to be appended
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* @attributes: The session attributes
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* @passphrase: The session authority (NULL if none)
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* @passphrase_len: The length of the session authority (0 if none)
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*
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* This fills in a session structure in the TPM command buffer, except
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* for the HMAC which cannot be computed until the command buffer is
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* complete. The type of session is controlled by the @attributes,
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* the main ones of which are TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION which means the
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* session won't terminate after tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(),
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* TPM2_SA_DECRYPT which means this buffers first parameter should be
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* encrypted with a session key and TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, which means the
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* response buffer's first parameter needs to be decrypted (confusing,
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* but the defines are written from the point of view of the TPM).
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*
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* Any session appended by this command must be finalized by calling
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* tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() otherwise the HMAC will be incorrect
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* and the TPM will reject the command.
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*
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* As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure
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* will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a
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* kernel message.
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*/
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void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
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u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase,
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int passphrase_len)
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{
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u8 nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
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u32 len;
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struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth;
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/*
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* The Architecture Guide requires us to strip trailing zeros
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* before computing the HMAC
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*/
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while (passphrase && passphrase_len > 0
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&& passphrase[passphrase_len - 1] == '\0')
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passphrase_len--;
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auth->attrs = attributes;
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auth->passphrase_len = passphrase_len;
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if (passphrase_len)
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memcpy(auth->passphrase, passphrase, passphrase_len);
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if (auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) {
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/* we're not the first session */
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len = get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[auth->session]);
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if (4 + len + auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf)) {
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WARN(1, "session length mismatch, cannot append");
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return;
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}
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/* add our new session */
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len += 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
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put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[auth->session]);
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} else {
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tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + 2 * SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
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}
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/* random number for our nonce */
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get_random_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce));
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memcpy(auth->our_nonce, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
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tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, auth->handle);
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/* our new nonce */
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tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
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tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
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tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, auth->attrs);
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/* and put a placeholder for the hmac */
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tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
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tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_append_hmac_session);
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/**
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* tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() - finalize the session HMAC
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* @chip: the TPM chip structure
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@ -563,6 +591,9 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
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u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
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struct sha256_state sctx;
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if (!auth)
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return;
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/* save the command code in BE format */
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auth->ordinal = head->ordinal;
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@ -721,6 +752,9 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
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u32 cc = be32_to_cpu(auth->ordinal);
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int parm_len, len, i, handles;
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if (!auth)
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return rc;
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if (auth->session >= TPM_HEADER_SIZE) {
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WARN(1, "tpm session not filled correctly\n");
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goto out;
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@ -502,10 +502,6 @@ static inline struct tpm2_auth *tpm2_chip_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip)
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void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
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u32 handle, u8 *name);
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#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
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int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip);
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void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
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u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase,
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int passphraselen);
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@ -515,9 +511,27 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip,
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u8 *passphrase,
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int passphraselen)
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{
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tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, attributes, passphrase,
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passphraselen);
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struct tpm_header *head;
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int offset;
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if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
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tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, attributes, passphrase, passphraselen);
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} else {
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offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
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head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
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/*
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* If the only sessions are optional, the command tag must change to
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* TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS.
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*/
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if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset)
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head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
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}
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
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int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip);
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void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf);
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int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
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int rc);
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@ -532,48 +546,6 @@ static inline int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
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static inline void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
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{
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}
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static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip,
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struct tpm_buf *buf,
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u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase,
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int passphraselen)
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{
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/* offset tells us where the sessions area begins */
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int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
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u32 len = 9 + passphraselen;
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if (tpm_buf_length(buf) != offset) {
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/* not the first session so update the existing length */
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len += get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[offset]);
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put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[offset]);
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} else {
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tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, len);
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}
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/* auth handle */
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tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RS_PW);
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/* nonce */
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tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, 0);
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/* attributes */
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tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, 0);
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/* passphrase */
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tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, passphraselen);
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tpm_buf_append(buf, passphrase, passphraselen);
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}
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static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session_opt(struct tpm_chip *chip,
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struct tpm_buf *buf,
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u8 attributes,
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u8 *passphrase,
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int passphraselen)
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{
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int offset = buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
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struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *) buf->data;
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/*
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* if the only sessions are optional, the command tag
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* must change to TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS
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*/
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if (tpm_buf_length(buf) == offset)
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head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
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}
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static inline void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip,
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struct tpm_buf *buf)
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{
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