linux/kernel/locking/Makefile

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 21:27:30 +00:00
# Any varying coverage in these files is non-deterministic
# and is generally not a function of system call inputs.
KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
obj-y += mutex.o semaphore.o rwsem.o percpu-rwsem.o
kcsan: Make KCSAN compatible with lockdep We must avoid any recursion into lockdep if KCSAN is enabled on utilities used by lockdep. One manifestation of this is corruption of lockdep's IRQ trace state (if TRACE_IRQFLAGS), resulting in spurious warnings (see below). This commit fixes this by: 1. Using raw_local_irq{save,restore} in kcsan_setup_watchpoint(). 2. Disabling lockdep in kcsan_report(). Tested with: CONFIG_LOCKDEP=y CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCKDEP=y CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS=y This fix eliminates spurious warnings such as the following one: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4406 check_flags.part.0+0x101/0x220 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 2 Comm: kthreadd Not tainted 5.5.0-rc1+ #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:check_flags.part.0+0x101/0x220 <snip> Call Trace: lock_is_held_type+0x69/0x150 freezer_fork+0x20b/0x370 cgroup_post_fork+0x2c9/0x5c0 copy_process+0x2675/0x3b40 _do_fork+0xbe/0xa30 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x40/0x50 ? match_held_lock+0x56/0x250 ? kthread_park+0xf0/0xf0 kernel_thread+0xa6/0xd0 ? kthread_park+0xf0/0xf0 kthreadd+0x321/0x3d0 ? kthread_create_on_cpu+0x130/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 irq event stamp: 64 hardirqs last enabled at (63): [<ffffffff9a7995d0>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x40/0x50 hardirqs last disabled at (64): [<ffffffff992a96d2>] kcsan_setup_watchpoint+0x92/0x460 softirqs last enabled at (32): [<ffffffff990489b8>] fpu__copy+0xe8/0x470 softirqs last disabled at (30): [<ffffffff99048939>] fpu__copy+0x69/0x470 Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Acked-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2020-01-15 16:25:12 +00:00
# Avoid recursion lockdep -> KCSAN -> ... -> lockdep.
KCSAN_SANITIZE_lockdep.o := n
ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
CFLAGS_REMOVE_lockdep.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
CFLAGS_REMOVE_lockdep_proc.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
CFLAGS_REMOVE_mutex-debug.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
endif
lockdep: report broken irq restoration We generally expect local_irq_save() and local_irq_restore() to be paired and sanely nested, and so local_irq_restore() expects to be called with irqs disabled. Thus, within local_irq_restore() we only trace irq flag changes when unmasking irqs. This means that a sequence such as: | local_irq_disable(); | local_irq_save(flags); | local_irq_enable(); | local_irq_restore(flags); ... is liable to break things, as the local_irq_restore() would mask irqs without tracing this change. Similar problems may exist for architectures whose arch_irq_restore() function depends on being called with irqs disabled. We don't consider such sequences to be a good idea, so let's define those as forbidden, and add tooling to detect such broken cases. This patch adds debug code to WARN() when raw_local_irq_restore() is called with irqs enabled. As raw_local_irq_restore() is expected to pair with raw_local_irq_save(), it should never be called with irqs enabled. To avoid the possibility of circular header dependencies between irqflags.h and bug.h, the warning is handled in a separate C file. The new code is all conditional on a new CONFIG_DEBUG_IRQFLAGS symbol which is independent of CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS. As noted above such cases will confuse lockdep, so CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCKDEP now selects CONFIG_DEBUG_IRQFLAGS. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210111153707.10071-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
2021-01-11 15:37:07 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_IRQFLAGS) += irqflag-debug.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES) += mutex-debug.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LOCKDEP) += lockdep.o
ifeq ($(CONFIG_PROC_FS),y)
obj-$(CONFIG_LOCKDEP) += lockdep_proc.o
endif
obj-$(CONFIG_SMP) += spinlock.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LOCK_SPIN_ON_OWNER) += osq_lock.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING) += spinlock.o
obj-$(CONFIG_QUEUED_SPINLOCKS) += qspinlock.o
obj-$(CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES) += rtmutex.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK) += spinlock.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK) += spinlock_debug.o
obj-$(CONFIG_QUEUED_RWLOCKS) += qrwlock.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LOCK_TORTURE_TEST) += locktorture.o
obj-$(CONFIG_WW_MUTEX_SELFTEST) += test-ww_mutex.o
locking/lock_events: Make lock_events available for all archs & other locks The QUEUED_LOCK_STAT option to report queued spinlocks event counts was previously allowed only on x86 architecture. To make the locking event counting code more useful, it is now renamed to a more generic LOCK_EVENT_COUNTS config option. This new option will be available to all the architectures that use qspinlock at the moment. Other locking code can now start to use the generic locking event counting code by including lock_events.h and put the new locking event names into the lock_events_list.h header file. My experience with lock event counting is that it gives valuable insight on how the locking code works and what can be done to make it better. I would like to extend this benefit to other locking code like mutex and rwsem in the near future. The PV qspinlock specific code will stay in qspinlock_stat.h. The locking event counters will now reside in the <debugfs>/lock_event_counts directory. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190404174320.22416-9-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-04 17:43:17 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_LOCK_EVENT_COUNTS) += lock_events.o