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Merge branch 'kvm-tsx-ctrl' into HEAD

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Conflicts:
	arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
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Paolo Bonzini 2019-11-21 10:01:51 +01:00
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8
.mailmap
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@ -108,6 +108,10 @@ Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> <jgg@mellanox.com>
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Javi Merino <javi.merino@kernel.org> <javi.merino@arm.com>
<javier@osg.samsung.com> <javier.martinez@collabora.co.uk>
Jayachandran C <c.jayachandran@gmail.com> <jayachandranc@netlogicmicro.com>
Jayachandran C <c.jayachandran@gmail.com> <jchandra@broadcom.com>
Jayachandran C <c.jayachandran@gmail.com> <jchandra@digeo.com>
Jayachandran C <c.jayachandran@gmail.com> <jnair@caviumnetworks.com>
Jean Tourrilhes <jt@hpl.hp.com>
<jean-philippe@linaro.org> <jean-philippe.brucker@arm.com>
Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@pretzel.yyz.us>
@ -196,7 +200,8 @@ Oleksij Rempel <linux@rempel-privat.de> <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Oleksij Rempel <linux@rempel-privat.de> <ore@pengutronix.de>
Paolo 'Blaisorblade' Giarrusso <blaisorblade@yahoo.it>
Patrick Mochel <mochel@digitalimplant.org>
Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org> <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org> <paul.burton@mips.com>
Peter A Jonsson <pj@ludd.ltu.se>
Peter Oruba <peter@oruba.de>
Peter Oruba <peter.oruba@amd.com>
@ -229,6 +234,7 @@ Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> <shuahkhan@gmail.com>
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> <shuah.khan@hp.com>
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> <shuah.kh@samsung.com>
Simon Arlott <simon@octiron.net> <simon@fire.lp0.eu>
Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
Stéphane Witzmann <stephane.witzmann@ubpmes.univ-bpclermont.fr>
Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@osdl.org>

2
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
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@ -486,6 +486,8 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
Date: January 2018
Contact: Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Description: Information about CPU vulnerabilities

2
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
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@ -12,3 +12,5 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
spectre
l1tf
mds
tsx_async_abort
multihit.rst

163
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/multihit.rst Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
iTLB multihit
=============
iTLB multihit is an erratum where some processors may incur a machine check
error, possibly resulting in an unrecoverable CPU lockup, when an
instruction fetch hits multiple entries in the instruction TLB. This can
occur when the page size is changed along with either the physical address
or cache type. A malicious guest running on a virtualized system can
exploit this erratum to perform a denial of service attack.
Affected processors
-------------------
Variations of this erratum are present on most Intel Core and Xeon processor
models. The erratum is not present on:
- non-Intel processors
- Some Atoms (Airmont, Bonnell, Goldmont, GoldmontPlus, Saltwell, Silvermont)
- Intel processors that have the PSCHANGE_MC_NO bit set in the
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
Related CVEs
------------
The following CVE entry is related to this issue:
============== =================================================
CVE-2018-12207 Machine Check Error Avoidance on Page Size Change
============== =================================================
Problem
-------
Privileged software, including OS and virtual machine managers (VMM), are in
charge of memory management. A key component in memory management is the control
of the page tables. Modern processors use virtual memory, a technique that creates
the illusion of a very large memory for processors. This virtual space is split
into pages of a given size. Page tables translate virtual addresses to physical
addresses.
To reduce latency when performing a virtual to physical address translation,
processors include a structure, called TLB, that caches recent translations.
There are separate TLBs for instruction (iTLB) and data (dTLB).
Under this errata, instructions are fetched from a linear address translated
using a 4 KB translation cached in the iTLB. Privileged software modifies the
paging structure so that the same linear address using large page size (2 MB, 4
MB, 1 GB) with a different physical address or memory type. After the page
structure modification but before the software invalidates any iTLB entries for
the linear address, a code fetch that happens on the same linear address may
cause a machine-check error which can result in a system hang or shutdown.
Attack scenarios
----------------
Attacks against the iTLB multihit erratum can be mounted from malicious
guests in a virtualized system.
iTLB multihit system information
--------------------------------
The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current iTLB
multihit status of the system:whether the system is vulnerable and which
mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
The possible values in this file are:
.. list-table::
* - Not affected
- The processor is not vulnerable.
* - KVM: Mitigation: Split huge pages
- Software changes mitigate this issue.
* - KVM: Vulnerable
- The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
Enumeration of the erratum
--------------------------------
A new bit has been allocated in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) msr
and will be set on CPU's which are mitigated against this issue.
======================================= =========== ===============================
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR Not present Possibly vulnerable,check model
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[PSCHANGE_MC_NO] '0' Likely vulnerable,check model
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[PSCHANGE_MC_NO] '1' Not vulnerable
======================================= =========== ===============================
Mitigation mechanism
-------------------------
This erratum can be mitigated by restricting the use of large page sizes to
non-executable pages. This forces all iTLB entries to be 4K, and removes
the possibility of multiple hits.
In order to mitigate the vulnerability, KVM initially marks all huge pages
as non-executable. If the guest attempts to execute in one of those pages,
the page is broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.
If EPT is disabled or not available on the host, KVM is in control of TLB
flushes and the problematic situation cannot happen. However, the shadow
EPT paging mechanism used by nested virtualization is vulnerable, because
the nested guest can trigger multiple iTLB hits by modifying its own
(non-nested) page tables. For simplicity, KVM will make large pages
non-executable in all shadow paging modes.
Mitigation control on the kernel command line and KVM - module parameter
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The KVM hypervisor mitigation mechanism for marking huge pages as
non-executable can be controlled with a module parameter "nx_huge_pages=".
The kernel command line allows to control the iTLB multihit mitigations at
boot time with the option "kvm.nx_huge_pages=".
The valid arguments for these options are:
========== ================================================================
force Mitigation is enabled. In this case, the mitigation implements
non-executable huge pages in Linux kernel KVM module. All huge
pages in the EPT are marked as non-executable.
If a guest attempts to execute in one of those pages, the page is
broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.
off Mitigation is disabled.
auto Enable mitigation only if the platform is affected and the kernel
was not booted with the "mitigations=off" command line parameter.
This is the default option.
========== ================================================================
Mitigation selection guide
--------------------------
1. No virtualization in use
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
The system is protected by the kernel unconditionally and no further
action is required.
2. Virtualization with trusted guests
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
If the guest comes from a trusted source, you may assume that the guest will
not attempt to maliciously exploit these errata and no further action is
required.
3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
If the guest comes from an untrusted source, the guest host kernel will need
to apply iTLB multihit mitigation via the kernel command line or kvm
module parameter.

276
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@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
TAA - TSX Asynchronous Abort
======================================
TAA is a hardware vulnerability that allows unprivileged speculative access to
data which is available in various CPU internal buffers by using asynchronous
aborts within an Intel TSX transactional region.
Affected processors
-------------------
This vulnerability only affects Intel processors that support Intel
Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) when the TAA_NO bit (bit 8)
is 0 in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. On processors where the MDS_NO bit
(bit 5) is 0 in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR, the existing MDS mitigations
also mitigate against TAA.
Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the TAA
vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`tsx_async_abort_sys_info`.
Related CVEs
------------
The following CVE entry is related to this TAA issue:
============== ===== ===================================================
CVE-2019-11135 TAA TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA) condition on some
microprocessors utilizing speculative execution may
allow an authenticated user to potentially enable
information disclosure via a side channel with
local access.
============== ===== ===================================================
Problem
-------
When performing store, load or L1 refill operations, processors write
data into temporary microarchitectural structures (buffers). The data in
those buffers can be forwarded to load operations as an optimization.
Intel TSX is an extension to the x86 instruction set architecture that adds
hardware transactional memory support to improve performance of multi-threaded
software. TSX lets the processor expose and exploit concurrency hidden in an
application due to dynamically avoiding unnecessary synchronization.
TSX supports atomic memory transactions that are either committed (success) or
aborted. During an abort, operations that happened within the transactional region
are rolled back. An asynchronous abort takes place, among other options, when a
different thread accesses a cache line that is also used within the transactional
region when that access might lead to a data race.
Immediately after an uncompleted asynchronous abort, certain speculatively
executed loads may read data from those internal buffers and pass it to dependent
operations. This can be then used to infer the value via a cache side channel
attack.
Because the buffers are potentially shared between Hyper-Threads cross
Hyper-Thread attacks are possible.
The victim of a malicious actor does not need to make use of TSX. Only the
attacker needs to begin a TSX transaction and raise an asynchronous abort
which in turn potenitally leaks data stored in the buffers.
More detailed technical information is available in the TAA specific x86
architecture section: :ref:`Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst <tsx_async_abort>`.
Attack scenarios
----------------
Attacks against the TAA vulnerability can be implemented from unprivileged
applications running on hosts or guests.
As for MDS, the attacker has no control over the memory addresses that can
be leaked. Only the victim is responsible for bringing data to the CPU. As
a result, the malicious actor has to sample as much data as possible and
then postprocess it to try to infer any useful information from it.
A potential attacker only has read access to the data. Also, there is no direct
privilege escalation by using this technique.
.. _tsx_async_abort_sys_info:
TAA system information
-----------------------
The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current TAA status
of mitigated systems. The relevant sysfs file is:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
The possible values in this file are:
.. list-table::
* - 'Vulnerable'
- The CPU is affected by this vulnerability and the microcode and kernel mitigation are not applied.
* - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode'
- The system tries to clear the buffers but the microcode might not support the operation.
* - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
- The microcode has been updated to clear the buffers. TSX is still enabled.
* - 'Mitigation: TSX disabled'
- TSX is disabled.
* - 'Not affected'
- The CPU is not affected by this issue.
.. _ucode_needed:
Best effort mitigation mode
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
If the processor is vulnerable, but the availability of the microcode-based
mitigation mechanism is not advertised via CPUID the kernel selects a best
effort mitigation mode. This mode invokes the mitigation instructions
without a guarantee that they clear the CPU buffers.
This is done to address virtualization scenarios where the host has the
microcode update applied, but the hypervisor is not yet updated to expose the
CPUID to the guest. If the host has updated microcode the protection takes
effect; otherwise a few CPU cycles are wasted pointlessly.
The state in the tsx_async_abort sysfs file reflects this situation
accordingly.
Mitigation mechanism
--------------------
The kernel detects the affected CPUs and the presence of the microcode which is
required. If a CPU is affected and the microcode is available, then the kernel
enables the mitigation by default.
The mitigation can be controlled at boot time via a kernel command line option.
See :ref:`taa_mitigation_control_command_line`.
.. _virt_mechanism:
Virtualization mitigation
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Affected systems where the host has TAA microcode and TAA is mitigated by
having disabled TSX previously, are not vulnerable regardless of the status
of the VMs.
In all other cases, if the host either does not have the TAA microcode or
the kernel is not mitigated, the system might be vulnerable.
.. _taa_mitigation_control_command_line:
Mitigation control on the kernel command line
---------------------------------------------
The kernel command line allows to control the TAA mitigations at boot time with
the option "tsx_async_abort=". The valid arguments for this option are:
============ =============================================================
off This option disables the TAA mitigation on affected platforms.
If the system has TSX enabled (see next parameter) and the CPU
is affected, the system is vulnerable.
full TAA mitigation is enabled. If TSX is enabled, on an affected
system it will clear CPU buffers on ring transitions. On
systems which are MDS-affected and deploy MDS mitigation,
TAA is also mitigated. Specifying this option on those
systems will have no effect.
full,nosmt The same as tsx_async_abort=full, with SMT disabled on
vulnerable CPUs that have TSX enabled. This is the complete
mitigation. When TSX is disabled, SMT is not disabled because
CPU is not vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks.
============ =============================================================
Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx_async_abort=full".
The kernel command line also allows to control the TSX feature using the
parameter "tsx=" on CPUs which support TSX control. MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL is used
to control the TSX feature and the enumeration of the TSX feature bits (RTM
and HLE) in CPUID.
The valid options are:
============ =============================================================
off Disables TSX on the system.
Note that this option takes effect only on newer CPUs which are
not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1
and which get the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR through a microcode
update. This new MSR allows for the reliable deactivation of
the TSX functionality.
on Enables TSX.
Although there are mitigations for all known security
vulnerabilities, TSX has been known to be an accelerator for
several previous speculation-related CVEs, and so there may be
unknown security risks associated with leaving it enabled.
auto Disables TSX if X86_BUG_TAA is present, otherwise enables TSX
on the system.
============ =============================================================
Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx=off".
The following combinations of the "tsx_async_abort" and "tsx" are possible. For
affected platforms tsx=auto is equivalent to tsx=off and the result will be:
========= ========================== =========================================
tsx=on tsx_async_abort=full The system will use VERW to clear CPU
buffers. Cross-thread attacks are still
possible on SMT machines.
tsx=on tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt As above, cross-thread attacks on SMT
mitigated.
tsx=on tsx_async_abort=off The system is vulnerable.
tsx=off tsx_async_abort=full TSX might be disabled if microcode
provides a TSX control MSR. If so,
system is not vulnerable.
tsx=off tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt Ditto
tsx=off tsx_async_abort=off ditto
========= ========================== =========================================
For unaffected platforms "tsx=on" and "tsx_async_abort=full" does not clear CPU
buffers. For platforms without TSX control (MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=0)
"tsx" command line argument has no effect.
For the affected platforms below table indicates the mitigation status for the
combinations of CPUID bit MD_CLEAR and IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bits MDS_NO
and TSX_CTRL_MSR.
======= ========= ============= ========================================
MDS_NO MD_CLEAR TSX_CTRL_MSR Status
======= ========= ============= ========================================
0 0 0 Vulnerable (needs microcode)
0 1 0 MDS and TAA mitigated via VERW
1 1 0 MDS fixed, TAA vulnerable if TSX enabled
because MD_CLEAR has no meaning and
VERW is not guaranteed to clear buffers
1 X 1 MDS fixed, TAA can be mitigated by
VERW or TSX_CTRL_MSR
======= ========= ============= ========================================
Mitigation selection guide
--------------------------
1. Trusted userspace and guests
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
If all user space applications are from a trusted source and do not execute
untrusted code which is supplied externally, then the mitigation can be
disabled. The same applies to virtualized environments with trusted guests.
2. Untrusted userspace and guests
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
If there are untrusted applications or guests on the system, enabling TSX
might allow a malicious actor to leak data from the host or from other
processes running on the same physical core.
If the microcode is available and the TSX is disabled on the host, attacks
are prevented in a virtualized environment as well, even if the VMs do not
explicitly enable the mitigation.
.. _taa_default_mitigations:
Default mitigations
-------------------
The kernel's default action for vulnerable processors is:
- Deploy TSX disable mitigation (tsx_async_abort=full tsx=off).

92
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
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@ -2055,6 +2055,25 @@
KVM MMU at runtime.
Default is 0 (off)
kvm.nx_huge_pages=
[KVM] Controls the software workaround for the
X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT bug.
force : Always deploy workaround.
off : Never deploy workaround.
auto : Deploy workaround based on the presence of
X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT.
Default is 'auto'.
If the software workaround is enabled for the host,
guests do need not to enable it for nested guests.
kvm.nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio=
[KVM] Controls how many 4KiB pages are periodically zapped
back to huge pages. 0 disables the recovery, otherwise if
the value is N KVM will zap 1/Nth of the 4KiB pages every
minute. The default is 60.
kvm-amd.nested= [KVM,AMD] Allow nested virtualization in KVM/SVM.
Default is 1 (enabled)
@ -2636,6 +2655,13 @@
ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
l1tf=off [X86]
mds=off [X86]
tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86]
Exceptions:
This does not have any effect on
kvm.nx_huge_pages when
kvm.nx_huge_pages=force.
auto (default)
Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
@ -2651,6 +2677,7 @@
be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
mds=full,nosmt [X86]
tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt [X86]
mminit_loglevel=
[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
@ -4848,6 +4875,71 @@
interruptions from clocksource watchdog are not
acceptable).
tsx= [X86] Control Transactional Synchronization
Extensions (TSX) feature in Intel processors that
support TSX control.
This parameter controls the TSX feature. The options are:
on - Enable TSX on the system. Although there are
mitigations for all known security vulnerabilities,
TSX has been known to be an accelerator for
several previous speculation-related CVEs, and
so there may be unknown security risks associated
with leaving it enabled.
off - Disable TSX on the system. (Note that this
option takes effect only on newer CPUs which are
not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1 and which get
the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR through a microcode
update. This new MSR allows for the reliable
deactivation of the TSX functionality.)
auto - Disable TSX if X86_BUG_TAA is present,
otherwise enable TSX on the system.
Not specifying this option is equivalent to tsx=off.
See Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
for more details.
tsx_async_abort= [X86,INTEL] Control mitigation for the TSX Async
Abort (TAA) vulnerability.
Similar to Micro-architectural Data Sampling (MDS)
certain CPUs that support Transactional
Synchronization Extensions (TSX) are vulnerable to an
exploit against CPU internal buffers which can forward
information to a disclosure gadget under certain
conditions.
In vulnerable processors, the speculatively forwarded
data can be used in a cache side channel attack, to
access data to which the attacker does not have direct
access.
This parameter controls the TAA mitigation. The
options are:
full - Enable TAA mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
if TSX is enabled.
full,nosmt - Enable TAA mitigation and disable SMT on
vulnerable CPUs. If TSX is disabled, SMT
is not disabled because CPU is not
vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks.
off - Unconditionally disable TAA mitigation
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
tsx_async_abort=full. On CPUs which are MDS affected
and deploy MDS mitigation, TAA mitigation is not
required and doesn't provide any additional
mitigation.
For details see:
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
turbografx.map[2|3]= [HW,JOY]
TurboGraFX parallel port interface
Format:

7
Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.rst
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@ -91,6 +91,11 @@ stable kernels.
| ARM | MMU-500 | #841119,826419 | N/A |
+----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
| Broadcom | Brahma-B53 | N/A | ARM64_ERRATUM_845719 |
+----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
| Broadcom | Brahma-B53 | N/A | ARM64_ERRATUM_843419 |
+----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
| Cavium | ThunderX ITS | #22375,24313 | CAVIUM_ERRATUM_22375 |
+----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
| Cavium | ThunderX ITS | #23144 | CAVIUM_ERRATUM_23144 |
@ -126,7 +131,7 @@ stable kernels.
+----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
| Qualcomm Tech. | Kryo/Falkor v1 | E1003 | QCOM_FALKOR_ERRATUM_1003 |
+----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
| Qualcomm Tech. | Falkor v1 | E1009 | QCOM_FALKOR_ERRATUM_1009 |
| Qualcomm Tech. | Kryo/Falkor v1 | E1009 | QCOM_FALKOR_ERRATUM_1009 |
+----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
| Qualcomm Tech. | QDF2400 ITS | E0065 | QCOM_QDF2400_ERRATUM_0065 |
+----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+

4
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/rockchip.yaml
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@ -496,12 +496,12 @@ properties:
- description: Theobroma Systems RK3368-uQ7 with Haikou baseboard
items:
- const: tsd,rk3368-uq7-haikou
- const: tsd,rk3368-lion-haikou
- const: rockchip,rk3368
- description: Theobroma Systems RK3399-Q7 with Haikou baseboard
items:
- const: tsd,rk3399-q7-haikou
- const: tsd,rk3399-puma-haikou
- const: rockchip,rk3399
- description: Tronsmart Orion R68 Meta

9
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/media/allwinner,sun4i-a10-csi.yaml
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause)
%YAML 1.2
---
$id: http://devicetree.org/schemas/arm/allwinner,sun4i-a10-csi.yaml#
$id: http://devicetree.org/schemas/media/allwinner,sun4i-a10-csi.yaml#
$schema: http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml#
title: Allwinner A10 CMOS Sensor Interface (CSI) Device Tree Bindings
@ -27,14 +27,12 @@ properties:
clocks:
items:
- description: The CSI interface clock
- description: The CSI module clock
- description: The CSI ISP clock
- description: The CSI DRAM clock
clock-names:
items:
- const: bus
- const: mod
- const: isp
- const: ram
@ -89,9 +87,8 @@ examples:
compatible = "allwinner,sun7i-a20-csi0";
reg = <0x01c09000 0x1000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 42 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&ccu CLK_AHB_CSI0>, <&ccu CLK_CSI0>,
<&ccu CLK_CSI_SCLK>, <&ccu CLK_DRAM_CSI0>;
clock-names = "bus", "mod", "isp", "ram";
clocks = <&ccu CLK_AHB_CSI0>, <&ccu CLK_CSI_SCLK>, <&ccu CLK_DRAM_CSI0>;
clock-names = "bus", "isp", "ram";
resets = <&ccu RST_CSI0>;
port {

4
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/regulator/fixed-regulator.yaml
View File

@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ if:
properties:
compatible:
enum:
- const: regulator-fixed
- const: regulator-fixed-clock
- regulator-fixed
- regulator-fixed-clock
regulator-name: true

29
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/riscv/cpus.yaml
View File

@ -24,15 +24,17 @@ description: |
properties:
compatible:
items:
- enum:
- sifive,rocket0
- sifive,e5
- sifive,e51
- sifive,u54-mc
- sifive,u54
- sifive,u5
- const: riscv
oneOf:
- items:
- enum:
- sifive,rocket0
- sifive,e5
- sifive,e51
- sifive,u54-mc
- sifive,u54
- sifive,u5
- const: riscv
- const: riscv # Simulator only
description:
Identifies that the hart uses the RISC-V instruction set
and identifies the type of the hart.
@ -66,12 +68,8 @@ properties:
insensitive, letters in the riscv,isa string must be all
lowercase to simplify parsing.
timebase-frequency:
type: integer
minimum: 1
description:
Specifies the clock frequency of the system timer in Hz.
This value is common to all harts on a single system image.
# RISC-V requires 'timebase-frequency' in /cpus, so disallow it here
timebase-frequency: false
interrupt-controller:
type: object
@ -93,7 +91,6 @@ properties:
required:
- riscv,isa
- timebase-frequency
- interrupt-controller
examples:

14
Documentation/networking/device_drivers/intel/e100.rst
View File

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
==============================================================
Linux* Base Driver for the Intel(R) PRO/100 Family of Adapters
==============================================================
=============================================================
Linux Base Driver for the Intel(R) PRO/100 Family of Adapters
=============================================================
June 1, 2018
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Contents
In This Release
===============
This file describes the Linux* Base Driver for the Intel(R) PRO/100 Family of
This file describes the Linux Base Driver for the Intel(R) PRO/100 Family of
Adapters. This driver includes support for Itanium(R)2-based systems.
For questions related to hardware requirements, refer to the documentation
@ -138,9 +138,9 @@ version 1.6 or later is required for this functionality.
The latest release of ethtool can be found from
https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/network/ethtool/
Enabling Wake on LAN* (WoL)
---------------------------
WoL is provided through the ethtool* utility. For instructions on
Enabling Wake on LAN (WoL)
--------------------------
WoL is provided through the ethtool utility. For instructions on
enabling WoL with ethtool, refer to the ethtool man page. WoL will be
enabled on the system during the next shut down or reboot. For this
driver version, in order to enable WoL, the e100 driver must be loaded

12
Documentation/networking/device_drivers/intel/e1000.rst
View File

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
===========================================================
Linux* Base Driver for Intel(R) Ethernet Network Connection
===========================================================
==========================================================
Linux Base Driver for Intel(R) Ethernet Network Connection
==========================================================
Intel Gigabit Linux driver.
Copyright(c) 1999 - 2013 Intel Corporation.
@ -438,10 +438,10 @@ ethtool
The latest release of ethtool can be found from
https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/network/ethtool/
Enabling Wake on LAN* (WoL)
---------------------------
Enabling Wake on LAN (WoL)
--------------------------
WoL is configured through the ethtool* utility.
WoL is configured through the ethtool utility.
WoL will be enabled on the system during the next shut down or reboot.
For this driver version, in order to enable WoL, the e1000 driver must be

14
Documentation/networking/device_drivers/intel/e1000e.rst
View File

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
======================================================
Linux* Driver for Intel(R) Ethernet Network Connection
======================================================
=====================================================
Linux Driver for Intel(R) Ethernet Network Connection
=====================================================
Intel Gigabit Linux driver.
Copyright(c) 2008-2018 Intel Corporation.
@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ and higher cannot be forced. Use the autonegotiation advertising setting to
manually set devices for 1 Gbps and higher.
Speed, duplex, and autonegotiation advertising are configured through the
ethtool* utility.
ethtool utility.
Caution: Only experienced network administrators should force speed and duplex
or change autonegotiation advertising manually. The settings at the switch must
@ -351,9 +351,9 @@ will not attempt to auto-negotiate with its link partner since those adapters
operate only in full duplex and only at their native speed.
Enabling Wake on LAN* (WoL)
---------------------------
WoL is configured through the ethtool* utility.
Enabling Wake on LAN (WoL)
--------------------------
WoL is configured through the ethtool utility.
WoL will be enabled on the system during the next shut down or reboot. For
this driver version, in order to enable WoL, the e1000e driver must be loaded

10
Documentation/networking/device_drivers/intel/fm10k.rst
View File

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
==============================================================
Linux* Base Driver for Intel(R) Ethernet Multi-host Controller
==============================================================
=============================================================
Linux Base Driver for Intel(R) Ethernet Multi-host Controller
=============================================================
August 20, 2018
Copyright(c) 2015-2018 Intel Corporation.
@ -120,8 +120,8 @@ rx-flow-hash tcp4|udp4|ah4|esp4|sctp4|tcp6|udp6|ah6|esp6|sctp6 m|v|t|s|d|f|n|r
Known Issues/Troubleshooting
============================
Enabling SR-IOV in a 64-bit Microsoft* Windows Server* 2012/R2 guest OS under Linux KVM
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Enabling SR-IOV in a 64-bit Microsoft Windows Server 2012/R2 guest OS under Linux KVM
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
KVM Hypervisor/VMM supports direct assignment of a PCIe device to a VM. This
includes traditional PCIe devices, as well as SR-IOV-capable devices based on
the Intel Ethernet Controller XL710.

8
Documentation/networking/device_drivers/intel/i40e.rst
View File

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
==================================================================
Linux* Base Driver for the Intel(R) Ethernet Controller 700 Series
==================================================================
=================================================================
Linux Base Driver for the Intel(R) Ethernet Controller 700 Series
=================================================================
Intel 40 Gigabit Linux driver.
Copyright(c) 1999-2018 Intel Corporation.
@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ NOTE: You cannot set the speed for devices based on the Intel(R) Ethernet
Network Adapter XXV710 based devices.
Speed, duplex, and autonegotiation advertising are configured through the
ethtool* utility.
ethtool utility.
Caution: Only experienced network administrators should force speed and duplex
or change autonegotiation advertising manually. The settings at the switch must

8
Documentation/networking/device_drivers/intel/iavf.rst
View File

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
==================================================================
Linux* Base Driver for Intel(R) Ethernet Adaptive Virtual Function
==================================================================
=================================================================
Linux Base Driver for Intel(R) Ethernet Adaptive Virtual Function
=================================================================
Intel Ethernet Adaptive Virtual Function Linux driver.
Copyright(c) 2013-2018 Intel Corporation.
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Contents
Overview
========
This file describes the iavf Linux* Base Driver. This driver was formerly
This file describes the iavf Linux Base Driver. This driver was formerly
called i40evf.
The iavf driver supports the below mentioned virtual function devices and

6
Documentation/networking/device_drivers/intel/ice.rst
View File

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
===================================================================
Linux* Base Driver for the Intel(R) Ethernet Connection E800 Series
===================================================================
==================================================================
Linux Base Driver for the Intel(R) Ethernet Connection E800 Series
==================================================================
Intel ice Linux driver.
Copyright(c) 2018 Intel Corporation.

12
Documentation/networking/device_drivers/intel/igb.rst
View File

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
===========================================================
Linux* Base Driver for Intel(R) Ethernet Network Connection
===========================================================
==========================================================
Linux Base Driver for Intel(R) Ethernet Network Connection
==========================================================
Intel Gigabit Linux driver.
Copyright(c) 1999-2018 Intel Corporation.
@ -129,9 +129,9 @@ version is required for this functionality. Download it at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/network/ethtool/
Enabling Wake on LAN* (WoL)
---------------------------
WoL is configured through the ethtool* utility.
Enabling Wake on LAN (WoL)
--------------------------
WoL is configured through the ethtool utility.
WoL will be enabled on the system during the next shut down or reboot. For
this driver version, in order to enable WoL, the igb driver must be loaded

6
Documentation/networking/device_drivers/intel/igbvf.rst
View File

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
============================================================
Linux* Base Virtual Function Driver for Intel(R) 1G Ethernet
============================================================
===========================================================
Linux Base Virtual Function Driver for Intel(R) 1G Ethernet
===========================================================
Intel Gigabit Virtual Function Linux driver.
Copyright(c) 1999-2018 Intel Corporation.

10
Documentation/networking/device_drivers/intel/ixgbe.rst
View File

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
=============================================================================
Linux* Base Driver for the Intel(R) Ethernet 10 Gigabit PCI Express Adapters
=============================================================================
===========================================================================
Linux Base Driver for the Intel(R) Ethernet 10 Gigabit PCI Express Adapters
===========================================================================
Intel 10 Gigabit Linux driver.
Copyright(c) 1999-2018 Intel Corporation.
@ -519,8 +519,8 @@ The offload is also supported for ixgbe's VFs, but the VF must be set as
Known Issues/Troubleshooting
============================
Enabling SR-IOV in a 64-bit Microsoft* Windows Server* 2012/R2 guest OS
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Enabling SR-IOV in a 64-bit Microsoft Windows Server 2012/R2 guest OS
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Linux KVM Hypervisor/VMM supports direct assignment of a PCIe device to a VM.
This includes traditional PCIe devices, as well as SR-IOV-capable devices based
on the Intel Ethernet Controller XL710.

6
Documentation/networking/device_drivers/intel/ixgbevf.rst
View File

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
=============================================================
Linux* Base Virtual Function Driver for Intel(R) 10G Ethernet
=============================================================
============================================================
Linux Base Virtual Function Driver for Intel(R) 10G Ethernet
============================================================
Intel 10 Gigabit Virtual Function Linux driver.
Copyright(c) 1999-2018 Intel Corporation.

6
Documentation/networking/device_drivers/pensando/ionic.rst
View File

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
==========================================================
Linux* Driver for the Pensando(R) Ethernet adapter family
==========================================================
========================================================
Linux Driver for the Pensando(R) Ethernet adapter family
========================================================
Pensando Linux Ethernet driver.
Copyright(c) 2019 Pensando Systems, Inc

11
Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
View File

@ -207,8 +207,8 @@ TCP variables:
somaxconn - INTEGER
Limit of socket listen() backlog, known in userspace as SOMAXCONN.
Defaults to 128. See also tcp_max_syn_backlog for additional tuning
for TCP sockets.
Defaults to 4096. (Was 128 before linux-5.4)
See also tcp_max_syn_backlog for additional tuning for TCP sockets.
tcp_abort_on_overflow - BOOLEAN
If listening service is too slow to accept new connections,
@ -408,11 +408,14 @@ tcp_max_orphans - INTEGER
up to ~64K of unswappable memory.
tcp_max_syn_backlog - INTEGER
Maximal number of remembered connection requests, which have not
received an acknowledgment from connecting client.
Maximal number of remembered connection requests (SYN_RECV),
which have not received an acknowledgment from connecting client.
This is a per-listener limit.
The minimal value is 128 for low memory machines, and it will
increase in proportion to the memory of machine.
If server suffers from overload, try increasing this number.
Remember to also check /proc/sys/net/core/somaxconn
A SYN_RECV request socket consumes about 304 bytes of memory.
tcp_max_tw_buckets - INTEGER
Maximal number of timewait sockets held by system simultaneously.

4
Documentation/networking/tls-offload.rst
View File

@ -436,6 +436,10 @@ by the driver:
encryption.
* ``tx_tls_ooo`` - number of TX packets which were part of a TLS stream
but did not arrive in the expected order.
* ``tx_tls_skip_no_sync_data`` - number of TX packets which were part of
a TLS stream and arrived out-of-order, but skipped the HW offload routine
and went to the regular transmit flow as they were retransmissions of the
connection handshake.
* ``tx_tls_drop_no_sync_data`` - number of TX packets which were part of
a TLS stream dropped, because they arrived out of order and associated
record could not be found.

1
Documentation/x86/index.rst
View File

@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ x86-specific Documentation
mds
microcode
resctrl_ui
tsx_async_abort
usb-legacy-support
i386/index
x86_64/index

117
Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
TSX Async Abort (TAA) mitigation
================================
.. _tsx_async_abort:
Overview
--------
TSX Async Abort (TAA) is a side channel attack on internal buffers in some
Intel processors similar to Microachitectural Data Sampling (MDS). In this
case certain loads may speculatively pass invalid data to dependent operations
when an asynchronous abort condition is pending in a Transactional
Synchronization Extensions (TSX) transaction. This includes loads with no
fault or assist condition. Such loads may speculatively expose stale data from
the same uarch data structures as in MDS, with same scope of exposure i.e.
same-thread and cross-thread. This issue affects all current processors that
support TSX.
Mitigation strategy
-------------------
a) TSX disable - one of the mitigations is to disable TSX. A new MSR
IA32_TSX_CTRL will be available in future and current processors after
microcode update which can be used to disable TSX. In addition, it
controls the enumeration of the TSX feature bits (RTM and HLE) in CPUID.
b) Clear CPU buffers - similar to MDS, clearing the CPU buffers mitigates this
vulnerability. More details on this approach can be found in
:ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst <mds>`.
Kernel internal mitigation modes
--------------------------------
============= ============================================================
off Mitigation is disabled. Either the CPU is not affected or
tsx_async_abort=off is supplied on the kernel command line.
tsx disabled Mitigation is enabled. TSX feature is disabled by default at
bootup on processors that support TSX control.
verw Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is
advertised in CPUID.
ucode needed Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is not
advertised in CPUID. That is mainly for virtualization
scenarios where the host has the updated microcode but the
hypervisor does not expose MD_CLEAR in CPUID. It's a best
effort approach without guarantee.
============= ============================================================
If the CPU is affected and the "tsx_async_abort" kernel command line parameter is
not provided then the kernel selects an appropriate mitigation depending on the
status of RTM and MD_CLEAR CPUID bits.
Below tables indicate the impact of tsx=on|off|auto cmdline options on state of
TAA mitigation, VERW behavior and TSX feature for various combinations of
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits.
1. "tsx=off"
========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits Result with cmdline tsx=off
---------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
TAA_NO MDS_NO TSX_CTRL_MSR TSX state VERW can clear TAA mitigation TAA mitigation
after bootup CPU buffers tsx_async_abort=off tsx_async_abort=full
========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
0 0 0 HW default Yes Same as MDS Same as MDS
0 0 1 Invalid case Invalid case Invalid case Invalid case
0 1 0 HW default No Need ucode update Need ucode update
0 1 1 Disabled Yes TSX disabled TSX disabled
1 X 1 Disabled X None needed None needed
========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
2. "tsx=on"
========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits Result with cmdline tsx=on
---------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
TAA_NO MDS_NO TSX_CTRL_MSR TSX state VERW can clear TAA mitigation TAA mitigation
after bootup CPU buffers tsx_async_abort=off tsx_async_abort=full
========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
0 0 0 HW default Yes Same as MDS Same as MDS
0 0 1 Invalid case Invalid case Invalid case Invalid case
0 1 0 HW default No Need ucode update Need ucode update
0 1 1 Enabled Yes None Same as MDS
1 X 1 Enabled X None needed None needed
========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
3. "tsx=auto"
========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits Result with cmdline tsx=auto
---------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
TAA_NO MDS_NO TSX_CTRL_MSR TSX state VERW can clear TAA mitigation TAA mitigation
after bootup CPU buffers tsx_async_abort=off tsx_async_abort=full
========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
0 0 0 HW default Yes Same as MDS Same as MDS
0 0 1 Invalid case Invalid case Invalid case Invalid case
0 1 0 HW default No Need ucode update Need ucode update
0 1 1 Disabled Yes TSX disabled TSX disabled
1 X 1 Enabled X None needed None needed
========= ========= ============ ============ ============== =================== ======================
In the tables, TSX_CTRL_MSR is a new bit in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES that
indicates whether MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL is supported.
There are two control bits in IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR:
Bit 0: When set it disables the Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM)
sub-feature of TSX (will force all transactions to abort on the
XBEGIN instruction).
Bit 1: When set it disables the enumeration of the RTM and HLE feature
(i.e. it will make CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4} and
CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit11} read as 0).

39
MAINTAINERS
View File

@ -2323,11 +2323,13 @@ F: drivers/edac/altera_edac.
ARM/SPREADTRUM SoC SUPPORT
M: Orson Zhai <orsonzhai@gmail.com>
M: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org>
M: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang7@gmail.com>
M: Chunyan Zhang <zhang.lyra@gmail.com>
S: Maintained
F: arch/arm64/boot/dts/sprd
N: sprd
N: sc27xx
N: sc2731
ARM/STI ARCHITECTURE
M: Patrice Chotard <patrice.chotard@st.com>
@ -3051,6 +3053,7 @@ M: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
R: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
R: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
R: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
R: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
L: netdev@vger.kernel.org
L: bpf@vger.kernel.org
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf.git
@ -3096,7 +3099,7 @@ S: Supported
F: arch/arm64/net/
BPF JIT for MIPS (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)
M: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
M: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org>
L: netdev@vger.kernel.org
L: bpf@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
@ -3183,7 +3186,7 @@ N: bcm216*
N: kona
F: arch/arm/mach-bcm/
BROADCOM BCM2835 ARM ARCHITECTURE
BROADCOM BCM2711/BCM2835 ARM ARCHITECTURE
M: Eric Anholt <eric@anholt.net>
M: Stefan Wahren <wahrenst@gmx.net>
L: bcm-kernel-feedback-list@broadcom.com
@ -3191,6 +3194,7 @@ L: linux-rpi-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers)
L: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers)
T: git git://github.com/anholt/linux
S: Maintained
N: bcm2711
N: bcm2835
F: drivers/staging/vc04_services
@ -3237,8 +3241,6 @@ S: Maintained
F: drivers/usb/gadget/udc/bcm63xx_udc.*
BROADCOM BCM7XXX ARM ARCHITECTURE
M: Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com>
M: Gregory Fong <gregory.0xf0@gmail.com>
M: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
M: bcm-kernel-feedback-list@broadcom.com
L: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers)
@ -3736,7 +3738,6 @@ F: drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/
CAVIUM THUNDERX2 ARM64 SOC
M: Robert Richter <rrichter@cavium.com>
M: Jayachandran C <jnair@caviumnetworks.com>
L: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers)
S: Maintained
F: arch/arm64/boot/dts/cavium/thunder2-99xx*
@ -8001,7 +8002,7 @@ S: Maintained
F: drivers/usb/atm/ueagle-atm.c
IMGTEC ASCII LCD DRIVER
M: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
M: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org>
S: Maintained
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.txt
F: drivers/auxdisplay/img-ascii-lcd.c
@ -10518,8 +10519,12 @@ F: mm/memblock.c
F: Documentation/core-api/boot-time-mm.rst
MEMORY MANAGEMENT
M: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
L: linux-mm@kvack.org
W: http://www.linux-mm.org
T: quilt https://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/
T: quilt https://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/
T: git git://github.com/hnaz/linux-mm.git
S: Maintained
F: include/linux/mm.h
F: include/linux/gfp.h
@ -10828,7 +10833,7 @@ F: drivers/usb/image/microtek.*
MIPS
M: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
M: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
M: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org>
M: James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org>
L: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
W: http://www.linux-mips.org/
@ -10842,7 +10847,7 @@ F: arch/mips/
F: drivers/platform/mips/
MIPS BOSTON DEVELOPMENT BOARD
M: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
M: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org>
L: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/clock/img,boston-clock.txt
@ -10852,7 +10857,7 @@ F: drivers/clk/imgtec/clk-boston.c
F: include/dt-bindings/clock/boston-clock.h
MIPS GENERIC PLATFORM
M: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
M: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org>
L: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
S: Supported
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/power/mti,mips-cpc.txt
@ -11407,7 +11412,6 @@ F: include/trace/events/tcp.h
NETWORKING [TLS]
M: Boris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com>
M: Aviad Yehezkel <aviadye@mellanox.com>
M: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>
M: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
M: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
M: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
@ -13905,7 +13909,7 @@ F: drivers/mtd/nand/raw/r852.h
RISC-V ARCHITECTURE
M: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
M: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
M: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
M: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
L: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux.git
@ -14782,7 +14786,7 @@ F: drivers/media/usb/siano/
F: drivers/media/mmc/siano/
SIFIVE DRIVERS
M: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
M: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
M: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
L: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
T: git git://github.com/sifive/riscv-linux.git
@ -14792,7 +14796,7 @@ N: sifive
SIFIVE FU540 SYSTEM-ON-CHIP
M: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
M: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
M: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
L: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pjw/sifive.git
S: Supported
@ -17334,6 +17338,12 @@ F: include/linux/vbox_utils.h
F: include/uapi/linux/vbox*.h
F: drivers/virt/vboxguest/
VIRTUAL BOX SHARED FOLDER VFS DRIVER:
M: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
L: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
F: drivers/staging/vboxsf/*
VIRTUAL SERIO DEVICE DRIVER
M: Stephen Chandler Paul <thatslyude@gmail.com>
S: Maintained
@ -18034,6 +18044,7 @@ F: Documentation/vm/zsmalloc.rst
ZSWAP COMPRESSED SWAP CACHING
M: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com>
M: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org>
M: Vitaly Wool <vitaly.wool@konsulko.com>
L: linux-mm@kvack.org
S: Maintained
F: mm/zswap.c

4
Makefile
View File

@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
VERSION = 5
PATCHLEVEL = 4
SUBLEVEL = 0
EXTRAVERSION = -rc4
NAME = Nesting Opossum
EXTRAVERSION = -rc7
NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus
# *DOCUMENTATION*
# To see a list of typical targets execute "make help"

23
arch/arc/boot/dts/hsdk.dts
View File

@ -65,6 +65,14 @@
clock-frequency = <33333333>;
};
reg_5v0: regulator-5v0 {
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
regulator-name = "5v0-supply";
regulator-min-microvolt = <5000000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <5000000>;
};
cpu_intc: cpu-interrupt-controller {
compatible = "snps,archs-intc";
interrupt-controller;
@ -264,6 +272,21 @@
clocks = <&input_clk>;
cs-gpios = <&creg_gpio 0 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>,
<&creg_gpio 1 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
spi-flash@0 {
compatible = "sst26wf016b", "jedec,spi-nor";
reg = <0>;
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <1>;
spi-max-frequency = <4000000>;
};
adc@1 {
compatible = "ti,adc108s102";
reg = <1>;
vref-supply = <&reg_5v0>;
spi-max-frequency = <1000000>;
};
};
creg_gpio: gpio@14b0 {

6
arch/arc/configs/hsdk_defconfig
View File

@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ CONFIG_INET=y
CONFIG_DEVTMPFS=y
# CONFIG_STANDALONE is not set
# CONFIG_PREVENT_FIRMWARE_BUILD is not set
CONFIG_MTD=y
CONFIG_MTD_SPI_NOR=y
CONFIG_SCSI=y
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_SD=y
CONFIG_NETDEVICES=y
@ -55,6 +57,8 @@ CONFIG_GPIO_SYSFS=y
CONFIG_GPIO_DWAPB=y
CONFIG_GPIO_SNPS_CREG=y
# CONFIG_HWMON is not set
CONFIG_REGULATOR=y
CONFIG_REGULATOR_FIXED_VOLTAGE=y
CONFIG_DRM=y
# CONFIG_DRM_FBDEV_EMULATION is not set
CONFIG_DRM_UDL=y
@ -72,6 +76,8 @@ CONFIG_MMC_SDHCI_PLTFM=y
CONFIG_MMC_DW=y
CONFIG_DMADEVICES=y
CONFIG_DW_AXI_DMAC=y
CONFIG_IIO=y
CONFIG_TI_ADC108S102=y
CONFIG_EXT3_FS=y
CONFIG_VFAT_FS=y
CONFIG_TMPFS=y

4
arch/arc/kernel/perf_event.c
View File

@ -614,8 +614,8 @@ static int arc_pmu_device_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
/* loop thru all available h/w condition indexes */
for (i = 0; i < cc_bcr.c; i++) {
write_aux_reg(ARC_REG_CC_INDEX, i);
cc_name.indiv.word0 = read_aux_reg(ARC_REG_CC_NAME0);
cc_name.indiv.word1 = read_aux_reg(ARC_REG_CC_NAME1);
cc_name.indiv.word0 = le32_to_cpu(read_aux_reg(ARC_REG_CC_NAME0));
cc_name.indiv.word1 = le32_to_cpu(read_aux_reg(ARC_REG_CC_NAME1));
arc_pmu_map_hw_event(i, cc_name.str);
arc_pmu_add_raw_event_attr(i, cc_name.str);

9
arch/arm/boot/dts/am3874-iceboard.dts
View File

@ -111,13 +111,13 @@
reg = <0x70>;
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
i2c-mux-idle-disconnect;
i2c@0 {
/* FMC A */
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
reg = <0>;
i2c-mux-idle-disconnect;
};
i2c@1 {
@ -125,7 +125,6 @@
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
reg = <1>;
i2c-mux-idle-disconnect;
};
i2c@2 {
@ -133,7 +132,6 @@
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
reg = <2>;
i2c-mux-idle-disconnect;
};
i2c@3 {
@ -141,7 +139,6 @@
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
reg = <3>;
i2c-mux-idle-disconnect;
};
i2c@4 {
@ -149,14 +146,12 @@
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
reg = <4>;
i2c-mux-idle-disconnect;
};
i2c@5 {
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
reg = <5>;
i2c-mux-idle-disconnect;
ina230@40 { compatible = "ti,ina230"; reg = <0x40>; shunt-resistor = <5000>; };
ina230@41 { compatible = "ti,ina230"; reg = <0x41>; shunt-resistor = <5000>; };
@ -182,14 +177,12 @@
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
reg = <6>;
i2c-mux-idle-disconnect;
};
i2c@7 {
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
reg = <7>;
i2c-mux-idle-disconnect;
u41: pca9575@20 {
compatible = "nxp,pca9575";

1
arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2835-rpi-zero-w.dts
View File

@ -113,6 +113,7 @@
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
pinctrl-0 = <&emmc_gpio34 &gpclk2_gpio43>;
bus-width = <4>;
mmc-pwrseq = <&wifi_pwrseq>;
non-removable;
status = "okay";

8
arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm2837-rpi-cm3.dtsi
View File

@ -9,6 +9,14 @@
reg = <0 0x40000000>;
};
leds {
/*
* Since there is no upstream GPIO driver yet,
* remove the incomplete node.
*/
/delete-node/ act;
};
reg_3v3: fixed-regulator {
compatible = "regulator-fixed";
regulator-name = "3V3";

4
arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6-logicpd-baseboard.dtsi
View File

@ -328,6 +328,10 @@
pinctrl-0 = <&pinctrl_pwm3>;
};
&snvs_pwrkey {
status = "okay";
};
&ssi2 {
status = "okay";
};

4
arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6-logicpd-som.dtsi
View File

@ -207,6 +207,10 @@
vin-supply = <&sw1c_reg>;
};
&snvs_poweroff {
status = "okay";
};
&iomuxc {
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&pinctrl_hog>;

8
arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl-sabreauto.dtsi
View File

@ -230,6 +230,8 @@
accelerometer@1c {
compatible = "fsl,mma8451";
reg = <0x1c>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&pinctrl_mma8451_int>;
interrupt-parent = <&gpio6>;
interrupts = <31 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW>;
};
@ -628,6 +630,12 @@
>;
};
pinctrl_mma8451_int: mma8451intgrp {
fsl,pins = <
MX6QDL_PAD_EIM_BCLK__GPIO6_IO31 0xb0b1
>;
};
pinctrl_pwm3: pwm1grp {
fsl,pins = <
MX6QDL_PAD_SD4_DAT1__PWM3_OUT 0x1b0b1

8
arch/arm/boot/dts/imx7s.dtsi
View File

@ -448,7 +448,7 @@
compatible = "fsl,imx7d-gpt", "fsl,imx6sx-gpt";
reg = <0x302d0000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 55 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clks IMX7D_CLK_DUMMY>,
clocks = <&clks IMX7D_GPT1_ROOT_CLK>,
<&clks IMX7D_GPT1_ROOT_CLK>;
clock-names = "ipg", "per";
};
@ -457,7 +457,7 @@
compatible = "fsl,imx7d-gpt", "fsl,imx6sx-gpt";
reg = <0x302e0000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 54 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clks IMX7D_CLK_DUMMY>,
clocks = <&clks IMX7D_GPT2_ROOT_CLK>,
<&clks IMX7D_GPT2_ROOT_CLK>;
clock-names = "ipg", "per";
status = "disabled";
@ -467,7 +467,7 @@
compatible = "fsl,imx7d-gpt", "fsl,imx6sx-gpt";
reg = <0x302f0000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 53 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clks IMX7D_CLK_DUMMY>,
clocks = <&clks IMX7D_GPT3_ROOT_CLK>,
<&clks IMX7D_GPT3_ROOT_CLK>;
clock-names = "ipg", "per";
status = "disabled";
@ -477,7 +477,7 @@
compatible = "fsl,imx7d-gpt", "fsl,imx6sx-gpt";
reg = <0x30300000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 52 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clks IMX7D_CLK_DUMMY>,
clocks = <&clks IMX7D_GPT4_ROOT_CLK>,
<&clks IMX7D_GPT4_ROOT_CLK>;
clock-names = "ipg", "per";
status = "disabled";

4
arch/arm/boot/dts/logicpd-torpedo-som.dtsi
View File

@ -192,3 +192,7 @@
&twl_gpio {
ti,use-leds;
};
&twl_keypad {
status = "disabled";
};

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/omap4-droid4-xt894.dts
View File

@ -369,7 +369,7 @@
compatible = "ti,wl1285", "ti,wl1283";
reg = <2>;
/* gpio_100 with gpmc_wait2 pad as wakeirq */
interrupts-extended = <&gpio4 4 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING>,
interrupts-extended = <&gpio4 4 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
<&omap4_pmx_core 0x4e>;
interrupt-names = "irq", "wakeup";
ref-clock-frequency = <26000000>;

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/omap4-panda-common.dtsi
View File

@ -474,7 +474,7 @@
compatible = "ti,wl1271";
reg = <2>;
/* gpio_53 with gpmc_ncs3 pad as wakeup */
interrupts-extended = <&gpio2 21 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING>,
interrupts-extended = <&gpio2 21 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
<&omap4_pmx_core 0x3a>;
interrupt-names = "irq", "wakeup";
ref-clock-frequency = <38400000>;

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/omap4-sdp.dts
View File

@ -512,7 +512,7 @@
compatible = "ti,wl1281";
reg = <2>;
interrupt-parent = <&gpio1>;
interrupts = <21 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING>; /* gpio 53 */
interrupts = <21 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>; /* gpio 53 */
ref-clock-frequency = <26000000>;
tcxo-clock-frequency = <26000000>;
};

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/omap4-var-som-om44-wlan.dtsi
View File

@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
compatible = "ti,wl1271";
reg = <2>;
interrupt-parent = <&gpio2>;
interrupts = <9 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING>; /* gpio 41 */
interrupts = <9 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>; /* gpio 41 */
ref-clock-frequency = <38400000>;
};
};

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/omap5-board-common.dtsi
View File

@ -362,7 +362,7 @@
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&wlcore_irq_pin>;
interrupt-parent = <&gpio1>;
interrupts = <14 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING>; /* gpio 14 */
interrupts = <14 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>; /* gpio 14 */
ref-clock-frequency = <26000000>;
};
};

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/omap54xx-clocks.dtsi
View File

@ -1146,7 +1146,7 @@
};
};
gpu_cm: clock-controller@1500 {
gpu_cm: gpu_cm@1500 {
compatible = "ti,omap4-cm";
reg = <0x1500 0x100>;
#address-cells = <1>;

8
arch/arm/boot/dts/stm32mp157-pinctrl.dtsi
View File

@ -609,13 +609,13 @@
<STM32_PINMUX('F', 6, AF9)>; /* QSPI_BK1_IO3 */
bias-disable;
drive-push-pull;
slew-rate = <3>;
slew-rate = <1>;
};
pins2 {
pinmux = <STM32_PINMUX('B', 6, AF10)>; /* QSPI_BK1_NCS */
bias-pull-up;
drive-push-pull;
slew-rate = <3>;
slew-rate = <1>;
};
};
@ -637,13 +637,13 @@
<STM32_PINMUX('G', 7, AF11)>; /* QSPI_BK2_IO3 */
bias-disable;
drive-push-pull;
slew-rate = <3>;
slew-rate = <1>;
};
pins2 {
pinmux = <STM32_PINMUX('C', 0, AF10)>; /* QSPI_BK2_NCS */
bias-pull-up;
drive-push-pull;
slew-rate = <3>;
slew-rate = <1>;
};
};

13
arch/arm/boot/dts/stm32mp157c-ev1.dts
View File

@ -183,14 +183,12 @@
ov5640: camera@3c {
compatible = "ovti,ov5640";
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&ov5640_pins>;
reg = <0x3c>;
clocks = <&clk_ext_camera>;
clock-names = "xclk";
DOVDD-supply = <&v2v8>;
powerdown-gpios = <&stmfx_pinctrl 18 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
reset-gpios = <&stmfx_pinctrl 19 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
powerdown-gpios = <&stmfx_pinctrl 18 (GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH | GPIO_PUSH_PULL)>;
reset-gpios = <&stmfx_pinctrl 19 (GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW | GPIO_PUSH_PULL)>;
rotation = <180>;
status = "okay";
@ -223,15 +221,8 @@
joystick_pins: joystick {
pins = "gpio0", "gpio1", "gpio2", "gpio3", "gpio4";
drive-push-pull;
bias-pull-down;
};
ov5640_pins: camera {
pins = "agpio2", "agpio3"; /* stmfx pins 18 & 19 */
drive-push-pull;
output-low;
};
};
};
};

4
arch/arm/boot/dts/stm32mp157c.dtsi
View File

@ -932,7 +932,7 @@
interrupt-names = "int0", "int1";
clocks = <&rcc CK_HSE>, <&rcc FDCAN_K>;
clock-names = "hclk", "cclk";
bosch,mram-cfg = <0x1400 0 0 32 0 0 2 2>;
bosch,mram-cfg = <0x0 0 0 32 0 0 2 2>;
status = "disabled";
};
@ -945,7 +945,7 @@
interrupt-names = "int0", "int1";
clocks = <&rcc CK_HSE>, <&rcc FDCAN_K>;
clock-names = "hclk", "cclk";
bosch,mram-cfg = <0x0 0 0 32 0 0 2 2>;
bosch,mram-cfg = <0x1400 0 0 32 0 0 2 2>;
status = "disabled";
};

5
arch/arm/boot/dts/sun7i-a20.dtsi
View File

@ -380,9 +380,8 @@
compatible = "allwinner,sun7i-a20-csi0";
reg = <0x01c09000 0x1000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 42 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&ccu CLK_AHB_CSI0>, <&ccu CLK_CSI0>,
<&ccu CLK_CSI_SCLK>, <&ccu CLK_DRAM_CSI0>;
clock-names = "bus", "mod", "isp", "ram";
clocks = <&ccu CLK_AHB_CSI0>, <&ccu CLK_CSI_SCLK>, <&ccu CLK_DRAM_CSI0>;
clock-names = "bus", "isp", "ram";
resets = <&ccu RST_CSI0>;
status = "disabled";
};

1
arch/arm/boot/dts/sun8i-a83t-tbs-a711.dts
View File

@ -192,6 +192,7 @@
vqmmc-supply = <&reg_dldo1>;
non-removable;
wakeup-source;
keep-power-in-suspend;
status = "okay";
brcmf: wifi@1 {

2
arch/arm/boot/dts/vf610-zii-scu4-aib.dts
View File

@ -602,6 +602,7 @@
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
reg = <0x70>;
i2c-mux-idle-disconnect;
sff0_i2c: i2c@1 {
#address-cells = <1>;
@ -640,6 +641,7 @@
reg = <0x71>;
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
i2c-mux-idle-disconnect;
sff5_i2c: i2c@1 {
#address-cells = <1>;

1
arch/arm/configs/davinci_all_defconfig
View File

@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ CONFIG_FB=y
CONFIG_FIRMWARE_EDID=y
CONFIG_FB_DA8XX=y
CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_PWM=m
CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_GPIO=m
CONFIG_FRAMEBUFFER_CONSOLE=y
CONFIG_LOGO=y
CONFIG_SOUND=m

1
arch/arm/configs/imx_v6_v7_defconfig
View File

@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ CONFIG_VIDEO_OV5640=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_OV5645=m
CONFIG_IMX_IPUV3_CORE=y
CONFIG_DRM=y
CONFIG_DRM_MSM=y
CONFIG_DRM_PANEL_LVDS=y
CONFIG_DRM_PANEL_SIMPLE=y
CONFIG_DRM_PANEL_SEIKO_43WVF1G=y

12
arch/arm/configs/omap2plus_defconfig
View File

@ -356,15 +356,15 @@ CONFIG_DRM_OMAP_CONNECTOR_HDMI=m
CONFIG_DRM_OMAP_CONNECTOR_ANALOG_TV=m
CONFIG_DRM_OMAP_PANEL_DPI=m
CONFIG_DRM_OMAP_PANEL_DSI_CM=m
CONFIG_DRM_OMAP_PANEL_SONY_ACX565AKM=m
CONFIG_DRM_OMAP_PANEL_LGPHILIPS_LB035Q02=m
CONFIG_DRM_OMAP_PANEL_SHARP_LS037V7DW01=m
CONFIG_DRM_OMAP_PANEL_TPO_TD028TTEC1=m
CONFIG_DRM_OMAP_PANEL_TPO_TD043MTEA1=m
CONFIG_DRM_OMAP_PANEL_NEC_NL8048HL11=m
CONFIG_DRM_TILCDC=m
CONFIG_DRM_PANEL_SIMPLE=m
CONFIG_DRM_TI_TFP410=m
CONFIG_DRM_PANEL_LG_LB035Q02=m
CONFIG_DRM_PANEL_NEC_NL8048HL11=m
CONFIG_DRM_PANEL_SHARP_LS037V7DW01=m
CONFIG_DRM_PANEL_SONY_ACX565AKM=m
CONFIG_DRM_PANEL_TPO_TD028TTEC1=m
CONFIG_DRM_PANEL_TPO_TD043MTEA1=m
CONFIG_FB=y
CONFIG_FIRMWARE_EDID=y
CONFIG_FB_MODE_HELPERS=y

8
arch/arm/include/asm/domain.h
View File

@ -82,7 +82,7 @@
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_CP15_MMU
static inline unsigned int get_domain(void)
static __always_inline unsigned int get_domain(void)
{
unsigned int domain;
@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static inline unsigned int get_domain(void)
return domain;
}
static inline void set_domain(unsigned val)
static __always_inline void set_domain(unsigned int val)
{
asm volatile(
"mcr p15, 0, %0, c3, c0 @ set domain"
@ -102,12 +102,12 @@ static inline void set_domain(unsigned val)
isb();
}
#else
static inline unsigned int get_domain(void)
static __always_inline unsigned int get_domain(void)
{
return 0;
}
static inline void set_domain(unsigned val)
static __always_inline void set_domain(unsigned int val)
{
}
#endif

4
arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
View File

@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
* perform such accesses (eg, via list poison values) which could then
* be exploited for priviledge escalation.
*/
static inline unsigned int uaccess_save_and_enable(void)
static __always_inline unsigned int uaccess_save_and_enable(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN
unsigned int old_domain = get_domain();
@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static inline unsigned int uaccess_save_and_enable(void)
#endif
}
static inline void uaccess_restore(unsigned int flags)
static __always_inline void uaccess_restore(unsigned int flags)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN
/* Restore the user access mask */

5
arch/arm/kernel/head-common.S
View File

@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ ENDPROC(__vet_atags)
* The following fragment of code is executed with the MMU on in MMU mode,
* and uses absolute addresses; this is not position independent.
*
* r0 = cp#15 control register
* r0 = cp#15 control register (exc_ret for M-class)
* r1 = machine ID
* r2 = atags/dtb pointer
* r9 = processor ID
@ -137,7 +137,8 @@ __mmap_switched_data:
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_CP15
.long cr_alignment @ r3
#else
.long 0 @ r3
M_CLASS(.long exc_ret) @ r3
AR_CLASS(.long 0) @ r3
#endif
.size __mmap_switched_data, . - __mmap_switched_data

2
arch/arm/kernel/head-nommu.S
View File

@ -201,6 +201,8 @@ M_CLASS(streq r3, [r12, #PMSAv8_MAIR1])
bic r0, r0, #V7M_SCB_CCR_IC
#endif
str r0, [r12, V7M_SCB_CCR]
/* Pass exc_ret to __mmap_switched */
mov r0, r10
#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_CP15 elif CONFIG_CPU_V7M */
ret lr
ENDPROC(__after_proc_init)

4
arch/arm/mach-davinci/dm365.c
View File

@ -462,8 +462,8 @@ static s8 dm365_queue_priority_mapping[][2] = {
};
static const struct dma_slave_map dm365_edma_map[] = {
{ "davinci-mcbsp.0", "tx", EDMA_FILTER_PARAM(0, 2) },
{ "davinci-mcbsp.0", "rx", EDMA_FILTER_PARAM(0, 3) },
{ "davinci-mcbsp", "tx", EDMA_FILTER_PARAM(0, 2) },
{ "davinci-mcbsp", "rx", EDMA_FILTER_PARAM(0, 3) },
{ "davinci_voicecodec", "tx", EDMA_FILTER_PARAM(0, 2) },
{ "davinci_voicecodec", "rx", EDMA_FILTER_PARAM(0, 3) },
{ "spi_davinci.2", "tx", EDMA_FILTER_PARAM(0, 10) },

11
arch/arm/mach-omap2/pdata-quirks.c
View File

@ -89,6 +89,13 @@ static struct iommu_platform_data omap3_iommu_pdata = {
.reset_name = "mmu",
.assert_reset = omap_device_assert_hardreset,
.deassert_reset = omap_device_deassert_hardreset,
.device_enable = omap_device_enable,
.device_idle = omap_device_idle,
};
static struct iommu_platform_data omap3_iommu_isp_pdata = {
.device_enable = omap_device_enable,
.device_idle = omap_device_idle,
};
static int omap3_sbc_t3730_twl_callback(struct device *dev,
@ -424,6 +431,8 @@ static struct iommu_platform_data omap4_iommu_pdata = {
.reset_name = "mmu_cache",
.assert_reset = omap_device_assert_hardreset,
.deassert_reset = omap_device_deassert_hardreset,
.device_enable = omap_device_enable,
.device_idle = omap_device_idle,
};
#endif
@ -617,6 +626,8 @@ static struct of_dev_auxdata omap_auxdata_lookup[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_OMAP3
OF_DEV_AUXDATA("ti,omap2-iommu", 0x5d000000, "5d000000.mmu",
&omap3_iommu_pdata),
OF_DEV_AUXDATA("ti,omap2-iommu", 0x480bd400, "480bd400.mmu",
&omap3_iommu_isp_pdata),
OF_DEV_AUXDATA("ti,omap3-smartreflex-core", 0x480cb000,
"480cb000.smartreflex", &omap_sr_pdata[OMAP_SR_CORE]),
OF_DEV_AUXDATA("ti,omap3-smartreflex-mpu-iva", 0x480c9000,

6
arch/arm/mach-sunxi/mc_smp.c
View File

@ -481,14 +481,18 @@ static void sunxi_mc_smp_cpu_die(unsigned int l_cpu)
static int sunxi_cpu_powerdown(unsigned int cpu, unsigned int cluster)
{
u32 reg;
int gating_bit = cpu;
pr_debug("%s: cluster %u cpu %u\n", __func__, cluster, cpu);
if (cpu >= SUNXI_CPUS_PER_CLUSTER || cluster >= SUNXI_NR_CLUSTERS)
return -EINVAL;
if (is_a83t && cpu == 0)
gating_bit = 4;
/* gate processor power */
reg = readl(prcm_base + PRCM_PWROFF_GATING_REG(cluster));
reg |= PRCM_PWROFF_GATING_REG_CORE(cpu);
reg |= PRCM_PWROFF_GATING_REG_CORE(gating_bit);
writel(reg, prcm_base + PRCM_PWROFF_GATING_REG(cluster));
udelay(20);

70
arch/arm/mm/alignment.c
View File

@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ union offset_union {
__put32_unaligned_check("strbt", val, addr)
static void
do_alignment_finish_ldst(unsigned long addr, unsigned long instr, struct pt_regs *regs, union offset_union offset)
do_alignment_finish_ldst(unsigned long addr, u32 instr, struct pt_regs *regs, union offset_union offset)
{
if (!LDST_U_BIT(instr))
offset.un = -offset.un;
@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ do_alignment_finish_ldst(unsigned long addr, unsigned long instr, struct pt_regs
}
static int
do_alignment_ldrhstrh(unsigned long addr, unsigned long instr, struct pt_regs *regs)
do_alignment_ldrhstrh(unsigned long addr, u32 instr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned int rd = RD_BITS(instr);
@ -386,8 +386,7 @@ do_alignment_ldrhstrh(unsigned long addr, unsigned long instr, struct pt_regs *r
}
static int
do_alignment_ldrdstrd(unsigned long addr, unsigned long instr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
do_alignment_ldrdstrd(unsigned long addr, u32 instr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned int rd = RD_BITS(instr);
unsigned int rd2;
@ -449,7 +448,7 @@ do_alignment_ldrdstrd(unsigned long addr, unsigned long instr,
}
static int
do_alignment_ldrstr(unsigned long addr, unsigned long instr, struct pt_regs *regs)
do_alignment_ldrstr(unsigned long addr, u32 instr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned int rd = RD_BITS(instr);
@ -498,7 +497,7 @@ do_alignment_ldrstr(unsigned long addr, unsigned long instr, struct pt_regs *reg
* PU = 10 A B
*/
static int
do_alignment_ldmstm(unsigned long addr, unsigned long instr, struct pt_regs *regs)
do_alignment_ldmstm(unsigned long addr, u32 instr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned int rd, rn, correction, nr_regs, regbits;
unsigned long eaddr, newaddr;
@ -539,7 +538,7 @@ do_alignment_ldmstm(unsigned long addr, unsigned long instr, struct pt_regs *reg
* processor for us.
*/
if (addr != eaddr) {
pr_err("LDMSTM: PC = %08lx, instr = %08lx, "
pr_err("LDMSTM: PC = %08lx, instr = %08x, "
"addr = %08lx, eaddr = %08lx\n",
instruction_pointer(regs), instr, addr, eaddr);
show_regs(regs);
@ -716,10 +715,10 @@ thumb2arm(u16 tinstr)
* 2. Register name Rt from ARMv7 is same as Rd from ARMv6 (Rd is Rt)
*/
static void *
do_alignment_t32_to_handler(unsigned long *pinstr, struct pt_regs *regs,
do_alignment_t32_to_handler(u32 *pinstr, struct pt_regs *regs,
union offset_union *poffset)
{
unsigned long instr = *pinstr;
u32 instr = *pinstr;
u16 tinst1 = (instr >> 16) & 0xffff;
u16 tinst2 = instr & 0xffff;
@ -767,17 +766,48 @@ do_alignment_t32_to_handler(unsigned long *pinstr, struct pt_regs *regs,
return NULL;
}
static int alignment_get_arm(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 *ip, u32 *inst)
{
u32 instr = 0;
int fault;
if (user_mode(regs))
fault = get_user(instr, ip);
else
fault = probe_kernel_address(ip, instr);
*inst = __mem_to_opcode_arm(instr);
return fault;
}
static int alignment_get_thumb(struct pt_regs *regs, u16 *ip, u16 *inst)
{
u16 instr = 0;
int fault;
if (user_mode(regs))
fault = get_user(instr, ip);
else
fault = probe_kernel_address(ip, instr);
*inst = __mem_to_opcode_thumb16(instr);
return fault;
}
static int
do_alignment(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
union offset_union uninitialized_var(offset);
unsigned long instr = 0, instrptr;
int (*handler)(unsigned long addr, unsigned long instr, struct pt_regs *regs);
unsigned long instrptr;
int (*handler)(unsigned long addr, u32 instr, struct pt_regs *regs);
unsigned int type;
unsigned int fault;
u32 instr = 0;
u16 tinstr = 0;
int isize = 4;
int thumb2_32b = 0;
int fault;
if (interrupts_enabled(regs))
local_irq_enable();
@ -786,15 +816,14 @@ do_alignment(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
if (thumb_mode(regs)) {
u16 *ptr = (u16 *)(instrptr & ~1);
fault = probe_kernel_address(ptr, tinstr);
tinstr = __mem_to_opcode_thumb16(tinstr);
fault = alignment_get_thumb(regs, ptr, &tinstr);
if (!fault) {
if (cpu_architecture() >= CPU_ARCH_ARMv7 &&
IS_T32(tinstr)) {
/* Thumb-2 32-bit */
u16 tinst2 = 0;
fault = probe_kernel_address(ptr + 1, tinst2);
tinst2 = __mem_to_opcode_thumb16(tinst2);
u16 tinst2;
fault = alignment_get_thumb(regs, ptr + 1, &tinst2);
instr = __opcode_thumb32_compose(tinstr, tinst2);
thumb2_32b = 1;
} else {
@ -803,8 +832,7 @@ do_alignment(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
}
}
} else {
fault = probe_kernel_address((void *)instrptr, instr);
instr = __mem_to_opcode_arm(instr);
fault = alignment_get_arm(regs, (void *)instrptr, &instr);
}
if (fault) {
@ -926,7 +954,7 @@ do_alignment(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
* Oops, we didn't handle the instruction.
*/
pr_err("Alignment trap: not handling instruction "
"%0*lx at [<%08lx>]\n",
"%0*x at [<%08lx>]\n",
isize << 1,
isize == 2 ? tinstr : instr, instrptr);
ai_skipped += 1;
@ -936,7 +964,7 @@ do_alignment(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr, struct pt_regs *regs)
ai_user += 1;
if (ai_usermode & UM_WARN)
printk("Alignment trap: %s (%d) PC=0x%08lx Instr=0x%0*lx "
printk("Alignment trap: %s (%d) PC=0x%08lx Instr=0x%0*x "
"Address=0x%08lx FSR 0x%03x\n", current->comm,
task_pid_nr(current), instrptr,
isize << 1,

6
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7m.S
View File

@ -132,13 +132,11 @@ __v7m_setup_cont:
dsb
mov r6, lr @ save LR
ldr sp, =init_thread_union + THREAD_START_SP
stmia sp, {r0-r3, r12}
cpsie i
svc #0
1: cpsid i
ldr r0, =exc_ret
orr lr, lr, #EXC_RET_THREADMODE_PROCESSSTACK
str lr, [r0]
/* Calculate exc_ret */
orr r10, lr, #EXC_RET_THREADMODE_PROCESSSTACK
ldmia sp, {r0-r3, r12}
str r5, [r12, #11 * 4] @ restore the original SVC vector entry
mov lr, r6 @ restore LR

9
arch/arm64/boot/dts/allwinner/sun50i-a64-pine64-plus.dts
View File

@ -63,3 +63,12 @@
reg = <1>;
};
};
&reg_dc1sw {
/*
* Ethernet PHY needs 30ms to properly power up and some more
* to initialize. 100ms should be plenty of time to finish
* whole process.
*/
regulator-enable-ramp-delay = <100000>;
};

6
arch/arm64/boot/dts/allwinner/sun50i-a64-sopine-baseboard.dts
View File

@ -159,6 +159,12 @@
};
&reg_dc1sw {
/*
* Ethernet PHY needs 30ms to properly power up and some more
* to initialize. 100ms should be plenty of time to finish
* whole process.
*/
regulator-enable-ramp-delay = <100000>;
regulator-name = "vcc-phy";
};

9
arch/arm64/boot/dts/allwinner/sun50i-a64.dtsi
View File

@ -142,15 +142,6 @@
clock-output-names = "ext-osc32k";
};
pmu {
compatible = "arm,cortex-a53-pmu";
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 152 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
<GIC_SPI 153 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
<GIC_SPI 154 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
<GIC_SPI 155 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
interrupt-affinity = <&cpu0>, <&cpu1>, <&cpu2>, <&cpu3>;
};
psci {
compatible = "arm,psci-0.2";
method = "smc";

5
arch/arm64/boot/dts/broadcom/stingray/stingray-pinctrl.dtsi
View File

@ -42,13 +42,14 @@
pinmux: pinmux@14029c {
compatible = "pinctrl-single";
reg = <0x0014029c 0x250>;
reg = <0x0014029c 0x26c>;
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <1>;
pinctrl-single,register-width = <32>;
pinctrl-single,function-mask = <0xf>;
pinctrl-single,gpio-range = <
&range 0 154 MODE_GPIO
&range 0 91 MODE_GPIO
&range 95 60 MODE_GPIO
>;
range: gpio-range {
#pinctrl-single,gpio-range-cells = <3>;

3
arch/arm64/boot/dts/broadcom/stingray/stingray.dtsi
View File

@ -464,8 +464,7 @@
<&pinmux 108 16 27>,
<&pinmux 135 77 6>,
<&pinmux 141 67 4>,
<&pinmux 145 149 6>,
<&pinmux 151 91 4>;
<&pinmux 145 149 6>;
};
i2c1: i2c@e0000 {

2
arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/fsl-ls1028a-qds.dts
View File

@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
status = "okay";
i2c-mux@77 {
compatible = "nxp,pca9847";
compatible = "nxp,pca9547";
reg = <0x77>;
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;

36
arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/fsl-lx2160a.dtsi
View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
i-cache-line-size = <64>;
i-cache-sets = <192>;
next-level-cache = <&cluster0_l2>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw20>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw15>;
};
cpu@1 {
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
i-cache-line-size = <64>;
i-cache-sets = <192>;
next-level-cache = <&cluster0_l2>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw20>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw15>;
};
cpu@100 {
@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
i-cache-line-size = <64>;
i-cache-sets = <192>;
next-level-cache = <&cluster1_l2>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw20>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw15>;
};
cpu@101 {
@ -81,7 +81,7 @@
i-cache-line-size = <64>;
i-cache-sets = <192>;
next-level-cache = <&cluster1_l2>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw20>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw15>;
};
cpu@200 {
@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
i-cache-line-size = <64>;
i-cache-sets = <192>;
next-level-cache = <&cluster2_l2>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw20>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw15>;
};
cpu@201 {
@ -113,7 +113,7 @@
i-cache-line-size = <64>;
i-cache-sets = <192>;
next-level-cache = <&cluster2_l2>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw20>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw15>;
};
cpu@300 {
@ -129,7 +129,7 @@
i-cache-line-size = <64>;
i-cache-sets = <192>;
next-level-cache = <&cluster3_l2>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw20>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw15>;
};
cpu@301 {
@ -145,7 +145,7 @@
i-cache-line-size = <64>;
i-cache-sets = <192>;
next-level-cache = <&cluster3_l2>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw20>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw15>;
};
cpu@400 {
@ -161,7 +161,7 @@
i-cache-line-size = <64>;
i-cache-sets = <192>;
next-level-cache = <&cluster4_l2>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw20>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw15>;
};
cpu@401 {
@ -177,7 +177,7 @@
i-cache-line-size = <64>;
i-cache-sets = <192>;
next-level-cache = <&cluster4_l2>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw20>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw15>;
};
cpu@500 {
@ -193,7 +193,7 @@
i-cache-line-size = <64>;
i-cache-sets = <192>;
next-level-cache = <&cluster5_l2>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw20>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw15>;
};
cpu@501 {
@ -209,7 +209,7 @@
i-cache-line-size = <64>;
i-cache-sets = <192>;
next-level-cache = <&cluster5_l2>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw20>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw15>;
};
cpu@600 {
@ -225,7 +225,7 @@
i-cache-line-size = <64>;
i-cache-sets = <192>;
next-level-cache = <&cluster6_l2>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw20>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw15>;
};
cpu@601 {
@ -241,7 +241,7 @@
i-cache-line-size = <64>;
i-cache-sets = <192>;
next-level-cache = <&cluster6_l2>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw20>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw15>;
};
cpu@700 {
@ -257,7 +257,7 @@
i-cache-line-size = <64>;
i-cache-sets = <192>;
next-level-cache = <&cluster7_l2>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw20>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw15>;
};
cpu@701 {
@ -273,7 +273,7 @@
i-cache-line-size = <64>;
i-cache-sets = <192>;
next-level-cache = <&cluster7_l2>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw20>;
cpu-idle-states = <&cpu_pw15>;
};
cluster0_l2: l2-cache0 {
@ -340,9 +340,9 @@
cache-level = <2>;
};
cpu_pw20: cpu-pw20 {
cpu_pw15: cpu-pw15 {
compatible = "arm,idle-state";
idle-state-name = "PW20";
idle-state-name = "PW15";
arm,psci-suspend-param = <0x0>;
entry-latency-us = <2000>;
exit-latency-us = <2000>;

12
arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8mm.dtsi
View File

@ -394,7 +394,7 @@
};
sdma2: dma-controller@302c0000 {
compatible = "fsl,imx8mm-sdma", "fsl,imx7d-sdma";
compatible = "fsl,imx8mm-sdma", "fsl,imx8mq-sdma";
reg = <0x302c0000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 103 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clk IMX8MM_CLK_SDMA2_ROOT>,
@ -405,7 +405,7 @@
};
sdma3: dma-controller@302b0000 {
compatible = "fsl,imx8mm-sdma", "fsl,imx7d-sdma";
compatible = "fsl,imx8mm-sdma", "fsl,imx8mq-sdma";
reg = <0x302b0000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 34 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clk IMX8MM_CLK_SDMA3_ROOT>,
@ -694,7 +694,7 @@
compatible = "fsl,imx8mm-usdhc", "fsl,imx7d-usdhc";
reg = <0x30b40000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 22 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clk IMX8MM_CLK_DUMMY>,
clocks = <&clk IMX8MM_CLK_IPG_ROOT>,
<&clk IMX8MM_CLK_NAND_USDHC_BUS>,
<&clk IMX8MM_CLK_USDHC1_ROOT>;
clock-names = "ipg", "ahb", "per";
@ -710,7 +710,7 @@
compatible = "fsl,imx8mm-usdhc", "fsl,imx7d-usdhc";
reg = <0x30b50000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 23 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clk IMX8MM_CLK_DUMMY>,
clocks = <&clk IMX8MM_CLK_IPG_ROOT>,
<&clk IMX8MM_CLK_NAND_USDHC_BUS>,
<&clk IMX8MM_CLK_USDHC2_ROOT>;
clock-names = "ipg", "ahb", "per";
@ -724,7 +724,7 @@
compatible = "fsl,imx8mm-usdhc", "fsl,imx7d-usdhc";
reg = <0x30b60000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 24 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clk IMX8MM_CLK_DUMMY>,
clocks = <&clk IMX8MM_CLK_IPG_ROOT>,
<&clk IMX8MM_CLK_NAND_USDHC_BUS>,
<&clk IMX8MM_CLK_USDHC3_ROOT>;
clock-names = "ipg", "ahb", "per";
@ -737,7 +737,7 @@
};
sdma1: dma-controller@30bd0000 {
compatible = "fsl,imx8mm-sdma", "fsl,imx7d-sdma";
compatible = "fsl,imx8mm-sdma", "fsl,imx8mq-sdma";
reg = <0x30bd0000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 2 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clk IMX8MM_CLK_SDMA1_ROOT>,

12
arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8mn.dtsi
View File

@ -288,7 +288,7 @@
};
sdma3: dma-controller@302b0000 {
compatible = "fsl,imx8mn-sdma", "fsl,imx7d-sdma";
compatible = "fsl,imx8mn-sdma", "fsl,imx8mq-sdma";
reg = <0x302b0000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 34 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clk IMX8MN_CLK_SDMA3_ROOT>,
@ -299,7 +299,7 @@
};
sdma2: dma-controller@302c0000 {
compatible = "fsl,imx8mn-sdma", "fsl,imx7d-sdma";
compatible = "fsl,imx8mn-sdma", "fsl,imx8mq-sdma";
reg = <0x302c0000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 103 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clk IMX8MN_CLK_SDMA2_ROOT>,
@ -569,7 +569,7 @@
compatible = "fsl,imx8mn-usdhc", "fsl,imx7d-usdhc";
reg = <0x30b40000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 22 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clk IMX8MN_CLK_DUMMY>,
clocks = <&clk IMX8MN_CLK_IPG_ROOT>,
<&clk IMX8MN_CLK_NAND_USDHC_BUS>,
<&clk IMX8MN_CLK_USDHC1_ROOT>;
clock-names = "ipg", "ahb", "per";
@ -585,7 +585,7 @@
compatible = "fsl,imx8mn-usdhc", "fsl,imx7d-usdhc";
reg = <0x30b50000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 23 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clk IMX8MN_CLK_DUMMY>,
clocks = <&clk IMX8MN_CLK_IPG_ROOT>,
<&clk IMX8MN_CLK_NAND_USDHC_BUS>,
<&clk IMX8MN_CLK_USDHC2_ROOT>;
clock-names = "ipg", "ahb", "per";
@ -599,7 +599,7 @@
compatible = "fsl,imx8mn-usdhc", "fsl,imx7d-usdhc";
reg = <0x30b60000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 24 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clk IMX8MN_CLK_DUMMY>,
clocks = <&clk IMX8MN_CLK_IPG_ROOT>,
<&clk IMX8MN_CLK_NAND_USDHC_BUS>,
<&clk IMX8MN_CLK_USDHC3_ROOT>;
clock-names = "ipg", "ahb", "per";
@ -612,7 +612,7 @@
};
sdma1: dma-controller@30bd0000 {
compatible = "fsl,imx8mn-sdma", "fsl,imx7d-sdma";
compatible = "fsl,imx8mn-sdma", "fsl,imx8mq-sdma";
reg = <0x30bd0000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 2 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clk IMX8MN_CLK_SDMA1_ROOT>,

6
arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8mq-zii-ultra.dtsi
View File

@ -88,9 +88,9 @@
regulator-name = "0V9_ARM";
regulator-min-microvolt = <900000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <1000000>;
gpios = <&gpio3 19 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
states = <1000000 0x0
900000 0x1>;
gpios = <&gpio3 16 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
states = <1000000 0x1
900000 0x0>;
regulator-always-on;
};
};

4
arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8mq.dtsi
View File

@ -850,7 +850,7 @@
"fsl,imx7d-usdhc";
reg = <0x30b40000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 22 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clk IMX8MQ_CLK_DUMMY>,
clocks = <&clk IMX8MQ_CLK_IPG_ROOT>,
<&clk IMX8MQ_CLK_NAND_USDHC_BUS>,
<&clk IMX8MQ_CLK_USDHC1_ROOT>;
clock-names = "ipg", "ahb", "per";
@ -867,7 +867,7 @@
"fsl,imx7d-usdhc";
reg = <0x30b50000 0x10000>;
interrupts = <GIC_SPI 23 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&clk IMX8MQ_CLK_DUMMY>,
clocks = <&clk IMX8MQ_CLK_IPG_ROOT>,
<&clk IMX8MQ_CLK_NAND_USDHC_BUS>,
<&clk IMX8MQ_CLK_USDHC2_ROOT>;
clock-names = "ipg", "ahb", "per";

13
arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-3720-turris-mox.dts
View File

@ -60,11 +60,6 @@
gpio = <&gpiosb 0 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
};
usb3_phy: usb3-phy {
compatible = "usb-nop-xceiv";
vcc-supply = <&exp_usb3_vbus>;
};
vsdc_reg: vsdc-reg {
compatible = "regulator-gpio";
regulator-name = "vsdc";
@ -255,10 +250,16 @@
status = "okay";
};
&comphy2 {
connector {
compatible = "usb-a-connector";
phy-supply = <&exp_usb3_vbus>;
};
};
&usb3 {
status = "okay";
phys = <&comphy2 0>;
usb-phy = <&usb3_phy>;
};
&mdio {

2
arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-gru-kevin.dts
View File

@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
power-supply = <&pp3300_disp>;
panel-timing {
clock-frequency = <266604720>;
clock-frequency = <266666667>;
hactive = <2400>;
hfront-porch = <48>;
hback-porch = <84>;

4
arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-hugsun-x99.dts
View File

@ -644,7 +644,7 @@
status = "okay";
u2phy0_host: host-port {
phy-supply = <&vcc5v0_host>;
phy-supply = <&vcc5v0_typec>;
status = "okay";
};
@ -712,7 +712,7 @@
&usbdrd_dwc3_0 {
status = "okay";
dr_mode = "otg";
dr_mode = "host";
};
&usbdrd3_1 {

12
arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-rockpro64.dts
View File

@ -173,7 +173,7 @@
regulator-always-on;
regulator-boot-on;
regulator-min-microvolt = <800000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <1400000>;
regulator-max-microvolt = <1700000>;
vin-supply = <&vcc5v0_sys>;
};
};
@ -247,8 +247,8 @@
rk808: pmic@1b {
compatible = "rockchip,rk808";
reg = <0x1b>;
interrupt-parent = <&gpio1>;
interrupts = <21 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW>;
interrupt-parent = <&gpio3>;
interrupts = <10 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW>;
#clock-cells = <1>;
clock-output-names = "xin32k", "rk808-clkout2";
pinctrl-names = "default";
@ -574,7 +574,7 @@
pmic {
pmic_int_l: pmic-int-l {
rockchip,pins = <1 RK_PC5 RK_FUNC_GPIO &pcfg_pull_up>;
rockchip,pins = <3 RK_PB2 RK_FUNC_GPIO &pcfg_pull_up>;
};
vsel1_gpio: vsel1-gpio {
@ -624,7 +624,6 @@
&sdmmc {
bus-width = <4>;
cap-mmc-highspeed;
cap-sd-highspeed;
cd-gpios = <&gpio0 7 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
disable-wp;
@ -636,8 +635,7 @@
&sdhci {
bus-width = <8>;
mmc-hs400-1_8v;
mmc-hs400-enhanced-strobe;
mmc-hs200-1_8v;
non-removable;
status = "okay";
};

2
arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h
View File

@ -79,6 +79,7 @@
#define CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_83XX 0x0A3
#define CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX2 0x0AF
#define BRCM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B53 0x100
#define BRCM_CPU_PART_VULCAN 0x516
#define QCOM_CPU_PART_FALKOR_V1 0x800
@ -105,6 +106,7 @@
#define MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_81XX)
#define MIDR_THUNDERX_83XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_83XX)
#define MIDR_CAVIUM_THUNDERX2 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX2)
#define MIDR_BRAHMA_B53 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_BRCM, BRCM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B53)
#define MIDR_BRCM_VULCAN MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_BRCM, BRCM_CPU_PART_VULCAN)
#define MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_QCOM, QCOM_CPU_PART_FALKOR_V1)
#define MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_QCOM, QCOM_CPU_PART_FALKOR)

15
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
View File

@ -32,11 +32,11 @@
#define PROT_DEFAULT (_PROT_DEFAULT | PTE_MAYBE_NG)
#define PROT_SECT_DEFAULT (_PROT_SECT_DEFAULT | PMD_MAYBE_NG)
#define PROT_DEVICE_nGnRnE (PROT_DEFAULT | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN | PTE_DIRTY | PTE_WRITE | PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_DEVICE_nGnRnE))
#define PROT_DEVICE_nGnRE (PROT_DEFAULT | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN | PTE_DIRTY | PTE_WRITE | PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_DEVICE_nGnRE))
#define PROT_NORMAL_NC (PROT_DEFAULT | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN | PTE_DIRTY | PTE_WRITE | PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL_NC))
#define PROT_NORMAL_WT (PROT_DEFAULT | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN | PTE_DIRTY | PTE_WRITE | PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL_WT))
#define PROT_NORMAL (PROT_DEFAULT | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN | PTE_DIRTY | PTE_WRITE | PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL))
#define PROT_DEVICE_nGnRnE (PROT_DEFAULT | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN | PTE_WRITE | PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_DEVICE_nGnRnE))
#define PROT_DEVICE_nGnRE (PROT_DEFAULT | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN | PTE_WRITE | PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_DEVICE_nGnRE))
#define PROT_NORMAL_NC (PROT_DEFAULT | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN | PTE_WRITE | PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL_NC))
#define PROT_NORMAL_WT (PROT_DEFAULT | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN | PTE_WRITE | PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL_WT))
#define PROT_NORMAL (PROT_DEFAULT | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN | PTE_WRITE | PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL))
#define PROT_SECT_DEVICE_nGnRE (PROT_SECT_DEFAULT | PMD_SECT_PXN | PMD_SECT_UXN | PMD_ATTRINDX(MT_DEVICE_nGnRE))
#define PROT_SECT_NORMAL (PROT_SECT_DEFAULT | PMD_SECT_PXN | PMD_SECT_UXN | PMD_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL))
@ -80,8 +80,9 @@
#define PAGE_S2_DEVICE __pgprot(_PROT_DEFAULT | PAGE_S2_MEMATTR(DEVICE_nGnRE) | PTE_S2_RDONLY | PTE_S2_XN)
#define PAGE_NONE __pgprot(((_PAGE_DEFAULT) & ~PTE_VALID) | PTE_PROT_NONE | PTE_RDONLY | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN)
#define PAGE_SHARED __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN | PTE_WRITE)
#define PAGE_SHARED_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN | PTE_WRITE)
/* shared+writable pages are clean by default, hence PTE_RDONLY|PTE_WRITE */
#define PAGE_SHARED __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_RDONLY | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN | PTE_WRITE)
#define PAGE_SHARED_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_RDONLY | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN | PTE_WRITE)
#define PAGE_READONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_RDONLY | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN)
#define PAGE_READONLY_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_RDONLY | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN)
#define PAGE_EXECONLY __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_RDONLY | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN)

17
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
View File

@ -283,23 +283,6 @@ static inline void set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
set_pte(ptep, pte);
}
#define __HAVE_ARCH_PTE_SAME
static inline int pte_same(pte_t pte_a, pte_t pte_b)
{
pteval_t lhs, rhs;
lhs = pte_val(pte_a);
rhs = pte_val(pte_b);
if (pte_present(pte_a))
lhs &= ~PTE_RDONLY;
if (pte_present(pte_b))
rhs &= ~PTE_RDONLY;
return (lhs == rhs);
}
/*
* Huge pte definitions.
*/

7
arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h
View File

@ -30,13 +30,6 @@ int __arm64_get_clock_mode(struct timekeeper *tk)
}
#define __arch_get_clock_mode __arm64_get_clock_mode
static __always_inline
int __arm64_use_vsyscall(struct vdso_data *vdata)
{
return !vdata[CS_HRES_COARSE].clock_mode;
}
#define __arch_use_vsyscall __arm64_use_vsyscall
static __always_inline
void __arm64_update_vsyscall(struct vdso_data *vdata, struct timekeeper *tk)
{

59
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
View File

@ -453,6 +453,7 @@ static const struct midr_range arm64_ssb_cpus[] = {
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A35),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A53),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A55),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRAHMA_B53),
{},
};
@ -537,6 +538,7 @@ static const struct midr_range spectre_v2_safe_list[] = {
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A35),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A53),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A55),
MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRAHMA_B53),
{ /* sentinel */ }
};
@ -623,17 +625,23 @@ static const struct midr_range arm64_harden_el2_vectors[] = {
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI
static const struct midr_range arm64_repeat_tlbi_cpus[] = {
static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_repeat_tlbi_list[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_QCOM_FALKOR_ERRATUM_1009
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1, 0, 0, 0, 0),
{
ERRATA_MIDR_REV(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1, 0, 0)
},
{
.midr_range.model = MIDR_QCOM_KRYO,
.matches = is_kryo_midr,
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1286807
MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A76, 0, 0, 3, 0),
{
ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A76, 0, 0, 3, 0),
},
#endif
{},
};
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_27456
@ -701,6 +709,33 @@ static const struct midr_range erratum_1418040_list[] = {
};
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_845719
static const struct midr_range erratum_845719_list[] = {
/* Cortex-A53 r0p[01234] */
MIDR_REV_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A53, 0, 0, 4),
/* Brahma-B53 r0p[0] */
MIDR_REV(MIDR_BRAHMA_B53, 0, 0),
{},
};
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419
static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities erratum_843419_list[] = {
{
/* Cortex-A53 r0p[01234] */
.matches = is_affected_midr_range,
ERRATA_MIDR_REV_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A53, 0, 0, 4),
MIDR_FIXED(0x4, BIT(8)),
},
{
/* Brahma-B53 r0p[0] */
.matches = is_affected_midr_range,
ERRATA_MIDR_REV(MIDR_BRAHMA_B53, 0, 0),
},
{},
};
#endif
const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_WORKAROUND_CLEAN_CACHE
{
@ -732,19 +767,18 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_843419
{
/* Cortex-A53 r0p[01234] */
.desc = "ARM erratum 843419",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_843419,
ERRATA_MIDR_REV_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A53, 0, 0, 4),
MIDR_FIXED(0x4, BIT(8)),
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
.matches = cpucap_multi_entry_cap_matches,
.match_list = erratum_843419_list,
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_845719
{
/* Cortex-A53 r0p[01234] */
.desc = "ARM erratum 845719",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_845719,
ERRATA_MIDR_REV_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A53, 0, 0, 4),
ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(erratum_845719_list),
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_23154
@ -780,6 +814,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
{
.desc = "Qualcomm Technologies Falkor/Kryo erratum 1003",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003,
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
.matches = cpucap_multi_entry_cap_matches,
.match_list = qcom_erratum_1003_list,
},
@ -788,7 +823,9 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
{
.desc = "Qualcomm erratum 1009, ARM erratum 1286807",
.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_REPEAT_TLBI,
ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(arm64_repeat_tlbi_cpus),
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
.matches = cpucap_multi_entry_cap_matches,
.match_list = arm64_repeat_tlbi_list,
},
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_858921

2
arch/mips/bcm63xx/prom.c
View File

@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ void __init prom_init(void)
* Here we will start up CPU1 in the background and ask it to
* reconfigure itself then go back to sleep.
*/
memcpy((void *)0xa0000200, &bmips_smp_movevec, 0x20);
memcpy((void *)0xa0000200, bmips_smp_movevec, 0x20);
__sync();
set_c0_cause(C_SW0);
cpumask_set_cpu(1, &bmips_booted_mask);

10
arch/mips/include/asm/bmips.h
View File

@ -75,11 +75,11 @@ static inline int register_bmips_smp_ops(void)
#endif
}
extern char bmips_reset_nmi_vec;
extern char bmips_reset_nmi_vec_end;
extern char bmips_smp_movevec;
extern char bmips_smp_int_vec;
extern char bmips_smp_int_vec_end;
extern char bmips_reset_nmi_vec[];
extern char bmips_reset_nmi_vec_end[];
extern char bmips_smp_movevec[];
extern char bmips_smp_int_vec[];
extern char bmips_smp_int_vec_end[];
extern int bmips_smp_enabled;
extern int bmips_cpu_offset;

4
arch/mips/include/asm/vdso/gettimeofday.h
View File

@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
#define VDSO_HAS_CLOCK_GETRES 1
#define __VDSO_USE_SYSCALL ULLONG_MAX
#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS_CLOCK_VSYSCALL
static __always_inline long gettimeofday_fallback(
@ -205,7 +207,7 @@ static __always_inline u64 __arch_get_hw_counter(s32 clock_mode)
break;
#endif
default:
cycle_now = 0;
cycle_now = __VDSO_USE_SYSCALL;
break;
}

7
arch/mips/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h
View File

@ -28,13 +28,6 @@ int __mips_get_clock_mode(struct timekeeper *tk)
}
#define __arch_get_clock_mode __mips_get_clock_mode
static __always_inline
int __mips_use_vsyscall(struct vdso_data *vdata)
{
return (vdata[CS_HRES_COARSE].clock_mode != VDSO_CLOCK_NONE);
}
#define __arch_use_vsyscall __mips_use_vsyscall
/* The asm-generic header needs to be included after the definitions above */
#include <asm-generic/vdso/vsyscall.h>

8
arch/mips/kernel/smp-bmips.c
View File

@ -464,10 +464,10 @@ static void bmips_wr_vec(unsigned long dst, char *start, char *end)
static inline void bmips_nmi_handler_setup(void)
{
bmips_wr_vec(BMIPS_NMI_RESET_VEC, &bmips_reset_nmi_vec,
&bmips_reset_nmi_vec_end);
bmips_wr_vec(BMIPS_WARM_RESTART_VEC, &bmips_smp_int_vec,
&bmips_smp_int_vec_end);
bmips_wr_vec(BMIPS_NMI_RESET_VEC, bmips_reset_nmi_vec,
bmips_reset_nmi_vec_end);
bmips_wr_vec(BMIPS_WARM_RESTART_VEC, bmips_smp_int_vec,
bmips_smp_int_vec_end);
}
struct reset_vec_info {

23
arch/mips/mm/tlbex.c
View File

@ -653,6 +653,13 @@ static void build_restore_pagemask(u32 **p, struct uasm_reloc **r,
int restore_scratch)
{
if (restore_scratch) {
/*
* Ensure the MFC0 below observes the value written to the
* KScratch register by the prior MTC0.
*/
if (scratch_reg >= 0)
uasm_i_ehb(p);
/* Reset default page size */
if (PM_DEFAULT_MASK >> 16) {
uasm_i_lui(p, tmp, PM_DEFAULT_MASK >> 16);
@ -667,12 +674,10 @@ static void build_restore_pagemask(u32 **p, struct uasm_reloc **r,
uasm_i_mtc0(p, 0, C0_PAGEMASK);
uasm_il_b(p, r, lid);
}
if (scratch_reg >= 0) {
uasm_i_ehb(p);
if (scratch_reg >= 0)
UASM_i_MFC0(p, 1, c0_kscratch(), scratch_reg);
} else {
else
UASM_i_LW(p, 1, scratchpad_offset(0), 0);
}
} else {
/* Reset default page size */
if (PM_DEFAULT_MASK >> 16) {
@ -921,6 +926,10 @@ build_get_pgd_vmalloc64(u32 **p, struct uasm_label **l, struct uasm_reloc **r,
}
if (mode != not_refill && check_for_high_segbits) {
uasm_l_large_segbits_fault(l, *p);
if (mode == refill_scratch && scratch_reg >= 0)
uasm_i_ehb(p);
/*
* We get here if we are an xsseg address, or if we are
* an xuseg address above (PGDIR_SHIFT+PGDIR_BITS) boundary.
@ -939,12 +948,10 @@ build_get_pgd_vmalloc64(u32 **p, struct uasm_label **l, struct uasm_reloc **r,
uasm_i_jr(p, ptr);
if (mode == refill_scratch) {
if (scratch_reg >= 0) {
uasm_i_ehb(p);
if (scratch_reg >= 0)
UASM_i_MFC0(p, 1, c0_kscratch(), scratch_reg);
} else {
else
UASM_i_LW(p, 1, scratchpad_offset(0), 0);
}
} else {
uasm_i_nop(p);
}

2
arch/parisc/kernel/entry.S
View File

@ -2125,7 +2125,7 @@ ftrace_regs_caller:
copy %rp, %r26
LDREG -FTRACE_FRAME_SIZE-PT_SZ_ALGN(%sp), %r25
ldo -8(%r25), %r25
copy %r3, %arg2
ldo -FTRACE_FRAME_SIZE(%r1), %arg2
b,l ftrace_function_trampoline, %rp
copy %r1, %arg3 /* struct pt_regs */

1
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/32/kup.h
View File

@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
static inline void kuap_update_sr(u32 sr, u32 addr, u32 end)
{
addr &= 0xf0000000; /* align addr to start of segment */
barrier(); /* make sure thread.kuap is updated before playing with SRs */
while (addr < end) {
mtsrin(sr, addr);

3
arch/powerpc/include/asm/elf.h
View File

@ -175,4 +175,7 @@ do { \
ARCH_DLINFO_CACHE_GEOMETRY; \
} while (0)
/* Relocate the kernel image to @final_address */
void relocate(unsigned long final_address);
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_ELF_H */

13
arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c
View File

@ -3249,7 +3249,20 @@ static void setup_secure_guest(unsigned long kbase, unsigned long fdt)
/* Switch to secure mode. */
prom_printf("Switching to secure mode.\n");
/*
* The ultravisor will do an integrity check of the kernel image but we
* relocated it so the check will fail. Restore the original image by
* relocating it back to the kernel virtual base address.
*/
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RELOCATABLE))
relocate(KERNELBASE);
ret = enter_secure_mode(kbase, fdt);
/* Relocate the kernel again. */
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RELOCATABLE))
relocate(kbase);
if (ret != U_SUCCESS) {
prom_printf("Returned %d from switching to secure mode.\n", ret);
prom_rtas_os_term("Switch to secure mode failed.\n");

3
arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init_check.sh
View File

@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ _end enter_prom $MEM_FUNCS reloc_offset __secondary_hold
__secondary_hold_acknowledge __secondary_hold_spinloop __start
logo_linux_clut224 btext_prepare_BAT
reloc_got2 kernstart_addr memstart_addr linux_banner _stext
__prom_init_toc_start __prom_init_toc_end btext_setup_display TOC."
__prom_init_toc_start __prom_init_toc_end btext_setup_display TOC.
relocate"
NM="$1"
OBJ="$2"

13
arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c
View File

@ -1141,6 +1141,19 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp)
goto out_addrs;
}
/*
* If we have seen a tail call, we need a second pass.
* This is because bpf_jit_emit_common_epilogue() is called
* from bpf_jit_emit_tail_call() with a not yet stable ctx->seen.
*/
if (cgctx.seen & SEEN_TAILCALL) {
cgctx.idx = 0;
if (bpf_jit_build_body(fp, 0, &cgctx, addrs, false)) {
fp = org_fp;
goto out_addrs;
}
}
/*
* Pretend to build prologue, given the features we've seen. This will
* update ctgtx.idx as it pretends to output instructions, then we can

2
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/eeh-powernv.c
View File

@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ void pnv_pcibios_bus_add_device(struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct pci_dn *pdn = pci_get_pdn(pdev);
if (eeh_has_flag(EEH_FORCE_DISABLED))
if (!pdn || eeh_has_flag(EEH_FORCE_DISABLED))
return;
dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "EEH: Setting up device\n");

53
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/smp.c
View File

@ -146,20 +146,25 @@ static int pnv_smp_cpu_disable(void)
return 0;
}
static void pnv_flush_interrupts(void)
{
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300)) {
if (xive_enabled())
xive_flush_interrupt();
else
icp_opal_flush_interrupt();
} else {
icp_native_flush_interrupt();
}
}
static void pnv_smp_cpu_kill_self(void)
{
unsigned long srr1, unexpected_mask, wmask;
unsigned int cpu;
unsigned long srr1, wmask;
u64 lpcr_val;
/* Standard hot unplug procedure */
/*
* This hard disables local interurpts, ensuring we have no lazy
* irqs pending.
*/
WARN_ON(irqs_disabled());
hard_irq_disable();
WARN_ON(lazy_irq_pending());
idle_task_exit();
current->active_mm = NULL; /* for sanity */
@ -172,6 +177,27 @@ static void pnv_smp_cpu_kill_self(void)
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S))
wmask = SRR1_WAKEMASK_P8;
/*
* This turns the irq soft-disabled state we're called with, into a
* hard-disabled state with pending irq_happened interrupts cleared.
*
* PACA_IRQ_DEC - Decrementer should be ignored.
* PACA_IRQ_HMI - Can be ignored, processing is done in real mode.
* PACA_IRQ_DBELL, EE, PMI - Unexpected.
*/
hard_irq_disable();
if (generic_check_cpu_restart(cpu))
goto out;
unexpected_mask = ~(PACA_IRQ_DEC | PACA_IRQ_HMI | PACA_IRQ_HARD_DIS);
if (local_paca->irq_happened & unexpected_mask) {
if (local_paca->irq_happened & PACA_IRQ_EE)
pnv_flush_interrupts();
DBG("CPU%d Unexpected exit while offline irq_happened=%lx!\n",
cpu, local_paca->irq_happened);
}
local_paca->irq_happened = PACA_IRQ_HARD_DIS;
/*
* We don't want to take decrementer interrupts while we are
* offline, so clear LPCR:PECE1. We keep PECE2 (and
@ -197,6 +223,7 @@ static void pnv_smp_cpu_kill_self(void)
srr1 = pnv_cpu_offline(cpu);
WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled());
WARN_ON(lazy_irq_pending());
/*
@ -212,13 +239,7 @@ static void pnv_smp_cpu_kill_self(void)
*/
if (((srr1 & wmask) == SRR1_WAKEEE) ||
((srr1 & wmask) == SRR1_WAKEHVI)) {
if (cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300)) {
if (xive_enabled())
xive_flush_interrupt();
else
icp_opal_flush_interrupt();
} else
icp_native_flush_interrupt();
pnv_flush_interrupts();
} else if ((srr1 & wmask) == SRR1_WAKEHDBELL) {
unsigned long msg = PPC_DBELL_TYPE(PPC_DBELL_SERVER);
asm volatile(PPC_MSGCLR(%0) : : "r" (msg));
@ -266,7 +287,7 @@ static void pnv_smp_cpu_kill_self(void)
*/
lpcr_val = mfspr(SPRN_LPCR) | (u64)LPCR_PECE1;
pnv_program_cpu_hotplug_lpcr(cpu, lpcr_val);
out:
DBG("CPU%d coming online...\n", cpu);
}

16
arch/riscv/include/asm/bug.h
View File

@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
#include <asm/asm.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG
#define __INSN_LENGTH_MASK _UL(0x3)
#define __INSN_LENGTH_32 _UL(0x3)
#define __COMPRESSED_INSN_MASK _UL(0xffff)
@ -20,7 +19,6 @@
#define __BUG_INSN_32 _UL(0x00100073) /* ebreak */
#define __BUG_INSN_16 _UL(0x9002) /* c.ebreak */
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
typedef u32 bug_insn_t;
#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG_RELATIVE_POINTERS
@ -43,6 +41,7 @@ typedef u32 bug_insn_t;
RISCV_SHORT " %2"
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG
#define __BUG_FLAGS(flags) \
do { \
__asm__ __volatile__ ( \
@ -58,14 +57,10 @@ do { \
"i" (flags), \
"i" (sizeof(struct bug_entry))); \
} while (0)
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#else /* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
#define __BUG_FLAGS(flags) do { \
__asm__ __volatile__ ("ebreak\n"); \
} while (0)
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */
#define BUG() do { \
@ -79,15 +74,10 @@ do { \
#include <asm-generic/bug.h>
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
struct pt_regs;
struct task_struct;
extern void die(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *str);
extern void do_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, int signo, int code,
unsigned long addr);
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
void die(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *str);
void do_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, int signo, int code, unsigned long addr);
#endif /* _ASM_RISCV_BUG_H */

7
arch/riscv/include/asm/io.h
View File

@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <asm/mmiowb.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
extern void __iomem *ioremap(phys_addr_t offset, unsigned long size);
@ -161,6 +162,12 @@ static inline u64 __raw_readq(const volatile void __iomem *addr)
#define writeq(v,c) ({ __io_bw(); writeq_cpu((v),(c)); __io_aw(); })
#endif
/*
* I/O port access constants.
*/
#define IO_SPACE_LIMIT (PCI_IO_SIZE - 1)
#define PCI_IOBASE ((void __iomem *)PCI_IO_START)
/*
* Emulation routines for the port-mapped IO space used by some PCI drivers.
* These are defined as being "fully synchronous", but also "not guaranteed to

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