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mm/slab: expand CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED to include SLAB

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Patch series "mm: Expand CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED to include SLAB"

In reviewing Vlastimil Babka's latest slub debug series, I realized[1]
that several checks under CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED weren't being
applied to SLAB.  Fix this by expanding the Kconfig coverage, and adding a
simple double-free test for SLAB.

This patch (of 2):

Include SLAB caches when performing kmem_cache pointer verification.  A
defense against such corruption[1] should be applied to all the
allocators.  With this added, the "SLAB_FREE_CROSS" and "SLAB_FREE_PAGE"
LKDTM tests now pass on SLAB:

  lkdtm: Performing direct entry SLAB_FREE_CROSS
  lkdtm: Attempting cross-cache slab free ...
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  cache_from_obj: Wrong slab cache. lkdtm-heap-b but object is from lkdtm-heap-a
  WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2195 at mm/slab.h:530 kmem_cache_free+0x8d/0x1d0
  ...
  lkdtm: Performing direct entry SLAB_FREE_PAGE
  lkdtm: Attempting non-Slab slab free ...
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  virt_to_cache: Object is not a Slab page!
  WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2202 at mm/slab.h:489 kmem_cache_free+0x196/0x1d0

Additionally clean up neighboring Kconfig entries for clarity,
readability, and redundant option removal.

[1] https://github.com/ThomasKing2014/slides/raw/master/Building%20universal%20Android%20rooting%20with%20a%20type%20confusion%20vulnerability.pdf

Fixes: 598a0717a8 ("mm/slab: validate cache membership under freelist hardening")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Vijayanand Jitta <vjitta@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Vinayak Menon <vinmenon@codeaurora.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200625215548.389774-1-keescook@chromium.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200625215548.389774-2-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Kees Cook 2020-08-06 23:18:20 -07:00 committed by Linus Torvalds
parent fa9ba3aa89
commit 3404be67bf
1 changed files with 5 additions and 4 deletions
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9
init/Kconfig
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@ -1913,9 +1913,8 @@ config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT
command line.
config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM
default n
bool "Randomize slab freelist"
depends on SLAB || SLUB
bool "SLAB freelist randomization"
help
Randomizes the freelist order used on creating new pages. This
security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel slab
@ -1923,12 +1922,14 @@ config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM
config SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED
bool "Harden slab freelist metadata"
depends on SLUB
depends on SLAB || SLUB
help
Many kernel heap attacks try to target slab cache metadata and
other infrastructure. This options makes minor performance
sacrifices to harden the kernel slab allocator against common
freelist exploit methods.
freelist exploit methods. Some slab implementations have more
sanity-checking than others. This option is most effective with
CONFIG_SLUB.
config SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR
bool "Page allocator randomization"