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netfilter: xt_u32: validate user space input
The xt_u32 module doesn't validate the fields in the xt_u32 structure.
An attacker may take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read by setting
the size fields with a value beyond the arrays boundaries.
Add a checkentry function to validate the structure.
This was originally reported by the ZDI project (ZDI-CAN-18408).
Fixes: 1b50b8a371
("[NETFILTER]: Add u32 match")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
e994764976
commit
69c5d284f6
@ -96,11 +96,32 @@ static bool u32_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)
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return ret ^ data->invert;
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}
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static int u32_mt_checkentry(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par)
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{
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const struct xt_u32 *data = par->matchinfo;
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const struct xt_u32_test *ct;
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unsigned int i;
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if (data->ntests > ARRAY_SIZE(data->tests))
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return -EINVAL;
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for (i = 0; i < data->ntests; ++i) {
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ct = &data->tests[i];
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if (ct->nnums > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->location) ||
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ct->nvalues > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->value))
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static struct xt_match xt_u32_mt_reg __read_mostly = {
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.name = "u32",
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.revision = 0,
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.family = NFPROTO_UNSPEC,
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.match = u32_mt,
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.checkentry = u32_mt_checkentry,
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.matchsize = sizeof(struct xt_u32),
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.me = THIS_MODULE,
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};
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