CRED: Constify the kernel_cap_t arguments to the capset LSM hooks

Constify the kernel_cap_t arguments to the capset LSM hooks.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This commit is contained in:
David Howells 2008-11-14 10:39:15 +11:00 committed by James Morris
parent 1cdcbec1a3
commit 15a2460ed0
4 changed files with 42 additions and 34 deletions

View File

@ -53,8 +53,12 @@ extern int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz);
extern int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
extern int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
extern int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
extern int cap_capset_check(kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
extern void cap_capset_set(kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
extern int cap_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
extern void cap_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
extern int cap_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
extern void cap_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe);
extern int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
@ -1293,12 +1297,12 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*capget) (struct task_struct *target,
kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
int (*capset_check) (kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
kernel_cap_t *permitted);
void (*capset_set) (kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
kernel_cap_t *permitted);
int (*capset_check) (const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
void (*capset_set) (const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit);
int (*acct) (struct file *file);
int (*sysctl) (struct ctl_table *table, int op);
@ -1560,12 +1564,12 @@ int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
kernel_cap_t *permitted);
int security_capset_check(kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
kernel_cap_t *permitted);
void security_capset_set(kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
kernel_cap_t *permitted);
int security_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
void security_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
int security_acct(struct file *file);
@ -1755,16 +1759,16 @@ static inline int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
static inline int security_capset_check(kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
kernel_cap_t *permitted)
static inline int security_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
return cap_capset_check(effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
static inline void security_capset_set(kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
kernel_cap_t *permitted)
static inline void security_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
cap_capset_set(effective, inheritable, permitted);
}

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@ -118,8 +118,9 @@ static inline int cap_limit_ptraced_target(void)
#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
int cap_capset_check (kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
int cap_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
if (cap_inh_is_capped()
&& !cap_issubset(*inheritable,
@ -150,8 +151,9 @@ int cap_capset_check (kernel_cap_t *effective,
return 0;
}
void cap_capset_set (kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
void cap_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
current->cap_effective = *effective;
current->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;

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@ -145,16 +145,16 @@ int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
return security_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
int security_capset_check(kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
kernel_cap_t *permitted)
int security_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
return security_ops->capset_check(effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
void security_capset_set(kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
kernel_cap_t *permitted)
void security_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
security_ops->capset_set(effective, inheritable, permitted);
}

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@ -1790,8 +1790,9 @@ static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
static int selinux_capset_check(kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
static int selinux_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
int error;
@ -1802,8 +1803,9 @@ static int selinux_capset_check(kernel_cap_t *effective,
return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETCAP);
}
static void selinux_capset_set(kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
static void selinux_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
secondary_ops->capset_set(effective, inheritable, permitted);
}