License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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/*
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* linux/kernel/sys.c
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*
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* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
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*/
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2011-05-23 18:51:41 +00:00
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#include <linux/export.h>
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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2022-03-05 04:28:51 +00:00
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#include <linux/mm_inline.h>
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#include <linux/utsname.h>
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#include <linux/mman.h>
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#include <linux/reboot.h>
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#include <linux/prctl.h>
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#include <linux/highuid.h>
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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2011-05-26 16:48:41 +00:00
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#include <linux/kmod.h>
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mm: add new api to enable ksm per process
Patch series "mm: process/cgroup ksm support", v9.
So far KSM can only be enabled by calling madvise for memory regions. To
be able to use KSM for more workloads, KSM needs to have the ability to be
enabled / disabled at the process / cgroup level.
Use case 1:
The madvise call is not available in the programming language. An
example for this are programs with forked workloads using a garbage
collected language without pointers. In such a language madvise cannot
be made available.
In addition the addresses of objects get moved around as they are
garbage collected. KSM sharing needs to be enabled "from the outside"
for these type of workloads.
Use case 2:
The same interpreter can also be used for workloads where KSM brings
no benefit or even has overhead. We'd like to be able to enable KSM on
a workload by workload basis.
Use case 3:
With the madvise call sharing opportunities are only enabled for the
current process: it is a workload-local decision. A considerable number
of sharing opportunities may exist across multiple workloads or jobs (if
they are part of the same security domain). Only a higler level entity
like a job scheduler or container can know for certain if its running
one or more instances of a job. That job scheduler however doesn't have
the necessary internal workload knowledge to make targeted madvise
calls.
Security concerns:
In previous discussions security concerns have been brought up. The
problem is that an individual workload does not have the knowledge about
what else is running on a machine. Therefore it has to be very
conservative in what memory areas can be shared or not. However, if the
system is dedicated to running multiple jobs within the same security
domain, its the job scheduler that has the knowledge that sharing can be
safely enabled and is even desirable.
Performance:
Experiments with using UKSM have shown a capacity increase of around 20%.
Here are the metrics from an instagram workload (taken from a machine
with 64GB main memory):
full_scans: 445
general_profit: 20158298048
max_page_sharing: 256
merge_across_nodes: 1
pages_shared: 129547
pages_sharing: 5119146
pages_to_scan: 4000
pages_unshared: 1760924
pages_volatile: 10761341
run: 1
sleep_millisecs: 20
stable_node_chains: 167
stable_node_chains_prune_millisecs: 2000
stable_node_dups: 2751
use_zero_pages: 0
zero_pages_sharing: 0
After the service is running for 30 minutes to an hour, 4 to 5 million
shared pages are common for this workload when using KSM.
Detailed changes:
1. New options for prctl system command
This patch series adds two new options to the prctl system call.
The first one allows to enable KSM at the process level and the second
one to query the setting.
The setting will be inherited by child processes.
With the above setting, KSM can be enabled for the seed process of a cgroup
and all processes in the cgroup will inherit the setting.
2. Changes to KSM processing
When KSM is enabled at the process level, the KSM code will iterate
over all the VMA's and enable KSM for the eligible VMA's.
When forking a process that has KSM enabled, the setting will be
inherited by the new child process.
3. Add general_profit metric
The general_profit metric of KSM is specified in the documentation,
but not calculated. This adds the general profit metric to
/sys/kernel/debug/mm/ksm.
4. Add more metrics to ksm_stat
This adds the process profit metric to /proc/<pid>/ksm_stat.
5. Add more tests to ksm_tests and ksm_functional_tests
This adds an option to specify the merge type to the ksm_tests.
This allows to test madvise and prctl KSM.
It also adds a two new tests to ksm_functional_tests: one to test
the new prctl options and the other one is a fork test to verify that
the KSM process setting is inherited by client processes.
This patch (of 3):
So far KSM can only be enabled by calling madvise for memory regions. To
be able to use KSM for more workloads, KSM needs to have the ability to be
enabled / disabled at the process / cgroup level.
1. New options for prctl system command
This patch series adds two new options to the prctl system call.
The first one allows to enable KSM at the process level and the second
one to query the setting.
The setting will be inherited by child processes.
With the above setting, KSM can be enabled for the seed process of a
cgroup and all processes in the cgroup will inherit the setting.
2. Changes to KSM processing
When KSM is enabled at the process level, the KSM code will iterate
over all the VMA's and enable KSM for the eligible VMA's.
When forking a process that has KSM enabled, the setting will be
inherited by the new child process.
1) Introduce new MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY flag
This introduces the new flag MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY flag. When this flag
is set, kernel samepage merging (ksm) gets enabled for all vma's of a
process.
2) Setting VM_MERGEABLE on VMA creation
When a VMA is created, if the MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY flag is set, the
VM_MERGEABLE flag will be set for this VMA.
3) support disabling of ksm for a process
This adds the ability to disable ksm for a process if ksm has been
enabled for the process with prctl.
4) add new prctl option to get and set ksm for a process
This adds two new options to the prctl system call
- enable ksm for all vmas of a process (if the vmas support it).
- query if ksm has been enabled for a process.
3. Disabling MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY for storage keys in s390
In the s390 architecture when storage keys are used, the
MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY will be disabled.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230418051342.1919757-1-shr@devkernel.io
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230418051342.1919757-2-shr@devkernel.io
Signed-off-by: Stefan Roesch <shr@devkernel.io>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-04-18 05:13:40 +00:00
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#include <linux/ksm.h>
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perf: Do the big rename: Performance Counters -> Performance Events
Bye-bye Performance Counters, welcome Performance Events!
In the past few months the perfcounters subsystem has grown out its
initial role of counting hardware events, and has become (and is
becoming) a much broader generic event enumeration, reporting, logging,
monitoring, analysis facility.
Naming its core object 'perf_counter' and naming the subsystem
'perfcounters' has become more and more of a misnomer. With pending
code like hw-breakpoints support the 'counter' name is less and
less appropriate.
All in one, we've decided to rename the subsystem to 'performance
events' and to propagate this rename through all fields, variables
and API names. (in an ABI compatible fashion)
The word 'event' is also a bit shorter than 'counter' - which makes
it slightly more convenient to write/handle as well.
Thanks goes to Stephane Eranian who first observed this misnomer and
suggested a rename.
User-space tooling and ABI compatibility is not affected - this patch
should be function-invariant. (Also, defconfigs were not touched to
keep the size down.)
This patch has been generated via the following script:
FILES=$(find * -type f | grep -vE 'oprofile|[^K]config')
sed -i \
-e 's/PERF_EVENT_/PERF_RECORD_/g' \
-e 's/PERF_COUNTER/PERF_EVENT/g' \
-e 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g' \
-e 's/nb_counters/nb_events/g' \
-e 's/swcounter/swevent/g' \
-e 's/tpcounter_event/tp_event/g' \
$FILES
for N in $(find . -name perf_counter.[ch]); do
M=$(echo $N | sed 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g')
mv $N $M
done
FILES=$(find . -name perf_event.*)
sed -i \
-e 's/COUNTER_MASK/REG_MASK/g' \
-e 's/COUNTER/EVENT/g' \
-e 's/\<event\>/event_id/g' \
-e 's/counter/event/g' \
-e 's/Counter/Event/g' \
$FILES
... to keep it as correct as possible. This script can also be
used by anyone who has pending perfcounters patches - it converts
a Linux kernel tree over to the new naming. We tried to time this
change to the point in time where the amount of pending patches
is the smallest: the end of the merge window.
Namespace clashes were fixed up in a preparatory patch - and some
stylistic fallout will be fixed up in a subsequent patch.
( NOTE: 'counters' are still the proper terminology when we deal
with hardware registers - and these sed scripts are a bit
over-eager in renaming them. I've undone some of that, but
in case there's something left where 'counter' would be
better than 'event' we can undo that on an individual basis
instead of touching an otherwise nicely automated patch. )
Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
LKML-Reference: <new-submission>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-21 10:02:48 +00:00
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#include <linux/perf_event.h>
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2007-05-11 05:22:53 +00:00
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#include <linux/resource.h>
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2005-06-25 21:57:52 +00:00
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#include <linux/workqueue.h>
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2006-01-11 20:17:46 +00:00
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#include <linux/device.h>
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#include <linux/key.h>
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#include <linux/times.h>
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#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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2022-09-27 09:35:16 +00:00
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#include <linux/random.h>
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#include <linux/suspend.h>
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#include <linux/tty.h>
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2005-05-01 15:59:14 +00:00
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#include <linux/signal.h>
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2005-11-07 08:59:16 +00:00
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#include <linux/cn_proc.h>
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2006-09-26 08:52:28 +00:00
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#include <linux/getcpu.h>
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2007-05-11 05:22:37 +00:00
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#include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h>
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2007-07-16 06:41:32 +00:00
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#include <linux/seccomp.h>
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2007-10-01 08:20:10 +00:00
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#include <linux/cpu.h>
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2010-03-10 23:21:19 +00:00
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#include <linux/personality.h>
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2009-01-06 22:41:02 +00:00
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#include <linux/ptrace.h>
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2009-03-29 23:50:06 +00:00
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#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
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2012-05-31 23:26:46 +00:00
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#include <linux/file.h>
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 08:04:11 +00:00
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#include <linux/gfp.h>
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2011-03-14 23:43:46 +00:00
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#include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
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2011-08-19 23:15:10 +00:00
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#include <linux/version.h>
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#include <linux/ctype.h>
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kernel: Implement selective syscall userspace redirection
Introduce a mechanism to quickly disable/enable syscall handling for a
specific process and redirect to userspace via SIGSYS. This is useful
for processes with parts that require syscall redirection and parts that
don't, but who need to perform this boundary crossing really fast,
without paying the cost of a system call to reconfigure syscall handling
on each boundary transition. This is particularly important for Windows
games running over Wine.
The proposed interface looks like this:
prctl(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH, <op>, <off>, <length>, [selector])
The range [<offset>,<offset>+<length>) is a part of the process memory
map that is allowed to by-pass the redirection code and dispatch
syscalls directly, such that in fast paths a process doesn't need to
disable the trap nor the kernel has to check the selector. This is
essential to return from SIGSYS to a blocked area without triggering
another SIGSYS from rt_sigreturn.
selector is an optional pointer to a char-sized userspace memory region
that has a key switch for the mechanism. This key switch is set to
either PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ON, PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF to enable and disable the
redirection without calling the kernel.
The feature is meant to be set per-thread and it is disabled on
fork/clone/execv.
Internally, this doesn't add overhead to the syscall hot path, and it
requires very little per-architecture support. I avoided using seccomp,
even though it duplicates some functionality, due to previous feedback
that maybe it shouldn't mix with seccomp since it is not a security
mechanism. And obviously, this should never be considered a security
mechanism, since any part of the program can by-pass it by using the
syscall dispatcher.
For the sysinfo benchmark, which measures the overhead added to
executing a native syscall that doesn't require interception, the
overhead using only the direct dispatcher region to issue syscalls is
pretty much irrelevant. The overhead of using the selector goes around
40ns for a native (unredirected) syscall in my system, and it is (as
expected) dominated by the supervisor-mode user-address access. In
fact, with SMAP off, the overhead is consistently less than 5ns on my
test box.
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127193238.821364-4-krisman@collabora.com
2020-11-27 19:32:34 +00:00
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#include <linux/syscall_user_dispatch.h>
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/compat.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
|
2005-12-12 08:37:33 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/kprobes.h>
|
2007-07-16 06:40:59 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
|
2020-03-03 15:06:38 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/time_namespace.h>
|
2013-02-22 00:43:06 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-04-30 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/sched.h>
|
2017-02-08 17:51:29 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/sched/autogroup.h>
|
2017-02-08 07:45:17 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/sched/loadavg.h>
|
2017-02-08 17:51:35 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/sched/stat.h>
|
2017-02-08 17:51:29 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
|
2017-02-08 17:51:30 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/sched/coredump.h>
|
2017-02-08 17:51:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/sched/task.h>
|
2017-02-05 10:48:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/sched/cputime.h>
|
2013-04-30 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/uidgid.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/cred.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-04-29 13:20:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/nospec.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
2011-01-13 00:59:30 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/kmsg_dump.h>
|
2011-08-19 23:15:10 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Move somewhere else to avoid recompiling? */
|
|
|
|
|
#include <generated/utsrelease.h>
|
2011-01-13 00:59:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-12-24 19:46:01 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <asm/io.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <asm/unistd.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
kernel: provide ksys_*() wrappers for syscalls called by kernel/uid16.c
Using these helpers allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to these
syscalls: sys_setregid(), sys_setgid(), sys_setreuid(), sys_setuid(),
sys_setresuid(), sys_setresgid(), sys_setfsuid(), and sys_setfsgid().
The ksys_ prefix denotes that these function are meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, they use the same calling
convention.
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-03-19 17:09:27 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "uid16.h"
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
# define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef SET_FPEMU_CTL
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef GET_FPEMU_CTL
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
# define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef SET_FPEXC_CTL
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef GET_FPEXC_CTL
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
# define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2006-06-07 06:10:19 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef GET_ENDIAN
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
# define GET_ENDIAN(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
2006-06-07 06:10:19 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef SET_ENDIAN
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
# define SET_ENDIAN(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
2006-06-07 06:10:19 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2008-04-11 16:54:17 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef GET_TSC_CTL
|
|
|
|
|
# define GET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL)
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef SET_TSC_CTL
|
|
|
|
|
# define SET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL)
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2015-01-08 12:17:37 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef GET_FP_MODE
|
|
|
|
|
# define GET_FP_MODE(a) (-EINVAL)
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef SET_FP_MODE
|
|
|
|
|
# define SET_FP_MODE(a,b) (-EINVAL)
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2017-10-31 15:51:14 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef SVE_SET_VL
|
|
|
|
|
# define SVE_SET_VL(a) (-EINVAL)
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef SVE_GET_VL
|
|
|
|
|
# define SVE_GET_VL() (-EINVAL)
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2022-04-19 11:22:19 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef SME_SET_VL
|
|
|
|
|
# define SME_SET_VL(a) (-EINVAL)
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef SME_GET_VL
|
|
|
|
|
# define SME_GET_VL() (-EINVAL)
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2018-12-07 18:39:28 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef PAC_RESET_KEYS
|
|
|
|
|
# define PAC_RESET_KEYS(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2021-03-19 03:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS
|
|
|
|
|
# define PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS(a, b, c) (-EINVAL)
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS
|
|
|
|
|
# define PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS(a) (-EINVAL)
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2019-07-23 17:58:39 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL
|
|
|
|
|
# define SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(a) (-EINVAL)
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL
|
|
|
|
|
# define GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL() (-EINVAL)
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2023-06-05 11:07:18 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef RISCV_V_SET_CONTROL
|
|
|
|
|
# define RISCV_V_SET_CONTROL(a) (-EINVAL)
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef RISCV_V_GET_CONTROL
|
|
|
|
|
# define RISCV_V_GET_CONTROL() (-EINVAL)
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2024-03-12 23:53:41 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef RISCV_SET_ICACHE_FLUSH_CTX
|
|
|
|
|
# define RISCV_SET_ICACHE_FLUSH_CTX(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2024-04-17 11:23:20 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef PPC_GET_DEXCR_ASPECT
|
|
|
|
|
# define PPC_GET_DEXCR_ASPECT(a, b) (-EINVAL)
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef PPC_SET_DEXCR_ASPECT
|
|
|
|
|
# define PPC_SET_DEXCR_ASPECT(a, b, c) (-EINVAL)
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for
|
|
|
|
|
* architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID;
|
|
|
|
|
int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid);
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit
|
|
|
|
|
* UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID;
|
2017-12-14 18:13:57 +00:00
|
|
|
int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWGID;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid);
|
|
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2011-03-23 23:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Returns true if current's euid is same as p's uid or euid,
|
|
|
|
|
* or has CAP_SYS_NICE to p's user_ns.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Called with rcu_read_lock, creds are safe
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
static bool set_one_prio_perm(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-04 04:21:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (uid_eq(pcred->uid, cred->euid) ||
|
|
|
|
|
uid_eq(pcred->euid, cred->euid))
|
2011-03-23 23:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
2011-11-17 07:15:31 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ns_capable(pcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE))
|
2011-03-23 23:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-13 23:39:19 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* set the priority of a task
|
|
|
|
|
* - the caller must hold the RCU read lock
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int no_nice;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2011-03-23 23:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!set_one_prio_perm(p)) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
error = -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-05-01 15:59:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !can_nice(p, niceval)) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
error = -EACCES;
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval);
|
|
|
|
|
if (no_nice) {
|
|
|
|
|
error = no_nice;
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if (error == -ESRCH)
|
|
|
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
set_user_nice(p, niceval);
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-14 13:14:09 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setpriority, int, which, int, who, int, niceval)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct *g, *p;
|
|
|
|
|
struct user_struct *user;
|
2008-11-13 23:39:18 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
int error = -EINVAL;
|
2007-02-12 08:53:01 +00:00
|
|
|
struct pid *pgrp;
|
2011-11-17 07:20:58 +00:00
|
|
|
kuid_t uid;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-05-11 05:22:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* normalize: avoid signed division (rounding problems) */
|
|
|
|
|
error = -ESRCH;
|
2014-02-11 07:34:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if (niceval < MIN_NICE)
|
|
|
|
|
niceval = MIN_NICE;
|
|
|
|
|
if (niceval > MAX_NICE)
|
|
|
|
|
niceval = MAX_NICE;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-12-10 00:52:51 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (which) {
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
case PRIO_PROCESS:
|
|
|
|
|
if (who)
|
|
|
|
|
p = find_task_by_vpid(who);
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
p = current;
|
|
|
|
|
if (p)
|
|
|
|
|
error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PRIO_PGRP:
|
|
|
|
|
if (who)
|
|
|
|
|
pgrp = find_vpid(who);
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
pgrp = task_pgrp(current);
|
2022-01-20 02:08:47 +00:00
|
|
|
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
|
|
|
|
|
error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
|
|
|
|
|
} while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
|
2022-01-20 02:08:47 +00:00
|
|
|
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PRIO_USER:
|
|
|
|
|
uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who);
|
|
|
|
|
user = cred->user;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!who)
|
|
|
|
|
uid = cred->uid;
|
|
|
|
|
else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) {
|
|
|
|
|
user = find_user(uid);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!user)
|
2008-11-13 23:39:18 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2022-01-20 02:08:47 +00:00
|
|
|
for_each_process_thread(g, p) {
|
2015-11-07 00:32:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid) && task_pid_vnr(p))
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error);
|
2022-01-20 02:08:47 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid))
|
|
|
|
|
free_uid(user); /* For find_user() */
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
out_unlock:
|
2009-12-10 00:52:51 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will
|
|
|
|
|
* not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that
|
|
|
|
|
* has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19)
|
|
|
|
|
* to stay compatible.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-01-14 13:14:09 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getpriority, int, which, int, who)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct *g, *p;
|
|
|
|
|
struct user_struct *user;
|
2008-11-13 23:39:18 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
long niceval, retval = -ESRCH;
|
2007-02-12 08:53:01 +00:00
|
|
|
struct pid *pgrp;
|
2011-11-17 07:20:58 +00:00
|
|
|
kuid_t uid;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-05-11 05:22:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010-02-22 20:44:16 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (which) {
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
case PRIO_PROCESS:
|
|
|
|
|
if (who)
|
|
|
|
|
p = find_task_by_vpid(who);
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
p = current;
|
|
|
|
|
if (p) {
|
|
|
|
|
niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p));
|
|
|
|
|
if (niceval > retval)
|
|
|
|
|
retval = niceval;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PRIO_PGRP:
|
|
|
|
|
if (who)
|
|
|
|
|
pgrp = find_vpid(who);
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
pgrp = task_pgrp(current);
|
2022-01-20 02:08:47 +00:00
|
|
|
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
|
|
|
|
|
niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p));
|
|
|
|
|
if (niceval > retval)
|
|
|
|
|
retval = niceval;
|
|
|
|
|
} while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
|
2022-01-20 02:08:47 +00:00
|
|
|
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PRIO_USER:
|
|
|
|
|
uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who);
|
|
|
|
|
user = cred->user;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!who)
|
|
|
|
|
uid = cred->uid;
|
|
|
|
|
else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) {
|
|
|
|
|
user = find_user(uid);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!user)
|
|
|
|
|
goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-01-20 02:08:47 +00:00
|
|
|
for_each_process_thread(g, p) {
|
2015-11-07 00:32:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid) && task_pid_vnr(p)) {
|
2014-05-08 09:33:49 +00:00
|
|
|
niceval = nice_to_rlimit(task_nice(p));
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (niceval > retval)
|
|
|
|
|
retval = niceval;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-01-20 02:08:47 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid))
|
|
|
|
|
free_uid(user); /* for find_user() */
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
out_unlock:
|
2010-02-22 20:44:16 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid
|
|
|
|
|
* or vice versa. (BSD-style)
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not
|
|
|
|
|
* equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its
|
|
|
|
|
* privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
|
|
|
|
|
* a security audit over a program.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be
|
|
|
|
|
* 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setgid() will be
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
* 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem
|
|
|
|
|
* operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned).
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
kernel: conditionally support non-root users, groups and capabilities
There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their
functionality in init, running as root:root. For these systems,
supporting multiple users is not necessary.
This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for
non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional. It is enabled
under CONFIG_EXPERT menu.
When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case
and processes always have all capabilities.
The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid,
setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups,
getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset.
Also, groups.c is compiled out completely.
In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid
adding two ifdef blocks.
This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build. The most minimal
kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than
low MB. (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much.
The kernel was booted in Qemu. All the common functionalities work.
Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS.
Bloat-o-meter output:
add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650)
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda <iulia.manda21@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 23:16:41 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_MULTIUSER
|
kernel: provide ksys_*() wrappers for syscalls called by kernel/uid16.c
Using these helpers allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to these
syscalls: sys_setregid(), sys_setgid(), sys_setreuid(), sys_setuid(),
sys_setresuid(), sys_setresgid(), sys_setfsuid(), and sys_setfsgid().
The ksys_ prefix denotes that these function are meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, they use the same calling
convention.
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-03-19 17:09:27 +00:00
|
|
|
long __sys_setregid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct cred *old;
|
|
|
|
|
struct cred *new;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
int retval;
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
kgid_t krgid, kegid;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid);
|
|
|
|
|
kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds();
|
|
|
|
|
if (!new)
|
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
old = current_cred();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
retval = -EPERM;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if (gid_eq(old->gid, krgid) ||
|
|
|
|
|
gid_eq(old->egid, krgid) ||
|
2020-07-16 19:13:57 +00:00
|
|
|
ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
new->gid = krgid;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if (egid != (gid_t) -1) {
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if (gid_eq(old->gid, kegid) ||
|
|
|
|
|
gid_eq(old->egid, kegid) ||
|
|
|
|
|
gid_eq(old->sgid, kegid) ||
|
2020-07-16 19:13:57 +00:00
|
|
|
ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
new->egid = kegid;
|
2006-10-01 06:27:24 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 ||
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
(egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid)))
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
new->sgid = new->egid;
|
|
|
|
|
new->fsgid = new->egid;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2020-06-09 17:22:13 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE);
|
|
|
|
|
if (retval < 0)
|
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return commit_creds(new);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
|
|
|
abort_creds(new);
|
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
kernel: provide ksys_*() wrappers for syscalls called by kernel/uid16.c
Using these helpers allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to these
syscalls: sys_setregid(), sys_setgid(), sys_setreuid(), sys_setuid(),
sys_setresuid(), sys_setresgid(), sys_setfsuid(), and sys_setfsgid().
The ksys_ prefix denotes that these function are meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, they use the same calling
convention.
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-03-19 17:09:27 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return __sys_setregid(rgid, egid);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
* setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* SMP: Same implicit races as above.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
kernel: provide ksys_*() wrappers for syscalls called by kernel/uid16.c
Using these helpers allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to these
syscalls: sys_setregid(), sys_setgid(), sys_setreuid(), sys_setuid(),
sys_setresuid(), sys_setresgid(), sys_setfsuid(), and sys_setfsgid().
The ksys_ prefix denotes that these function are meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, they use the same calling
convention.
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-03-19 17:09:27 +00:00
|
|
|
long __sys_setgid(gid_t gid)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct cred *old;
|
|
|
|
|
struct cred *new;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
int retval;
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
kgid_t kgid;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kgid = make_kgid(ns, gid);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!gid_valid(kgid))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds();
|
|
|
|
|
if (!new)
|
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
old = current_cred();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
retval = -EPERM;
|
2020-07-16 19:13:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = kgid;
|
|
|
|
|
else if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid))
|
|
|
|
|
new->egid = new->fsgid = kgid;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-06-09 17:22:13 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID);
|
|
|
|
|
if (retval < 0)
|
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return commit_creds(new);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
|
|
|
abort_creds(new);
|
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-02-27 09:43:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
kernel: provide ksys_*() wrappers for syscalls called by kernel/uid16.c
Using these helpers allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to these
syscalls: sys_setregid(), sys_setgid(), sys_setreuid(), sys_setuid(),
sys_setresuid(), sys_setresgid(), sys_setfsuid(), and sys_setfsgid().
The ksys_ prefix denotes that these function are meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, they use the same calling
convention.
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-03-19 17:09:27 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return __sys_setgid(gid);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* change the user struct in a credentials set to match the new UID
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
static int set_user(struct cred *new)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct user_struct *new_user;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-02-08 15:00:08 +00:00
|
|
|
new_user = alloc_uid(new->uid);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!new_user)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EAGAIN;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-02-14 15:40:25 +00:00
|
|
|
free_uid(new->user);
|
|
|
|
|
new->user = new_user;
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void flag_nproc_exceeded(struct cred *new)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if (new->ucounts == current_ucounts())
|
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2011-08-08 15:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* We don't fail in case of NPROC limit excess here because too many
|
|
|
|
|
* poorly written programs don't check set*uid() return code, assuming
|
|
|
|
|
* it never fails if called by root. We may still enforce NPROC limit
|
|
|
|
|
* for programs doing set*uid()+execve() by harmlessly deferring the
|
|
|
|
|
* failure to the execve() stage.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2022-05-18 17:17:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (is_rlimit_overlimit(new->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)) &&
|
2022-02-14 15:40:25 +00:00
|
|
|
new->user != INIT_USER)
|
2011-08-08 15:02:04 +00:00
|
|
|
current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid
|
|
|
|
|
* or vice versa. (BSD-style)
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not
|
|
|
|
|
* equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its
|
|
|
|
|
* privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing
|
|
|
|
|
* a security audit over a program.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be
|
|
|
|
|
* 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setuid() will be
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
* 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
kernel: provide ksys_*() wrappers for syscalls called by kernel/uid16.c
Using these helpers allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to these
syscalls: sys_setregid(), sys_setgid(), sys_setreuid(), sys_setuid(),
sys_setresuid(), sys_setresgid(), sys_setfsuid(), and sys_setfsgid().
The ksys_ prefix denotes that these function are meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, they use the same calling
convention.
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-03-19 17:09:27 +00:00
|
|
|
long __sys_setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct cred *old;
|
|
|
|
|
struct cred *new;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
int retval;
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
kuid_t kruid, keuid;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid);
|
|
|
|
|
keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds();
|
|
|
|
|
if (!new)
|
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
old = current_cred();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
retval = -EPERM;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
new->uid = kruid;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!uid_eq(old->uid, kruid) &&
|
|
|
|
|
!uid_eq(old->euid, kruid) &&
|
2019-01-22 22:42:09 +00:00
|
|
|
!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (euid != (uid_t) -1) {
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
new->euid = keuid;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!uid_eq(old->uid, keuid) &&
|
|
|
|
|
!uid_eq(old->euid, keuid) &&
|
|
|
|
|
!uid_eq(old->suid, keuid) &&
|
2019-01-22 22:42:09 +00:00
|
|
|
!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid)) {
|
2009-02-27 09:43:54 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = set_user(new);
|
|
|
|
|
if (retval < 0)
|
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 ||
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
(euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid)))
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
new->suid = new->euid;
|
|
|
|
|
new->fsuid = new->euid;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE);
|
|
|
|
|
if (retval < 0)
|
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-22 12:27:09 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = set_cred_ucounts(new);
|
|
|
|
|
if (retval < 0)
|
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-02-14 15:40:25 +00:00
|
|
|
flag_nproc_exceeded(new);
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return commit_creds(new);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
error:
|
|
|
|
|
abort_creds(new);
|
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
kernel: provide ksys_*() wrappers for syscalls called by kernel/uid16.c
Using these helpers allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to these
syscalls: sys_setregid(), sys_setgid(), sys_setreuid(), sys_setuid(),
sys_setresuid(), sys_setresgid(), sys_setfsuid(), and sys_setfsgid().
The ksys_ prefix denotes that these function are meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, they use the same calling
convention.
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-03-19 17:09:27 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return __sys_setreuid(ruid, euid);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
* setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
* Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
* like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
* user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets
|
|
|
|
|
* the saved uid too. If you don't like this, blame the bright people
|
|
|
|
|
* in the POSIX committee and/or USG. Note that the BSD-style setreuid()
|
|
|
|
|
* will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
* regain them by swapping the real and effective uid.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
kernel: provide ksys_*() wrappers for syscalls called by kernel/uid16.c
Using these helpers allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to these
syscalls: sys_setregid(), sys_setgid(), sys_setreuid(), sys_setuid(),
sys_setresuid(), sys_setresgid(), sys_setfsuid(), and sys_setfsgid().
The ksys_ prefix denotes that these function are meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, they use the same calling
convention.
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-03-19 17:09:27 +00:00
|
|
|
long __sys_setuid(uid_t uid)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct cred *old;
|
|
|
|
|
struct cred *new;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
int retval;
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
kuid_t kuid;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kuid = make_kuid(ns, uid);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!uid_valid(kuid))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds();
|
|
|
|
|
if (!new)
|
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
old = current_cred();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
retval = -EPERM;
|
2019-01-22 22:42:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
new->suid = new->uid = kuid;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid)) {
|
2009-02-27 09:43:54 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = set_user(new);
|
|
|
|
|
if (retval < 0)
|
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
} else if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(kuid, new->suid)) {
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
new->fsuid = new->euid = kuid;
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID);
|
|
|
|
|
if (retval < 0)
|
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-22 12:27:09 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = set_cred_ucounts(new);
|
|
|
|
|
if (retval < 0)
|
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-02-14 15:40:25 +00:00
|
|
|
flag_nproc_exceeded(new);
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return commit_creds(new);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
error:
|
|
|
|
|
abort_creds(new);
|
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
kernel: provide ksys_*() wrappers for syscalls called by kernel/uid16.c
Using these helpers allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to these
syscalls: sys_setregid(), sys_setgid(), sys_setreuid(), sys_setuid(),
sys_setresuid(), sys_setresgid(), sys_setfsuid(), and sys_setfsgid().
The ksys_ prefix denotes that these function are meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, they use the same calling
convention.
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-03-19 17:09:27 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return __sys_setuid(uid);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid,
|
|
|
|
|
* and suid. This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid().
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
kernel: provide ksys_*() wrappers for syscalls called by kernel/uid16.c
Using these helpers allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to these
syscalls: sys_setregid(), sys_setgid(), sys_setreuid(), sys_setuid(),
sys_setresuid(), sys_setresgid(), sys_setfsuid(), and sys_setfsgid().
The ksys_ prefix denotes that these function are meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, they use the same calling
convention.
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-03-19 17:09:27 +00:00
|
|
|
long __sys_setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct cred *old;
|
|
|
|
|
struct cred *new;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
int retval;
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
kuid_t kruid, keuid, ksuid;
|
2023-02-17 16:21:54 +00:00
|
|
|
bool ruid_new, euid_new, suid_new;
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid);
|
|
|
|
|
keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid);
|
|
|
|
|
ksuid = make_kuid(ns, suid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(ksuid))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2023-02-17 16:21:54 +00:00
|
|
|
old = current_cred();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* check for no-op */
|
|
|
|
|
if ((ruid == (uid_t) -1 || uid_eq(kruid, old->uid)) &&
|
|
|
|
|
(euid == (uid_t) -1 || (uid_eq(keuid, old->euid) &&
|
|
|
|
|
uid_eq(keuid, old->fsuid))) &&
|
|
|
|
|
(suid == (uid_t) -1 || uid_eq(ksuid, old->suid)))
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ruid_new = ruid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(kruid, old->uid) &&
|
|
|
|
|
!uid_eq(kruid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->suid);
|
|
|
|
|
euid_new = euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid) &&
|
|
|
|
|
!uid_eq(keuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(keuid, old->suid);
|
|
|
|
|
suid_new = suid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->uid) &&
|
|
|
|
|
!uid_eq(ksuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->suid);
|
|
|
|
|
if ((ruid_new || euid_new || suid_new) &&
|
|
|
|
|
!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds();
|
|
|
|
|
if (!new)
|
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
new->uid = kruid;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!uid_eq(kruid, old->uid)) {
|
2009-02-27 09:43:54 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = set_user(new);
|
|
|
|
|
if (retval < 0)
|
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
if (euid != (uid_t) -1)
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
new->euid = keuid;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (suid != (uid_t) -1)
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
new->suid = ksuid;
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
new->fsuid = new->euid;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES);
|
|
|
|
|
if (retval < 0)
|
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-22 12:27:09 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = set_cred_ucounts(new);
|
|
|
|
|
if (retval < 0)
|
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-02-14 15:40:25 +00:00
|
|
|
flag_nproc_exceeded(new);
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return commit_creds(new);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
error:
|
|
|
|
|
abort_creds(new);
|
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
kernel: provide ksys_*() wrappers for syscalls called by kernel/uid16.c
Using these helpers allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to these
syscalls: sys_setregid(), sys_setgid(), sys_setreuid(), sys_setuid(),
sys_setresuid(), sys_setresgid(), sys_setfsuid(), and sys_setfsgid().
The ksys_ prefix denotes that these function are meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, they use the same calling
convention.
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-03-19 17:09:27 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return __sys_setresuid(ruid, euid, suid);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresuid, uid_t __user *, ruidp, uid_t __user *, euidp, uid_t __user *, suidp)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-11-13 23:39:18 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
int retval;
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
uid_t ruid, euid, suid;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ruid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->uid);
|
|
|
|
|
euid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid);
|
|
|
|
|
suid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->suid);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = put_user(ruid, ruidp);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!retval) {
|
|
|
|
|
retval = put_user(euid, euidp);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!retval)
|
|
|
|
|
return put_user(suid, suidp);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
kernel: provide ksys_*() wrappers for syscalls called by kernel/uid16.c
Using these helpers allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to these
syscalls: sys_setregid(), sys_setgid(), sys_setreuid(), sys_setuid(),
sys_setresuid(), sys_setresgid(), sys_setfsuid(), and sys_setfsgid().
The ksys_ prefix denotes that these function are meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, they use the same calling
convention.
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-03-19 17:09:27 +00:00
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long __sys_setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid)
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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{
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userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns();
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
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const struct cred *old;
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struct cred *new;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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int retval;
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userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
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|
kgid_t krgid, kegid, ksgid;
|
2023-02-17 16:21:54 +00:00
|
|
|
bool rgid_new, egid_new, sgid_new;
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
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krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid);
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kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid);
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ksgid = make_kgid(ns, sgid);
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if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid))
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return -EINVAL;
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if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid))
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return -EINVAL;
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if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(ksgid))
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return -EINVAL;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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2023-02-17 16:21:54 +00:00
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old = current_cred();
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/* check for no-op */
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if ((rgid == (gid_t) -1 || gid_eq(krgid, old->gid)) &&
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(egid == (gid_t) -1 || (gid_eq(kegid, old->egid) &&
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gid_eq(kegid, old->fsgid))) &&
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(sgid == (gid_t) -1 || gid_eq(ksgid, old->sgid)))
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return 0;
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rgid_new = rgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(krgid, old->gid) &&
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!gid_eq(krgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->sgid);
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egid_new = egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid) &&
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!gid_eq(kegid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(kegid, old->sgid);
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sgid_new = sgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->gid) &&
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!gid_eq(ksgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->sgid);
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if ((rgid_new || egid_new || sgid_new) &&
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!ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
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return -EPERM;
|
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|
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds();
|
|
|
|
|
if (!new)
|
|
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|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
new->gid = krgid;
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
if (egid != (gid_t) -1)
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
new->egid = kegid;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (sgid != (gid_t) -1)
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
new->sgid = ksgid;
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
new->fsgid = new->egid;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-06-09 17:22:13 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES);
|
|
|
|
|
if (retval < 0)
|
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return commit_creds(new);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
|
|
|
abort_creds(new);
|
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
kernel: provide ksys_*() wrappers for syscalls called by kernel/uid16.c
Using these helpers allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to these
syscalls: sys_setregid(), sys_setgid(), sys_setreuid(), sys_setuid(),
sys_setresuid(), sys_setresgid(), sys_setfsuid(), and sys_setfsgid().
The ksys_ prefix denotes that these function are meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, they use the same calling
convention.
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-03-19 17:09:27 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return __sys_setresgid(rgid, egid, sgid);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresgid, gid_t __user *, rgidp, gid_t __user *, egidp, gid_t __user *, sgidp)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-11-13 23:39:18 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
int retval;
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
gid_t rgid, egid, sgid;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->gid);
|
|
|
|
|
egid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->egid);
|
|
|
|
|
sgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->sgid);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = put_user(rgid, rgidp);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!retval) {
|
|
|
|
|
retval = put_user(egid, egidp);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!retval)
|
|
|
|
|
retval = put_user(sgid, sgidp);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This
|
|
|
|
|
* is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at
|
|
|
|
|
* whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when
|
|
|
|
|
* explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access..
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
kernel: provide ksys_*() wrappers for syscalls called by kernel/uid16.c
Using these helpers allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to these
syscalls: sys_setregid(), sys_setgid(), sys_setreuid(), sys_setuid(),
sys_setresuid(), sys_setresgid(), sys_setfsuid(), and sys_setfsgid().
The ksys_ prefix denotes that these function are meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, they use the same calling
convention.
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-03-19 17:09:27 +00:00
|
|
|
long __sys_setfsuid(uid_t uid)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct cred *old;
|
|
|
|
|
struct cred *new;
|
|
|
|
|
uid_t old_fsuid;
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
kuid_t kuid;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
old = current_cred();
|
|
|
|
|
old_fsuid = from_kuid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsuid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kuid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, uid);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!uid_valid(kuid))
|
|
|
|
|
return old_fsuid;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds();
|
|
|
|
|
if (!new)
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
return old_fsuid;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if (uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->euid) ||
|
|
|
|
|
uid_eq(kuid, old->suid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid) ||
|
2019-01-22 22:42:09 +00:00
|
|
|
ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid)) {
|
|
|
|
|
new->fsuid = kuid;
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
goto change_okay;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
abort_creds(new);
|
|
|
|
|
return old_fsuid;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
change_okay:
|
|
|
|
|
commit_creds(new);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return old_fsuid;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
kernel: provide ksys_*() wrappers for syscalls called by kernel/uid16.c
Using these helpers allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to these
syscalls: sys_setregid(), sys_setgid(), sys_setreuid(), sys_setuid(),
sys_setresuid(), sys_setresgid(), sys_setfsuid(), and sys_setfsgid().
The ksys_ prefix denotes that these function are meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, they use the same calling
convention.
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-03-19 17:09:27 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return __sys_setfsuid(uid);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2007-05-09 06:23:08 +00:00
|
|
|
* Samma på svenska..
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
kernel: provide ksys_*() wrappers for syscalls called by kernel/uid16.c
Using these helpers allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to these
syscalls: sys_setregid(), sys_setgid(), sys_setreuid(), sys_setuid(),
sys_setresuid(), sys_setresgid(), sys_setfsuid(), and sys_setfsgid().
The ksys_ prefix denotes that these function are meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, they use the same calling
convention.
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-03-19 17:09:27 +00:00
|
|
|
long __sys_setfsgid(gid_t gid)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct cred *old;
|
|
|
|
|
struct cred *new;
|
|
|
|
|
gid_t old_fsgid;
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
kgid_t kgid;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
old = current_cred();
|
|
|
|
|
old_fsgid = from_kgid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsgid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kgid = make_kgid(old->user_ns, gid);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!gid_valid(kgid))
|
|
|
|
|
return old_fsgid;
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds();
|
|
|
|
|
if (!new)
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
return old_fsgid;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->egid) ||
|
|
|
|
|
gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid) ||
|
2020-07-16 19:13:57 +00:00
|
|
|
ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) {
|
userns: Convert setting and getting uid and gid system calls to use kuid and kgid
Convert setregid, setgid, setreuid, setuid,
setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setfsuid, setfsgid,
getuid, geteuid, getgid, getegid,
waitpid, waitid, wait4.
Convert userspace uids and gids into kuids and kgids before
being placed on struct cred. Convert struct cred kuids and
kgids into userspace uids and gids when returning them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2012-02-08 02:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid)) {
|
|
|
|
|
new->fsgid = kgid;
|
2020-06-09 17:22:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if (security_task_fix_setgid(new,old,LSM_SETID_FS) == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
goto change_okay;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
abort_creds(new);
|
|
|
|
|
return old_fsgid;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
change_okay:
|
|
|
|
|
commit_creds(new);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return old_fsgid;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
kernel: provide ksys_*() wrappers for syscalls called by kernel/uid16.c
Using these helpers allows us to avoid the in-kernel calls to these
syscalls: sys_setregid(), sys_setgid(), sys_setreuid(), sys_setuid(),
sys_setresuid(), sys_setresgid(), sys_setfsuid(), and sys_setfsgid().
The ksys_ prefix denotes that these function are meant as a drop-in
replacement for the syscall. In particular, they use the same calling
convention.
This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls.
On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
2018-03-19 17:09:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return __sys_setfsgid(gid);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
kernel: conditionally support non-root users, groups and capabilities
There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their
functionality in init, running as root:root. For these systems,
supporting multiple users is not necessary.
This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for
non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional. It is enabled
under CONFIG_EXPERT menu.
When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case
and processes always have all capabilities.
The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid,
setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups,
getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset.
Also, groups.c is compiled out completely.
In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid
adding two ifdef blocks.
This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build. The most minimal
kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than
low MB. (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much.
The kernel was booted in Qemu. All the common functionalities work.
Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS.
Bloat-o-meter output:
add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650)
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda <iulia.manda21@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 23:16:41 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-04-30 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
|
* sys_getpid - return the thread group id of the current process
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Note, despite the name, this returns the tgid not the pid. The tgid and
|
|
|
|
|
* the pid are identical unless CLONE_THREAD was specified on clone() in
|
|
|
|
|
* which case the tgid is the same in all threads of the same group.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* This is SMP safe as current->tgid does not change.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return task_tgid_vnr(current);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Thread ID - the internal kernel "pid" */
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(gettid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return task_pid_vnr(current);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Accessing ->real_parent is not SMP-safe, it could
|
|
|
|
|
* change from under us. However, we can use a stale
|
|
|
|
|
* value of ->real_parent under rcu_read_lock(), see
|
|
|
|
|
* release_task()->call_rcu(delayed_put_task_struct).
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getppid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int pid;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
|
|
pid = task_tgid_vnr(rcu_dereference(current->real_parent));
|
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return pid;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getuid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
/* Only we change this so SMP safe */
|
|
|
|
|
return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid());
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(geteuid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
/* Only we change this so SMP safe */
|
|
|
|
|
return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_euid());
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getgid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
/* Only we change this so SMP safe */
|
|
|
|
|
return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_gid());
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getegid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
/* Only we change this so SMP safe */
|
|
|
|
|
return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_egid());
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-31 08:22:44 +00:00
|
|
|
static void do_sys_times(struct tms *tms)
|
timers: fix itimer/many thread hang
Overview
This patch reworks the handling of POSIX CPU timers, including the
ITIMER_PROF, ITIMER_VIRT timers and rlimit handling. It was put together
with the help of Roland McGrath, the owner and original writer of this code.
The problem we ran into, and the reason for this rework, has to do with using
a profiling timer in a process with a large number of threads. It appears
that the performance of the old implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() was
at least O(n*3) (where "n" is the number of threads in a process) or worse.
Everything is fine with an increasing number of threads until the time taken
for that routine to run becomes the same as or greater than the tick time, at
which point things degrade rather quickly.
This patch fixes bug 9906, "Weird hang with NPTL and SIGPROF."
Code Changes
This rework corrects the implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() to make it
run in constant time for a particular machine. (Performance may vary between
one machine and another depending upon whether the kernel is built as single-
or multiprocessor and, in the latter case, depending upon the number of
running processors.) To do this, at each tick we now update fields in
signal_struct as well as task_struct. The run_posix_cpu_timers() function
uses those fields to make its decisions.
We define a new structure, "task_cputime," to contain user, system and
scheduler times and use these in appropriate places:
struct task_cputime {
cputime_t utime;
cputime_t stime;
unsigned long long sum_exec_runtime;
};
This is included in the structure "thread_group_cputime," which is a new
substructure of signal_struct and which varies for uniprocessor versus
multiprocessor kernels. For uniprocessor kernels, it uses "task_cputime" as
a simple substructure, while for multiprocessor kernels it is a pointer:
struct thread_group_cputime {
struct task_cputime totals;
};
struct thread_group_cputime {
struct task_cputime *totals;
};
We also add a new task_cputime substructure directly to signal_struct, to
cache the earliest expiration of process-wide timers, and task_cputime also
replaces the it_*_expires fields of task_struct (used for earliest expiration
of thread timers). The "thread_group_cputime" structure contains process-wide
timers that are updated via account_user_time() and friends. In the non-SMP
case the structure is a simple aggregator; unfortunately in the SMP case that
simplicity was not achievable due to cache-line contention between CPUs (in
one measured case performance was actually _worse_ on a 16-cpu system than
the same test on a 4-cpu system, due to this contention). For SMP, the
thread_group_cputime counters are maintained as a per-cpu structure allocated
using alloc_percpu(). The timer functions update only the timer field in
the structure corresponding to the running CPU, obtained using per_cpu_ptr().
We define a set of inline functions in sched.h that we use to maintain the
thread_group_cputime structure and hide the differences between UP and SMP
implementations from the rest of the kernel. The thread_group_cputime_init()
function initializes the thread_group_cputime structure for the given task.
The thread_group_cputime_alloc() is a no-op for UP; for SMP it calls the
out-of-line function thread_group_cputime_alloc_smp() to allocate and fill
in the per-cpu structures and fields. The thread_group_cputime_free()
function, also a no-op for UP, in SMP frees the per-cpu structures. The
thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() function (also a UP no-op) for SMP calls
thread_group_cputime_alloc() if the per-cpu structures haven't yet been
allocated. The thread_group_cputime() function fills the task_cputime
structure it is passed with the contents of the thread_group_cputime fields;
in UP it's that simple but in SMP it must also safely check that tsk->signal
is non-NULL (if it is it just uses the appropriate fields of task_struct) and,
if so, sums the per-cpu values for each online CPU. Finally, the three
functions account_group_user_time(), account_group_system_time() and
account_group_exec_runtime() are used by timer functions to update the
respective fields of the thread_group_cputime structure.
Non-SMP operation is trivial and will not be mentioned further.
The per-cpu structure is always allocated when a task creates its first new
thread, via a call to thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() from copy_signal().
It is freed at process exit via a call to thread_group_cputime_free() from
cleanup_signal().
All functions that formerly summed utime/stime/sum_sched_runtime values from
from all threads in the thread group now use thread_group_cputime() to
snapshot the values in the thread_group_cputime structure or the values in
the task structure itself if the per-cpu structure hasn't been allocated.
Finally, the code in kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c has changed quite a bit.
The run_posix_cpu_timers() function has been split into a fast path and a
slow path; the former safely checks whether there are any expired thread
timers and, if not, just returns, while the slow path does the heavy lifting.
With the dedicated thread group fields, timers are no longer "rebalanced" and
the process_timer_rebalance() function and related code has gone away. All
summing loops are gone and all code that used them now uses the
thread_group_cputime() inline. When process-wide timers are set, the new
task_cputime structure in signal_struct is used to cache the earliest
expiration; this is checked in the fast path.
Performance
The fix appears not to add significant overhead to existing operations. It
generally performs the same as the current code except in two cases, one in
which it performs slightly worse (Case 5 below) and one in which it performs
very significantly better (Case 2 below). Overall it's a wash except in those
two cases.
I've since done somewhat more involved testing on a dual-core Opteron system.
Case 1: With no itimer running, for a test with 100,000 threads, the fixed
kernel took 1428.5 seconds, 513 seconds more than the unfixed system,
all of which was spent in the system. There were twice as many
voluntary context switches with the fix as without it.
Case 2: With an itimer running at .01 second ticks and 4000 threads (the most
an unmodified kernel can handle), the fixed kernel ran the test in
eight percent of the time (5.8 seconds as opposed to 70 seconds) and
had better tick accuracy (.012 seconds per tick as opposed to .023
seconds per tick).
Case 3: A 4000-thread test with an initial timer tick of .01 second and an
interval of 10,000 seconds (i.e. a timer that ticks only once) had
very nearly the same performance in both cases: 6.3 seconds elapsed
for the fixed kernel versus 5.5 seconds for the unfixed kernel.
With fewer threads (eight in these tests), the Case 1 test ran in essentially
the same time on both the modified and unmodified kernels (5.2 seconds versus
5.8 seconds). The Case 2 test ran in about the same time as well, 5.9 seconds
versus 5.4 seconds but again with much better tick accuracy, .013 seconds per
tick versus .025 seconds per tick for the unmodified kernel.
Since the fix affected the rlimit code, I also tested soft and hard CPU limits.
Case 4: With a hard CPU limit of 20 seconds and eight threads (and an itimer
running), the modified kernel was very slightly favored in that while
it killed the process in 19.997 seconds of CPU time (5.002 seconds of
wall time), only .003 seconds of that was system time, the rest was
user time. The unmodified kernel killed the process in 20.001 seconds
of CPU (5.014 seconds of wall time) of which .016 seconds was system
time. Really, though, the results were too close to call. The results
were essentially the same with no itimer running.
Case 5: With a soft limit of 20 seconds and a hard limit of 2000 seconds
(where the hard limit would never be reached) and an itimer running,
the modified kernel exhibited worse tick accuracy than the unmodified
kernel: .050 seconds/tick versus .028 seconds/tick. Otherwise,
performance was almost indistinguishable. With no itimer running this
test exhibited virtually identical behavior and times in both cases.
In times past I did some limited performance testing. those results are below.
On a four-cpu Opteron system without this fix, a sixteen-thread test executed
in 3569.991 seconds, of which user was 3568.435s and system was 1.556s. On
the same system with the fix, user and elapsed time were about the same, but
system time dropped to 0.007 seconds. Performance with eight, four and one
thread were comparable. Interestingly, the timer ticks with the fix seemed
more accurate: The sixteen-thread test with the fix received 149543 ticks
for 0.024 seconds per tick, while the same test without the fix received 58720
for 0.061 seconds per tick. Both cases were configured for an interval of
0.01 seconds. Again, the other tests were comparable. Each thread in this
test computed the primes up to 25,000,000.
I also did a test with a large number of threads, 100,000 threads, which is
impossible without the fix. In this case each thread computed the primes only
up to 10,000 (to make the runtime manageable). System time dominated, at
1546.968 seconds out of a total 2176.906 seconds (giving a user time of
629.938s). It received 147651 ticks for 0.015 seconds per tick, still quite
accurate. There is obviously no comparable test without the fix.
Signed-off-by: Frank Mayhar <fmayhar@google.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-09-12 16:54:39 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-01-31 03:09:23 +00:00
|
|
|
u64 tgutime, tgstime, cutime, cstime;
|
timers: fix itimer/many thread hang
Overview
This patch reworks the handling of POSIX CPU timers, including the
ITIMER_PROF, ITIMER_VIRT timers and rlimit handling. It was put together
with the help of Roland McGrath, the owner and original writer of this code.
The problem we ran into, and the reason for this rework, has to do with using
a profiling timer in a process with a large number of threads. It appears
that the performance of the old implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() was
at least O(n*3) (where "n" is the number of threads in a process) or worse.
Everything is fine with an increasing number of threads until the time taken
for that routine to run becomes the same as or greater than the tick time, at
which point things degrade rather quickly.
This patch fixes bug 9906, "Weird hang with NPTL and SIGPROF."
Code Changes
This rework corrects the implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() to make it
run in constant time for a particular machine. (Performance may vary between
one machine and another depending upon whether the kernel is built as single-
or multiprocessor and, in the latter case, depending upon the number of
running processors.) To do this, at each tick we now update fields in
signal_struct as well as task_struct. The run_posix_cpu_timers() function
uses those fields to make its decisions.
We define a new structure, "task_cputime," to contain user, system and
scheduler times and use these in appropriate places:
struct task_cputime {
cputime_t utime;
cputime_t stime;
unsigned long long sum_exec_runtime;
};
This is included in the structure "thread_group_cputime," which is a new
substructure of signal_struct and which varies for uniprocessor versus
multiprocessor kernels. For uniprocessor kernels, it uses "task_cputime" as
a simple substructure, while for multiprocessor kernels it is a pointer:
struct thread_group_cputime {
struct task_cputime totals;
};
struct thread_group_cputime {
struct task_cputime *totals;
};
We also add a new task_cputime substructure directly to signal_struct, to
cache the earliest expiration of process-wide timers, and task_cputime also
replaces the it_*_expires fields of task_struct (used for earliest expiration
of thread timers). The "thread_group_cputime" structure contains process-wide
timers that are updated via account_user_time() and friends. In the non-SMP
case the structure is a simple aggregator; unfortunately in the SMP case that
simplicity was not achievable due to cache-line contention between CPUs (in
one measured case performance was actually _worse_ on a 16-cpu system than
the same test on a 4-cpu system, due to this contention). For SMP, the
thread_group_cputime counters are maintained as a per-cpu structure allocated
using alloc_percpu(). The timer functions update only the timer field in
the structure corresponding to the running CPU, obtained using per_cpu_ptr().
We define a set of inline functions in sched.h that we use to maintain the
thread_group_cputime structure and hide the differences between UP and SMP
implementations from the rest of the kernel. The thread_group_cputime_init()
function initializes the thread_group_cputime structure for the given task.
The thread_group_cputime_alloc() is a no-op for UP; for SMP it calls the
out-of-line function thread_group_cputime_alloc_smp() to allocate and fill
in the per-cpu structures and fields. The thread_group_cputime_free()
function, also a no-op for UP, in SMP frees the per-cpu structures. The
thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() function (also a UP no-op) for SMP calls
thread_group_cputime_alloc() if the per-cpu structures haven't yet been
allocated. The thread_group_cputime() function fills the task_cputime
structure it is passed with the contents of the thread_group_cputime fields;
in UP it's that simple but in SMP it must also safely check that tsk->signal
is non-NULL (if it is it just uses the appropriate fields of task_struct) and,
if so, sums the per-cpu values for each online CPU. Finally, the three
functions account_group_user_time(), account_group_system_time() and
account_group_exec_runtime() are used by timer functions to update the
respective fields of the thread_group_cputime structure.
Non-SMP operation is trivial and will not be mentioned further.
The per-cpu structure is always allocated when a task creates its first new
thread, via a call to thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() from copy_signal().
It is freed at process exit via a call to thread_group_cputime_free() from
cleanup_signal().
All functions that formerly summed utime/stime/sum_sched_runtime values from
from all threads in the thread group now use thread_group_cputime() to
snapshot the values in the thread_group_cputime structure or the values in
the task structure itself if the per-cpu structure hasn't been allocated.
Finally, the code in kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c has changed quite a bit.
The run_posix_cpu_timers() function has been split into a fast path and a
slow path; the former safely checks whether there are any expired thread
timers and, if not, just returns, while the slow path does the heavy lifting.
With the dedicated thread group fields, timers are no longer "rebalanced" and
the process_timer_rebalance() function and related code has gone away. All
summing loops are gone and all code that used them now uses the
thread_group_cputime() inline. When process-wide timers are set, the new
task_cputime structure in signal_struct is used to cache the earliest
expiration; this is checked in the fast path.
Performance
The fix appears not to add significant overhead to existing operations. It
generally performs the same as the current code except in two cases, one in
which it performs slightly worse (Case 5 below) and one in which it performs
very significantly better (Case 2 below). Overall it's a wash except in those
two cases.
I've since done somewhat more involved testing on a dual-core Opteron system.
Case 1: With no itimer running, for a test with 100,000 threads, the fixed
kernel took 1428.5 seconds, 513 seconds more than the unfixed system,
all of which was spent in the system. There were twice as many
voluntary context switches with the fix as without it.
Case 2: With an itimer running at .01 second ticks and 4000 threads (the most
an unmodified kernel can handle), the fixed kernel ran the test in
eight percent of the time (5.8 seconds as opposed to 70 seconds) and
had better tick accuracy (.012 seconds per tick as opposed to .023
seconds per tick).
Case 3: A 4000-thread test with an initial timer tick of .01 second and an
interval of 10,000 seconds (i.e. a timer that ticks only once) had
very nearly the same performance in both cases: 6.3 seconds elapsed
for the fixed kernel versus 5.5 seconds for the unfixed kernel.
With fewer threads (eight in these tests), the Case 1 test ran in essentially
the same time on both the modified and unmodified kernels (5.2 seconds versus
5.8 seconds). The Case 2 test ran in about the same time as well, 5.9 seconds
versus 5.4 seconds but again with much better tick accuracy, .013 seconds per
tick versus .025 seconds per tick for the unmodified kernel.
Since the fix affected the rlimit code, I also tested soft and hard CPU limits.
Case 4: With a hard CPU limit of 20 seconds and eight threads (and an itimer
running), the modified kernel was very slightly favored in that while
it killed the process in 19.997 seconds of CPU time (5.002 seconds of
wall time), only .003 seconds of that was system time, the rest was
user time. The unmodified kernel killed the process in 20.001 seconds
of CPU (5.014 seconds of wall time) of which .016 seconds was system
time. Really, though, the results were too close to call. The results
were essentially the same with no itimer running.
Case 5: With a soft limit of 20 seconds and a hard limit of 2000 seconds
(where the hard limit would never be reached) and an itimer running,
the modified kernel exhibited worse tick accuracy than the unmodified
kernel: .050 seconds/tick versus .028 seconds/tick. Otherwise,
performance was almost indistinguishable. With no itimer running this
test exhibited virtually identical behavior and times in both cases.
In times past I did some limited performance testing. those results are below.
On a four-cpu Opteron system without this fix, a sixteen-thread test executed
in 3569.991 seconds, of which user was 3568.435s and system was 1.556s. On
the same system with the fix, user and elapsed time were about the same, but
system time dropped to 0.007 seconds. Performance with eight, four and one
thread were comparable. Interestingly, the timer ticks with the fix seemed
more accurate: The sixteen-thread test with the fix received 149543 ticks
for 0.024 seconds per tick, while the same test without the fix received 58720
for 0.061 seconds per tick. Both cases were configured for an interval of
0.01 seconds. Again, the other tests were comparable. Each thread in this
test computed the primes up to 25,000,000.
I also did a test with a large number of threads, 100,000 threads, which is
impossible without the fix. In this case each thread computed the primes only
up to 10,000 (to make the runtime manageable). System time dominated, at
1546.968 seconds out of a total 2176.906 seconds (giving a user time of
629.938s). It received 147651 ticks for 0.015 seconds per tick, still quite
accurate. There is obviously no comparable test without the fix.
Signed-off-by: Frank Mayhar <fmayhar@google.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-09-12 16:54:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-11-21 15:26:44 +00:00
|
|
|
thread_group_cputime_adjusted(current, &tgutime, &tgstime);
|
timers: fix itimer/many thread hang
Overview
This patch reworks the handling of POSIX CPU timers, including the
ITIMER_PROF, ITIMER_VIRT timers and rlimit handling. It was put together
with the help of Roland McGrath, the owner and original writer of this code.
The problem we ran into, and the reason for this rework, has to do with using
a profiling timer in a process with a large number of threads. It appears
that the performance of the old implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() was
at least O(n*3) (where "n" is the number of threads in a process) or worse.
Everything is fine with an increasing number of threads until the time taken
for that routine to run becomes the same as or greater than the tick time, at
which point things degrade rather quickly.
This patch fixes bug 9906, "Weird hang with NPTL and SIGPROF."
Code Changes
This rework corrects the implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() to make it
run in constant time for a particular machine. (Performance may vary between
one machine and another depending upon whether the kernel is built as single-
or multiprocessor and, in the latter case, depending upon the number of
running processors.) To do this, at each tick we now update fields in
signal_struct as well as task_struct. The run_posix_cpu_timers() function
uses those fields to make its decisions.
We define a new structure, "task_cputime," to contain user, system and
scheduler times and use these in appropriate places:
struct task_cputime {
cputime_t utime;
cputime_t stime;
unsigned long long sum_exec_runtime;
};
This is included in the structure "thread_group_cputime," which is a new
substructure of signal_struct and which varies for uniprocessor versus
multiprocessor kernels. For uniprocessor kernels, it uses "task_cputime" as
a simple substructure, while for multiprocessor kernels it is a pointer:
struct thread_group_cputime {
struct task_cputime totals;
};
struct thread_group_cputime {
struct task_cputime *totals;
};
We also add a new task_cputime substructure directly to signal_struct, to
cache the earliest expiration of process-wide timers, and task_cputime also
replaces the it_*_expires fields of task_struct (used for earliest expiration
of thread timers). The "thread_group_cputime" structure contains process-wide
timers that are updated via account_user_time() and friends. In the non-SMP
case the structure is a simple aggregator; unfortunately in the SMP case that
simplicity was not achievable due to cache-line contention between CPUs (in
one measured case performance was actually _worse_ on a 16-cpu system than
the same test on a 4-cpu system, due to this contention). For SMP, the
thread_group_cputime counters are maintained as a per-cpu structure allocated
using alloc_percpu(). The timer functions update only the timer field in
the structure corresponding to the running CPU, obtained using per_cpu_ptr().
We define a set of inline functions in sched.h that we use to maintain the
thread_group_cputime structure and hide the differences between UP and SMP
implementations from the rest of the kernel. The thread_group_cputime_init()
function initializes the thread_group_cputime structure for the given task.
The thread_group_cputime_alloc() is a no-op for UP; for SMP it calls the
out-of-line function thread_group_cputime_alloc_smp() to allocate and fill
in the per-cpu structures and fields. The thread_group_cputime_free()
function, also a no-op for UP, in SMP frees the per-cpu structures. The
thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() function (also a UP no-op) for SMP calls
thread_group_cputime_alloc() if the per-cpu structures haven't yet been
allocated. The thread_group_cputime() function fills the task_cputime
structure it is passed with the contents of the thread_group_cputime fields;
in UP it's that simple but in SMP it must also safely check that tsk->signal
is non-NULL (if it is it just uses the appropriate fields of task_struct) and,
if so, sums the per-cpu values for each online CPU. Finally, the three
functions account_group_user_time(), account_group_system_time() and
account_group_exec_runtime() are used by timer functions to update the
respective fields of the thread_group_cputime structure.
Non-SMP operation is trivial and will not be mentioned further.
The per-cpu structure is always allocated when a task creates its first new
thread, via a call to thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() from copy_signal().
It is freed at process exit via a call to thread_group_cputime_free() from
cleanup_signal().
All functions that formerly summed utime/stime/sum_sched_runtime values from
from all threads in the thread group now use thread_group_cputime() to
snapshot the values in the thread_group_cputime structure or the values in
the task structure itself if the per-cpu structure hasn't been allocated.
Finally, the code in kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c has changed quite a bit.
The run_posix_cpu_timers() function has been split into a fast path and a
slow path; the former safely checks whether there are any expired thread
timers and, if not, just returns, while the slow path does the heavy lifting.
With the dedicated thread group fields, timers are no longer "rebalanced" and
the process_timer_rebalance() function and related code has gone away. All
summing loops are gone and all code that used them now uses the
thread_group_cputime() inline. When process-wide timers are set, the new
task_cputime structure in signal_struct is used to cache the earliest
expiration; this is checked in the fast path.
Performance
The fix appears not to add significant overhead to existing operations. It
generally performs the same as the current code except in two cases, one in
which it performs slightly worse (Case 5 below) and one in which it performs
very significantly better (Case 2 below). Overall it's a wash except in those
two cases.
I've since done somewhat more involved testing on a dual-core Opteron system.
Case 1: With no itimer running, for a test with 100,000 threads, the fixed
kernel took 1428.5 seconds, 513 seconds more than the unfixed system,
all of which was spent in the system. There were twice as many
voluntary context switches with the fix as without it.
Case 2: With an itimer running at .01 second ticks and 4000 threads (the most
an unmodified kernel can handle), the fixed kernel ran the test in
eight percent of the time (5.8 seconds as opposed to 70 seconds) and
had better tick accuracy (.012 seconds per tick as opposed to .023
seconds per tick).
Case 3: A 4000-thread test with an initial timer tick of .01 second and an
interval of 10,000 seconds (i.e. a timer that ticks only once) had
very nearly the same performance in both cases: 6.3 seconds elapsed
for the fixed kernel versus 5.5 seconds for the unfixed kernel.
With fewer threads (eight in these tests), the Case 1 test ran in essentially
the same time on both the modified and unmodified kernels (5.2 seconds versus
5.8 seconds). The Case 2 test ran in about the same time as well, 5.9 seconds
versus 5.4 seconds but again with much better tick accuracy, .013 seconds per
tick versus .025 seconds per tick for the unmodified kernel.
Since the fix affected the rlimit code, I also tested soft and hard CPU limits.
Case 4: With a hard CPU limit of 20 seconds and eight threads (and an itimer
running), the modified kernel was very slightly favored in that while
it killed the process in 19.997 seconds of CPU time (5.002 seconds of
wall time), only .003 seconds of that was system time, the rest was
user time. The unmodified kernel killed the process in 20.001 seconds
of CPU (5.014 seconds of wall time) of which .016 seconds was system
time. Really, though, the results were too close to call. The results
were essentially the same with no itimer running.
Case 5: With a soft limit of 20 seconds and a hard limit of 2000 seconds
(where the hard limit would never be reached) and an itimer running,
the modified kernel exhibited worse tick accuracy than the unmodified
kernel: .050 seconds/tick versus .028 seconds/tick. Otherwise,
performance was almost indistinguishable. With no itimer running this
test exhibited virtually identical behavior and times in both cases.
In times past I did some limited performance testing. those results are below.
On a four-cpu Opteron system without this fix, a sixteen-thread test executed
in 3569.991 seconds, of which user was 3568.435s and system was 1.556s. On
the same system with the fix, user and elapsed time were about the same, but
system time dropped to 0.007 seconds. Performance with eight, four and one
thread were comparable. Interestingly, the timer ticks with the fix seemed
more accurate: The sixteen-thread test with the fix received 149543 ticks
for 0.024 seconds per tick, while the same test without the fix received 58720
for 0.061 seconds per tick. Both cases were configured for an interval of
0.01 seconds. Again, the other tests were comparable. Each thread in this
test computed the primes up to 25,000,000.
I also did a test with a large number of threads, 100,000 threads, which is
impossible without the fix. In this case each thread computed the primes only
up to 10,000 (to make the runtime manageable). System time dominated, at
1546.968 seconds out of a total 2176.906 seconds (giving a user time of
629.938s). It received 147651 ticks for 0.015 seconds per tick, still quite
accurate. There is obviously no comparable test without the fix.
Signed-off-by: Frank Mayhar <fmayhar@google.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-09-12 16:54:39 +00:00
|
|
|
cutime = current->signal->cutime;
|
|
|
|
|
cstime = current->signal->cstime;
|
2017-01-31 03:09:23 +00:00
|
|
|
tms->tms_utime = nsec_to_clock_t(tgutime);
|
|
|
|
|
tms->tms_stime = nsec_to_clock_t(tgstime);
|
|
|
|
|
tms->tms_cutime = nsec_to_clock_t(cutime);
|
|
|
|
|
tms->tms_cstime = nsec_to_clock_t(cstime);
|
timers: fix itimer/many thread hang
Overview
This patch reworks the handling of POSIX CPU timers, including the
ITIMER_PROF, ITIMER_VIRT timers and rlimit handling. It was put together
with the help of Roland McGrath, the owner and original writer of this code.
The problem we ran into, and the reason for this rework, has to do with using
a profiling timer in a process with a large number of threads. It appears
that the performance of the old implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() was
at least O(n*3) (where "n" is the number of threads in a process) or worse.
Everything is fine with an increasing number of threads until the time taken
for that routine to run becomes the same as or greater than the tick time, at
which point things degrade rather quickly.
This patch fixes bug 9906, "Weird hang with NPTL and SIGPROF."
Code Changes
This rework corrects the implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() to make it
run in constant time for a particular machine. (Performance may vary between
one machine and another depending upon whether the kernel is built as single-
or multiprocessor and, in the latter case, depending upon the number of
running processors.) To do this, at each tick we now update fields in
signal_struct as well as task_struct. The run_posix_cpu_timers() function
uses those fields to make its decisions.
We define a new structure, "task_cputime," to contain user, system and
scheduler times and use these in appropriate places:
struct task_cputime {
cputime_t utime;
cputime_t stime;
unsigned long long sum_exec_runtime;
};
This is included in the structure "thread_group_cputime," which is a new
substructure of signal_struct and which varies for uniprocessor versus
multiprocessor kernels. For uniprocessor kernels, it uses "task_cputime" as
a simple substructure, while for multiprocessor kernels it is a pointer:
struct thread_group_cputime {
struct task_cputime totals;
};
struct thread_group_cputime {
struct task_cputime *totals;
};
We also add a new task_cputime substructure directly to signal_struct, to
cache the earliest expiration of process-wide timers, and task_cputime also
replaces the it_*_expires fields of task_struct (used for earliest expiration
of thread timers). The "thread_group_cputime" structure contains process-wide
timers that are updated via account_user_time() and friends. In the non-SMP
case the structure is a simple aggregator; unfortunately in the SMP case that
simplicity was not achievable due to cache-line contention between CPUs (in
one measured case performance was actually _worse_ on a 16-cpu system than
the same test on a 4-cpu system, due to this contention). For SMP, the
thread_group_cputime counters are maintained as a per-cpu structure allocated
using alloc_percpu(). The timer functions update only the timer field in
the structure corresponding to the running CPU, obtained using per_cpu_ptr().
We define a set of inline functions in sched.h that we use to maintain the
thread_group_cputime structure and hide the differences between UP and SMP
implementations from the rest of the kernel. The thread_group_cputime_init()
function initializes the thread_group_cputime structure for the given task.
The thread_group_cputime_alloc() is a no-op for UP; for SMP it calls the
out-of-line function thread_group_cputime_alloc_smp() to allocate and fill
in the per-cpu structures and fields. The thread_group_cputime_free()
function, also a no-op for UP, in SMP frees the per-cpu structures. The
thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() function (also a UP no-op) for SMP calls
thread_group_cputime_alloc() if the per-cpu structures haven't yet been
allocated. The thread_group_cputime() function fills the task_cputime
structure it is passed with the contents of the thread_group_cputime fields;
in UP it's that simple but in SMP it must also safely check that tsk->signal
is non-NULL (if it is it just uses the appropriate fields of task_struct) and,
if so, sums the per-cpu values for each online CPU. Finally, the three
functions account_group_user_time(), account_group_system_time() and
account_group_exec_runtime() are used by timer functions to update the
respective fields of the thread_group_cputime structure.
Non-SMP operation is trivial and will not be mentioned further.
The per-cpu structure is always allocated when a task creates its first new
thread, via a call to thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() from copy_signal().
It is freed at process exit via a call to thread_group_cputime_free() from
cleanup_signal().
All functions that formerly summed utime/stime/sum_sched_runtime values from
from all threads in the thread group now use thread_group_cputime() to
snapshot the values in the thread_group_cputime structure or the values in
the task structure itself if the per-cpu structure hasn't been allocated.
Finally, the code in kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c has changed quite a bit.
The run_posix_cpu_timers() function has been split into a fast path and a
slow path; the former safely checks whether there are any expired thread
timers and, if not, just returns, while the slow path does the heavy lifting.
With the dedicated thread group fields, timers are no longer "rebalanced" and
the process_timer_rebalance() function and related code has gone away. All
summing loops are gone and all code that used them now uses the
thread_group_cputime() inline. When process-wide timers are set, the new
task_cputime structure in signal_struct is used to cache the earliest
expiration; this is checked in the fast path.
Performance
The fix appears not to add significant overhead to existing operations. It
generally performs the same as the current code except in two cases, one in
which it performs slightly worse (Case 5 below) and one in which it performs
very significantly better (Case 2 below). Overall it's a wash except in those
two cases.
I've since done somewhat more involved testing on a dual-core Opteron system.
Case 1: With no itimer running, for a test with 100,000 threads, the fixed
kernel took 1428.5 seconds, 513 seconds more than the unfixed system,
all of which was spent in the system. There were twice as many
voluntary context switches with the fix as without it.
Case 2: With an itimer running at .01 second ticks and 4000 threads (the most
an unmodified kernel can handle), the fixed kernel ran the test in
eight percent of the time (5.8 seconds as opposed to 70 seconds) and
had better tick accuracy (.012 seconds per tick as opposed to .023
seconds per tick).
Case 3: A 4000-thread test with an initial timer tick of .01 second and an
interval of 10,000 seconds (i.e. a timer that ticks only once) had
very nearly the same performance in both cases: 6.3 seconds elapsed
for the fixed kernel versus 5.5 seconds for the unfixed kernel.
With fewer threads (eight in these tests), the Case 1 test ran in essentially
the same time on both the modified and unmodified kernels (5.2 seconds versus
5.8 seconds). The Case 2 test ran in about the same time as well, 5.9 seconds
versus 5.4 seconds but again with much better tick accuracy, .013 seconds per
tick versus .025 seconds per tick for the unmodified kernel.
Since the fix affected the rlimit code, I also tested soft and hard CPU limits.
Case 4: With a hard CPU limit of 20 seconds and eight threads (and an itimer
running), the modified kernel was very slightly favored in that while
it killed the process in 19.997 seconds of CPU time (5.002 seconds of
wall time), only .003 seconds of that was system time, the rest was
user time. The unmodified kernel killed the process in 20.001 seconds
of CPU (5.014 seconds of wall time) of which .016 seconds was system
time. Really, though, the results were too close to call. The results
were essentially the same with no itimer running.
Case 5: With a soft limit of 20 seconds and a hard limit of 2000 seconds
(where the hard limit would never be reached) and an itimer running,
the modified kernel exhibited worse tick accuracy than the unmodified
kernel: .050 seconds/tick versus .028 seconds/tick. Otherwise,
performance was almost indistinguishable. With no itimer running this
test exhibited virtually identical behavior and times in both cases.
In times past I did some limited performance testing. those results are below.
On a four-cpu Opteron system without this fix, a sixteen-thread test executed
in 3569.991 seconds, of which user was 3568.435s and system was 1.556s. On
the same system with the fix, user and elapsed time were about the same, but
system time dropped to 0.007 seconds. Performance with eight, four and one
thread were comparable. Interestingly, the timer ticks with the fix seemed
more accurate: The sixteen-thread test with the fix received 149543 ticks
for 0.024 seconds per tick, while the same test without the fix received 58720
for 0.061 seconds per tick. Both cases were configured for an interval of
0.01 seconds. Again, the other tests were comparable. Each thread in this
test computed the primes up to 25,000,000.
I also did a test with a large number of threads, 100,000 threads, which is
impossible without the fix. In this case each thread computed the primes only
up to 10,000 (to make the runtime manageable). System time dominated, at
1546.968 seconds out of a total 2176.906 seconds (giving a user time of
629.938s). It received 147651 ticks for 0.015 seconds per tick, still quite
accurate. There is obviously no comparable test without the fix.
Signed-off-by: Frank Mayhar <fmayhar@google.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-09-12 16:54:39 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-14 13:14:03 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct tms __user *, tbuf)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if (tbuf) {
|
|
|
|
|
struct tms tmp;
|
timers: fix itimer/many thread hang
Overview
This patch reworks the handling of POSIX CPU timers, including the
ITIMER_PROF, ITIMER_VIRT timers and rlimit handling. It was put together
with the help of Roland McGrath, the owner and original writer of this code.
The problem we ran into, and the reason for this rework, has to do with using
a profiling timer in a process with a large number of threads. It appears
that the performance of the old implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() was
at least O(n*3) (where "n" is the number of threads in a process) or worse.
Everything is fine with an increasing number of threads until the time taken
for that routine to run becomes the same as or greater than the tick time, at
which point things degrade rather quickly.
This patch fixes bug 9906, "Weird hang with NPTL and SIGPROF."
Code Changes
This rework corrects the implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() to make it
run in constant time for a particular machine. (Performance may vary between
one machine and another depending upon whether the kernel is built as single-
or multiprocessor and, in the latter case, depending upon the number of
running processors.) To do this, at each tick we now update fields in
signal_struct as well as task_struct. The run_posix_cpu_timers() function
uses those fields to make its decisions.
We define a new structure, "task_cputime," to contain user, system and
scheduler times and use these in appropriate places:
struct task_cputime {
cputime_t utime;
cputime_t stime;
unsigned long long sum_exec_runtime;
};
This is included in the structure "thread_group_cputime," which is a new
substructure of signal_struct and which varies for uniprocessor versus
multiprocessor kernels. For uniprocessor kernels, it uses "task_cputime" as
a simple substructure, while for multiprocessor kernels it is a pointer:
struct thread_group_cputime {
struct task_cputime totals;
};
struct thread_group_cputime {
struct task_cputime *totals;
};
We also add a new task_cputime substructure directly to signal_struct, to
cache the earliest expiration of process-wide timers, and task_cputime also
replaces the it_*_expires fields of task_struct (used for earliest expiration
of thread timers). The "thread_group_cputime" structure contains process-wide
timers that are updated via account_user_time() and friends. In the non-SMP
case the structure is a simple aggregator; unfortunately in the SMP case that
simplicity was not achievable due to cache-line contention between CPUs (in
one measured case performance was actually _worse_ on a 16-cpu system than
the same test on a 4-cpu system, due to this contention). For SMP, the
thread_group_cputime counters are maintained as a per-cpu structure allocated
using alloc_percpu(). The timer functions update only the timer field in
the structure corresponding to the running CPU, obtained using per_cpu_ptr().
We define a set of inline functions in sched.h that we use to maintain the
thread_group_cputime structure and hide the differences between UP and SMP
implementations from the rest of the kernel. The thread_group_cputime_init()
function initializes the thread_group_cputime structure for the given task.
The thread_group_cputime_alloc() is a no-op for UP; for SMP it calls the
out-of-line function thread_group_cputime_alloc_smp() to allocate and fill
in the per-cpu structures and fields. The thread_group_cputime_free()
function, also a no-op for UP, in SMP frees the per-cpu structures. The
thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() function (also a UP no-op) for SMP calls
thread_group_cputime_alloc() if the per-cpu structures haven't yet been
allocated. The thread_group_cputime() function fills the task_cputime
structure it is passed with the contents of the thread_group_cputime fields;
in UP it's that simple but in SMP it must also safely check that tsk->signal
is non-NULL (if it is it just uses the appropriate fields of task_struct) and,
if so, sums the per-cpu values for each online CPU. Finally, the three
functions account_group_user_time(), account_group_system_time() and
account_group_exec_runtime() are used by timer functions to update the
respective fields of the thread_group_cputime structure.
Non-SMP operation is trivial and will not be mentioned further.
The per-cpu structure is always allocated when a task creates its first new
thread, via a call to thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() from copy_signal().
It is freed at process exit via a call to thread_group_cputime_free() from
cleanup_signal().
All functions that formerly summed utime/stime/sum_sched_runtime values from
from all threads in the thread group now use thread_group_cputime() to
snapshot the values in the thread_group_cputime structure or the values in
the task structure itself if the per-cpu structure hasn't been allocated.
Finally, the code in kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c has changed quite a bit.
The run_posix_cpu_timers() function has been split into a fast path and a
slow path; the former safely checks whether there are any expired thread
timers and, if not, just returns, while the slow path does the heavy lifting.
With the dedicated thread group fields, timers are no longer "rebalanced" and
the process_timer_rebalance() function and related code has gone away. All
summing loops are gone and all code that used them now uses the
thread_group_cputime() inline. When process-wide timers are set, the new
task_cputime structure in signal_struct is used to cache the earliest
expiration; this is checked in the fast path.
Performance
The fix appears not to add significant overhead to existing operations. It
generally performs the same as the current code except in two cases, one in
which it performs slightly worse (Case 5 below) and one in which it performs
very significantly better (Case 2 below). Overall it's a wash except in those
two cases.
I've since done somewhat more involved testing on a dual-core Opteron system.
Case 1: With no itimer running, for a test with 100,000 threads, the fixed
kernel took 1428.5 seconds, 513 seconds more than the unfixed system,
all of which was spent in the system. There were twice as many
voluntary context switches with the fix as without it.
Case 2: With an itimer running at .01 second ticks and 4000 threads (the most
an unmodified kernel can handle), the fixed kernel ran the test in
eight percent of the time (5.8 seconds as opposed to 70 seconds) and
had better tick accuracy (.012 seconds per tick as opposed to .023
seconds per tick).
Case 3: A 4000-thread test with an initial timer tick of .01 second and an
interval of 10,000 seconds (i.e. a timer that ticks only once) had
very nearly the same performance in both cases: 6.3 seconds elapsed
for the fixed kernel versus 5.5 seconds for the unfixed kernel.
With fewer threads (eight in these tests), the Case 1 test ran in essentially
the same time on both the modified and unmodified kernels (5.2 seconds versus
5.8 seconds). The Case 2 test ran in about the same time as well, 5.9 seconds
versus 5.4 seconds but again with much better tick accuracy, .013 seconds per
tick versus .025 seconds per tick for the unmodified kernel.
Since the fix affected the rlimit code, I also tested soft and hard CPU limits.
Case 4: With a hard CPU limit of 20 seconds and eight threads (and an itimer
running), the modified kernel was very slightly favored in that while
it killed the process in 19.997 seconds of CPU time (5.002 seconds of
wall time), only .003 seconds of that was system time, the rest was
user time. The unmodified kernel killed the process in 20.001 seconds
of CPU (5.014 seconds of wall time) of which .016 seconds was system
time. Really, though, the results were too close to call. The results
were essentially the same with no itimer running.
Case 5: With a soft limit of 20 seconds and a hard limit of 2000 seconds
(where the hard limit would never be reached) and an itimer running,
the modified kernel exhibited worse tick accuracy than the unmodified
kernel: .050 seconds/tick versus .028 seconds/tick. Otherwise,
performance was almost indistinguishable. With no itimer running this
test exhibited virtually identical behavior and times in both cases.
In times past I did some limited performance testing. those results are below.
On a four-cpu Opteron system without this fix, a sixteen-thread test executed
in 3569.991 seconds, of which user was 3568.435s and system was 1.556s. On
the same system with the fix, user and elapsed time were about the same, but
system time dropped to 0.007 seconds. Performance with eight, four and one
thread were comparable. Interestingly, the timer ticks with the fix seemed
more accurate: The sixteen-thread test with the fix received 149543 ticks
for 0.024 seconds per tick, while the same test without the fix received 58720
for 0.061 seconds per tick. Both cases were configured for an interval of
0.01 seconds. Again, the other tests were comparable. Each thread in this
test computed the primes up to 25,000,000.
I also did a test with a large number of threads, 100,000 threads, which is
impossible without the fix. In this case each thread computed the primes only
up to 10,000 (to make the runtime manageable). System time dominated, at
1546.968 seconds out of a total 2176.906 seconds (giving a user time of
629.938s). It received 147651 ticks for 0.015 seconds per tick, still quite
accurate. There is obviously no comparable test without the fix.
Signed-off-by: Frank Mayhar <fmayhar@google.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-09-12 16:54:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
do_sys_times(&tmp);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(struct tms)))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-06 22:41:02 +00:00
|
|
|
force_successful_syscall_return();
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64());
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-31 08:22:44 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
|
|
|
|
static compat_clock_t clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(clock_t x)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return compat_jiffies_to_clock_t(clock_t_to_jiffies(x));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct compat_tms __user *, tbuf)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if (tbuf) {
|
|
|
|
|
struct tms tms;
|
|
|
|
|
struct compat_tms tmp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
do_sys_times(&tms);
|
|
|
|
|
/* Convert our struct tms to the compat version. */
|
|
|
|
|
tmp.tms_utime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_utime);
|
|
|
|
|
tmp.tms_stime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_stime);
|
|
|
|
|
tmp.tms_cutime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_cutime);
|
|
|
|
|
tmp.tms_cstime = clock_t_to_compat_clock_t(tms.tms_cstime);
|
|
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
force_successful_syscall_return();
|
|
|
|
|
return compat_jiffies_to_clock_t(jiffies);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* This needs some heavy checking ...
|
|
|
|
|
* I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully
|
|
|
|
|
* understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really
|
|
|
|
|
* only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user
|
|
|
|
|
* can't send a signal to a process owned by another. -TYT, 12/12/91
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
2014-01-23 23:55:52 +00:00
|
|
|
* !PF_FORKNOEXEC check to conform completely to POSIX.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-01-14 13:14:06 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setpgid, pid_t, pid, pid_t, pgid)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct *p;
|
2006-01-08 09:03:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader;
|
2008-02-08 12:19:08 +00:00
|
|
|
struct pid *pgrp;
|
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!pid)
|
2007-10-19 06:40:14 +00:00
|
|
|
pid = task_pid_vnr(group_leader);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!pgid)
|
|
|
|
|
pgid = pid;
|
|
|
|
|
if (pgid < 0)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2010-09-01 00:00:18 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* From this point forward we keep holding onto the tasklist lock
|
|
|
|
|
* so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = -ESRCH;
|
2008-02-08 12:19:08 +00:00
|
|
|
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!p)
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!thread_group_leader(p))
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-08 12:19:08 +00:00
|
|
|
if (same_thread_group(p->real_parent, group_leader)) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
err = -EPERM;
|
2007-02-12 08:53:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if (task_session(p) != task_session(group_leader))
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
err = -EACCES;
|
2014-01-23 23:55:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(p->flags & PF_FORKNOEXEC))
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
|
err = -ESRCH;
|
2006-01-08 09:03:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (p != group_leader)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
if (p->signal->leader)
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-08 12:19:08 +00:00
|
|
|
pgrp = task_pid(p);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pgid != pid) {
|
2007-10-19 06:40:14 +00:00
|
|
|
struct task_struct *g;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-08 12:19:08 +00:00
|
|
|
pgrp = find_vpid(pgid);
|
|
|
|
|
g = pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID);
|
2007-02-12 08:53:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!g || task_session(g) != task_session(group_leader))
|
2006-12-08 10:38:02 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = security_task_setpgid(p, pgid);
|
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-02 23:58:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (task_pgrp(p) != pgrp)
|
2008-04-30 07:54:27 +00:00
|
|
|
change_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, pgrp);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
|
/* All paths lead to here, thus we are safe. -DaveM */
|
|
|
|
|
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
2010-09-01 00:00:18 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-11 10:34:27 +00:00
|
|
|
static int do_getpgid(pid_t pid)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-04-30 07:54:29 +00:00
|
|
|
struct task_struct *p;
|
|
|
|
|
struct pid *grp;
|
|
|
|
|
int retval;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
2006-10-01 06:27:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!pid)
|
2008-04-30 07:54:29 +00:00
|
|
|
grp = task_pgrp(current);
|
2006-10-01 06:27:24 +00:00
|
|
|
else {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = -ESRCH;
|
2008-04-30 07:54:29 +00:00
|
|
|
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!p)
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
grp = task_pgrp(p);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!grp)
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
retval = security_task_getpgid(p);
|
|
|
|
|
if (retval)
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-04-30 07:54:29 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = pid_vnr(grp);
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-11 10:34:27 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getpgid, pid_t, pid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return do_getpgid(pid);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-14 13:14:04 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpgrp)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-03-11 10:34:27 +00:00
|
|
|
return do_getpgid(0);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-14 13:14:04 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getsid, pid_t, pid)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-04-30 07:54:28 +00:00
|
|
|
struct task_struct *p;
|
|
|
|
|
struct pid *sid;
|
|
|
|
|
int retval;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
2006-10-01 06:27:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!pid)
|
2008-04-30 07:54:28 +00:00
|
|
|
sid = task_session(current);
|
2006-10-01 06:27:24 +00:00
|
|
|
else {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = -ESRCH;
|
2008-04-30 07:54:28 +00:00
|
|
|
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!p)
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
sid = task_session(p);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!sid)
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
retval = security_task_getsid(p);
|
|
|
|
|
if (retval)
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-04-30 07:54:28 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = pid_vnr(sid);
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-03 22:08:26 +00:00
|
|
|
static void set_special_pids(struct pid *pid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct *curr = current->group_leader;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (task_session(curr) != pid)
|
|
|
|
|
change_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_SID, pid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (task_pgrp(curr) != pid)
|
|
|
|
|
change_pid(curr, PIDTYPE_PGID, pid);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-16 11:36:06 +00:00
|
|
|
int ksys_setsid(void)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-01-08 09:03:58 +00:00
|
|
|
struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader;
|
2008-02-08 12:19:09 +00:00
|
|
|
struct pid *sid = task_pid(group_leader);
|
|
|
|
|
pid_t session = pid_vnr(sid);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
int err = -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
2006-03-31 10:31:33 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Fail if I am already a session leader */
|
|
|
|
|
if (group_leader->signal->leader)
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-08 12:19:11 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Fail if a process group id already exists that equals the
|
|
|
|
|
* proposed session id.
|
2006-03-31 10:31:33 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-02-08 12:19:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pid_task(sid, PIDTYPE_PGID))
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2006-01-08 09:03:58 +00:00
|
|
|
group_leader->signal->leader = 1;
|
2013-07-03 22:08:26 +00:00
|
|
|
set_special_pids(sid);
|
2006-12-08 10:36:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-10-13 09:37:26 +00:00
|
|
|
proc_clear_tty(group_leader);
|
2006-12-08 10:36:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-08 12:19:09 +00:00
|
|
|
err = session;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
|
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
|
sched: Add 'autogroup' scheduling feature: automated per session task groups
A recurring complaint from CFS users is that parallel kbuild has
a negative impact on desktop interactivity. This patch
implements an idea from Linus, to automatically create task
groups. Currently, only per session autogroups are implemented,
but the patch leaves the way open for enhancement.
Implementation: each task's signal struct contains an inherited
pointer to a refcounted autogroup struct containing a task group
pointer, the default for all tasks pointing to the
init_task_group. When a task calls setsid(), a new task group
is created, the process is moved into the new task group, and a
reference to the preveious task group is dropped. Child
processes inherit this task group thereafter, and increase it's
refcount. When the last thread of a process exits, the
process's reference is dropped, such that when the last process
referencing an autogroup exits, the autogroup is destroyed.
At runqueue selection time, IFF a task has no cgroup assignment,
its current autogroup is used.
Autogroup bandwidth is controllable via setting it's nice level
through the proc filesystem:
cat /proc/<pid>/autogroup
Displays the task's group and the group's nice level.
echo <nice level> > /proc/<pid>/autogroup
Sets the task group's shares to the weight of nice <level> task.
Setting nice level is rate limited for !admin users due to the
abuse risk of task group locking.
The feature is enabled from boot by default if
CONFIG_SCHED_AUTOGROUP=y is selected, but can be disabled via
the boot option noautogroup, and can also be turned on/off on
the fly via:
echo [01] > /proc/sys/kernel/sched_autogroup_enabled
... which will automatically move tasks to/from the root task group.
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Markus Trippelsdorf <markus@trippelsdorf.de>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
[ Removed the task_group_path() debug code, and fixed !EVENTFD build failure. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
LKML-Reference: <1290281700.28711.9.camel@maggy.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2010-11-30 13:18:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if (err > 0) {
|
2009-10-26 23:49:34 +00:00
|
|
|
proc_sid_connector(group_leader);
|
sched: Add 'autogroup' scheduling feature: automated per session task groups
A recurring complaint from CFS users is that parallel kbuild has
a negative impact on desktop interactivity. This patch
implements an idea from Linus, to automatically create task
groups. Currently, only per session autogroups are implemented,
but the patch leaves the way open for enhancement.
Implementation: each task's signal struct contains an inherited
pointer to a refcounted autogroup struct containing a task group
pointer, the default for all tasks pointing to the
init_task_group. When a task calls setsid(), a new task group
is created, the process is moved into the new task group, and a
reference to the preveious task group is dropped. Child
processes inherit this task group thereafter, and increase it's
refcount. When the last thread of a process exits, the
process's reference is dropped, such that when the last process
referencing an autogroup exits, the autogroup is destroyed.
At runqueue selection time, IFF a task has no cgroup assignment,
its current autogroup is used.
Autogroup bandwidth is controllable via setting it's nice level
through the proc filesystem:
cat /proc/<pid>/autogroup
Displays the task's group and the group's nice level.
echo <nice level> > /proc/<pid>/autogroup
Sets the task group's shares to the weight of nice <level> task.
Setting nice level is rate limited for !admin users due to the
abuse risk of task group locking.
The feature is enabled from boot by default if
CONFIG_SCHED_AUTOGROUP=y is selected, but can be disabled via
the boot option noautogroup, and can also be turned on/off on
the fly via:
echo [01] > /proc/sys/kernel/sched_autogroup_enabled
... which will automatically move tasks to/from the root task group.
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Markus Trippelsdorf <markus@trippelsdorf.de>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
[ Removed the task_group_path() debug code, and fixed !EVENTFD build failure. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
LKML-Reference: <1290281700.28711.9.camel@maggy.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2010-11-30 13:18:03 +00:00
|
|
|
sched_autogroup_create_attach(group_leader);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-16 11:36:06 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(setsid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return ksys_setsid();
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010-03-10 23:21:19 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE
|
|
|
|
|
#define override_architecture(name) \
|
2010-04-23 17:17:44 +00:00
|
|
|
(personality(current->personality) == PER_LINUX32 && \
|
2010-03-10 23:21:19 +00:00
|
|
|
copy_to_user(name->machine, COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE, \
|
|
|
|
|
sizeof(COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE)))
|
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
|
#define override_architecture(name) 0
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
2011-08-19 23:15:10 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Work around broken programs that cannot handle "Linux 3.0".
|
|
|
|
|
* Instead we map 3.x to 2.6.40+x, so e.g. 3.0 would be 2.6.40
|
2019-01-12 17:14:30 +00:00
|
|
|
* And we map 4.x and later versions to 2.6.60+x, so 4.0/5.0/6.0/... would be
|
|
|
|
|
* 2.6.60.
|
2011-08-19 23:15:10 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-10-19 20:56:51 +00:00
|
|
|
static int override_release(char __user *release, size_t len)
|
2011-08-19 23:15:10 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (current->personality & UNAME26) {
|
2012-10-19 20:56:51 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *rest = UTS_RELEASE;
|
|
|
|
|
char buf[65] = { 0 };
|
2011-08-19 23:15:10 +00:00
|
|
|
int ndots = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned v;
|
2012-10-19 20:56:51 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t copy;
|
2011-08-19 23:15:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (*rest) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (*rest == '.' && ++ndots >= 3)
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!isdigit(*rest) && *rest != '.')
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
rest++;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-02-12 16:29:24 +00:00
|
|
|
v = LINUX_VERSION_PATCHLEVEL + 60;
|
2012-10-20 01:45:53 +00:00
|
|
|
copy = clamp_t(size_t, len, 1, sizeof(buf));
|
2012-10-19 20:56:51 +00:00
|
|
|
copy = scnprintf(buf, copy, "2.6.%u%s", v, rest);
|
|
|
|
|
ret = copy_to_user(release, buf, copy + 1);
|
2011-08-19 23:15:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-14 13:14:26 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(newuname, struct new_utsname __user *, name)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-06-25 16:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
struct new_utsname tmp;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
down_read(&uts_sem);
|
2018-06-25 16:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
memcpy(&tmp, utsname(), sizeof(tmp));
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
up_read(&uts_sem);
|
2018-06-25 16:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user(name, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
2010-03-10 23:21:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-06-25 16:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release)))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
if (override_architecture(name))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010-03-10 23:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_UNAME
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Old cruft
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uname, struct old_utsname __user *, name)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-06-25 16:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
struct old_utsname tmp;
|
2010-03-10 23:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!name)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
down_read(&uts_sem);
|
2018-06-25 16:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
memcpy(&tmp, utsname(), sizeof(tmp));
|
2010-03-10 23:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
up_read(&uts_sem);
|
2018-06-25 16:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user(name, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
2010-03-10 23:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-06-25 16:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release)))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
if (override_architecture(name))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2010-03-10 23:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(olduname, struct oldold_utsname __user *, name)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
2019-12-05 00:50:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct oldold_utsname tmp;
|
2010-03-10 23:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!name)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-12-05 00:50:53 +00:00
|
|
|
memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010-03-10 23:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
down_read(&uts_sem);
|
2018-06-25 16:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
memcpy(&tmp.sysname, &utsname()->sysname, __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&tmp.nodename, &utsname()->nodename, __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&tmp.release, &utsname()->release, __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&tmp.version, &utsname()->version, __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&tmp.machine, &utsname()->machine, __OLD_UTS_LEN);
|
2010-03-10 23:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
up_read(&uts_sem);
|
2018-06-25 16:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user(name, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
2010-03-10 23:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-06-25 16:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (override_architecture(name))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
if (override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release)))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2010-03-10 23:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-14 13:14:25 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int errno;
|
|
|
|
|
char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
|
|
|
|
|
|
2011-03-23 23:43:18 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
2011-03-23 23:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
errno = -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) {
|
2018-06-25 16:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
struct new_utsname *u;
|
2008-10-16 05:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-09-27 09:35:16 +00:00
|
|
|
add_device_randomness(tmp, len);
|
2018-06-25 16:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
down_write(&uts_sem);
|
|
|
|
|
u = utsname();
|
2008-10-16 05:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
memcpy(u->nodename, tmp, len);
|
|
|
|
|
memset(u->nodename + len, 0, sizeof(u->nodename) - len);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
errno = 0;
|
2012-05-31 23:26:07 +00:00
|
|
|
uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_HOSTNAME);
|
2018-06-25 16:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
up_write(&uts_sem);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return errno;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETHOSTNAME
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-14 13:14:25 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(gethostname, char __user *, name, int, len)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-06-25 16:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
2008-10-16 05:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
struct new_utsname *u;
|
2018-06-25 16:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN + 1];
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (len < 0)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
down_read(&uts_sem);
|
2008-10-16 05:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
u = utsname();
|
|
|
|
|
i = 1 + strlen(u->nodename);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (i > len)
|
|
|
|
|
i = len;
|
2018-06-25 16:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
memcpy(tmp, u->nodename, i);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
up_read(&uts_sem);
|
2018-06-25 16:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user(name, tmp, i))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Only setdomainname; getdomainname can be implemented by calling
|
|
|
|
|
* uname()
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-01-14 13:14:25 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setdomainname, char __user *, name, int, len)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int errno;
|
|
|
|
|
char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
|
|
|
|
|
|
2011-03-23 23:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
errno = -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) {
|
2018-06-25 16:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
struct new_utsname *u;
|
2008-10-16 05:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-09-27 09:35:16 +00:00
|
|
|
add_device_randomness(tmp, len);
|
2018-06-25 16:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
down_write(&uts_sem);
|
|
|
|
|
u = utsname();
|
2008-10-16 05:01:51 +00:00
|
|
|
memcpy(u->domainname, tmp, len);
|
|
|
|
|
memset(u->domainname + len, 0, sizeof(u->domainname) - len);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
errno = 0;
|
2012-05-31 23:26:07 +00:00
|
|
|
uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_DOMAINNAME);
|
2018-06-25 16:34:10 +00:00
|
|
|
up_write(&uts_sem);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return errno;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-01-06 17:20:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/* make sure you are allowed to change @tsk limits before calling this */
|
|
|
|
|
static int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource,
|
|
|
|
|
struct rlimit *new_rlim, struct rlimit *old_rlim)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct rlimit *rlim;
|
|
|
|
|
int retval = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2023-01-20 10:03:20 +00:00
|
|
|
resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-01-06 17:20:40 +00:00
|
|
|
if (new_rlim) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (new_rlim->rlim_cur > new_rlim->rlim_max)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE &&
|
|
|
|
|
new_rlim->rlim_max > sysctl_nr_open)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
prlimit: do not grab the tasklist_lock
Unnecessarily grabbing the tasklist_lock can be a scalability bottleneck
for workloads that also must grab the tasklist_lock for waiting,
killing, and cloning.
The tasklist_lock was grabbed to protect tsk->sighand from disappearing
(becoming NULL). tsk->signal was already protected by holding a
reference to tsk.
update_rlimit_cpu() assumed tsk->sighand != NULL. With this commit, it
attempts to lock_task_sighand(). However, this means that
update_rlimit_cpu() can fail. This only happens when a task is exiting.
Note that during exec, sighand may *change*, but it will not be NULL.
Prior to this commit, the do_prlimit() ensured that update_rlimit_cpu()
would not fail by read locking the tasklist_lock and checking tsk->sighand
!= NULL.
If update_rlimit_cpu() fails, there may be other tasks that are not
exiting that share tsk->signal. However, the group_leader is the last
task to be released, so if we cannot update_rlimit_cpu(group_leader),
then the entire process is exiting.
The only other caller of update_rlimit_cpu() is
selinux_bprm_committing_creds(). It has tsk == current, so
update_rlimit_cpu() cannot fail (current->sighand cannot disappear
until current exits).
This change resulted in a 14% speedup on a microbenchmark where parents
kill and wait on their children, and children getpriority, setpriority,
and getrlimit.
Signed-off-by: Barret Rhoden <brho@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220106172041.522167-4-brho@google.com
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2022-01-06 17:20:41 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Holding a refcount on tsk protects tsk->signal from disappearing. */
|
2022-01-06 17:20:40 +00:00
|
|
|
rlim = tsk->signal->rlim + resource;
|
|
|
|
|
task_lock(tsk->group_leader);
|
|
|
|
|
if (new_rlim) {
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Keep the capable check against init_user_ns until cgroups can
|
|
|
|
|
* contain all limits.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (new_rlim->rlim_max > rlim->rlim_max &&
|
|
|
|
|
!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
|
|
|
|
|
retval = -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!retval)
|
|
|
|
|
retval = security_task_setrlimit(tsk, resource, new_rlim);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if (!retval) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (old_rlim)
|
|
|
|
|
*old_rlim = *rlim;
|
|
|
|
|
if (new_rlim)
|
|
|
|
|
*rlim = *new_rlim;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
task_unlock(tsk->group_leader);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* RLIMIT_CPU handling. Arm the posix CPU timer if the limit is not
|
|
|
|
|
* infinite. In case of RLIM_INFINITY the posix CPU timer code
|
|
|
|
|
* ignores the rlimit.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (!retval && new_rlim && resource == RLIMIT_CPU &&
|
|
|
|
|
new_rlim->rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY &&
|
prlimit: do not grab the tasklist_lock
Unnecessarily grabbing the tasklist_lock can be a scalability bottleneck
for workloads that also must grab the tasklist_lock for waiting,
killing, and cloning.
The tasklist_lock was grabbed to protect tsk->sighand from disappearing
(becoming NULL). tsk->signal was already protected by holding a
reference to tsk.
update_rlimit_cpu() assumed tsk->sighand != NULL. With this commit, it
attempts to lock_task_sighand(). However, this means that
update_rlimit_cpu() can fail. This only happens when a task is exiting.
Note that during exec, sighand may *change*, but it will not be NULL.
Prior to this commit, the do_prlimit() ensured that update_rlimit_cpu()
would not fail by read locking the tasklist_lock and checking tsk->sighand
!= NULL.
If update_rlimit_cpu() fails, there may be other tasks that are not
exiting that share tsk->signal. However, the group_leader is the last
task to be released, so if we cannot update_rlimit_cpu(group_leader),
then the entire process is exiting.
The only other caller of update_rlimit_cpu() is
selinux_bprm_committing_creds(). It has tsk == current, so
update_rlimit_cpu() cannot fail (current->sighand cannot disappear
until current exits).
This change resulted in a 14% speedup on a microbenchmark where parents
kill and wait on their children, and children getpriority, setpriority,
and getrlimit.
Signed-off-by: Barret Rhoden <brho@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220106172041.522167-4-brho@google.com
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2022-01-06 17:20:41 +00:00
|
|
|
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) {
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* update_rlimit_cpu can fail if the task is exiting, but there
|
|
|
|
|
* may be other tasks in the thread group that are not exiting,
|
|
|
|
|
* and they need their cpu timers adjusted.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* The group_leader is the last task to be released, so if we
|
|
|
|
|
* cannot update_rlimit_cpu on it, then the entire process is
|
|
|
|
|
* exiting and we do not need to update at all.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
update_rlimit_cpu(tsk->group_leader, new_rlim->rlim_cur);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2022-01-06 17:20:40 +00:00
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-14 13:14:26 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2010-05-04 09:28:25 +00:00
|
|
|
struct rlimit value;
|
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = do_prlimit(current, resource, NULL, &value);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ret)
|
|
|
|
|
ret = copy_to_user(rlim, &value, sizeof(*rlim)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-31 08:33:51 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource,
|
|
|
|
|
struct compat_rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct rlimit r;
|
|
|
|
|
struct compat_rlimit r32;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&r32, rlim, sizeof(struct compat_rlimit)))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (r32.rlim_cur == COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY)
|
|
|
|
|
r.rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY;
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
r.rlim_cur = r32.rlim_cur;
|
|
|
|
|
if (r32.rlim_max == COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY)
|
|
|
|
|
r.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY;
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
r.rlim_max = r32.rlim_max;
|
|
|
|
|
return do_prlimit(current, resource, &r, NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource,
|
|
|
|
|
struct compat_rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct rlimit r;
|
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = do_prlimit(current, resource, NULL, &r);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ret) {
|
2017-07-12 03:59:45 +00:00
|
|
|
struct compat_rlimit r32;
|
2017-05-31 08:33:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if (r.rlim_cur > COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY)
|
|
|
|
|
r32.rlim_cur = COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY;
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
r32.rlim_cur = r.rlim_cur;
|
|
|
|
|
if (r.rlim_max > COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY)
|
|
|
|
|
r32.rlim_max = COMPAT_RLIM_INFINITY;
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
r32.rlim_max = r.rlim_max;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user(rlim, &r32, sizeof(struct compat_rlimit)))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Back compatibility for getrlimit. Needed for some apps.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-01-14 13:14:26 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource,
|
|
|
|
|
struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct rlimit x;
|
|
|
|
|
if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-25 21:47:57 +00:00
|
|
|
resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
task_lock(current->group_leader);
|
|
|
|
|
x = current->signal->rlim[resource];
|
|
|
|
|
task_unlock(current->group_leader);
|
2006-10-01 06:27:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (x.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
x.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF;
|
2006-10-01 06:27:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (x.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
x.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF;
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return copy_to_user(rlim, &x, sizeof(x)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-27 02:04:29 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
|
|
|
|
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource,
|
|
|
|
|
struct compat_rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct rlimit r;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-25 21:47:57 +00:00
|
|
|
resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
|
2017-05-27 02:04:29 +00:00
|
|
|
task_lock(current->group_leader);
|
|
|
|
|
r = current->signal->rlim[resource];
|
|
|
|
|
task_unlock(current->group_leader);
|
|
|
|
|
if (r.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF)
|
|
|
|
|
r.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF;
|
|
|
|
|
if (r.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF)
|
|
|
|
|
r.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (put_user(r.rlim_cur, &rlim->rlim_cur) ||
|
|
|
|
|
put_user(r.rlim_max, &rlim->rlim_max))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-04 16:03:50 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline bool rlim64_is_infinity(__u64 rlim64)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
#if BITS_PER_LONG < 64
|
|
|
|
|
return rlim64 >= ULONG_MAX;
|
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
|
return rlim64 == RLIM64_INFINITY;
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void rlim_to_rlim64(const struct rlimit *rlim, struct rlimit64 *rlim64)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if (rlim->rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY)
|
|
|
|
|
rlim64->rlim_cur = RLIM64_INFINITY;
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
rlim64->rlim_cur = rlim->rlim_cur;
|
|
|
|
|
if (rlim->rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY)
|
|
|
|
|
rlim64->rlim_max = RLIM64_INFINITY;
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
rlim64->rlim_max = rlim->rlim_max;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void rlim64_to_rlim(const struct rlimit64 *rlim64, struct rlimit *rlim)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_cur))
|
|
|
|
|
rlim->rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY;
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
rlim->rlim_cur = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_cur;
|
|
|
|
|
if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_max))
|
|
|
|
|
rlim->rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY;
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
rlim->rlim_max = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_max;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* rcu lock must be held */
|
prlimit,security,selinux: add a security hook for prlimit
When SELinux was first added to the kernel, a process could only get
and set its own resource limits via getrlimit(2) and setrlimit(2), so no
MAC checks were required for those operations, and thus no security hooks
were defined for them. Later, SELinux introduced a hook for setlimit(2)
with a check if the hard limit was being changed in order to be able to
rely on the hard limit value as a safe reset point upon context
transitions.
Later on, when prlimit(2) was added to the kernel with the ability to get
or set resource limits (hard or soft) of another process, LSM/SELinux was
not updated other than to pass the target process to the setrlimit hook.
This resulted in incomplete control over both getting and setting the
resource limits of another process.
Add a new security_task_prlimit() hook to the check_prlimit_permission()
function to provide complete mediation. The hook is only called when
acting on another task, and only if the existing DAC/capability checks
would allow access. Pass flags down to the hook to indicate whether the
prlimit(2) call will read, write, or both read and write the resource
limits of the target process.
The existing security_task_setrlimit() hook is left alone; it continues
to serve a purpose in supporting the ability to make decisions based on
the old and/or new resource limit values when setting limits. This
is consistent with the DAC/capability logic, where
check_prlimit_permission() performs generic DAC/capability checks for
acting on another task, while do_prlimit() performs a capability check
based on a comparison of the old and new resource limits. Fix the
inline documentation for the hook to match the code.
Implement the new hook for SELinux. For setting resource limits, we
reuse the existing setrlimit permission. Note that this does overload
the setrlimit permission to mean the ability to set the resource limit
(soft or hard) of another process or the ability to change one's own
hard limit. For getting resource limits, a new getrlimit permission
is defined. This was not originally defined since getrlimit(2) could
only be used to obtain a process' own limits.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-02-17 12:57:00 +00:00
|
|
|
static int check_prlimit_permission(struct task_struct *task,
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned int flags)
|
2010-05-04 16:03:50 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
|
prlimit,security,selinux: add a security hook for prlimit
When SELinux was first added to the kernel, a process could only get
and set its own resource limits via getrlimit(2) and setrlimit(2), so no
MAC checks were required for those operations, and thus no security hooks
were defined for them. Later, SELinux introduced a hook for setlimit(2)
with a check if the hard limit was being changed in order to be able to
rely on the hard limit value as a safe reset point upon context
transitions.
Later on, when prlimit(2) was added to the kernel with the ability to get
or set resource limits (hard or soft) of another process, LSM/SELinux was
not updated other than to pass the target process to the setrlimit hook.
This resulted in incomplete control over both getting and setting the
resource limits of another process.
Add a new security_task_prlimit() hook to the check_prlimit_permission()
function to provide complete mediation. The hook is only called when
acting on another task, and only if the existing DAC/capability checks
would allow access. Pass flags down to the hook to indicate whether the
prlimit(2) call will read, write, or both read and write the resource
limits of the target process.
The existing security_task_setrlimit() hook is left alone; it continues
to serve a purpose in supporting the ability to make decisions based on
the old and/or new resource limit values when setting limits. This
is consistent with the DAC/capability logic, where
check_prlimit_permission() performs generic DAC/capability checks for
acting on another task, while do_prlimit() performs a capability check
based on a comparison of the old and new resource limits. Fix the
inline documentation for the hook to match the code.
Implement the new hook for SELinux. For setting resource limits, we
reuse the existing setrlimit permission. Note that this does overload
the setrlimit permission to mean the ability to set the resource limit
(soft or hard) of another process or the ability to change one's own
hard limit. For getting resource limits, a new getrlimit permission
is defined. This was not originally defined since getrlimit(2) could
only be used to obtain a process' own limits.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-02-17 12:57:00 +00:00
|
|
|
bool id_match;
|
2010-05-04 16:03:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-03-23 23:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (current == task)
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2010-05-04 16:03:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-03-23 23:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
tcred = __task_cred(task);
|
prlimit,security,selinux: add a security hook for prlimit
When SELinux was first added to the kernel, a process could only get
and set its own resource limits via getrlimit(2) and setrlimit(2), so no
MAC checks were required for those operations, and thus no security hooks
were defined for them. Later, SELinux introduced a hook for setlimit(2)
with a check if the hard limit was being changed in order to be able to
rely on the hard limit value as a safe reset point upon context
transitions.
Later on, when prlimit(2) was added to the kernel with the ability to get
or set resource limits (hard or soft) of another process, LSM/SELinux was
not updated other than to pass the target process to the setrlimit hook.
This resulted in incomplete control over both getting and setting the
resource limits of another process.
Add a new security_task_prlimit() hook to the check_prlimit_permission()
function to provide complete mediation. The hook is only called when
acting on another task, and only if the existing DAC/capability checks
would allow access. Pass flags down to the hook to indicate whether the
prlimit(2) call will read, write, or both read and write the resource
limits of the target process.
The existing security_task_setrlimit() hook is left alone; it continues
to serve a purpose in supporting the ability to make decisions based on
the old and/or new resource limit values when setting limits. This
is consistent with the DAC/capability logic, where
check_prlimit_permission() performs generic DAC/capability checks for
acting on another task, while do_prlimit() performs a capability check
based on a comparison of the old and new resource limits. Fix the
inline documentation for the hook to match the code.
Implement the new hook for SELinux. For setting resource limits, we
reuse the existing setrlimit permission. Note that this does overload
the setrlimit permission to mean the ability to set the resource limit
(soft or hard) of another process or the ability to change one's own
hard limit. For getting resource limits, a new getrlimit permission
is defined. This was not originally defined since getrlimit(2) could
only be used to obtain a process' own limits.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-02-17 12:57:00 +00:00
|
|
|
id_match = (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) &&
|
|
|
|
|
uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) &&
|
|
|
|
|
uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) &&
|
|
|
|
|
gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) &&
|
|
|
|
|
gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) &&
|
|
|
|
|
gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid));
|
|
|
|
|
if (!id_match && !ns_capable(tcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
2011-03-23 23:43:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
prlimit,security,selinux: add a security hook for prlimit
When SELinux was first added to the kernel, a process could only get
and set its own resource limits via getrlimit(2) and setrlimit(2), so no
MAC checks were required for those operations, and thus no security hooks
were defined for them. Later, SELinux introduced a hook for setlimit(2)
with a check if the hard limit was being changed in order to be able to
rely on the hard limit value as a safe reset point upon context
transitions.
Later on, when prlimit(2) was added to the kernel with the ability to get
or set resource limits (hard or soft) of another process, LSM/SELinux was
not updated other than to pass the target process to the setrlimit hook.
This resulted in incomplete control over both getting and setting the
resource limits of another process.
Add a new security_task_prlimit() hook to the check_prlimit_permission()
function to provide complete mediation. The hook is only called when
acting on another task, and only if the existing DAC/capability checks
would allow access. Pass flags down to the hook to indicate whether the
prlimit(2) call will read, write, or both read and write the resource
limits of the target process.
The existing security_task_setrlimit() hook is left alone; it continues
to serve a purpose in supporting the ability to make decisions based on
the old and/or new resource limit values when setting limits. This
is consistent with the DAC/capability logic, where
check_prlimit_permission() performs generic DAC/capability checks for
acting on another task, while do_prlimit() performs a capability check
based on a comparison of the old and new resource limits. Fix the
inline documentation for the hook to match the code.
Implement the new hook for SELinux. For setting resource limits, we
reuse the existing setrlimit permission. Note that this does overload
the setrlimit permission to mean the ability to set the resource limit
(soft or hard) of another process or the ability to change one's own
hard limit. For getting resource limits, a new getrlimit permission
is defined. This was not originally defined since getrlimit(2) could
only be used to obtain a process' own limits.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-02-17 12:57:00 +00:00
|
|
|
return security_task_prlimit(cred, tcred, flags);
|
2010-05-04 16:03:50 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(prlimit64, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, resource,
|
|
|
|
|
const struct rlimit64 __user *, new_rlim,
|
|
|
|
|
struct rlimit64 __user *, old_rlim)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct rlimit64 old64, new64;
|
|
|
|
|
struct rlimit old, new;
|
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct *tsk;
|
prlimit,security,selinux: add a security hook for prlimit
When SELinux was first added to the kernel, a process could only get
and set its own resource limits via getrlimit(2) and setrlimit(2), so no
MAC checks were required for those operations, and thus no security hooks
were defined for them. Later, SELinux introduced a hook for setlimit(2)
with a check if the hard limit was being changed in order to be able to
rely on the hard limit value as a safe reset point upon context
transitions.
Later on, when prlimit(2) was added to the kernel with the ability to get
or set resource limits (hard or soft) of another process, LSM/SELinux was
not updated other than to pass the target process to the setrlimit hook.
This resulted in incomplete control over both getting and setting the
resource limits of another process.
Add a new security_task_prlimit() hook to the check_prlimit_permission()
function to provide complete mediation. The hook is only called when
acting on another task, and only if the existing DAC/capability checks
would allow access. Pass flags down to the hook to indicate whether the
prlimit(2) call will read, write, or both read and write the resource
limits of the target process.
The existing security_task_setrlimit() hook is left alone; it continues
to serve a purpose in supporting the ability to make decisions based on
the old and/or new resource limit values when setting limits. This
is consistent with the DAC/capability logic, where
check_prlimit_permission() performs generic DAC/capability checks for
acting on another task, while do_prlimit() performs a capability check
based on a comparison of the old and new resource limits. Fix the
inline documentation for the hook to match the code.
Implement the new hook for SELinux. For setting resource limits, we
reuse the existing setrlimit permission. Note that this does overload
the setrlimit permission to mean the ability to set the resource limit
(soft or hard) of another process or the ability to change one's own
hard limit. For getting resource limits, a new getrlimit permission
is defined. This was not originally defined since getrlimit(2) could
only be used to obtain a process' own limits.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-02-17 12:57:00 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int checkflags = 0;
|
2010-05-04 16:03:50 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
prlimit,security,selinux: add a security hook for prlimit
When SELinux was first added to the kernel, a process could only get
and set its own resource limits via getrlimit(2) and setrlimit(2), so no
MAC checks were required for those operations, and thus no security hooks
were defined for them. Later, SELinux introduced a hook for setlimit(2)
with a check if the hard limit was being changed in order to be able to
rely on the hard limit value as a safe reset point upon context
transitions.
Later on, when prlimit(2) was added to the kernel with the ability to get
or set resource limits (hard or soft) of another process, LSM/SELinux was
not updated other than to pass the target process to the setrlimit hook.
This resulted in incomplete control over both getting and setting the
resource limits of another process.
Add a new security_task_prlimit() hook to the check_prlimit_permission()
function to provide complete mediation. The hook is only called when
acting on another task, and only if the existing DAC/capability checks
would allow access. Pass flags down to the hook to indicate whether the
prlimit(2) call will read, write, or both read and write the resource
limits of the target process.
The existing security_task_setrlimit() hook is left alone; it continues
to serve a purpose in supporting the ability to make decisions based on
the old and/or new resource limit values when setting limits. This
is consistent with the DAC/capability logic, where
check_prlimit_permission() performs generic DAC/capability checks for
acting on another task, while do_prlimit() performs a capability check
based on a comparison of the old and new resource limits. Fix the
inline documentation for the hook to match the code.
Implement the new hook for SELinux. For setting resource limits, we
reuse the existing setrlimit permission. Note that this does overload
the setrlimit permission to mean the ability to set the resource limit
(soft or hard) of another process or the ability to change one's own
hard limit. For getting resource limits, a new getrlimit permission
is defined. This was not originally defined since getrlimit(2) could
only be used to obtain a process' own limits.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-02-17 12:57:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (old_rlim)
|
|
|
|
|
checkflags |= LSM_PRLIMIT_READ;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-04 16:03:50 +00:00
|
|
|
if (new_rlim) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&new64, new_rlim, sizeof(new64)))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
rlim64_to_rlim(&new64, &new);
|
prlimit,security,selinux: add a security hook for prlimit
When SELinux was first added to the kernel, a process could only get
and set its own resource limits via getrlimit(2) and setrlimit(2), so no
MAC checks were required for those operations, and thus no security hooks
were defined for them. Later, SELinux introduced a hook for setlimit(2)
with a check if the hard limit was being changed in order to be able to
rely on the hard limit value as a safe reset point upon context
transitions.
Later on, when prlimit(2) was added to the kernel with the ability to get
or set resource limits (hard or soft) of another process, LSM/SELinux was
not updated other than to pass the target process to the setrlimit hook.
This resulted in incomplete control over both getting and setting the
resource limits of another process.
Add a new security_task_prlimit() hook to the check_prlimit_permission()
function to provide complete mediation. The hook is only called when
acting on another task, and only if the existing DAC/capability checks
would allow access. Pass flags down to the hook to indicate whether the
prlimit(2) call will read, write, or both read and write the resource
limits of the target process.
The existing security_task_setrlimit() hook is left alone; it continues
to serve a purpose in supporting the ability to make decisions based on
the old and/or new resource limit values when setting limits. This
is consistent with the DAC/capability logic, where
check_prlimit_permission() performs generic DAC/capability checks for
acting on another task, while do_prlimit() performs a capability check
based on a comparison of the old and new resource limits. Fix the
inline documentation for the hook to match the code.
Implement the new hook for SELinux. For setting resource limits, we
reuse the existing setrlimit permission. Note that this does overload
the setrlimit permission to mean the ability to set the resource limit
(soft or hard) of another process or the ability to change one's own
hard limit. For getting resource limits, a new getrlimit permission
is defined. This was not originally defined since getrlimit(2) could
only be used to obtain a process' own limits.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-02-17 12:57:00 +00:00
|
|
|
checkflags |= LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE;
|
2010-05-04 16:03:50 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
|
|
tsk = pid ? find_task_by_vpid(pid) : current;
|
|
|
|
|
if (!tsk) {
|
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
|
return -ESRCH;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
prlimit,security,selinux: add a security hook for prlimit
When SELinux was first added to the kernel, a process could only get
and set its own resource limits via getrlimit(2) and setrlimit(2), so no
MAC checks were required for those operations, and thus no security hooks
were defined for them. Later, SELinux introduced a hook for setlimit(2)
with a check if the hard limit was being changed in order to be able to
rely on the hard limit value as a safe reset point upon context
transitions.
Later on, when prlimit(2) was added to the kernel with the ability to get
or set resource limits (hard or soft) of another process, LSM/SELinux was
not updated other than to pass the target process to the setrlimit hook.
This resulted in incomplete control over both getting and setting the
resource limits of another process.
Add a new security_task_prlimit() hook to the check_prlimit_permission()
function to provide complete mediation. The hook is only called when
acting on another task, and only if the existing DAC/capability checks
would allow access. Pass flags down to the hook to indicate whether the
prlimit(2) call will read, write, or both read and write the resource
limits of the target process.
The existing security_task_setrlimit() hook is left alone; it continues
to serve a purpose in supporting the ability to make decisions based on
the old and/or new resource limit values when setting limits. This
is consistent with the DAC/capability logic, where
check_prlimit_permission() performs generic DAC/capability checks for
acting on another task, while do_prlimit() performs a capability check
based on a comparison of the old and new resource limits. Fix the
inline documentation for the hook to match the code.
Implement the new hook for SELinux. For setting resource limits, we
reuse the existing setrlimit permission. Note that this does overload
the setrlimit permission to mean the ability to set the resource limit
(soft or hard) of another process or the ability to change one's own
hard limit. For getting resource limits, a new getrlimit permission
is defined. This was not originally defined since getrlimit(2) could
only be used to obtain a process' own limits.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-02-17 12:57:00 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = check_prlimit_permission(tsk, checkflags);
|
2010-05-04 16:03:50 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
get_task_struct(tsk);
|
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = do_prlimit(tsk, resource, new_rlim ? &new : NULL,
|
|
|
|
|
old_rlim ? &old : NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ret && old_rlim) {
|
|
|
|
|
rlim_to_rlim64(&old, &old64);
|
|
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user(old_rlim, &old64, sizeof(old64)))
|
|
|
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
put_task_struct(tsk);
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009-08-26 21:45:34 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct rlimit new_rlim;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim)))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
2010-03-24 15:11:29 +00:00
|
|
|
return do_prlimit(current, resource, &new_rlim, NULL);
|
2009-08-26 21:45:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* It would make sense to put struct rusage in the task_struct,
|
|
|
|
|
* except that would make the task_struct be *really big*. After
|
|
|
|
|
* task_struct gets moved into malloc'ed memory, it would
|
|
|
|
|
* make sense to do this. It will make moving the rest of the information
|
|
|
|
|
* a lot simpler! (Which we're not doing right now because we're not
|
|
|
|
|
* measuring them yet).
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* When sampling multiple threads for RUSAGE_SELF, under SMP we might have
|
|
|
|
|
* races with threads incrementing their own counters. But since word
|
|
|
|
|
* reads are atomic, we either get new values or old values and we don't
|
|
|
|
|
* care which for the sums. We always take the siglock to protect reading
|
|
|
|
|
* the c* fields from p->signal from races with exit.c updating those
|
|
|
|
|
* fields when reaping, so a sample either gets all the additions of a
|
|
|
|
|
* given child after it's reaped, or none so this sample is before reaping.
|
2006-03-23 11:00:13 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2006-06-22 21:47:26 +00:00
|
|
|
* Locking:
|
|
|
|
|
* We need to take the siglock for CHILDEREN, SELF and BOTH
|
|
|
|
|
* for the cases current multithreaded, non-current single threaded
|
|
|
|
|
* non-current multithreaded. Thread traversal is now safe with
|
|
|
|
|
* the siglock held.
|
|
|
|
|
* Strictly speaking, we donot need to take the siglock if we are current and
|
|
|
|
|
* single threaded, as no one else can take our signal_struct away, no one
|
|
|
|
|
* else can reap the children to update signal->c* counters, and no one else
|
|
|
|
|
* can race with the signal-> fields. If we do not take any lock, the
|
|
|
|
|
* signal-> fields could be read out of order while another thread was just
|
|
|
|
|
* exiting. So we should place a read memory barrier when we avoid the lock.
|
|
|
|
|
* On the writer side, write memory barrier is implied in __exit_signal
|
|
|
|
|
* as __exit_signal releases the siglock spinlock after updating the signal->
|
|
|
|
|
* fields. But we don't do this yet to keep things simple.
|
2006-03-23 11:00:13 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
timers: fix itimer/many thread hang
Overview
This patch reworks the handling of POSIX CPU timers, including the
ITIMER_PROF, ITIMER_VIRT timers and rlimit handling. It was put together
with the help of Roland McGrath, the owner and original writer of this code.
The problem we ran into, and the reason for this rework, has to do with using
a profiling timer in a process with a large number of threads. It appears
that the performance of the old implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() was
at least O(n*3) (where "n" is the number of threads in a process) or worse.
Everything is fine with an increasing number of threads until the time taken
for that routine to run becomes the same as or greater than the tick time, at
which point things degrade rather quickly.
This patch fixes bug 9906, "Weird hang with NPTL and SIGPROF."
Code Changes
This rework corrects the implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() to make it
run in constant time for a particular machine. (Performance may vary between
one machine and another depending upon whether the kernel is built as single-
or multiprocessor and, in the latter case, depending upon the number of
running processors.) To do this, at each tick we now update fields in
signal_struct as well as task_struct. The run_posix_cpu_timers() function
uses those fields to make its decisions.
We define a new structure, "task_cputime," to contain user, system and
scheduler times and use these in appropriate places:
struct task_cputime {
cputime_t utime;
cputime_t stime;
unsigned long long sum_exec_runtime;
};
This is included in the structure "thread_group_cputime," which is a new
substructure of signal_struct and which varies for uniprocessor versus
multiprocessor kernels. For uniprocessor kernels, it uses "task_cputime" as
a simple substructure, while for multiprocessor kernels it is a pointer:
struct thread_group_cputime {
struct task_cputime totals;
};
struct thread_group_cputime {
struct task_cputime *totals;
};
We also add a new task_cputime substructure directly to signal_struct, to
cache the earliest expiration of process-wide timers, and task_cputime also
replaces the it_*_expires fields of task_struct (used for earliest expiration
of thread timers). The "thread_group_cputime" structure contains process-wide
timers that are updated via account_user_time() and friends. In the non-SMP
case the structure is a simple aggregator; unfortunately in the SMP case that
simplicity was not achievable due to cache-line contention between CPUs (in
one measured case performance was actually _worse_ on a 16-cpu system than
the same test on a 4-cpu system, due to this contention). For SMP, the
thread_group_cputime counters are maintained as a per-cpu structure allocated
using alloc_percpu(). The timer functions update only the timer field in
the structure corresponding to the running CPU, obtained using per_cpu_ptr().
We define a set of inline functions in sched.h that we use to maintain the
thread_group_cputime structure and hide the differences between UP and SMP
implementations from the rest of the kernel. The thread_group_cputime_init()
function initializes the thread_group_cputime structure for the given task.
The thread_group_cputime_alloc() is a no-op for UP; for SMP it calls the
out-of-line function thread_group_cputime_alloc_smp() to allocate and fill
in the per-cpu structures and fields. The thread_group_cputime_free()
function, also a no-op for UP, in SMP frees the per-cpu structures. The
thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() function (also a UP no-op) for SMP calls
thread_group_cputime_alloc() if the per-cpu structures haven't yet been
allocated. The thread_group_cputime() function fills the task_cputime
structure it is passed with the contents of the thread_group_cputime fields;
in UP it's that simple but in SMP it must also safely check that tsk->signal
is non-NULL (if it is it just uses the appropriate fields of task_struct) and,
if so, sums the per-cpu values for each online CPU. Finally, the three
functions account_group_user_time(), account_group_system_time() and
account_group_exec_runtime() are used by timer functions to update the
respective fields of the thread_group_cputime structure.
Non-SMP operation is trivial and will not be mentioned further.
The per-cpu structure is always allocated when a task creates its first new
thread, via a call to thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() from copy_signal().
It is freed at process exit via a call to thread_group_cputime_free() from
cleanup_signal().
All functions that formerly summed utime/stime/sum_sched_runtime values from
from all threads in the thread group now use thread_group_cputime() to
snapshot the values in the thread_group_cputime structure or the values in
the task structure itself if the per-cpu structure hasn't been allocated.
Finally, the code in kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c has changed quite a bit.
The run_posix_cpu_timers() function has been split into a fast path and a
slow path; the former safely checks whether there are any expired thread
timers and, if not, just returns, while the slow path does the heavy lifting.
With the dedicated thread group fields, timers are no longer "rebalanced" and
the process_timer_rebalance() function and related code has gone away. All
summing loops are gone and all code that used them now uses the
thread_group_cputime() inline. When process-wide timers are set, the new
task_cputime structure in signal_struct is used to cache the earliest
expiration; this is checked in the fast path.
Performance
The fix appears not to add significant overhead to existing operations. It
generally performs the same as the current code except in two cases, one in
which it performs slightly worse (Case 5 below) and one in which it performs
very significantly better (Case 2 below). Overall it's a wash except in those
two cases.
I've since done somewhat more involved testing on a dual-core Opteron system.
Case 1: With no itimer running, for a test with 100,000 threads, the fixed
kernel took 1428.5 seconds, 513 seconds more than the unfixed system,
all of which was spent in the system. There were twice as many
voluntary context switches with the fix as without it.
Case 2: With an itimer running at .01 second ticks and 4000 threads (the most
an unmodified kernel can handle), the fixed kernel ran the test in
eight percent of the time (5.8 seconds as opposed to 70 seconds) and
had better tick accuracy (.012 seconds per tick as opposed to .023
seconds per tick).
Case 3: A 4000-thread test with an initial timer tick of .01 second and an
interval of 10,000 seconds (i.e. a timer that ticks only once) had
very nearly the same performance in both cases: 6.3 seconds elapsed
for the fixed kernel versus 5.5 seconds for the unfixed kernel.
With fewer threads (eight in these tests), the Case 1 test ran in essentially
the same time on both the modified and unmodified kernels (5.2 seconds versus
5.8 seconds). The Case 2 test ran in about the same time as well, 5.9 seconds
versus 5.4 seconds but again with much better tick accuracy, .013 seconds per
tick versus .025 seconds per tick for the unmodified kernel.
Since the fix affected the rlimit code, I also tested soft and hard CPU limits.
Case 4: With a hard CPU limit of 20 seconds and eight threads (and an itimer
running), the modified kernel was very slightly favored in that while
it killed the process in 19.997 seconds of CPU time (5.002 seconds of
wall time), only .003 seconds of that was system time, the rest was
user time. The unmodified kernel killed the process in 20.001 seconds
of CPU (5.014 seconds of wall time) of which .016 seconds was system
time. Really, though, the results were too close to call. The results
were essentially the same with no itimer running.
Case 5: With a soft limit of 20 seconds and a hard limit of 2000 seconds
(where the hard limit would never be reached) and an itimer running,
the modified kernel exhibited worse tick accuracy than the unmodified
kernel: .050 seconds/tick versus .028 seconds/tick. Otherwise,
performance was almost indistinguishable. With no itimer running this
test exhibited virtually identical behavior and times in both cases.
In times past I did some limited performance testing. those results are below.
On a four-cpu Opteron system without this fix, a sixteen-thread test executed
in 3569.991 seconds, of which user was 3568.435s and system was 1.556s. On
the same system with the fix, user and elapsed time were about the same, but
system time dropped to 0.007 seconds. Performance with eight, four and one
thread were comparable. Interestingly, the timer ticks with the fix seemed
more accurate: The sixteen-thread test with the fix received 149543 ticks
for 0.024 seconds per tick, while the same test without the fix received 58720
for 0.061 seconds per tick. Both cases were configured for an interval of
0.01 seconds. Again, the other tests were comparable. Each thread in this
test computed the primes up to 25,000,000.
I also did a test with a large number of threads, 100,000 threads, which is
impossible without the fix. In this case each thread computed the primes only
up to 10,000 (to make the runtime manageable). System time dominated, at
1546.968 seconds out of a total 2176.906 seconds (giving a user time of
629.938s). It received 147651 ticks for 0.015 seconds per tick, still quite
accurate. There is obviously no comparable test without the fix.
Signed-off-by: Frank Mayhar <fmayhar@google.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-09-12 16:54:39 +00:00
|
|
|
static void accumulate_thread_rusage(struct task_struct *t, struct rusage *r)
|
2008-04-29 07:58:42 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
r->ru_nvcsw += t->nvcsw;
|
|
|
|
|
r->ru_nivcsw += t->nivcsw;
|
|
|
|
|
r->ru_minflt += t->min_flt;
|
|
|
|
|
r->ru_majflt += t->maj_flt;
|
|
|
|
|
r->ru_inblock += task_io_get_inblock(t);
|
|
|
|
|
r->ru_oublock += task_io_get_oublock(t);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-15 00:25:02 +00:00
|
|
|
void getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct *t;
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long flags;
|
2017-01-31 03:09:23 +00:00
|
|
|
u64 tgutime, tgstime, utime, stime;
|
2024-01-22 15:50:50 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long maxrss;
|
|
|
|
|
struct mm_struct *mm;
|
2023-09-09 17:25:54 +00:00
|
|
|
struct signal_struct *sig = p->signal;
|
2024-01-22 15:50:53 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int seq = 0;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2024-01-22 15:50:53 +00:00
|
|
|
retry:
|
2024-01-22 15:50:50 +00:00
|
|
|
memset(r, 0, sizeof(*r));
|
2011-12-15 13:56:09 +00:00
|
|
|
utime = stime = 0;
|
2024-01-22 15:50:50 +00:00
|
|
|
maxrss = 0;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-29 07:58:42 +00:00
|
|
|
if (who == RUSAGE_THREAD) {
|
2012-11-21 15:26:44 +00:00
|
|
|
task_cputime_adjusted(current, &utime, &stime);
|
timers: fix itimer/many thread hang
Overview
This patch reworks the handling of POSIX CPU timers, including the
ITIMER_PROF, ITIMER_VIRT timers and rlimit handling. It was put together
with the help of Roland McGrath, the owner and original writer of this code.
The problem we ran into, and the reason for this rework, has to do with using
a profiling timer in a process with a large number of threads. It appears
that the performance of the old implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() was
at least O(n*3) (where "n" is the number of threads in a process) or worse.
Everything is fine with an increasing number of threads until the time taken
for that routine to run becomes the same as or greater than the tick time, at
which point things degrade rather quickly.
This patch fixes bug 9906, "Weird hang with NPTL and SIGPROF."
Code Changes
This rework corrects the implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() to make it
run in constant time for a particular machine. (Performance may vary between
one machine and another depending upon whether the kernel is built as single-
or multiprocessor and, in the latter case, depending upon the number of
running processors.) To do this, at each tick we now update fields in
signal_struct as well as task_struct. The run_posix_cpu_timers() function
uses those fields to make its decisions.
We define a new structure, "task_cputime," to contain user, system and
scheduler times and use these in appropriate places:
struct task_cputime {
cputime_t utime;
cputime_t stime;
unsigned long long sum_exec_runtime;
};
This is included in the structure "thread_group_cputime," which is a new
substructure of signal_struct and which varies for uniprocessor versus
multiprocessor kernels. For uniprocessor kernels, it uses "task_cputime" as
a simple substructure, while for multiprocessor kernels it is a pointer:
struct thread_group_cputime {
struct task_cputime totals;
};
struct thread_group_cputime {
struct task_cputime *totals;
};
We also add a new task_cputime substructure directly to signal_struct, to
cache the earliest expiration of process-wide timers, and task_cputime also
replaces the it_*_expires fields of task_struct (used for earliest expiration
of thread timers). The "thread_group_cputime" structure contains process-wide
timers that are updated via account_user_time() and friends. In the non-SMP
case the structure is a simple aggregator; unfortunately in the SMP case that
simplicity was not achievable due to cache-line contention between CPUs (in
one measured case performance was actually _worse_ on a 16-cpu system than
the same test on a 4-cpu system, due to this contention). For SMP, the
thread_group_cputime counters are maintained as a per-cpu structure allocated
using alloc_percpu(). The timer functions update only the timer field in
the structure corresponding to the running CPU, obtained using per_cpu_ptr().
We define a set of inline functions in sched.h that we use to maintain the
thread_group_cputime structure and hide the differences between UP and SMP
implementations from the rest of the kernel. The thread_group_cputime_init()
function initializes the thread_group_cputime structure for the given task.
The thread_group_cputime_alloc() is a no-op for UP; for SMP it calls the
out-of-line function thread_group_cputime_alloc_smp() to allocate and fill
in the per-cpu structures and fields. The thread_group_cputime_free()
function, also a no-op for UP, in SMP frees the per-cpu structures. The
thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() function (also a UP no-op) for SMP calls
thread_group_cputime_alloc() if the per-cpu structures haven't yet been
allocated. The thread_group_cputime() function fills the task_cputime
structure it is passed with the contents of the thread_group_cputime fields;
in UP it's that simple but in SMP it must also safely check that tsk->signal
is non-NULL (if it is it just uses the appropriate fields of task_struct) and,
if so, sums the per-cpu values for each online CPU. Finally, the three
functions account_group_user_time(), account_group_system_time() and
account_group_exec_runtime() are used by timer functions to update the
respective fields of the thread_group_cputime structure.
Non-SMP operation is trivial and will not be mentioned further.
The per-cpu structure is always allocated when a task creates its first new
thread, via a call to thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() from copy_signal().
It is freed at process exit via a call to thread_group_cputime_free() from
cleanup_signal().
All functions that formerly summed utime/stime/sum_sched_runtime values from
from all threads in the thread group now use thread_group_cputime() to
snapshot the values in the thread_group_cputime structure or the values in
the task structure itself if the per-cpu structure hasn't been allocated.
Finally, the code in kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c has changed quite a bit.
The run_posix_cpu_timers() function has been split into a fast path and a
slow path; the former safely checks whether there are any expired thread
timers and, if not, just returns, while the slow path does the heavy lifting.
With the dedicated thread group fields, timers are no longer "rebalanced" and
the process_timer_rebalance() function and related code has gone away. All
summing loops are gone and all code that used them now uses the
thread_group_cputime() inline. When process-wide timers are set, the new
task_cputime structure in signal_struct is used to cache the earliest
expiration; this is checked in the fast path.
Performance
The fix appears not to add significant overhead to existing operations. It
generally performs the same as the current code except in two cases, one in
which it performs slightly worse (Case 5 below) and one in which it performs
very significantly better (Case 2 below). Overall it's a wash except in those
two cases.
I've since done somewhat more involved testing on a dual-core Opteron system.
Case 1: With no itimer running, for a test with 100,000 threads, the fixed
kernel took 1428.5 seconds, 513 seconds more than the unfixed system,
all of which was spent in the system. There were twice as many
voluntary context switches with the fix as without it.
Case 2: With an itimer running at .01 second ticks and 4000 threads (the most
an unmodified kernel can handle), the fixed kernel ran the test in
eight percent of the time (5.8 seconds as opposed to 70 seconds) and
had better tick accuracy (.012 seconds per tick as opposed to .023
seconds per tick).
Case 3: A 4000-thread test with an initial timer tick of .01 second and an
interval of 10,000 seconds (i.e. a timer that ticks only once) had
very nearly the same performance in both cases: 6.3 seconds elapsed
for the fixed kernel versus 5.5 seconds for the unfixed kernel.
With fewer threads (eight in these tests), the Case 1 test ran in essentially
the same time on both the modified and unmodified kernels (5.2 seconds versus
5.8 seconds). The Case 2 test ran in about the same time as well, 5.9 seconds
versus 5.4 seconds but again with much better tick accuracy, .013 seconds per
tick versus .025 seconds per tick for the unmodified kernel.
Since the fix affected the rlimit code, I also tested soft and hard CPU limits.
Case 4: With a hard CPU limit of 20 seconds and eight threads (and an itimer
running), the modified kernel was very slightly favored in that while
it killed the process in 19.997 seconds of CPU time (5.002 seconds of
wall time), only .003 seconds of that was system time, the rest was
user time. The unmodified kernel killed the process in 20.001 seconds
of CPU (5.014 seconds of wall time) of which .016 seconds was system
time. Really, though, the results were too close to call. The results
were essentially the same with no itimer running.
Case 5: With a soft limit of 20 seconds and a hard limit of 2000 seconds
(where the hard limit would never be reached) and an itimer running,
the modified kernel exhibited worse tick accuracy than the unmodified
kernel: .050 seconds/tick versus .028 seconds/tick. Otherwise,
performance was almost indistinguishable. With no itimer running this
test exhibited virtually identical behavior and times in both cases.
In times past I did some limited performance testing. those results are below.
On a four-cpu Opteron system without this fix, a sixteen-thread test executed
in 3569.991 seconds, of which user was 3568.435s and system was 1.556s. On
the same system with the fix, user and elapsed time were about the same, but
system time dropped to 0.007 seconds. Performance with eight, four and one
thread were comparable. Interestingly, the timer ticks with the fix seemed
more accurate: The sixteen-thread test with the fix received 149543 ticks
for 0.024 seconds per tick, while the same test without the fix received 58720
for 0.061 seconds per tick. Both cases were configured for an interval of
0.01 seconds. Again, the other tests were comparable. Each thread in this
test computed the primes up to 25,000,000.
I also did a test with a large number of threads, 100,000 threads, which is
impossible without the fix. In this case each thread computed the primes only
up to 10,000 (to make the runtime manageable). System time dominated, at
1546.968 seconds out of a total 2176.906 seconds (giving a user time of
629.938s). It received 147651 ticks for 0.015 seconds per tick, still quite
accurate. There is obviously no comparable test without the fix.
Signed-off-by: Frank Mayhar <fmayhar@google.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-09-12 16:54:39 +00:00
|
|
|
accumulate_thread_rusage(p, r);
|
2023-09-09 17:25:54 +00:00
|
|
|
maxrss = sig->maxrss;
|
2024-01-22 15:50:50 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out_thread;
|
2008-04-29 07:58:42 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2024-01-22 15:50:53 +00:00
|
|
|
flags = read_seqbegin_or_lock_irqsave(&sig->stats_lock, &seq);
|
2006-01-08 09:05:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (who) {
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
case RUSAGE_BOTH:
|
|
|
|
|
case RUSAGE_CHILDREN:
|
2023-09-09 17:25:54 +00:00
|
|
|
utime = sig->cutime;
|
|
|
|
|
stime = sig->cstime;
|
|
|
|
|
r->ru_nvcsw = sig->cnvcsw;
|
|
|
|
|
r->ru_nivcsw = sig->cnivcsw;
|
|
|
|
|
r->ru_minflt = sig->cmin_flt;
|
|
|
|
|
r->ru_majflt = sig->cmaj_flt;
|
|
|
|
|
r->ru_inblock = sig->cinblock;
|
|
|
|
|
r->ru_oublock = sig->coublock;
|
|
|
|
|
maxrss = sig->cmaxrss;
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2020-08-23 22:36:59 +00:00
|
|
|
fallthrough;
|
2006-01-08 09:05:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
case RUSAGE_SELF:
|
2023-09-09 17:25:54 +00:00
|
|
|
r->ru_nvcsw += sig->nvcsw;
|
|
|
|
|
r->ru_nivcsw += sig->nivcsw;
|
|
|
|
|
r->ru_minflt += sig->min_flt;
|
|
|
|
|
r->ru_majflt += sig->maj_flt;
|
|
|
|
|
r->ru_inblock += sig->inblock;
|
|
|
|
|
r->ru_oublock += sig->oublock;
|
|
|
|
|
if (maxrss < sig->maxrss)
|
|
|
|
|
maxrss = sig->maxrss;
|
2024-01-22 15:50:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
2023-09-09 17:26:29 +00:00
|
|
|
__for_each_thread(sig, t)
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
accumulate_thread_rusage(t, r);
|
2024-01-22 15:50:53 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
|
BUG();
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2024-01-22 15:50:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (need_seqretry(&sig->stats_lock, seq)) {
|
|
|
|
|
seq = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
done_seqretry_irqrestore(&sig->stats_lock, seq, flags);
|
2006-06-22 21:47:26 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2024-01-22 15:50:50 +00:00
|
|
|
if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN)
|
|
|
|
|
goto out_children;
|
getrusage: fill ru_maxrss value
Make ->ru_maxrss value in struct rusage filled accordingly to rss hiwater
mark. This struct is filled as a parameter to getrusage syscall.
->ru_maxrss value is set to KBs which is the way it is done in BSD
systems. /usr/bin/time (gnu time) application converts ->ru_maxrss to KBs
which seems to be incorrect behavior. Maintainer of this util was
notified by me with the patch which corrects it and cc'ed.
To make this happen we extend struct signal_struct by two fields. The
first one is ->maxrss which we use to store rss hiwater of the task. The
second one is ->cmaxrss which we use to store highest rss hiwater of all
task childs. These values are used in k_getrusage() to actually fill
->ru_maxrss. k_getrusage() uses current rss hiwater value directly if mm
struct exists.
Note:
exec() clear mm->hiwater_rss, but doesn't clear sig->maxrss.
it is intetionally behavior. *BSD getrusage have exec() inheriting.
test programs
========================================================
getrusage.c
===========
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include "common.h"
#define err(str) perror(str), exit(1)
int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
int status;
printf("allocate 100MB\n");
consume(100);
printf("testcase1: fork inherit? \n");
printf(" expect: initial.self ~= child.self\n");
show_rusage("initial");
if (__fork()) {
wait(&status);
} else {
show_rusage("fork child");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
printf("testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.) \n");
printf(" expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0\n");
show_rusage("initial");
if (__fork()) {
wait(&status);
} else {
show_rusage("child");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
printf("testcase3: fork + malloc \n");
printf(" expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB\n");
show_rusage("initial");
if (__fork()) {
wait(&status);
} else {
printf("allocate +50MB\n");
consume(50);
show_rusage("fork child");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
printf("testcase4: grandchild maxrss\n");
printf(" expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB\n");
show_rusage("initial");
if (__fork()) {
wait(&status);
show_rusage("post_wait");
} else {
system("./child -n 0 -g 300");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
printf("testcase5: zombie\n");
printf(" expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted.\n");
printf(" post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss. \n");
show_rusage("initial");
if (__fork()) {
sleep(1); /* children become zombie */
show_rusage("pre_wait");
wait(&status);
show_rusage("post_wait");
} else {
system("./child -n 400");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
printf("testcase6: SIG_IGN\n");
printf(" expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored).\n");
show_rusage("initial");
signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN);
if (__fork()) {
sleep(1); /* children become zombie */
show_rusage("after_zombie");
} else {
system("./child -n 500");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
printf("testcase7: exec (without fork) \n");
printf(" expect: initial ~= exec \n");
show_rusage("initial");
execl("./child", "child", "-v", NULL);
return 0;
}
child.c
=======
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include "common.h"
int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
int status;
int c;
long consume_size = 0;
long grandchild_consume_size = 0;
int show = 0;
while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "n:g:v")) != -1) {
switch (c) {
case 'n':
consume_size = atol(optarg);
break;
case 'v':
show = 1;
break;
case 'g':
grandchild_consume_size = atol(optarg);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (show)
show_rusage("exec");
if (consume_size) {
printf("child alloc %ldMB\n", consume_size);
consume(consume_size);
}
if (grandchild_consume_size) {
if (fork()) {
wait(&status);
} else {
printf("grandchild alloc %ldMB\n", grandchild_consume_size);
consume(grandchild_consume_size);
exit(0);
}
}
return 0;
}
common.c
========
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include "common.h"
#define err(str) perror(str), exit(1)
void show_rusage(char *prefix)
{
int err, err2;
struct rusage rusage_self;
struct rusage rusage_children;
printf("%s: ", prefix);
err = getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rusage_self);
if (!err)
printf("self %ld ", rusage_self.ru_maxrss);
err2 = getrusage(RUSAGE_CHILDREN, &rusage_children);
if (!err2)
printf("children %ld ", rusage_children.ru_maxrss);
printf("\n");
}
/* Some buggy OS need this worthless CPU waste. */
void make_pagefault(void)
{
void *addr;
int size = getpagesize();
int i;
for (i=0; i<1000; i++) {
addr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0);
if (addr == MAP_FAILED)
err("make_pagefault");
memset(addr, 0, size);
munmap(addr, size);
}
}
void consume(int mega)
{
size_t sz = mega * 1024 * 1024;
void *ptr;
ptr = malloc(sz);
memset(ptr, 0, sz);
make_pagefault();
}
pid_t __fork(void)
{
pid_t pid;
pid = fork();
make_pagefault();
return pid;
}
common.h
========
void show_rusage(char *prefix);
void make_pagefault(void);
void consume(int mega);
pid_t __fork(void);
FreeBSD result (expected result)
========================================================
allocate 100MB
testcase1: fork inherit?
expect: initial.self ~= child.self
initial: self 103492 children 0
fork child: self 103540 children 0
testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.)
expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0
initial: self 103540 children 103540
child: self 103564 children 0
testcase3: fork + malloc
expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB
initial: self 103564 children 103564
allocate +50MB
fork child: self 154860 children 0
testcase4: grandchild maxrss
expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB
initial: self 103564 children 154860
grandchild alloc 300MB
post_wait: self 103564 children 308720
testcase5: zombie
expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted.
post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss.
initial: self 103564 children 308720
child alloc 400MB
pre_wait: self 103564 children 308720
post_wait: self 103564 children 411312
testcase6: SIG_IGN
expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored).
initial: self 103564 children 411312
child alloc 500MB
after_zombie: self 103624 children 411312
testcase7: exec (without fork)
expect: initial ~= exec
initial: self 103624 children 411312
exec: self 103624 children 411312
Linux result (actual test result)
========================================================
allocate 100MB
testcase1: fork inherit?
expect: initial.self ~= child.self
initial: self 102848 children 0
fork child: self 102572 children 0
testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.)
expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0
initial: self 102876 children 102644
child: self 102572 children 0
testcase3: fork + malloc
expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB
initial: self 102876 children 102644
allocate +50MB
fork child: self 153804 children 0
testcase4: grandchild maxrss
expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB
initial: self 102876 children 153864
grandchild alloc 300MB
post_wait: self 102876 children 307536
testcase5: zombie
expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted.
post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss.
initial: self 102876 children 307536
child alloc 400MB
pre_wait: self 102876 children 307536
post_wait: self 102876 children 410076
testcase6: SIG_IGN
expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored).
initial: self 102876 children 410076
child alloc 500MB
after_zombie: self 102880 children 410076
testcase7: exec (without fork)
expect: initial ~= exec
initial: self 102880 children 410076
exec: self 102880 children 410076
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-22 23:44:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2024-01-22 15:50:50 +00:00
|
|
|
thread_group_cputime_adjusted(p, &tgutime, &tgstime);
|
|
|
|
|
utime += tgutime;
|
|
|
|
|
stime += tgstime;
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2024-01-22 15:50:50 +00:00
|
|
|
out_thread:
|
|
|
|
|
mm = get_task_mm(p);
|
|
|
|
|
if (mm) {
|
|
|
|
|
setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&maxrss, mm);
|
|
|
|
|
mmput(mm);
|
getrusage: fill ru_maxrss value
Make ->ru_maxrss value in struct rusage filled accordingly to rss hiwater
mark. This struct is filled as a parameter to getrusage syscall.
->ru_maxrss value is set to KBs which is the way it is done in BSD
systems. /usr/bin/time (gnu time) application converts ->ru_maxrss to KBs
which seems to be incorrect behavior. Maintainer of this util was
notified by me with the patch which corrects it and cc'ed.
To make this happen we extend struct signal_struct by two fields. The
first one is ->maxrss which we use to store rss hiwater of the task. The
second one is ->cmaxrss which we use to store highest rss hiwater of all
task childs. These values are used in k_getrusage() to actually fill
->ru_maxrss. k_getrusage() uses current rss hiwater value directly if mm
struct exists.
Note:
exec() clear mm->hiwater_rss, but doesn't clear sig->maxrss.
it is intetionally behavior. *BSD getrusage have exec() inheriting.
test programs
========================================================
getrusage.c
===========
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include "common.h"
#define err(str) perror(str), exit(1)
int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
int status;
printf("allocate 100MB\n");
consume(100);
printf("testcase1: fork inherit? \n");
printf(" expect: initial.self ~= child.self\n");
show_rusage("initial");
if (__fork()) {
wait(&status);
} else {
show_rusage("fork child");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
printf("testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.) \n");
printf(" expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0\n");
show_rusage("initial");
if (__fork()) {
wait(&status);
} else {
show_rusage("child");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
printf("testcase3: fork + malloc \n");
printf(" expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB\n");
show_rusage("initial");
if (__fork()) {
wait(&status);
} else {
printf("allocate +50MB\n");
consume(50);
show_rusage("fork child");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
printf("testcase4: grandchild maxrss\n");
printf(" expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB\n");
show_rusage("initial");
if (__fork()) {
wait(&status);
show_rusage("post_wait");
} else {
system("./child -n 0 -g 300");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
printf("testcase5: zombie\n");
printf(" expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted.\n");
printf(" post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss. \n");
show_rusage("initial");
if (__fork()) {
sleep(1); /* children become zombie */
show_rusage("pre_wait");
wait(&status);
show_rusage("post_wait");
} else {
system("./child -n 400");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
printf("testcase6: SIG_IGN\n");
printf(" expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored).\n");
show_rusage("initial");
signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN);
if (__fork()) {
sleep(1); /* children become zombie */
show_rusage("after_zombie");
} else {
system("./child -n 500");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
printf("testcase7: exec (without fork) \n");
printf(" expect: initial ~= exec \n");
show_rusage("initial");
execl("./child", "child", "-v", NULL);
return 0;
}
child.c
=======
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include "common.h"
int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
int status;
int c;
long consume_size = 0;
long grandchild_consume_size = 0;
int show = 0;
while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "n:g:v")) != -1) {
switch (c) {
case 'n':
consume_size = atol(optarg);
break;
case 'v':
show = 1;
break;
case 'g':
grandchild_consume_size = atol(optarg);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (show)
show_rusage("exec");
if (consume_size) {
printf("child alloc %ldMB\n", consume_size);
consume(consume_size);
}
if (grandchild_consume_size) {
if (fork()) {
wait(&status);
} else {
printf("grandchild alloc %ldMB\n", grandchild_consume_size);
consume(grandchild_consume_size);
exit(0);
}
}
return 0;
}
common.c
========
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include "common.h"
#define err(str) perror(str), exit(1)
void show_rusage(char *prefix)
{
int err, err2;
struct rusage rusage_self;
struct rusage rusage_children;
printf("%s: ", prefix);
err = getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rusage_self);
if (!err)
printf("self %ld ", rusage_self.ru_maxrss);
err2 = getrusage(RUSAGE_CHILDREN, &rusage_children);
if (!err2)
printf("children %ld ", rusage_children.ru_maxrss);
printf("\n");
}
/* Some buggy OS need this worthless CPU waste. */
void make_pagefault(void)
{
void *addr;
int size = getpagesize();
int i;
for (i=0; i<1000; i++) {
addr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0);
if (addr == MAP_FAILED)
err("make_pagefault");
memset(addr, 0, size);
munmap(addr, size);
}
}
void consume(int mega)
{
size_t sz = mega * 1024 * 1024;
void *ptr;
ptr = malloc(sz);
memset(ptr, 0, sz);
make_pagefault();
}
pid_t __fork(void)
{
pid_t pid;
pid = fork();
make_pagefault();
return pid;
}
common.h
========
void show_rusage(char *prefix);
void make_pagefault(void);
void consume(int mega);
pid_t __fork(void);
FreeBSD result (expected result)
========================================================
allocate 100MB
testcase1: fork inherit?
expect: initial.self ~= child.self
initial: self 103492 children 0
fork child: self 103540 children 0
testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.)
expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0
initial: self 103540 children 103540
child: self 103564 children 0
testcase3: fork + malloc
expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB
initial: self 103564 children 103564
allocate +50MB
fork child: self 154860 children 0
testcase4: grandchild maxrss
expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB
initial: self 103564 children 154860
grandchild alloc 300MB
post_wait: self 103564 children 308720
testcase5: zombie
expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted.
post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss.
initial: self 103564 children 308720
child alloc 400MB
pre_wait: self 103564 children 308720
post_wait: self 103564 children 411312
testcase6: SIG_IGN
expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored).
initial: self 103564 children 411312
child alloc 500MB
after_zombie: self 103624 children 411312
testcase7: exec (without fork)
expect: initial ~= exec
initial: self 103624 children 411312
exec: self 103624 children 411312
Linux result (actual test result)
========================================================
allocate 100MB
testcase1: fork inherit?
expect: initial.self ~= child.self
initial: self 102848 children 0
fork child: self 102572 children 0
testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.)
expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0
initial: self 102876 children 102644
child: self 102572 children 0
testcase3: fork + malloc
expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB
initial: self 102876 children 102644
allocate +50MB
fork child: self 153804 children 0
testcase4: grandchild maxrss
expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB
initial: self 102876 children 153864
grandchild alloc 300MB
post_wait: self 102876 children 307536
testcase5: zombie
expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted.
post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss.
initial: self 102876 children 307536
child alloc 400MB
pre_wait: self 102876 children 307536
post_wait: self 102876 children 410076
testcase6: SIG_IGN
expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored).
initial: self 102876 children 410076
child alloc 500MB
after_zombie: self 102880 children 410076
testcase7: exec (without fork)
expect: initial ~= exec
initial: self 102880 children 410076
exec: self 102880 children 410076
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-22 23:44:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2024-01-22 15:50:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out_children:
|
getrusage: fill ru_maxrss value
Make ->ru_maxrss value in struct rusage filled accordingly to rss hiwater
mark. This struct is filled as a parameter to getrusage syscall.
->ru_maxrss value is set to KBs which is the way it is done in BSD
systems. /usr/bin/time (gnu time) application converts ->ru_maxrss to KBs
which seems to be incorrect behavior. Maintainer of this util was
notified by me with the patch which corrects it and cc'ed.
To make this happen we extend struct signal_struct by two fields. The
first one is ->maxrss which we use to store rss hiwater of the task. The
second one is ->cmaxrss which we use to store highest rss hiwater of all
task childs. These values are used in k_getrusage() to actually fill
->ru_maxrss. k_getrusage() uses current rss hiwater value directly if mm
struct exists.
Note:
exec() clear mm->hiwater_rss, but doesn't clear sig->maxrss.
it is intetionally behavior. *BSD getrusage have exec() inheriting.
test programs
========================================================
getrusage.c
===========
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include "common.h"
#define err(str) perror(str), exit(1)
int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
int status;
printf("allocate 100MB\n");
consume(100);
printf("testcase1: fork inherit? \n");
printf(" expect: initial.self ~= child.self\n");
show_rusage("initial");
if (__fork()) {
wait(&status);
} else {
show_rusage("fork child");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
printf("testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.) \n");
printf(" expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0\n");
show_rusage("initial");
if (__fork()) {
wait(&status);
} else {
show_rusage("child");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
printf("testcase3: fork + malloc \n");
printf(" expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB\n");
show_rusage("initial");
if (__fork()) {
wait(&status);
} else {
printf("allocate +50MB\n");
consume(50);
show_rusage("fork child");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
printf("testcase4: grandchild maxrss\n");
printf(" expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB\n");
show_rusage("initial");
if (__fork()) {
wait(&status);
show_rusage("post_wait");
} else {
system("./child -n 0 -g 300");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
printf("testcase5: zombie\n");
printf(" expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted.\n");
printf(" post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss. \n");
show_rusage("initial");
if (__fork()) {
sleep(1); /* children become zombie */
show_rusage("pre_wait");
wait(&status);
show_rusage("post_wait");
} else {
system("./child -n 400");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
printf("testcase6: SIG_IGN\n");
printf(" expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored).\n");
show_rusage("initial");
signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN);
if (__fork()) {
sleep(1); /* children become zombie */
show_rusage("after_zombie");
} else {
system("./child -n 500");
_exit(0);
}
printf("\n");
signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
printf("testcase7: exec (without fork) \n");
printf(" expect: initial ~= exec \n");
show_rusage("initial");
execl("./child", "child", "-v", NULL);
return 0;
}
child.c
=======
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include "common.h"
int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
int status;
int c;
long consume_size = 0;
long grandchild_consume_size = 0;
int show = 0;
while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "n:g:v")) != -1) {
switch (c) {
case 'n':
consume_size = atol(optarg);
break;
case 'v':
show = 1;
break;
case 'g':
grandchild_consume_size = atol(optarg);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (show)
show_rusage("exec");
if (consume_size) {
printf("child alloc %ldMB\n", consume_size);
consume(consume_size);
}
if (grandchild_consume_size) {
if (fork()) {
wait(&status);
} else {
printf("grandchild alloc %ldMB\n", grandchild_consume_size);
consume(grandchild_consume_size);
exit(0);
}
}
return 0;
}
common.c
========
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include "common.h"
#define err(str) perror(str), exit(1)
void show_rusage(char *prefix)
{
int err, err2;
struct rusage rusage_self;
struct rusage rusage_children;
printf("%s: ", prefix);
err = getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rusage_self);
if (!err)
printf("self %ld ", rusage_self.ru_maxrss);
err2 = getrusage(RUSAGE_CHILDREN, &rusage_children);
if (!err2)
printf("children %ld ", rusage_children.ru_maxrss);
printf("\n");
}
/* Some buggy OS need this worthless CPU waste. */
void make_pagefault(void)
{
void *addr;
int size = getpagesize();
int i;
for (i=0; i<1000; i++) {
addr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0);
if (addr == MAP_FAILED)
err("make_pagefault");
memset(addr, 0, size);
munmap(addr, size);
}
}
void consume(int mega)
{
size_t sz = mega * 1024 * 1024;
void *ptr;
ptr = malloc(sz);
memset(ptr, 0, sz);
make_pagefault();
}
pid_t __fork(void)
{
pid_t pid;
pid = fork();
make_pagefault();
return pid;
}
common.h
========
void show_rusage(char *prefix);
void make_pagefault(void);
void consume(int mega);
pid_t __fork(void);
FreeBSD result (expected result)
========================================================
allocate 100MB
testcase1: fork inherit?
expect: initial.self ~= child.self
initial: self 103492 children 0
fork child: self 103540 children 0
testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.)
expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0
initial: self 103540 children 103540
child: self 103564 children 0
testcase3: fork + malloc
expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB
initial: self 103564 children 103564
allocate +50MB
fork child: self 154860 children 0
testcase4: grandchild maxrss
expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB
initial: self 103564 children 154860
grandchild alloc 300MB
post_wait: self 103564 children 308720
testcase5: zombie
expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted.
post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss.
initial: self 103564 children 308720
child alloc 400MB
pre_wait: self 103564 children 308720
post_wait: self 103564 children 411312
testcase6: SIG_IGN
expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored).
initial: self 103564 children 411312
child alloc 500MB
after_zombie: self 103624 children 411312
testcase7: exec (without fork)
expect: initial ~= exec
initial: self 103624 children 411312
exec: self 103624 children 411312
Linux result (actual test result)
========================================================
allocate 100MB
testcase1: fork inherit?
expect: initial.self ~= child.self
initial: self 102848 children 0
fork child: self 102572 children 0
testcase2: fork inherit? (cont.)
expect: initial.children ~= 100MB, but child.children = 0
initial: self 102876 children 102644
child: self 102572 children 0
testcase3: fork + malloc
expect: child.self ~= initial.self + 50MB
initial: self 102876 children 102644
allocate +50MB
fork child: self 153804 children 0
testcase4: grandchild maxrss
expect: post_wait.children ~= 300MB
initial: self 102876 children 153864
grandchild alloc 300MB
post_wait: self 102876 children 307536
testcase5: zombie
expect: pre_wait ~= initial, IOW the zombie process is not accounted.
post_wait ~= 400MB, IOW wait() collect child's max_rss.
initial: self 102876 children 307536
child alloc 400MB
pre_wait: self 102876 children 307536
post_wait: self 102876 children 410076
testcase6: SIG_IGN
expect: initial ~= after_zombie (child's 500MB alloc should be ignored).
initial: self 102876 children 410076
child alloc 500MB
after_zombie: self 102880 children 410076
testcase7: exec (without fork)
expect: initial ~= exec
initial: self 102880 children 410076
exec: self 102880 children 410076
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jpirko@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-09-22 23:44:10 +00:00
|
|
|
r->ru_maxrss = maxrss * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* convert pages to KBs */
|
2024-01-22 15:50:50 +00:00
|
|
|
r->ru_utime = ns_to_kernel_old_timeval(utime);
|
|
|
|
|
r->ru_stime = ns_to_kernel_old_timeval(stime);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-15 00:25:02 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct rusage __user *, ru)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct rusage r;
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-29 07:58:42 +00:00
|
|
|
if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN &&
|
|
|
|
|
who != RUSAGE_THREAD)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2017-05-15 00:25:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
getrusage(current, who, &r);
|
|
|
|
|
return copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(r)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013-03-03 17:49:06 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
|
|
|
|
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct compat_rusage __user *, ru)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct rusage r;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN &&
|
|
|
|
|
who != RUSAGE_THREAD)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-15 00:25:02 +00:00
|
|
|
getrusage(current, who, &r);
|
2013-03-03 17:49:06 +00:00
|
|
|
return put_compat_rusage(&r, ru);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-14 13:14:26 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(umask, int, mask)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
mask = xchg(¤t->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO);
|
|
|
|
|
return mask;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding set
The capability bounding set is a set beyond which capabilities cannot grow.
Currently cap_bset is per-system. It can be manipulated through sysctl,
but only init can add capabilities. Root can remove capabilities. By
default it includes all caps except CAP_SETPCAP.
This patch makes the bounding set per-process when file capabilities are
enabled. It is inherited at fork from parent. Noone can add elements,
CAP_SETPCAP is required to remove them.
One example use of this is to start a safer container. For instance, until
device namespaces or per-container device whitelists are introduced, it is
best to take CAP_MKNOD away from a container.
The bounding set will not affect pP and pE immediately. It will only
affect pP' and pE' after subsequent exec()s. It also does not affect pI,
and exec() does not constrain pI'. So to really start a shell with no way
of regain CAP_MKNOD, you would do
prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, CAP_MKNOD);
cap_t cap = cap_get_proc();
cap_value_t caparray[1];
caparray[0] = CAP_MKNOD;
cap_set_flag(cap, CAP_INHERITABLE, 1, caparray, CAP_DROP);
cap_set_proc(cap);
cap_free(cap);
The following test program will get and set the bounding
set (but not pI). For instance
./bset get
(lists capabilities in bset)
./bset drop cap_net_raw
(starts shell with new bset)
(use capset, setuid binary, or binary with
file capabilities to try to increase caps)
************************************************************
cap_bound.c
************************************************************
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifndef PR_CAPBSET_READ
#define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23
#endif
#ifndef PR_CAPBSET_DROP
#define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24
#endif
int usage(char *me)
{
printf("Usage: %s get\n", me);
printf(" %s drop <capability>\n", me);
return 1;
}
#define numcaps 32
char *captable[numcaps] = {
"cap_chown",
"cap_dac_override",
"cap_dac_read_search",
"cap_fowner",
"cap_fsetid",
"cap_kill",
"cap_setgid",
"cap_setuid",
"cap_setpcap",
"cap_linux_immutable",
"cap_net_bind_service",
"cap_net_broadcast",
"cap_net_admin",
"cap_net_raw",
"cap_ipc_lock",
"cap_ipc_owner",
"cap_sys_module",
"cap_sys_rawio",
"cap_sys_chroot",
"cap_sys_ptrace",
"cap_sys_pacct",
"cap_sys_admin",
"cap_sys_boot",
"cap_sys_nice",
"cap_sys_resource",
"cap_sys_time",
"cap_sys_tty_config",
"cap_mknod",
"cap_lease",
"cap_audit_write",
"cap_audit_control",
"cap_setfcap"
};
int getbcap(void)
{
int comma=0;
unsigned long i;
int ret;
printf("i know of %d capabilities\n", numcaps);
printf("capability bounding set:");
for (i=0; i<numcaps; i++) {
ret = prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, i);
if (ret < 0)
perror("prctl");
else if (ret==1)
printf("%s%s", (comma++) ? ", " : " ", captable[i]);
}
printf("\n");
return 0;
}
int capdrop(char *str)
{
unsigned long i;
int found=0;
for (i=0; i<numcaps; i++) {
if (strcmp(captable[i], str) == 0) {
found=1;
break;
}
}
if (!found)
return 1;
if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, i)) {
perror("prctl");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc<2)
return usage(argv[0]);
if (strcmp(argv[1], "get")==0)
return getbcap();
if (strcmp(argv[1], "drop")!=0 || argc<3)
return usage(argv[0]);
if (capdrop(argv[2])) {
printf("unknown capability\n");
return 1;
}
return execl("/bin/bash", "/bin/bash", NULL);
}
************************************************************
[serue@us.ibm.com: fix typo]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>a
Signed-off-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-05 06:29:45 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-16 19:47:59 +00:00
|
|
|
static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd)
|
2012-05-31 23:26:46 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2012-08-28 16:52:22 +00:00
|
|
|
struct fd exe;
|
2013-01-23 22:07:38 +00:00
|
|
|
struct inode *inode;
|
2012-08-28 16:52:22 +00:00
|
|
|
int err;
|
2012-05-31 23:26:46 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-08-28 16:52:22 +00:00
|
|
|
exe = fdget(fd);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!exe.file)
|
2012-05-31 23:26:46 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EBADF;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-23 22:07:38 +00:00
|
|
|
inode = file_inode(exe.file);
|
2012-05-31 23:26:46 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Because the original mm->exe_file points to executable file, make
|
|
|
|
|
* sure that this one is executable as well, to avoid breaking an
|
|
|
|
|
* overall picture.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
err = -EACCES;
|
2015-06-29 19:42:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || path_noexec(&exe.file->f_path))
|
2012-05-31 23:26:46 +00:00
|
|
|
goto exit;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2021-01-21 13:19:22 +00:00
|
|
|
err = file_permission(exe.file, MAY_EXEC);
|
2012-05-31 23:26:46 +00:00
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
|
goto exit;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-23 08:20:25 +00:00
|
|
|
err = replace_mm_exe_file(mm, exe.file);
|
2012-05-31 23:26:46 +00:00
|
|
|
exit:
|
2012-08-28 16:52:22 +00:00
|
|
|
fdput(exe);
|
2012-05-31 23:26:46 +00:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation
During development of c/r we've noticed that in case if we need to support
user namespaces we face a problem with capabilities in prctl(PR_SET_MM,
...) call, in particular once new user namespace is created
capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) no longer passes.
A approach is to eliminate CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check but pass all new values
in one bundle, which would allow the kernel to make more intensive test
for sanity of values and same time allow us to support checkpoint/restore
of user namespaces.
Thus a new command PR_SET_MM_MAP introduced. It takes a pointer of
prctl_mm_map structure which carries all the members to be updated.
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, struct prctl_mm_map *, size)
struct prctl_mm_map {
__u64 start_code;
__u64 end_code;
__u64 start_data;
__u64 end_data;
__u64 start_brk;
__u64 brk;
__u64 start_stack;
__u64 arg_start;
__u64 arg_end;
__u64 env_start;
__u64 env_end;
__u64 *auxv;
__u32 auxv_size;
__u32 exe_fd;
};
All members except @exe_fd correspond ones of struct mm_struct. To figure
out which available values these members may take here are meanings of the
members.
- start_code, end_code: represent bounds of executable code area
- start_data, end_data: represent bounds of data area
- start_brk, brk: used to calculate bounds for brk() syscall
- start_stack: used when accounting space needed for command
line arguments, environment and shmat() syscall
- arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end: represent memory area
supplied for command line arguments and environment variables
- auxv, auxv_size: carries auxiliary vector, Elf format specifics
- exe_fd: file descriptor number for executable link (/proc/self/exe)
Thus we apply the following requirements to the values
1) Any member except @auxv, @auxv_size, @exe_fd is rather an address
in user space thus it must be laying inside [mmap_min_addr, mmap_max_addr)
interval.
2) While @[start|end]_code and @[start|end]_data may point to an nonexisting
VMAs (say a program maps own new .text and .data segments during execution)
the rest of members should belong to VMA which must exist.
3) Addresses must be ordered, ie @start_ member must not be greater or
equal to appropriate @end_ member.
4) As in regular Elf loading procedure we require that @start_brk and
@brk be greater than @end_data.
5) If RLIMIT_DATA rlimit is set to non-infinity new values should not
exceed existing limit. Same applies to RLIMIT_STACK.
6) Auxiliary vector size must not exceed existing one (which is
predefined as AT_VECTOR_SIZE and depends on architecture).
7) File descriptor passed in @exe_file should be pointing
to executable file (because we use existing prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked
helper it ensures that the file we are going to use as exe link has all
required permission granted).
Now about where these members are involved inside kernel code:
- @start_code and @end_code are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output;
- @start_data and @end_data are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output,
also they are considered if there enough space for brk() syscall
result if RLIMIT_DATA is set;
- @start_brk shown in /proc/$pid/stat output and accounted in brk()
syscall if RLIMIT_DATA is set; also this member is tested to
find a symbolic name of mmap event for perf system (we choose
if event is generated for "heap" area); one more aplication is
selinux -- we test if a process has PROCESS__EXECHEAP permission
if trying to make heap area being executable with mprotect() syscall;
- @brk is a current value for brk() syscall which lays inside heap
area, it's shown in /proc/$pid/stat. When syscall brk() succesfully
provides new memory area to a user space upon brk() completion the
mm::brk is updated to carry new value;
Both @start_brk and @brk are actively used in /proc/$pid/maps
and /proc/$pid/smaps output to find a symbolic name "heap" for
VMA being scanned;
- @start_stack is printed out in /proc/$pid/stat and used to
find a symbolic name "stack" for task and threads in
/proc/$pid/maps and /proc/$pid/smaps output, and as the same
as with @start_brk -- perf system uses it for event naming.
Also kernel treat this member as a start address of where
to map vDSO pages and to check if there is enough space
for shmat() syscall;
- @arg_start, @arg_end, @env_start and @env_end are printed out
in /proc/$pid/stat. Another access to the data these members
represent is to read /proc/$pid/environ or /proc/$pid/cmdline.
Any attempt to read these areas kernel tests with access_process_vm
helper so a user must have enough rights for this action;
- @auxv and @auxv_size may be read from /proc/$pid/auxv. Strictly
speaking kernel doesn't care much about which exactly data is
sitting there because it is solely for userspace;
- @exe_fd is referred from /proc/$pid/exe and when generating
coredump. We uses prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked helper to update
this member, so exe-file link modification remains one-shot
action.
Still note that updating exe-file link now doesn't require sys-resource
capability anymore, after all there is no much profit in preventing setup
own file link (there are a number of ways to execute own code -- ptrace,
ld-preload, so that the only reliable way to find which exactly code is
executed is to inspect running program memory). Still we require the
caller to be at least user-namespace root user.
I believe the old interface should be deprecated and ripped off in a
couple of kernel releases if no one against.
To test if new interface is implemented in the kernel one can pass
PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE opcode and the kernel returns the size of currently
supported struct prctl_mm_map.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix 80-col wordwrap in macro definitions]
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Tested-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-09 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2019-06-01 05:30:16 +00:00
|
|
|
* Check arithmetic relations of passed addresses.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation
During development of c/r we've noticed that in case if we need to support
user namespaces we face a problem with capabilities in prctl(PR_SET_MM,
...) call, in particular once new user namespace is created
capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) no longer passes.
A approach is to eliminate CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check but pass all new values
in one bundle, which would allow the kernel to make more intensive test
for sanity of values and same time allow us to support checkpoint/restore
of user namespaces.
Thus a new command PR_SET_MM_MAP introduced. It takes a pointer of
prctl_mm_map structure which carries all the members to be updated.
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, struct prctl_mm_map *, size)
struct prctl_mm_map {
__u64 start_code;
__u64 end_code;
__u64 start_data;
__u64 end_data;
__u64 start_brk;
__u64 brk;
__u64 start_stack;
__u64 arg_start;
__u64 arg_end;
__u64 env_start;
__u64 env_end;
__u64 *auxv;
__u32 auxv_size;
__u32 exe_fd;
};
All members except @exe_fd correspond ones of struct mm_struct. To figure
out which available values these members may take here are meanings of the
members.
- start_code, end_code: represent bounds of executable code area
- start_data, end_data: represent bounds of data area
- start_brk, brk: used to calculate bounds for brk() syscall
- start_stack: used when accounting space needed for command
line arguments, environment and shmat() syscall
- arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end: represent memory area
supplied for command line arguments and environment variables
- auxv, auxv_size: carries auxiliary vector, Elf format specifics
- exe_fd: file descriptor number for executable link (/proc/self/exe)
Thus we apply the following requirements to the values
1) Any member except @auxv, @auxv_size, @exe_fd is rather an address
in user space thus it must be laying inside [mmap_min_addr, mmap_max_addr)
interval.
2) While @[start|end]_code and @[start|end]_data may point to an nonexisting
VMAs (say a program maps own new .text and .data segments during execution)
the rest of members should belong to VMA which must exist.
3) Addresses must be ordered, ie @start_ member must not be greater or
equal to appropriate @end_ member.
4) As in regular Elf loading procedure we require that @start_brk and
@brk be greater than @end_data.
5) If RLIMIT_DATA rlimit is set to non-infinity new values should not
exceed existing limit. Same applies to RLIMIT_STACK.
6) Auxiliary vector size must not exceed existing one (which is
predefined as AT_VECTOR_SIZE and depends on architecture).
7) File descriptor passed in @exe_file should be pointing
to executable file (because we use existing prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked
helper it ensures that the file we are going to use as exe link has all
required permission granted).
Now about where these members are involved inside kernel code:
- @start_code and @end_code are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output;
- @start_data and @end_data are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output,
also they are considered if there enough space for brk() syscall
result if RLIMIT_DATA is set;
- @start_brk shown in /proc/$pid/stat output and accounted in brk()
syscall if RLIMIT_DATA is set; also this member is tested to
find a symbolic name of mmap event for perf system (we choose
if event is generated for "heap" area); one more aplication is
selinux -- we test if a process has PROCESS__EXECHEAP permission
if trying to make heap area being executable with mprotect() syscall;
- @brk is a current value for brk() syscall which lays inside heap
area, it's shown in /proc/$pid/stat. When syscall brk() succesfully
provides new memory area to a user space upon brk() completion the
mm::brk is updated to carry new value;
Both @start_brk and @brk are actively used in /proc/$pid/maps
and /proc/$pid/smaps output to find a symbolic name "heap" for
VMA being scanned;
- @start_stack is printed out in /proc/$pid/stat and used to
find a symbolic name "stack" for task and threads in
/proc/$pid/maps and /proc/$pid/smaps output, and as the same
as with @start_brk -- perf system uses it for event naming.
Also kernel treat this member as a start address of where
to map vDSO pages and to check if there is enough space
for shmat() syscall;
- @arg_start, @arg_end, @env_start and @env_end are printed out
in /proc/$pid/stat. Another access to the data these members
represent is to read /proc/$pid/environ or /proc/$pid/cmdline.
Any attempt to read these areas kernel tests with access_process_vm
helper so a user must have enough rights for this action;
- @auxv and @auxv_size may be read from /proc/$pid/auxv. Strictly
speaking kernel doesn't care much about which exactly data is
sitting there because it is solely for userspace;
- @exe_fd is referred from /proc/$pid/exe and when generating
coredump. We uses prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked helper to update
this member, so exe-file link modification remains one-shot
action.
Still note that updating exe-file link now doesn't require sys-resource
capability anymore, after all there is no much profit in preventing setup
own file link (there are a number of ways to execute own code -- ptrace,
ld-preload, so that the only reliable way to find which exactly code is
executed is to inspect running program memory). Still we require the
caller to be at least user-namespace root user.
I believe the old interface should be deprecated and ripped off in a
couple of kernel releases if no one against.
To test if new interface is implemented in the kernel one can pass
PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE opcode and the kernel returns the size of currently
supported struct prctl_mm_map.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix 80-col wordwrap in macro definitions]
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Tested-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-09 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
* WARNING: we don't require any capability here so be very careful
|
|
|
|
|
* in what is allowed for modification from userspace.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-06-01 05:30:16 +00:00
|
|
|
static int validate_prctl_map_addr(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map)
|
prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation
During development of c/r we've noticed that in case if we need to support
user namespaces we face a problem with capabilities in prctl(PR_SET_MM,
...) call, in particular once new user namespace is created
capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) no longer passes.
A approach is to eliminate CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check but pass all new values
in one bundle, which would allow the kernel to make more intensive test
for sanity of values and same time allow us to support checkpoint/restore
of user namespaces.
Thus a new command PR_SET_MM_MAP introduced. It takes a pointer of
prctl_mm_map structure which carries all the members to be updated.
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, struct prctl_mm_map *, size)
struct prctl_mm_map {
__u64 start_code;
__u64 end_code;
__u64 start_data;
__u64 end_data;
__u64 start_brk;
__u64 brk;
__u64 start_stack;
__u64 arg_start;
__u64 arg_end;
__u64 env_start;
__u64 env_end;
__u64 *auxv;
__u32 auxv_size;
__u32 exe_fd;
};
All members except @exe_fd correspond ones of struct mm_struct. To figure
out which available values these members may take here are meanings of the
members.
- start_code, end_code: represent bounds of executable code area
- start_data, end_data: represent bounds of data area
- start_brk, brk: used to calculate bounds for brk() syscall
- start_stack: used when accounting space needed for command
line arguments, environment and shmat() syscall
- arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end: represent memory area
supplied for command line arguments and environment variables
- auxv, auxv_size: carries auxiliary vector, Elf format specifics
- exe_fd: file descriptor number for executable link (/proc/self/exe)
Thus we apply the following requirements to the values
1) Any member except @auxv, @auxv_size, @exe_fd is rather an address
in user space thus it must be laying inside [mmap_min_addr, mmap_max_addr)
interval.
2) While @[start|end]_code and @[start|end]_data may point to an nonexisting
VMAs (say a program maps own new .text and .data segments during execution)
the rest of members should belong to VMA which must exist.
3) Addresses must be ordered, ie @start_ member must not be greater or
equal to appropriate @end_ member.
4) As in regular Elf loading procedure we require that @start_brk and
@brk be greater than @end_data.
5) If RLIMIT_DATA rlimit is set to non-infinity new values should not
exceed existing limit. Same applies to RLIMIT_STACK.
6) Auxiliary vector size must not exceed existing one (which is
predefined as AT_VECTOR_SIZE and depends on architecture).
7) File descriptor passed in @exe_file should be pointing
to executable file (because we use existing prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked
helper it ensures that the file we are going to use as exe link has all
required permission granted).
Now about where these members are involved inside kernel code:
- @start_code and @end_code are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output;
- @start_data and @end_data are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output,
also they are considered if there enough space for brk() syscall
result if RLIMIT_DATA is set;
- @start_brk shown in /proc/$pid/stat output and accounted in brk()
syscall if RLIMIT_DATA is set; also this member is tested to
find a symbolic name of mmap event for perf system (we choose
if event is generated for "heap" area); one more aplication is
selinux -- we test if a process has PROCESS__EXECHEAP permission
if trying to make heap area being executable with mprotect() syscall;
- @brk is a current value for brk() syscall which lays inside heap
area, it's shown in /proc/$pid/stat. When syscall brk() succesfully
provides new memory area to a user space upon brk() completion the
mm::brk is updated to carry new value;
Both @start_brk and @brk are actively used in /proc/$pid/maps
and /proc/$pid/smaps output to find a symbolic name "heap" for
VMA being scanned;
- @start_stack is printed out in /proc/$pid/stat and used to
find a symbolic name "stack" for task and threads in
/proc/$pid/maps and /proc/$pid/smaps output, and as the same
as with @start_brk -- perf system uses it for event naming.
Also kernel treat this member as a start address of where
to map vDSO pages and to check if there is enough space
for shmat() syscall;
- @arg_start, @arg_end, @env_start and @env_end are printed out
in /proc/$pid/stat. Another access to the data these members
represent is to read /proc/$pid/environ or /proc/$pid/cmdline.
Any attempt to read these areas kernel tests with access_process_vm
helper so a user must have enough rights for this action;
- @auxv and @auxv_size may be read from /proc/$pid/auxv. Strictly
speaking kernel doesn't care much about which exactly data is
sitting there because it is solely for userspace;
- @exe_fd is referred from /proc/$pid/exe and when generating
coredump. We uses prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked helper to update
this member, so exe-file link modification remains one-shot
action.
Still note that updating exe-file link now doesn't require sys-resource
capability anymore, after all there is no much profit in preventing setup
own file link (there are a number of ways to execute own code -- ptrace,
ld-preload, so that the only reliable way to find which exactly code is
executed is to inspect running program memory). Still we require the
caller to be at least user-namespace root user.
I believe the old interface should be deprecated and ripped off in a
couple of kernel releases if no one against.
To test if new interface is implemented in the kernel one can pass
PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE opcode and the kernel returns the size of currently
supported struct prctl_mm_map.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix 80-col wordwrap in macro definitions]
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Tested-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-09 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long mmap_max_addr = TASK_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
|
int error = -EINVAL, i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const unsigned char offsets[] = {
|
|
|
|
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_code),
|
|
|
|
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, end_code),
|
|
|
|
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_data),
|
|
|
|
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, end_data),
|
|
|
|
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_brk),
|
|
|
|
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, brk),
|
|
|
|
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, start_stack),
|
|
|
|
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, arg_start),
|
|
|
|
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, arg_end),
|
|
|
|
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, env_start),
|
|
|
|
|
offsetof(struct prctl_mm_map, env_end),
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Make sure the members are not somewhere outside
|
|
|
|
|
* of allowed address space.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(offsets); i++) {
|
|
|
|
|
u64 val = *(u64 *)((char *)prctl_map + offsets[i]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((unsigned long)val >= mmap_max_addr ||
|
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long)val < mmap_min_addr)
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Make sure the pairs are ordered.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
#define __prctl_check_order(__m1, __op, __m2) \
|
|
|
|
|
((unsigned long)prctl_map->__m1 __op \
|
|
|
|
|
(unsigned long)prctl_map->__m2) ? 0 : -EINVAL
|
|
|
|
|
error = __prctl_check_order(start_code, <, end_code);
|
2019-05-14 00:15:40 +00:00
|
|
|
error |= __prctl_check_order(start_data,<=, end_data);
|
prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation
During development of c/r we've noticed that in case if we need to support
user namespaces we face a problem with capabilities in prctl(PR_SET_MM,
...) call, in particular once new user namespace is created
capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) no longer passes.
A approach is to eliminate CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check but pass all new values
in one bundle, which would allow the kernel to make more intensive test
for sanity of values and same time allow us to support checkpoint/restore
of user namespaces.
Thus a new command PR_SET_MM_MAP introduced. It takes a pointer of
prctl_mm_map structure which carries all the members to be updated.
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, struct prctl_mm_map *, size)
struct prctl_mm_map {
__u64 start_code;
__u64 end_code;
__u64 start_data;
__u64 end_data;
__u64 start_brk;
__u64 brk;
__u64 start_stack;
__u64 arg_start;
__u64 arg_end;
__u64 env_start;
__u64 env_end;
__u64 *auxv;
__u32 auxv_size;
__u32 exe_fd;
};
All members except @exe_fd correspond ones of struct mm_struct. To figure
out which available values these members may take here are meanings of the
members.
- start_code, end_code: represent bounds of executable code area
- start_data, end_data: represent bounds of data area
- start_brk, brk: used to calculate bounds for brk() syscall
- start_stack: used when accounting space needed for command
line arguments, environment and shmat() syscall
- arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end: represent memory area
supplied for command line arguments and environment variables
- auxv, auxv_size: carries auxiliary vector, Elf format specifics
- exe_fd: file descriptor number for executable link (/proc/self/exe)
Thus we apply the following requirements to the values
1) Any member except @auxv, @auxv_size, @exe_fd is rather an address
in user space thus it must be laying inside [mmap_min_addr, mmap_max_addr)
interval.
2) While @[start|end]_code and @[start|end]_data may point to an nonexisting
VMAs (say a program maps own new .text and .data segments during execution)
the rest of members should belong to VMA which must exist.
3) Addresses must be ordered, ie @start_ member must not be greater or
equal to appropriate @end_ member.
4) As in regular Elf loading procedure we require that @start_brk and
@brk be greater than @end_data.
5) If RLIMIT_DATA rlimit is set to non-infinity new values should not
exceed existing limit. Same applies to RLIMIT_STACK.
6) Auxiliary vector size must not exceed existing one (which is
predefined as AT_VECTOR_SIZE and depends on architecture).
7) File descriptor passed in @exe_file should be pointing
to executable file (because we use existing prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked
helper it ensures that the file we are going to use as exe link has all
required permission granted).
Now about where these members are involved inside kernel code:
- @start_code and @end_code are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output;
- @start_data and @end_data are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output,
also they are considered if there enough space for brk() syscall
result if RLIMIT_DATA is set;
- @start_brk shown in /proc/$pid/stat output and accounted in brk()
syscall if RLIMIT_DATA is set; also this member is tested to
find a symbolic name of mmap event for perf system (we choose
if event is generated for "heap" area); one more aplication is
selinux -- we test if a process has PROCESS__EXECHEAP permission
if trying to make heap area being executable with mprotect() syscall;
- @brk is a current value for brk() syscall which lays inside heap
area, it's shown in /proc/$pid/stat. When syscall brk() succesfully
provides new memory area to a user space upon brk() completion the
mm::brk is updated to carry new value;
Both @start_brk and @brk are actively used in /proc/$pid/maps
and /proc/$pid/smaps output to find a symbolic name "heap" for
VMA being scanned;
- @start_stack is printed out in /proc/$pid/stat and used to
find a symbolic name "stack" for task and threads in
/proc/$pid/maps and /proc/$pid/smaps output, and as the same
as with @start_brk -- perf system uses it for event naming.
Also kernel treat this member as a start address of where
to map vDSO pages and to check if there is enough space
for shmat() syscall;
- @arg_start, @arg_end, @env_start and @env_end are printed out
in /proc/$pid/stat. Another access to the data these members
represent is to read /proc/$pid/environ or /proc/$pid/cmdline.
Any attempt to read these areas kernel tests with access_process_vm
helper so a user must have enough rights for this action;
- @auxv and @auxv_size may be read from /proc/$pid/auxv. Strictly
speaking kernel doesn't care much about which exactly data is
sitting there because it is solely for userspace;
- @exe_fd is referred from /proc/$pid/exe and when generating
coredump. We uses prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked helper to update
this member, so exe-file link modification remains one-shot
action.
Still note that updating exe-file link now doesn't require sys-resource
capability anymore, after all there is no much profit in preventing setup
own file link (there are a number of ways to execute own code -- ptrace,
ld-preload, so that the only reliable way to find which exactly code is
executed is to inspect running program memory). Still we require the
caller to be at least user-namespace root user.
I believe the old interface should be deprecated and ripped off in a
couple of kernel releases if no one against.
To test if new interface is implemented in the kernel one can pass
PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE opcode and the kernel returns the size of currently
supported struct prctl_mm_map.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix 80-col wordwrap in macro definitions]
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Tested-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-09 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
error |= __prctl_check_order(start_brk, <=, brk);
|
|
|
|
|
error |= __prctl_check_order(arg_start, <=, arg_end);
|
|
|
|
|
error |= __prctl_check_order(env_start, <=, env_end);
|
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
#undef __prctl_check_order
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Neither we should allow to override limits if they set.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (check_data_rlimit(rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA), prctl_map->brk,
|
|
|
|
|
prctl_map->start_brk, prctl_map->end_data,
|
|
|
|
|
prctl_map->start_data))
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
prctl: more prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) checks
Individual prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) calls do some checking to maintain a
consistent view of mm->arg_start et al fields, but not enough. In
particular PR_SET_MM_ARG_START/PR_SET_MM_ARG_END/ R_SET_MM_ENV_START/
PR_SET_MM_ENV_END only check that the address lies in an existing VMA,
but don't check that the start address is lower than the end address _at
all_.
Consolidate all consistency checks, so there will be no difference in
the future between PR_SET_MM_MAP and individual PR_SET_MM_* calls.
The program below makes both ARGV and ENVP areas be reversed. It makes
/proc/$PID/cmdline show garbage (it doesn't oops by luck).
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
enum {PAGE_SIZE=4096};
int main(void)
{
void *p;
p = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
#define PR_SET_MM 35
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
pause();
return 0;
}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy code, tweak comment]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 22:00:51 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
|
prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation
During development of c/r we've noticed that in case if we need to support
user namespaces we face a problem with capabilities in prctl(PR_SET_MM,
...) call, in particular once new user namespace is created
capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) no longer passes.
A approach is to eliminate CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check but pass all new values
in one bundle, which would allow the kernel to make more intensive test
for sanity of values and same time allow us to support checkpoint/restore
of user namespaces.
Thus a new command PR_SET_MM_MAP introduced. It takes a pointer of
prctl_mm_map structure which carries all the members to be updated.
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, struct prctl_mm_map *, size)
struct prctl_mm_map {
__u64 start_code;
__u64 end_code;
__u64 start_data;
__u64 end_data;
__u64 start_brk;
__u64 brk;
__u64 start_stack;
__u64 arg_start;
__u64 arg_end;
__u64 env_start;
__u64 env_end;
__u64 *auxv;
__u32 auxv_size;
__u32 exe_fd;
};
All members except @exe_fd correspond ones of struct mm_struct. To figure
out which available values these members may take here are meanings of the
members.
- start_code, end_code: represent bounds of executable code area
- start_data, end_data: represent bounds of data area
- start_brk, brk: used to calculate bounds for brk() syscall
- start_stack: used when accounting space needed for command
line arguments, environment and shmat() syscall
- arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end: represent memory area
supplied for command line arguments and environment variables
- auxv, auxv_size: carries auxiliary vector, Elf format specifics
- exe_fd: file descriptor number for executable link (/proc/self/exe)
Thus we apply the following requirements to the values
1) Any member except @auxv, @auxv_size, @exe_fd is rather an address
in user space thus it must be laying inside [mmap_min_addr, mmap_max_addr)
interval.
2) While @[start|end]_code and @[start|end]_data may point to an nonexisting
VMAs (say a program maps own new .text and .data segments during execution)
the rest of members should belong to VMA which must exist.
3) Addresses must be ordered, ie @start_ member must not be greater or
equal to appropriate @end_ member.
4) As in regular Elf loading procedure we require that @start_brk and
@brk be greater than @end_data.
5) If RLIMIT_DATA rlimit is set to non-infinity new values should not
exceed existing limit. Same applies to RLIMIT_STACK.
6) Auxiliary vector size must not exceed existing one (which is
predefined as AT_VECTOR_SIZE and depends on architecture).
7) File descriptor passed in @exe_file should be pointing
to executable file (because we use existing prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked
helper it ensures that the file we are going to use as exe link has all
required permission granted).
Now about where these members are involved inside kernel code:
- @start_code and @end_code are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output;
- @start_data and @end_data are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output,
also they are considered if there enough space for brk() syscall
result if RLIMIT_DATA is set;
- @start_brk shown in /proc/$pid/stat output and accounted in brk()
syscall if RLIMIT_DATA is set; also this member is tested to
find a symbolic name of mmap event for perf system (we choose
if event is generated for "heap" area); one more aplication is
selinux -- we test if a process has PROCESS__EXECHEAP permission
if trying to make heap area being executable with mprotect() syscall;
- @brk is a current value for brk() syscall which lays inside heap
area, it's shown in /proc/$pid/stat. When syscall brk() succesfully
provides new memory area to a user space upon brk() completion the
mm::brk is updated to carry new value;
Both @start_brk and @brk are actively used in /proc/$pid/maps
and /proc/$pid/smaps output to find a symbolic name "heap" for
VMA being scanned;
- @start_stack is printed out in /proc/$pid/stat and used to
find a symbolic name "stack" for task and threads in
/proc/$pid/maps and /proc/$pid/smaps output, and as the same
as with @start_brk -- perf system uses it for event naming.
Also kernel treat this member as a start address of where
to map vDSO pages and to check if there is enough space
for shmat() syscall;
- @arg_start, @arg_end, @env_start and @env_end are printed out
in /proc/$pid/stat. Another access to the data these members
represent is to read /proc/$pid/environ or /proc/$pid/cmdline.
Any attempt to read these areas kernel tests with access_process_vm
helper so a user must have enough rights for this action;
- @auxv and @auxv_size may be read from /proc/$pid/auxv. Strictly
speaking kernel doesn't care much about which exactly data is
sitting there because it is solely for userspace;
- @exe_fd is referred from /proc/$pid/exe and when generating
coredump. We uses prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked helper to update
this member, so exe-file link modification remains one-shot
action.
Still note that updating exe-file link now doesn't require sys-resource
capability anymore, after all there is no much profit in preventing setup
own file link (there are a number of ways to execute own code -- ptrace,
ld-preload, so that the only reliable way to find which exactly code is
executed is to inspect running program memory). Still we require the
caller to be at least user-namespace root user.
I believe the old interface should be deprecated and ripped off in a
couple of kernel releases if no one against.
To test if new interface is implemented in the kernel one can pass
PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE opcode and the kernel returns the size of currently
supported struct prctl_mm_map.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix 80-col wordwrap in macro definitions]
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Tested-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-09 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long data_size)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = { .exe_fd = (u32)-1, };
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
|
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
|
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_auxv) != sizeof(mm->saved_auxv));
|
|
|
|
|
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct prctl_mm_map) > 256);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE)
|
|
|
|
|
return put_user((unsigned int)sizeof(prctl_map),
|
|
|
|
|
(unsigned int __user *)addr);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data_size != sizeof(prctl_map))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&prctl_map, addr, sizeof(prctl_map)))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-06-01 05:30:16 +00:00
|
|
|
error = validate_prctl_map_addr(&prctl_map);
|
prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation
During development of c/r we've noticed that in case if we need to support
user namespaces we face a problem with capabilities in prctl(PR_SET_MM,
...) call, in particular once new user namespace is created
capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) no longer passes.
A approach is to eliminate CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check but pass all new values
in one bundle, which would allow the kernel to make more intensive test
for sanity of values and same time allow us to support checkpoint/restore
of user namespaces.
Thus a new command PR_SET_MM_MAP introduced. It takes a pointer of
prctl_mm_map structure which carries all the members to be updated.
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, struct prctl_mm_map *, size)
struct prctl_mm_map {
__u64 start_code;
__u64 end_code;
__u64 start_data;
__u64 end_data;
__u64 start_brk;
__u64 brk;
__u64 start_stack;
__u64 arg_start;
__u64 arg_end;
__u64 env_start;
__u64 env_end;
__u64 *auxv;
__u32 auxv_size;
__u32 exe_fd;
};
All members except @exe_fd correspond ones of struct mm_struct. To figure
out which available values these members may take here are meanings of the
members.
- start_code, end_code: represent bounds of executable code area
- start_data, end_data: represent bounds of data area
- start_brk, brk: used to calculate bounds for brk() syscall
- start_stack: used when accounting space needed for command
line arguments, environment and shmat() syscall
- arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end: represent memory area
supplied for command line arguments and environment variables
- auxv, auxv_size: carries auxiliary vector, Elf format specifics
- exe_fd: file descriptor number for executable link (/proc/self/exe)
Thus we apply the following requirements to the values
1) Any member except @auxv, @auxv_size, @exe_fd is rather an address
in user space thus it must be laying inside [mmap_min_addr, mmap_max_addr)
interval.
2) While @[start|end]_code and @[start|end]_data may point to an nonexisting
VMAs (say a program maps own new .text and .data segments during execution)
the rest of members should belong to VMA which must exist.
3) Addresses must be ordered, ie @start_ member must not be greater or
equal to appropriate @end_ member.
4) As in regular Elf loading procedure we require that @start_brk and
@brk be greater than @end_data.
5) If RLIMIT_DATA rlimit is set to non-infinity new values should not
exceed existing limit. Same applies to RLIMIT_STACK.
6) Auxiliary vector size must not exceed existing one (which is
predefined as AT_VECTOR_SIZE and depends on architecture).
7) File descriptor passed in @exe_file should be pointing
to executable file (because we use existing prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked
helper it ensures that the file we are going to use as exe link has all
required permission granted).
Now about where these members are involved inside kernel code:
- @start_code and @end_code are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output;
- @start_data and @end_data are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output,
also they are considered if there enough space for brk() syscall
result if RLIMIT_DATA is set;
- @start_brk shown in /proc/$pid/stat output and accounted in brk()
syscall if RLIMIT_DATA is set; also this member is tested to
find a symbolic name of mmap event for perf system (we choose
if event is generated for "heap" area); one more aplication is
selinux -- we test if a process has PROCESS__EXECHEAP permission
if trying to make heap area being executable with mprotect() syscall;
- @brk is a current value for brk() syscall which lays inside heap
area, it's shown in /proc/$pid/stat. When syscall brk() succesfully
provides new memory area to a user space upon brk() completion the
mm::brk is updated to carry new value;
Both @start_brk and @brk are actively used in /proc/$pid/maps
and /proc/$pid/smaps output to find a symbolic name "heap" for
VMA being scanned;
- @start_stack is printed out in /proc/$pid/stat and used to
find a symbolic name "stack" for task and threads in
/proc/$pid/maps and /proc/$pid/smaps output, and as the same
as with @start_brk -- perf system uses it for event naming.
Also kernel treat this member as a start address of where
to map vDSO pages and to check if there is enough space
for shmat() syscall;
- @arg_start, @arg_end, @env_start and @env_end are printed out
in /proc/$pid/stat. Another access to the data these members
represent is to read /proc/$pid/environ or /proc/$pid/cmdline.
Any attempt to read these areas kernel tests with access_process_vm
helper so a user must have enough rights for this action;
- @auxv and @auxv_size may be read from /proc/$pid/auxv. Strictly
speaking kernel doesn't care much about which exactly data is
sitting there because it is solely for userspace;
- @exe_fd is referred from /proc/$pid/exe and when generating
coredump. We uses prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked helper to update
this member, so exe-file link modification remains one-shot
action.
Still note that updating exe-file link now doesn't require sys-resource
capability anymore, after all there is no much profit in preventing setup
own file link (there are a number of ways to execute own code -- ptrace,
ld-preload, so that the only reliable way to find which exactly code is
executed is to inspect running program memory). Still we require the
caller to be at least user-namespace root user.
I believe the old interface should be deprecated and ripped off in a
couple of kernel releases if no one against.
To test if new interface is implemented in the kernel one can pass
PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE opcode and the kernel returns the size of currently
supported struct prctl_mm_map.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix 80-col wordwrap in macro definitions]
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Tested-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-09 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (prctl_map.auxv_size) {
|
2019-06-01 05:30:16 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Someone is trying to cheat the auxv vector.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (!prctl_map.auxv ||
|
|
|
|
|
prctl_map.auxv_size > sizeof(mm->saved_auxv))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation
During development of c/r we've noticed that in case if we need to support
user namespaces we face a problem with capabilities in prctl(PR_SET_MM,
...) call, in particular once new user namespace is created
capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) no longer passes.
A approach is to eliminate CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check but pass all new values
in one bundle, which would allow the kernel to make more intensive test
for sanity of values and same time allow us to support checkpoint/restore
of user namespaces.
Thus a new command PR_SET_MM_MAP introduced. It takes a pointer of
prctl_mm_map structure which carries all the members to be updated.
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, struct prctl_mm_map *, size)
struct prctl_mm_map {
__u64 start_code;
__u64 end_code;
__u64 start_data;
__u64 end_data;
__u64 start_brk;
__u64 brk;
__u64 start_stack;
__u64 arg_start;
__u64 arg_end;
__u64 env_start;
__u64 env_end;
__u64 *auxv;
__u32 auxv_size;
__u32 exe_fd;
};
All members except @exe_fd correspond ones of struct mm_struct. To figure
out which available values these members may take here are meanings of the
members.
- start_code, end_code: represent bounds of executable code area
- start_data, end_data: represent bounds of data area
- start_brk, brk: used to calculate bounds for brk() syscall
- start_stack: used when accounting space needed for command
line arguments, environment and shmat() syscall
- arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end: represent memory area
supplied for command line arguments and environment variables
- auxv, auxv_size: carries auxiliary vector, Elf format specifics
- exe_fd: file descriptor number for executable link (/proc/self/exe)
Thus we apply the following requirements to the values
1) Any member except @auxv, @auxv_size, @exe_fd is rather an address
in user space thus it must be laying inside [mmap_min_addr, mmap_max_addr)
interval.
2) While @[start|end]_code and @[start|end]_data may point to an nonexisting
VMAs (say a program maps own new .text and .data segments during execution)
the rest of members should belong to VMA which must exist.
3) Addresses must be ordered, ie @start_ member must not be greater or
equal to appropriate @end_ member.
4) As in regular Elf loading procedure we require that @start_brk and
@brk be greater than @end_data.
5) If RLIMIT_DATA rlimit is set to non-infinity new values should not
exceed existing limit. Same applies to RLIMIT_STACK.
6) Auxiliary vector size must not exceed existing one (which is
predefined as AT_VECTOR_SIZE and depends on architecture).
7) File descriptor passed in @exe_file should be pointing
to executable file (because we use existing prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked
helper it ensures that the file we are going to use as exe link has all
required permission granted).
Now about where these members are involved inside kernel code:
- @start_code and @end_code are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output;
- @start_data and @end_data are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output,
also they are considered if there enough space for brk() syscall
result if RLIMIT_DATA is set;
- @start_brk shown in /proc/$pid/stat output and accounted in brk()
syscall if RLIMIT_DATA is set; also this member is tested to
find a symbolic name of mmap event for perf system (we choose
if event is generated for "heap" area); one more aplication is
selinux -- we test if a process has PROCESS__EXECHEAP permission
if trying to make heap area being executable with mprotect() syscall;
- @brk is a current value for brk() syscall which lays inside heap
area, it's shown in /proc/$pid/stat. When syscall brk() succesfully
provides new memory area to a user space upon brk() completion the
mm::brk is updated to carry new value;
Both @start_brk and @brk are actively used in /proc/$pid/maps
and /proc/$pid/smaps output to find a symbolic name "heap" for
VMA being scanned;
- @start_stack is printed out in /proc/$pid/stat and used to
find a symbolic name "stack" for task and threads in
/proc/$pid/maps and /proc/$pid/smaps output, and as the same
as with @start_brk -- perf system uses it for event naming.
Also kernel treat this member as a start address of where
to map vDSO pages and to check if there is enough space
for shmat() syscall;
- @arg_start, @arg_end, @env_start and @env_end are printed out
in /proc/$pid/stat. Another access to the data these members
represent is to read /proc/$pid/environ or /proc/$pid/cmdline.
Any attempt to read these areas kernel tests with access_process_vm
helper so a user must have enough rights for this action;
- @auxv and @auxv_size may be read from /proc/$pid/auxv. Strictly
speaking kernel doesn't care much about which exactly data is
sitting there because it is solely for userspace;
- @exe_fd is referred from /proc/$pid/exe and when generating
coredump. We uses prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked helper to update
this member, so exe-file link modification remains one-shot
action.
Still note that updating exe-file link now doesn't require sys-resource
capability anymore, after all there is no much profit in preventing setup
own file link (there are a number of ways to execute own code -- ptrace,
ld-preload, so that the only reliable way to find which exactly code is
executed is to inspect running program memory). Still we require the
caller to be at least user-namespace root user.
I believe the old interface should be deprecated and ripped off in a
couple of kernel releases if no one against.
To test if new interface is implemented in the kernel one can pass
PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE opcode and the kernel returns the size of currently
supported struct prctl_mm_map.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix 80-col wordwrap in macro definitions]
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Tested-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-09 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
memset(user_auxv, 0, sizeof(user_auxv));
|
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(user_auxv,
|
|
|
|
|
(const void __user *)prctl_map.auxv,
|
|
|
|
|
prctl_map.auxv_size))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Last entry must be AT_NULL as specification requires */
|
|
|
|
|
user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 2] = AT_NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = AT_NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-20 23:01:02 +00:00
|
|
|
if (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1) {
|
2019-06-01 05:30:16 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
prctl: Allow local CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to change /proc/self/exe
Originally, only a local CAP_SYS_ADMIN could change the exe link,
making it difficult for doing checkpoint/restore without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
This commit adds CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE in addition to CAP_SYS_ADMIN
for permitting changing the exe link.
The following describes the history of the /proc/self/exe permission
checks as it may be difficult to understand what decisions lead to this
point.
* [1] May 2012: This commit introduces the ability of changing
/proc/self/exe if the user is CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capable.
In the related discussion [2], no clear thread model is presented for
what could happen if the /proc/self/exe changes multiple times, or why
would the admin be at the mercy of userspace.
* [3] Oct 2014: This commit introduces a new API to change
/proc/self/exe. The permission no longer checks for CAP_SYS_RESOURCE,
but instead checks if the current user is root (uid=0) in its local
namespace. In the related discussion [4] it is said that "Controlling
exe_fd without privileges may turn out to be dangerous. At least
things like tomoyo examine it for making policy decisions (see
tomoyo_manager())."
* [5] Dec 2016: This commit removes the restriction to change
/proc/self/exe at most once. The related discussion [6] informs that
the audit subsystem relies on the exe symlink, presumably
audit_log_d_path_exe() in kernel/audit.c.
* [7] May 2017: This commit changed the check from uid==0 to local
CAP_SYS_ADMIN. No discussion.
* [8] July 2020: A PoC to spoof any program's /proc/self/exe via ptrace
is demonstrated
Overall, the concrete points that were made to retain capability checks
around changing the exe symlink is that tomoyo_manager() and
audit_log_d_path_exe() uses the exe_file path.
Christian Brauner said that relying on /proc/<pid>/exe being immutable (or
guarded by caps) in a sake of security is a bit misleading. It can only
be used as a hint without any guarantees of what code is being executed
once execve() returns to userspace. Christian suggested that in the
future, we could call audit_log() or similar to inform the admin of all
exe link changes, instead of attempting to provide security guarantees
via permission checks. However, this proposed change requires the
understanding of the security implications in the tomoyo/audit subsystems.
[1] b32dfe377102 ("c/r: prctl: add ability to set new mm_struct::exe_file")
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/292515/
[3] f606b77f1a9e ("prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation")
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/479359/
[5] 3fb4afd9a504 ("prctl: remove one-shot limitation for changing exe link")
[6] https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/697304/
[7] 4d28df6152aa ("prctl: Allow local CAP_SYS_ADMIN changing exe_file")
[8] https://github.com/nviennot/run_as_exe
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200719100418.2112740-6-areber@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2020-07-19 10:04:15 +00:00
|
|
|
* Check if the current user is checkpoint/restore capable.
|
|
|
|
|
* At the time of this writing, it checks for CAP_SYS_ADMIN
|
|
|
|
|
* or CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
|
|
|
|
|
* Note that a user with access to ptrace can masquerade an
|
|
|
|
|
* arbitrary program as any executable, even setuid ones.
|
|
|
|
|
* This may have implications in the tomoyo subsystem.
|
2019-06-01 05:30:16 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
prctl: Allow local CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to change /proc/self/exe
Originally, only a local CAP_SYS_ADMIN could change the exe link,
making it difficult for doing checkpoint/restore without CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
This commit adds CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE in addition to CAP_SYS_ADMIN
for permitting changing the exe link.
The following describes the history of the /proc/self/exe permission
checks as it may be difficult to understand what decisions lead to this
point.
* [1] May 2012: This commit introduces the ability of changing
/proc/self/exe if the user is CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capable.
In the related discussion [2], no clear thread model is presented for
what could happen if the /proc/self/exe changes multiple times, or why
would the admin be at the mercy of userspace.
* [3] Oct 2014: This commit introduces a new API to change
/proc/self/exe. The permission no longer checks for CAP_SYS_RESOURCE,
but instead checks if the current user is root (uid=0) in its local
namespace. In the related discussion [4] it is said that "Controlling
exe_fd without privileges may turn out to be dangerous. At least
things like tomoyo examine it for making policy decisions (see
tomoyo_manager())."
* [5] Dec 2016: This commit removes the restriction to change
/proc/self/exe at most once. The related discussion [6] informs that
the audit subsystem relies on the exe symlink, presumably
audit_log_d_path_exe() in kernel/audit.c.
* [7] May 2017: This commit changed the check from uid==0 to local
CAP_SYS_ADMIN. No discussion.
* [8] July 2020: A PoC to spoof any program's /proc/self/exe via ptrace
is demonstrated
Overall, the concrete points that were made to retain capability checks
around changing the exe symlink is that tomoyo_manager() and
audit_log_d_path_exe() uses the exe_file path.
Christian Brauner said that relying on /proc/<pid>/exe being immutable (or
guarded by caps) in a sake of security is a bit misleading. It can only
be used as a hint without any guarantees of what code is being executed
once execve() returns to userspace. Christian suggested that in the
future, we could call audit_log() or similar to inform the admin of all
exe link changes, instead of attempting to provide security guarantees
via permission checks. However, this proposed change requires the
understanding of the security implications in the tomoyo/audit subsystems.
[1] b32dfe377102 ("c/r: prctl: add ability to set new mm_struct::exe_file")
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/292515/
[3] f606b77f1a9e ("prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation")
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/479359/
[5] 3fb4afd9a504 ("prctl: remove one-shot limitation for changing exe link")
[6] https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/697304/
[7] 4d28df6152aa ("prctl: Allow local CAP_SYS_ADMIN changing exe_file")
[8] https://github.com/nviennot/run_as_exe
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200719100418.2112740-6-areber@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2020-07-19 10:04:15 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(current_user_ns()))
|
2020-07-19 10:04:16 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
2019-06-01 05:30:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-04-16 19:47:59 +00:00
|
|
|
error = prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, prctl_map.exe_fd);
|
2016-01-20 23:01:02 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
mm: introduce arg_lock to protect arg_start|end and env_start|end in mm_struct
mmap_sem is on the hot path of kernel, and it very contended, but it is
abused too. It is used to protect arg_start|end and evn_start|end when
reading /proc/$PID/cmdline and /proc/$PID/environ, but it doesn't make
sense since those proc files just expect to read 4 values atomically and
not related to VM, they could be set to arbitrary values by C/R.
And, the mmap_sem contention may cause unexpected issue like below:
INFO: task ps:14018 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
Tainted: G E 4.9.79-009.ali3000.alios7.x86_64 #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this
message.
ps D 0 14018 1 0x00000004
Call Trace:
schedule+0x36/0x80
rwsem_down_read_failed+0xf0/0x150
call_rwsem_down_read_failed+0x18/0x30
down_read+0x20/0x40
proc_pid_cmdline_read+0xd9/0x4e0
__vfs_read+0x37/0x150
vfs_read+0x96/0x130
SyS_read+0x55/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xc5
Both Alexey Dobriyan and Michal Hocko suggested to use dedicated lock
for them to mitigate the abuse of mmap_sem.
So, introduce a new spinlock in mm_struct to protect the concurrent
access to arg_start|end, env_start|end and others, as well as replace
write map_sem to read to protect the race condition between prctl and
sys_brk which might break check_data_rlimit(), and makes prctl more
friendly to other VM operations.
This patch just eliminates the abuse of mmap_sem, but it can't resolve
the above hung task warning completely since the later
access_remote_vm() call needs acquire mmap_sem. The mmap_sem
scalability issue will be solved in the future.
[yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com: add comment about mmap_sem and arg_lock]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524077799-80690-1-git-send-email-yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1523730291-109696-1-git-send-email-yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-08 00:05:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2021-05-07 01:06:36 +00:00
|
|
|
* arg_lock protects concurrent updates but we still need mmap_lock for
|
mm: introduce arg_lock to protect arg_start|end and env_start|end in mm_struct
mmap_sem is on the hot path of kernel, and it very contended, but it is
abused too. It is used to protect arg_start|end and evn_start|end when
reading /proc/$PID/cmdline and /proc/$PID/environ, but it doesn't make
sense since those proc files just expect to read 4 values atomically and
not related to VM, they could be set to arbitrary values by C/R.
And, the mmap_sem contention may cause unexpected issue like below:
INFO: task ps:14018 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
Tainted: G E 4.9.79-009.ali3000.alios7.x86_64 #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this
message.
ps D 0 14018 1 0x00000004
Call Trace:
schedule+0x36/0x80
rwsem_down_read_failed+0xf0/0x150
call_rwsem_down_read_failed+0x18/0x30
down_read+0x20/0x40
proc_pid_cmdline_read+0xd9/0x4e0
__vfs_read+0x37/0x150
vfs_read+0x96/0x130
SyS_read+0x55/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xc5
Both Alexey Dobriyan and Michal Hocko suggested to use dedicated lock
for them to mitigate the abuse of mmap_sem.
So, introduce a new spinlock in mm_struct to protect the concurrent
access to arg_start|end, env_start|end and others, as well as replace
write map_sem to read to protect the race condition between prctl and
sys_brk which might break check_data_rlimit(), and makes prctl more
friendly to other VM operations.
This patch just eliminates the abuse of mmap_sem, but it can't resolve
the above hung task warning completely since the later
access_remote_vm() call needs acquire mmap_sem. The mmap_sem
scalability issue will be solved in the future.
[yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com: add comment about mmap_sem and arg_lock]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524077799-80690-1-git-send-email-yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1523730291-109696-1-git-send-email-yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-08 00:05:28 +00:00
|
|
|
* read to exclude races with sys_brk.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-06-09 04:33:25 +00:00
|
|
|
mmap_read_lock(mm);
|
prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation
During development of c/r we've noticed that in case if we need to support
user namespaces we face a problem with capabilities in prctl(PR_SET_MM,
...) call, in particular once new user namespace is created
capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) no longer passes.
A approach is to eliminate CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check but pass all new values
in one bundle, which would allow the kernel to make more intensive test
for sanity of values and same time allow us to support checkpoint/restore
of user namespaces.
Thus a new command PR_SET_MM_MAP introduced. It takes a pointer of
prctl_mm_map structure which carries all the members to be updated.
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, struct prctl_mm_map *, size)
struct prctl_mm_map {
__u64 start_code;
__u64 end_code;
__u64 start_data;
__u64 end_data;
__u64 start_brk;
__u64 brk;
__u64 start_stack;
__u64 arg_start;
__u64 arg_end;
__u64 env_start;
__u64 env_end;
__u64 *auxv;
__u32 auxv_size;
__u32 exe_fd;
};
All members except @exe_fd correspond ones of struct mm_struct. To figure
out which available values these members may take here are meanings of the
members.
- start_code, end_code: represent bounds of executable code area
- start_data, end_data: represent bounds of data area
- start_brk, brk: used to calculate bounds for brk() syscall
- start_stack: used when accounting space needed for command
line arguments, environment and shmat() syscall
- arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end: represent memory area
supplied for command line arguments and environment variables
- auxv, auxv_size: carries auxiliary vector, Elf format specifics
- exe_fd: file descriptor number for executable link (/proc/self/exe)
Thus we apply the following requirements to the values
1) Any member except @auxv, @auxv_size, @exe_fd is rather an address
in user space thus it must be laying inside [mmap_min_addr, mmap_max_addr)
interval.
2) While @[start|end]_code and @[start|end]_data may point to an nonexisting
VMAs (say a program maps own new .text and .data segments during execution)
the rest of members should belong to VMA which must exist.
3) Addresses must be ordered, ie @start_ member must not be greater or
equal to appropriate @end_ member.
4) As in regular Elf loading procedure we require that @start_brk and
@brk be greater than @end_data.
5) If RLIMIT_DATA rlimit is set to non-infinity new values should not
exceed existing limit. Same applies to RLIMIT_STACK.
6) Auxiliary vector size must not exceed existing one (which is
predefined as AT_VECTOR_SIZE and depends on architecture).
7) File descriptor passed in @exe_file should be pointing
to executable file (because we use existing prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked
helper it ensures that the file we are going to use as exe link has all
required permission granted).
Now about where these members are involved inside kernel code:
- @start_code and @end_code are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output;
- @start_data and @end_data are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output,
also they are considered if there enough space for brk() syscall
result if RLIMIT_DATA is set;
- @start_brk shown in /proc/$pid/stat output and accounted in brk()
syscall if RLIMIT_DATA is set; also this member is tested to
find a symbolic name of mmap event for perf system (we choose
if event is generated for "heap" area); one more aplication is
selinux -- we test if a process has PROCESS__EXECHEAP permission
if trying to make heap area being executable with mprotect() syscall;
- @brk is a current value for brk() syscall which lays inside heap
area, it's shown in /proc/$pid/stat. When syscall brk() succesfully
provides new memory area to a user space upon brk() completion the
mm::brk is updated to carry new value;
Both @start_brk and @brk are actively used in /proc/$pid/maps
and /proc/$pid/smaps output to find a symbolic name "heap" for
VMA being scanned;
- @start_stack is printed out in /proc/$pid/stat and used to
find a symbolic name "stack" for task and threads in
/proc/$pid/maps and /proc/$pid/smaps output, and as the same
as with @start_brk -- perf system uses it for event naming.
Also kernel treat this member as a start address of where
to map vDSO pages and to check if there is enough space
for shmat() syscall;
- @arg_start, @arg_end, @env_start and @env_end are printed out
in /proc/$pid/stat. Another access to the data these members
represent is to read /proc/$pid/environ or /proc/$pid/cmdline.
Any attempt to read these areas kernel tests with access_process_vm
helper so a user must have enough rights for this action;
- @auxv and @auxv_size may be read from /proc/$pid/auxv. Strictly
speaking kernel doesn't care much about which exactly data is
sitting there because it is solely for userspace;
- @exe_fd is referred from /proc/$pid/exe and when generating
coredump. We uses prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked helper to update
this member, so exe-file link modification remains one-shot
action.
Still note that updating exe-file link now doesn't require sys-resource
capability anymore, after all there is no much profit in preventing setup
own file link (there are a number of ways to execute own code -- ptrace,
ld-preload, so that the only reliable way to find which exactly code is
executed is to inspect running program memory). Still we require the
caller to be at least user-namespace root user.
I believe the old interface should be deprecated and ripped off in a
couple of kernel releases if no one against.
To test if new interface is implemented in the kernel one can pass
PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE opcode and the kernel returns the size of currently
supported struct prctl_mm_map.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix 80-col wordwrap in macro definitions]
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Tested-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-09 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* We don't validate if these members are pointing to
|
|
|
|
|
* real present VMAs because application may have correspond
|
|
|
|
|
* VMAs already unmapped and kernel uses these members for statistics
|
|
|
|
|
* output in procfs mostly, except
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
2020-10-16 03:10:25 +00:00
|
|
|
* - @start_brk/@brk which are used in do_brk_flags but kernel lookups
|
2021-05-07 01:06:36 +00:00
|
|
|
* for VMAs when updating these members so anything wrong written
|
prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation
During development of c/r we've noticed that in case if we need to support
user namespaces we face a problem with capabilities in prctl(PR_SET_MM,
...) call, in particular once new user namespace is created
capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) no longer passes.
A approach is to eliminate CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check but pass all new values
in one bundle, which would allow the kernel to make more intensive test
for sanity of values and same time allow us to support checkpoint/restore
of user namespaces.
Thus a new command PR_SET_MM_MAP introduced. It takes a pointer of
prctl_mm_map structure which carries all the members to be updated.
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, struct prctl_mm_map *, size)
struct prctl_mm_map {
__u64 start_code;
__u64 end_code;
__u64 start_data;
__u64 end_data;
__u64 start_brk;
__u64 brk;
__u64 start_stack;
__u64 arg_start;
__u64 arg_end;
__u64 env_start;
__u64 env_end;
__u64 *auxv;
__u32 auxv_size;
__u32 exe_fd;
};
All members except @exe_fd correspond ones of struct mm_struct. To figure
out which available values these members may take here are meanings of the
members.
- start_code, end_code: represent bounds of executable code area
- start_data, end_data: represent bounds of data area
- start_brk, brk: used to calculate bounds for brk() syscall
- start_stack: used when accounting space needed for command
line arguments, environment and shmat() syscall
- arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end: represent memory area
supplied for command line arguments and environment variables
- auxv, auxv_size: carries auxiliary vector, Elf format specifics
- exe_fd: file descriptor number for executable link (/proc/self/exe)
Thus we apply the following requirements to the values
1) Any member except @auxv, @auxv_size, @exe_fd is rather an address
in user space thus it must be laying inside [mmap_min_addr, mmap_max_addr)
interval.
2) While @[start|end]_code and @[start|end]_data may point to an nonexisting
VMAs (say a program maps own new .text and .data segments during execution)
the rest of members should belong to VMA which must exist.
3) Addresses must be ordered, ie @start_ member must not be greater or
equal to appropriate @end_ member.
4) As in regular Elf loading procedure we require that @start_brk and
@brk be greater than @end_data.
5) If RLIMIT_DATA rlimit is set to non-infinity new values should not
exceed existing limit. Same applies to RLIMIT_STACK.
6) Auxiliary vector size must not exceed existing one (which is
predefined as AT_VECTOR_SIZE and depends on architecture).
7) File descriptor passed in @exe_file should be pointing
to executable file (because we use existing prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked
helper it ensures that the file we are going to use as exe link has all
required permission granted).
Now about where these members are involved inside kernel code:
- @start_code and @end_code are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output;
- @start_data and @end_data are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output,
also they are considered if there enough space for brk() syscall
result if RLIMIT_DATA is set;
- @start_brk shown in /proc/$pid/stat output and accounted in brk()
syscall if RLIMIT_DATA is set; also this member is tested to
find a symbolic name of mmap event for perf system (we choose
if event is generated for "heap" area); one more aplication is
selinux -- we test if a process has PROCESS__EXECHEAP permission
if trying to make heap area being executable with mprotect() syscall;
- @brk is a current value for brk() syscall which lays inside heap
area, it's shown in /proc/$pid/stat. When syscall brk() succesfully
provides new memory area to a user space upon brk() completion the
mm::brk is updated to carry new value;
Both @start_brk and @brk are actively used in /proc/$pid/maps
and /proc/$pid/smaps output to find a symbolic name "heap" for
VMA being scanned;
- @start_stack is printed out in /proc/$pid/stat and used to
find a symbolic name "stack" for task and threads in
/proc/$pid/maps and /proc/$pid/smaps output, and as the same
as with @start_brk -- perf system uses it for event naming.
Also kernel treat this member as a start address of where
to map vDSO pages and to check if there is enough space
for shmat() syscall;
- @arg_start, @arg_end, @env_start and @env_end are printed out
in /proc/$pid/stat. Another access to the data these members
represent is to read /proc/$pid/environ or /proc/$pid/cmdline.
Any attempt to read these areas kernel tests with access_process_vm
helper so a user must have enough rights for this action;
- @auxv and @auxv_size may be read from /proc/$pid/auxv. Strictly
speaking kernel doesn't care much about which exactly data is
sitting there because it is solely for userspace;
- @exe_fd is referred from /proc/$pid/exe and when generating
coredump. We uses prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked helper to update
this member, so exe-file link modification remains one-shot
action.
Still note that updating exe-file link now doesn't require sys-resource
capability anymore, after all there is no much profit in preventing setup
own file link (there are a number of ways to execute own code -- ptrace,
ld-preload, so that the only reliable way to find which exactly code is
executed is to inspect running program memory). Still we require the
caller to be at least user-namespace root user.
I believe the old interface should be deprecated and ripped off in a
couple of kernel releases if no one against.
To test if new interface is implemented in the kernel one can pass
PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE opcode and the kernel returns the size of currently
supported struct prctl_mm_map.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix 80-col wordwrap in macro definitions]
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Tested-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-09 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
* here cause kernel to swear at userspace program but won't lead
|
|
|
|
|
* to any problem in kernel itself
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
mm: introduce arg_lock to protect arg_start|end and env_start|end in mm_struct
mmap_sem is on the hot path of kernel, and it very contended, but it is
abused too. It is used to protect arg_start|end and evn_start|end when
reading /proc/$PID/cmdline and /proc/$PID/environ, but it doesn't make
sense since those proc files just expect to read 4 values atomically and
not related to VM, they could be set to arbitrary values by C/R.
And, the mmap_sem contention may cause unexpected issue like below:
INFO: task ps:14018 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
Tainted: G E 4.9.79-009.ali3000.alios7.x86_64 #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this
message.
ps D 0 14018 1 0x00000004
Call Trace:
schedule+0x36/0x80
rwsem_down_read_failed+0xf0/0x150
call_rwsem_down_read_failed+0x18/0x30
down_read+0x20/0x40
proc_pid_cmdline_read+0xd9/0x4e0
__vfs_read+0x37/0x150
vfs_read+0x96/0x130
SyS_read+0x55/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xc5
Both Alexey Dobriyan and Michal Hocko suggested to use dedicated lock
for them to mitigate the abuse of mmap_sem.
So, introduce a new spinlock in mm_struct to protect the concurrent
access to arg_start|end, env_start|end and others, as well as replace
write map_sem to read to protect the race condition between prctl and
sys_brk which might break check_data_rlimit(), and makes prctl more
friendly to other VM operations.
This patch just eliminates the abuse of mmap_sem, but it can't resolve
the above hung task warning completely since the later
access_remote_vm() call needs acquire mmap_sem. The mmap_sem
scalability issue will be solved in the future.
[yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com: add comment about mmap_sem and arg_lock]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524077799-80690-1-git-send-email-yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1523730291-109696-1-git-send-email-yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-08 00:05:28 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_lock(&mm->arg_lock);
|
prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation
During development of c/r we've noticed that in case if we need to support
user namespaces we face a problem with capabilities in prctl(PR_SET_MM,
...) call, in particular once new user namespace is created
capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) no longer passes.
A approach is to eliminate CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check but pass all new values
in one bundle, which would allow the kernel to make more intensive test
for sanity of values and same time allow us to support checkpoint/restore
of user namespaces.
Thus a new command PR_SET_MM_MAP introduced. It takes a pointer of
prctl_mm_map structure which carries all the members to be updated.
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, struct prctl_mm_map *, size)
struct prctl_mm_map {
__u64 start_code;
__u64 end_code;
__u64 start_data;
__u64 end_data;
__u64 start_brk;
__u64 brk;
__u64 start_stack;
__u64 arg_start;
__u64 arg_end;
__u64 env_start;
__u64 env_end;
__u64 *auxv;
__u32 auxv_size;
__u32 exe_fd;
};
All members except @exe_fd correspond ones of struct mm_struct. To figure
out which available values these members may take here are meanings of the
members.
- start_code, end_code: represent bounds of executable code area
- start_data, end_data: represent bounds of data area
- start_brk, brk: used to calculate bounds for brk() syscall
- start_stack: used when accounting space needed for command
line arguments, environment and shmat() syscall
- arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end: represent memory area
supplied for command line arguments and environment variables
- auxv, auxv_size: carries auxiliary vector, Elf format specifics
- exe_fd: file descriptor number for executable link (/proc/self/exe)
Thus we apply the following requirements to the values
1) Any member except @auxv, @auxv_size, @exe_fd is rather an address
in user space thus it must be laying inside [mmap_min_addr, mmap_max_addr)
interval.
2) While @[start|end]_code and @[start|end]_data may point to an nonexisting
VMAs (say a program maps own new .text and .data segments during execution)
the rest of members should belong to VMA which must exist.
3) Addresses must be ordered, ie @start_ member must not be greater or
equal to appropriate @end_ member.
4) As in regular Elf loading procedure we require that @start_brk and
@brk be greater than @end_data.
5) If RLIMIT_DATA rlimit is set to non-infinity new values should not
exceed existing limit. Same applies to RLIMIT_STACK.
6) Auxiliary vector size must not exceed existing one (which is
predefined as AT_VECTOR_SIZE and depends on architecture).
7) File descriptor passed in @exe_file should be pointing
to executable file (because we use existing prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked
helper it ensures that the file we are going to use as exe link has all
required permission granted).
Now about where these members are involved inside kernel code:
- @start_code and @end_code are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output;
- @start_data and @end_data are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output,
also they are considered if there enough space for brk() syscall
result if RLIMIT_DATA is set;
- @start_brk shown in /proc/$pid/stat output and accounted in brk()
syscall if RLIMIT_DATA is set; also this member is tested to
find a symbolic name of mmap event for perf system (we choose
if event is generated for "heap" area); one more aplication is
selinux -- we test if a process has PROCESS__EXECHEAP permission
if trying to make heap area being executable with mprotect() syscall;
- @brk is a current value for brk() syscall which lays inside heap
area, it's shown in /proc/$pid/stat. When syscall brk() succesfully
provides new memory area to a user space upon brk() completion the
mm::brk is updated to carry new value;
Both @start_brk and @brk are actively used in /proc/$pid/maps
and /proc/$pid/smaps output to find a symbolic name "heap" for
VMA being scanned;
- @start_stack is printed out in /proc/$pid/stat and used to
find a symbolic name "stack" for task and threads in
/proc/$pid/maps and /proc/$pid/smaps output, and as the same
as with @start_brk -- perf system uses it for event naming.
Also kernel treat this member as a start address of where
to map vDSO pages and to check if there is enough space
for shmat() syscall;
- @arg_start, @arg_end, @env_start and @env_end are printed out
in /proc/$pid/stat. Another access to the data these members
represent is to read /proc/$pid/environ or /proc/$pid/cmdline.
Any attempt to read these areas kernel tests with access_process_vm
helper so a user must have enough rights for this action;
- @auxv and @auxv_size may be read from /proc/$pid/auxv. Strictly
speaking kernel doesn't care much about which exactly data is
sitting there because it is solely for userspace;
- @exe_fd is referred from /proc/$pid/exe and when generating
coredump. We uses prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked helper to update
this member, so exe-file link modification remains one-shot
action.
Still note that updating exe-file link now doesn't require sys-resource
capability anymore, after all there is no much profit in preventing setup
own file link (there are a number of ways to execute own code -- ptrace,
ld-preload, so that the only reliable way to find which exactly code is
executed is to inspect running program memory). Still we require the
caller to be at least user-namespace root user.
I believe the old interface should be deprecated and ripped off in a
couple of kernel releases if no one against.
To test if new interface is implemented in the kernel one can pass
PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE opcode and the kernel returns the size of currently
supported struct prctl_mm_map.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix 80-col wordwrap in macro definitions]
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Tested-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-09 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
mm->start_code = prctl_map.start_code;
|
|
|
|
|
mm->end_code = prctl_map.end_code;
|
|
|
|
|
mm->start_data = prctl_map.start_data;
|
|
|
|
|
mm->end_data = prctl_map.end_data;
|
|
|
|
|
mm->start_brk = prctl_map.start_brk;
|
|
|
|
|
mm->brk = prctl_map.brk;
|
|
|
|
|
mm->start_stack = prctl_map.start_stack;
|
|
|
|
|
mm->arg_start = prctl_map.arg_start;
|
|
|
|
|
mm->arg_end = prctl_map.arg_end;
|
|
|
|
|
mm->env_start = prctl_map.env_start;
|
|
|
|
|
mm->env_end = prctl_map.env_end;
|
mm: introduce arg_lock to protect arg_start|end and env_start|end in mm_struct
mmap_sem is on the hot path of kernel, and it very contended, but it is
abused too. It is used to protect arg_start|end and evn_start|end when
reading /proc/$PID/cmdline and /proc/$PID/environ, but it doesn't make
sense since those proc files just expect to read 4 values atomically and
not related to VM, they could be set to arbitrary values by C/R.
And, the mmap_sem contention may cause unexpected issue like below:
INFO: task ps:14018 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
Tainted: G E 4.9.79-009.ali3000.alios7.x86_64 #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this
message.
ps D 0 14018 1 0x00000004
Call Trace:
schedule+0x36/0x80
rwsem_down_read_failed+0xf0/0x150
call_rwsem_down_read_failed+0x18/0x30
down_read+0x20/0x40
proc_pid_cmdline_read+0xd9/0x4e0
__vfs_read+0x37/0x150
vfs_read+0x96/0x130
SyS_read+0x55/0xc0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xc5
Both Alexey Dobriyan and Michal Hocko suggested to use dedicated lock
for them to mitigate the abuse of mmap_sem.
So, introduce a new spinlock in mm_struct to protect the concurrent
access to arg_start|end, env_start|end and others, as well as replace
write map_sem to read to protect the race condition between prctl and
sys_brk which might break check_data_rlimit(), and makes prctl more
friendly to other VM operations.
This patch just eliminates the abuse of mmap_sem, but it can't resolve
the above hung task warning completely since the later
access_remote_vm() call needs acquire mmap_sem. The mmap_sem
scalability issue will be solved in the future.
[yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com: add comment about mmap_sem and arg_lock]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1524077799-80690-1-git-send-email-yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1523730291-109696-1-git-send-email-yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-08 00:05:28 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&mm->arg_lock);
|
prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation
During development of c/r we've noticed that in case if we need to support
user namespaces we face a problem with capabilities in prctl(PR_SET_MM,
...) call, in particular once new user namespace is created
capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) no longer passes.
A approach is to eliminate CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check but pass all new values
in one bundle, which would allow the kernel to make more intensive test
for sanity of values and same time allow us to support checkpoint/restore
of user namespaces.
Thus a new command PR_SET_MM_MAP introduced. It takes a pointer of
prctl_mm_map structure which carries all the members to be updated.
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, struct prctl_mm_map *, size)
struct prctl_mm_map {
__u64 start_code;
__u64 end_code;
__u64 start_data;
__u64 end_data;
__u64 start_brk;
__u64 brk;
__u64 start_stack;
__u64 arg_start;
__u64 arg_end;
__u64 env_start;
__u64 env_end;
__u64 *auxv;
__u32 auxv_size;
__u32 exe_fd;
};
All members except @exe_fd correspond ones of struct mm_struct. To figure
out which available values these members may take here are meanings of the
members.
- start_code, end_code: represent bounds of executable code area
- start_data, end_data: represent bounds of data area
- start_brk, brk: used to calculate bounds for brk() syscall
- start_stack: used when accounting space needed for command
line arguments, environment and shmat() syscall
- arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end: represent memory area
supplied for command line arguments and environment variables
- auxv, auxv_size: carries auxiliary vector, Elf format specifics
- exe_fd: file descriptor number for executable link (/proc/self/exe)
Thus we apply the following requirements to the values
1) Any member except @auxv, @auxv_size, @exe_fd is rather an address
in user space thus it must be laying inside [mmap_min_addr, mmap_max_addr)
interval.
2) While @[start|end]_code and @[start|end]_data may point to an nonexisting
VMAs (say a program maps own new .text and .data segments during execution)
the rest of members should belong to VMA which must exist.
3) Addresses must be ordered, ie @start_ member must not be greater or
equal to appropriate @end_ member.
4) As in regular Elf loading procedure we require that @start_brk and
@brk be greater than @end_data.
5) If RLIMIT_DATA rlimit is set to non-infinity new values should not
exceed existing limit. Same applies to RLIMIT_STACK.
6) Auxiliary vector size must not exceed existing one (which is
predefined as AT_VECTOR_SIZE and depends on architecture).
7) File descriptor passed in @exe_file should be pointing
to executable file (because we use existing prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked
helper it ensures that the file we are going to use as exe link has all
required permission granted).
Now about where these members are involved inside kernel code:
- @start_code and @end_code are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output;
- @start_data and @end_data are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output,
also they are considered if there enough space for brk() syscall
result if RLIMIT_DATA is set;
- @start_brk shown in /proc/$pid/stat output and accounted in brk()
syscall if RLIMIT_DATA is set; also this member is tested to
find a symbolic name of mmap event for perf system (we choose
if event is generated for "heap" area); one more aplication is
selinux -- we test if a process has PROCESS__EXECHEAP permission
if trying to make heap area being executable with mprotect() syscall;
- @brk is a current value for brk() syscall which lays inside heap
area, it's shown in /proc/$pid/stat. When syscall brk() succesfully
provides new memory area to a user space upon brk() completion the
mm::brk is updated to carry new value;
Both @start_brk and @brk are actively used in /proc/$pid/maps
and /proc/$pid/smaps output to find a symbolic name "heap" for
VMA being scanned;
- @start_stack is printed out in /proc/$pid/stat and used to
find a symbolic name "stack" for task and threads in
/proc/$pid/maps and /proc/$pid/smaps output, and as the same
as with @start_brk -- perf system uses it for event naming.
Also kernel treat this member as a start address of where
to map vDSO pages and to check if there is enough space
for shmat() syscall;
- @arg_start, @arg_end, @env_start and @env_end are printed out
in /proc/$pid/stat. Another access to the data these members
represent is to read /proc/$pid/environ or /proc/$pid/cmdline.
Any attempt to read these areas kernel tests with access_process_vm
helper so a user must have enough rights for this action;
- @auxv and @auxv_size may be read from /proc/$pid/auxv. Strictly
speaking kernel doesn't care much about which exactly data is
sitting there because it is solely for userspace;
- @exe_fd is referred from /proc/$pid/exe and when generating
coredump. We uses prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked helper to update
this member, so exe-file link modification remains one-shot
action.
Still note that updating exe-file link now doesn't require sys-resource
capability anymore, after all there is no much profit in preventing setup
own file link (there are a number of ways to execute own code -- ptrace,
ld-preload, so that the only reliable way to find which exactly code is
executed is to inspect running program memory). Still we require the
caller to be at least user-namespace root user.
I believe the old interface should be deprecated and ripped off in a
couple of kernel releases if no one against.
To test if new interface is implemented in the kernel one can pass
PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE opcode and the kernel returns the size of currently
supported struct prctl_mm_map.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix 80-col wordwrap in macro definitions]
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Tested-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-09 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Note this update of @saved_auxv is lockless thus
|
|
|
|
|
* if someone reads this member in procfs while we're
|
|
|
|
|
* updating -- it may get partly updated results. It's
|
|
|
|
|
* known and acceptable trade off: we leave it as is to
|
|
|
|
|
* not introduce additional locks here making the kernel
|
|
|
|
|
* more complex.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (prctl_map.auxv_size)
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, sizeof(user_auxv));
|
|
|
|
|
|
2020-06-09 04:33:25 +00:00
|
|
|
mmap_read_unlock(mm);
|
2016-01-20 23:01:02 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation
During development of c/r we've noticed that in case if we need to support
user namespaces we face a problem with capabilities in prctl(PR_SET_MM,
...) call, in particular once new user namespace is created
capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) no longer passes.
A approach is to eliminate CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check but pass all new values
in one bundle, which would allow the kernel to make more intensive test
for sanity of values and same time allow us to support checkpoint/restore
of user namespaces.
Thus a new command PR_SET_MM_MAP introduced. It takes a pointer of
prctl_mm_map structure which carries all the members to be updated.
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, struct prctl_mm_map *, size)
struct prctl_mm_map {
__u64 start_code;
__u64 end_code;
__u64 start_data;
__u64 end_data;
__u64 start_brk;
__u64 brk;
__u64 start_stack;
__u64 arg_start;
__u64 arg_end;
__u64 env_start;
__u64 env_end;
__u64 *auxv;
__u32 auxv_size;
__u32 exe_fd;
};
All members except @exe_fd correspond ones of struct mm_struct. To figure
out which available values these members may take here are meanings of the
members.
- start_code, end_code: represent bounds of executable code area
- start_data, end_data: represent bounds of data area
- start_brk, brk: used to calculate bounds for brk() syscall
- start_stack: used when accounting space needed for command
line arguments, environment and shmat() syscall
- arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end: represent memory area
supplied for command line arguments and environment variables
- auxv, auxv_size: carries auxiliary vector, Elf format specifics
- exe_fd: file descriptor number for executable link (/proc/self/exe)
Thus we apply the following requirements to the values
1) Any member except @auxv, @auxv_size, @exe_fd is rather an address
in user space thus it must be laying inside [mmap_min_addr, mmap_max_addr)
interval.
2) While @[start|end]_code and @[start|end]_data may point to an nonexisting
VMAs (say a program maps own new .text and .data segments during execution)
the rest of members should belong to VMA which must exist.
3) Addresses must be ordered, ie @start_ member must not be greater or
equal to appropriate @end_ member.
4) As in regular Elf loading procedure we require that @start_brk and
@brk be greater than @end_data.
5) If RLIMIT_DATA rlimit is set to non-infinity new values should not
exceed existing limit. Same applies to RLIMIT_STACK.
6) Auxiliary vector size must not exceed existing one (which is
predefined as AT_VECTOR_SIZE and depends on architecture).
7) File descriptor passed in @exe_file should be pointing
to executable file (because we use existing prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked
helper it ensures that the file we are going to use as exe link has all
required permission granted).
Now about where these members are involved inside kernel code:
- @start_code and @end_code are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output;
- @start_data and @end_data are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output,
also they are considered if there enough space for brk() syscall
result if RLIMIT_DATA is set;
- @start_brk shown in /proc/$pid/stat output and accounted in brk()
syscall if RLIMIT_DATA is set; also this member is tested to
find a symbolic name of mmap event for perf system (we choose
if event is generated for "heap" area); one more aplication is
selinux -- we test if a process has PROCESS__EXECHEAP permission
if trying to make heap area being executable with mprotect() syscall;
- @brk is a current value for brk() syscall which lays inside heap
area, it's shown in /proc/$pid/stat. When syscall brk() succesfully
provides new memory area to a user space upon brk() completion the
mm::brk is updated to carry new value;
Both @start_brk and @brk are actively used in /proc/$pid/maps
and /proc/$pid/smaps output to find a symbolic name "heap" for
VMA being scanned;
- @start_stack is printed out in /proc/$pid/stat and used to
find a symbolic name "stack" for task and threads in
/proc/$pid/maps and /proc/$pid/smaps output, and as the same
as with @start_brk -- perf system uses it for event naming.
Also kernel treat this member as a start address of where
to map vDSO pages and to check if there is enough space
for shmat() syscall;
- @arg_start, @arg_end, @env_start and @env_end are printed out
in /proc/$pid/stat. Another access to the data these members
represent is to read /proc/$pid/environ or /proc/$pid/cmdline.
Any attempt to read these areas kernel tests with access_process_vm
helper so a user must have enough rights for this action;
- @auxv and @auxv_size may be read from /proc/$pid/auxv. Strictly
speaking kernel doesn't care much about which exactly data is
sitting there because it is solely for userspace;
- @exe_fd is referred from /proc/$pid/exe and when generating
coredump. We uses prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked helper to update
this member, so exe-file link modification remains one-shot
action.
Still note that updating exe-file link now doesn't require sys-resource
capability anymore, after all there is no much profit in preventing setup
own file link (there are a number of ways to execute own code -- ptrace,
ld-preload, so that the only reliable way to find which exactly code is
executed is to inspect running program memory). Still we require the
caller to be at least user-namespace root user.
I believe the old interface should be deprecated and ripped off in a
couple of kernel releases if no one against.
To test if new interface is implemented in the kernel one can pass
PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE opcode and the kernel returns the size of currently
supported struct prctl_mm_map.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix 80-col wordwrap in macro definitions]
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Tested-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-09 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */
|
|
|
|
|
|
prctl: more prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) checks
Individual prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) calls do some checking to maintain a
consistent view of mm->arg_start et al fields, but not enough. In
particular PR_SET_MM_ARG_START/PR_SET_MM_ARG_END/ R_SET_MM_ENV_START/
PR_SET_MM_ENV_END only check that the address lies in an existing VMA,
but don't check that the start address is lower than the end address _at
all_.
Consolidate all consistency checks, so there will be no difference in
the future between PR_SET_MM_MAP and individual PR_SET_MM_* calls.
The program below makes both ARGV and ENVP areas be reversed. It makes
/proc/$PID/cmdline show garbage (it doesn't oops by luck).
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
enum {PAGE_SIZE=4096};
int main(void)
{
void *p;
p = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
#define PR_SET_MM 35
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
pause();
return 0;
}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy code, tweak comment]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 22:00:51 +00:00
|
|
|
static int prctl_set_auxv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long len)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* This doesn't move the auxiliary vector itself since it's pinned to
|
|
|
|
|
* mm_struct, but it permits filling the vector with new values. It's
|
|
|
|
|
* up to the caller to provide sane values here, otherwise userspace
|
|
|
|
|
* tools which use this vector might be unhappy.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2021-03-14 20:51:14 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE] = {};
|
prctl: more prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) checks
Individual prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) calls do some checking to maintain a
consistent view of mm->arg_start et al fields, but not enough. In
particular PR_SET_MM_ARG_START/PR_SET_MM_ARG_END/ R_SET_MM_ENV_START/
PR_SET_MM_ENV_END only check that the address lies in an existing VMA,
but don't check that the start address is lower than the end address _at
all_.
Consolidate all consistency checks, so there will be no difference in
the future between PR_SET_MM_MAP and individual PR_SET_MM_* calls.
The program below makes both ARGV and ENVP areas be reversed. It makes
/proc/$PID/cmdline show garbage (it doesn't oops by luck).
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
enum {PAGE_SIZE=4096};
int main(void)
{
void *p;
p = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
#define PR_SET_MM 35
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
pause();
return 0;
}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy code, tweak comment]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 22:00:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (len > sizeof(user_auxv))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(user_auxv, (const void __user *)addr, len))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure the last entry is always AT_NULL */
|
|
|
|
|
user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 2] = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_auxv) != sizeof(mm->saved_auxv));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
task_lock(current);
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, len);
|
|
|
|
|
task_unlock(current);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-01-13 01:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr,
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
|
2019-06-01 05:30:16 +00:00
|
|
|
struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = {
|
|
|
|
|
.auxv = NULL,
|
|
|
|
|
.auxv_size = 0,
|
|
|
|
|
.exe_fd = -1,
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
2012-05-31 23:26:45 +00:00
|
|
|
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
|
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
2012-01-13 01:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation
During development of c/r we've noticed that in case if we need to support
user namespaces we face a problem with capabilities in prctl(PR_SET_MM,
...) call, in particular once new user namespace is created
capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) no longer passes.
A approach is to eliminate CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check but pass all new values
in one bundle, which would allow the kernel to make more intensive test
for sanity of values and same time allow us to support checkpoint/restore
of user namespaces.
Thus a new command PR_SET_MM_MAP introduced. It takes a pointer of
prctl_mm_map structure which carries all the members to be updated.
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, struct prctl_mm_map *, size)
struct prctl_mm_map {
__u64 start_code;
__u64 end_code;
__u64 start_data;
__u64 end_data;
__u64 start_brk;
__u64 brk;
__u64 start_stack;
__u64 arg_start;
__u64 arg_end;
__u64 env_start;
__u64 env_end;
__u64 *auxv;
__u32 auxv_size;
__u32 exe_fd;
};
All members except @exe_fd correspond ones of struct mm_struct. To figure
out which available values these members may take here are meanings of the
members.
- start_code, end_code: represent bounds of executable code area
- start_data, end_data: represent bounds of data area
- start_brk, brk: used to calculate bounds for brk() syscall
- start_stack: used when accounting space needed for command
line arguments, environment and shmat() syscall
- arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end: represent memory area
supplied for command line arguments and environment variables
- auxv, auxv_size: carries auxiliary vector, Elf format specifics
- exe_fd: file descriptor number for executable link (/proc/self/exe)
Thus we apply the following requirements to the values
1) Any member except @auxv, @auxv_size, @exe_fd is rather an address
in user space thus it must be laying inside [mmap_min_addr, mmap_max_addr)
interval.
2) While @[start|end]_code and @[start|end]_data may point to an nonexisting
VMAs (say a program maps own new .text and .data segments during execution)
the rest of members should belong to VMA which must exist.
3) Addresses must be ordered, ie @start_ member must not be greater or
equal to appropriate @end_ member.
4) As in regular Elf loading procedure we require that @start_brk and
@brk be greater than @end_data.
5) If RLIMIT_DATA rlimit is set to non-infinity new values should not
exceed existing limit. Same applies to RLIMIT_STACK.
6) Auxiliary vector size must not exceed existing one (which is
predefined as AT_VECTOR_SIZE and depends on architecture).
7) File descriptor passed in @exe_file should be pointing
to executable file (because we use existing prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked
helper it ensures that the file we are going to use as exe link has all
required permission granted).
Now about where these members are involved inside kernel code:
- @start_code and @end_code are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output;
- @start_data and @end_data are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output,
also they are considered if there enough space for brk() syscall
result if RLIMIT_DATA is set;
- @start_brk shown in /proc/$pid/stat output and accounted in brk()
syscall if RLIMIT_DATA is set; also this member is tested to
find a symbolic name of mmap event for perf system (we choose
if event is generated for "heap" area); one more aplication is
selinux -- we test if a process has PROCESS__EXECHEAP permission
if trying to make heap area being executable with mprotect() syscall;
- @brk is a current value for brk() syscall which lays inside heap
area, it's shown in /proc/$pid/stat. When syscall brk() succesfully
provides new memory area to a user space upon brk() completion the
mm::brk is updated to carry new value;
Both @start_brk and @brk are actively used in /proc/$pid/maps
and /proc/$pid/smaps output to find a symbolic name "heap" for
VMA being scanned;
- @start_stack is printed out in /proc/$pid/stat and used to
find a symbolic name "stack" for task and threads in
/proc/$pid/maps and /proc/$pid/smaps output, and as the same
as with @start_brk -- perf system uses it for event naming.
Also kernel treat this member as a start address of where
to map vDSO pages and to check if there is enough space
for shmat() syscall;
- @arg_start, @arg_end, @env_start and @env_end are printed out
in /proc/$pid/stat. Another access to the data these members
represent is to read /proc/$pid/environ or /proc/$pid/cmdline.
Any attempt to read these areas kernel tests with access_process_vm
helper so a user must have enough rights for this action;
- @auxv and @auxv_size may be read from /proc/$pid/auxv. Strictly
speaking kernel doesn't care much about which exactly data is
sitting there because it is solely for userspace;
- @exe_fd is referred from /proc/$pid/exe and when generating
coredump. We uses prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked helper to update
this member, so exe-file link modification remains one-shot
action.
Still note that updating exe-file link now doesn't require sys-resource
capability anymore, after all there is no much profit in preventing setup
own file link (there are a number of ways to execute own code -- ptrace,
ld-preload, so that the only reliable way to find which exactly code is
executed is to inspect running program memory). Still we require the
caller to be at least user-namespace root user.
I believe the old interface should be deprecated and ripped off in a
couple of kernel releases if no one against.
To test if new interface is implemented in the kernel one can pass
PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE opcode and the kernel returns the size of currently
supported struct prctl_mm_map.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix 80-col wordwrap in macro definitions]
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Tested-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-09 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if (arg5 || (arg4 && (opt != PR_SET_MM_AUXV &&
|
|
|
|
|
opt != PR_SET_MM_MAP &&
|
|
|
|
|
opt != PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE)))
|
2012-01-13 01:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation
During development of c/r we've noticed that in case if we need to support
user namespaces we face a problem with capabilities in prctl(PR_SET_MM,
...) call, in particular once new user namespace is created
capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) no longer passes.
A approach is to eliminate CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check but pass all new values
in one bundle, which would allow the kernel to make more intensive test
for sanity of values and same time allow us to support checkpoint/restore
of user namespaces.
Thus a new command PR_SET_MM_MAP introduced. It takes a pointer of
prctl_mm_map structure which carries all the members to be updated.
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, struct prctl_mm_map *, size)
struct prctl_mm_map {
__u64 start_code;
__u64 end_code;
__u64 start_data;
__u64 end_data;
__u64 start_brk;
__u64 brk;
__u64 start_stack;
__u64 arg_start;
__u64 arg_end;
__u64 env_start;
__u64 env_end;
__u64 *auxv;
__u32 auxv_size;
__u32 exe_fd;
};
All members except @exe_fd correspond ones of struct mm_struct. To figure
out which available values these members may take here are meanings of the
members.
- start_code, end_code: represent bounds of executable code area
- start_data, end_data: represent bounds of data area
- start_brk, brk: used to calculate bounds for brk() syscall
- start_stack: used when accounting space needed for command
line arguments, environment and shmat() syscall
- arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end: represent memory area
supplied for command line arguments and environment variables
- auxv, auxv_size: carries auxiliary vector, Elf format specifics
- exe_fd: file descriptor number for executable link (/proc/self/exe)
Thus we apply the following requirements to the values
1) Any member except @auxv, @auxv_size, @exe_fd is rather an address
in user space thus it must be laying inside [mmap_min_addr, mmap_max_addr)
interval.
2) While @[start|end]_code and @[start|end]_data may point to an nonexisting
VMAs (say a program maps own new .text and .data segments during execution)
the rest of members should belong to VMA which must exist.
3) Addresses must be ordered, ie @start_ member must not be greater or
equal to appropriate @end_ member.
4) As in regular Elf loading procedure we require that @start_brk and
@brk be greater than @end_data.
5) If RLIMIT_DATA rlimit is set to non-infinity new values should not
exceed existing limit. Same applies to RLIMIT_STACK.
6) Auxiliary vector size must not exceed existing one (which is
predefined as AT_VECTOR_SIZE and depends on architecture).
7) File descriptor passed in @exe_file should be pointing
to executable file (because we use existing prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked
helper it ensures that the file we are going to use as exe link has all
required permission granted).
Now about where these members are involved inside kernel code:
- @start_code and @end_code are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output;
- @start_data and @end_data are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output,
also they are considered if there enough space for brk() syscall
result if RLIMIT_DATA is set;
- @start_brk shown in /proc/$pid/stat output and accounted in brk()
syscall if RLIMIT_DATA is set; also this member is tested to
find a symbolic name of mmap event for perf system (we choose
if event is generated for "heap" area); one more aplication is
selinux -- we test if a process has PROCESS__EXECHEAP permission
if trying to make heap area being executable with mprotect() syscall;
- @brk is a current value for brk() syscall which lays inside heap
area, it's shown in /proc/$pid/stat. When syscall brk() succesfully
provides new memory area to a user space upon brk() completion the
mm::brk is updated to carry new value;
Both @start_brk and @brk are actively used in /proc/$pid/maps
and /proc/$pid/smaps output to find a symbolic name "heap" for
VMA being scanned;
- @start_stack is printed out in /proc/$pid/stat and used to
find a symbolic name "stack" for task and threads in
/proc/$pid/maps and /proc/$pid/smaps output, and as the same
as with @start_brk -- perf system uses it for event naming.
Also kernel treat this member as a start address of where
to map vDSO pages and to check if there is enough space
for shmat() syscall;
- @arg_start, @arg_end, @env_start and @env_end are printed out
in /proc/$pid/stat. Another access to the data these members
represent is to read /proc/$pid/environ or /proc/$pid/cmdline.
Any attempt to read these areas kernel tests with access_process_vm
helper so a user must have enough rights for this action;
- @auxv and @auxv_size may be read from /proc/$pid/auxv. Strictly
speaking kernel doesn't care much about which exactly data is
sitting there because it is solely for userspace;
- @exe_fd is referred from /proc/$pid/exe and when generating
coredump. We uses prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked helper to update
this member, so exe-file link modification remains one-shot
action.
Still note that updating exe-file link now doesn't require sys-resource
capability anymore, after all there is no much profit in preventing setup
own file link (there are a number of ways to execute own code -- ptrace,
ld-preload, so that the only reliable way to find which exactly code is
executed is to inspect running program memory). Still we require the
caller to be at least user-namespace root user.
I believe the old interface should be deprecated and ripped off in a
couple of kernel releases if no one against.
To test if new interface is implemented in the kernel one can pass
PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE opcode and the kernel returns the size of currently
supported struct prctl_mm_map.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix 80-col wordwrap in macro definitions]
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Tested-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-09 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
|
|
|
|
|
if (opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP || opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE)
|
|
|
|
|
return prctl_set_mm_map(opt, (const void __user *)addr, arg4);
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-15 22:17:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
|
2012-01-13 01:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-16 19:47:59 +00:00
|
|
|
if (opt == PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE)
|
|
|
|
|
return prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, (unsigned int)addr);
|
2012-05-31 23:26:46 +00:00
|
|
|
|
prctl: more prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) checks
Individual prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) calls do some checking to maintain a
consistent view of mm->arg_start et al fields, but not enough. In
particular PR_SET_MM_ARG_START/PR_SET_MM_ARG_END/ R_SET_MM_ENV_START/
PR_SET_MM_ENV_END only check that the address lies in an existing VMA,
but don't check that the start address is lower than the end address _at
all_.
Consolidate all consistency checks, so there will be no difference in
the future between PR_SET_MM_MAP and individual PR_SET_MM_* calls.
The program below makes both ARGV and ENVP areas be reversed. It makes
/proc/$PID/cmdline show garbage (it doesn't oops by luck).
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
enum {PAGE_SIZE=4096};
int main(void)
{
void *p;
p = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
#define PR_SET_MM 35
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
pause();
return 0;
}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy code, tweak comment]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 22:00:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if (opt == PR_SET_MM_AUXV)
|
|
|
|
|
return prctl_set_auxv(mm, addr, arg4);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-06-07 21:21:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (addr >= TASK_SIZE || addr < mmap_min_addr)
|
2012-01-13 01:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-05-31 23:26:45 +00:00
|
|
|
error = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-06-01 05:30:19 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2021-05-07 01:06:36 +00:00
|
|
|
* arg_lock protects concurrent updates of arg boundaries, we need
|
2020-06-09 04:33:54 +00:00
|
|
|
* mmap_lock for a) concurrent sys_brk, b) finding VMA for addr
|
2019-06-01 05:30:19 +00:00
|
|
|
* validation.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-06-09 04:33:25 +00:00
|
|
|
mmap_read_lock(mm);
|
2012-01-13 01:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-06-01 05:30:19 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_lock(&mm->arg_lock);
|
prctl: more prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) checks
Individual prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) calls do some checking to maintain a
consistent view of mm->arg_start et al fields, but not enough. In
particular PR_SET_MM_ARG_START/PR_SET_MM_ARG_END/ R_SET_MM_ENV_START/
PR_SET_MM_ENV_END only check that the address lies in an existing VMA,
but don't check that the start address is lower than the end address _at
all_.
Consolidate all consistency checks, so there will be no difference in
the future between PR_SET_MM_MAP and individual PR_SET_MM_* calls.
The program below makes both ARGV and ENVP areas be reversed. It makes
/proc/$PID/cmdline show garbage (it doesn't oops by luck).
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
enum {PAGE_SIZE=4096};
int main(void)
{
void *p;
p = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
#define PR_SET_MM 35
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
pause();
return 0;
}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy code, tweak comment]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 22:00:51 +00:00
|
|
|
prctl_map.start_code = mm->start_code;
|
|
|
|
|
prctl_map.end_code = mm->end_code;
|
|
|
|
|
prctl_map.start_data = mm->start_data;
|
|
|
|
|
prctl_map.end_data = mm->end_data;
|
|
|
|
|
prctl_map.start_brk = mm->start_brk;
|
|
|
|
|
prctl_map.brk = mm->brk;
|
|
|
|
|
prctl_map.start_stack = mm->start_stack;
|
|
|
|
|
prctl_map.arg_start = mm->arg_start;
|
|
|
|
|
prctl_map.arg_end = mm->arg_end;
|
|
|
|
|
prctl_map.env_start = mm->env_start;
|
|
|
|
|
prctl_map.env_end = mm->env_end;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-01-13 01:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (opt) {
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_MM_START_CODE:
|
prctl: more prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) checks
Individual prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) calls do some checking to maintain a
consistent view of mm->arg_start et al fields, but not enough. In
particular PR_SET_MM_ARG_START/PR_SET_MM_ARG_END/ R_SET_MM_ENV_START/
PR_SET_MM_ENV_END only check that the address lies in an existing VMA,
but don't check that the start address is lower than the end address _at
all_.
Consolidate all consistency checks, so there will be no difference in
the future between PR_SET_MM_MAP and individual PR_SET_MM_* calls.
The program below makes both ARGV and ENVP areas be reversed. It makes
/proc/$PID/cmdline show garbage (it doesn't oops by luck).
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
enum {PAGE_SIZE=4096};
int main(void)
{
void *p;
p = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
#define PR_SET_MM 35
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
pause();
return 0;
}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy code, tweak comment]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 22:00:51 +00:00
|
|
|
prctl_map.start_code = addr;
|
2012-05-31 23:26:45 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2012-01-13 01:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_SET_MM_END_CODE:
|
prctl: more prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) checks
Individual prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) calls do some checking to maintain a
consistent view of mm->arg_start et al fields, but not enough. In
particular PR_SET_MM_ARG_START/PR_SET_MM_ARG_END/ R_SET_MM_ENV_START/
PR_SET_MM_ENV_END only check that the address lies in an existing VMA,
but don't check that the start address is lower than the end address _at
all_.
Consolidate all consistency checks, so there will be no difference in
the future between PR_SET_MM_MAP and individual PR_SET_MM_* calls.
The program below makes both ARGV and ENVP areas be reversed. It makes
/proc/$PID/cmdline show garbage (it doesn't oops by luck).
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
enum {PAGE_SIZE=4096};
int main(void)
{
void *p;
p = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
#define PR_SET_MM 35
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
pause();
return 0;
}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy code, tweak comment]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 22:00:51 +00:00
|
|
|
prctl_map.end_code = addr;
|
2012-01-13 01:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_MM_START_DATA:
|
prctl: more prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) checks
Individual prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) calls do some checking to maintain a
consistent view of mm->arg_start et al fields, but not enough. In
particular PR_SET_MM_ARG_START/PR_SET_MM_ARG_END/ R_SET_MM_ENV_START/
PR_SET_MM_ENV_END only check that the address lies in an existing VMA,
but don't check that the start address is lower than the end address _at
all_.
Consolidate all consistency checks, so there will be no difference in
the future between PR_SET_MM_MAP and individual PR_SET_MM_* calls.
The program below makes both ARGV and ENVP areas be reversed. It makes
/proc/$PID/cmdline show garbage (it doesn't oops by luck).
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
enum {PAGE_SIZE=4096};
int main(void)
{
void *p;
p = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
#define PR_SET_MM 35
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
pause();
return 0;
}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy code, tweak comment]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 22:00:51 +00:00
|
|
|
prctl_map.start_data = addr;
|
2012-01-13 01:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2012-05-31 23:26:45 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_SET_MM_END_DATA:
|
prctl: more prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) checks
Individual prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) calls do some checking to maintain a
consistent view of mm->arg_start et al fields, but not enough. In
particular PR_SET_MM_ARG_START/PR_SET_MM_ARG_END/ R_SET_MM_ENV_START/
PR_SET_MM_ENV_END only check that the address lies in an existing VMA,
but don't check that the start address is lower than the end address _at
all_.
Consolidate all consistency checks, so there will be no difference in
the future between PR_SET_MM_MAP and individual PR_SET_MM_* calls.
The program below makes both ARGV and ENVP areas be reversed. It makes
/proc/$PID/cmdline show garbage (it doesn't oops by luck).
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
enum {PAGE_SIZE=4096};
int main(void)
{
void *p;
p = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
#define PR_SET_MM 35
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
pause();
return 0;
}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy code, tweak comment]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 22:00:51 +00:00
|
|
|
prctl_map.end_data = addr;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_MM_START_STACK:
|
|
|
|
|
prctl_map.start_stack = addr;
|
2012-01-13 01:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_MM_START_BRK:
|
prctl: more prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) checks
Individual prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) calls do some checking to maintain a
consistent view of mm->arg_start et al fields, but not enough. In
particular PR_SET_MM_ARG_START/PR_SET_MM_ARG_END/ R_SET_MM_ENV_START/
PR_SET_MM_ENV_END only check that the address lies in an existing VMA,
but don't check that the start address is lower than the end address _at
all_.
Consolidate all consistency checks, so there will be no difference in
the future between PR_SET_MM_MAP and individual PR_SET_MM_* calls.
The program below makes both ARGV and ENVP areas be reversed. It makes
/proc/$PID/cmdline show garbage (it doesn't oops by luck).
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
enum {PAGE_SIZE=4096};
int main(void)
{
void *p;
p = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
#define PR_SET_MM 35
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
pause();
return 0;
}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy code, tweak comment]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 22:00:51 +00:00
|
|
|
prctl_map.start_brk = addr;
|
2012-01-13 01:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_MM_BRK:
|
prctl: more prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) checks
Individual prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) calls do some checking to maintain a
consistent view of mm->arg_start et al fields, but not enough. In
particular PR_SET_MM_ARG_START/PR_SET_MM_ARG_END/ R_SET_MM_ENV_START/
PR_SET_MM_ENV_END only check that the address lies in an existing VMA,
but don't check that the start address is lower than the end address _at
all_.
Consolidate all consistency checks, so there will be no difference in
the future between PR_SET_MM_MAP and individual PR_SET_MM_* calls.
The program below makes both ARGV and ENVP areas be reversed. It makes
/proc/$PID/cmdline show garbage (it doesn't oops by luck).
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
enum {PAGE_SIZE=4096};
int main(void)
{
void *p;
p = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
#define PR_SET_MM 35
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
pause();
return 0;
}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy code, tweak comment]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 22:00:51 +00:00
|
|
|
prctl_map.brk = addr;
|
2012-01-13 01:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
prctl: more prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) checks
Individual prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) calls do some checking to maintain a
consistent view of mm->arg_start et al fields, but not enough. In
particular PR_SET_MM_ARG_START/PR_SET_MM_ARG_END/ R_SET_MM_ENV_START/
PR_SET_MM_ENV_END only check that the address lies in an existing VMA,
but don't check that the start address is lower than the end address _at
all_.
Consolidate all consistency checks, so there will be no difference in
the future between PR_SET_MM_MAP and individual PR_SET_MM_* calls.
The program below makes both ARGV and ENVP areas be reversed. It makes
/proc/$PID/cmdline show garbage (it doesn't oops by luck).
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
enum {PAGE_SIZE=4096};
int main(void)
{
void *p;
p = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
#define PR_SET_MM 35
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
pause();
return 0;
}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy code, tweak comment]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 22:00:51 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_SET_MM_ARG_START:
|
|
|
|
|
prctl_map.arg_start = addr;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_MM_ARG_END:
|
|
|
|
|
prctl_map.arg_end = addr;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_MM_ENV_START:
|
|
|
|
|
prctl_map.env_start = addr;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_MM_ENV_END:
|
|
|
|
|
prctl_map.env_end = addr;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019-06-01 05:30:16 +00:00
|
|
|
error = validate_prctl_map_addr(&prctl_map);
|
prctl: more prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) checks
Individual prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) calls do some checking to maintain a
consistent view of mm->arg_start et al fields, but not enough. In
particular PR_SET_MM_ARG_START/PR_SET_MM_ARG_END/ R_SET_MM_ENV_START/
PR_SET_MM_ENV_END only check that the address lies in an existing VMA,
but don't check that the start address is lower than the end address _at
all_.
Consolidate all consistency checks, so there will be no difference in
the future between PR_SET_MM_MAP and individual PR_SET_MM_* calls.
The program below makes both ARGV and ENVP areas be reversed. It makes
/proc/$PID/cmdline show garbage (it doesn't oops by luck).
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
enum {PAGE_SIZE=4096};
int main(void)
{
void *p;
p = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
#define PR_SET_MM 35
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
pause();
return 0;
}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy code, tweak comment]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 22:00:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2012-01-13 01:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
|
prctl: more prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) checks
Individual prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) calls do some checking to maintain a
consistent view of mm->arg_start et al fields, but not enough. In
particular PR_SET_MM_ARG_START/PR_SET_MM_ARG_END/ R_SET_MM_ENV_START/
PR_SET_MM_ENV_END only check that the address lies in an existing VMA,
but don't check that the start address is lower than the end address _at
all_.
Consolidate all consistency checks, so there will be no difference in
the future between PR_SET_MM_MAP and individual PR_SET_MM_* calls.
The program below makes both ARGV and ENVP areas be reversed. It makes
/proc/$PID/cmdline show garbage (it doesn't oops by luck).
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
enum {PAGE_SIZE=4096};
int main(void)
{
void *p;
p = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
#define PR_SET_MM 35
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
pause();
return 0;
}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy code, tweak comment]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 22:00:51 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (opt) {
|
2012-05-31 23:26:45 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* If command line arguments and environment
|
|
|
|
|
* are placed somewhere else on stack, we can
|
|
|
|
|
* set them up here, ARG_START/END to setup
|
2021-05-07 01:06:36 +00:00
|
|
|
* command line arguments and ENV_START/END
|
2012-05-31 23:26:45 +00:00
|
|
|
* for environment.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_MM_START_STACK:
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_MM_ARG_START:
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_MM_ARG_END:
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_MM_ENV_START:
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_MM_ENV_END:
|
|
|
|
|
if (!vma) {
|
|
|
|
|
error = -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-01-13 01:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
prctl: more prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) checks
Individual prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) calls do some checking to maintain a
consistent view of mm->arg_start et al fields, but not enough. In
particular PR_SET_MM_ARG_START/PR_SET_MM_ARG_END/ R_SET_MM_ENV_START/
PR_SET_MM_ENV_END only check that the address lies in an existing VMA,
but don't check that the start address is lower than the end address _at
all_.
Consolidate all consistency checks, so there will be no difference in
the future between PR_SET_MM_MAP and individual PR_SET_MM_* calls.
The program below makes both ARGV and ENVP areas be reversed. It makes
/proc/$PID/cmdline show garbage (it doesn't oops by luck).
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
enum {PAGE_SIZE=4096};
int main(void)
{
void *p;
p = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
#define PR_SET_MM 35
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8
#define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10
#define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0);
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0);
pause();
return 0;
}
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy code, tweak comment]
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-25 22:00:51 +00:00
|
|
|
mm->start_code = prctl_map.start_code;
|
|
|
|
|
mm->end_code = prctl_map.end_code;
|
|
|
|
|
mm->start_data = prctl_map.start_data;
|
|
|
|
|
mm->end_data = prctl_map.end_data;
|
|
|
|
|
mm->start_brk = prctl_map.start_brk;
|
|
|
|
|
mm->brk = prctl_map.brk;
|
|
|
|
|
mm->start_stack = prctl_map.start_stack;
|
|
|
|
|
mm->arg_start = prctl_map.arg_start;
|
|
|
|
|
mm->arg_end = prctl_map.arg_end;
|
|
|
|
|
mm->env_start = prctl_map.env_start;
|
|
|
|
|
mm->env_end = prctl_map.env_end;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2012-01-13 01:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
2019-06-01 05:30:19 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&mm->arg_lock);
|
2020-06-09 04:33:25 +00:00
|
|
|
mmap_read_unlock(mm);
|
2012-01-13 01:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-06-07 21:21:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
kernel/sys.c: make prctl(PR_SET_MM) generally available
The purpose of this patch is to allow privileged processes to set
their own per-memory memory-region fields:
start_code, end_code, start_data, end_data, start_brk, brk,
start_stack, arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end.
This functionality is needed by any application or package that needs to
reconstruct Linux processes, that is, to start them in any way other than
by means of an "execve()" from an executable file. This includes:
1. Restoring processes from a checkpoint-file (by all potential
user-level checkpointing packages, not only CRIU's).
2. Restarting processes on another node after process migration.
3. Starting duplicated copies of a running process (for reliability
and high-availablity).
4. Starting a process from an executable format that is not supported
by Linux, thus requiring a "manual execve" by a user-level utility.
5. Similarly, starting a process from a networked and/or crypted
executable that, for confidentiality, licensing or other reasons,
may not be written to the local file-systems.
The code that does that was already included in the Linux kernel by the
CRIU group, in the form of "prctl(PR_SET_MM)", but prior to this was
enclosed within their private "#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE", which is
normally disabled. The patch removes those ifdefs.
Signed-off-by: Amnon Shiloh <u3557@miso.sublimeip.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-04-30 22:28:48 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
|
2020-10-24 01:04:26 +00:00
|
|
|
static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user * __user *tid_addr)
|
2012-06-07 21:21:12 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return put_user(me->clear_child_tid, tid_addr);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
kernel/sys.c: make prctl(PR_SET_MM) generally available
The purpose of this patch is to allow privileged processes to set
their own per-memory memory-region fields:
start_code, end_code, start_data, end_data, start_brk, brk,
start_stack, arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end.
This functionality is needed by any application or package that needs to
reconstruct Linux processes, that is, to start them in any way other than
by means of an "execve()" from an executable file. This includes:
1. Restoring processes from a checkpoint-file (by all potential
user-level checkpointing packages, not only CRIU's).
2. Restarting processes on another node after process migration.
3. Starting duplicated copies of a running process (for reliability
and high-availablity).
4. Starting a process from an executable format that is not supported
by Linux, thus requiring a "manual execve" by a user-level utility.
5. Similarly, starting a process from a networked and/or crypted
executable that, for confidentiality, licensing or other reasons,
may not be written to the local file-systems.
The code that does that was already included in the Linux kernel by the
CRIU group, in the form of "prctl(PR_SET_MM)", but prior to this was
enclosed within their private "#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE", which is
normally disabled. The patch removes those ifdefs.
Signed-off-by: Amnon Shiloh <u3557@miso.sublimeip.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-04-30 22:28:48 +00:00
|
|
|
#else
|
2020-10-24 01:04:26 +00:00
|
|
|
static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user * __user *tid_addr)
|
2012-06-07 21:21:12 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-01-13 01:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant
If process forks some children when it has is_child_subreaper
flag enabled they will inherit has_child_subreaper flag - first
group, when is_child_subreaper is disabled forked children will
not inherit it - second group. So child-subreaper does not reparent
all his descendants when their parents die. Having these two
differently behaving groups can lead to confusion. Also it is
a problem for CRIU, as when we restore process tree we need to
somehow determine which descendants belong to which group and
much harder - to put them exactly to these group.
To simplify these we can add a propagation of has_child_subreaper
flag on PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER, walking all descendants of child-
subreaper to setup has_child_subreaper flag.
In common cases when process like systemd first sets itself to
be a child-subreaper and only after that forks its services, we will
have zero-length list of descendants to walk. Testing with binary
subtree of 2^15 processes prctl took < 0.007 sec and has shown close
to linear dependency(~0.2 * n * usec) on lower numbers of processes.
Moreover, I doubt someone intentionaly pre-forks the children whitch
should reparent to init before becoming subreaper, because some our
ancestor migh have had is_child_subreaper flag while forking our
sub-tree and our childs will all inherit has_child_subreaper flag,
and we have no way to influence it. And only way to check if we have
no has_child_subreaper flag is to create some childs, kill them and
see where they will reparent to.
Using walk_process_tree helper to walk subtree, thanks to Oleg! Timing
seems to be the same.
Optimize:
a) When descendant already has has_child_subreaper flag all his subtree
has it too already.
* for a) to be true need to move has_child_subreaper inheritance under
the same tasklist_lock with adding task to its ->real_parent->children
as without it process can inherit zero has_child_subreaper, then we
set 1 to it's parent flag, check that parent has no more children, and
only after child with wrong flag is added to the tree.
* Also make these inheritance more clear by using real_parent instead of
current, as on clone(CLONE_PARENT) if current has is_child_subreaper
and real_parent has no is_child_subreaper or has_child_subreaper, child
will have has_child_subreaper flag set without actually having a
subreaper in it's ancestors.
b) When some descendant is child_reaper, it's subtree is in different
pidns from us(original child-subreaper) and processes from other pidns
will never reparent to us.
So we can skip their(a,b) subtree from walk.
v2: switch to walk_process_tree() general helper, move
has_child_subreaper inheritance
v3: remove csr_descendant leftover, change current to real_parent
in has_child_subreaper inheritance
v4: small commit message fix
Fixes: ebec18a6d3aa ("prctl: add PR_{SET,GET}_CHILD_SUBREAPER to allow simple process supervision")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-01-30 15:06:12 +00:00
|
|
|
static int propagate_has_child_subreaper(struct task_struct *p, void *data)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2021-05-07 01:06:36 +00:00
|
|
|
* If task has has_child_subreaper - all its descendants
|
|
|
|
|
* already have these flag too and new descendants will
|
prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant
If process forks some children when it has is_child_subreaper
flag enabled they will inherit has_child_subreaper flag - first
group, when is_child_subreaper is disabled forked children will
not inherit it - second group. So child-subreaper does not reparent
all his descendants when their parents die. Having these two
differently behaving groups can lead to confusion. Also it is
a problem for CRIU, as when we restore process tree we need to
somehow determine which descendants belong to which group and
much harder - to put them exactly to these group.
To simplify these we can add a propagation of has_child_subreaper
flag on PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER, walking all descendants of child-
subreaper to setup has_child_subreaper flag.
In common cases when process like systemd first sets itself to
be a child-subreaper and only after that forks its services, we will
have zero-length list of descendants to walk. Testing with binary
subtree of 2^15 processes prctl took < 0.007 sec and has shown close
to linear dependency(~0.2 * n * usec) on lower numbers of processes.
Moreover, I doubt someone intentionaly pre-forks the children whitch
should reparent to init before becoming subreaper, because some our
ancestor migh have had is_child_subreaper flag while forking our
sub-tree and our childs will all inherit has_child_subreaper flag,
and we have no way to influence it. And only way to check if we have
no has_child_subreaper flag is to create some childs, kill them and
see where they will reparent to.
Using walk_process_tree helper to walk subtree, thanks to Oleg! Timing
seems to be the same.
Optimize:
a) When descendant already has has_child_subreaper flag all his subtree
has it too already.
* for a) to be true need to move has_child_subreaper inheritance under
the same tasklist_lock with adding task to its ->real_parent->children
as without it process can inherit zero has_child_subreaper, then we
set 1 to it's parent flag, check that parent has no more children, and
only after child with wrong flag is added to the tree.
* Also make these inheritance more clear by using real_parent instead of
current, as on clone(CLONE_PARENT) if current has is_child_subreaper
and real_parent has no is_child_subreaper or has_child_subreaper, child
will have has_child_subreaper flag set without actually having a
subreaper in it's ancestors.
b) When some descendant is child_reaper, it's subtree is in different
pidns from us(original child-subreaper) and processes from other pidns
will never reparent to us.
So we can skip their(a,b) subtree from walk.
v2: switch to walk_process_tree() general helper, move
has_child_subreaper inheritance
v3: remove csr_descendant leftover, change current to real_parent
in has_child_subreaper inheritance
v4: small commit message fix
Fixes: ebec18a6d3aa ("prctl: add PR_{SET,GET}_CHILD_SUBREAPER to allow simple process supervision")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-01-30 15:06:12 +00:00
|
|
|
* inherit it on fork, skip them.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* If we've found child_reaper - skip descendants in
|
|
|
|
|
* it's subtree as they will never get out pidns.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (p->signal->has_child_subreaper ||
|
|
|
|
|
is_child_reaper(task_pid(p)))
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p->signal->has_child_subreaper = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-01 22:19:04 +00:00
|
|
|
int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long which)
|
2018-04-29 13:20:11 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-01 22:19:04 +00:00
|
|
|
int __weak arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long which,
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long ctrl)
|
2018-04-29 13:20:11 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
mm/writeback: replace PF_LESS_THROTTLE with PF_LOCAL_THROTTLE
PF_LESS_THROTTLE exists for loop-back nfsd (and a similar need in the
loop block driver and callers of prctl(PR_SET_IO_FLUSHER)), where a
daemon needs to write to one bdi (the final bdi) in order to free up
writes queued to another bdi (the client bdi).
The daemon sets PF_LESS_THROTTLE and gets a larger allowance of dirty
pages, so that it can still dirty pages after other processses have been
throttled. The purpose of this is to avoid deadlock that happen when
the PF_LESS_THROTTLE process must write for any dirty pages to be freed,
but it is being thottled and cannot write.
This approach was designed when all threads were blocked equally,
independently on which device they were writing to, or how fast it was.
Since that time the writeback algorithm has changed substantially with
different threads getting different allowances based on non-trivial
heuristics. This means the simple "add 25%" heuristic is no longer
reliable.
The important issue is not that the daemon needs a *larger* dirty page
allowance, but that it needs a *private* dirty page allowance, so that
dirty pages for the "client" bdi that it is helping to clear (the bdi
for an NFS filesystem or loop block device etc) do not affect the
throttling of the daemon writing to the "final" bdi.
This patch changes the heuristic so that the task is not throttled when
the bdi it is writing to has a dirty page count below below (or equal
to) the free-run threshold for that bdi. This ensures it will always be
able to have some pages in flight, and so will not deadlock.
In a steady-state, it is expected that PF_LOCAL_THROTTLE tasks might
still be throttled by global threshold, but that is acceptable as it is
only the deadlock state that is interesting for this flag.
This approach of "only throttle when target bdi is busy" is consistent
with the other use of PF_LESS_THROTTLE in current_may_throttle(), were
it causes attention to be focussed only on the target bdi.
So this patch
- renames PF_LESS_THROTTLE to PF_LOCAL_THROTTLE,
- removes the 25% bonus that that flag gives, and
- If PF_LOCAL_THROTTLE is set, don't delay at all unless the
global and the local free-run thresholds are exceeded.
Note that previously realtime threads were treated the same as
PF_LESS_THROTTLE threads. This patch does *not* change the behvaiour
for real-time threads, so it is now different from the behaviour of nfsd
and loop tasks. I don't know what is wanted for realtime.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes]
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> [nfsd]
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87ftbf7gs3.fsf@notabene.neil.brown.name
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-02 04:48:18 +00:00
|
|
|
#define PR_IO_FLUSHER (PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO | PF_LOCAL_THROTTLE)
|
prctl: PR_{G,S}ET_IO_FLUSHER to support controlling memory reclaim
There are several storage drivers like dm-multipath, iscsi, tcmu-runner,
amd nbd that have userspace components that can run in the IO path. For
example, iscsi and nbd's userspace deamons may need to recreate a socket
and/or send IO on it, and dm-multipath's daemon multipathd may need to
send SG IO or read/write IO to figure out the state of paths and re-set
them up.
In the kernel these drivers have access to GFP_NOIO/GFP_NOFS and the
memalloc_*_save/restore functions to control the allocation behavior,
but for userspace we would end up hitting an allocation that ended up
writing data back to the same device we are trying to allocate for.
The device is then in a state of deadlock, because to execute IO the
device needs to allocate memory, but to allocate memory the memory
layers want execute IO to the device.
Here is an example with nbd using a local userspace daemon that performs
network IO to a remote server. We are using XFS on top of the nbd device,
but it can happen with any FS or other modules layered on top of the nbd
device that can write out data to free memory. Here a nbd daemon helper
thread, msgr-worker-1, is performing a write/sendmsg on a socket to execute
a request. This kicks off a reclaim operation which results in a WRITE to
the nbd device and the nbd thread calling back into the mm layer.
[ 1626.609191] msgr-worker-1 D 0 1026 1 0x00004000
[ 1626.609193] Call Trace:
[ 1626.609195] ? __schedule+0x29b/0x630
[ 1626.609197] ? wait_for_completion+0xe0/0x170
[ 1626.609198] schedule+0x30/0xb0
[ 1626.609200] schedule_timeout+0x1f6/0x2f0
[ 1626.609202] ? blk_finish_plug+0x21/0x2e
[ 1626.609204] ? _xfs_buf_ioapply+0x2e6/0x410
[ 1626.609206] ? wait_for_completion+0xe0/0x170
[ 1626.609208] wait_for_completion+0x108/0x170
[ 1626.609210] ? wake_up_q+0x70/0x70
[ 1626.609212] ? __xfs_buf_submit+0x12e/0x250
[ 1626.609214] ? xfs_bwrite+0x25/0x60
[ 1626.609215] xfs_buf_iowait+0x22/0xf0
[ 1626.609218] __xfs_buf_submit+0x12e/0x250
[ 1626.609220] xfs_bwrite+0x25/0x60
[ 1626.609222] xfs_reclaim_inode+0x2e8/0x310
[ 1626.609224] xfs_reclaim_inodes_ag+0x1b6/0x300
[ 1626.609227] xfs_reclaim_inodes_nr+0x31/0x40
[ 1626.609228] super_cache_scan+0x152/0x1a0
[ 1626.609231] do_shrink_slab+0x12c/0x2d0
[ 1626.609233] shrink_slab+0x9c/0x2a0
[ 1626.609235] shrink_node+0xd7/0x470
[ 1626.609237] do_try_to_free_pages+0xbf/0x380
[ 1626.609240] try_to_free_pages+0xd9/0x1f0
[ 1626.609245] __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x3a4/0xd30
[ 1626.609251] ? ___slab_alloc+0x238/0x560
[ 1626.609254] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x30c/0x350
[ 1626.609259] skb_page_frag_refill+0x97/0xd0
[ 1626.609274] sk_page_frag_refill+0x1d/0x80
[ 1626.609279] tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2bb/0xdd0
[ 1626.609304] tcp_sendmsg+0x27/0x40
[ 1626.609307] sock_sendmsg+0x54/0x60
[ 1626.609308] ___sys_sendmsg+0x29f/0x320
[ 1626.609313] ? sock_poll+0x66/0xb0
[ 1626.609318] ? ep_item_poll.isra.15+0x40/0xc0
[ 1626.609320] ? ep_send_events_proc+0xe6/0x230
[ 1626.609322] ? hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0x54/0xf0
[ 1626.609324] ? ep_read_events_proc+0xc0/0xc0
[ 1626.609326] ? _raw_write_unlock_irq+0xa/0x20
[ 1626.609327] ? ep_scan_ready_list.constprop.19+0x218/0x230
[ 1626.609329] ? __hrtimer_init+0xb0/0xb0
[ 1626.609331] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0xa/0x20
[ 1626.609334] ? ep_poll+0x26c/0x4a0
[ 1626.609337] ? tcp_tsq_write.part.54+0xa0/0xa0
[ 1626.609339] ? release_sock+0x43/0x90
[ 1626.609341] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0xa/0x20
[ 1626.609342] __sys_sendmsg+0x47/0x80
[ 1626.609347] do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x1c0
[ 1626.609349] ? prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x75/0xa0
[ 1626.609351] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
This patch adds a new prctl command that daemons can use after they have
done their initial setup, and before they start to do allocations that
are in the IO path. It sets the PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO and PF_LESS_THROTTLE
flags so both userspace block and FS threads can use it to avoid the
allocation recursion and try to prevent from being throttled while
writing out data to free up memory.
Signed-off-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Tested-by: Masato Suzuki <masato.suzuki@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191112001900.9206-1-mchristi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2019-11-12 00:19:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
mm: add a field to store names for private anonymous memory
In many userspace applications, and especially in VM based applications
like Android uses heavily, there are multiple different allocators in
use. At a minimum there is libc malloc and the stack, and in many cases
there are libc malloc, the stack, direct syscalls to mmap anonymous
memory, and multiple VM heaps (one for small objects, one for big
objects, etc.). Each of these layers usually has its own tools to
inspect its usage; malloc by compiling a debug version, the VM through
heap inspection tools, and for direct syscalls there is usually no way
to track them.
On Android we heavily use a set of tools that use an extended version of
the logic covered in Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt to walk all pages
mapped in userspace and slice their usage by process, shared (COW) vs.
unique mappings, backing, etc. This can account for real physical
memory usage even in cases like fork without exec (which Android uses
heavily to share as many private COW pages as possible between
processes), Kernel SamePage Merging, and clean zero pages. It produces
a measurement of the pages that only exist in that process (USS, for
unique), and a measurement of the physical memory usage of that process
with the cost of shared pages being evenly split between processes that
share them (PSS).
If all anonymous memory is indistinguishable then figuring out the real
physical memory usage (PSS) of each heap requires either a pagemap
walking tool that can understand the heap debugging of every layer, or
for every layer's heap debugging tools to implement the pagemap walking
logic, in which case it is hard to get a consistent view of memory
across the whole system.
Tracking the information in userspace leads to all sorts of problems.
It either needs to be stored inside the process, which means every
process has to have an API to export its current heap information upon
request, or it has to be stored externally in a filesystem that somebody
needs to clean up on crashes. It needs to be readable while the process
is still running, so it has to have some sort of synchronization with
every layer of userspace. Efficiently tracking the ranges requires
reimplementing something like the kernel vma trees, and linking to it
from every layer of userspace. It requires more memory, more syscalls,
more runtime cost, and more complexity to separately track regions that
the kernel is already tracking.
This patch adds a field to /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps to show a
userspace-provided name for anonymous vmas. The names of named
anonymous vmas are shown in /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps as
[anon:<name>].
Userspace can set the name for a region of memory by calling
prctl(PR_SET_VMA, PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME, start, len, (unsigned long)name)
Setting the name to NULL clears it. The name length limit is 80 bytes
including NUL-terminator and is checked to contain only printable ascii
characters (including space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.
Ascii strings are being used to have a descriptive identifiers for vmas,
which can be understood by the users reading /proc/pid/maps or
/proc/pid/smaps. Names can be standardized for a given system and they
can include some variable parts such as the name of the allocator or a
library, tid of the thread using it, etc.
The name is stored in a pointer in the shared union in vm_area_struct
that points to a null terminated string. Anonymous vmas with the same
name (equivalent strings) and are otherwise mergeable will be merged.
The name pointers are not shared between vmas even if they contain the
same name. The name pointer is stored in a union with fields that are
only used on file-backed mappings, so it does not increase memory usage.
CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME kernel configuration is introduced to enable this
feature. It keeps the feature disabled by default to prevent any
additional memory overhead and to avoid confusing procfs parsers on
systems which are not ready to support named anonymous vmas.
The patch is based on the original patch developed by Colin Cross, more
specifically on its latest version [1] posted upstream by Sumit Semwal.
It used a userspace pointer to store vma names. In that design, name
pointers could be shared between vmas. However during the last
upstreaming attempt, Kees Cook raised concerns [2] about this approach
and suggested to copy the name into kernel memory space, perform
validity checks [3] and store as a string referenced from
vm_area_struct.
One big concern is about fork() performance which would need to strdup
anonymous vma names. Dave Hansen suggested experimenting with
worst-case scenario of forking a process with 64k vmas having longest
possible names [4]. I ran this experiment on an ARM64 Android device
and recorded a worst-case regression of almost 40% when forking such a
process.
This regression is addressed in the followup patch which replaces the
pointer to a name with a refcounted structure that allows sharing the
name pointer between vmas of the same name. Instead of duplicating the
string during fork() or when splitting a vma it increments the refcount.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200901161459.11772-4-sumit.semwal@linaro.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031031.D32EF57ED@keescook/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031022.3834F692@keescook/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/5d0358ab-8c47-2f5f-8e43-23b89d6a8e95@intel.com/
Changes for prctl(2) manual page (in the options section):
PR_SET_VMA
Sets an attribute specified in arg2 for virtual memory areas
starting from the address specified in arg3 and spanning the
size specified in arg4. arg5 specifies the value of the attribute
to be set. Note that assigning an attribute to a virtual memory
area might prevent it from being merged with adjacent virtual
memory areas due to the difference in that attribute's value.
Currently, arg2 must be one of:
PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME
Set a name for anonymous virtual memory areas. arg5 should
be a pointer to a null-terminated string containing the
name. The name length including null byte cannot exceed
80 bytes. If arg5 is NULL, the name of the appropriate
anonymous virtual memory areas will be reset. The name
can contain only printable ascii characters (including
space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.
This feature is available only if the kernel is built with
the CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME option enabled.
[surenb@google.com: docs: proc.rst: /proc/PID/maps: fix malformed table]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211123185928.2513763-1-surenb@google.com
[surenb: rebased over v5.15-rc6, replaced userpointer with a kernel copy,
added input sanitization and CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME config. The bulk of the
work here was done by Colin Cross, therefore, with his permission, keeping
him as the author]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211019215511.3771969-2-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:05:59 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define ANON_VMA_NAME_MAX_LEN 80
|
|
|
|
|
#define ANON_VMA_NAME_INVALID_CHARS "\\`$[]"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline bool is_valid_name_char(char ch)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
/* printable ascii characters, excluding ANON_VMA_NAME_INVALID_CHARS */
|
|
|
|
|
return ch > 0x1f && ch < 0x7f &&
|
|
|
|
|
!strchr(ANON_VMA_NAME_INVALID_CHARS, ch);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int prctl_set_vma(unsigned long opt, unsigned long addr,
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long size, unsigned long arg)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
|
|
|
|
|
const char __user *uname;
|
2022-03-05 04:28:51 +00:00
|
|
|
struct anon_vma_name *anon_name = NULL;
|
mm: add a field to store names for private anonymous memory
In many userspace applications, and especially in VM based applications
like Android uses heavily, there are multiple different allocators in
use. At a minimum there is libc malloc and the stack, and in many cases
there are libc malloc, the stack, direct syscalls to mmap anonymous
memory, and multiple VM heaps (one for small objects, one for big
objects, etc.). Each of these layers usually has its own tools to
inspect its usage; malloc by compiling a debug version, the VM through
heap inspection tools, and for direct syscalls there is usually no way
to track them.
On Android we heavily use a set of tools that use an extended version of
the logic covered in Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt to walk all pages
mapped in userspace and slice their usage by process, shared (COW) vs.
unique mappings, backing, etc. This can account for real physical
memory usage even in cases like fork without exec (which Android uses
heavily to share as many private COW pages as possible between
processes), Kernel SamePage Merging, and clean zero pages. It produces
a measurement of the pages that only exist in that process (USS, for
unique), and a measurement of the physical memory usage of that process
with the cost of shared pages being evenly split between processes that
share them (PSS).
If all anonymous memory is indistinguishable then figuring out the real
physical memory usage (PSS) of each heap requires either a pagemap
walking tool that can understand the heap debugging of every layer, or
for every layer's heap debugging tools to implement the pagemap walking
logic, in which case it is hard to get a consistent view of memory
across the whole system.
Tracking the information in userspace leads to all sorts of problems.
It either needs to be stored inside the process, which means every
process has to have an API to export its current heap information upon
request, or it has to be stored externally in a filesystem that somebody
needs to clean up on crashes. It needs to be readable while the process
is still running, so it has to have some sort of synchronization with
every layer of userspace. Efficiently tracking the ranges requires
reimplementing something like the kernel vma trees, and linking to it
from every layer of userspace. It requires more memory, more syscalls,
more runtime cost, and more complexity to separately track regions that
the kernel is already tracking.
This patch adds a field to /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps to show a
userspace-provided name for anonymous vmas. The names of named
anonymous vmas are shown in /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps as
[anon:<name>].
Userspace can set the name for a region of memory by calling
prctl(PR_SET_VMA, PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME, start, len, (unsigned long)name)
Setting the name to NULL clears it. The name length limit is 80 bytes
including NUL-terminator and is checked to contain only printable ascii
characters (including space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.
Ascii strings are being used to have a descriptive identifiers for vmas,
which can be understood by the users reading /proc/pid/maps or
/proc/pid/smaps. Names can be standardized for a given system and they
can include some variable parts such as the name of the allocator or a
library, tid of the thread using it, etc.
The name is stored in a pointer in the shared union in vm_area_struct
that points to a null terminated string. Anonymous vmas with the same
name (equivalent strings) and are otherwise mergeable will be merged.
The name pointers are not shared between vmas even if they contain the
same name. The name pointer is stored in a union with fields that are
only used on file-backed mappings, so it does not increase memory usage.
CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME kernel configuration is introduced to enable this
feature. It keeps the feature disabled by default to prevent any
additional memory overhead and to avoid confusing procfs parsers on
systems which are not ready to support named anonymous vmas.
The patch is based on the original patch developed by Colin Cross, more
specifically on its latest version [1] posted upstream by Sumit Semwal.
It used a userspace pointer to store vma names. In that design, name
pointers could be shared between vmas. However during the last
upstreaming attempt, Kees Cook raised concerns [2] about this approach
and suggested to copy the name into kernel memory space, perform
validity checks [3] and store as a string referenced from
vm_area_struct.
One big concern is about fork() performance which would need to strdup
anonymous vma names. Dave Hansen suggested experimenting with
worst-case scenario of forking a process with 64k vmas having longest
possible names [4]. I ran this experiment on an ARM64 Android device
and recorded a worst-case regression of almost 40% when forking such a
process.
This regression is addressed in the followup patch which replaces the
pointer to a name with a refcounted structure that allows sharing the
name pointer between vmas of the same name. Instead of duplicating the
string during fork() or when splitting a vma it increments the refcount.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200901161459.11772-4-sumit.semwal@linaro.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031031.D32EF57ED@keescook/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031022.3834F692@keescook/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/5d0358ab-8c47-2f5f-8e43-23b89d6a8e95@intel.com/
Changes for prctl(2) manual page (in the options section):
PR_SET_VMA
Sets an attribute specified in arg2 for virtual memory areas
starting from the address specified in arg3 and spanning the
size specified in arg4. arg5 specifies the value of the attribute
to be set. Note that assigning an attribute to a virtual memory
area might prevent it from being merged with adjacent virtual
memory areas due to the difference in that attribute's value.
Currently, arg2 must be one of:
PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME
Set a name for anonymous virtual memory areas. arg5 should
be a pointer to a null-terminated string containing the
name. The name length including null byte cannot exceed
80 bytes. If arg5 is NULL, the name of the appropriate
anonymous virtual memory areas will be reset. The name
can contain only printable ascii characters (including
space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.
This feature is available only if the kernel is built with
the CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME option enabled.
[surenb@google.com: docs: proc.rst: /proc/PID/maps: fix malformed table]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211123185928.2513763-1-surenb@google.com
[surenb: rebased over v5.15-rc6, replaced userpointer with a kernel copy,
added input sanitization and CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME config. The bulk of the
work here was done by Colin Cross, therefore, with his permission, keeping
him as the author]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211019215511.3771969-2-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:05:59 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (opt) {
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME:
|
|
|
|
|
uname = (const char __user *)arg;
|
|
|
|
|
if (uname) {
|
2022-03-05 04:28:51 +00:00
|
|
|
char *name, *pch;
|
mm: add a field to store names for private anonymous memory
In many userspace applications, and especially in VM based applications
like Android uses heavily, there are multiple different allocators in
use. At a minimum there is libc malloc and the stack, and in many cases
there are libc malloc, the stack, direct syscalls to mmap anonymous
memory, and multiple VM heaps (one for small objects, one for big
objects, etc.). Each of these layers usually has its own tools to
inspect its usage; malloc by compiling a debug version, the VM through
heap inspection tools, and for direct syscalls there is usually no way
to track them.
On Android we heavily use a set of tools that use an extended version of
the logic covered in Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt to walk all pages
mapped in userspace and slice their usage by process, shared (COW) vs.
unique mappings, backing, etc. This can account for real physical
memory usage even in cases like fork without exec (which Android uses
heavily to share as many private COW pages as possible between
processes), Kernel SamePage Merging, and clean zero pages. It produces
a measurement of the pages that only exist in that process (USS, for
unique), and a measurement of the physical memory usage of that process
with the cost of shared pages being evenly split between processes that
share them (PSS).
If all anonymous memory is indistinguishable then figuring out the real
physical memory usage (PSS) of each heap requires either a pagemap
walking tool that can understand the heap debugging of every layer, or
for every layer's heap debugging tools to implement the pagemap walking
logic, in which case it is hard to get a consistent view of memory
across the whole system.
Tracking the information in userspace leads to all sorts of problems.
It either needs to be stored inside the process, which means every
process has to have an API to export its current heap information upon
request, or it has to be stored externally in a filesystem that somebody
needs to clean up on crashes. It needs to be readable while the process
is still running, so it has to have some sort of synchronization with
every layer of userspace. Efficiently tracking the ranges requires
reimplementing something like the kernel vma trees, and linking to it
from every layer of userspace. It requires more memory, more syscalls,
more runtime cost, and more complexity to separately track regions that
the kernel is already tracking.
This patch adds a field to /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps to show a
userspace-provided name for anonymous vmas. The names of named
anonymous vmas are shown in /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps as
[anon:<name>].
Userspace can set the name for a region of memory by calling
prctl(PR_SET_VMA, PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME, start, len, (unsigned long)name)
Setting the name to NULL clears it. The name length limit is 80 bytes
including NUL-terminator and is checked to contain only printable ascii
characters (including space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.
Ascii strings are being used to have a descriptive identifiers for vmas,
which can be understood by the users reading /proc/pid/maps or
/proc/pid/smaps. Names can be standardized for a given system and they
can include some variable parts such as the name of the allocator or a
library, tid of the thread using it, etc.
The name is stored in a pointer in the shared union in vm_area_struct
that points to a null terminated string. Anonymous vmas with the same
name (equivalent strings) and are otherwise mergeable will be merged.
The name pointers are not shared between vmas even if they contain the
same name. The name pointer is stored in a union with fields that are
only used on file-backed mappings, so it does not increase memory usage.
CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME kernel configuration is introduced to enable this
feature. It keeps the feature disabled by default to prevent any
additional memory overhead and to avoid confusing procfs parsers on
systems which are not ready to support named anonymous vmas.
The patch is based on the original patch developed by Colin Cross, more
specifically on its latest version [1] posted upstream by Sumit Semwal.
It used a userspace pointer to store vma names. In that design, name
pointers could be shared between vmas. However during the last
upstreaming attempt, Kees Cook raised concerns [2] about this approach
and suggested to copy the name into kernel memory space, perform
validity checks [3] and store as a string referenced from
vm_area_struct.
One big concern is about fork() performance which would need to strdup
anonymous vma names. Dave Hansen suggested experimenting with
worst-case scenario of forking a process with 64k vmas having longest
possible names [4]. I ran this experiment on an ARM64 Android device
and recorded a worst-case regression of almost 40% when forking such a
process.
This regression is addressed in the followup patch which replaces the
pointer to a name with a refcounted structure that allows sharing the
name pointer between vmas of the same name. Instead of duplicating the
string during fork() or when splitting a vma it increments the refcount.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200901161459.11772-4-sumit.semwal@linaro.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031031.D32EF57ED@keescook/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031022.3834F692@keescook/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/5d0358ab-8c47-2f5f-8e43-23b89d6a8e95@intel.com/
Changes for prctl(2) manual page (in the options section):
PR_SET_VMA
Sets an attribute specified in arg2 for virtual memory areas
starting from the address specified in arg3 and spanning the
size specified in arg4. arg5 specifies the value of the attribute
to be set. Note that assigning an attribute to a virtual memory
area might prevent it from being merged with adjacent virtual
memory areas due to the difference in that attribute's value.
Currently, arg2 must be one of:
PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME
Set a name for anonymous virtual memory areas. arg5 should
be a pointer to a null-terminated string containing the
name. The name length including null byte cannot exceed
80 bytes. If arg5 is NULL, the name of the appropriate
anonymous virtual memory areas will be reset. The name
can contain only printable ascii characters (including
space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.
This feature is available only if the kernel is built with
the CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME option enabled.
[surenb@google.com: docs: proc.rst: /proc/PID/maps: fix malformed table]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211123185928.2513763-1-surenb@google.com
[surenb: rebased over v5.15-rc6, replaced userpointer with a kernel copy,
added input sanitization and CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME config. The bulk of the
work here was done by Colin Cross, therefore, with his permission, keeping
him as the author]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211019215511.3771969-2-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:05:59 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2022-03-05 04:28:51 +00:00
|
|
|
name = strndup_user(uname, ANON_VMA_NAME_MAX_LEN);
|
mm: add a field to store names for private anonymous memory
In many userspace applications, and especially in VM based applications
like Android uses heavily, there are multiple different allocators in
use. At a minimum there is libc malloc and the stack, and in many cases
there are libc malloc, the stack, direct syscalls to mmap anonymous
memory, and multiple VM heaps (one for small objects, one for big
objects, etc.). Each of these layers usually has its own tools to
inspect its usage; malloc by compiling a debug version, the VM through
heap inspection tools, and for direct syscalls there is usually no way
to track them.
On Android we heavily use a set of tools that use an extended version of
the logic covered in Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt to walk all pages
mapped in userspace and slice their usage by process, shared (COW) vs.
unique mappings, backing, etc. This can account for real physical
memory usage even in cases like fork without exec (which Android uses
heavily to share as many private COW pages as possible between
processes), Kernel SamePage Merging, and clean zero pages. It produces
a measurement of the pages that only exist in that process (USS, for
unique), and a measurement of the physical memory usage of that process
with the cost of shared pages being evenly split between processes that
share them (PSS).
If all anonymous memory is indistinguishable then figuring out the real
physical memory usage (PSS) of each heap requires either a pagemap
walking tool that can understand the heap debugging of every layer, or
for every layer's heap debugging tools to implement the pagemap walking
logic, in which case it is hard to get a consistent view of memory
across the whole system.
Tracking the information in userspace leads to all sorts of problems.
It either needs to be stored inside the process, which means every
process has to have an API to export its current heap information upon
request, or it has to be stored externally in a filesystem that somebody
needs to clean up on crashes. It needs to be readable while the process
is still running, so it has to have some sort of synchronization with
every layer of userspace. Efficiently tracking the ranges requires
reimplementing something like the kernel vma trees, and linking to it
from every layer of userspace. It requires more memory, more syscalls,
more runtime cost, and more complexity to separately track regions that
the kernel is already tracking.
This patch adds a field to /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps to show a
userspace-provided name for anonymous vmas. The names of named
anonymous vmas are shown in /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps as
[anon:<name>].
Userspace can set the name for a region of memory by calling
prctl(PR_SET_VMA, PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME, start, len, (unsigned long)name)
Setting the name to NULL clears it. The name length limit is 80 bytes
including NUL-terminator and is checked to contain only printable ascii
characters (including space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.
Ascii strings are being used to have a descriptive identifiers for vmas,
which can be understood by the users reading /proc/pid/maps or
/proc/pid/smaps. Names can be standardized for a given system and they
can include some variable parts such as the name of the allocator or a
library, tid of the thread using it, etc.
The name is stored in a pointer in the shared union in vm_area_struct
that points to a null terminated string. Anonymous vmas with the same
name (equivalent strings) and are otherwise mergeable will be merged.
The name pointers are not shared between vmas even if they contain the
same name. The name pointer is stored in a union with fields that are
only used on file-backed mappings, so it does not increase memory usage.
CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME kernel configuration is introduced to enable this
feature. It keeps the feature disabled by default to prevent any
additional memory overhead and to avoid confusing procfs parsers on
systems which are not ready to support named anonymous vmas.
The patch is based on the original patch developed by Colin Cross, more
specifically on its latest version [1] posted upstream by Sumit Semwal.
It used a userspace pointer to store vma names. In that design, name
pointers could be shared between vmas. However during the last
upstreaming attempt, Kees Cook raised concerns [2] about this approach
and suggested to copy the name into kernel memory space, perform
validity checks [3] and store as a string referenced from
vm_area_struct.
One big concern is about fork() performance which would need to strdup
anonymous vma names. Dave Hansen suggested experimenting with
worst-case scenario of forking a process with 64k vmas having longest
possible names [4]. I ran this experiment on an ARM64 Android device
and recorded a worst-case regression of almost 40% when forking such a
process.
This regression is addressed in the followup patch which replaces the
pointer to a name with a refcounted structure that allows sharing the
name pointer between vmas of the same name. Instead of duplicating the
string during fork() or when splitting a vma it increments the refcount.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200901161459.11772-4-sumit.semwal@linaro.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031031.D32EF57ED@keescook/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031022.3834F692@keescook/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/5d0358ab-8c47-2f5f-8e43-23b89d6a8e95@intel.com/
Changes for prctl(2) manual page (in the options section):
PR_SET_VMA
Sets an attribute specified in arg2 for virtual memory areas
starting from the address specified in arg3 and spanning the
size specified in arg4. arg5 specifies the value of the attribute
to be set. Note that assigning an attribute to a virtual memory
area might prevent it from being merged with adjacent virtual
memory areas due to the difference in that attribute's value.
Currently, arg2 must be one of:
PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME
Set a name for anonymous virtual memory areas. arg5 should
be a pointer to a null-terminated string containing the
name. The name length including null byte cannot exceed
80 bytes. If arg5 is NULL, the name of the appropriate
anonymous virtual memory areas will be reset. The name
can contain only printable ascii characters (including
space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.
This feature is available only if the kernel is built with
the CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME option enabled.
[surenb@google.com: docs: proc.rst: /proc/PID/maps: fix malformed table]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211123185928.2513763-1-surenb@google.com
[surenb: rebased over v5.15-rc6, replaced userpointer with a kernel copy,
added input sanitization and CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME config. The bulk of the
work here was done by Colin Cross, therefore, with his permission, keeping
him as the author]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211019215511.3771969-2-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:05:59 +00:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(name))
|
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(name);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (pch = name; *pch != '\0'; pch++) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (!is_valid_name_char(*pch)) {
|
|
|
|
|
kfree(name);
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-03-05 04:28:51 +00:00
|
|
|
/* anon_vma has its own copy */
|
|
|
|
|
anon_name = anon_vma_name_alloc(name);
|
|
|
|
|
kfree(name);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!anon_name)
|
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
mm: add a field to store names for private anonymous memory
In many userspace applications, and especially in VM based applications
like Android uses heavily, there are multiple different allocators in
use. At a minimum there is libc malloc and the stack, and in many cases
there are libc malloc, the stack, direct syscalls to mmap anonymous
memory, and multiple VM heaps (one for small objects, one for big
objects, etc.). Each of these layers usually has its own tools to
inspect its usage; malloc by compiling a debug version, the VM through
heap inspection tools, and for direct syscalls there is usually no way
to track them.
On Android we heavily use a set of tools that use an extended version of
the logic covered in Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt to walk all pages
mapped in userspace and slice their usage by process, shared (COW) vs.
unique mappings, backing, etc. This can account for real physical
memory usage even in cases like fork without exec (which Android uses
heavily to share as many private COW pages as possible between
processes), Kernel SamePage Merging, and clean zero pages. It produces
a measurement of the pages that only exist in that process (USS, for
unique), and a measurement of the physical memory usage of that process
with the cost of shared pages being evenly split between processes that
share them (PSS).
If all anonymous memory is indistinguishable then figuring out the real
physical memory usage (PSS) of each heap requires either a pagemap
walking tool that can understand the heap debugging of every layer, or
for every layer's heap debugging tools to implement the pagemap walking
logic, in which case it is hard to get a consistent view of memory
across the whole system.
Tracking the information in userspace leads to all sorts of problems.
It either needs to be stored inside the process, which means every
process has to have an API to export its current heap information upon
request, or it has to be stored externally in a filesystem that somebody
needs to clean up on crashes. It needs to be readable while the process
is still running, so it has to have some sort of synchronization with
every layer of userspace. Efficiently tracking the ranges requires
reimplementing something like the kernel vma trees, and linking to it
from every layer of userspace. It requires more memory, more syscalls,
more runtime cost, and more complexity to separately track regions that
the kernel is already tracking.
This patch adds a field to /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps to show a
userspace-provided name for anonymous vmas. The names of named
anonymous vmas are shown in /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps as
[anon:<name>].
Userspace can set the name for a region of memory by calling
prctl(PR_SET_VMA, PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME, start, len, (unsigned long)name)
Setting the name to NULL clears it. The name length limit is 80 bytes
including NUL-terminator and is checked to contain only printable ascii
characters (including space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.
Ascii strings are being used to have a descriptive identifiers for vmas,
which can be understood by the users reading /proc/pid/maps or
/proc/pid/smaps. Names can be standardized for a given system and they
can include some variable parts such as the name of the allocator or a
library, tid of the thread using it, etc.
The name is stored in a pointer in the shared union in vm_area_struct
that points to a null terminated string. Anonymous vmas with the same
name (equivalent strings) and are otherwise mergeable will be merged.
The name pointers are not shared between vmas even if they contain the
same name. The name pointer is stored in a union with fields that are
only used on file-backed mappings, so it does not increase memory usage.
CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME kernel configuration is introduced to enable this
feature. It keeps the feature disabled by default to prevent any
additional memory overhead and to avoid confusing procfs parsers on
systems which are not ready to support named anonymous vmas.
The patch is based on the original patch developed by Colin Cross, more
specifically on its latest version [1] posted upstream by Sumit Semwal.
It used a userspace pointer to store vma names. In that design, name
pointers could be shared between vmas. However during the last
upstreaming attempt, Kees Cook raised concerns [2] about this approach
and suggested to copy the name into kernel memory space, perform
validity checks [3] and store as a string referenced from
vm_area_struct.
One big concern is about fork() performance which would need to strdup
anonymous vma names. Dave Hansen suggested experimenting with
worst-case scenario of forking a process with 64k vmas having longest
possible names [4]. I ran this experiment on an ARM64 Android device
and recorded a worst-case regression of almost 40% when forking such a
process.
This regression is addressed in the followup patch which replaces the
pointer to a name with a refcounted structure that allows sharing the
name pointer between vmas of the same name. Instead of duplicating the
string during fork() or when splitting a vma it increments the refcount.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200901161459.11772-4-sumit.semwal@linaro.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031031.D32EF57ED@keescook/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031022.3834F692@keescook/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/5d0358ab-8c47-2f5f-8e43-23b89d6a8e95@intel.com/
Changes for prctl(2) manual page (in the options section):
PR_SET_VMA
Sets an attribute specified in arg2 for virtual memory areas
starting from the address specified in arg3 and spanning the
size specified in arg4. arg5 specifies the value of the attribute
to be set. Note that assigning an attribute to a virtual memory
area might prevent it from being merged with adjacent virtual
memory areas due to the difference in that attribute's value.
Currently, arg2 must be one of:
PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME
Set a name for anonymous virtual memory areas. arg5 should
be a pointer to a null-terminated string containing the
name. The name length including null byte cannot exceed
80 bytes. If arg5 is NULL, the name of the appropriate
anonymous virtual memory areas will be reset. The name
can contain only printable ascii characters (including
space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.
This feature is available only if the kernel is built with
the CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME option enabled.
[surenb@google.com: docs: proc.rst: /proc/PID/maps: fix malformed table]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211123185928.2513763-1-surenb@google.com
[surenb: rebased over v5.15-rc6, replaced userpointer with a kernel copy,
added input sanitization and CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME config. The bulk of the
work here was done by Colin Cross, therefore, with his permission, keeping
him as the author]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211019215511.3771969-2-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:05:59 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mmap_write_lock(mm);
|
2022-03-05 04:28:51 +00:00
|
|
|
error = madvise_set_anon_name(mm, addr, size, anon_name);
|
mm: add a field to store names for private anonymous memory
In many userspace applications, and especially in VM based applications
like Android uses heavily, there are multiple different allocators in
use. At a minimum there is libc malloc and the stack, and in many cases
there are libc malloc, the stack, direct syscalls to mmap anonymous
memory, and multiple VM heaps (one for small objects, one for big
objects, etc.). Each of these layers usually has its own tools to
inspect its usage; malloc by compiling a debug version, the VM through
heap inspection tools, and for direct syscalls there is usually no way
to track them.
On Android we heavily use a set of tools that use an extended version of
the logic covered in Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt to walk all pages
mapped in userspace and slice their usage by process, shared (COW) vs.
unique mappings, backing, etc. This can account for real physical
memory usage even in cases like fork without exec (which Android uses
heavily to share as many private COW pages as possible between
processes), Kernel SamePage Merging, and clean zero pages. It produces
a measurement of the pages that only exist in that process (USS, for
unique), and a measurement of the physical memory usage of that process
with the cost of shared pages being evenly split between processes that
share them (PSS).
If all anonymous memory is indistinguishable then figuring out the real
physical memory usage (PSS) of each heap requires either a pagemap
walking tool that can understand the heap debugging of every layer, or
for every layer's heap debugging tools to implement the pagemap walking
logic, in which case it is hard to get a consistent view of memory
across the whole system.
Tracking the information in userspace leads to all sorts of problems.
It either needs to be stored inside the process, which means every
process has to have an API to export its current heap information upon
request, or it has to be stored externally in a filesystem that somebody
needs to clean up on crashes. It needs to be readable while the process
is still running, so it has to have some sort of synchronization with
every layer of userspace. Efficiently tracking the ranges requires
reimplementing something like the kernel vma trees, and linking to it
from every layer of userspace. It requires more memory, more syscalls,
more runtime cost, and more complexity to separately track regions that
the kernel is already tracking.
This patch adds a field to /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps to show a
userspace-provided name for anonymous vmas. The names of named
anonymous vmas are shown in /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps as
[anon:<name>].
Userspace can set the name for a region of memory by calling
prctl(PR_SET_VMA, PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME, start, len, (unsigned long)name)
Setting the name to NULL clears it. The name length limit is 80 bytes
including NUL-terminator and is checked to contain only printable ascii
characters (including space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.
Ascii strings are being used to have a descriptive identifiers for vmas,
which can be understood by the users reading /proc/pid/maps or
/proc/pid/smaps. Names can be standardized for a given system and they
can include some variable parts such as the name of the allocator or a
library, tid of the thread using it, etc.
The name is stored in a pointer in the shared union in vm_area_struct
that points to a null terminated string. Anonymous vmas with the same
name (equivalent strings) and are otherwise mergeable will be merged.
The name pointers are not shared between vmas even if they contain the
same name. The name pointer is stored in a union with fields that are
only used on file-backed mappings, so it does not increase memory usage.
CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME kernel configuration is introduced to enable this
feature. It keeps the feature disabled by default to prevent any
additional memory overhead and to avoid confusing procfs parsers on
systems which are not ready to support named anonymous vmas.
The patch is based on the original patch developed by Colin Cross, more
specifically on its latest version [1] posted upstream by Sumit Semwal.
It used a userspace pointer to store vma names. In that design, name
pointers could be shared between vmas. However during the last
upstreaming attempt, Kees Cook raised concerns [2] about this approach
and suggested to copy the name into kernel memory space, perform
validity checks [3] and store as a string referenced from
vm_area_struct.
One big concern is about fork() performance which would need to strdup
anonymous vma names. Dave Hansen suggested experimenting with
worst-case scenario of forking a process with 64k vmas having longest
possible names [4]. I ran this experiment on an ARM64 Android device
and recorded a worst-case regression of almost 40% when forking such a
process.
This regression is addressed in the followup patch which replaces the
pointer to a name with a refcounted structure that allows sharing the
name pointer between vmas of the same name. Instead of duplicating the
string during fork() or when splitting a vma it increments the refcount.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200901161459.11772-4-sumit.semwal@linaro.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031031.D32EF57ED@keescook/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031022.3834F692@keescook/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/5d0358ab-8c47-2f5f-8e43-23b89d6a8e95@intel.com/
Changes for prctl(2) manual page (in the options section):
PR_SET_VMA
Sets an attribute specified in arg2 for virtual memory areas
starting from the address specified in arg3 and spanning the
size specified in arg4. arg5 specifies the value of the attribute
to be set. Note that assigning an attribute to a virtual memory
area might prevent it from being merged with adjacent virtual
memory areas due to the difference in that attribute's value.
Currently, arg2 must be one of:
PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME
Set a name for anonymous virtual memory areas. arg5 should
be a pointer to a null-terminated string containing the
name. The name length including null byte cannot exceed
80 bytes. If arg5 is NULL, the name of the appropriate
anonymous virtual memory areas will be reset. The name
can contain only printable ascii characters (including
space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.
This feature is available only if the kernel is built with
the CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME option enabled.
[surenb@google.com: docs: proc.rst: /proc/PID/maps: fix malformed table]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211123185928.2513763-1-surenb@google.com
[surenb: rebased over v5.15-rc6, replaced userpointer with a kernel copy,
added input sanitization and CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME config. The bulk of the
work here was done by Colin Cross, therefore, with his permission, keeping
him as the author]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211019215511.3771969-2-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:05:59 +00:00
|
|
|
mmap_write_unlock(mm);
|
2022-03-05 04:28:51 +00:00
|
|
|
anon_vma_name_put(anon_name);
|
mm: add a field to store names for private anonymous memory
In many userspace applications, and especially in VM based applications
like Android uses heavily, there are multiple different allocators in
use. At a minimum there is libc malloc and the stack, and in many cases
there are libc malloc, the stack, direct syscalls to mmap anonymous
memory, and multiple VM heaps (one for small objects, one for big
objects, etc.). Each of these layers usually has its own tools to
inspect its usage; malloc by compiling a debug version, the VM through
heap inspection tools, and for direct syscalls there is usually no way
to track them.
On Android we heavily use a set of tools that use an extended version of
the logic covered in Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt to walk all pages
mapped in userspace and slice their usage by process, shared (COW) vs.
unique mappings, backing, etc. This can account for real physical
memory usage even in cases like fork without exec (which Android uses
heavily to share as many private COW pages as possible between
processes), Kernel SamePage Merging, and clean zero pages. It produces
a measurement of the pages that only exist in that process (USS, for
unique), and a measurement of the physical memory usage of that process
with the cost of shared pages being evenly split between processes that
share them (PSS).
If all anonymous memory is indistinguishable then figuring out the real
physical memory usage (PSS) of each heap requires either a pagemap
walking tool that can understand the heap debugging of every layer, or
for every layer's heap debugging tools to implement the pagemap walking
logic, in which case it is hard to get a consistent view of memory
across the whole system.
Tracking the information in userspace leads to all sorts of problems.
It either needs to be stored inside the process, which means every
process has to have an API to export its current heap information upon
request, or it has to be stored externally in a filesystem that somebody
needs to clean up on crashes. It needs to be readable while the process
is still running, so it has to have some sort of synchronization with
every layer of userspace. Efficiently tracking the ranges requires
reimplementing something like the kernel vma trees, and linking to it
from every layer of userspace. It requires more memory, more syscalls,
more runtime cost, and more complexity to separately track regions that
the kernel is already tracking.
This patch adds a field to /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps to show a
userspace-provided name for anonymous vmas. The names of named
anonymous vmas are shown in /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps as
[anon:<name>].
Userspace can set the name for a region of memory by calling
prctl(PR_SET_VMA, PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME, start, len, (unsigned long)name)
Setting the name to NULL clears it. The name length limit is 80 bytes
including NUL-terminator and is checked to contain only printable ascii
characters (including space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.
Ascii strings are being used to have a descriptive identifiers for vmas,
which can be understood by the users reading /proc/pid/maps or
/proc/pid/smaps. Names can be standardized for a given system and they
can include some variable parts such as the name of the allocator or a
library, tid of the thread using it, etc.
The name is stored in a pointer in the shared union in vm_area_struct
that points to a null terminated string. Anonymous vmas with the same
name (equivalent strings) and are otherwise mergeable will be merged.
The name pointers are not shared between vmas even if they contain the
same name. The name pointer is stored in a union with fields that are
only used on file-backed mappings, so it does not increase memory usage.
CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME kernel configuration is introduced to enable this
feature. It keeps the feature disabled by default to prevent any
additional memory overhead and to avoid confusing procfs parsers on
systems which are not ready to support named anonymous vmas.
The patch is based on the original patch developed by Colin Cross, more
specifically on its latest version [1] posted upstream by Sumit Semwal.
It used a userspace pointer to store vma names. In that design, name
pointers could be shared between vmas. However during the last
upstreaming attempt, Kees Cook raised concerns [2] about this approach
and suggested to copy the name into kernel memory space, perform
validity checks [3] and store as a string referenced from
vm_area_struct.
One big concern is about fork() performance which would need to strdup
anonymous vma names. Dave Hansen suggested experimenting with
worst-case scenario of forking a process with 64k vmas having longest
possible names [4]. I ran this experiment on an ARM64 Android device
and recorded a worst-case regression of almost 40% when forking such a
process.
This regression is addressed in the followup patch which replaces the
pointer to a name with a refcounted structure that allows sharing the
name pointer between vmas of the same name. Instead of duplicating the
string during fork() or when splitting a vma it increments the refcount.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200901161459.11772-4-sumit.semwal@linaro.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031031.D32EF57ED@keescook/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031022.3834F692@keescook/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/5d0358ab-8c47-2f5f-8e43-23b89d6a8e95@intel.com/
Changes for prctl(2) manual page (in the options section):
PR_SET_VMA
Sets an attribute specified in arg2 for virtual memory areas
starting from the address specified in arg3 and spanning the
size specified in arg4. arg5 specifies the value of the attribute
to be set. Note that assigning an attribute to a virtual memory
area might prevent it from being merged with adjacent virtual
memory areas due to the difference in that attribute's value.
Currently, arg2 must be one of:
PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME
Set a name for anonymous virtual memory areas. arg5 should
be a pointer to a null-terminated string containing the
name. The name length including null byte cannot exceed
80 bytes. If arg5 is NULL, the name of the appropriate
anonymous virtual memory areas will be reset. The name
can contain only printable ascii characters (including
space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.
This feature is available only if the kernel is built with
the CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME option enabled.
[surenb@google.com: docs: proc.rst: /proc/PID/maps: fix malformed table]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211123185928.2513763-1-surenb@google.com
[surenb: rebased over v5.15-rc6, replaced userpointer with a kernel copy,
added input sanitization and CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME config. The bulk of the
work here was done by Colin Cross, therefore, with his permission, keeping
him as the author]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211019215511.3771969-2-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:05:59 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
|
error = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#else /* CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME */
|
|
|
|
|
static int prctl_set_vma(unsigned long opt, unsigned long start,
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long size, unsigned long arg)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME */
|
|
|
|
|
|
2023-08-28 15:08:57 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline unsigned long get_current_mdwe(void)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(MMF_HAS_MDWE, ¤t->mm->flags))
|
|
|
|
|
ret |= PR_MDWE_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN;
|
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(MMF_HAS_MDWE_NO_INHERIT, ¤t->mm->flags))
|
|
|
|
|
ret |= PR_MDWE_NO_INHERIT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
mm: implement memory-deny-write-execute as a prctl
Patch series "mm: In-kernel support for memory-deny-write-execute (MDWE)",
v2.
The background to this is that systemd has a configuration option called
MemoryDenyWriteExecute [2], implemented as a SECCOMP BPF filter. Its aim
is to prevent a user task from inadvertently creating an executable
mapping that is (or was) writeable. Since such BPF filter is stateless,
it cannot detect mappings that were previously writeable but subsequently
changed to read-only. Therefore the filter simply rejects any
mprotect(PROT_EXEC). The side-effect is that on arm64 with BTI support
(Branch Target Identification), the dynamic loader cannot change an ELF
section from PROT_EXEC to PROT_EXEC|PROT_BTI using mprotect(). For
libraries, it can resort to unmapping and re-mapping but for the main
executable it does not have a file descriptor. The original bug report in
the Red Hat bugzilla - [3] - and subsequent glibc workaround for libraries
- [4].
This series adds in-kernel support for this feature as a prctl
PR_SET_MDWE, that is inherited on fork(). The prctl denies PROT_WRITE |
PROT_EXEC mappings. Like the systemd BPF filter it also denies adding
PROT_EXEC to mappings. However unlike the BPF filter it only denies it if
the mapping didn't previous have PROT_EXEC. This allows to PROT_EXEC ->
PROT_EXEC | PROT_BTI with mprotect(), which is a problem with the BPF
filter.
This patch (of 2):
The aim of such policy is to prevent a user task from creating an
executable mapping that is also writeable.
An example of mmap() returning -EACCESS if the policy is enabled:
mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
Similarly, mprotect() would return -EACCESS below:
addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC);
The BPF filter that systemd MDWE uses is stateless, and disallows
mprotect() with PROT_EXEC completely. This new prctl allows PROT_EXEC to
be enabled if it was already PROT_EXEC, which allows the following case:
addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC | PROT_BTI);
where PROT_BTI enables branch tracking identification on arm64.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230119160344.54358-1-joey.gouly@arm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230119160344.54358-2-joey.gouly@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Co-developed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: nd <nd@arm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>
Cc: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
Cc: Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-01-19 16:03:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline int prctl_set_mdwe(unsigned long bits, unsigned long arg3,
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
2023-08-28 15:08:57 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long current_bits;
|
|
|
|
|
|
mm: implement memory-deny-write-execute as a prctl
Patch series "mm: In-kernel support for memory-deny-write-execute (MDWE)",
v2.
The background to this is that systemd has a configuration option called
MemoryDenyWriteExecute [2], implemented as a SECCOMP BPF filter. Its aim
is to prevent a user task from inadvertently creating an executable
mapping that is (or was) writeable. Since such BPF filter is stateless,
it cannot detect mappings that were previously writeable but subsequently
changed to read-only. Therefore the filter simply rejects any
mprotect(PROT_EXEC). The side-effect is that on arm64 with BTI support
(Branch Target Identification), the dynamic loader cannot change an ELF
section from PROT_EXEC to PROT_EXEC|PROT_BTI using mprotect(). For
libraries, it can resort to unmapping and re-mapping but for the main
executable it does not have a file descriptor. The original bug report in
the Red Hat bugzilla - [3] - and subsequent glibc workaround for libraries
- [4].
This series adds in-kernel support for this feature as a prctl
PR_SET_MDWE, that is inherited on fork(). The prctl denies PROT_WRITE |
PROT_EXEC mappings. Like the systemd BPF filter it also denies adding
PROT_EXEC to mappings. However unlike the BPF filter it only denies it if
the mapping didn't previous have PROT_EXEC. This allows to PROT_EXEC ->
PROT_EXEC | PROT_BTI with mprotect(), which is a problem with the BPF
filter.
This patch (of 2):
The aim of such policy is to prevent a user task from creating an
executable mapping that is also writeable.
An example of mmap() returning -EACCESS if the policy is enabled:
mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
Similarly, mprotect() would return -EACCESS below:
addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC);
The BPF filter that systemd MDWE uses is stateless, and disallows
mprotect() with PROT_EXEC completely. This new prctl allows PROT_EXEC to
be enabled if it was already PROT_EXEC, which allows the following case:
addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC | PROT_BTI);
where PROT_BTI enables branch tracking identification on arm64.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230119160344.54358-1-joey.gouly@arm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230119160344.54358-2-joey.gouly@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Co-developed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: nd <nd@arm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>
Cc: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
Cc: Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-01-19 16:03:43 +00:00
|
|
|
if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2023-08-28 15:08:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (bits & ~(PR_MDWE_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN | PR_MDWE_NO_INHERIT))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* NO_INHERIT only makes sense with REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN */
|
|
|
|
|
if (bits & PR_MDWE_NO_INHERIT && !(bits & PR_MDWE_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN))
|
mm: implement memory-deny-write-execute as a prctl
Patch series "mm: In-kernel support for memory-deny-write-execute (MDWE)",
v2.
The background to this is that systemd has a configuration option called
MemoryDenyWriteExecute [2], implemented as a SECCOMP BPF filter. Its aim
is to prevent a user task from inadvertently creating an executable
mapping that is (or was) writeable. Since such BPF filter is stateless,
it cannot detect mappings that were previously writeable but subsequently
changed to read-only. Therefore the filter simply rejects any
mprotect(PROT_EXEC). The side-effect is that on arm64 with BTI support
(Branch Target Identification), the dynamic loader cannot change an ELF
section from PROT_EXEC to PROT_EXEC|PROT_BTI using mprotect(). For
libraries, it can resort to unmapping and re-mapping but for the main
executable it does not have a file descriptor. The original bug report in
the Red Hat bugzilla - [3] - and subsequent glibc workaround for libraries
- [4].
This series adds in-kernel support for this feature as a prctl
PR_SET_MDWE, that is inherited on fork(). The prctl denies PROT_WRITE |
PROT_EXEC mappings. Like the systemd BPF filter it also denies adding
PROT_EXEC to mappings. However unlike the BPF filter it only denies it if
the mapping didn't previous have PROT_EXEC. This allows to PROT_EXEC ->
PROT_EXEC | PROT_BTI with mprotect(), which is a problem with the BPF
filter.
This patch (of 2):
The aim of such policy is to prevent a user task from creating an
executable mapping that is also writeable.
An example of mmap() returning -EACCESS if the policy is enabled:
mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
Similarly, mprotect() would return -EACCESS below:
addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC);
The BPF filter that systemd MDWE uses is stateless, and disallows
mprotect() with PROT_EXEC completely. This new prctl allows PROT_EXEC to
be enabled if it was already PROT_EXEC, which allows the following case:
addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC | PROT_BTI);
where PROT_BTI enables branch tracking identification on arm64.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230119160344.54358-1-joey.gouly@arm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230119160344.54358-2-joey.gouly@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Co-developed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: nd <nd@arm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>
Cc: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
Cc: Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-01-19 16:03:43 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2024-02-27 01:35:41 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* EOPNOTSUPP might be more appropriate here in principle, but
|
|
|
|
|
* existing userspace depends on EINVAL specifically.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (!arch_memory_deny_write_exec_supported())
|
2023-11-18 18:33:35 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2023-08-28 15:08:57 +00:00
|
|
|
current_bits = get_current_mdwe();
|
|
|
|
|
if (current_bits && current_bits != bits)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM; /* Cannot unset the flags */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (bits & PR_MDWE_NO_INHERIT)
|
|
|
|
|
set_bit(MMF_HAS_MDWE_NO_INHERIT, ¤t->mm->flags);
|
mm: implement memory-deny-write-execute as a prctl
Patch series "mm: In-kernel support for memory-deny-write-execute (MDWE)",
v2.
The background to this is that systemd has a configuration option called
MemoryDenyWriteExecute [2], implemented as a SECCOMP BPF filter. Its aim
is to prevent a user task from inadvertently creating an executable
mapping that is (or was) writeable. Since such BPF filter is stateless,
it cannot detect mappings that were previously writeable but subsequently
changed to read-only. Therefore the filter simply rejects any
mprotect(PROT_EXEC). The side-effect is that on arm64 with BTI support
(Branch Target Identification), the dynamic loader cannot change an ELF
section from PROT_EXEC to PROT_EXEC|PROT_BTI using mprotect(). For
libraries, it can resort to unmapping and re-mapping but for the main
executable it does not have a file descriptor. The original bug report in
the Red Hat bugzilla - [3] - and subsequent glibc workaround for libraries
- [4].
This series adds in-kernel support for this feature as a prctl
PR_SET_MDWE, that is inherited on fork(). The prctl denies PROT_WRITE |
PROT_EXEC mappings. Like the systemd BPF filter it also denies adding
PROT_EXEC to mappings. However unlike the BPF filter it only denies it if
the mapping didn't previous have PROT_EXEC. This allows to PROT_EXEC ->
PROT_EXEC | PROT_BTI with mprotect(), which is a problem with the BPF
filter.
This patch (of 2):
The aim of such policy is to prevent a user task from creating an
executable mapping that is also writeable.
An example of mmap() returning -EACCESS if the policy is enabled:
mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
Similarly, mprotect() would return -EACCESS below:
addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC);
The BPF filter that systemd MDWE uses is stateless, and disallows
mprotect() with PROT_EXEC completely. This new prctl allows PROT_EXEC to
be enabled if it was already PROT_EXEC, which allows the following case:
addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC | PROT_BTI);
where PROT_BTI enables branch tracking identification on arm64.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230119160344.54358-1-joey.gouly@arm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230119160344.54358-2-joey.gouly@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Co-developed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: nd <nd@arm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>
Cc: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
Cc: Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-01-19 16:03:43 +00:00
|
|
|
if (bits & PR_MDWE_REFUSE_EXEC_GAIN)
|
|
|
|
|
set_bit(MMF_HAS_MDWE, ¤t->mm->flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline int prctl_get_mdwe(unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2023-08-28 15:08:57 +00:00
|
|
|
return get_current_mdwe();
|
mm: implement memory-deny-write-execute as a prctl
Patch series "mm: In-kernel support for memory-deny-write-execute (MDWE)",
v2.
The background to this is that systemd has a configuration option called
MemoryDenyWriteExecute [2], implemented as a SECCOMP BPF filter. Its aim
is to prevent a user task from inadvertently creating an executable
mapping that is (or was) writeable. Since such BPF filter is stateless,
it cannot detect mappings that were previously writeable but subsequently
changed to read-only. Therefore the filter simply rejects any
mprotect(PROT_EXEC). The side-effect is that on arm64 with BTI support
(Branch Target Identification), the dynamic loader cannot change an ELF
section from PROT_EXEC to PROT_EXEC|PROT_BTI using mprotect(). For
libraries, it can resort to unmapping and re-mapping but for the main
executable it does not have a file descriptor. The original bug report in
the Red Hat bugzilla - [3] - and subsequent glibc workaround for libraries
- [4].
This series adds in-kernel support for this feature as a prctl
PR_SET_MDWE, that is inherited on fork(). The prctl denies PROT_WRITE |
PROT_EXEC mappings. Like the systemd BPF filter it also denies adding
PROT_EXEC to mappings. However unlike the BPF filter it only denies it if
the mapping didn't previous have PROT_EXEC. This allows to PROT_EXEC ->
PROT_EXEC | PROT_BTI with mprotect(), which is a problem with the BPF
filter.
This patch (of 2):
The aim of such policy is to prevent a user task from creating an
executable mapping that is also writeable.
An example of mmap() returning -EACCESS if the policy is enabled:
mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
Similarly, mprotect() would return -EACCESS below:
addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC);
The BPF filter that systemd MDWE uses is stateless, and disallows
mprotect() with PROT_EXEC completely. This new prctl allows PROT_EXEC to
be enabled if it was already PROT_EXEC, which allows the following case:
addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC | PROT_BTI);
where PROT_BTI enables branch tracking identification on arm64.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230119160344.54358-1-joey.gouly@arm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230119160344.54358-2-joey.gouly@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Co-developed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: nd <nd@arm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>
Cc: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
Cc: Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-01-19 16:03:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2023-04-04 12:31:48 +00:00
|
|
|
static int prctl_get_auxv(void __user *addr, unsigned long len)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long size = min_t(unsigned long, sizeof(mm->saved_auxv), len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (size && copy_to_user(addr, mm->saved_auxv, size))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
return sizeof(mm->saved_auxv);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-14 13:14:28 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-11-13 23:39:16 +00:00
|
|
|
struct task_struct *me = current;
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)];
|
|
|
|
|
long error;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
|
|
|
|
if (error != -ENOSYS)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.
A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().
With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:
struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
int ret = blah(new);
if (ret < 0) {
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
return commit_creds(new);
There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.
To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:
(1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.
(2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.
The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).
This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.
This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:
(1) execve().
This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
security code rather than altering the current creds directly.
(2) Temporary credential overrides.
do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
on the thread being dumped.
This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
the task's objective credentials.
(3) LSM interface.
A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:
(*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
(*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()
Removed in favour of security_capset().
(*) security_capset(), ->capset()
New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new
creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the
new creds, are now const.
(*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()
Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
killed if it's an error.
(*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()
Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().
(*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()
New. Free security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()
New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.
(*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()
New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
security by commit_creds().
(*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()
Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().
(*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()
Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by
cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().
(*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()
Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
directly to init's credentials.
NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.
(*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
(*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()
Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
refer to the security context.
(4) sys_capset().
This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it
calls have been merged.
(5) reparent_to_kthreadd().
This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
commit_thread() to point that way.
(6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()
__sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
successful.
switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting
__sigqueue_alloc().
(7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.
The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
it.
security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This
guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.
The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().
Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
commit_creds().
The get functions all simply access the data directly.
(8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().
security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
rather than through an argument.
Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
if it doesn't end up using it.
(9) Keyrings.
A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:
(a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
They may want separating out again later.
(b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.
(c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
keyring.
(d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.
(e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
process or session keyrings (they're shared).
(10) Usermode helper.
The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set
of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
after it has been cloned.
call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A
special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.
call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
supplied keyring as the new session keyring.
(11) SELinux.
SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
interface changes mentioned above:
(a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that
the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
lock.
(12) is_single_threaded().
This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
wants to use it too.
The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want
to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).
(13) nfsd.
The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials
down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
in this series have been applied.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2008-11-13 23:39:23 +00:00
|
|
|
error = 0;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (option) {
|
2013-02-22 00:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG:
|
|
|
|
|
if (!valid_signal(arg2)) {
|
|
|
|
|
error = -EINVAL;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2013-02-22 00:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
me->pdeath_signal = arg2;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG:
|
|
|
|
|
error = put_user(me->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_GET_DUMPABLE:
|
|
|
|
|
error = get_dumpable(me->mm);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_DUMPABLE:
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg2 != SUID_DUMP_DISABLE && arg2 != SUID_DUMP_USER) {
|
|
|
|
|
error = -EINVAL;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2013-02-22 00:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-02-22 00:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_SET_UNALIGN:
|
|
|
|
|
error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_GET_UNALIGN:
|
|
|
|
|
error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_FPEMU:
|
|
|
|
|
error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_GET_FPEMU:
|
|
|
|
|
error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_FPEXC:
|
|
|
|
|
error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_GET_FPEXC:
|
|
|
|
|
error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_GET_TIMING:
|
|
|
|
|
error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_TIMING:
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg2 != PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL)
|
|
|
|
|
error = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_NAME:
|
|
|
|
|
comm[sizeof(me->comm) - 1] = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
if (strncpy_from_user(comm, (char __user *)arg2,
|
|
|
|
|
sizeof(me->comm) - 1) < 0)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
set_task_comm(me, comm);
|
|
|
|
|
proc_comm_connector(me);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_GET_NAME:
|
|
|
|
|
get_task_comm(comm, me);
|
|
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm, sizeof(comm)))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_GET_ENDIAN:
|
|
|
|
|
error = GET_ENDIAN(me, arg2);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_ENDIAN:
|
|
|
|
|
error = SET_ENDIAN(me, arg2);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_GET_SECCOMP:
|
|
|
|
|
error = prctl_get_seccomp();
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_SECCOMP:
|
|
|
|
|
error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2, (char __user *)arg3);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_GET_TSC:
|
|
|
|
|
error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_TSC:
|
|
|
|
|
error = SET_TSC_CTL(arg2);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE:
|
|
|
|
|
error = perf_event_task_disable();
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE:
|
|
|
|
|
error = perf_event_task_enable();
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_GET_TIMERSLACK:
|
timer: convert timer_slack_ns from unsigned long to u64
This patchset introduces a /proc/<pid>/timerslack_ns interface which
would allow controlling processes to be able to set the timerslack value
on other processes in order to save power by avoiding wakeups (Something
Android currently does via out-of-tree patches).
The first patch tries to fix the internal timer_slack_ns usage which was
defined as a long, which limits the slack range to ~4 seconds on 32bit
systems. It converts it to a u64, which provides the same basically
unlimited slack (500 years) on both 32bit and 64bit machines.
The second patch introduces the /proc/<pid>/timerslack_ns interface
which allows the full 64bit slack range for a task to be read or set on
both 32bit and 64bit machines.
With these two patches, on a 32bit machine, after setting the slack on
bash to 10 seconds:
$ time sleep 1
real 0m10.747s
user 0m0.001s
sys 0m0.005s
The first patch is a little ugly, since I had to chase the slack delta
arguments through a number of functions converting them to u64s. Let me
know if it makes sense to break that up more or not.
Other than that things are fairly straightforward.
This patch (of 2):
The timer_slack_ns value in the task struct is currently a unsigned
long. This means that on 32bit applications, the maximum slack is just
over 4 seconds. However, on 64bit machines, its much much larger (~500
years).
This disparity could make application development a little (as well as
the default_slack) to a u64. This means both 32bit and 64bit systems
have the same effective internal slack range.
Now the existing ABI via PR_GET_TIMERSLACK and PR_SET_TIMERSLACK specify
the interface as a unsigned long, so we preserve that limitation on
32bit systems, where SET_TIMERSLACK can only set the slack to a unsigned
long value, and GET_TIMERSLACK will return ULONG_MAX if the slack is
actually larger then what can be stored by an unsigned long.
This patch also modifies hrtimer functions which specified the slack
delta as a unsigned long.
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Oren Laadan <orenl@cellrox.com>
Cc: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
Cc: Rom Lemarchand <romlem@android.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-17 21:20:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if (current->timer_slack_ns > ULONG_MAX)
|
|
|
|
|
error = ULONG_MAX;
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
error = current->timer_slack_ns;
|
2013-02-22 00:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_TIMERSLACK:
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg2 <= 0)
|
|
|
|
|
current->timer_slack_ns =
|
2008-09-01 22:52:40 +00:00
|
|
|
current->default_timer_slack_ns;
|
2013-02-22 00:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
current->timer_slack_ns = arg2;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_MCE_KILL:
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg4 | arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
switch (arg2) {
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR:
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg3 != 0)
|
2009-09-16 09:50:14 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2013-02-22 00:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_PROCESS;
|
2009-09-16 09:50:14 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2013-02-22 00:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_MCE_KILL_SET:
|
|
|
|
|
current->flags |= PF_MCE_PROCESS;
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY)
|
|
|
|
|
current->flags |= PF_MCE_EARLY;
|
|
|
|
|
else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_LATE)
|
|
|
|
|
current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_EARLY;
|
|
|
|
|
else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT)
|
|
|
|
|
current->flags &=
|
|
|
|
|
~(PF_MCE_EARLY|PF_MCE_PROCESS);
|
2009-10-04 00:20:11 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs
With this change, calling
prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)
disables privilege granting operations at execve-time. For example, a
process will not be able to execute a setuid binary to change their uid
or gid if this bit is set. The same is true for file capabilities.
Additionally, LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS is defined to ensure that
LSMs respect the requested behavior.
To determine if the NO_NEW_PRIVS bit is set, a task may call
prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0);
It returns 1 if set and 0 if it is not set. If any of the arguments are
non-zero, it will return -1 and set errno to -EINVAL.
(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS behaves similarly.)
This functionality is desired for the proposed seccomp filter patch
series. By using PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, it allows a task to modify the
system call behavior for itself and its child tasks without being
able to impact the behavior of a more privileged task.
Another potential use is making certain privileged operations
unprivileged. For example, chroot may be considered "safe" if it cannot
affect privileged tasks.
Note, this patch causes execve to fail when PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is
set and AppArmor is in use. It is fixed in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
v18: updated change desc
v17: using new define values as per 3.4
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-04-12 21:47:50 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
default:
|
2013-02-22 00:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_MCE_KILL_GET:
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg2 | arg3 | arg4 | arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
if (current->flags & PF_MCE_PROCESS)
|
|
|
|
|
error = (current->flags & PF_MCE_EARLY) ?
|
|
|
|
|
PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY : PR_MCE_KILL_LATE;
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
error = PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_MM:
|
|
|
|
|
error = prctl_set_mm(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS:
|
2020-10-24 01:04:26 +00:00
|
|
|
error = prctl_get_tid_address(me, (int __user * __user *)arg2);
|
2013-02-22 00:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER:
|
|
|
|
|
me->signal->is_child_subreaper = !!arg2;
|
prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant
If process forks some children when it has is_child_subreaper
flag enabled they will inherit has_child_subreaper flag - first
group, when is_child_subreaper is disabled forked children will
not inherit it - second group. So child-subreaper does not reparent
all his descendants when their parents die. Having these two
differently behaving groups can lead to confusion. Also it is
a problem for CRIU, as when we restore process tree we need to
somehow determine which descendants belong to which group and
much harder - to put them exactly to these group.
To simplify these we can add a propagation of has_child_subreaper
flag on PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER, walking all descendants of child-
subreaper to setup has_child_subreaper flag.
In common cases when process like systemd first sets itself to
be a child-subreaper and only after that forks its services, we will
have zero-length list of descendants to walk. Testing with binary
subtree of 2^15 processes prctl took < 0.007 sec and has shown close
to linear dependency(~0.2 * n * usec) on lower numbers of processes.
Moreover, I doubt someone intentionaly pre-forks the children whitch
should reparent to init before becoming subreaper, because some our
ancestor migh have had is_child_subreaper flag while forking our
sub-tree and our childs will all inherit has_child_subreaper flag,
and we have no way to influence it. And only way to check if we have
no has_child_subreaper flag is to create some childs, kill them and
see where they will reparent to.
Using walk_process_tree helper to walk subtree, thanks to Oleg! Timing
seems to be the same.
Optimize:
a) When descendant already has has_child_subreaper flag all his subtree
has it too already.
* for a) to be true need to move has_child_subreaper inheritance under
the same tasklist_lock with adding task to its ->real_parent->children
as without it process can inherit zero has_child_subreaper, then we
set 1 to it's parent flag, check that parent has no more children, and
only after child with wrong flag is added to the tree.
* Also make these inheritance more clear by using real_parent instead of
current, as on clone(CLONE_PARENT) if current has is_child_subreaper
and real_parent has no is_child_subreaper or has_child_subreaper, child
will have has_child_subreaper flag set without actually having a
subreaper in it's ancestors.
b) When some descendant is child_reaper, it's subtree is in different
pidns from us(original child-subreaper) and processes from other pidns
will never reparent to us.
So we can skip their(a,b) subtree from walk.
v2: switch to walk_process_tree() general helper, move
has_child_subreaper inheritance
v3: remove csr_descendant leftover, change current to real_parent
in has_child_subreaper inheritance
v4: small commit message fix
Fixes: ebec18a6d3aa ("prctl: add PR_{SET,GET}_CHILD_SUBREAPER to allow simple process supervision")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-01-30 15:06:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!arg2)
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
walk_process_tree(me, propagate_has_child_subreaper, NULL);
|
2013-02-22 00:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER:
|
|
|
|
|
error = put_user(me->signal->is_child_subreaper,
|
|
|
|
|
(int __user *)arg2);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS:
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg2 != 1 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-21 22:23:46 +00:00
|
|
|
task_set_no_new_privs(current);
|
2013-02-22 00:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS:
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2014-05-21 22:23:46 +00:00
|
|
|
return task_no_new_privs(current) ? 1 : 0;
|
2014-04-07 22:37:10 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_GET_THP_DISABLE:
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2017-07-10 22:48:02 +00:00
|
|
|
error = !!test_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &me->mm->flags);
|
2014-04-07 22:37:10 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_THP_DISABLE:
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2020-06-09 04:33:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if (mmap_write_lock_killable(me->mm))
|
2016-05-23 23:26:05 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINTR;
|
2014-04-07 22:37:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (arg2)
|
2017-07-10 22:48:02 +00:00
|
|
|
set_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &me->mm->flags);
|
2014-04-07 22:37:10 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
2017-07-10 22:48:02 +00:00
|
|
|
clear_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &me->mm->flags);
|
2020-06-09 04:33:25 +00:00
|
|
|
mmap_write_unlock(me->mm);
|
2014-04-07 22:37:10 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
x86, mpx: On-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables
This is really the meat of the MPX patch set. If there is one patch to
review in the entire series, this is the one. There is a new ABI here
and this kernel code also interacts with userspace memory in a
relatively unusual manner. (small FAQ below).
Long Description:
This patch adds two prctl() commands to provide enable or disable the
management of bounds tables in kernel, including on-demand kernel
allocation (See the patch "on-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables")
and cleanup (See the patch "cleanup unused bound tables"). Applications
do not strictly need the kernel to manage bounds tables and we expect
some applications to use MPX without taking advantage of this kernel
support. This means the kernel can not simply infer whether an application
needs bounds table management from the MPX registers. The prctl() is an
explicit signal from userspace.
PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT is meant to be a signal from userspace to
require kernel's help in managing bounds tables.
PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT is the opposite, meaning that userspace don't
want kernel's help any more. With PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT, the kernel
won't allocate and free bounds tables even if the CPU supports MPX.
PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT will fetch the base address of the bounds
directory out of a userspace register (bndcfgu) and then cache it into
a new field (->bd_addr) in the 'mm_struct'. PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT
will set "bd_addr" to an invalid address. Using this scheme, we can
use "bd_addr" to determine whether the management of bounds tables in
kernel is enabled.
Also, the only way to access that bndcfgu register is via an xsaves,
which can be expensive. Caching "bd_addr" like this also helps reduce
the cost of those xsaves when doing table cleanup at munmap() time.
Unfortunately, we can not apply this optimization to #BR fault time
because we need an xsave to get the value of BNDSTATUS.
==== Why does the hardware even have these Bounds Tables? ====
MPX only has 4 hardware registers for storing bounds information.
If MPX-enabled code needs more than these 4 registers, it needs to
spill them somewhere. It has two special instructions for this
which allow the bounds to be moved between the bounds registers
and some new "bounds tables".
They are similar conceptually to a page fault and will be raised by
the MPX hardware during both bounds violations or when the tables
are not present. This patch handles those #BR exceptions for
not-present tables by carving the space out of the normal processes
address space (essentially calling the new mmap() interface indroduced
earlier in this patch set.) and then pointing the bounds-directory
over to it.
The tables *need* to be accessed and controlled by userspace because
the instructions for moving bounds in and out of them are extremely
frequent. They potentially happen every time a register pointing to
memory is dereferenced. Any direct kernel involvement (like a syscall)
to access the tables would obviously destroy performance.
==== Why not do this in userspace? ====
This patch is obviously doing this allocation in the kernel.
However, MPX does not strictly *require* anything in the kernel.
It can theoretically be done completely from userspace. Here are
a few ways this *could* be done. I don't think any of them are
practical in the real-world, but here they are.
Q: Can virtual space simply be reserved for the bounds tables so
that we never have to allocate them?
A: As noted earlier, these tables are *HUGE*. An X-GB virtual
area needs 4*X GB of virtual space, plus 2GB for the bounds
directory. If we were to preallocate them for the 128TB of
user virtual address space, we would need to reserve 512TB+2GB,
which is larger than the entire virtual address space today.
This means they can not be reserved ahead of time. Also, a
single process's pre-popualated bounds directory consumes 2GB
of virtual *AND* physical memory. IOW, it's completely
infeasible to prepopulate bounds directories.
Q: Can we preallocate bounds table space at the same time memory
is allocated which might contain pointers that might eventually
need bounds tables?
A: This would work if we could hook the site of each and every
memory allocation syscall. This can be done for small,
constrained applications. But, it isn't practical at a larger
scale since a given app has no way of controlling how all the
parts of the app might allocate memory (think libraries). The
kernel is really the only place to intercept these calls.
Q: Could a bounds fault be handed to userspace and the tables
allocated there in a signal handler instead of in the kernel?
A: (thanks to tglx) mmap() is not on the list of safe async
handler functions and even if mmap() would work it still
requires locking or nasty tricks to keep track of the
allocation state there.
Having ruled out all of the userspace-only approaches for managing
bounds tables that we could think of, we create them on demand in
the kernel.
Based-on-patch-by: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141114151829.AD4310DE@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2014-11-14 15:18:29 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT:
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT:
|
2019-07-05 17:53:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/* No longer implemented: */
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2015-01-08 12:17:37 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_SET_FP_MODE:
|
|
|
|
|
error = SET_FP_MODE(me, arg2);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_GET_FP_MODE:
|
|
|
|
|
error = GET_FP_MODE(me);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2017-10-31 15:51:14 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_SVE_SET_VL:
|
|
|
|
|
error = SVE_SET_VL(arg2);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SVE_GET_VL:
|
|
|
|
|
error = SVE_GET_VL();
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2022-04-19 11:22:19 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_SME_SET_VL:
|
|
|
|
|
error = SME_SET_VL(arg2);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SME_GET_VL:
|
|
|
|
|
error = SME_GET_VL();
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2018-04-29 13:20:11 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL:
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2018-05-01 22:19:04 +00:00
|
|
|
error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(me, arg2);
|
2018-04-29 13:20:11 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL:
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg4 || arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2018-05-01 22:19:04 +00:00
|
|
|
error = arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(me, arg2, arg3);
|
2018-04-29 13:20:11 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2018-12-07 18:39:28 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS:
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
error = PAC_RESET_KEYS(me, arg2);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2021-03-19 03:10:53 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS:
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg4 || arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
error = PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS(me, arg2, arg3);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS:
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
error = PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS(me);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2019-07-23 17:58:39 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL:
|
2019-08-15 15:44:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2019-07-23 17:58:39 +00:00
|
|
|
error = SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(arg2);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL:
|
2019-08-15 15:44:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2019-07-23 17:58:39 +00:00
|
|
|
error = GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL();
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
prctl: PR_{G,S}ET_IO_FLUSHER to support controlling memory reclaim
There are several storage drivers like dm-multipath, iscsi, tcmu-runner,
amd nbd that have userspace components that can run in the IO path. For
example, iscsi and nbd's userspace deamons may need to recreate a socket
and/or send IO on it, and dm-multipath's daemon multipathd may need to
send SG IO or read/write IO to figure out the state of paths and re-set
them up.
In the kernel these drivers have access to GFP_NOIO/GFP_NOFS and the
memalloc_*_save/restore functions to control the allocation behavior,
but for userspace we would end up hitting an allocation that ended up
writing data back to the same device we are trying to allocate for.
The device is then in a state of deadlock, because to execute IO the
device needs to allocate memory, but to allocate memory the memory
layers want execute IO to the device.
Here is an example with nbd using a local userspace daemon that performs
network IO to a remote server. We are using XFS on top of the nbd device,
but it can happen with any FS or other modules layered on top of the nbd
device that can write out data to free memory. Here a nbd daemon helper
thread, msgr-worker-1, is performing a write/sendmsg on a socket to execute
a request. This kicks off a reclaim operation which results in a WRITE to
the nbd device and the nbd thread calling back into the mm layer.
[ 1626.609191] msgr-worker-1 D 0 1026 1 0x00004000
[ 1626.609193] Call Trace:
[ 1626.609195] ? __schedule+0x29b/0x630
[ 1626.609197] ? wait_for_completion+0xe0/0x170
[ 1626.609198] schedule+0x30/0xb0
[ 1626.609200] schedule_timeout+0x1f6/0x2f0
[ 1626.609202] ? blk_finish_plug+0x21/0x2e
[ 1626.609204] ? _xfs_buf_ioapply+0x2e6/0x410
[ 1626.609206] ? wait_for_completion+0xe0/0x170
[ 1626.609208] wait_for_completion+0x108/0x170
[ 1626.609210] ? wake_up_q+0x70/0x70
[ 1626.609212] ? __xfs_buf_submit+0x12e/0x250
[ 1626.609214] ? xfs_bwrite+0x25/0x60
[ 1626.609215] xfs_buf_iowait+0x22/0xf0
[ 1626.609218] __xfs_buf_submit+0x12e/0x250
[ 1626.609220] xfs_bwrite+0x25/0x60
[ 1626.609222] xfs_reclaim_inode+0x2e8/0x310
[ 1626.609224] xfs_reclaim_inodes_ag+0x1b6/0x300
[ 1626.609227] xfs_reclaim_inodes_nr+0x31/0x40
[ 1626.609228] super_cache_scan+0x152/0x1a0
[ 1626.609231] do_shrink_slab+0x12c/0x2d0
[ 1626.609233] shrink_slab+0x9c/0x2a0
[ 1626.609235] shrink_node+0xd7/0x470
[ 1626.609237] do_try_to_free_pages+0xbf/0x380
[ 1626.609240] try_to_free_pages+0xd9/0x1f0
[ 1626.609245] __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x3a4/0xd30
[ 1626.609251] ? ___slab_alloc+0x238/0x560
[ 1626.609254] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x30c/0x350
[ 1626.609259] skb_page_frag_refill+0x97/0xd0
[ 1626.609274] sk_page_frag_refill+0x1d/0x80
[ 1626.609279] tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2bb/0xdd0
[ 1626.609304] tcp_sendmsg+0x27/0x40
[ 1626.609307] sock_sendmsg+0x54/0x60
[ 1626.609308] ___sys_sendmsg+0x29f/0x320
[ 1626.609313] ? sock_poll+0x66/0xb0
[ 1626.609318] ? ep_item_poll.isra.15+0x40/0xc0
[ 1626.609320] ? ep_send_events_proc+0xe6/0x230
[ 1626.609322] ? hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0x54/0xf0
[ 1626.609324] ? ep_read_events_proc+0xc0/0xc0
[ 1626.609326] ? _raw_write_unlock_irq+0xa/0x20
[ 1626.609327] ? ep_scan_ready_list.constprop.19+0x218/0x230
[ 1626.609329] ? __hrtimer_init+0xb0/0xb0
[ 1626.609331] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0xa/0x20
[ 1626.609334] ? ep_poll+0x26c/0x4a0
[ 1626.609337] ? tcp_tsq_write.part.54+0xa0/0xa0
[ 1626.609339] ? release_sock+0x43/0x90
[ 1626.609341] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0xa/0x20
[ 1626.609342] __sys_sendmsg+0x47/0x80
[ 1626.609347] do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x1c0
[ 1626.609349] ? prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x75/0xa0
[ 1626.609351] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
This patch adds a new prctl command that daemons can use after they have
done their initial setup, and before they start to do allocations that
are in the IO path. It sets the PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO and PF_LESS_THROTTLE
flags so both userspace block and FS threads can use it to avoid the
allocation recursion and try to prevent from being throttled while
writing out data to free up memory.
Signed-off-by: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Tested-by: Masato Suzuki <masato.suzuki@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191112001900.9206-1-mchristi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2019-11-12 00:19:00 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_SET_IO_FLUSHER:
|
|
|
|
|
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg2 == 1)
|
|
|
|
|
current->flags |= PR_IO_FLUSHER;
|
|
|
|
|
else if (!arg2)
|
|
|
|
|
current->flags &= ~PR_IO_FLUSHER;
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_GET_IO_FLUSHER:
|
|
|
|
|
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = (current->flags & PR_IO_FLUSHER) == PR_IO_FLUSHER;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
kernel: Implement selective syscall userspace redirection
Introduce a mechanism to quickly disable/enable syscall handling for a
specific process and redirect to userspace via SIGSYS. This is useful
for processes with parts that require syscall redirection and parts that
don't, but who need to perform this boundary crossing really fast,
without paying the cost of a system call to reconfigure syscall handling
on each boundary transition. This is particularly important for Windows
games running over Wine.
The proposed interface looks like this:
prctl(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH, <op>, <off>, <length>, [selector])
The range [<offset>,<offset>+<length>) is a part of the process memory
map that is allowed to by-pass the redirection code and dispatch
syscalls directly, such that in fast paths a process doesn't need to
disable the trap nor the kernel has to check the selector. This is
essential to return from SIGSYS to a blocked area without triggering
another SIGSYS from rt_sigreturn.
selector is an optional pointer to a char-sized userspace memory region
that has a key switch for the mechanism. This key switch is set to
either PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ON, PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF to enable and disable the
redirection without calling the kernel.
The feature is meant to be set per-thread and it is disabled on
fork/clone/execv.
Internally, this doesn't add overhead to the syscall hot path, and it
requires very little per-architecture support. I avoided using seccomp,
even though it duplicates some functionality, due to previous feedback
that maybe it shouldn't mix with seccomp since it is not a security
mechanism. And obviously, this should never be considered a security
mechanism, since any part of the program can by-pass it by using the
syscall dispatcher.
For the sysinfo benchmark, which measures the overhead added to
executing a native syscall that doesn't require interception, the
overhead using only the direct dispatcher region to issue syscalls is
pretty much irrelevant. The overhead of using the selector goes around
40ns for a native (unredirected) syscall in my system, and it is (as
expected) dominated by the supervisor-mode user-address access. In
fact, with SMAP off, the overhead is consistently less than 5ns on my
test box.
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127193238.821364-4-krisman@collabora.com
2020-11-27 19:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH:
|
|
|
|
|
error = set_syscall_user_dispatch(arg2, arg3, arg4,
|
|
|
|
|
(char __user *) arg5);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
sched: prctl() core-scheduling interface
This patch provides support for setting and copying core scheduling
'task cookies' between threads (PID), processes (TGID), and process
groups (PGID).
The value of core scheduling isn't that tasks don't share a core,
'nosmt' can do that. The value lies in exploiting all the sharing
opportunities that exist to recover possible lost performance and that
requires a degree of flexibility in the API.
From a security perspective (and there are others), the thread,
process and process group distinction is an existent hierarchal
categorization of tasks that reflects many of the security concerns
about 'data sharing'. For example, protecting against cache-snooping
by a thread that can just read the memory directly isn't all that
useful.
With this in mind, subcommands to CREATE/SHARE (TO/FROM) provide a
mechanism to create and share cookies. CREATE/SHARE_TO specify a
target pid with enum pidtype used to specify the scope of the targeted
tasks. For example, PIDTYPE_TGID will share the cookie with the
process and all of it's threads as typically desired in a security
scenario.
API:
prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE, PR_SCHED_CORE_GET, tgtpid, pidtype, &cookie)
prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE, PR_SCHED_CORE_CREATE, tgtpid, pidtype, NULL)
prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE, PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_TO, tgtpid, pidtype, NULL)
prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE, PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_FROM, srcpid, pidtype, NULL)
where 'tgtpid/srcpid == 0' implies the current process and pidtype is
kernel enum pid_type {PIDTYPE_PID, PIDTYPE_TGID, PIDTYPE_PGID, ...}.
For return values, EINVAL, ENOMEM are what they say. ESRCH means the
tgtpid/srcpid was not found. EPERM indicates lack of PTRACE permission
access to tgtpid/srcpid. ENODEV indicates your machines lacks SMT.
[peterz: complete rewrite]
Signed-off-by: Chris Hyser <chris.hyser@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Don Hiatt <dhiatt@digitalocean.com>
Tested-by: Hongyu Ning <hongyu.ning@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210422123309.039845339@infradead.org
2021-03-24 21:40:15 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_CORE
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SCHED_CORE:
|
|
|
|
|
error = sched_core_share_pid(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
mm: implement memory-deny-write-execute as a prctl
Patch series "mm: In-kernel support for memory-deny-write-execute (MDWE)",
v2.
The background to this is that systemd has a configuration option called
MemoryDenyWriteExecute [2], implemented as a SECCOMP BPF filter. Its aim
is to prevent a user task from inadvertently creating an executable
mapping that is (or was) writeable. Since such BPF filter is stateless,
it cannot detect mappings that were previously writeable but subsequently
changed to read-only. Therefore the filter simply rejects any
mprotect(PROT_EXEC). The side-effect is that on arm64 with BTI support
(Branch Target Identification), the dynamic loader cannot change an ELF
section from PROT_EXEC to PROT_EXEC|PROT_BTI using mprotect(). For
libraries, it can resort to unmapping and re-mapping but for the main
executable it does not have a file descriptor. The original bug report in
the Red Hat bugzilla - [3] - and subsequent glibc workaround for libraries
- [4].
This series adds in-kernel support for this feature as a prctl
PR_SET_MDWE, that is inherited on fork(). The prctl denies PROT_WRITE |
PROT_EXEC mappings. Like the systemd BPF filter it also denies adding
PROT_EXEC to mappings. However unlike the BPF filter it only denies it if
the mapping didn't previous have PROT_EXEC. This allows to PROT_EXEC ->
PROT_EXEC | PROT_BTI with mprotect(), which is a problem with the BPF
filter.
This patch (of 2):
The aim of such policy is to prevent a user task from creating an
executable mapping that is also writeable.
An example of mmap() returning -EACCESS if the policy is enabled:
mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
Similarly, mprotect() would return -EACCESS below:
addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC);
The BPF filter that systemd MDWE uses is stateless, and disallows
mprotect() with PROT_EXEC completely. This new prctl allows PROT_EXEC to
be enabled if it was already PROT_EXEC, which allows the following case:
addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC | PROT_BTI);
where PROT_BTI enables branch tracking identification on arm64.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230119160344.54358-1-joey.gouly@arm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230119160344.54358-2-joey.gouly@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Co-developed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: nd <nd@arm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>
Cc: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
Cc: Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-01-19 16:03:43 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_SET_MDWE:
|
|
|
|
|
error = prctl_set_mdwe(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_GET_MDWE:
|
|
|
|
|
error = prctl_get_mdwe(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2024-04-17 11:23:20 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_PPC_GET_DEXCR:
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
error = PPC_GET_DEXCR_ASPECT(me, arg2);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_PPC_SET_DEXCR:
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg4 || arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
error = PPC_SET_DEXCR_ASPECT(me, arg2, arg3);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
mm: add a field to store names for private anonymous memory
In many userspace applications, and especially in VM based applications
like Android uses heavily, there are multiple different allocators in
use. At a minimum there is libc malloc and the stack, and in many cases
there are libc malloc, the stack, direct syscalls to mmap anonymous
memory, and multiple VM heaps (one for small objects, one for big
objects, etc.). Each of these layers usually has its own tools to
inspect its usage; malloc by compiling a debug version, the VM through
heap inspection tools, and for direct syscalls there is usually no way
to track them.
On Android we heavily use a set of tools that use an extended version of
the logic covered in Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt to walk all pages
mapped in userspace and slice their usage by process, shared (COW) vs.
unique mappings, backing, etc. This can account for real physical
memory usage even in cases like fork without exec (which Android uses
heavily to share as many private COW pages as possible between
processes), Kernel SamePage Merging, and clean zero pages. It produces
a measurement of the pages that only exist in that process (USS, for
unique), and a measurement of the physical memory usage of that process
with the cost of shared pages being evenly split between processes that
share them (PSS).
If all anonymous memory is indistinguishable then figuring out the real
physical memory usage (PSS) of each heap requires either a pagemap
walking tool that can understand the heap debugging of every layer, or
for every layer's heap debugging tools to implement the pagemap walking
logic, in which case it is hard to get a consistent view of memory
across the whole system.
Tracking the information in userspace leads to all sorts of problems.
It either needs to be stored inside the process, which means every
process has to have an API to export its current heap information upon
request, or it has to be stored externally in a filesystem that somebody
needs to clean up on crashes. It needs to be readable while the process
is still running, so it has to have some sort of synchronization with
every layer of userspace. Efficiently tracking the ranges requires
reimplementing something like the kernel vma trees, and linking to it
from every layer of userspace. It requires more memory, more syscalls,
more runtime cost, and more complexity to separately track regions that
the kernel is already tracking.
This patch adds a field to /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps to show a
userspace-provided name for anonymous vmas. The names of named
anonymous vmas are shown in /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps as
[anon:<name>].
Userspace can set the name for a region of memory by calling
prctl(PR_SET_VMA, PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME, start, len, (unsigned long)name)
Setting the name to NULL clears it. The name length limit is 80 bytes
including NUL-terminator and is checked to contain only printable ascii
characters (including space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.
Ascii strings are being used to have a descriptive identifiers for vmas,
which can be understood by the users reading /proc/pid/maps or
/proc/pid/smaps. Names can be standardized for a given system and they
can include some variable parts such as the name of the allocator or a
library, tid of the thread using it, etc.
The name is stored in a pointer in the shared union in vm_area_struct
that points to a null terminated string. Anonymous vmas with the same
name (equivalent strings) and are otherwise mergeable will be merged.
The name pointers are not shared between vmas even if they contain the
same name. The name pointer is stored in a union with fields that are
only used on file-backed mappings, so it does not increase memory usage.
CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME kernel configuration is introduced to enable this
feature. It keeps the feature disabled by default to prevent any
additional memory overhead and to avoid confusing procfs parsers on
systems which are not ready to support named anonymous vmas.
The patch is based on the original patch developed by Colin Cross, more
specifically on its latest version [1] posted upstream by Sumit Semwal.
It used a userspace pointer to store vma names. In that design, name
pointers could be shared between vmas. However during the last
upstreaming attempt, Kees Cook raised concerns [2] about this approach
and suggested to copy the name into kernel memory space, perform
validity checks [3] and store as a string referenced from
vm_area_struct.
One big concern is about fork() performance which would need to strdup
anonymous vma names. Dave Hansen suggested experimenting with
worst-case scenario of forking a process with 64k vmas having longest
possible names [4]. I ran this experiment on an ARM64 Android device
and recorded a worst-case regression of almost 40% when forking such a
process.
This regression is addressed in the followup patch which replaces the
pointer to a name with a refcounted structure that allows sharing the
name pointer between vmas of the same name. Instead of duplicating the
string during fork() or when splitting a vma it increments the refcount.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200901161459.11772-4-sumit.semwal@linaro.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031031.D32EF57ED@keescook/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031022.3834F692@keescook/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/5d0358ab-8c47-2f5f-8e43-23b89d6a8e95@intel.com/
Changes for prctl(2) manual page (in the options section):
PR_SET_VMA
Sets an attribute specified in arg2 for virtual memory areas
starting from the address specified in arg3 and spanning the
size specified in arg4. arg5 specifies the value of the attribute
to be set. Note that assigning an attribute to a virtual memory
area might prevent it from being merged with adjacent virtual
memory areas due to the difference in that attribute's value.
Currently, arg2 must be one of:
PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME
Set a name for anonymous virtual memory areas. arg5 should
be a pointer to a null-terminated string containing the
name. The name length including null byte cannot exceed
80 bytes. If arg5 is NULL, the name of the appropriate
anonymous virtual memory areas will be reset. The name
can contain only printable ascii characters (including
space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.
This feature is available only if the kernel is built with
the CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME option enabled.
[surenb@google.com: docs: proc.rst: /proc/PID/maps: fix malformed table]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211123185928.2513763-1-surenb@google.com
[surenb: rebased over v5.15-rc6, replaced userpointer with a kernel copy,
added input sanitization and CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME config. The bulk of the
work here was done by Colin Cross, therefore, with his permission, keeping
him as the author]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211019215511.3771969-2-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:05:59 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_SET_VMA:
|
|
|
|
|
error = prctl_set_vma(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2023-07-08 23:33:44 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_GET_AUXV:
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg4 || arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
error = prctl_get_auxv((void __user *)arg2, arg3);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
mm: add new api to enable ksm per process
Patch series "mm: process/cgroup ksm support", v9.
So far KSM can only be enabled by calling madvise for memory regions. To
be able to use KSM for more workloads, KSM needs to have the ability to be
enabled / disabled at the process / cgroup level.
Use case 1:
The madvise call is not available in the programming language. An
example for this are programs with forked workloads using a garbage
collected language without pointers. In such a language madvise cannot
be made available.
In addition the addresses of objects get moved around as they are
garbage collected. KSM sharing needs to be enabled "from the outside"
for these type of workloads.
Use case 2:
The same interpreter can also be used for workloads where KSM brings
no benefit or even has overhead. We'd like to be able to enable KSM on
a workload by workload basis.
Use case 3:
With the madvise call sharing opportunities are only enabled for the
current process: it is a workload-local decision. A considerable number
of sharing opportunities may exist across multiple workloads or jobs (if
they are part of the same security domain). Only a higler level entity
like a job scheduler or container can know for certain if its running
one or more instances of a job. That job scheduler however doesn't have
the necessary internal workload knowledge to make targeted madvise
calls.
Security concerns:
In previous discussions security concerns have been brought up. The
problem is that an individual workload does not have the knowledge about
what else is running on a machine. Therefore it has to be very
conservative in what memory areas can be shared or not. However, if the
system is dedicated to running multiple jobs within the same security
domain, its the job scheduler that has the knowledge that sharing can be
safely enabled and is even desirable.
Performance:
Experiments with using UKSM have shown a capacity increase of around 20%.
Here are the metrics from an instagram workload (taken from a machine
with 64GB main memory):
full_scans: 445
general_profit: 20158298048
max_page_sharing: 256
merge_across_nodes: 1
pages_shared: 129547
pages_sharing: 5119146
pages_to_scan: 4000
pages_unshared: 1760924
pages_volatile: 10761341
run: 1
sleep_millisecs: 20
stable_node_chains: 167
stable_node_chains_prune_millisecs: 2000
stable_node_dups: 2751
use_zero_pages: 0
zero_pages_sharing: 0
After the service is running for 30 minutes to an hour, 4 to 5 million
shared pages are common for this workload when using KSM.
Detailed changes:
1. New options for prctl system command
This patch series adds two new options to the prctl system call.
The first one allows to enable KSM at the process level and the second
one to query the setting.
The setting will be inherited by child processes.
With the above setting, KSM can be enabled for the seed process of a cgroup
and all processes in the cgroup will inherit the setting.
2. Changes to KSM processing
When KSM is enabled at the process level, the KSM code will iterate
over all the VMA's and enable KSM for the eligible VMA's.
When forking a process that has KSM enabled, the setting will be
inherited by the new child process.
3. Add general_profit metric
The general_profit metric of KSM is specified in the documentation,
but not calculated. This adds the general profit metric to
/sys/kernel/debug/mm/ksm.
4. Add more metrics to ksm_stat
This adds the process profit metric to /proc/<pid>/ksm_stat.
5. Add more tests to ksm_tests and ksm_functional_tests
This adds an option to specify the merge type to the ksm_tests.
This allows to test madvise and prctl KSM.
It also adds a two new tests to ksm_functional_tests: one to test
the new prctl options and the other one is a fork test to verify that
the KSM process setting is inherited by client processes.
This patch (of 3):
So far KSM can only be enabled by calling madvise for memory regions. To
be able to use KSM for more workloads, KSM needs to have the ability to be
enabled / disabled at the process / cgroup level.
1. New options for prctl system command
This patch series adds two new options to the prctl system call.
The first one allows to enable KSM at the process level and the second
one to query the setting.
The setting will be inherited by child processes.
With the above setting, KSM can be enabled for the seed process of a
cgroup and all processes in the cgroup will inherit the setting.
2. Changes to KSM processing
When KSM is enabled at the process level, the KSM code will iterate
over all the VMA's and enable KSM for the eligible VMA's.
When forking a process that has KSM enabled, the setting will be
inherited by the new child process.
1) Introduce new MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY flag
This introduces the new flag MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY flag. When this flag
is set, kernel samepage merging (ksm) gets enabled for all vma's of a
process.
2) Setting VM_MERGEABLE on VMA creation
When a VMA is created, if the MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY flag is set, the
VM_MERGEABLE flag will be set for this VMA.
3) support disabling of ksm for a process
This adds the ability to disable ksm for a process if ksm has been
enabled for the process with prctl.
4) add new prctl option to get and set ksm for a process
This adds two new options to the prctl system call
- enable ksm for all vmas of a process (if the vmas support it).
- query if ksm has been enabled for a process.
3. Disabling MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY for storage keys in s390
In the s390 architecture when storage keys are used, the
MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY will be disabled.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230418051342.1919757-1-shr@devkernel.io
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230418051342.1919757-2-shr@devkernel.io
Signed-off-by: Stefan Roesch <shr@devkernel.io>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-04-18 05:13:40 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_KSM
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE:
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
if (mmap_write_lock_killable(me->mm))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINTR;
|
|
|
|
|
|
2023-04-22 20:54:18 +00:00
|
|
|
if (arg2)
|
mm: add new api to enable ksm per process
Patch series "mm: process/cgroup ksm support", v9.
So far KSM can only be enabled by calling madvise for memory regions. To
be able to use KSM for more workloads, KSM needs to have the ability to be
enabled / disabled at the process / cgroup level.
Use case 1:
The madvise call is not available in the programming language. An
example for this are programs with forked workloads using a garbage
collected language without pointers. In such a language madvise cannot
be made available.
In addition the addresses of objects get moved around as they are
garbage collected. KSM sharing needs to be enabled "from the outside"
for these type of workloads.
Use case 2:
The same interpreter can also be used for workloads where KSM brings
no benefit or even has overhead. We'd like to be able to enable KSM on
a workload by workload basis.
Use case 3:
With the madvise call sharing opportunities are only enabled for the
current process: it is a workload-local decision. A considerable number
of sharing opportunities may exist across multiple workloads or jobs (if
they are part of the same security domain). Only a higler level entity
like a job scheduler or container can know for certain if its running
one or more instances of a job. That job scheduler however doesn't have
the necessary internal workload knowledge to make targeted madvise
calls.
Security concerns:
In previous discussions security concerns have been brought up. The
problem is that an individual workload does not have the knowledge about
what else is running on a machine. Therefore it has to be very
conservative in what memory areas can be shared or not. However, if the
system is dedicated to running multiple jobs within the same security
domain, its the job scheduler that has the knowledge that sharing can be
safely enabled and is even desirable.
Performance:
Experiments with using UKSM have shown a capacity increase of around 20%.
Here are the metrics from an instagram workload (taken from a machine
with 64GB main memory):
full_scans: 445
general_profit: 20158298048
max_page_sharing: 256
merge_across_nodes: 1
pages_shared: 129547
pages_sharing: 5119146
pages_to_scan: 4000
pages_unshared: 1760924
pages_volatile: 10761341
run: 1
sleep_millisecs: 20
stable_node_chains: 167
stable_node_chains_prune_millisecs: 2000
stable_node_dups: 2751
use_zero_pages: 0
zero_pages_sharing: 0
After the service is running for 30 minutes to an hour, 4 to 5 million
shared pages are common for this workload when using KSM.
Detailed changes:
1. New options for prctl system command
This patch series adds two new options to the prctl system call.
The first one allows to enable KSM at the process level and the second
one to query the setting.
The setting will be inherited by child processes.
With the above setting, KSM can be enabled for the seed process of a cgroup
and all processes in the cgroup will inherit the setting.
2. Changes to KSM processing
When KSM is enabled at the process level, the KSM code will iterate
over all the VMA's and enable KSM for the eligible VMA's.
When forking a process that has KSM enabled, the setting will be
inherited by the new child process.
3. Add general_profit metric
The general_profit metric of KSM is specified in the documentation,
but not calculated. This adds the general profit metric to
/sys/kernel/debug/mm/ksm.
4. Add more metrics to ksm_stat
This adds the process profit metric to /proc/<pid>/ksm_stat.
5. Add more tests to ksm_tests and ksm_functional_tests
This adds an option to specify the merge type to the ksm_tests.
This allows to test madvise and prctl KSM.
It also adds a two new tests to ksm_functional_tests: one to test
the new prctl options and the other one is a fork test to verify that
the KSM process setting is inherited by client processes.
This patch (of 3):
So far KSM can only be enabled by calling madvise for memory regions. To
be able to use KSM for more workloads, KSM needs to have the ability to be
enabled / disabled at the process / cgroup level.
1. New options for prctl system command
This patch series adds two new options to the prctl system call.
The first one allows to enable KSM at the process level and the second
one to query the setting.
The setting will be inherited by child processes.
With the above setting, KSM can be enabled for the seed process of a
cgroup and all processes in the cgroup will inherit the setting.
2. Changes to KSM processing
When KSM is enabled at the process level, the KSM code will iterate
over all the VMA's and enable KSM for the eligible VMA's.
When forking a process that has KSM enabled, the setting will be
inherited by the new child process.
1) Introduce new MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY flag
This introduces the new flag MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY flag. When this flag
is set, kernel samepage merging (ksm) gets enabled for all vma's of a
process.
2) Setting VM_MERGEABLE on VMA creation
When a VMA is created, if the MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY flag is set, the
VM_MERGEABLE flag will be set for this VMA.
3) support disabling of ksm for a process
This adds the ability to disable ksm for a process if ksm has been
enabled for the process with prctl.
4) add new prctl option to get and set ksm for a process
This adds two new options to the prctl system call
- enable ksm for all vmas of a process (if the vmas support it).
- query if ksm has been enabled for a process.
3. Disabling MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY for storage keys in s390
In the s390 architecture when storage keys are used, the
MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY will be disabled.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230418051342.1919757-1-shr@devkernel.io
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230418051342.1919757-2-shr@devkernel.io
Signed-off-by: Stefan Roesch <shr@devkernel.io>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-04-18 05:13:40 +00:00
|
|
|
error = ksm_enable_merge_any(me->mm);
|
2023-04-22 20:54:18 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
error = ksm_disable_merge_any(me->mm);
|
mm: add new api to enable ksm per process
Patch series "mm: process/cgroup ksm support", v9.
So far KSM can only be enabled by calling madvise for memory regions. To
be able to use KSM for more workloads, KSM needs to have the ability to be
enabled / disabled at the process / cgroup level.
Use case 1:
The madvise call is not available in the programming language. An
example for this are programs with forked workloads using a garbage
collected language without pointers. In such a language madvise cannot
be made available.
In addition the addresses of objects get moved around as they are
garbage collected. KSM sharing needs to be enabled "from the outside"
for these type of workloads.
Use case 2:
The same interpreter can also be used for workloads where KSM brings
no benefit or even has overhead. We'd like to be able to enable KSM on
a workload by workload basis.
Use case 3:
With the madvise call sharing opportunities are only enabled for the
current process: it is a workload-local decision. A considerable number
of sharing opportunities may exist across multiple workloads or jobs (if
they are part of the same security domain). Only a higler level entity
like a job scheduler or container can know for certain if its running
one or more instances of a job. That job scheduler however doesn't have
the necessary internal workload knowledge to make targeted madvise
calls.
Security concerns:
In previous discussions security concerns have been brought up. The
problem is that an individual workload does not have the knowledge about
what else is running on a machine. Therefore it has to be very
conservative in what memory areas can be shared or not. However, if the
system is dedicated to running multiple jobs within the same security
domain, its the job scheduler that has the knowledge that sharing can be
safely enabled and is even desirable.
Performance:
Experiments with using UKSM have shown a capacity increase of around 20%.
Here are the metrics from an instagram workload (taken from a machine
with 64GB main memory):
full_scans: 445
general_profit: 20158298048
max_page_sharing: 256
merge_across_nodes: 1
pages_shared: 129547
pages_sharing: 5119146
pages_to_scan: 4000
pages_unshared: 1760924
pages_volatile: 10761341
run: 1
sleep_millisecs: 20
stable_node_chains: 167
stable_node_chains_prune_millisecs: 2000
stable_node_dups: 2751
use_zero_pages: 0
zero_pages_sharing: 0
After the service is running for 30 minutes to an hour, 4 to 5 million
shared pages are common for this workload when using KSM.
Detailed changes:
1. New options for prctl system command
This patch series adds two new options to the prctl system call.
The first one allows to enable KSM at the process level and the second
one to query the setting.
The setting will be inherited by child processes.
With the above setting, KSM can be enabled for the seed process of a cgroup
and all processes in the cgroup will inherit the setting.
2. Changes to KSM processing
When KSM is enabled at the process level, the KSM code will iterate
over all the VMA's and enable KSM for the eligible VMA's.
When forking a process that has KSM enabled, the setting will be
inherited by the new child process.
3. Add general_profit metric
The general_profit metric of KSM is specified in the documentation,
but not calculated. This adds the general profit metric to
/sys/kernel/debug/mm/ksm.
4. Add more metrics to ksm_stat
This adds the process profit metric to /proc/<pid>/ksm_stat.
5. Add more tests to ksm_tests and ksm_functional_tests
This adds an option to specify the merge type to the ksm_tests.
This allows to test madvise and prctl KSM.
It also adds a two new tests to ksm_functional_tests: one to test
the new prctl options and the other one is a fork test to verify that
the KSM process setting is inherited by client processes.
This patch (of 3):
So far KSM can only be enabled by calling madvise for memory regions. To
be able to use KSM for more workloads, KSM needs to have the ability to be
enabled / disabled at the process / cgroup level.
1. New options for prctl system command
This patch series adds two new options to the prctl system call.
The first one allows to enable KSM at the process level and the second
one to query the setting.
The setting will be inherited by child processes.
With the above setting, KSM can be enabled for the seed process of a
cgroup and all processes in the cgroup will inherit the setting.
2. Changes to KSM processing
When KSM is enabled at the process level, the KSM code will iterate
over all the VMA's and enable KSM for the eligible VMA's.
When forking a process that has KSM enabled, the setting will be
inherited by the new child process.
1) Introduce new MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY flag
This introduces the new flag MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY flag. When this flag
is set, kernel samepage merging (ksm) gets enabled for all vma's of a
process.
2) Setting VM_MERGEABLE on VMA creation
When a VMA is created, if the MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY flag is set, the
VM_MERGEABLE flag will be set for this VMA.
3) support disabling of ksm for a process
This adds the ability to disable ksm for a process if ksm has been
enabled for the process with prctl.
4) add new prctl option to get and set ksm for a process
This adds two new options to the prctl system call
- enable ksm for all vmas of a process (if the vmas support it).
- query if ksm has been enabled for a process.
3. Disabling MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY for storage keys in s390
In the s390 architecture when storage keys are used, the
MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY will be disabled.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230418051342.1919757-1-shr@devkernel.io
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230418051342.1919757-2-shr@devkernel.io
Signed-off-by: Stefan Roesch <shr@devkernel.io>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-04-18 05:13:40 +00:00
|
|
|
mmap_write_unlock(me->mm);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_GET_MEMORY_MERGE:
|
|
|
|
|
if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
|
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = !!test_bit(MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY, &me->mm->flags);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2023-06-05 11:07:18 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_RISCV_V_SET_CONTROL:
|
|
|
|
|
error = RISCV_V_SET_CONTROL(arg2);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
case PR_RISCV_V_GET_CONTROL:
|
|
|
|
|
error = RISCV_V_GET_CONTROL();
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2024-03-12 23:53:41 +00:00
|
|
|
case PR_RISCV_SET_ICACHE_FLUSH_CTX:
|
|
|
|
|
error = RISCV_SET_ICACHE_FLUSH_CTX(arg2, arg3);
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2013-02-22 00:43:07 +00:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
|
error = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return error;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-09-26 08:52:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-01-14 13:14:33 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getcpu, unsigned __user *, cpup, unsigned __user *, nodep,
|
|
|
|
|
struct getcpu_cache __user *, unused)
|
2006-09-26 08:52:28 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int err = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
|
2014-10-09 22:30:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-09-26 08:52:28 +00:00
|
|
|
if (cpup)
|
|
|
|
|
err |= put_user(cpu, cpup);
|
|
|
|
|
if (nodep)
|
|
|
|
|
err |= put_user(cpu_to_node(cpu), nodep);
|
|
|
|
|
return err ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-07-18 01:37:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-04-30 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
|
* do_sysinfo - fill in sysinfo struct
|
|
|
|
|
* @info: pointer to buffer to fill
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
static int do_sysinfo(struct sysinfo *info)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned long mem_total, sav_total;
|
|
|
|
|
unsigned int mem_unit, bitcount;
|
2018-06-18 15:00:38 +00:00
|
|
|
struct timespec64 tp;
|
2013-04-30 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(info, 0, sizeof(struct sysinfo));
|
|
|
|
|
|
2018-06-18 15:00:38 +00:00
|
|
|
ktime_get_boottime_ts64(&tp);
|
2020-03-03 15:06:38 +00:00
|
|
|
timens_add_boottime(&tp);
|
2013-04-30 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
info->uptime = tp.tv_sec + (tp.tv_nsec ? 1 : 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
get_avenrun(info->loads, 0, SI_LOAD_SHIFT - FSHIFT);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
info->procs = nr_threads;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
si_meminfo(info);
|
|
|
|
|
si_swapinfo(info);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* If the sum of all the available memory (i.e. ram + swap)
|
|
|
|
|
* is less than can be stored in a 32 bit unsigned long then
|
|
|
|
|
* we can be binary compatible with 2.2.x kernels. If not,
|
|
|
|
|
* well, in that case 2.2.x was broken anyways...
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* -Erik Andersen <andersee@debian.org>
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mem_total = info->totalram + info->totalswap;
|
|
|
|
|
if (mem_total < info->totalram || mem_total < info->totalswap)
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
bitcount = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
mem_unit = info->mem_unit;
|
|
|
|
|
while (mem_unit > 1) {
|
|
|
|
|
bitcount++;
|
|
|
|
|
mem_unit >>= 1;
|
|
|
|
|
sav_total = mem_total;
|
|
|
|
|
mem_total <<= 1;
|
|
|
|
|
if (mem_total < sav_total)
|
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* If mem_total did not overflow, multiply all memory values by
|
|
|
|
|
* info->mem_unit and set it to 1. This leaves things compatible
|
|
|
|
|
* with 2.2.x, and also retains compatibility with earlier 2.4.x
|
|
|
|
|
* kernels...
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
info->mem_unit = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
info->totalram <<= bitcount;
|
|
|
|
|
info->freeram <<= bitcount;
|
|
|
|
|
info->sharedram <<= bitcount;
|
|
|
|
|
info->bufferram <<= bitcount;
|
|
|
|
|
info->totalswap <<= bitcount;
|
|
|
|
|
info->freeswap <<= bitcount;
|
|
|
|
|
info->totalhigh <<= bitcount;
|
|
|
|
|
info->freehigh <<= bitcount;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct sysinfo __user *, info)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct sysinfo val;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
do_sysinfo(&val);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user(info, &val, sizeof(struct sysinfo)))
|
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
|
|
|
|
struct compat_sysinfo {
|
|
|
|
|
s32 uptime;
|
|
|
|
|
u32 loads[3];
|
|
|
|
|
u32 totalram;
|
|
|
|
|
u32 freeram;
|
|
|
|
|
u32 sharedram;
|
|
|
|
|
u32 bufferram;
|
|
|
|
|
u32 totalswap;
|
|
|
|
|
u32 freeswap;
|
|
|
|
|
u16 procs;
|
|
|
|
|
u16 pad;
|
|
|
|
|
u32 totalhigh;
|
|
|
|
|
u32 freehigh;
|
|
|
|
|
u32 mem_unit;
|
|
|
|
|
char _f[20-2*sizeof(u32)-sizeof(int)];
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct sysinfo s;
|
2020-02-19 03:43:15 +00:00
|
|
|
struct compat_sysinfo s_32;
|
2013-04-30 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
do_sysinfo(&s);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check to see if any memory value is too large for 32-bit and scale
|
|
|
|
|
* down if needed
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-10-09 22:30:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (upper_32_bits(s.totalram) || upper_32_bits(s.totalswap)) {
|
2013-04-30 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
int bitcount = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (s.mem_unit < PAGE_SIZE) {
|
|
|
|
|
s.mem_unit <<= 1;
|
|
|
|
|
bitcount++;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
s.totalram >>= bitcount;
|
|
|
|
|
s.freeram >>= bitcount;
|
|
|
|
|
s.sharedram >>= bitcount;
|
|
|
|
|
s.bufferram >>= bitcount;
|
|
|
|
|
s.totalswap >>= bitcount;
|
|
|
|
|
s.freeswap >>= bitcount;
|
|
|
|
|
s.totalhigh >>= bitcount;
|
|
|
|
|
s.freehigh >>= bitcount;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-19 03:43:15 +00:00
|
|
|
memset(&s_32, 0, sizeof(s_32));
|
|
|
|
|
s_32.uptime = s.uptime;
|
|
|
|
|
s_32.loads[0] = s.loads[0];
|
|
|
|
|
s_32.loads[1] = s.loads[1];
|
|
|
|
|
s_32.loads[2] = s.loads[2];
|
|
|
|
|
s_32.totalram = s.totalram;
|
|
|
|
|
s_32.freeram = s.freeram;
|
|
|
|
|
s_32.sharedram = s.sharedram;
|
|
|
|
|
s_32.bufferram = s.bufferram;
|
|
|
|
|
s_32.totalswap = s.totalswap;
|
|
|
|
|
s_32.freeswap = s.freeswap;
|
|
|
|
|
s_32.procs = s.procs;
|
|
|
|
|
s_32.totalhigh = s.totalhigh;
|
|
|
|
|
s_32.freehigh = s.freehigh;
|
|
|
|
|
s_32.mem_unit = s.mem_unit;
|
|
|
|
|
if (copy_to_user(info, &s_32, sizeof(s_32)))
|
2013-04-30 22:27:37 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
|
