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CRED: Differentiate objective and effective subjective credentials on a task
Differentiate the objective and real subjective credentials from the effective subjective credentials on a task by introducing a second credentials pointer into the task_struct. task_struct::real_cred then refers to the objective and apparent real subjective credentials of a task, as perceived by the other tasks in the system. task_struct::cred then refers to the effective subjective credentials of a task, as used by that task when it's actually running. These are not visible to the other tasks in the system. __task_cred(task) then refers to the objective/real credentials of the task in question. current_cred() refers to the effective subjective credentials of the current task. prepare_creds() uses the objective creds as a base and commit_creds() changes both pointers in the task_struct (indeed commit_creds() requires them to be the same). override_creds() and revert_creds() change the subjective creds pointer only, and the former returns the old subjective creds. These are used by NFSD, faccessat() and do_coredump(), and will by used by CacheFiles. In SELinux, current_has_perm() is provided as an alternative to task_has_perm(). This uses the effective subjective context of current, whereas task_has_perm() uses the objective/real context of the subject. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This commit is contained in:
David Howells
James Morris
parent
98870ab0a5
commit
3b11a1dece
@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp)
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int flags = nfsexp_flags(rqstp, exp);
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int ret;
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/* discard any old override before preparing the new set */
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revert_creds(get_cred(current->real_cred));
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new = prepare_creds();
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if (!new)
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return -ENOMEM;
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@ -82,7 +84,8 @@ int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp)
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else
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new->cap_effective = cap_raise_nfsd_set(new->cap_effective,
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new->cap_permitted);
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return commit_creds(new);
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put_cred(override_creds(new));
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return 0;
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oom:
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ret = -ENOMEM;
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@ -146,8 +146,8 @@ extern struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void);
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extern struct cred *prepare_usermodehelper_creds(void);
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extern int commit_creds(struct cred *);
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extern void abort_creds(struct cred *);
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extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *) __deprecated;
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extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *) __deprecated;
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extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
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extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *);
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extern void __init cred_init(void);
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/**
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@ -202,32 +202,32 @@ static inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred)
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}
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/**
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* current_cred - Access the current task's credentials
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* current_cred - Access the current task's subjective credentials
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*
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* Access the credentials of the current task.
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* Access the subjective credentials of the current task.
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*/
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#define current_cred() \
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(current->cred)
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/**
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* __task_cred - Access another task's credentials
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* __task_cred - Access a task's objective credentials
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* @task: The task to query
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*
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* Access the credentials of another task. The caller must hold the
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* RCU readlock.
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* Access the objective credentials of a task. The caller must hold the RCU
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* readlock.
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*
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* The caller must make sure task doesn't go away, either by holding a ref on
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* task or by holding tasklist_lock to prevent it from being unlinked.
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*/
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#define __task_cred(task) \
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((const struct cred *)(rcu_dereference((task)->cred)))
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((const struct cred *)(rcu_dereference((task)->real_cred)))
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/**
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* get_task_cred - Get another task's credentials
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* get_task_cred - Get another task's objective credentials
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* @task: The task to query
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*
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* Get the credentials of a task, pinning them so that they can't go away.
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* Accessing a task's credentials directly is not permitted.
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* Get the objective credentials of a task, pinning them so that they can't go
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* away. Accessing a task's credentials directly is not permitted.
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*
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* The caller must make sure task doesn't go away, either by holding a ref on
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* task or by holding tasklist_lock to prevent it from being unlinked.
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@ -243,10 +243,11 @@ static inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred)
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})
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/**
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* get_current_cred - Get the current task's credentials
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* get_current_cred - Get the current task's subjective credentials
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*
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* Get the credentials of the current task, pinning them so that they can't go
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* away. Accessing the current task's credentials directly is not permitted.
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* Get the subjective credentials of the current task, pinning them so that
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* they can't go away. Accessing the current task's credentials directly is
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* not permitted.
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*/
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#define get_current_cred() \
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(get_cred(current_cred()))
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@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ extern struct cred init_cred;
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.children = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tsk.children), \
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.sibling = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tsk.sibling), \
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.group_leader = &tsk, \
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.real_cred = &init_cred, \
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.cred = &init_cred, \
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.cred_exec_mutex = \
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__MUTEX_INITIALIZER(tsk.cred_exec_mutex), \
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@ -1145,7 +1145,10 @@ struct task_struct {
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struct list_head cpu_timers[3];
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/* process credentials */
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const struct cred *cred; /* actual/objective task credentials (COW) */
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const struct cred *real_cred; /* objective and real subjective task
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* credentials (COW) */
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const struct cred *cred; /* effective (overridable) subjective task
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* credentials (COW) */
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struct mutex cred_exec_mutex; /* execve vs ptrace cred calculation mutex */
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char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; /* executable name excluding path
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@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static struct thread_group_cred init_tgcred = {
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* The initial credentials for the initial task
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*/
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struct cred init_cred = {
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.usage = ATOMIC_INIT(3),
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.usage = ATOMIC_INIT(4),
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.securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT,
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.cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET,
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.cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET,
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@ -120,6 +120,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_cred);
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* prepare a new copy, which the caller then modifies and then commits by
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* calling commit_creds().
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*
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* Preparation involves making a copy of the objective creds for modification.
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*
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* Returns a pointer to the new creds-to-be if successful, NULL otherwise.
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*
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* Call commit_creds() or abort_creds() to clean up.
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@ -130,7 +132,7 @@ struct cred *prepare_creds(void)
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const struct cred *old;
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struct cred *new;
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BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->cred->usage) < 1);
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BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->real_cred->usage) < 1);
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new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!new)
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@ -262,6 +264,9 @@ error:
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*
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* We share if we can, but under some circumstances we have to generate a new
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* set.
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*
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* The new process gets the current process's subjective credentials as its
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* objective and subjective credentials
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*/
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int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
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{
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@ -278,6 +283,7 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
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#endif
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clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD
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) {
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p->real_cred = get_cred(p->cred);
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get_cred(p->cred);
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atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes);
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return 0;
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@ -317,7 +323,7 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
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#endif
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atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
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p->cred = new;
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p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new);
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return 0;
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}
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@ -326,7 +332,9 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
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* @new: The credentials to be assigned
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*
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* Install a new set of credentials to the current task, using RCU to replace
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* the old set.
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* the old set. Both the objective and the subjective credentials pointers are
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* updated. This function may not be called if the subjective credentials are
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* in an overridden state.
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*
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* This function eats the caller's reference to the new credentials.
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*
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@ -338,12 +346,15 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
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struct task_struct *task = current;
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const struct cred *old;
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BUG_ON(task->cred != task->real_cred);
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BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->real_cred->usage) < 2);
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BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
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BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->cred->usage) < 1);
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old = task->cred;
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old = task->real_cred;
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security_commit_creds(new, old);
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get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */
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/* dumpability changes */
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if (old->euid != new->euid ||
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old->egid != new->egid ||
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@ -369,6 +380,7 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
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*/
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if (new->user != old->user)
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atomic_inc(&new->user->processes);
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rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new);
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rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new);
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if (new->user != old->user)
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atomic_dec(&old->user->processes);
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@ -388,6 +400,8 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
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new->fsgid != old->fsgid)
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proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_GID);
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/* release the old obj and subj refs both */
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put_cred(old);
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put_cred(old);
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return 0;
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}
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@ -408,11 +422,11 @@ void abort_creds(struct cred *new)
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(abort_creds);
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/**
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* override_creds - Temporarily override the current process's credentials
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* override_creds - Override the current process's subjective credentials
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* @new: The credentials to be assigned
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*
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* Install a set of temporary override credentials on the current process,
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* returning the old set for later reversion.
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* Install a set of temporary override subjective credentials on the current
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* process, returning the old set for later reversion.
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*/
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const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new)
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{
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@ -424,11 +438,11 @@ const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new)
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(override_creds);
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/**
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* revert_creds - Revert a temporary credentials override
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* revert_creds - Revert a temporary subjective credentials override
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* @old: The credentials to be restored
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*
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* Revert a temporary set of override credentials to an old set, discarding the
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* override set.
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* Revert a temporary set of override subjective credentials to an old set,
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* discarding the override set.
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*/
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void revert_creds(const struct cred *old)
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{
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@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ void __put_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk)
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WARN_ON(atomic_read(&tsk->usage));
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WARN_ON(tsk == current);
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put_cred(tsk->real_cred);
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put_cred(tsk->cred);
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delayacct_tsk_free(tsk);
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@ -961,10 +962,10 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
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DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->softirqs_enabled);
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#endif
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retval = -EAGAIN;
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if (atomic_read(&p->cred->user->processes) >=
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if (atomic_read(&p->real_cred->user->processes) >=
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p->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) {
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if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) &&
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p->cred->user != current->nsproxy->user_ns->root_user)
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p->real_cred->user != current->nsproxy->user_ns->root_user)
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goto bad_fork_free;
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}
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@ -1278,6 +1279,7 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_put_domain:
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module_put(task_thread_info(p)->exec_domain->module);
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bad_fork_cleanup_count:
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atomic_dec(&p->cred->user->processes);
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put_cred(p->real_cred);
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put_cred(p->cred);
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bad_fork_free:
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free_task(p);
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@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
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*/
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static void cred_init_security(void)
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{
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struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
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struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
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struct task_security_struct *tsec;
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tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
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@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
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}
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/*
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* get the security ID of a task
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* get the objective security ID of a task
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*/
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static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
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{
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@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
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}
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/*
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* get the security ID of the current task
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* get the subjective security ID of the current task
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*/
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static inline u32 current_sid(void)
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{
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@ -1395,6 +1395,7 @@ static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
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* Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
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* fork check, ptrace check, etc.
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* tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
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* - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
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*/
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static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
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const struct task_struct *tsk2,
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@ -1410,6 +1411,22 @@ static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
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return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
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}
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/*
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* Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
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* fork check, ptrace check, etc.
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* current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
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* - this uses current's subjective creds
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*/
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static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
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u32 perms)
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{
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u32 sid, tsid;
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sid = current_sid();
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tsid = task_sid(tsk);
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return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
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}
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#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
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#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
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#endif
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@ -1807,7 +1824,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
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return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
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}
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return task_has_perm(current, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
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return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
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}
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static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
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@ -1826,7 +1843,7 @@ static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
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{
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int error;
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error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
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error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
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if (error)
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return error;
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@ -3071,7 +3088,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
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} else if (!vma->vm_file &&
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vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
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vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
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rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
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rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
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} else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
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/*
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* We are making executable a file mapping that has
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@ -3220,7 +3237,7 @@ static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
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if (rc)
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return rc;
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return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
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return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
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}
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/*
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@ -3285,17 +3302,17 @@ static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
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static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
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{
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return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
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return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
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}
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static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
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{
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return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
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return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
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}
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static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
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{
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return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
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return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
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}
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static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
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@ -3317,7 +3334,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
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if (rc)
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return rc;
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return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
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return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
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}
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static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
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@ -3328,12 +3345,12 @@ static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
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if (rc)
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return rc;
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return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
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return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
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}
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static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
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{
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return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
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return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
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}
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static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
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@ -3350,7 +3367,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim
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later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
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upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
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if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
|
||||
return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
|
||||
return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -3363,17 +3380,17 @@ static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct s
|
||||
if (rc)
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
|
||||
return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
|
||||
return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
|
||||
return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
|
||||
return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
|
||||
@ -3394,7 +3411,7 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
|
||||
rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
|
||||
SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
|
||||
else
|
||||
rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
|
||||
rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -5250,7 +5267,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
|
||||
unsigned len;
|
||||
|
||||
if (current != p) {
|
||||
error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
|
||||
error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
|
||||
if (error)
|
||||
return error;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -5309,15 +5326,15 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
|
||||
* above restriction is ever removed.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
|
||||
error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
|
||||
error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
|
||||
else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
|
||||
error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
|
||||
error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
|
||||
else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
|
||||
error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
|
||||
error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
|
||||
else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
|
||||
error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
|
||||
error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
|
||||
else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
|
||||
error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
|
||||
error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
|
||||
else
|
||||
error = -EINVAL;
|
||||
if (error)
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user