2019-05-27 06:55:05 +00:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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/*
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* Fast Userspace Mutexes (which I call "Futexes!").
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* (C) Rusty Russell, IBM 2002
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*
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* Generalized futexes, futex requeueing, misc fixes by Ingo Molnar
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* (C) Copyright 2003 Red Hat Inc, All Rights Reserved
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*
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* Removed page pinning, fix privately mapped COW pages and other cleanups
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* (C) Copyright 2003, 2004 Jamie Lokier
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*
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2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
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* Robust futex support started by Ingo Molnar
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* (C) Copyright 2006 Red Hat Inc, All Rights Reserved
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* Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for suggestions, analysis and fixes.
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*
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2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
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* PI-futex support started by Ingo Molnar and Thomas Gleixner
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* Copyright (C) 2006 Red Hat, Inc., Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
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* Copyright (C) 2006 Timesys Corp., Thomas Gleixner <tglx@timesys.com>
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*
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FUTEX: new PRIVATE futexes
Analysis of current linux futex code :
--------------------------------------
A central hash table futex_queues[] holds all contexts (futex_q) of waiting
threads.
Each futex_wait()/futex_wait() has to obtain a spinlock on a hash slot to
perform lookups or insert/deletion of a futex_q.
When a futex_wait() is done, calling thread has to :
1) - Obtain a read lock on mmap_sem to be able to validate the user pointer
(calling find_vma()). This validation tells us if the futex uses
an inode based store (mapped file), or mm based store (anonymous mem)
2) - compute a hash key
3) - Atomic increment of reference counter on an inode or a mm_struct
4) - lock part of futex_queues[] hash table
5) - perform the test on value of futex.
(rollback is value != expected_value, returns EWOULDBLOCK)
(various loops if test triggers mm faults)
6) queue the context into hash table, release the lock got in 4)
7) - release the read_lock on mmap_sem
<block>
8) Eventually unqueue the context (but rarely, as this part may be done
by the futex_wake())
Futexes were designed to improve scalability but current implementation has
various problems :
- Central hashtable :
This means scalability problems if many processes/threads want to use
futexes at the same time.
This means NUMA unbalance because this hashtable is located on one node.
- Using mmap_sem on every futex() syscall :
Even if mmap_sem is a rw_semaphore, up_read()/down_read() are doing atomic
ops on mmap_sem, dirtying cache line :
- lot of cache line ping pongs on SMP configurations.
mmap_sem is also extensively used by mm code (page faults, mmap()/munmap())
Highly threaded processes might suffer from mmap_sem contention.
mmap_sem is also used by oprofile code. Enabling oprofile hurts threaded
programs because of contention on the mmap_sem cache line.
- Using an atomic_inc()/atomic_dec() on inode ref counter or mm ref counter:
It's also a cache line ping pong on SMP. It also increases mmap_sem hold time
because of cache misses.
Most of these scalability problems come from the fact that futexes are in
one global namespace. As we use a central hash table, we must make sure
they are all using the same reference (given by the mm subsystem). We
chose to force all futexes be 'shared'. This has a cost.
But fact is POSIX defined PRIVATE and SHARED, allowing clear separation,
and optimal performance if carefuly implemented. Time has come for linux
to have better threading performance.
The goal is to permit new futex commands to avoid :
- Taking the mmap_sem semaphore, conflicting with other subsystems.
- Modifying a ref_count on mm or an inode, still conflicting with mm or fs.
This is possible because, for one process using PTHREAD_PROCESS_PRIVATE
futexes, we only need to distinguish futexes by their virtual address, no
matter the underlying mm storage is.
If glibc wants to exploit this new infrastructure, it should use new
_PRIVATE futex subcommands for PTHREAD_PROCESS_PRIVATE futexes. And be
prepared to fallback on old subcommands for old kernels. Using one global
variable with the FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG or 0 value should be OK.
PTHREAD_PROCESS_SHARED futexes should still use the old subcommands.
Compatibility with old applications is preserved, they still hit the
scalability problems, but new applications can fly :)
Note : the same SHARED futex (mapped on a file) can be used by old binaries
*and* new binaries, because both binaries will use the old subcommands.
Note : Vast majority of futexes should be using PROCESS_PRIVATE semantic,
as this is the default semantic. Almost all applications should benefit
of this changes (new kernel and updated libc)
Some bench results on a Pentium M 1.6 GHz (SMP kernel on a UP machine)
/* calling futex_wait(addr, value) with value != *addr */
433 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT) call (mixing 2 futexes)
424 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT) call (using one futex)
334 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE) call (mixing 2 futexes)
334 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE) call (using one futex)
For reference :
187 cycles per getppid() call
188 cycles per umask() call
181 cycles per ni_syscall() call
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Pierre Peiffer <pierre.peiffer@bull.net>
Cc: "Ulrich Drepper" <drepper@gmail.com>
Cc: "Nick Piggin" <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Cc: "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-09 09:35:04 +00:00
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* PRIVATE futexes by Eric Dumazet
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* Copyright (C) 2007 Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
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*
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2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
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* Requeue-PI support by Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com>
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* Copyright (C) IBM Corporation, 2009
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* Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for conceptual design and careful reviews.
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*
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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* Thanks to Ben LaHaise for yelling "hashed waitqueues" loudly
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* enough at me, Linus for the original (flawed) idea, Matthew
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* Kirkwood for proof-of-concept implementation.
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*
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* "The futexes are also cursed."
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* "But they come in a choice of three flavours!"
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*/
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2018-04-17 14:31:07 +00:00
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#include <linux/compat.h>
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#include <linux/jhash.h>
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#include <linux/pagemap.h>
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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2013-06-25 13:19:31 +00:00
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#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
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2013-05-02 01:35:05 +00:00
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#include <linux/freezer.h>
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2018-10-30 22:09:49 +00:00
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#include <linux/memblock.h>
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2015-06-30 06:26:02 +00:00
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#include <linux/fault-inject.h>
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2020-10-15 16:00:19 +00:00
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#include <linux/time_namespace.h>
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2007-10-19 06:40:14 +00:00
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[PATCH] FUTEX_WAKE_OP: pthread_cond_signal() speedup
ATM pthread_cond_signal is unnecessarily slow, because it wakes one waiter
(which at least on UP usually means an immediate context switch to one of
the waiter threads). This waiter wakes up and after a few instructions it
attempts to acquire the cv internal lock, but that lock is still held by
the thread calling pthread_cond_signal. So it goes to sleep and eventually
the signalling thread is scheduled in, unlocks the internal lock and wakes
the waiter again.
Now, before 2003-09-21 NPTL was using FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal
to avoid this performance issue, but it was removed when locks were
redesigned to the 3 state scheme (unlocked, locked uncontended, locked
contended).
Following scenario shows why simply using FUTEX_REQUEUE in
pthread_cond_signal together with using lll_mutex_unlock_force in place of
lll_mutex_unlock is not enough and probably why it has been disabled at
that time:
The number is value in cv->__data.__lock.
thr1 thr2 thr3
0 pthread_cond_wait
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__futex, futexval)
0 pthread_cond_signal
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
1 pthread_cond_signal
2 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
2 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__lock, 2)
2 lll_futex_requeue (&cv->__data.__futex, 0, 1, &cv->__data.__lock)
# FUTEX_REQUEUE, not FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
2 lll_mutex_unlock_force (cv->__data.__lock)
0 cv->__data.__lock = 0
0 lll_futex_wake (&cv->__data.__lock, 1)
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
# Here, lll_mutex_unlock doesn't know there are threads waiting
# on the internal cv's lock
Now, I believe it is possible to use FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal,
but it will cost us not one, but 2 extra syscalls and, what's worse, one of
these extra syscalls will be done for every single waiting loop in
pthread_cond_*wait.
We would need to use lll_mutex_unlock_force in pthread_cond_signal after
requeue and lll_mutex_cond_lock in pthread_cond_*wait after lll_futex_wait.
Another alternative is to do the unlocking pthread_cond_signal needs to do
(the lock can't be unlocked before lll_futex_wake, as that is racy) in the
kernel.
I have implemented both variants, futex-requeue-glibc.patch is the first
one and futex-wake_op{,-glibc}.patch is the unlocking inside of the kernel.
The kernel interface allows userland to specify how exactly an unlocking
operation should look like (some atomic arithmetic operation with optional
constant argument and comparison of the previous futex value with another
constant).
It has been implemented just for ppc*, x86_64 and i?86, for other
architectures I'm including just a stub header which can be used as a
starting point by maintainers to write support for their arches and ATM
will just return -ENOSYS for FUTEX_WAKE_OP. The requeue patch has been
(lightly) tested just on x86_64, the wake_op patch on ppc64 kernel running
32-bit and 64-bit NPTL and x86_64 kernel running 32-bit and 64-bit NPTL.
With the following benchmark on UP x86-64 I get:
for i in nptl-orig nptl-requeue nptl-wake_op; do echo time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench; \
for j in 1 2; do echo ( time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench ) 2>&1; done; done
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-orig /tmp/bench
real 0m0.655s user 0m0.253s sys 0m0.403s
real 0m0.657s user 0m0.269s sys 0m0.388s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-requeue /tmp/bench
real 0m0.496s user 0m0.225s sys 0m0.271s
real 0m0.531s user 0m0.242s sys 0m0.288s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-wake_op /tmp/bench
real 0m0.380s user 0m0.176s sys 0m0.204s
real 0m0.382s user 0m0.175s sys 0m0.207s
The benchmark is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00001.txt
Older futex-requeue-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00002.txt
Older futex-wake_op-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00003.txt
Will post a new version (just x86-64 fixes so that the patch
applies against pthread_cond_signal.S) to libc-hacker ml soon.
Attached is the kernel FUTEX_WAKE_OP patch as well as a simple-minded
testcase that will not test the atomicity of the operation, but at least
check if the threads that should have been woken up are woken up and
whether the arithmetic operation in the kernel gave the expected results.
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yuasa@hh.iij4u.or.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-06 22:16:25 +00:00
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#include <asm/futex.h>
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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2013-10-31 17:18:19 +00:00
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#include "locking/rtmutex_common.h"
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2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
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2014-01-12 23:31:24 +00:00
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/*
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2014-04-09 18:55:07 +00:00
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* READ this before attempting to hack on futexes!
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*
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* Basic futex operation and ordering guarantees
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* =============================================
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2014-01-12 23:31:24 +00:00
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*
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* The waiter reads the futex value in user space and calls
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* futex_wait(). This function computes the hash bucket and acquires
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* the hash bucket lock. After that it reads the futex user space value
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2014-01-12 23:31:25 +00:00
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* again and verifies that the data has not changed. If it has not changed
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* it enqueues itself into the hash bucket, releases the hash bucket lock
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* and schedules.
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2014-01-12 23:31:24 +00:00
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*
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* The waker side modifies the user space value of the futex and calls
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2014-01-12 23:31:25 +00:00
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* futex_wake(). This function computes the hash bucket and acquires the
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* hash bucket lock. Then it looks for waiters on that futex in the hash
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* bucket and wakes them.
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2014-01-12 23:31:24 +00:00
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*
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2014-01-12 23:31:25 +00:00
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* In futex wake up scenarios where no tasks are blocked on a futex, taking
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* the hb spinlock can be avoided and simply return. In order for this
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* optimization to work, ordering guarantees must exist so that the waiter
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* being added to the list is acknowledged when the list is concurrently being
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* checked by the waker, avoiding scenarios like the following:
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2014-01-12 23:31:24 +00:00
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*
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* CPU 0 CPU 1
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* val = *futex;
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* sys_futex(WAIT, futex, val);
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* futex_wait(futex, val);
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* uval = *futex;
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* *futex = newval;
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* sys_futex(WAKE, futex);
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* futex_wake(futex);
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* if (queue_empty())
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* return;
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* if (uval == val)
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* lock(hash_bucket(futex));
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* queue();
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* unlock(hash_bucket(futex));
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* schedule();
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*
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* This would cause the waiter on CPU 0 to wait forever because it
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* missed the transition of the user space value from val to newval
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* and the waker did not find the waiter in the hash bucket queue.
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*
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2014-01-12 23:31:25 +00:00
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* The correct serialization ensures that a waiter either observes
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* the changed user space value before blocking or is woken by a
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* concurrent waker:
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*
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* CPU 0 CPU 1
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2014-01-12 23:31:24 +00:00
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* val = *futex;
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* sys_futex(WAIT, futex, val);
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* futex_wait(futex, val);
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2014-01-12 23:31:25 +00:00
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*
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2014-04-09 18:55:07 +00:00
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* waiters++; (a)
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2016-02-09 19:15:13 +00:00
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* smp_mb(); (A) <-- paired with -.
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* |
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* lock(hash_bucket(futex)); |
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* |
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* uval = *futex; |
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* | *futex = newval;
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* | sys_futex(WAKE, futex);
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* | futex_wake(futex);
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* |
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* `--------> smp_mb(); (B)
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2014-01-12 23:31:24 +00:00
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* if (uval == val)
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2014-01-12 23:31:25 +00:00
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* queue();
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2014-01-12 23:31:24 +00:00
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* unlock(hash_bucket(futex));
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2014-01-12 23:31:25 +00:00
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* schedule(); if (waiters)
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* lock(hash_bucket(futex));
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2014-04-09 18:55:07 +00:00
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* else wake_waiters(futex);
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* waiters--; (b) unlock(hash_bucket(futex));
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2014-01-12 23:31:25 +00:00
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*
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2014-04-09 18:55:07 +00:00
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* Where (A) orders the waiters increment and the futex value read through
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* atomic operations (see hb_waiters_inc) and where (B) orders the write
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2020-03-04 12:24:24 +00:00
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* to futex and the waiters read (see hb_waiters_pending()).
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2014-01-12 23:31:25 +00:00
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*
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* This yields the following case (where X:=waiters, Y:=futex):
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*
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* X = Y = 0
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*
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* w[X]=1 w[Y]=1
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* MB MB
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* r[Y]=y r[X]=x
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*
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* Which guarantees that x==0 && y==0 is impossible; which translates back into
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* the guarantee that we cannot both miss the futex variable change and the
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* enqueue.
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2014-04-09 18:55:07 +00:00
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*
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* Note that a new waiter is accounted for in (a) even when it is possible that
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* the wait call can return error, in which case we backtrack from it in (b).
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* Refer to the comment in queue_lock().
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*
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* Similarly, in order to account for waiters being requeued on another
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* address we always increment the waiters for the destination bucket before
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* acquiring the lock. It then decrements them again after releasing it -
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* the code that actually moves the futex(es) between hash buckets (requeue_futex)
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* will do the additional required waiter count housekeeping. This is done for
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* double_lock_hb() and double_unlock_hb(), respectively.
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2014-01-12 23:31:24 +00:00
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*/
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2018-04-17 14:31:07 +00:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG
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#define futex_cmpxchg_enabled 1
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#else
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static int __read_mostly futex_cmpxchg_enabled;
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2014-03-02 12:09:47 +00:00
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#endif
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2008-02-23 23:23:57 +00:00
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2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
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/*
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* Futex flags used to encode options to functions and preserve them across
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* restarts.
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*/
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2016-07-29 14:32:30 +00:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
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# define FLAGS_SHARED 0x01
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#else
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/*
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* NOMMU does not have per process address space. Let the compiler optimize
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* code away.
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*/
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# define FLAGS_SHARED 0x00
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#endif
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2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
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#define FLAGS_CLOCKRT 0x02
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#define FLAGS_HAS_TIMEOUT 0x04
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2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
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/*
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* Priority Inheritance state:
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*/
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struct futex_pi_state {
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/*
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* list of 'owned' pi_state instances - these have to be
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* cleaned up in do_exit() if the task exits prematurely:
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*/
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struct list_head list;
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/*
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* The PI object:
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*/
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struct rt_mutex pi_mutex;
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struct task_struct *owner;
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2019-02-05 12:24:27 +00:00
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refcount_t refcount;
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2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
union futex_key key;
|
2016-10-28 08:22:25 +00:00
|
|
|
} __randomize_layout;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-09-22 05:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* struct futex_q - The hashed futex queue entry, one per waiting task
|
2010-10-13 18:02:34 +00:00
|
|
|
* @list: priority-sorted list of tasks waiting on this futex
|
2009-09-22 05:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
* @task: the task waiting on the futex
|
|
|
|
* @lock_ptr: the hash bucket lock
|
|
|
|
* @key: the key the futex is hashed on
|
|
|
|
* @pi_state: optional priority inheritance state
|
|
|
|
* @rt_waiter: rt_waiter storage for use with requeue_pi
|
|
|
|
* @requeue_pi_key: the requeue_pi target futex key
|
|
|
|
* @bitset: bitset for the optional bitmasked wakeup
|
|
|
|
*
|
2017-06-20 10:06:13 +00:00
|
|
|
* We use this hashed waitqueue, instead of a normal wait_queue_entry_t, so
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
* we can wake only the relevant ones (hashed queues may be shared).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* A futex_q has a woken state, just like tasks have TASK_RUNNING.
|
2007-05-09 09:35:00 +00:00
|
|
|
* It is considered woken when plist_node_empty(&q->list) || q->lock_ptr == 0.
|
2010-10-13 18:02:34 +00:00
|
|
|
* The order of wakeup is always to make the first condition true, then
|
2009-09-22 05:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
* the second.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* PI futexes are typically woken before they are removed from the hash list via
|
|
|
|
* the rt_mutex code. See unqueue_me_pi().
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct futex_q {
|
2007-05-09 09:35:00 +00:00
|
|
|
struct plist_node list;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-09-22 05:30:30 +00:00
|
|
|
struct task_struct *task;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
spinlock_t *lock_ptr;
|
|
|
|
union futex_key key;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
struct rt_mutex_waiter *rt_waiter;
|
2009-08-14 00:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
union futex_key *requeue_pi_key;
|
2008-02-01 16:45:14 +00:00
|
|
|
u32 bitset;
|
2016-10-28 08:22:25 +00:00
|
|
|
} __randomize_layout;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-11-08 21:40:28 +00:00
|
|
|
static const struct futex_q futex_q_init = {
|
|
|
|
/* list gets initialized in queue_me()*/
|
|
|
|
.key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT,
|
|
|
|
.bitset = FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2009-03-12 07:55:37 +00:00
|
|
|
* Hash buckets are shared by all the futex_keys that hash to the same
|
|
|
|
* location. Each key may have multiple futex_q structures, one for each task
|
|
|
|
* waiting on a futex.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket {
|
2014-03-21 05:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
atomic_t waiters;
|
2007-05-09 09:35:00 +00:00
|
|
|
spinlock_t lock;
|
|
|
|
struct plist_head chain;
|
futexes: Increase hash table size for better performance
Currently, the futex global hash table suffers from its fixed,
smallish (for today's standards) size of 256 entries, as well as
its lack of NUMA awareness. Large systems, using many futexes,
can be prone to high amounts of collisions; where these futexes
hash to the same bucket and lead to extra contention on the same
hb->lock. Furthermore, cacheline bouncing is a reality when we
have multiple hb->locks residing on the same cacheline and
different futexes hash to adjacent buckets.
This patch keeps the current static size of 16 entries for small
systems, or otherwise, 256 * ncpus (or larger as we need to
round the number to a power of 2). Note that this number of CPUs
accounts for all CPUs that can ever be available in the system,
taking into consideration things like hotpluging. While we do
impose extra overhead at bootup by making the hash table larger,
this is a one time thing, and does not shadow the benefits of
this patch.
Furthermore, as suggested by tglx, by cache aligning the hash
buckets we can avoid access across cacheline boundaries and also
avoid massive cache line bouncing if multiple cpus are hammering
away at different hash buckets which happen to reside in the
same cache line.
Also, similar to other core kernel components (pid, dcache,
tcp), by using alloc_large_system_hash() we benefit from its
NUMA awareness and thus the table is distributed among the nodes
instead of in a single one.
For a custom microbenchmark that pounds on the uaddr hashing --
making the wait path fail at futex_wait_setup() returning
-EWOULDBLOCK for large amounts of futexes, we can see the
following benefits on a 80-core, 8-socket 1Tb server:
+---------+--------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+
| threads | baseline (ops/sec) | aligned-only (ops/sec) | large table (ops/sec) | large table+aligned (ops/sec) |
+---------+--------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+
| 512 | 32426 | 50531 (+55.8%) | 255274 (+687.2%) | 292553 (+802.2%) |
| 256 | 65360 | 99588 (+52.3%) | 443563 (+578.6%) | 508088 (+677.3%) |
| 128 | 125635 | 200075 (+59.2%) | 742613 (+491.1%) | 835452 (+564.9%) |
| 80 | 193559 | 323425 (+67.1%) | 1028147 (+431.1%) | 1130304 (+483.9%) |
| 64 | 247667 | 443740 (+79.1%) | 997300 (+302.6%) | 1145494 (+362.5%) |
| 32 | 628412 | 721401 (+14.7%) | 965996 (+53.7%) | 1122115 (+78.5%) |
+---------+--------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Scott Norton <scott.norton@hp.com>
Cc: Tom Vaden <tom.vaden@hp.com>
Cc: Aswin Chandramouleeswaran <aswin@hp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1389569486-25487-3-git-send-email-davidlohr@hp.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2014-01-12 23:31:23 +00:00
|
|
|
} ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-09-09 21:36:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The base of the bucket array and its size are always used together
|
|
|
|
* (after initialization only in hash_futex()), so ensure that they
|
|
|
|
* reside in the same cacheline.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static struct {
|
|
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *queues;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long hashsize;
|
|
|
|
} __futex_data __read_mostly __aligned(2*sizeof(long));
|
|
|
|
#define futex_queues (__futex_data.queues)
|
|
|
|
#define futex_hashsize (__futex_data.hashsize)
|
futexes: Increase hash table size for better performance
Currently, the futex global hash table suffers from its fixed,
smallish (for today's standards) size of 256 entries, as well as
its lack of NUMA awareness. Large systems, using many futexes,
can be prone to high amounts of collisions; where these futexes
hash to the same bucket and lead to extra contention on the same
hb->lock. Furthermore, cacheline bouncing is a reality when we
have multiple hb->locks residing on the same cacheline and
different futexes hash to adjacent buckets.
This patch keeps the current static size of 16 entries for small
systems, or otherwise, 256 * ncpus (or larger as we need to
round the number to a power of 2). Note that this number of CPUs
accounts for all CPUs that can ever be available in the system,
taking into consideration things like hotpluging. While we do
impose extra overhead at bootup by making the hash table larger,
this is a one time thing, and does not shadow the benefits of
this patch.
Furthermore, as suggested by tglx, by cache aligning the hash
buckets we can avoid access across cacheline boundaries and also
avoid massive cache line bouncing if multiple cpus are hammering
away at different hash buckets which happen to reside in the
same cache line.
Also, similar to other core kernel components (pid, dcache,
tcp), by using alloc_large_system_hash() we benefit from its
NUMA awareness and thus the table is distributed among the nodes
instead of in a single one.
For a custom microbenchmark that pounds on the uaddr hashing --
making the wait path fail at futex_wait_setup() returning
-EWOULDBLOCK for large amounts of futexes, we can see the
following benefits on a 80-core, 8-socket 1Tb server:
+---------+--------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+
| threads | baseline (ops/sec) | aligned-only (ops/sec) | large table (ops/sec) | large table+aligned (ops/sec) |
+---------+--------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+
| 512 | 32426 | 50531 (+55.8%) | 255274 (+687.2%) | 292553 (+802.2%) |
| 256 | 65360 | 99588 (+52.3%) | 443563 (+578.6%) | 508088 (+677.3%) |
| 128 | 125635 | 200075 (+59.2%) | 742613 (+491.1%) | 835452 (+564.9%) |
| 80 | 193559 | 323425 (+67.1%) | 1028147 (+431.1%) | 1130304 (+483.9%) |
| 64 | 247667 | 443740 (+79.1%) | 997300 (+302.6%) | 1145494 (+362.5%) |
| 32 | 628412 | 721401 (+14.7%) | 965996 (+53.7%) | 1122115 (+78.5%) |
+---------+--------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Scott Norton <scott.norton@hp.com>
Cc: Tom Vaden <tom.vaden@hp.com>
Cc: Aswin Chandramouleeswaran <aswin@hp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1389569486-25487-3-git-send-email-davidlohr@hp.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2014-01-12 23:31:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-06-30 06:26:02 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Fault injections for futexes.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_FAIL_FUTEX
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct {
|
|
|
|
struct fault_attr attr;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-26 22:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
bool ignore_private;
|
2015-06-30 06:26:02 +00:00
|
|
|
} fail_futex = {
|
|
|
|
.attr = FAULT_ATTR_INITIALIZER,
|
2015-09-26 22:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
.ignore_private = false,
|
2015-06-30 06:26:02 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init setup_fail_futex(char *str)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return setup_fault_attr(&fail_futex.attr, str);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
__setup("fail_futex=", setup_fail_futex);
|
|
|
|
|
2015-07-20 17:40:45 +00:00
|
|
|
static bool should_fail_futex(bool fshared)
|
2015-06-30 06:26:02 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (fail_futex.ignore_private && !fshared)
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return should_fail(&fail_futex.attr, 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_DEBUG_FS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init fail_futex_debugfs(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
umode_t mode = S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR;
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *dir;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dir = fault_create_debugfs_attr("fail_futex", NULL,
|
|
|
|
&fail_futex.attr);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(dir))
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(dir);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-01-22 15:21:39 +00:00
|
|
|
debugfs_create_bool("ignore-private", mode, dir,
|
|
|
|
&fail_futex.ignore_private);
|
2015-06-30 06:26:02 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
late_initcall(fail_futex_debugfs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_DEBUG_FS */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
static inline bool should_fail_futex(bool fshared)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_FAIL_FUTEX */
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-06 21:55:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
|
|
|
static void compat_exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-21 05:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Reflects a new waiter being added to the waitqueue.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline void hb_waiters_inc(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
|
2014-01-12 23:31:25 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
|
2014-03-21 05:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
atomic_inc(&hb->waiters);
|
2014-01-12 23:31:25 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-03-21 05:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
* Full barrier (A), see the ordering comment above.
|
2014-01-12 23:31:25 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-03-17 17:06:10 +00:00
|
|
|
smp_mb__after_atomic();
|
2014-03-21 05:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Reflects a waiter being removed from the waitqueue by wakeup
|
|
|
|
* paths.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline void hb_waiters_dec(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
|
|
|
|
atomic_dec(&hb->waiters);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-01-12 23:31:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-03-21 05:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline int hb_waiters_pending(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
|
2020-03-04 12:24:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Full barrier (B), see the ordering comment above.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
smp_mb();
|
2014-03-21 05:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
return atomic_read(&hb->waiters);
|
2014-01-12 23:31:25 +00:00
|
|
|
#else
|
2014-03-21 05:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2014-01-12 23:31:25 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-01 08:43:29 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* hash_futex - Return the hash bucket in the global hash
|
|
|
|
* @key: Pointer to the futex key for which the hash is calculated
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We hash on the keys returned from get_futex_key (see below) and return the
|
|
|
|
* corresponding hash bucket in the global hash.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static struct futex_hash_bucket *hash_futex(union futex_key *key)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2020-03-08 18:07:17 +00:00
|
|
|
u32 hash = jhash2((u32 *)key, offsetof(typeof(*key), both.offset) / 4,
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
key->both.offset);
|
2020-03-08 18:07:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
futexes: Increase hash table size for better performance
Currently, the futex global hash table suffers from its fixed,
smallish (for today's standards) size of 256 entries, as well as
its lack of NUMA awareness. Large systems, using many futexes,
can be prone to high amounts of collisions; where these futexes
hash to the same bucket and lead to extra contention on the same
hb->lock. Furthermore, cacheline bouncing is a reality when we
have multiple hb->locks residing on the same cacheline and
different futexes hash to adjacent buckets.
This patch keeps the current static size of 16 entries for small
systems, or otherwise, 256 * ncpus (or larger as we need to
round the number to a power of 2). Note that this number of CPUs
accounts for all CPUs that can ever be available in the system,
taking into consideration things like hotpluging. While we do
impose extra overhead at bootup by making the hash table larger,
this is a one time thing, and does not shadow the benefits of
this patch.
Furthermore, as suggested by tglx, by cache aligning the hash
buckets we can avoid access across cacheline boundaries and also
avoid massive cache line bouncing if multiple cpus are hammering
away at different hash buckets which happen to reside in the
same cache line.
Also, similar to other core kernel components (pid, dcache,
tcp), by using alloc_large_system_hash() we benefit from its
NUMA awareness and thus the table is distributed among the nodes
instead of in a single one.
For a custom microbenchmark that pounds on the uaddr hashing --
making the wait path fail at futex_wait_setup() returning
-EWOULDBLOCK for large amounts of futexes, we can see the
following benefits on a 80-core, 8-socket 1Tb server:
+---------+--------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+
| threads | baseline (ops/sec) | aligned-only (ops/sec) | large table (ops/sec) | large table+aligned (ops/sec) |
+---------+--------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+
| 512 | 32426 | 50531 (+55.8%) | 255274 (+687.2%) | 292553 (+802.2%) |
| 256 | 65360 | 99588 (+52.3%) | 443563 (+578.6%) | 508088 (+677.3%) |
| 128 | 125635 | 200075 (+59.2%) | 742613 (+491.1%) | 835452 (+564.9%) |
| 80 | 193559 | 323425 (+67.1%) | 1028147 (+431.1%) | 1130304 (+483.9%) |
| 64 | 247667 | 443740 (+79.1%) | 997300 (+302.6%) | 1145494 (+362.5%) |
| 32 | 628412 | 721401 (+14.7%) | 965996 (+53.7%) | 1122115 (+78.5%) |
+---------+--------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Scott Norton <scott.norton@hp.com>
Cc: Tom Vaden <tom.vaden@hp.com>
Cc: Aswin Chandramouleeswaran <aswin@hp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1389569486-25487-3-git-send-email-davidlohr@hp.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2014-01-12 23:31:23 +00:00
|
|
|
return &futex_queues[hash & (futex_hashsize - 1)];
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-01 08:43:29 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* match_futex - Check whether two futex keys are equal
|
|
|
|
* @key1: Pointer to key1
|
|
|
|
* @key2: Pointer to key2
|
|
|
|
*
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
* Return 1 if two futex_keys are equal, 0 otherwise.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline int match_futex(union futex_key *key1, union futex_key *key2)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2009-10-14 17:12:39 +00:00
|
|
|
return (key1 && key2
|
|
|
|
&& key1->both.word == key2->both.word
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
&& key1->both.ptr == key2->both.ptr
|
|
|
|
&& key1->both.offset == key2->both.offset);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 02:57:57 +00:00
|
|
|
enum futex_access {
|
|
|
|
FUTEX_READ,
|
|
|
|
FUTEX_WRITE
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2019-05-28 16:03:45 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* futex_setup_timer - set up the sleeping hrtimer.
|
|
|
|
* @time: ptr to the given timeout value
|
|
|
|
* @timeout: the hrtimer_sleeper structure to be set up
|
|
|
|
* @flags: futex flags
|
|
|
|
* @range_ns: optional range in ns
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return: Initialized hrtimer_sleeper structure or NULL if no timeout
|
|
|
|
* value given
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline struct hrtimer_sleeper *
|
|
|
|
futex_setup_timer(ktime_t *time, struct hrtimer_sleeper *timeout,
|
|
|
|
int flags, u64 range_ns)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!time)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-07-26 18:30:50 +00:00
|
|
|
hrtimer_init_sleeper_on_stack(timeout, (flags & FLAGS_CLOCKRT) ?
|
|
|
|
CLOCK_REALTIME : CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
|
|
|
|
HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
|
2019-05-28 16:03:45 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If range_ns is 0, calling hrtimer_set_expires_range_ns() is
|
|
|
|
* effectively the same as calling hrtimer_set_expires().
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
hrtimer_set_expires_range_ns(&timeout->timer, *time, range_ns);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return timeout;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-03-04 10:28:31 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Generate a machine wide unique identifier for this inode.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This relies on u64 not wrapping in the life-time of the machine; which with
|
|
|
|
* 1ns resolution means almost 585 years.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This further relies on the fact that a well formed program will not unmap
|
|
|
|
* the file while it has a (shared) futex waiting on it. This mapping will have
|
|
|
|
* a file reference which pins the mount and inode.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If for some reason an inode gets evicted and read back in again, it will get
|
|
|
|
* a new sequence number and will _NOT_ match, even though it is the exact same
|
|
|
|
* file.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* It is important that match_futex() will never have a false-positive, esp.
|
|
|
|
* for PI futexes that can mess up the state. The above argues that false-negatives
|
|
|
|
* are only possible for malformed programs.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static u64 get_inode_sequence_number(struct inode *inode)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
static atomic64_t i_seq;
|
|
|
|
u64 old;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Does the inode already have a sequence number? */
|
|
|
|
old = atomic64_read(&inode->i_sequence);
|
|
|
|
if (likely(old))
|
|
|
|
return old;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
|
|
u64 new = atomic64_add_return(1, &i_seq);
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!new))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
old = atomic64_cmpxchg_relaxed(&inode->i_sequence, 0, new);
|
|
|
|
if (old)
|
|
|
|
return old;
|
|
|
|
return new;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
FUTEX: new PRIVATE futexes
Analysis of current linux futex code :
--------------------------------------
A central hash table futex_queues[] holds all contexts (futex_q) of waiting
threads.
Each futex_wait()/futex_wait() has to obtain a spinlock on a hash slot to
perform lookups or insert/deletion of a futex_q.
When a futex_wait() is done, calling thread has to :
1) - Obtain a read lock on mmap_sem to be able to validate the user pointer
(calling find_vma()). This validation tells us if the futex uses
an inode based store (mapped file), or mm based store (anonymous mem)
2) - compute a hash key
3) - Atomic increment of reference counter on an inode or a mm_struct
4) - lock part of futex_queues[] hash table
5) - perform the test on value of futex.
(rollback is value != expected_value, returns EWOULDBLOCK)
(various loops if test triggers mm faults)
6) queue the context into hash table, release the lock got in 4)
7) - release the read_lock on mmap_sem
<block>
8) Eventually unqueue the context (but rarely, as this part may be done
by the futex_wake())
Futexes were designed to improve scalability but current implementation has
various problems :
- Central hashtable :
This means scalability problems if many processes/threads want to use
futexes at the same time.
This means NUMA unbalance because this hashtable is located on one node.
- Using mmap_sem on every futex() syscall :
Even if mmap_sem is a rw_semaphore, up_read()/down_read() are doing atomic
ops on mmap_sem, dirtying cache line :
- lot of cache line ping pongs on SMP configurations.
mmap_sem is also extensively used by mm code (page faults, mmap()/munmap())
Highly threaded processes might suffer from mmap_sem contention.
mmap_sem is also used by oprofile code. Enabling oprofile hurts threaded
programs because of contention on the mmap_sem cache line.
- Using an atomic_inc()/atomic_dec() on inode ref counter or mm ref counter:
It's also a cache line ping pong on SMP. It also increases mmap_sem hold time
because of cache misses.
Most of these scalability problems come from the fact that futexes are in
one global namespace. As we use a central hash table, we must make sure
they are all using the same reference (given by the mm subsystem). We
chose to force all futexes be 'shared'. This has a cost.
But fact is POSIX defined PRIVATE and SHARED, allowing clear separation,
and optimal performance if carefuly implemented. Time has come for linux
to have better threading performance.
The goal is to permit new futex commands to avoid :
- Taking the mmap_sem semaphore, conflicting with other subsystems.
- Modifying a ref_count on mm or an inode, still conflicting with mm or fs.
This is possible because, for one process using PTHREAD_PROCESS_PRIVATE
futexes, we only need to distinguish futexes by their virtual address, no
matter the underlying mm storage is.
If glibc wants to exploit this new infrastructure, it should use new
_PRIVATE futex subcommands for PTHREAD_PROCESS_PRIVATE futexes. And be
prepared to fallback on old subcommands for old kernels. Using one global
variable with the FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG or 0 value should be OK.
PTHREAD_PROCESS_SHARED futexes should still use the old subcommands.
Compatibility with old applications is preserved, they still hit the
scalability problems, but new applications can fly :)
Note : the same SHARED futex (mapped on a file) can be used by old binaries
*and* new binaries, because both binaries will use the old subcommands.
Note : Vast majority of futexes should be using PROCESS_PRIVATE semantic,
as this is the default semantic. Almost all applications should benefit
of this changes (new kernel and updated libc)
Some bench results on a Pentium M 1.6 GHz (SMP kernel on a UP machine)
/* calling futex_wait(addr, value) with value != *addr */
433 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT) call (mixing 2 futexes)
424 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT) call (using one futex)
334 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE) call (mixing 2 futexes)
334 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE) call (using one futex)
For reference :
187 cycles per getppid() call
188 cycles per umask() call
181 cycles per ni_syscall() call
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Pierre Peiffer <pierre.peiffer@bull.net>
Cc: "Ulrich Drepper" <drepper@gmail.com>
Cc: "Nick Piggin" <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Cc: "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-09 09:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
2009-09-22 05:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
* get_futex_key() - Get parameters which are the keys for a futex
|
|
|
|
* @uaddr: virtual address of the futex
|
2020-07-02 20:28:43 +00:00
|
|
|
* @fshared: false for a PROCESS_PRIVATE futex, true for PROCESS_SHARED
|
2009-09-22 05:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
* @key: address where result is stored.
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 02:57:57 +00:00
|
|
|
* @rw: mapping needs to be read/write (values: FUTEX_READ,
|
|
|
|
* FUTEX_WRITE)
|
FUTEX: new PRIVATE futexes
Analysis of current linux futex code :
--------------------------------------
A central hash table futex_queues[] holds all contexts (futex_q) of waiting
threads.
Each futex_wait()/futex_wait() has to obtain a spinlock on a hash slot to
perform lookups or insert/deletion of a futex_q.
When a futex_wait() is done, calling thread has to :
1) - Obtain a read lock on mmap_sem to be able to validate the user pointer
(calling find_vma()). This validation tells us if the futex uses
an inode based store (mapped file), or mm based store (anonymous mem)
2) - compute a hash key
3) - Atomic increment of reference counter on an inode or a mm_struct
4) - lock part of futex_queues[] hash table
5) - perform the test on value of futex.
(rollback is value != expected_value, returns EWOULDBLOCK)
(various loops if test triggers mm faults)
6) queue the context into hash table, release the lock got in 4)
7) - release the read_lock on mmap_sem
<block>
8) Eventually unqueue the context (but rarely, as this part may be done
by the futex_wake())
Futexes were designed to improve scalability but current implementation has
various problems :
- Central hashtable :
This means scalability problems if many processes/threads want to use
futexes at the same time.
This means NUMA unbalance because this hashtable is located on one node.
- Using mmap_sem on every futex() syscall :
Even if mmap_sem is a rw_semaphore, up_read()/down_read() are doing atomic
ops on mmap_sem, dirtying cache line :
- lot of cache line ping pongs on SMP configurations.
mmap_sem is also extensively used by mm code (page faults, mmap()/munmap())
Highly threaded processes might suffer from mmap_sem contention.
mmap_sem is also used by oprofile code. Enabling oprofile hurts threaded
programs because of contention on the mmap_sem cache line.
- Using an atomic_inc()/atomic_dec() on inode ref counter or mm ref counter:
It's also a cache line ping pong on SMP. It also increases mmap_sem hold time
because of cache misses.
Most of these scalability problems come from the fact that futexes are in
one global namespace. As we use a central hash table, we must make sure
they are all using the same reference (given by the mm subsystem). We
chose to force all futexes be 'shared'. This has a cost.
But fact is POSIX defined PRIVATE and SHARED, allowing clear separation,
and optimal performance if carefuly implemented. Time has come for linux
to have better threading performance.
The goal is to permit new futex commands to avoid :
- Taking the mmap_sem semaphore, conflicting with other subsystems.
- Modifying a ref_count on mm or an inode, still conflicting with mm or fs.
This is possible because, for one process using PTHREAD_PROCESS_PRIVATE
futexes, we only need to distinguish futexes by their virtual address, no
matter the underlying mm storage is.
If glibc wants to exploit this new infrastructure, it should use new
_PRIVATE futex subcommands for PTHREAD_PROCESS_PRIVATE futexes. And be
prepared to fallback on old subcommands for old kernels. Using one global
variable with the FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG or 0 value should be OK.
PTHREAD_PROCESS_SHARED futexes should still use the old subcommands.
Compatibility with old applications is preserved, they still hit the
scalability problems, but new applications can fly :)
Note : the same SHARED futex (mapped on a file) can be used by old binaries
*and* new binaries, because both binaries will use the old subcommands.
Note : Vast majority of futexes should be using PROCESS_PRIVATE semantic,
as this is the default semantic. Almost all applications should benefit
of this changes (new kernel and updated libc)
Some bench results on a Pentium M 1.6 GHz (SMP kernel on a UP machine)
/* calling futex_wait(addr, value) with value != *addr */
433 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT) call (mixing 2 futexes)
424 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT) call (using one futex)
334 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE) call (mixing 2 futexes)
334 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE) call (using one futex)
For reference :
187 cycles per getppid() call
188 cycles per umask() call
181 cycles per ni_syscall() call
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Pierre Peiffer <pierre.peiffer@bull.net>
Cc: "Ulrich Drepper" <drepper@gmail.com>
Cc: "Nick Piggin" <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Cc: "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-09 09:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2013-03-05 18:00:24 +00:00
|
|
|
* Return: a negative error code or 0
|
|
|
|
*
|
2017-05-11 13:17:45 +00:00
|
|
|
* The key words are stored in @key on success.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2020-03-04 10:28:31 +00:00
|
|
|
* For shared mappings (when @fshared), the key is:
|
2020-04-14 16:48:58 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2020-03-04 10:28:31 +00:00
|
|
|
* ( inode->i_sequence, page->index, offset_within_page )
|
2020-04-14 16:48:58 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2020-03-04 10:28:31 +00:00
|
|
|
* [ also see get_inode_sequence_number() ]
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For private mappings (or when !@fshared), the key is:
|
2020-04-14 16:48:58 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2020-03-04 10:28:31 +00:00
|
|
|
* ( current->mm, address, 0 )
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This allows (cross process, where applicable) identification of the futex
|
|
|
|
* without keeping the page pinned for the duration of the FUTEX_WAIT.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2009-03-12 07:55:37 +00:00
|
|
|
* lock_page() might sleep, the caller should not hold a spinlock.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-07-02 20:28:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static int get_futex_key(u32 __user *uaddr, bool fshared, union futex_key *key,
|
|
|
|
enum futex_access rw)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long address = (unsigned long)uaddr;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
|
2016-06-08 13:25:22 +00:00
|
|
|
struct page *page, *tail;
|
2016-01-16 00:53:00 +00:00
|
|
|
struct address_space *mapping;
|
futex: Fix regression with read only mappings
commit 7485d0d3758e8e6491a5c9468114e74dc050785d (futexes: Remove rw
parameter from get_futex_key()) in 2.6.33 fixed two problems: First, It
prevented a loop when encountering a ZERO_PAGE. Second, it fixed RW
MAP_PRIVATE futex operations by forcing the COW to occur by
unconditionally performing a write access get_user_pages_fast() to get
the page. The commit also introduced a user-mode regression in that it
broke futex operations on read-only memory maps. For example, this
breaks workloads that have one or more reader processes doing a
FUTEX_WAIT on a futex within a read only shared file mapping, and a
writer processes that has a writable mapping issuing the FUTEX_WAKE.
This fixes the regression for valid futex operations on RO mappings by
trying a RO get_user_pages_fast() when the RW get_user_pages_fast()
fails. This change makes it necessary to also check for invalid use
cases, such as anonymous RO mappings (which can never change) and the
ZERO_PAGE which the commit referenced above was written to address.
This patch does restore the original behavior with RO MAP_PRIVATE
mappings, which have inherent user-mode usage problems and don't really
make sense. With this patch performing a FUTEX_WAIT within a RO
MAP_PRIVATE mapping will be successfully woken provided another process
updates the region of the underlying mapped file. However, the mmap()
man page states that for a MAP_PRIVATE mapping:
It is unspecified whether changes made to the file after
the mmap() call are visible in the mapped region.
So user-mode users attempting to use futex operations on RO MAP_PRIVATE
mappings are depending on unspecified behavior. Additionally a
RO MAP_PRIVATE mapping could fail to wake up in the following case.
Thread-A: call futex(FUTEX_WAIT, memory-region-A).
get_futex_key() return inode based key.
sleep on the key
Thread-B: call mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, memory-region-A)
Thread-B: write memory-region-A.
COW happen. This process's memory-region-A become related
to new COWed private (ie PageAnon=1) page.
Thread-B: call futex(FUETX_WAKE, memory-region-A).
get_futex_key() return mm based key.
IOW, we fail to wake up Thread-A.
Once again doing something like this is just silly and users who do
something like this get what they deserve.
While RO MAP_PRIVATE mappings are nonsensical, checking for a private
mapping requires walking the vmas and was deemed too costly to avoid a
userspace hang.
This Patch is based on Peter Zijlstra's initial patch with modifications to
only allow RO mappings for futex operations that need VERIFY_READ access.
Reported-by: David Oliver <david@rgmadvisors.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Bohrer <sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Cc: zvonler@rgmadvisors.com
Cc: hughd@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1309450892-30676-1-git-send-email-sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2011-06-30 16:21:32 +00:00
|
|
|
int err, ro = 0;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The futex address must be "naturally" aligned.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
key->both.offset = address % PAGE_SIZE;
|
FUTEX: new PRIVATE futexes
Analysis of current linux futex code :
--------------------------------------
A central hash table futex_queues[] holds all contexts (futex_q) of waiting
threads.
Each futex_wait()/futex_wait() has to obtain a spinlock on a hash slot to
perform lookups or insert/deletion of a futex_q.
When a futex_wait() is done, calling thread has to :
1) - Obtain a read lock on mmap_sem to be able to validate the user pointer
(calling find_vma()). This validation tells us if the futex uses
an inode based store (mapped file), or mm based store (anonymous mem)
2) - compute a hash key
3) - Atomic increment of reference counter on an inode or a mm_struct
4) - lock part of futex_queues[] hash table
5) - perform the test on value of futex.
(rollback is value != expected_value, returns EWOULDBLOCK)
(various loops if test triggers mm faults)
6) queue the context into hash table, release the lock got in 4)
7) - release the read_lock on mmap_sem
<block>
8) Eventually unqueue the context (but rarely, as this part may be done
by the futex_wake())
Futexes were designed to improve scalability but current implementation has
various problems :
- Central hashtable :
This means scalability problems if many processes/threads want to use
futexes at the same time.
This means NUMA unbalance because this hashtable is located on one node.
- Using mmap_sem on every futex() syscall :
Even if mmap_sem is a rw_semaphore, up_read()/down_read() are doing atomic
ops on mmap_sem, dirtying cache line :
- lot of cache line ping pongs on SMP configurations.
mmap_sem is also extensively used by mm code (page faults, mmap()/munmap())
Highly threaded processes might suffer from mmap_sem contention.
mmap_sem is also used by oprofile code. Enabling oprofile hurts threaded
programs because of contention on the mmap_sem cache line.
- Using an atomic_inc()/atomic_dec() on inode ref counter or mm ref counter:
It's also a cache line ping pong on SMP. It also increases mmap_sem hold time
because of cache misses.
Most of these scalability problems come from the fact that futexes are in
one global namespace. As we use a central hash table, we must make sure
they are all using the same reference (given by the mm subsystem). We
chose to force all futexes be 'shared'. This has a cost.
But fact is POSIX defined PRIVATE and SHARED, allowing clear separation,
and optimal performance if carefuly implemented. Time has come for linux
to have better threading performance.
The goal is to permit new futex commands to avoid :
- Taking the mmap_sem semaphore, conflicting with other subsystems.
- Modifying a ref_count on mm or an inode, still conflicting with mm or fs.
This is possible because, for one process using PTHREAD_PROCESS_PRIVATE
futexes, we only need to distinguish futexes by their virtual address, no
matter the underlying mm storage is.
If glibc wants to exploit this new infrastructure, it should use new
_PRIVATE futex subcommands for PTHREAD_PROCESS_PRIVATE futexes. And be
prepared to fallback on old subcommands for old kernels. Using one global
variable with the FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG or 0 value should be OK.
PTHREAD_PROCESS_SHARED futexes should still use the old subcommands.
Compatibility with old applications is preserved, they still hit the
scalability problems, but new applications can fly :)
Note : the same SHARED futex (mapped on a file) can be used by old binaries
*and* new binaries, because both binaries will use the old subcommands.
Note : Vast majority of futexes should be using PROCESS_PRIVATE semantic,
as this is the default semantic. Almost all applications should benefit
of this changes (new kernel and updated libc)
Some bench results on a Pentium M 1.6 GHz (SMP kernel on a UP machine)
/* calling futex_wait(addr, value) with value != *addr */
433 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT) call (mixing 2 futexes)
424 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT) call (using one futex)
334 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE) call (mixing 2 futexes)
334 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE) call (using one futex)
For reference :
187 cycles per getppid() call
188 cycles per umask() call
181 cycles per ni_syscall() call
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Pierre Peiffer <pierre.peiffer@bull.net>
Cc: "Ulrich Drepper" <drepper@gmail.com>
Cc: "Nick Piggin" <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Cc: "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-09 09:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely((address % sizeof(u32)) != 0))
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
address -= key->both.offset;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 02:57:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(!access_ok(uaddr, sizeof(u32))))
|
2013-12-12 17:53:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-30 06:26:02 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(fshared)))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
FUTEX: new PRIVATE futexes
Analysis of current linux futex code :
--------------------------------------
A central hash table futex_queues[] holds all contexts (futex_q) of waiting
threads.
Each futex_wait()/futex_wait() has to obtain a spinlock on a hash slot to
perform lookups or insert/deletion of a futex_q.
When a futex_wait() is done, calling thread has to :
1) - Obtain a read lock on mmap_sem to be able to validate the user pointer
(calling find_vma()). This validation tells us if the futex uses
an inode based store (mapped file), or mm based store (anonymous mem)
2) - compute a hash key
3) - Atomic increment of reference counter on an inode or a mm_struct
4) - lock part of futex_queues[] hash table
5) - perform the test on value of futex.
(rollback is value != expected_value, returns EWOULDBLOCK)
(various loops if test triggers mm faults)
6) queue the context into hash table, release the lock got in 4)
7) - release the read_lock on mmap_sem
<block>
8) Eventually unqueue the context (but rarely, as this part may be done
by the futex_wake())
Futexes were designed to improve scalability but current implementation has
various problems :
- Central hashtable :
This means scalability problems if many processes/threads want to use
futexes at the same time.
This means NUMA unbalance because this hashtable is located on one node.
- Using mmap_sem on every futex() syscall :
Even if mmap_sem is a rw_semaphore, up_read()/down_read() are doing atomic
ops on mmap_sem, dirtying cache line :
- lot of cache line ping pongs on SMP configurations.
mmap_sem is also extensively used by mm code (page faults, mmap()/munmap())
Highly threaded processes might suffer from mmap_sem contention.
mmap_sem is also used by oprofile code. Enabling oprofile hurts threaded
programs because of contention on the mmap_sem cache line.
- Using an atomic_inc()/atomic_dec() on inode ref counter or mm ref counter:
It's also a cache line ping pong on SMP. It also increases mmap_sem hold time
because of cache misses.
Most of these scalability problems come from the fact that futexes are in
one global namespace. As we use a central hash table, we must make sure
they are all using the same reference (given by the mm subsystem). We
chose to force all futexes be 'shared'. This has a cost.
But fact is POSIX defined PRIVATE and SHARED, allowing clear separation,
and optimal performance if carefuly implemented. Time has come for linux
to have better threading performance.
The goal is to permit new futex commands to avoid :
- Taking the mmap_sem semaphore, conflicting with other subsystems.
- Modifying a ref_count on mm or an inode, still conflicting with mm or fs.
This is possible because, for one process using PTHREAD_PROCESS_PRIVATE
futexes, we only need to distinguish futexes by their virtual address, no
matter the underlying mm storage is.
If glibc wants to exploit this new infrastructure, it should use new
_PRIVATE futex subcommands for PTHREAD_PROCESS_PRIVATE futexes. And be
prepared to fallback on old subcommands for old kernels. Using one global
variable with the FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG or 0 value should be OK.
PTHREAD_PROCESS_SHARED futexes should still use the old subcommands.
Compatibility with old applications is preserved, they still hit the
scalability problems, but new applications can fly :)
Note : the same SHARED futex (mapped on a file) can be used by old binaries
*and* new binaries, because both binaries will use the old subcommands.
Note : Vast majority of futexes should be using PROCESS_PRIVATE semantic,
as this is the default semantic. Almost all applications should benefit
of this changes (new kernel and updated libc)
Some bench results on a Pentium M 1.6 GHz (SMP kernel on a UP machine)
/* calling futex_wait(addr, value) with value != *addr */
433 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT) call (mixing 2 futexes)
424 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT) call (using one futex)
334 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE) call (mixing 2 futexes)
334 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE) call (using one futex)
For reference :
187 cycles per getppid() call
188 cycles per umask() call
181 cycles per ni_syscall() call
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Pierre Peiffer <pierre.peiffer@bull.net>
Cc: "Ulrich Drepper" <drepper@gmail.com>
Cc: "Nick Piggin" <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Cc: "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-09 09:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* PROCESS_PRIVATE futexes are fast.
|
|
|
|
* As the mm cannot disappear under us and the 'key' only needs
|
|
|
|
* virtual address, we dont even have to find the underlying vma.
|
|
|
|
* Note : We do have to check 'uaddr' is a valid user address,
|
|
|
|
* but access_ok() should be faster than find_vma()
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!fshared) {
|
|
|
|
key->private.mm = mm;
|
|
|
|
key->private.address = address;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-09-26 17:32:20 +00:00
|
|
|
again:
|
2015-06-30 06:26:02 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Ignore any VERIFY_READ mapping (futex common case) */
|
2020-07-02 20:28:43 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)))
|
2015-06-30 06:26:02 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-05-14 00:17:11 +00:00
|
|
|
err = get_user_pages_fast(address, 1, FOLL_WRITE, &page);
|
futex: Fix regression with read only mappings
commit 7485d0d3758e8e6491a5c9468114e74dc050785d (futexes: Remove rw
parameter from get_futex_key()) in 2.6.33 fixed two problems: First, It
prevented a loop when encountering a ZERO_PAGE. Second, it fixed RW
MAP_PRIVATE futex operations by forcing the COW to occur by
unconditionally performing a write access get_user_pages_fast() to get
the page. The commit also introduced a user-mode regression in that it
broke futex operations on read-only memory maps. For example, this
breaks workloads that have one or more reader processes doing a
FUTEX_WAIT on a futex within a read only shared file mapping, and a
writer processes that has a writable mapping issuing the FUTEX_WAKE.
This fixes the regression for valid futex operations on RO mappings by
trying a RO get_user_pages_fast() when the RW get_user_pages_fast()
fails. This change makes it necessary to also check for invalid use
cases, such as anonymous RO mappings (which can never change) and the
ZERO_PAGE which the commit referenced above was written to address.
This patch does restore the original behavior with RO MAP_PRIVATE
mappings, which have inherent user-mode usage problems and don't really
make sense. With this patch performing a FUTEX_WAIT within a RO
MAP_PRIVATE mapping will be successfully woken provided another process
updates the region of the underlying mapped file. However, the mmap()
man page states that for a MAP_PRIVATE mapping:
It is unspecified whether changes made to the file after
the mmap() call are visible in the mapped region.
So user-mode users attempting to use futex operations on RO MAP_PRIVATE
mappings are depending on unspecified behavior. Additionally a
RO MAP_PRIVATE mapping could fail to wake up in the following case.
Thread-A: call futex(FUTEX_WAIT, memory-region-A).
get_futex_key() return inode based key.
sleep on the key
Thread-B: call mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, memory-region-A)
Thread-B: write memory-region-A.
COW happen. This process's memory-region-A become related
to new COWed private (ie PageAnon=1) page.
Thread-B: call futex(FUETX_WAKE, memory-region-A).
get_futex_key() return mm based key.
IOW, we fail to wake up Thread-A.
Once again doing something like this is just silly and users who do
something like this get what they deserve.
While RO MAP_PRIVATE mappings are nonsensical, checking for a private
mapping requires walking the vmas and was deemed too costly to avoid a
userspace hang.
This Patch is based on Peter Zijlstra's initial patch with modifications to
only allow RO mappings for futex operations that need VERIFY_READ access.
Reported-by: David Oliver <david@rgmadvisors.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Bohrer <sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Cc: zvonler@rgmadvisors.com
Cc: hughd@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1309450892-30676-1-git-send-email-sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2011-06-30 16:21:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If write access is not required (eg. FUTEX_WAIT), try
|
|
|
|
* and get read-only access.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 02:57:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (err == -EFAULT && rw == FUTEX_READ) {
|
futex: Fix regression with read only mappings
commit 7485d0d3758e8e6491a5c9468114e74dc050785d (futexes: Remove rw
parameter from get_futex_key()) in 2.6.33 fixed two problems: First, It
prevented a loop when encountering a ZERO_PAGE. Second, it fixed RW
MAP_PRIVATE futex operations by forcing the COW to occur by
unconditionally performing a write access get_user_pages_fast() to get
the page. The commit also introduced a user-mode regression in that it
broke futex operations on read-only memory maps. For example, this
breaks workloads that have one or more reader processes doing a
FUTEX_WAIT on a futex within a read only shared file mapping, and a
writer processes that has a writable mapping issuing the FUTEX_WAKE.
This fixes the regression for valid futex operations on RO mappings by
trying a RO get_user_pages_fast() when the RW get_user_pages_fast()
fails. This change makes it necessary to also check for invalid use
cases, such as anonymous RO mappings (which can never change) and the
ZERO_PAGE which the commit referenced above was written to address.
This patch does restore the original behavior with RO MAP_PRIVATE
mappings, which have inherent user-mode usage problems and don't really
make sense. With this patch performing a FUTEX_WAIT within a RO
MAP_PRIVATE mapping will be successfully woken provided another process
updates the region of the underlying mapped file. However, the mmap()
man page states that for a MAP_PRIVATE mapping:
It is unspecified whether changes made to the file after
the mmap() call are visible in the mapped region.
So user-mode users attempting to use futex operations on RO MAP_PRIVATE
mappings are depending on unspecified behavior. Additionally a
RO MAP_PRIVATE mapping could fail to wake up in the following case.
Thread-A: call futex(FUTEX_WAIT, memory-region-A).
get_futex_key() return inode based key.
sleep on the key
Thread-B: call mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, memory-region-A)
Thread-B: write memory-region-A.
COW happen. This process's memory-region-A become related
to new COWed private (ie PageAnon=1) page.
Thread-B: call futex(FUETX_WAKE, memory-region-A).
get_futex_key() return mm based key.
IOW, we fail to wake up Thread-A.
Once again doing something like this is just silly and users who do
something like this get what they deserve.
While RO MAP_PRIVATE mappings are nonsensical, checking for a private
mapping requires walking the vmas and was deemed too costly to avoid a
userspace hang.
This Patch is based on Peter Zijlstra's initial patch with modifications to
only allow RO mappings for futex operations that need VERIFY_READ access.
Reported-by: David Oliver <david@rgmadvisors.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Bohrer <sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Cc: zvonler@rgmadvisors.com
Cc: hughd@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1309450892-30676-1-git-send-email-sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2011-06-30 16:21:32 +00:00
|
|
|
err = get_user_pages_fast(address, 1, 0, &page);
|
|
|
|
ro = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-09-26 17:32:20 +00:00
|
|
|
if (err < 0)
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
futex: Fix regression with read only mappings
commit 7485d0d3758e8e6491a5c9468114e74dc050785d (futexes: Remove rw
parameter from get_futex_key()) in 2.6.33 fixed two problems: First, It
prevented a loop when encountering a ZERO_PAGE. Second, it fixed RW
MAP_PRIVATE futex operations by forcing the COW to occur by
unconditionally performing a write access get_user_pages_fast() to get
the page. The commit also introduced a user-mode regression in that it
broke futex operations on read-only memory maps. For example, this
breaks workloads that have one or more reader processes doing a
FUTEX_WAIT on a futex within a read only shared file mapping, and a
writer processes that has a writable mapping issuing the FUTEX_WAKE.
This fixes the regression for valid futex operations on RO mappings by
trying a RO get_user_pages_fast() when the RW get_user_pages_fast()
fails. This change makes it necessary to also check for invalid use
cases, such as anonymous RO mappings (which can never change) and the
ZERO_PAGE which the commit referenced above was written to address.
This patch does restore the original behavior with RO MAP_PRIVATE
mappings, which have inherent user-mode usage problems and don't really
make sense. With this patch performing a FUTEX_WAIT within a RO
MAP_PRIVATE mapping will be successfully woken provided another process
updates the region of the underlying mapped file. However, the mmap()
man page states that for a MAP_PRIVATE mapping:
It is unspecified whether changes made to the file after
the mmap() call are visible in the mapped region.
So user-mode users attempting to use futex operations on RO MAP_PRIVATE
mappings are depending on unspecified behavior. Additionally a
RO MAP_PRIVATE mapping could fail to wake up in the following case.
Thread-A: call futex(FUTEX_WAIT, memory-region-A).
get_futex_key() return inode based key.
sleep on the key
Thread-B: call mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, memory-region-A)
Thread-B: write memory-region-A.
COW happen. This process's memory-region-A become related
to new COWed private (ie PageAnon=1) page.
Thread-B: call futex(FUETX_WAKE, memory-region-A).
get_futex_key() return mm based key.
IOW, we fail to wake up Thread-A.
Once again doing something like this is just silly and users who do
something like this get what they deserve.
While RO MAP_PRIVATE mappings are nonsensical, checking for a private
mapping requires walking the vmas and was deemed too costly to avoid a
userspace hang.
This Patch is based on Peter Zijlstra's initial patch with modifications to
only allow RO mappings for futex operations that need VERIFY_READ access.
Reported-by: David Oliver <david@rgmadvisors.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Bohrer <sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Cc: zvonler@rgmadvisors.com
Cc: hughd@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1309450892-30676-1-git-send-email-sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2011-06-30 16:21:32 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
err = 0;
|
2008-09-26 17:32:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
futex: Remove requirement for lock_page() in get_futex_key()
When dealing with key handling for shared futexes, we can drastically reduce
the usage/need of the page lock. 1) For anonymous pages, the associated futex
object is the mm_struct which does not require the page lock. 2) For inode
based, keys, we can check under RCU read lock if the page mapping is still
valid and take reference to the inode. This just leaves one rare race that
requires the page lock in the slow path when examining the swapcache.
Additionally realtime users currently have a problem with the page lock being
contended for unbounded periods of time during futex operations.
Task A
get_futex_key()
lock_page()
---> preempted
Now any other task trying to lock that page will have to wait until
task A gets scheduled back in, which is an unbound time.
With this patch, we pretty much have a lockless futex_get_key().
Experiments show that this patch can boost/speedup the hashing of shared
futexes with the perf futex benchmarks (which is good for measuring such
change) by up to 45% when there are high (> 100) thread counts on a 60 core
Westmere. Lower counts are pretty much in the noise range or less than 10%,
but mid range can be seen at over 30% overall throughput (hash ops/sec).
This makes anon-mem shared futexes much closer to its private counterpart.
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
[ Ported on top of thp refcount rework, changelog, comments, fixes. ]
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: dave@stgolabs.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455045314-8305-3-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-09 19:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The treatment of mapping from this point on is critical. The page
|
|
|
|
* lock protects many things but in this context the page lock
|
|
|
|
* stabilizes mapping, prevents inode freeing in the shared
|
|
|
|
* file-backed region case and guards against movement to swap cache.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Strictly speaking the page lock is not needed in all cases being
|
|
|
|
* considered here and page lock forces unnecessarily serialization
|
|
|
|
* From this point on, mapping will be re-verified if necessary and
|
|
|
|
* page lock will be acquired only if it is unavoidable
|
2016-06-08 13:25:22 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Mapping checks require the head page for any compound page so the
|
|
|
|
* head page and mapping is looked up now. For anonymous pages, it
|
|
|
|
* does not matter if the page splits in the future as the key is
|
|
|
|
* based on the address. For filesystem-backed pages, the tail is
|
|
|
|
* required as the index of the page determines the key. For
|
|
|
|
* base pages, there is no tail page and tail == page.
|
futex: Remove requirement for lock_page() in get_futex_key()
When dealing with key handling for shared futexes, we can drastically reduce
the usage/need of the page lock. 1) For anonymous pages, the associated futex
object is the mm_struct which does not require the page lock. 2) For inode
based, keys, we can check under RCU read lock if the page mapping is still
valid and take reference to the inode. This just leaves one rare race that
requires the page lock in the slow path when examining the swapcache.
Additionally realtime users currently have a problem with the page lock being
contended for unbounded periods of time during futex operations.
Task A
get_futex_key()
lock_page()
---> preempted
Now any other task trying to lock that page will have to wait until
task A gets scheduled back in, which is an unbound time.
With this patch, we pretty much have a lockless futex_get_key().
Experiments show that this patch can boost/speedup the hashing of shared
futexes with the perf futex benchmarks (which is good for measuring such
change) by up to 45% when there are high (> 100) thread counts on a 60 core
Westmere. Lower counts are pretty much in the noise range or less than 10%,
but mid range can be seen at over 30% overall throughput (hash ops/sec).
This makes anon-mem shared futexes much closer to its private counterpart.
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
[ Ported on top of thp refcount rework, changelog, comments, fixes. ]
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: dave@stgolabs.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455045314-8305-3-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-09 19:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-06-08 13:25:22 +00:00
|
|
|
tail = page;
|
futex: Remove requirement for lock_page() in get_futex_key()
When dealing with key handling for shared futexes, we can drastically reduce
the usage/need of the page lock. 1) For anonymous pages, the associated futex
object is the mm_struct which does not require the page lock. 2) For inode
based, keys, we can check under RCU read lock if the page mapping is still
valid and take reference to the inode. This just leaves one rare race that
requires the page lock in the slow path when examining the swapcache.
Additionally realtime users currently have a problem with the page lock being
contended for unbounded periods of time during futex operations.
Task A
get_futex_key()
lock_page()
---> preempted
Now any other task trying to lock that page will have to wait until
task A gets scheduled back in, which is an unbound time.
With this patch, we pretty much have a lockless futex_get_key().
Experiments show that this patch can boost/speedup the hashing of shared
futexes with the perf futex benchmarks (which is good for measuring such
change) by up to 45% when there are high (> 100) thread counts on a 60 core
Westmere. Lower counts are pretty much in the noise range or less than 10%,
but mid range can be seen at over 30% overall throughput (hash ops/sec).
This makes anon-mem shared futexes much closer to its private counterpart.
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
[ Ported on top of thp refcount rework, changelog, comments, fixes. ]
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: dave@stgolabs.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455045314-8305-3-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-09 19:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
page = compound_head(page);
|
|
|
|
mapping = READ_ONCE(page->mapping);
|
|
|
|
|
2011-12-31 19:44:01 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2016-01-16 00:53:00 +00:00
|
|
|
* If page->mapping is NULL, then it cannot be a PageAnon
|
2011-12-31 19:44:01 +00:00
|
|
|
* page; but it might be the ZERO_PAGE or in the gate area or
|
|
|
|
* in a special mapping (all cases which we are happy to fail);
|
|
|
|
* or it may have been a good file page when get_user_pages_fast
|
|
|
|
* found it, but truncated or holepunched or subjected to
|
|
|
|
* invalidate_complete_page2 before we got the page lock (also
|
|
|
|
* cases which we are happy to fail). And we hold a reference,
|
|
|
|
* so refcount care in invalidate_complete_page's remove_mapping
|
|
|
|
* prevents drop_caches from setting mapping to NULL beneath us.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The case we do have to guard against is when memory pressure made
|
|
|
|
* shmem_writepage move it from filecache to swapcache beneath us:
|
2016-01-16 00:53:00 +00:00
|
|
|
* an unlikely race, but we do need to retry for page->mapping.
|
2011-12-31 19:44:01 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
futex: Remove requirement for lock_page() in get_futex_key()
When dealing with key handling for shared futexes, we can drastically reduce
the usage/need of the page lock. 1) For anonymous pages, the associated futex
object is the mm_struct which does not require the page lock. 2) For inode
based, keys, we can check under RCU read lock if the page mapping is still
valid and take reference to the inode. This just leaves one rare race that
requires the page lock in the slow path when examining the swapcache.
Additionally realtime users currently have a problem with the page lock being
contended for unbounded periods of time during futex operations.
Task A
get_futex_key()
lock_page()
---> preempted
Now any other task trying to lock that page will have to wait until
task A gets scheduled back in, which is an unbound time.
With this patch, we pretty much have a lockless futex_get_key().
Experiments show that this patch can boost/speedup the hashing of shared
futexes with the perf futex benchmarks (which is good for measuring such
change) by up to 45% when there are high (> 100) thread counts on a 60 core
Westmere. Lower counts are pretty much in the noise range or less than 10%,
but mid range can be seen at over 30% overall throughput (hash ops/sec).
This makes anon-mem shared futexes much closer to its private counterpart.
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
[ Ported on top of thp refcount rework, changelog, comments, fixes. ]
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: dave@stgolabs.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455045314-8305-3-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-09 19:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(!mapping)) {
|
|
|
|
int shmem_swizzled;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Page lock is required to identify which special case above
|
|
|
|
* applies. If this is really a shmem page then the page lock
|
|
|
|
* will prevent unexpected transitions.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
lock_page(page);
|
|
|
|
shmem_swizzled = PageSwapCache(page) || page->mapping;
|
2016-01-16 00:53:00 +00:00
|
|
|
unlock_page(page);
|
|
|
|
put_page(page);
|
futex: Remove requirement for lock_page() in get_futex_key()
When dealing with key handling for shared futexes, we can drastically reduce
the usage/need of the page lock. 1) For anonymous pages, the associated futex
object is the mm_struct which does not require the page lock. 2) For inode
based, keys, we can check under RCU read lock if the page mapping is still
valid and take reference to the inode. This just leaves one rare race that
requires the page lock in the slow path when examining the swapcache.
Additionally realtime users currently have a problem with the page lock being
contended for unbounded periods of time during futex operations.
Task A
get_futex_key()
lock_page()
---> preempted
Now any other task trying to lock that page will have to wait until
task A gets scheduled back in, which is an unbound time.
With this patch, we pretty much have a lockless futex_get_key().
Experiments show that this patch can boost/speedup the hashing of shared
futexes with the perf futex benchmarks (which is good for measuring such
change) by up to 45% when there are high (> 100) thread counts on a 60 core
Westmere. Lower counts are pretty much in the noise range or less than 10%,
but mid range can be seen at over 30% overall throughput (hash ops/sec).
This makes anon-mem shared futexes much closer to its private counterpart.
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
[ Ported on top of thp refcount rework, changelog, comments, fixes. ]
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: dave@stgolabs.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455045314-8305-3-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-09 19:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-12-31 19:44:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if (shmem_swizzled)
|
|
|
|
goto again;
|
futex: Remove requirement for lock_page() in get_futex_key()
When dealing with key handling for shared futexes, we can drastically reduce
the usage/need of the page lock. 1) For anonymous pages, the associated futex
object is the mm_struct which does not require the page lock. 2) For inode
based, keys, we can check under RCU read lock if the page mapping is still
valid and take reference to the inode. This just leaves one rare race that
requires the page lock in the slow path when examining the swapcache.
Additionally realtime users currently have a problem with the page lock being
contended for unbounded periods of time during futex operations.
Task A
get_futex_key()
lock_page()
---> preempted
Now any other task trying to lock that page will have to wait until
task A gets scheduled back in, which is an unbound time.
With this patch, we pretty much have a lockless futex_get_key().
Experiments show that this patch can boost/speedup the hashing of shared
futexes with the perf futex benchmarks (which is good for measuring such
change) by up to 45% when there are high (> 100) thread counts on a 60 core
Westmere. Lower counts are pretty much in the noise range or less than 10%,
but mid range can be seen at over 30% overall throughput (hash ops/sec).
This makes anon-mem shared futexes much closer to its private counterpart.
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
[ Ported on top of thp refcount rework, changelog, comments, fixes. ]
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: dave@stgolabs.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455045314-8305-3-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-09 19:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-12-31 19:44:01 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
2008-09-26 17:32:20 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Private mappings are handled in a simple way.
|
|
|
|
*
|
futex: Remove requirement for lock_page() in get_futex_key()
When dealing with key handling for shared futexes, we can drastically reduce
the usage/need of the page lock. 1) For anonymous pages, the associated futex
object is the mm_struct which does not require the page lock. 2) For inode
based, keys, we can check under RCU read lock if the page mapping is still
valid and take reference to the inode. This just leaves one rare race that
requires the page lock in the slow path when examining the swapcache.
Additionally realtime users currently have a problem with the page lock being
contended for unbounded periods of time during futex operations.
Task A
get_futex_key()
lock_page()
---> preempted
Now any other task trying to lock that page will have to wait until
task A gets scheduled back in, which is an unbound time.
With this patch, we pretty much have a lockless futex_get_key().
Experiments show that this patch can boost/speedup the hashing of shared
futexes with the perf futex benchmarks (which is good for measuring such
change) by up to 45% when there are high (> 100) thread counts on a 60 core
Westmere. Lower counts are pretty much in the noise range or less than 10%,
but mid range can be seen at over 30% overall throughput (hash ops/sec).
This makes anon-mem shared futexes much closer to its private counterpart.
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
[ Ported on top of thp refcount rework, changelog, comments, fixes. ]
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: dave@stgolabs.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455045314-8305-3-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-09 19:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
* If the futex key is stored on an anonymous page, then the associated
|
|
|
|
* object is the mm which is implicitly pinned by the calling process.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
* NOTE: When userspace waits on a MAP_SHARED mapping, even if
|
|
|
|
* it's a read-only handle, it's expected that futexes attach to
|
2008-09-26 17:32:20 +00:00
|
|
|
* the object not the particular process.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-01-16 00:53:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (PageAnon(page)) {
|
futex: Fix regression with read only mappings
commit 7485d0d3758e8e6491a5c9468114e74dc050785d (futexes: Remove rw
parameter from get_futex_key()) in 2.6.33 fixed two problems: First, It
prevented a loop when encountering a ZERO_PAGE. Second, it fixed RW
MAP_PRIVATE futex operations by forcing the COW to occur by
unconditionally performing a write access get_user_pages_fast() to get
the page. The commit also introduced a user-mode regression in that it
broke futex operations on read-only memory maps. For example, this
breaks workloads that have one or more reader processes doing a
FUTEX_WAIT on a futex within a read only shared file mapping, and a
writer processes that has a writable mapping issuing the FUTEX_WAKE.
This fixes the regression for valid futex operations on RO mappings by
trying a RO get_user_pages_fast() when the RW get_user_pages_fast()
fails. This change makes it necessary to also check for invalid use
cases, such as anonymous RO mappings (which can never change) and the
ZERO_PAGE which the commit referenced above was written to address.
This patch does restore the original behavior with RO MAP_PRIVATE
mappings, which have inherent user-mode usage problems and don't really
make sense. With this patch performing a FUTEX_WAIT within a RO
MAP_PRIVATE mapping will be successfully woken provided another process
updates the region of the underlying mapped file. However, the mmap()
man page states that for a MAP_PRIVATE mapping:
It is unspecified whether changes made to the file after
the mmap() call are visible in the mapped region.
So user-mode users attempting to use futex operations on RO MAP_PRIVATE
mappings are depending on unspecified behavior. Additionally a
RO MAP_PRIVATE mapping could fail to wake up in the following case.
Thread-A: call futex(FUTEX_WAIT, memory-region-A).
get_futex_key() return inode based key.
sleep on the key
Thread-B: call mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, memory-region-A)
Thread-B: write memory-region-A.
COW happen. This process's memory-region-A become related
to new COWed private (ie PageAnon=1) page.
Thread-B: call futex(FUETX_WAKE, memory-region-A).
get_futex_key() return mm based key.
IOW, we fail to wake up Thread-A.
Once again doing something like this is just silly and users who do
something like this get what they deserve.
While RO MAP_PRIVATE mappings are nonsensical, checking for a private
mapping requires walking the vmas and was deemed too costly to avoid a
userspace hang.
This Patch is based on Peter Zijlstra's initial patch with modifications to
only allow RO mappings for futex operations that need VERIFY_READ access.
Reported-by: David Oliver <david@rgmadvisors.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Bohrer <sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Cc: zvonler@rgmadvisors.com
Cc: hughd@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1309450892-30676-1-git-send-email-sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2011-06-30 16:21:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* A RO anonymous page will never change and thus doesn't make
|
|
|
|
* sense for futex operations.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-07-02 20:28:43 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)) || ro) {
|
futex: Fix regression with read only mappings
commit 7485d0d3758e8e6491a5c9468114e74dc050785d (futexes: Remove rw
parameter from get_futex_key()) in 2.6.33 fixed two problems: First, It
prevented a loop when encountering a ZERO_PAGE. Second, it fixed RW
MAP_PRIVATE futex operations by forcing the COW to occur by
unconditionally performing a write access get_user_pages_fast() to get
the page. The commit also introduced a user-mode regression in that it
broke futex operations on read-only memory maps. For example, this
breaks workloads that have one or more reader processes doing a
FUTEX_WAIT on a futex within a read only shared file mapping, and a
writer processes that has a writable mapping issuing the FUTEX_WAKE.
This fixes the regression for valid futex operations on RO mappings by
trying a RO get_user_pages_fast() when the RW get_user_pages_fast()
fails. This change makes it necessary to also check for invalid use
cases, such as anonymous RO mappings (which can never change) and the
ZERO_PAGE which the commit referenced above was written to address.
This patch does restore the original behavior with RO MAP_PRIVATE
mappings, which have inherent user-mode usage problems and don't really
make sense. With this patch performing a FUTEX_WAIT within a RO
MAP_PRIVATE mapping will be successfully woken provided another process
updates the region of the underlying mapped file. However, the mmap()
man page states that for a MAP_PRIVATE mapping:
It is unspecified whether changes made to the file after
the mmap() call are visible in the mapped region.
So user-mode users attempting to use futex operations on RO MAP_PRIVATE
mappings are depending on unspecified behavior. Additionally a
RO MAP_PRIVATE mapping could fail to wake up in the following case.
Thread-A: call futex(FUTEX_WAIT, memory-region-A).
get_futex_key() return inode based key.
sleep on the key
Thread-B: call mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, memory-region-A)
Thread-B: write memory-region-A.
COW happen. This process's memory-region-A become related
to new COWed private (ie PageAnon=1) page.
Thread-B: call futex(FUETX_WAKE, memory-region-A).
get_futex_key() return mm based key.
IOW, we fail to wake up Thread-A.
Once again doing something like this is just silly and users who do
something like this get what they deserve.
While RO MAP_PRIVATE mappings are nonsensical, checking for a private
mapping requires walking the vmas and was deemed too costly to avoid a
userspace hang.
This Patch is based on Peter Zijlstra's initial patch with modifications to
only allow RO mappings for futex operations that need VERIFY_READ access.
Reported-by: David Oliver <david@rgmadvisors.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Bohrer <sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Cc: zvonler@rgmadvisors.com
Cc: hughd@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1309450892-30676-1-git-send-email-sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2011-06-30 16:21:32 +00:00
|
|
|
err = -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-09-26 17:32:20 +00:00
|
|
|
key->both.offset |= FUT_OFF_MMSHARED; /* ref taken on mm */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
key->private.mm = mm;
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
key->private.address = address;
|
futex: Remove requirement for lock_page() in get_futex_key()
When dealing with key handling for shared futexes, we can drastically reduce
the usage/need of the page lock. 1) For anonymous pages, the associated futex
object is the mm_struct which does not require the page lock. 2) For inode
based, keys, we can check under RCU read lock if the page mapping is still
valid and take reference to the inode. This just leaves one rare race that
requires the page lock in the slow path when examining the swapcache.
Additionally realtime users currently have a problem with the page lock being
contended for unbounded periods of time during futex operations.
Task A
get_futex_key()
lock_page()
---> preempted
Now any other task trying to lock that page will have to wait until
task A gets scheduled back in, which is an unbound time.
With this patch, we pretty much have a lockless futex_get_key().
Experiments show that this patch can boost/speedup the hashing of shared
futexes with the perf futex benchmarks (which is good for measuring such
change) by up to 45% when there are high (> 100) thread counts on a 60 core
Westmere. Lower counts are pretty much in the noise range or less than 10%,
but mid range can be seen at over 30% overall throughput (hash ops/sec).
This makes anon-mem shared futexes much closer to its private counterpart.
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
[ Ported on top of thp refcount rework, changelog, comments, fixes. ]
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: dave@stgolabs.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455045314-8305-3-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-09 19:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-09-26 17:32:20 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
futex: Remove requirement for lock_page() in get_futex_key()
When dealing with key handling for shared futexes, we can drastically reduce
the usage/need of the page lock. 1) For anonymous pages, the associated futex
object is the mm_struct which does not require the page lock. 2) For inode
based, keys, we can check under RCU read lock if the page mapping is still
valid and take reference to the inode. This just leaves one rare race that
requires the page lock in the slow path when examining the swapcache.
Additionally realtime users currently have a problem with the page lock being
contended for unbounded periods of time during futex operations.
Task A
get_futex_key()
lock_page()
---> preempted
Now any other task trying to lock that page will have to wait until
task A gets scheduled back in, which is an unbound time.
With this patch, we pretty much have a lockless futex_get_key().
Experiments show that this patch can boost/speedup the hashing of shared
futexes with the perf futex benchmarks (which is good for measuring such
change) by up to 45% when there are high (> 100) thread counts on a 60 core
Westmere. Lower counts are pretty much in the noise range or less than 10%,
but mid range can be seen at over 30% overall throughput (hash ops/sec).
This makes anon-mem shared futexes much closer to its private counterpart.
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
[ Ported on top of thp refcount rework, changelog, comments, fixes. ]
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: dave@stgolabs.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455045314-8305-3-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-09 19:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
struct inode *inode;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The associated futex object in this case is the inode and
|
|
|
|
* the page->mapping must be traversed. Ordinarily this should
|
|
|
|
* be stabilised under page lock but it's not strictly
|
|
|
|
* necessary in this case as we just want to pin the inode, not
|
|
|
|
* update the radix tree or anything like that.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The RCU read lock is taken as the inode is finally freed
|
|
|
|
* under RCU. If the mapping still matches expectations then the
|
|
|
|
* mapping->host can be safely accessed as being a valid inode.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (READ_ONCE(page->mapping) != mapping) {
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
put_page(page);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
inode = READ_ONCE(mapping->host);
|
|
|
|
if (!inode) {
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
put_page(page);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-09-26 17:32:20 +00:00
|
|
|
key->both.offset |= FUT_OFF_INODE; /* inode-based key */
|
2020-03-04 10:28:31 +00:00
|
|
|
key->shared.i_seq = get_inode_sequence_number(inode);
|
2016-06-08 13:25:22 +00:00
|
|
|
key->shared.pgoff = basepage_index(tail);
|
futex: Remove requirement for lock_page() in get_futex_key()
When dealing with key handling for shared futexes, we can drastically reduce
the usage/need of the page lock. 1) For anonymous pages, the associated futex
object is the mm_struct which does not require the page lock. 2) For inode
based, keys, we can check under RCU read lock if the page mapping is still
valid and take reference to the inode. This just leaves one rare race that
requires the page lock in the slow path when examining the swapcache.
Additionally realtime users currently have a problem with the page lock being
contended for unbounded periods of time during futex operations.
Task A
get_futex_key()
lock_page()
---> preempted
Now any other task trying to lock that page will have to wait until
task A gets scheduled back in, which is an unbound time.
With this patch, we pretty much have a lockless futex_get_key().
Experiments show that this patch can boost/speedup the hashing of shared
futexes with the perf futex benchmarks (which is good for measuring such
change) by up to 45% when there are high (> 100) thread counts on a 60 core
Westmere. Lower counts are pretty much in the noise range or less than 10%,
but mid range can be seen at over 30% overall throughput (hash ops/sec).
This makes anon-mem shared futexes much closer to its private counterpart.
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
[ Ported on top of thp refcount rework, changelog, comments, fixes. ]
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: dave@stgolabs.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455045314-8305-3-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-02-09 19:15:14 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
futex: Fix regression with read only mappings
commit 7485d0d3758e8e6491a5c9468114e74dc050785d (futexes: Remove rw
parameter from get_futex_key()) in 2.6.33 fixed two problems: First, It
prevented a loop when encountering a ZERO_PAGE. Second, it fixed RW
MAP_PRIVATE futex operations by forcing the COW to occur by
unconditionally performing a write access get_user_pages_fast() to get
the page. The commit also introduced a user-mode regression in that it
broke futex operations on read-only memory maps. For example, this
breaks workloads that have one or more reader processes doing a
FUTEX_WAIT on a futex within a read only shared file mapping, and a
writer processes that has a writable mapping issuing the FUTEX_WAKE.
This fixes the regression for valid futex operations on RO mappings by
trying a RO get_user_pages_fast() when the RW get_user_pages_fast()
fails. This change makes it necessary to also check for invalid use
cases, such as anonymous RO mappings (which can never change) and the
ZERO_PAGE which the commit referenced above was written to address.
This patch does restore the original behavior with RO MAP_PRIVATE
mappings, which have inherent user-mode usage problems and don't really
make sense. With this patch performing a FUTEX_WAIT within a RO
MAP_PRIVATE mapping will be successfully woken provided another process
updates the region of the underlying mapped file. However, the mmap()
man page states that for a MAP_PRIVATE mapping:
It is unspecified whether changes made to the file after
the mmap() call are visible in the mapped region.
So user-mode users attempting to use futex operations on RO MAP_PRIVATE
mappings are depending on unspecified behavior. Additionally a
RO MAP_PRIVATE mapping could fail to wake up in the following case.
Thread-A: call futex(FUTEX_WAIT, memory-region-A).
get_futex_key() return inode based key.
sleep on the key
Thread-B: call mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, memory-region-A)
Thread-B: write memory-region-A.
COW happen. This process's memory-region-A become related
to new COWed private (ie PageAnon=1) page.
Thread-B: call futex(FUETX_WAKE, memory-region-A).
get_futex_key() return mm based key.
IOW, we fail to wake up Thread-A.
Once again doing something like this is just silly and users who do
something like this get what they deserve.
While RO MAP_PRIVATE mappings are nonsensical, checking for a private
mapping requires walking the vmas and was deemed too costly to avoid a
userspace hang.
This Patch is based on Peter Zijlstra's initial patch with modifications to
only allow RO mappings for futex operations that need VERIFY_READ access.
Reported-by: David Oliver <david@rgmadvisors.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Bohrer <sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Cc: zvonler@rgmadvisors.com
Cc: hughd@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1309450892-30676-1-git-send-email-sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2011-06-30 16:21:32 +00:00
|
|
|
out:
|
2016-01-16 00:53:00 +00:00
|
|
|
put_page(page);
|
futex: Fix regression with read only mappings
commit 7485d0d3758e8e6491a5c9468114e74dc050785d (futexes: Remove rw
parameter from get_futex_key()) in 2.6.33 fixed two problems: First, It
prevented a loop when encountering a ZERO_PAGE. Second, it fixed RW
MAP_PRIVATE futex operations by forcing the COW to occur by
unconditionally performing a write access get_user_pages_fast() to get
the page. The commit also introduced a user-mode regression in that it
broke futex operations on read-only memory maps. For example, this
breaks workloads that have one or more reader processes doing a
FUTEX_WAIT on a futex within a read only shared file mapping, and a
writer processes that has a writable mapping issuing the FUTEX_WAKE.
This fixes the regression for valid futex operations on RO mappings by
trying a RO get_user_pages_fast() when the RW get_user_pages_fast()
fails. This change makes it necessary to also check for invalid use
cases, such as anonymous RO mappings (which can never change) and the
ZERO_PAGE which the commit referenced above was written to address.
This patch does restore the original behavior with RO MAP_PRIVATE
mappings, which have inherent user-mode usage problems and don't really
make sense. With this patch performing a FUTEX_WAIT within a RO
MAP_PRIVATE mapping will be successfully woken provided another process
updates the region of the underlying mapped file. However, the mmap()
man page states that for a MAP_PRIVATE mapping:
It is unspecified whether changes made to the file after
the mmap() call are visible in the mapped region.
So user-mode users attempting to use futex operations on RO MAP_PRIVATE
mappings are depending on unspecified behavior. Additionally a
RO MAP_PRIVATE mapping could fail to wake up in the following case.
Thread-A: call futex(FUTEX_WAIT, memory-region-A).
get_futex_key() return inode based key.
sleep on the key
Thread-B: call mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, memory-region-A)
Thread-B: write memory-region-A.
COW happen. This process's memory-region-A become related
to new COWed private (ie PageAnon=1) page.
Thread-B: call futex(FUETX_WAKE, memory-region-A).
get_futex_key() return mm based key.
IOW, we fail to wake up Thread-A.
Once again doing something like this is just silly and users who do
something like this get what they deserve.
While RO MAP_PRIVATE mappings are nonsensical, checking for a private
mapping requires walking the vmas and was deemed too costly to avoid a
userspace hang.
This Patch is based on Peter Zijlstra's initial patch with modifications to
only allow RO mappings for futex operations that need VERIFY_READ access.
Reported-by: David Oliver <david@rgmadvisors.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Bohrer <sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Cc: zvonler@rgmadvisors.com
Cc: hughd@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1309450892-30676-1-git-send-email-sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2011-06-30 16:21:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-09-22 05:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* fault_in_user_writeable() - Fault in user address and verify RW access
|
2009-06-11 21:15:43 +00:00
|
|
|
* @uaddr: pointer to faulting user space address
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Slow path to fixup the fault we just took in the atomic write
|
|
|
|
* access to @uaddr.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2010-10-13 18:02:34 +00:00
|
|
|
* We have no generic implementation of a non-destructive write to the
|
2009-06-11 21:15:43 +00:00
|
|
|
* user address. We know that we faulted in the atomic pagefault
|
|
|
|
* disabled section so we can as well avoid the #PF overhead by
|
|
|
|
* calling get_user_pages() right away.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int fault_in_user_writeable(u32 __user *uaddr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2009-12-08 12:19:42 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-06-09 04:33:25 +00:00
|
|
|
mmap_read_lock(mm);
|
2020-08-12 01:39:01 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = fixup_user_fault(mm, (unsigned long)uaddr,
|
2016-01-16 00:57:04 +00:00
|
|
|
FAULT_FLAG_WRITE, NULL);
|
2020-06-09 04:33:25 +00:00
|
|
|
mmap_read_unlock(mm);
|
2009-12-08 12:19:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-06-11 21:15:43 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret < 0 ? ret : 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:39:42 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* futex_top_waiter() - Return the highest priority waiter on a futex
|
2009-09-22 05:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
* @hb: the hash bucket the futex_q's reside in
|
|
|
|
* @key: the futex key (to distinguish it from other futex futex_q's)
|
2009-04-03 20:39:42 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Must be called with the hb lock held.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static struct futex_q *futex_top_waiter(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
|
|
|
|
union futex_key *key)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct futex_q *this;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
plist_for_each_entry(this, &hb->chain, list) {
|
|
|
|
if (match_futex(&this->key, key))
|
|
|
|
return this;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-03-11 02:48:51 +00:00
|
|
|
static int cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(u32 *curval, u32 __user *uaddr,
|
|
|
|
u32 uval, u32 newval)
|
2007-07-16 06:41:20 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2011-03-11 02:48:51 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2007-07-16 06:41:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pagefault_disable();
|
2011-03-11 02:48:51 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(curval, uaddr, uval, newval);
|
2007-07-16 06:41:20 +00:00
|
|
|
pagefault_enable();
|
|
|
|
|
2011-03-11 02:48:51 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2007-07-16 06:41:20 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int get_futex_value_locked(u32 *dest, u32 __user *from)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-12-07 04:32:20 +00:00
|
|
|
pagefault_disable();
|
2016-05-23 00:21:27 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = __get_user(*dest, from);
|
2006-12-07 04:32:20 +00:00
|
|
|
pagefault_enable();
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* PI code:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int refill_pi_state_cache(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (likely(current->pi_state_cache))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-12-07 04:38:51 +00:00
|
|
|
pi_state = kzalloc(sizeof(*pi_state), GFP_KERNEL);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!pi_state)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pi_state->list);
|
|
|
|
/* pi_mutex gets initialized later */
|
|
|
|
pi_state->owner = NULL;
|
2019-02-05 12:24:27 +00:00
|
|
|
refcount_set(&pi_state->refcount, 1);
|
2008-09-26 17:32:20 +00:00
|
|
|
pi_state->key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
current->pi_state_cache = pi_state;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 10:35:53 +00:00
|
|
|
static struct futex_pi_state *alloc_pi_state(void)
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = current->pi_state_cache;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON(!pi_state);
|
|
|
|
current->pi_state_cache = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return pi_state;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-01-19 14:21:35 +00:00
|
|
|
static void pi_state_update_owner(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state,
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct *new_owner)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct *old_owner = pi_state->owner;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
lockdep_assert_held(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (old_owner) {
|
|
|
|
raw_spin_lock(&old_owner->pi_lock);
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON(list_empty(&pi_state->list));
|
|
|
|
list_del_init(&pi_state->list);
|
|
|
|
raw_spin_unlock(&old_owner->pi_lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (new_owner) {
|
|
|
|
raw_spin_lock(&new_owner->pi_lock);
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&pi_state->list));
|
|
|
|
list_add(&pi_state->list, &new_owner->pi_state_list);
|
|
|
|
pi_state->owner = new_owner;
|
|
|
|
raw_spin_unlock(&new_owner->pi_lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 10:35:53 +00:00
|
|
|
static void get_pi_state(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2019-02-05 12:24:27 +00:00
|
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(!refcount_inc_not_zero(&pi_state->refcount));
|
2017-03-22 10:35:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-10-26 00:20:37 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2015-12-19 20:07:39 +00:00
|
|
|
* Drops a reference to the pi_state object and frees or caches it
|
|
|
|
* when the last reference is gone.
|
2014-10-26 00:20:37 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-12-19 20:07:39 +00:00
|
|
|
static void put_pi_state(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state)
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-10-26 00:20:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!pi_state)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-02-05 12:24:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&pi_state->refcount))
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If pi_state->owner is NULL, the owner is most probably dying
|
|
|
|
* and has cleaned up the pi_state already
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (pi_state->owner) {
|
2020-11-06 08:52:05 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long flags;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-11-06 08:52:05 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock, flags);
|
2021-01-20 10:35:19 +00:00
|
|
|
pi_state_update_owner(pi_state, NULL);
|
2021-01-20 10:32:07 +00:00
|
|
|
rt_mutex_proxy_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex);
|
2020-11-06 08:52:05 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock, flags);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-22 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
if (current->pi_state_cache) {
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
kfree(pi_state);
|
2017-09-22 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* pi_state->list is already empty.
|
|
|
|
* clear pi_state->owner.
|
|
|
|
* refcount is at 0 - put it back to 1.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
pi_state->owner = NULL;
|
2019-02-05 12:24:27 +00:00
|
|
|
refcount_set(&pi_state->refcount, 1);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
current->pi_state_cache = pi_state;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-01 04:31:32 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX_PI
|
|
|
|
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This task is holding PI mutexes at exit time => bad.
|
|
|
|
* Kernel cleans up PI-state, but userspace is likely hosed.
|
|
|
|
* (Robust-futex cleanup is separate and might save the day for userspace.)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-11-06 21:55:36 +00:00
|
|
|
static void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr)
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct list_head *next, *head = &curr->pi_state_list;
|
|
|
|
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state;
|
2006-07-29 03:16:20 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
|
2008-09-26 17:32:20 +00:00
|
|
|
union futex_key key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-23 23:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We are a ZOMBIE and nobody can enqueue itself on
|
|
|
|
* pi_state_list anymore, but we have to be careful
|
2006-07-29 03:16:20 +00:00
|
|
|
* versus waiters unqueueing themselves:
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-11-17 13:54:03 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
while (!list_empty(head)) {
|
|
|
|
next = head->next;
|
|
|
|
pi_state = list_entry(next, struct futex_pi_state, list);
|
|
|
|
key = pi_state->key;
|
2006-07-29 03:16:20 +00:00
|
|
|
hb = hash_futex(&key);
|
2017-10-31 10:18:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We can race against put_pi_state() removing itself from the
|
|
|
|
* list (a waiter going away). put_pi_state() will first
|
|
|
|
* decrement the reference count and then modify the list, so
|
|
|
|
* its possible to see the list entry but fail this reference
|
|
|
|
* acquire.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* In that case; drop the locks to let put_pi_state() make
|
|
|
|
* progress and retry the loop.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-02-05 12:24:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&pi_state->refcount)) {
|
2017-10-31 10:18:53 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
|
|
|
|
cpu_relax();
|
|
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-11-17 13:54:03 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
|
2017-09-22 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
|
|
|
|
raw_spin_lock(&curr->pi_lock);
|
2006-07-29 03:16:20 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We dropped the pi-lock, so re-check whether this
|
|
|
|
* task still owns the PI-state:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (head->next != next) {
|
2017-10-31 10:18:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/* retain curr->pi_lock for the loop invariant */
|
2017-09-22 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
|
2017-10-31 10:18:53 +00:00
|
|
|
put_pi_state(pi_state);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON(pi_state->owner != curr);
|
2006-07-29 03:16:20 +00:00
|
|
|
WARN_ON(list_empty(&pi_state->list));
|
|
|
|
list_del_init(&pi_state->list);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
pi_state->owner = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-31 10:18:53 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_unlock(&curr->pi_lock);
|
2017-09-22 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 10:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
rt_mutex_futex_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex);
|
|
|
|
put_pi_state(pi_state);
|
|
|
|
|
2009-11-17 13:54:03 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-11-17 13:54:03 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-11-06 21:55:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
static inline void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr) { }
|
2017-08-01 04:31:32 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-03 12:27:08 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We need to check the following states:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Waiter | pi_state | pi->owner | uTID | uODIED | ?
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* [1] NULL | --- | --- | 0 | 0/1 | Valid
|
|
|
|
* [2] NULL | --- | --- | >0 | 0/1 | Valid
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* [3] Found | NULL | -- | Any | 0/1 | Invalid
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* [4] Found | Found | NULL | 0 | 1 | Valid
|
|
|
|
* [5] Found | Found | NULL | >0 | 1 | Invalid
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* [6] Found | Found | task | 0 | 1 | Valid
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* [7] Found | Found | NULL | Any | 0 | Invalid
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* [8] Found | Found | task | ==taskTID | 0/1 | Valid
|
|
|
|
* [9] Found | Found | task | 0 | 0 | Invalid
|
|
|
|
* [10] Found | Found | task | !=taskTID | 0/1 | Invalid
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* [1] Indicates that the kernel can acquire the futex atomically. We
|
2020-10-16 03:10:28 +00:00
|
|
|
* came here due to a stale FUTEX_WAITERS/FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit.
|
2014-06-03 12:27:08 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* [2] Valid, if TID does not belong to a kernel thread. If no matching
|
|
|
|
* thread is found then it indicates that the owner TID has died.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* [3] Invalid. The waiter is queued on a non PI futex
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* [4] Valid state after exit_robust_list(), which sets the user space
|
|
|
|
* value to FUTEX_WAITERS | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* [5] The user space value got manipulated between exit_robust_list()
|
|
|
|
* and exit_pi_state_list()
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* [6] Valid state after exit_pi_state_list() which sets the new owner in
|
|
|
|
* the pi_state but cannot access the user space value.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* [7] pi_state->owner can only be NULL when the OWNER_DIED bit is set.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* [8] Owner and user space value match
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* [9] There is no transient state which sets the user space TID to 0
|
|
|
|
* except exit_robust_list(), but this is indicated by the
|
|
|
|
* FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit. See [4]
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* [10] There is no transient state which leaves owner and user space
|
2021-01-18 18:01:21 +00:00
|
|
|
* TID out of sync. Except one error case where the kernel is denied
|
|
|
|
* write access to the user address, see fixup_pi_state_owner().
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Serialization and lifetime rules:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* hb->lock:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* hb -> futex_q, relation
|
|
|
|
* futex_q -> pi_state, relation
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* (cannot be raw because hb can contain arbitrary amount
|
|
|
|
* of futex_q's)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* pi_mutex->wait_lock:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* {uval, pi_state}
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* (and pi_mutex 'obviously')
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* p->pi_lock:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* p->pi_state_list -> pi_state->list, relation
|
2021-02-26 17:50:29 +00:00
|
|
|
* pi_mutex->owner -> pi_state->owner, relation
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* pi_state->refcount:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* pi_state lifetime
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Lock order:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* hb->lock
|
|
|
|
* pi_mutex->wait_lock
|
|
|
|
* p->pi_lock
|
|
|
|
*
|
2014-06-03 12:27:08 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Validate that the existing waiter has a pi_state and sanity check
|
|
|
|
* the pi_state against the user space value. If correct, attach to
|
|
|
|
* it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
static int attach_to_pi_state(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval,
|
|
|
|
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state,
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_pi_state **ps)
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2007-06-08 20:47:00 +00:00
|
|
|
pid_t pid = uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK;
|
2017-04-07 07:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
u32 uval2;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Userspace might have messed up non-PI and PI futexes [3]
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(!pi_state))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2006-07-10 11:44:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We get here with hb->lock held, and having found a
|
|
|
|
* futex_top_waiter(). This means that futex_lock_pi() of said futex_q
|
|
|
|
* has dropped the hb->lock in between queue_me() and unqueue_me_pi(),
|
|
|
|
* which in turn means that futex_lock_pi() still has a reference on
|
|
|
|
* our pi_state.
|
2017-03-22 10:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The waiter holding a reference on @pi_state also protects against
|
|
|
|
* the unlocked put_pi_state() in futex_unlock_pi(), futex_lock_pi()
|
|
|
|
* and futex_wait_requeue_pi() as it cannot go to 0 and consequently
|
|
|
|
* free pi_state before we can take a reference ourselves.
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-02-05 12:24:27 +00:00
|
|
|
WARN_ON(!refcount_read(&pi_state->refcount));
|
2010-02-03 08:33:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Now that we have a pi_state, we can acquire wait_lock
|
|
|
|
* and do the state validation.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Since {uval, pi_state} is serialized by wait_lock, and our current
|
|
|
|
* uval was read without holding it, it can have changed. Verify it
|
|
|
|
* still is what we expect it to be, otherwise retry the entire
|
|
|
|
* operation.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (get_futex_value_locked(&uval2, uaddr))
|
|
|
|
goto out_efault;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (uval != uval2)
|
|
|
|
goto out_eagain;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Handle the owner died case:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) {
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
* exit_pi_state_list sets owner to NULL and wakes the
|
|
|
|
* topmost waiter. The task which acquires the
|
|
|
|
* pi_state->rt_mutex will fixup owner.
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!pi_state->owner) {
|
2010-02-03 08:33:05 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
* No pi state owner, but the user space TID
|
|
|
|
* is not 0. Inconsistent state. [5]
|
2010-02-03 08:33:05 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pid)
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out_einval;
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
* Take a ref on the state and return success. [4]
|
2014-05-12 20:45:34 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out_attach;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
* If TID is 0, then either the dying owner has not
|
|
|
|
* yet executed exit_pi_state_list() or some waiter
|
|
|
|
* acquired the rtmutex in the pi state, but did not
|
|
|
|
* yet fixup the TID in user space.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Take a ref on the state and return success. [6]
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!pid)
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out_attach;
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If the owner died bit is not set, then the pi_state
|
|
|
|
* must have an owner. [7]
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!pi_state->owner)
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out_einval;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Bail out if user space manipulated the futex value. If pi
|
|
|
|
* state exists then the owner TID must be the same as the
|
|
|
|
* user space TID. [9/10]
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (pid != task_pid_vnr(pi_state->owner))
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out_einval;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out_attach:
|
2017-03-22 10:35:53 +00:00
|
|
|
get_pi_state(pi_state);
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
*ps = pi_state;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out_einval:
|
|
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
goto out_error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out_eagain:
|
|
|
|
ret = -EAGAIN;
|
|
|
|
goto out_error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out_efault:
|
|
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
goto out_error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out_error:
|
|
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
futex: Prevent exit livelock
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
2019-11-06 21:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* wait_for_owner_exiting - Block until the owner has exited
|
2019-12-09 04:26:55 +00:00
|
|
|
* @ret: owner's current futex lock status
|
futex: Prevent exit livelock
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
2019-11-06 21:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
* @exiting: Pointer to the exiting task
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Caller must hold a refcount on @exiting.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void wait_for_owner_exiting(int ret, struct task_struct *exiting)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (ret != -EBUSY) {
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(exiting);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret == -EBUSY && !exiting))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&exiting->futex_exit_mutex);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* No point in doing state checking here. If the waiter got here
|
|
|
|
* while the task was in exec()->exec_futex_release() then it can
|
|
|
|
* have any FUTEX_STATE_* value when the waiter has acquired the
|
|
|
|
* mutex. OK, if running, EXITING or DEAD if it reached exit()
|
|
|
|
* already. Highly unlikely and not a problem. Just one more round
|
|
|
|
* through the futex maze.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&exiting->futex_exit_mutex);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
put_task_struct(exiting);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-12-10 13:35:14 +00:00
|
|
|
static int handle_exit_race(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval,
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u32 uval2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2019-11-06 21:55:45 +00:00
|
|
|
* If the futex exit state is not yet FUTEX_STATE_DEAD, tell the
|
|
|
|
* caller that the alleged owner is busy.
|
2018-12-10 13:35:14 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-11-06 21:55:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tsk && tsk->futex_state != FUTEX_STATE_DEAD)
|
2019-11-06 21:55:45 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EBUSY;
|
2018-12-10 13:35:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Reread the user space value to handle the following situation:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* CPU0 CPU1
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* sys_exit() sys_futex()
|
|
|
|
* do_exit() futex_lock_pi()
|
|
|
|
* futex_lock_pi_atomic()
|
|
|
|
* exit_signals(tsk) No waiters:
|
|
|
|
* tsk->flags |= PF_EXITING; *uaddr == 0x00000PID
|
|
|
|
* mm_release(tsk) Set waiter bit
|
|
|
|
* exit_robust_list(tsk) { *uaddr = 0x80000PID;
|
|
|
|
* Set owner died attach_to_pi_owner() {
|
|
|
|
* *uaddr = 0xC0000000; tsk = get_task(PID);
|
|
|
|
* } if (!tsk->flags & PF_EXITING) {
|
|
|
|
* ... attach();
|
2019-11-06 21:55:37 +00:00
|
|
|
* tsk->futex_state = } else {
|
|
|
|
* FUTEX_STATE_DEAD; if (tsk->futex_state !=
|
|
|
|
* FUTEX_STATE_DEAD)
|
2018-12-10 13:35:14 +00:00
|
|
|
* return -EAGAIN;
|
|
|
|
* return -ESRCH; <--- FAIL
|
|
|
|
* }
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returning ESRCH unconditionally is wrong here because the
|
|
|
|
* user space value has been changed by the exiting task.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The same logic applies to the case where the exiting task is
|
|
|
|
* already gone.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (get_futex_value_locked(&uval2, uaddr))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the user space value has changed, try again. */
|
|
|
|
if (uval2 != uval)
|
|
|
|
return -EAGAIN;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The exiting task did not have a robust list, the robust list was
|
|
|
|
* corrupted or the user space value in *uaddr is simply bogus.
|
|
|
|
* Give up and tell user space.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return -ESRCH;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-11 20:45:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Lookup the task for the TID provided from user space and attach to
|
|
|
|
* it after doing proper sanity checks.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-12-10 13:35:14 +00:00
|
|
|
static int attach_to_pi_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, union futex_key *key,
|
futex: Prevent exit livelock
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
2019-11-06 21:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_pi_state **ps,
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct **exiting)
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pid_t pid = uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK;
|
2014-06-11 20:45:40 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state;
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct *p;
|
2014-06-11 20:45:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2006-07-29 03:17:57 +00:00
|
|
|
* We are the first waiter - try to look up the real owner and attach
|
2014-06-03 12:27:08 +00:00
|
|
|
* the new pi_state to it, but bail out when TID = 0 [1]
|
2018-12-10 13:35:14 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The !pid check is paranoid. None of the call sites should end up
|
|
|
|
* with pid == 0, but better safe than sorry. Let the caller retry
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2007-06-08 20:47:00 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!pid)
|
2018-12-10 13:35:14 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EAGAIN;
|
2018-02-06 23:40:17 +00:00
|
|
|
p = find_get_task_by_vpid(pid);
|
2010-06-30 07:51:19 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!p)
|
2018-12-10 13:35:14 +00:00
|
|
|
return handle_exit_race(uaddr, uval, NULL);
|
2007-06-08 20:47:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-02 14:05:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(p->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
|
2014-05-12 20:45:35 +00:00
|
|
|
put_task_struct(p);
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-06-08 20:47:00 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2019-11-06 21:55:37 +00:00
|
|
|
* We need to look at the task state to figure out, whether the
|
|
|
|
* task is exiting. To protect against the change of the task state
|
|
|
|
* in futex_exit_release(), we do this protected by p->pi_lock:
|
2007-06-08 20:47:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-11-17 13:54:03 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irq(&p->pi_lock);
|
2019-11-06 21:55:37 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(p->futex_state != FUTEX_STATE_OK)) {
|
2007-06-08 20:47:00 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2019-11-06 21:55:37 +00:00
|
|
|
* The task is on the way out. When the futex state is
|
|
|
|
* FUTEX_STATE_DEAD, we know that the task has finished
|
|
|
|
* the cleanup:
|
2007-06-08 20:47:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-12-10 13:35:14 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret = handle_exit_race(uaddr, uval, p);
|
2007-06-08 20:47:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-11-17 13:54:03 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&p->pi_lock);
|
futex: Prevent exit livelock
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
2019-11-06 21:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If the owner task is between FUTEX_STATE_EXITING and
|
|
|
|
* FUTEX_STATE_DEAD then store the task pointer and keep
|
|
|
|
* the reference on the task struct. The calling code will
|
|
|
|
* drop all locks, wait for the task to reach
|
|
|
|
* FUTEX_STATE_DEAD and then drop the refcount. This is
|
|
|
|
* required to prevent a live lock when the current task
|
|
|
|
* preempted the exiting task between the two states.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ret == -EBUSY)
|
|
|
|
*exiting = p;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
put_task_struct(p);
|
2007-06-08 20:47:00 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-03 12:27:08 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* No existing pi state. First waiter. [2]
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This creates pi_state, we have hb->lock held, this means nothing can
|
|
|
|
* observe this state, wait_lock is irrelevant.
|
2014-06-03 12:27:08 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
pi_state = alloc_pi_state();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-06-11 20:45:40 +00:00
|
|
|
* Initialize the pi_mutex in locked state and make @p
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
* the owner of it:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
rt_mutex_init_proxy_locked(&pi_state->pi_mutex, p);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Store the key for possible exit cleanups: */
|
2007-05-09 09:35:02 +00:00
|
|
|
pi_state->key = *key;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-07-29 03:16:20 +00:00
|
|
|
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&pi_state->list));
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
list_add(&pi_state->list, &p->pi_state_list);
|
2017-09-22 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Assignment without holding pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock is safe
|
|
|
|
* because there is no concurrency as the object is not published yet.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
pi_state->owner = p;
|
2009-11-17 13:54:03 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&p->pi_lock);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
put_task_struct(p);
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-09 09:35:02 +00:00
|
|
|
*ps = pi_state;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
static int lookup_pi_state(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval,
|
|
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
|
futex: Prevent exit livelock
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
2019-11-06 21:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
union futex_key *key, struct futex_pi_state **ps,
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct **exiting)
|
2014-06-11 20:45:40 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-03-22 10:35:48 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_q *top_waiter = futex_top_waiter(hb, key);
|
2014-06-11 20:45:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If there is a waiter on that futex, validate it and
|
|
|
|
* attach to the pi_state when the validation succeeds.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-03-22 10:35:48 +00:00
|
|
|
if (top_waiter)
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
return attach_to_pi_state(uaddr, uval, top_waiter->pi_state, ps);
|
2014-06-11 20:45:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We are the first waiter - try to look up the owner based on
|
|
|
|
* @uval and attach to it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
futex: Prevent exit livelock
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
2019-11-06 21:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
return attach_to_pi_owner(uaddr, uval, key, ps, exiting);
|
2014-06-11 20:45:40 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
static int lock_pi_update_atomic(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, u32 newval)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
int err;
|
treewide: Remove uninitialized_var() usage
Using uninitialized_var() is dangerous as it papers over real bugs[1]
(or can in the future), and suppresses unrelated compiler warnings
(e.g. "unused variable"). If the compiler thinks it is uninitialized,
either simply initialize the variable or make compiler changes.
In preparation for removing[2] the[3] macro[4], remove all remaining
needless uses with the following script:
git grep '\buninitialized_var\b' | cut -d: -f1 | sort -u | \
xargs perl -pi -e \
's/\buninitialized_var\(([^\)]+)\)/\1/g;
s:\s*/\* (GCC be quiet|to make compiler happy) \*/$::g;'
drivers/video/fbdev/riva/riva_hw.c was manually tweaked to avoid
pathological white-space.
No outstanding warnings were found building allmodconfig with GCC 9.3.0
for x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, powerpc64le, s390x, mips, sparc64,
alpha, and m68k.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200603174714.192027-1-glider@google.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFw+Vbj0i=1TGqCR5vQkCzWJ0QxK6CernOU6eedsudAixw@mail.gmail.com/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFwgbgqhbp1fkxvRKEpzyR5J8n1vKT1VZdz9knmPuXhOeg@mail.gmail.com/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFz2500WfbKXAx8s67wrm9=yVJu65TpLgN_ybYNv0VEOKA@mail.gmail.com/
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> # drivers/infiniband and mlx4/mlx5
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> # IB
Acked-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> # wireless drivers
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> # erofs
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2020-06-03 20:09:38 +00:00
|
|
|
u32 curval;
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-06-30 06:26:02 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
err = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval);
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(err))
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
/* If user space value changed, let the caller retry */
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
return curval != uval ? -EAGAIN : 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
2009-09-22 05:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
* futex_lock_pi_atomic() - Atomic work required to acquire a pi aware futex
|
2009-04-08 06:23:50 +00:00
|
|
|
* @uaddr: the pi futex user address
|
|
|
|
* @hb: the pi futex hash bucket
|
|
|
|
* @key: the futex key associated with uaddr and hb
|
|
|
|
* @ps: the pi_state pointer where we store the result of the
|
|
|
|
* lookup
|
|
|
|
* @task: the task to perform the atomic lock work for. This will
|
|
|
|
* be "current" except in the case of requeue pi.
|
futex: Prevent exit livelock
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
2019-11-06 21:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
* @exiting: Pointer to store the task pointer of the owner task
|
|
|
|
* which is in the middle of exiting
|
2009-04-08 06:23:50 +00:00
|
|
|
* @set_waiters: force setting the FUTEX_WAITERS bit (1) or not (0)
|
2009-04-03 20:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2013-03-05 18:00:24 +00:00
|
|
|
* Return:
|
2017-05-11 13:17:45 +00:00
|
|
|
* - 0 - ready to wait;
|
|
|
|
* - 1 - acquired the lock;
|
|
|
|
* - <0 - error
|
2009-04-03 20:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The hb->lock and futex_key refs shall be held by the caller.
|
futex: Prevent exit livelock
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
2019-11-06 21:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* @exiting is only set when the return value is -EBUSY. If so, this holds
|
|
|
|
* a refcount on the exiting task on return and the caller needs to drop it
|
|
|
|
* after waiting for the exit to complete.
|
2009-04-03 20:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int futex_lock_pi_atomic(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
|
|
|
|
union futex_key *key,
|
|
|
|
struct futex_pi_state **ps,
|
futex: Prevent exit livelock
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
2019-11-06 21:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
struct task_struct *task,
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct **exiting,
|
|
|
|
int set_waiters)
|
2009-04-03 20:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
u32 uval, newval, vpid = task_pid_vnr(task);
|
2017-03-22 10:35:48 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_q *top_waiter;
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2009-04-03 20:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
* Read the user space value first so we can validate a few
|
|
|
|
* things before proceeding further.
|
2009-04-03 20:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if (get_futex_value_locked(&uval, uaddr))
|
2009-04-03 20:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-30 06:26:02 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Detect deadlocks.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((unlikely((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) == vpid)))
|
2009-04-03 20:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EDEADLK;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-30 06:26:02 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((unlikely(should_fail_futex(true))))
|
|
|
|
return -EDEADLK;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
* Lookup existing state first. If it exists, try to attach to
|
|
|
|
* its pi_state.
|
2009-04-03 20:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-03-22 10:35:48 +00:00
|
|
|
top_waiter = futex_top_waiter(hb, key);
|
|
|
|
if (top_waiter)
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
return attach_to_pi_state(uaddr, uval, top_waiter->pi_state, ps);
|
2009-04-03 20:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
* No waiter and user TID is 0. We are here because the
|
|
|
|
* waiters or the owner died bit is set or called from
|
|
|
|
* requeue_cmp_pi or for whatever reason something took the
|
|
|
|
* syscall.
|
2009-04-03 20:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK)) {
|
2012-10-23 20:29:38 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
* We take over the futex. No other waiters and the user space
|
|
|
|
* TID is 0. We preserve the owner died bit.
|
2012-10-23 20:29:38 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
newval = uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED;
|
|
|
|
newval |= vpid;
|
2009-04-03 20:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
/* The futex requeue_pi code can enforce the waiters bit */
|
|
|
|
if (set_waiters)
|
|
|
|
newval |= FUTEX_WAITERS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = lock_pi_update_atomic(uaddr, uval, newval);
|
|
|
|
/* If the take over worked, return 1 */
|
|
|
|
return ret < 0 ? ret : 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-04-03 20:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
* First waiter. Set the waiters bit before attaching ourself to
|
|
|
|
* the owner. If owner tries to unlock, it will be forced into
|
|
|
|
* the kernel and blocked on hb->lock.
|
2009-04-03 20:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
newval = uval | FUTEX_WAITERS;
|
|
|
|
ret = lock_pi_update_atomic(uaddr, uval, newval);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2009-04-03 20:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
* If the update of the user space value succeeded, we try to
|
|
|
|
* attach to the owner. If that fails, no harm done, we only
|
|
|
|
* set the FUTEX_WAITERS bit in the user space variable.
|
2009-04-03 20:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
futex: Prevent exit livelock
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
2019-11-06 21:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
return attach_to_pi_owner(uaddr, newval, key, ps, exiting);
|
2009-04-03 20:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-12-22 06:18:50 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* __unqueue_futex() - Remove the futex_q from its futex_hash_bucket
|
|
|
|
* @q: The futex_q to unqueue
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The q->lock_ptr must not be NULL and must be held by the caller.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void __unqueue_futex(struct futex_q *q)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-03 05:38:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON_SMP(!q->lock_ptr) || WARN_ON(plist_node_empty(&q->list)))
|
2010-12-22 06:18:50 +00:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2018-10-03 05:38:57 +00:00
|
|
|
lockdep_assert_held(q->lock_ptr);
|
2010-12-22 06:18:50 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hb = container_of(q->lock_ptr, struct futex_hash_bucket, lock);
|
|
|
|
plist_del(&q->list, &hb->chain);
|
2014-03-21 05:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
hb_waiters_dec(hb);
|
2010-12-22 06:18:50 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The hash bucket lock must be held when this is called.
|
futex: Implement lockless wakeups
Given the overall futex architecture, any chance of reducing
hb->lock contention is welcome. In this particular case, using
wake-queues to enable lockless wakeups addresses very much real
world performance concerns, even cases of soft-lockups in cases
of large amounts of blocked tasks (which is not hard to find in
large boxes, using but just a handful of futex).
At the lowest level, this patch can reduce latency of a single thread
attempting to acquire hb->lock in highly contended scenarios by a
up to 2x. At lower counts of nr_wake there are no regressions,
confirming, of course, that the wake_q handling overhead is practically
non existent. For instance, while a fair amount of variation,
the extended pef-bench wakeup benchmark shows for a 20 core machine
the following avg per-thread time to wakeup its share of tasks:
nr_thr ms-before ms-after
16 0.0590 0.0215
32 0.0396 0.0220
48 0.0417 0.0182
64 0.0536 0.0236
80 0.0414 0.0097
96 0.0672 0.0152
Naturally, this can cause spurious wakeups. However there is no core code
that cannot handle them afaict, and furthermore tglx does have the point
that other events can already trigger them anyway.
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1430494072-30283-3-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-05-01 15:27:51 +00:00
|
|
|
* Afterwards, the futex_q must not be accessed. Callers
|
|
|
|
* must ensure to later call wake_up_q() for the actual
|
|
|
|
* wakeups to occur.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
futex: Implement lockless wakeups
Given the overall futex architecture, any chance of reducing
hb->lock contention is welcome. In this particular case, using
wake-queues to enable lockless wakeups addresses very much real
world performance concerns, even cases of soft-lockups in cases
of large amounts of blocked tasks (which is not hard to find in
large boxes, using but just a handful of futex).
At the lowest level, this patch can reduce latency of a single thread
attempting to acquire hb->lock in highly contended scenarios by a
up to 2x. At lower counts of nr_wake there are no regressions,
confirming, of course, that the wake_q handling overhead is practically
non existent. For instance, while a fair amount of variation,
the extended pef-bench wakeup benchmark shows for a 20 core machine
the following avg per-thread time to wakeup its share of tasks:
nr_thr ms-before ms-after
16 0.0590 0.0215
32 0.0396 0.0220
48 0.0417 0.0182
64 0.0536 0.0236
80 0.0414 0.0097
96 0.0672 0.0152
Naturally, this can cause spurious wakeups. However there is no core code
that cannot handle them afaict, and furthermore tglx does have the point
that other events can already trigger them anyway.
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1430494072-30283-3-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-05-01 15:27:51 +00:00
|
|
|
static void mark_wake_futex(struct wake_q_head *wake_q, struct futex_q *q)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-05-05 17:21:40 +00:00
|
|
|
struct task_struct *p = q->task;
|
|
|
|
|
2012-11-27 00:29:56 +00:00
|
|
|
if (WARN(q->pi_state || q->rt_waiter, "refusing to wake PI futex\n"))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-11-29 13:44:49 +00:00
|
|
|
get_task_struct(p);
|
2010-12-22 06:18:50 +00:00
|
|
|
__unqueue_futex(q);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-04-14 22:31:38 +00:00
|
|
|
* The waiting task can free the futex_q as soon as q->lock_ptr = NULL
|
|
|
|
* is written, without taking any locks. This is possible in the event
|
|
|
|
* of a spurious wakeup, for example. A memory barrier is required here
|
|
|
|
* to prevent the following store to lock_ptr from getting ahead of the
|
|
|
|
* plist_del in __unqueue_futex().
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-03-22 10:35:49 +00:00
|
|
|
smp_store_release(&q->lock_ptr, NULL);
|
2018-11-29 13:44:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Queue the task for later wakeup for after we've released
|
2019-10-23 03:34:50 +00:00
|
|
|
* the hb->lock.
|
2018-11-29 13:44:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2018-12-18 19:53:52 +00:00
|
|
|
wake_q_add_safe(wake_q, p);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 10:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Caller must hold a reference on @pi_state.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int wake_futex_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, struct futex_pi_state *pi_state)
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
treewide: Remove uninitialized_var() usage
Using uninitialized_var() is dangerous as it papers over real bugs[1]
(or can in the future), and suppresses unrelated compiler warnings
(e.g. "unused variable"). If the compiler thinks it is uninitialized,
either simply initialize the variable or make compiler changes.
In preparation for removing[2] the[3] macro[4], remove all remaining
needless uses with the following script:
git grep '\buninitialized_var\b' | cut -d: -f1 | sort -u | \
xargs perl -pi -e \
's/\buninitialized_var\(([^\)]+)\)/\1/g;
s:\s*/\* (GCC be quiet|to make compiler happy) \*/$::g;'
drivers/video/fbdev/riva/riva_hw.c was manually tweaked to avoid
pathological white-space.
No outstanding warnings were found building allmodconfig with GCC 9.3.0
for x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, powerpc64le, s390x, mips, sparc64,
alpha, and m68k.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200603174714.192027-1-glider@google.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFw+Vbj0i=1TGqCR5vQkCzWJ0QxK6CernOU6eedsudAixw@mail.gmail.com/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFwgbgqhbp1fkxvRKEpzyR5J8n1vKT1VZdz9knmPuXhOeg@mail.gmail.com/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFz2500WfbKXAx8s67wrm9=yVJu65TpLgN_ybYNv0VEOKA@mail.gmail.com/
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> # drivers/infiniband and mlx4/mlx5
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> # IB
Acked-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> # wireless drivers
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> # erofs
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2020-06-03 20:09:38 +00:00
|
|
|
u32 curval, newval;
|
2021-02-26 17:50:26 +00:00
|
|
|
struct rt_mutex_waiter *top_waiter;
|
2017-03-22 10:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
struct task_struct *new_owner;
|
2017-03-23 14:56:10 +00:00
|
|
|
bool postunlock = false;
|
2016-11-17 16:46:38 +00:00
|
|
|
DEFINE_WAKE_Q(wake_q);
|
2014-06-03 12:27:07 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-02-26 17:50:26 +00:00
|
|
|
top_waiter = rt_mutex_top_waiter(&pi_state->pi_mutex);
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!top_waiter)) {
|
2017-03-22 10:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-03-22 10:35:59 +00:00
|
|
|
* As per the comment in futex_unlock_pi() this should not happen.
|
2017-03-22 10:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* When this happens, give up our locks and try again, giving
|
|
|
|
* the futex_lock_pi() instance time to complete, either by
|
|
|
|
* waiting on the rtmutex or removing itself from the futex
|
|
|
|
* queue.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ret = -EAGAIN;
|
|
|
|
goto out_unlock;
|
2017-03-22 10:35:54 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-02-26 17:50:26 +00:00
|
|
|
new_owner = top_waiter->task;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-03-22 10:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
* We pass it to the next owner. The WAITERS bit is always kept
|
|
|
|
* enabled while there is PI state around. We cleanup the owner
|
|
|
|
* died bit, because we are the owner.
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-06-03 12:27:07 +00:00
|
|
|
newval = FUTEX_WAITERS | task_pid_vnr(new_owner);
|
2006-07-29 03:17:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-09-27 00:08:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true))) {
|
2015-06-30 06:26:02 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = -EFAULT;
|
2020-09-27 00:08:58 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out_unlock;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2015-06-30 06:26:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval);
|
|
|
|
if (!ret && (curval != uval)) {
|
2016-04-15 12:35:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If a unconditional UNLOCK_PI operation (user space did not
|
|
|
|
* try the TID->0 transition) raced with a waiter setting the
|
|
|
|
* FUTEX_WAITERS flag between get_user() and locking the hash
|
|
|
|
* bucket lock, retry the operation.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((FUTEX_TID_MASK & curval) == uval)
|
|
|
|
ret = -EAGAIN;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-01-19 14:21:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ret) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This is a point of no return; once we modified the uval
|
|
|
|
* there is no going back and subsequent operations must
|
|
|
|
* not fail.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
pi_state_update_owner(pi_state, new_owner);
|
|
|
|
postunlock = __rt_mutex_futex_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex, &wake_q);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-03-22 10:35:51 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 10:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
out_unlock:
|
2017-03-22 10:35:51 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-23 14:56:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (postunlock)
|
|
|
|
rt_mutex_postunlock(&wake_q);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 10:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-07-03 07:25:05 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Express the locking dependencies for lockdep:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline void
|
|
|
|
double_lock_hb(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb2)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (hb1 <= hb2) {
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&hb1->lock);
|
|
|
|
if (hb1 < hb2)
|
|
|
|
spin_lock_nested(&hb2->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
|
|
|
|
} else { /* hb1 > hb2 */
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&hb2->lock);
|
|
|
|
spin_lock_nested(&hb1->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-12 07:55:52 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline void
|
|
|
|
double_unlock_hb(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb2)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2009-03-12 22:11:18 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&hb1->lock);
|
2009-03-13 09:32:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if (hb1 != hb2)
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&hb2->lock);
|
2009-03-12 07:55:52 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2009-03-12 07:55:37 +00:00
|
|
|
* Wake up waiters matching bitset queued on this futex (uaddr).
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
futex_wake(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags, int nr_wake, u32 bitset)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_q *this, *next;
|
2008-09-26 17:32:20 +00:00
|
|
|
union futex_key key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2016-11-17 16:46:38 +00:00
|
|
|
DEFINE_WAKE_Q(wake_q);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-01 16:45:14 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!bitset)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 02:57:57 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key, FUTEX_READ);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
|
2020-07-02 20:28:41 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
hb = hash_futex(&key);
|
2014-01-12 23:31:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure we really have tasks to wakeup */
|
|
|
|
if (!hb_waiters_pending(hb))
|
2020-07-02 20:28:41 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2014-01-12 23:31:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-01-12 23:31:22 +00:00
|
|
|
plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, &hb->chain, list) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (match_futex (&this->key, &key)) {
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
if (this->pi_state || this->rt_waiter) {
|
2006-07-01 11:35:46 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-02-01 16:45:14 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check if one of the bits is set in both bitsets */
|
|
|
|
if (!(this->bitset & bitset))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
futex: Implement lockless wakeups
Given the overall futex architecture, any chance of reducing
hb->lock contention is welcome. In this particular case, using
wake-queues to enable lockless wakeups addresses very much real
world performance concerns, even cases of soft-lockups in cases
of large amounts of blocked tasks (which is not hard to find in
large boxes, using but just a handful of futex).
At the lowest level, this patch can reduce latency of a single thread
attempting to acquire hb->lock in highly contended scenarios by a
up to 2x. At lower counts of nr_wake there are no regressions,
confirming, of course, that the wake_q handling overhead is practically
non existent. For instance, while a fair amount of variation,
the extended pef-bench wakeup benchmark shows for a 20 core machine
the following avg per-thread time to wakeup its share of tasks:
nr_thr ms-before ms-after
16 0.0590 0.0215
32 0.0396 0.0220
48 0.0417 0.0182
64 0.0536 0.0236
80 0.0414 0.0097
96 0.0672 0.0152
Naturally, this can cause spurious wakeups. However there is no core code
that cannot handle them afaict, and furthermore tglx does have the point
that other events can already trigger them anyway.
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1430494072-30283-3-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-05-01 15:27:51 +00:00
|
|
|
mark_wake_futex(&wake_q, this);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (++ret >= nr_wake)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
|
futex: Implement lockless wakeups
Given the overall futex architecture, any chance of reducing
hb->lock contention is welcome. In this particular case, using
wake-queues to enable lockless wakeups addresses very much real
world performance concerns, even cases of soft-lockups in cases
of large amounts of blocked tasks (which is not hard to find in
large boxes, using but just a handful of futex).
At the lowest level, this patch can reduce latency of a single thread
attempting to acquire hb->lock in highly contended scenarios by a
up to 2x. At lower counts of nr_wake there are no regressions,
confirming, of course, that the wake_q handling overhead is practically
non existent. For instance, while a fair amount of variation,
the extended pef-bench wakeup benchmark shows for a 20 core machine
the following avg per-thread time to wakeup its share of tasks:
nr_thr ms-before ms-after
16 0.0590 0.0215
32 0.0396 0.0220
48 0.0417 0.0182
64 0.0536 0.0236
80 0.0414 0.0097
96 0.0672 0.0152
Naturally, this can cause spurious wakeups. However there is no core code
that cannot handle them afaict, and furthermore tglx does have the point
that other events can already trigger them anyway.
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1430494072-30283-3-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-05-01 15:27:51 +00:00
|
|
|
wake_up_q(&wake_q);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-24 07:31:05 +00:00
|
|
|
static int futex_atomic_op_inuser(unsigned int encoded_op, u32 __user *uaddr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned int op = (encoded_op & 0x70000000) >> 28;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int cmp = (encoded_op & 0x0f000000) >> 24;
|
2017-11-30 14:35:44 +00:00
|
|
|
int oparg = sign_extend32((encoded_op & 0x00fff000) >> 12, 11);
|
|
|
|
int cmparg = sign_extend32(encoded_op & 0x00000fff, 11);
|
2017-08-24 07:31:05 +00:00
|
|
|
int oldval, ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (encoded_op & (FUTEX_OP_OPARG_SHIFT << 28)) {
|
futex: futex_wake_op, do not fail on invalid op
In commit 30d6e0a4190d ("futex: Remove duplicated code and fix undefined
behaviour"), I let FUTEX_WAKE_OP to fail on invalid op. Namely when op
should be considered as shift and the shift is out of range (< 0 or > 31).
But strace's test suite does this madness:
futex(0x7fabd78bcffc, 0x5, 0xfacefeed, 0xb, 0x7fabd78bcffc, 0xa0caffee);
futex(0x7fabd78bcffc, 0x5, 0xfacefeed, 0xb, 0x7fabd78bcffc, 0xbadfaced);
futex(0x7fabd78bcffc, 0x5, 0xfacefeed, 0xb, 0x7fabd78bcffc, 0xffffffff);
When I pick the first 0xa0caffee, it decodes as:
0x80000000 & 0xa0caffee: oparg is shift
0x70000000 & 0xa0caffee: op is FUTEX_OP_OR
0x0f000000 & 0xa0caffee: cmp is FUTEX_OP_CMP_EQ
0x00fff000 & 0xa0caffee: oparg is sign-extended 0xcaf = -849
0x00000fff & 0xa0caffee: cmparg is sign-extended 0xfee = -18
That means the op tries to do this:
(futex |= (1 << (-849))) == -18
which is completely bogus. The new check of op in the code is:
if (encoded_op & (FUTEX_OP_OPARG_SHIFT << 28)) {
if (oparg < 0 || oparg > 31)
return -EINVAL;
oparg = 1 << oparg;
}
which results obviously in the "Invalid argument" errno:
FAIL: futex
===========
futex(0x7fabd78bcffc, 0x5, 0xfacefeed, 0xb, 0x7fabd78bcffc, 0xa0caffee) = -1: Invalid argument
futex.test: failed test: ../futex failed with code 1
So let us soften the failure to print only a (ratelimited) message, crop
the value and continue as if it were right. When userspace keeps up, we
can switch this to return -EINVAL again.
[v2] Do not return 0 immediatelly, proceed with the cropped value.
Fixes: 30d6e0a4190d ("futex: Remove duplicated code and fix undefined behaviour")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-10-23 11:41:51 +00:00
|
|
|
if (oparg < 0 || oparg > 31) {
|
|
|
|
char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* kill this print and return -EINVAL when userspace
|
|
|
|
* is sane again
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
pr_info_ratelimited("futex_wake_op: %s tries to shift op by %d; fix this program\n",
|
|
|
|
get_task_comm(comm, current), oparg);
|
|
|
|
oparg &= 31;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-24 07:31:05 +00:00
|
|
|
oparg = 1 << oparg;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-16 15:17:27 +00:00
|
|
|
pagefault_disable();
|
2017-08-24 07:31:05 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser(op, oparg, &oldval, uaddr);
|
2020-02-16 15:17:27 +00:00
|
|
|
pagefault_enable();
|
2017-08-24 07:31:05 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (cmp) {
|
|
|
|
case FUTEX_OP_CMP_EQ:
|
|
|
|
return oldval == cmparg;
|
|
|
|
case FUTEX_OP_CMP_NE:
|
|
|
|
return oldval != cmparg;
|
|
|
|
case FUTEX_OP_CMP_LT:
|
|
|
|
return oldval < cmparg;
|
|
|
|
case FUTEX_OP_CMP_GE:
|
|
|
|
return oldval >= cmparg;
|
|
|
|
case FUTEX_OP_CMP_LE:
|
|
|
|
return oldval <= cmparg;
|
|
|
|
case FUTEX_OP_CMP_GT:
|
|
|
|
return oldval > cmparg;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] FUTEX_WAKE_OP: pthread_cond_signal() speedup
ATM pthread_cond_signal is unnecessarily slow, because it wakes one waiter
(which at least on UP usually means an immediate context switch to one of
the waiter threads). This waiter wakes up and after a few instructions it
attempts to acquire the cv internal lock, but that lock is still held by
the thread calling pthread_cond_signal. So it goes to sleep and eventually
the signalling thread is scheduled in, unlocks the internal lock and wakes
the waiter again.
Now, before 2003-09-21 NPTL was using FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal
to avoid this performance issue, but it was removed when locks were
redesigned to the 3 state scheme (unlocked, locked uncontended, locked
contended).
Following scenario shows why simply using FUTEX_REQUEUE in
pthread_cond_signal together with using lll_mutex_unlock_force in place of
lll_mutex_unlock is not enough and probably why it has been disabled at
that time:
The number is value in cv->__data.__lock.
thr1 thr2 thr3
0 pthread_cond_wait
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__futex, futexval)
0 pthread_cond_signal
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
1 pthread_cond_signal
2 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
2 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__lock, 2)
2 lll_futex_requeue (&cv->__data.__futex, 0, 1, &cv->__data.__lock)
# FUTEX_REQUEUE, not FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
2 lll_mutex_unlock_force (cv->__data.__lock)
0 cv->__data.__lock = 0
0 lll_futex_wake (&cv->__data.__lock, 1)
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
# Here, lll_mutex_unlock doesn't know there are threads waiting
# on the internal cv's lock
Now, I believe it is possible to use FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal,
but it will cost us not one, but 2 extra syscalls and, what's worse, one of
these extra syscalls will be done for every single waiting loop in
pthread_cond_*wait.
We would need to use lll_mutex_unlock_force in pthread_cond_signal after
requeue and lll_mutex_cond_lock in pthread_cond_*wait after lll_futex_wait.
Another alternative is to do the unlocking pthread_cond_signal needs to do
(the lock can't be unlocked before lll_futex_wake, as that is racy) in the
kernel.
I have implemented both variants, futex-requeue-glibc.patch is the first
one and futex-wake_op{,-glibc}.patch is the unlocking inside of the kernel.
The kernel interface allows userland to specify how exactly an unlocking
operation should look like (some atomic arithmetic operation with optional
constant argument and comparison of the previous futex value with another
constant).
It has been implemented just for ppc*, x86_64 and i?86, for other
architectures I'm including just a stub header which can be used as a
starting point by maintainers to write support for their arches and ATM
will just return -ENOSYS for FUTEX_WAKE_OP. The requeue patch has been
(lightly) tested just on x86_64, the wake_op patch on ppc64 kernel running
32-bit and 64-bit NPTL and x86_64 kernel running 32-bit and 64-bit NPTL.
With the following benchmark on UP x86-64 I get:
for i in nptl-orig nptl-requeue nptl-wake_op; do echo time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench; \
for j in 1 2; do echo ( time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench ) 2>&1; done; done
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-orig /tmp/bench
real 0m0.655s user 0m0.253s sys 0m0.403s
real 0m0.657s user 0m0.269s sys 0m0.388s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-requeue /tmp/bench
real 0m0.496s user 0m0.225s sys 0m0.271s
real 0m0.531s user 0m0.242s sys 0m0.288s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-wake_op /tmp/bench
real 0m0.380s user 0m0.176s sys 0m0.204s
real 0m0.382s user 0m0.175s sys 0m0.207s
The benchmark is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00001.txt
Older futex-requeue-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00002.txt
Older futex-wake_op-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00003.txt
Will post a new version (just x86-64 fixes so that the patch
applies against pthread_cond_signal.S) to libc-hacker ml soon.
Attached is the kernel FUTEX_WAKE_OP patch as well as a simple-minded
testcase that will not test the atomicity of the operation, but at least
check if the threads that should have been woken up are woken up and
whether the arithmetic operation in the kernel gave the expected results.
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yuasa@hh.iij4u.or.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-06 22:16:25 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Wake up all waiters hashed on the physical page that is mapped
|
|
|
|
* to this virtual address:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
futex_wake_op(u32 __user *uaddr1, unsigned int flags, u32 __user *uaddr2,
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
int nr_wake, int nr_wake2, int op)
|
[PATCH] FUTEX_WAKE_OP: pthread_cond_signal() speedup
ATM pthread_cond_signal is unnecessarily slow, because it wakes one waiter
(which at least on UP usually means an immediate context switch to one of
the waiter threads). This waiter wakes up and after a few instructions it
attempts to acquire the cv internal lock, but that lock is still held by
the thread calling pthread_cond_signal. So it goes to sleep and eventually
the signalling thread is scheduled in, unlocks the internal lock and wakes
the waiter again.
Now, before 2003-09-21 NPTL was using FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal
to avoid this performance issue, but it was removed when locks were
redesigned to the 3 state scheme (unlocked, locked uncontended, locked
contended).
Following scenario shows why simply using FUTEX_REQUEUE in
pthread_cond_signal together with using lll_mutex_unlock_force in place of
lll_mutex_unlock is not enough and probably why it has been disabled at
that time:
The number is value in cv->__data.__lock.
thr1 thr2 thr3
0 pthread_cond_wait
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__futex, futexval)
0 pthread_cond_signal
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
1 pthread_cond_signal
2 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
2 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__lock, 2)
2 lll_futex_requeue (&cv->__data.__futex, 0, 1, &cv->__data.__lock)
# FUTEX_REQUEUE, not FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
2 lll_mutex_unlock_force (cv->__data.__lock)
0 cv->__data.__lock = 0
0 lll_futex_wake (&cv->__data.__lock, 1)
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
# Here, lll_mutex_unlock doesn't know there are threads waiting
# on the internal cv's lock
Now, I believe it is possible to use FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal,
but it will cost us not one, but 2 extra syscalls and, what's worse, one of
these extra syscalls will be done for every single waiting loop in
pthread_cond_*wait.
We would need to use lll_mutex_unlock_force in pthread_cond_signal after
requeue and lll_mutex_cond_lock in pthread_cond_*wait after lll_futex_wait.
Another alternative is to do the unlocking pthread_cond_signal needs to do
(the lock can't be unlocked before lll_futex_wake, as that is racy) in the
kernel.
I have implemented both variants, futex-requeue-glibc.patch is the first
one and futex-wake_op{,-glibc}.patch is the unlocking inside of the kernel.
The kernel interface allows userland to specify how exactly an unlocking
operation should look like (some atomic arithmetic operation with optional
constant argument and comparison of the previous futex value with another
constant).
It has been implemented just for ppc*, x86_64 and i?86, for other
architectures I'm including just a stub header which can be used as a
starting point by maintainers to write support for their arches and ATM
will just return -ENOSYS for FUTEX_WAKE_OP. The requeue patch has been
(lightly) tested just on x86_64, the wake_op patch on ppc64 kernel running
32-bit and 64-bit NPTL and x86_64 kernel running 32-bit and 64-bit NPTL.
With the following benchmark on UP x86-64 I get:
for i in nptl-orig nptl-requeue nptl-wake_op; do echo time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench; \
for j in 1 2; do echo ( time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench ) 2>&1; done; done
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-orig /tmp/bench
real 0m0.655s user 0m0.253s sys 0m0.403s
real 0m0.657s user 0m0.269s sys 0m0.388s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-requeue /tmp/bench
real 0m0.496s user 0m0.225s sys 0m0.271s
real 0m0.531s user 0m0.242s sys 0m0.288s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-wake_op /tmp/bench
real 0m0.380s user 0m0.176s sys 0m0.204s
real 0m0.382s user 0m0.175s sys 0m0.207s
The benchmark is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00001.txt
Older futex-requeue-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00002.txt
Older futex-wake_op-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00003.txt
Will post a new version (just x86-64 fixes so that the patch
applies against pthread_cond_signal.S) to libc-hacker ml soon.
Attached is the kernel FUTEX_WAKE_OP patch as well as a simple-minded
testcase that will not test the atomicity of the operation, but at least
check if the threads that should have been woken up are woken up and
whether the arithmetic operation in the kernel gave the expected results.
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yuasa@hh.iij4u.or.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-06 22:16:25 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-09-26 17:32:20 +00:00
|
|
|
union futex_key key1 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT, key2 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1, *hb2;
|
[PATCH] FUTEX_WAKE_OP: pthread_cond_signal() speedup
ATM pthread_cond_signal is unnecessarily slow, because it wakes one waiter
(which at least on UP usually means an immediate context switch to one of
the waiter threads). This waiter wakes up and after a few instructions it
attempts to acquire the cv internal lock, but that lock is still held by
the thread calling pthread_cond_signal. So it goes to sleep and eventually
the signalling thread is scheduled in, unlocks the internal lock and wakes
the waiter again.
Now, before 2003-09-21 NPTL was using FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal
to avoid this performance issue, but it was removed when locks were
redesigned to the 3 state scheme (unlocked, locked uncontended, locked
contended).
Following scenario shows why simply using FUTEX_REQUEUE in
pthread_cond_signal together with using lll_mutex_unlock_force in place of
lll_mutex_unlock is not enough and probably why it has been disabled at
that time:
The number is value in cv->__data.__lock.
thr1 thr2 thr3
0 pthread_cond_wait
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__futex, futexval)
0 pthread_cond_signal
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
1 pthread_cond_signal
2 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
2 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__lock, 2)
2 lll_futex_requeue (&cv->__data.__futex, 0, 1, &cv->__data.__lock)
# FUTEX_REQUEUE, not FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
2 lll_mutex_unlock_force (cv->__data.__lock)
0 cv->__data.__lock = 0
0 lll_futex_wake (&cv->__data.__lock, 1)
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
# Here, lll_mutex_unlock doesn't know there are threads waiting
# on the internal cv's lock
Now, I believe it is possible to use FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal,
but it will cost us not one, but 2 extra syscalls and, what's worse, one of
these extra syscalls will be done for every single waiting loop in
pthread_cond_*wait.
We would need to use lll_mutex_unlock_force in pthread_cond_signal after
requeue and lll_mutex_cond_lock in pthread_cond_*wait after lll_futex_wait.
Another alternative is to do the unlocking pthread_cond_signal needs to do
(the lock can't be unlocked before lll_futex_wake, as that is racy) in the
kernel.
I have implemented both variants, futex-requeue-glibc.patch is the first
one and futex-wake_op{,-glibc}.patch is the unlocking inside of the kernel.
The kernel interface allows userland to specify how exactly an unlocking
operation should look like (some atomic arithmetic operation with optional
constant argument and comparison of the previous futex value with another
constant).
It has been implemented just for ppc*, x86_64 and i?86, for other
architectures I'm including just a stub header which can be used as a
starting point by maintainers to write support for their arches and ATM
will just return -ENOSYS for FUTEX_WAKE_OP. The requeue patch has been
(lightly) tested just on x86_64, the wake_op patch on ppc64 kernel running
32-bit and 64-bit NPTL and x86_64 kernel running 32-bit and 64-bit NPTL.
With the following benchmark on UP x86-64 I get:
for i in nptl-orig nptl-requeue nptl-wake_op; do echo time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench; \
for j in 1 2; do echo ( time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench ) 2>&1; done; done
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-orig /tmp/bench
real 0m0.655s user 0m0.253s sys 0m0.403s
real 0m0.657s user 0m0.269s sys 0m0.388s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-requeue /tmp/bench
real 0m0.496s user 0m0.225s sys 0m0.271s
real 0m0.531s user 0m0.242s sys 0m0.288s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-wake_op /tmp/bench
real 0m0.380s user 0m0.176s sys 0m0.204s
real 0m0.382s user 0m0.175s sys 0m0.207s
The benchmark is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00001.txt
Older futex-requeue-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00002.txt
Older futex-wake_op-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00003.txt
Will post a new version (just x86-64 fixes so that the patch
applies against pthread_cond_signal.S) to libc-hacker ml soon.
Attached is the kernel FUTEX_WAKE_OP patch as well as a simple-minded
testcase that will not test the atomicity of the operation, but at least
check if the threads that should have been woken up are woken up and
whether the arithmetic operation in the kernel gave the expected results.
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yuasa@hh.iij4u.or.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-06 22:16:25 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_q *this, *next;
|
2009-03-12 07:56:13 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret, op_ret;
|
2016-11-17 16:46:38 +00:00
|
|
|
DEFINE_WAKE_Q(wake_q);
|
[PATCH] FUTEX_WAKE_OP: pthread_cond_signal() speedup
ATM pthread_cond_signal is unnecessarily slow, because it wakes one waiter
(which at least on UP usually means an immediate context switch to one of
the waiter threads). This waiter wakes up and after a few instructions it
attempts to acquire the cv internal lock, but that lock is still held by
the thread calling pthread_cond_signal. So it goes to sleep and eventually
the signalling thread is scheduled in, unlocks the internal lock and wakes
the waiter again.
Now, before 2003-09-21 NPTL was using FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal
to avoid this performance issue, but it was removed when locks were
redesigned to the 3 state scheme (unlocked, locked uncontended, locked
contended).
Following scenario shows why simply using FUTEX_REQUEUE in
pthread_cond_signal together with using lll_mutex_unlock_force in place of
lll_mutex_unlock is not enough and probably why it has been disabled at
that time:
The number is value in cv->__data.__lock.
thr1 thr2 thr3
0 pthread_cond_wait
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__futex, futexval)
0 pthread_cond_signal
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
1 pthread_cond_signal
2 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
2 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__lock, 2)
2 lll_futex_requeue (&cv->__data.__futex, 0, 1, &cv->__data.__lock)
# FUTEX_REQUEUE, not FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
2 lll_mutex_unlock_force (cv->__data.__lock)
0 cv->__data.__lock = 0
0 lll_futex_wake (&cv->__data.__lock, 1)
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
# Here, lll_mutex_unlock doesn't know there are threads waiting
# on the internal cv's lock
Now, I believe it is possible to use FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal,
but it will cost us not one, but 2 extra syscalls and, what's worse, one of
these extra syscalls will be done for every single waiting loop in
pthread_cond_*wait.
We would need to use lll_mutex_unlock_force in pthread_cond_signal after
requeue and lll_mutex_cond_lock in pthread_cond_*wait after lll_futex_wait.
Another alternative is to do the unlocking pthread_cond_signal needs to do
(the lock can't be unlocked before lll_futex_wake, as that is racy) in the
kernel.
I have implemented both variants, futex-requeue-glibc.patch is the first
one and futex-wake_op{,-glibc}.patch is the unlocking inside of the kernel.
The kernel interface allows userland to specify how exactly an unlocking
operation should look like (some atomic arithmetic operation with optional
constant argument and comparison of the previous futex value with another
constant).
It has been implemented just for ppc*, x86_64 and i?86, for other
architectures I'm including just a stub header which can be used as a
starting point by maintainers to write support for their arches and ATM
will just return -ENOSYS for FUTEX_WAKE_OP. The requeue patch has been
(lightly) tested just on x86_64, the wake_op patch on ppc64 kernel running
32-bit and 64-bit NPTL and x86_64 kernel running 32-bit and 64-bit NPTL.
With the following benchmark on UP x86-64 I get:
for i in nptl-orig nptl-requeue nptl-wake_op; do echo time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench; \
for j in 1 2; do echo ( time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench ) 2>&1; done; done
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-orig /tmp/bench
real 0m0.655s user 0m0.253s sys 0m0.403s
real 0m0.657s user 0m0.269s sys 0m0.388s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-requeue /tmp/bench
real 0m0.496s user 0m0.225s sys 0m0.271s
real 0m0.531s user 0m0.242s sys 0m0.288s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-wake_op /tmp/bench
real 0m0.380s user 0m0.176s sys 0m0.204s
real 0m0.382s user 0m0.175s sys 0m0.207s
The benchmark is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00001.txt
Older futex-requeue-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00002.txt
Older futex-wake_op-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00003.txt
Will post a new version (just x86-64 fixes so that the patch
applies against pthread_cond_signal.S) to libc-hacker ml soon.
Attached is the kernel FUTEX_WAKE_OP patch as well as a simple-minded
testcase that will not test the atomicity of the operation, but at least
check if the threads that should have been woken up are woken up and
whether the arithmetic operation in the kernel gave the expected results.
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yuasa@hh.iij4u.or.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-06 22:16:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-12 07:56:13 +00:00
|
|
|
retry:
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 02:57:57 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr1, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key1, FUTEX_READ);
|
[PATCH] FUTEX_WAKE_OP: pthread_cond_signal() speedup
ATM pthread_cond_signal is unnecessarily slow, because it wakes one waiter
(which at least on UP usually means an immediate context switch to one of
the waiter threads). This waiter wakes up and after a few instructions it
attempts to acquire the cv internal lock, but that lock is still held by
the thread calling pthread_cond_signal. So it goes to sleep and eventually
the signalling thread is scheduled in, unlocks the internal lock and wakes
the waiter again.
Now, before 2003-09-21 NPTL was using FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal
to avoid this performance issue, but it was removed when locks were
redesigned to the 3 state scheme (unlocked, locked uncontended, locked
contended).
Following scenario shows why simply using FUTEX_REQUEUE in
pthread_cond_signal together with using lll_mutex_unlock_force in place of
lll_mutex_unlock is not enough and probably why it has been disabled at
that time:
The number is value in cv->__data.__lock.
thr1 thr2 thr3
0 pthread_cond_wait
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__futex, futexval)
0 pthread_cond_signal
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
1 pthread_cond_signal
2 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
2 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__lock, 2)
2 lll_futex_requeue (&cv->__data.__futex, 0, 1, &cv->__data.__lock)
# FUTEX_REQUEUE, not FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
2 lll_mutex_unlock_force (cv->__data.__lock)
0 cv->__data.__lock = 0
0 lll_futex_wake (&cv->__data.__lock, 1)
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
# Here, lll_mutex_unlock doesn't know there are threads waiting
# on the internal cv's lock
Now, I believe it is possible to use FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal,
but it will cost us not one, but 2 extra syscalls and, what's worse, one of
these extra syscalls will be done for every single waiting loop in
pthread_cond_*wait.
We would need to use lll_mutex_unlock_force in pthread_cond_signal after
requeue and lll_mutex_cond_lock in pthread_cond_*wait after lll_futex_wait.
Another alternative is to do the unlocking pthread_cond_signal needs to do
(the lock can't be unlocked before lll_futex_wake, as that is racy) in the
kernel.
I have implemented both variants, futex-requeue-glibc.patch is the first
one and futex-wake_op{,-glibc}.patch is the unlocking inside of the kernel.
The kernel interface allows userland to specify how exactly an unlocking
operation should look like (some atomic arithmetic operation with optional
constant argument and comparison of the previous futex value with another
constant).
It has been implemented just for ppc*, x86_64 and i?86, for other
architectures I'm including just a stub header which can be used as a
starting point by maintainers to write support for their arches and ATM
will just return -ENOSYS for FUTEX_WAKE_OP. The requeue patch has been
(lightly) tested just on x86_64, the wake_op patch on ppc64 kernel running
32-bit and 64-bit NPTL and x86_64 kernel running 32-bit and 64-bit NPTL.
With the following benchmark on UP x86-64 I get:
for i in nptl-orig nptl-requeue nptl-wake_op; do echo time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench; \
for j in 1 2; do echo ( time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench ) 2>&1; done; done
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-orig /tmp/bench
real 0m0.655s user 0m0.253s sys 0m0.403s
real 0m0.657s user 0m0.269s sys 0m0.388s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-requeue /tmp/bench
real 0m0.496s user 0m0.225s sys 0m0.271s
real 0m0.531s user 0m0.242s sys 0m0.288s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-wake_op /tmp/bench
real 0m0.380s user 0m0.176s sys 0m0.204s
real 0m0.382s user 0m0.175s sys 0m0.207s
The benchmark is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00001.txt
Older futex-requeue-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00002.txt
Older futex-wake_op-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00003.txt
Will post a new version (just x86-64 fixes so that the patch
applies against pthread_cond_signal.S) to libc-hacker ml soon.
Attached is the kernel FUTEX_WAKE_OP patch as well as a simple-minded
testcase that will not test the atomicity of the operation, but at least
check if the threads that should have been woken up are woken up and
whether the arithmetic operation in the kernel gave the expected results.
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yuasa@hh.iij4u.or.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-06 22:16:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
|
2020-07-02 20:28:41 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 02:57:57 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key2, FUTEX_WRITE);
|
[PATCH] FUTEX_WAKE_OP: pthread_cond_signal() speedup
ATM pthread_cond_signal is unnecessarily slow, because it wakes one waiter
(which at least on UP usually means an immediate context switch to one of
the waiter threads). This waiter wakes up and after a few instructions it
attempts to acquire the cv internal lock, but that lock is still held by
the thread calling pthread_cond_signal. So it goes to sleep and eventually
the signalling thread is scheduled in, unlocks the internal lock and wakes
the waiter again.
Now, before 2003-09-21 NPTL was using FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal
to avoid this performance issue, but it was removed when locks were
redesigned to the 3 state scheme (unlocked, locked uncontended, locked
contended).
Following scenario shows why simply using FUTEX_REQUEUE in
pthread_cond_signal together with using lll_mutex_unlock_force in place of
lll_mutex_unlock is not enough and probably why it has been disabled at
that time:
The number is value in cv->__data.__lock.
thr1 thr2 thr3
0 pthread_cond_wait
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__futex, futexval)
0 pthread_cond_signal
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
1 pthread_cond_signal
2 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
2 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__lock, 2)
2 lll_futex_requeue (&cv->__data.__futex, 0, 1, &cv->__data.__lock)
# FUTEX_REQUEUE, not FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
2 lll_mutex_unlock_force (cv->__data.__lock)
0 cv->__data.__lock = 0
0 lll_futex_wake (&cv->__data.__lock, 1)
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
# Here, lll_mutex_unlock doesn't know there are threads waiting
# on the internal cv's lock
Now, I believe it is possible to use FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal,
but it will cost us not one, but 2 extra syscalls and, what's worse, one of
these extra syscalls will be done for every single waiting loop in
pthread_cond_*wait.
We would need to use lll_mutex_unlock_force in pthread_cond_signal after
requeue and lll_mutex_cond_lock in pthread_cond_*wait after lll_futex_wait.
Another alternative is to do the unlocking pthread_cond_signal needs to do
(the lock can't be unlocked before lll_futex_wake, as that is racy) in the
kernel.
I have implemented both variants, futex-requeue-glibc.patch is the first
one and futex-wake_op{,-glibc}.patch is the unlocking inside of the kernel.
The kernel interface allows userland to specify how exactly an unlocking
operation should look like (some atomic arithmetic operation with optional
constant argument and comparison of the previous futex value with another
constant).
It has been implemented just for ppc*, x86_64 and i?86, for other
architectures I'm including just a stub header which can be used as a
starting point by maintainers to write support for their arches and ATM
will just return -ENOSYS for FUTEX_WAKE_OP. The requeue patch has been
(lightly) tested just on x86_64, the wake_op patch on ppc64 kernel running
32-bit and 64-bit NPTL and x86_64 kernel running 32-bit and 64-bit NPTL.
With the following benchmark on UP x86-64 I get:
for i in nptl-orig nptl-requeue nptl-wake_op; do echo time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench; \
for j in 1 2; do echo ( time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench ) 2>&1; done; done
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-orig /tmp/bench
real 0m0.655s user 0m0.253s sys 0m0.403s
real 0m0.657s user 0m0.269s sys 0m0.388s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-requeue /tmp/bench
real 0m0.496s user 0m0.225s sys 0m0.271s
real 0m0.531s user 0m0.242s sys 0m0.288s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-wake_op /tmp/bench
real 0m0.380s user 0m0.176s sys 0m0.204s
real 0m0.382s user 0m0.175s sys 0m0.207s
The benchmark is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00001.txt
Older futex-requeue-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00002.txt
Older futex-wake_op-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00003.txt
Will post a new version (just x86-64 fixes so that the patch
applies against pthread_cond_signal.S) to libc-hacker ml soon.
Attached is the kernel FUTEX_WAKE_OP patch as well as a simple-minded
testcase that will not test the atomicity of the operation, but at least
check if the threads that should have been woken up are woken up and
whether the arithmetic operation in the kernel gave the expected results.
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yuasa@hh.iij4u.or.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-06 22:16:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
|
2020-07-02 20:28:41 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
[PATCH] FUTEX_WAKE_OP: pthread_cond_signal() speedup
ATM pthread_cond_signal is unnecessarily slow, because it wakes one waiter
(which at least on UP usually means an immediate context switch to one of
the waiter threads). This waiter wakes up and after a few instructions it
attempts to acquire the cv internal lock, but that lock is still held by
the thread calling pthread_cond_signal. So it goes to sleep and eventually
the signalling thread is scheduled in, unlocks the internal lock and wakes
the waiter again.
Now, before 2003-09-21 NPTL was using FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal
to avoid this performance issue, but it was removed when locks were
redesigned to the 3 state scheme (unlocked, locked uncontended, locked
contended).
Following scenario shows why simply using FUTEX_REQUEUE in
pthread_cond_signal together with using lll_mutex_unlock_force in place of
lll_mutex_unlock is not enough and probably why it has been disabled at
that time:
The number is value in cv->__data.__lock.
thr1 thr2 thr3
0 pthread_cond_wait
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__futex, futexval)
0 pthread_cond_signal
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
1 pthread_cond_signal
2 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
2 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__lock, 2)
2 lll_futex_requeue (&cv->__data.__futex, 0, 1, &cv->__data.__lock)
# FUTEX_REQUEUE, not FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
2 lll_mutex_unlock_force (cv->__data.__lock)
0 cv->__data.__lock = 0
0 lll_futex_wake (&cv->__data.__lock, 1)
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
# Here, lll_mutex_unlock doesn't know there are threads waiting
# on the internal cv's lock
Now, I believe it is possible to use FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal,
but it will cost us not one, but 2 extra syscalls and, what's worse, one of
these extra syscalls will be done for every single waiting loop in
pthread_cond_*wait.
We would need to use lll_mutex_unlock_force in pthread_cond_signal after
requeue and lll_mutex_cond_lock in pthread_cond_*wait after lll_futex_wait.
Another alternative is to do the unlocking pthread_cond_signal needs to do
(the lock can't be unlocked before lll_futex_wake, as that is racy) in the
kernel.
I have implemented both variants, futex-requeue-glibc.patch is the first
one and futex-wake_op{,-glibc}.patch is the unlocking inside of the kernel.
The kernel interface allows userland to specify how exactly an unlocking
operation should look like (some atomic arithmetic operation with optional
constant argument and comparison of the previous futex value with another
constant).
It has been implemented just for ppc*, x86_64 and i?86, for other
architectures I'm including just a stub header which can be used as a
starting point by maintainers to write support for their arches and ATM
will just return -ENOSYS for FUTEX_WAKE_OP. The requeue patch has been
(lightly) tested just on x86_64, the wake_op patch on ppc64 kernel running
32-bit and 64-bit NPTL and x86_64 kernel running 32-bit and 64-bit NPTL.
With the following benchmark on UP x86-64 I get:
for i in nptl-orig nptl-requeue nptl-wake_op; do echo time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench; \
for j in 1 2; do echo ( time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench ) 2>&1; done; done
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-orig /tmp/bench
real 0m0.655s user 0m0.253s sys 0m0.403s
real 0m0.657s user 0m0.269s sys 0m0.388s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-requeue /tmp/bench
real 0m0.496s user 0m0.225s sys 0m0.271s
real 0m0.531s user 0m0.242s sys 0m0.288s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-wake_op /tmp/bench
real 0m0.380s user 0m0.176s sys 0m0.204s
real 0m0.382s user 0m0.175s sys 0m0.207s
The benchmark is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00001.txt
Older futex-requeue-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00002.txt
Older futex-wake_op-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00003.txt
Will post a new version (just x86-64 fixes so that the patch
applies against pthread_cond_signal.S) to libc-hacker ml soon.
Attached is the kernel FUTEX_WAKE_OP patch as well as a simple-minded
testcase that will not test the atomicity of the operation, but at least
check if the threads that should have been woken up are woken up and
whether the arithmetic operation in the kernel gave the expected results.
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yuasa@hh.iij4u.or.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-06 22:16:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
hb1 = hash_futex(&key1);
|
|
|
|
hb2 = hash_futex(&key2);
|
[PATCH] FUTEX_WAKE_OP: pthread_cond_signal() speedup
ATM pthread_cond_signal is unnecessarily slow, because it wakes one waiter
(which at least on UP usually means an immediate context switch to one of
the waiter threads). This waiter wakes up and after a few instructions it
attempts to acquire the cv internal lock, but that lock is still held by
the thread calling pthread_cond_signal. So it goes to sleep and eventually
the signalling thread is scheduled in, unlocks the internal lock and wakes
the waiter again.
Now, before 2003-09-21 NPTL was using FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal
to avoid this performance issue, but it was removed when locks were
redesigned to the 3 state scheme (unlocked, locked uncontended, locked
contended).
Following scenario shows why simply using FUTEX_REQUEUE in
pthread_cond_signal together with using lll_mutex_unlock_force in place of
lll_mutex_unlock is not enough and probably why it has been disabled at
that time:
The number is value in cv->__data.__lock.
thr1 thr2 thr3
0 pthread_cond_wait
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__futex, futexval)
0 pthread_cond_signal
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
1 pthread_cond_signal
2 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
2 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__lock, 2)
2 lll_futex_requeue (&cv->__data.__futex, 0, 1, &cv->__data.__lock)
# FUTEX_REQUEUE, not FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
2 lll_mutex_unlock_force (cv->__data.__lock)
0 cv->__data.__lock = 0
0 lll_futex_wake (&cv->__data.__lock, 1)
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
# Here, lll_mutex_unlock doesn't know there are threads waiting
# on the internal cv's lock
Now, I believe it is possible to use FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal,
but it will cost us not one, but 2 extra syscalls and, what's worse, one of
these extra syscalls will be done for every single waiting loop in
pthread_cond_*wait.
We would need to use lll_mutex_unlock_force in pthread_cond_signal after
requeue and lll_mutex_cond_lock in pthread_cond_*wait after lll_futex_wait.
Another alternative is to do the unlocking pthread_cond_signal needs to do
(the lock can't be unlocked before lll_futex_wake, as that is racy) in the
kernel.
I have implemented both variants, futex-requeue-glibc.patch is the first
one and futex-wake_op{,-glibc}.patch is the unlocking inside of the kernel.
The kernel interface allows userland to specify how exactly an unlocking
operation should look like (some atomic arithmetic operation with optional
constant argument and comparison of the previous futex value with another
constant).
It has been implemented just for ppc*, x86_64 and i?86, for other
architectures I'm including just a stub header which can be used as a
starting point by maintainers to write support for their arches and ATM
will just return -ENOSYS for FUTEX_WAKE_OP. The requeue patch has been
(lightly) tested just on x86_64, the wake_op patch on ppc64 kernel running
32-bit and 64-bit NPTL and x86_64 kernel running 32-bit and 64-bit NPTL.
With the following benchmark on UP x86-64 I get:
for i in nptl-orig nptl-requeue nptl-wake_op; do echo time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench; \
for j in 1 2; do echo ( time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench ) 2>&1; done; done
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-orig /tmp/bench
real 0m0.655s user 0m0.253s sys 0m0.403s
real 0m0.657s user 0m0.269s sys 0m0.388s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-requeue /tmp/bench
real 0m0.496s user 0m0.225s sys 0m0.271s
real 0m0.531s user 0m0.242s sys 0m0.288s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-wake_op /tmp/bench
real 0m0.380s user 0m0.176s sys 0m0.204s
real 0m0.382s user 0m0.175s sys 0m0.207s
The benchmark is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00001.txt
Older futex-requeue-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00002.txt
Older futex-wake_op-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00003.txt
Will post a new version (just x86-64 fixes so that the patch
applies against pthread_cond_signal.S) to libc-hacker ml soon.
Attached is the kernel FUTEX_WAKE_OP patch as well as a simple-minded
testcase that will not test the atomicity of the operation, but at least
check if the threads that should have been woken up are woken up and
whether the arithmetic operation in the kernel gave the expected results.
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yuasa@hh.iij4u.or.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-06 22:16:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-12 07:56:13 +00:00
|
|
|
retry_private:
|
2009-10-04 07:34:17 +00:00
|
|
|
double_lock_hb(hb1, hb2);
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
op_ret = futex_atomic_op_inuser(op, uaddr2);
|
[PATCH] FUTEX_WAKE_OP: pthread_cond_signal() speedup
ATM pthread_cond_signal is unnecessarily slow, because it wakes one waiter
(which at least on UP usually means an immediate context switch to one of
the waiter threads). This waiter wakes up and after a few instructions it
attempts to acquire the cv internal lock, but that lock is still held by
the thread calling pthread_cond_signal. So it goes to sleep and eventually
the signalling thread is scheduled in, unlocks the internal lock and wakes
the waiter again.
Now, before 2003-09-21 NPTL was using FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal
to avoid this performance issue, but it was removed when locks were
redesigned to the 3 state scheme (unlocked, locked uncontended, locked
contended).
Following scenario shows why simply using FUTEX_REQUEUE in
pthread_cond_signal together with using lll_mutex_unlock_force in place of
lll_mutex_unlock is not enough and probably why it has been disabled at
that time:
The number is value in cv->__data.__lock.
thr1 thr2 thr3
0 pthread_cond_wait
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__futex, futexval)
0 pthread_cond_signal
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
1 pthread_cond_signal
2 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
2 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__lock, 2)
2 lll_futex_requeue (&cv->__data.__futex, 0, 1, &cv->__data.__lock)
# FUTEX_REQUEUE, not FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
2 lll_mutex_unlock_force (cv->__data.__lock)
0 cv->__data.__lock = 0
0 lll_futex_wake (&cv->__data.__lock, 1)
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
# Here, lll_mutex_unlock doesn't know there are threads waiting
# on the internal cv's lock
Now, I believe it is possible to use FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal,
but it will cost us not one, but 2 extra syscalls and, what's worse, one of
these extra syscalls will be done for every single waiting loop in
pthread_cond_*wait.
We would need to use lll_mutex_unlock_force in pthread_cond_signal after
requeue and lll_mutex_cond_lock in pthread_cond_*wait after lll_futex_wait.
Another alternative is to do the unlocking pthread_cond_signal needs to do
(the lock can't be unlocked before lll_futex_wake, as that is racy) in the
kernel.
I have implemented both variants, futex-requeue-glibc.patch is the first
one and futex-wake_op{,-glibc}.patch is the unlocking inside of the kernel.
The kernel interface allows userland to specify how exactly an unlocking
operation should look like (some atomic arithmetic operation with optional
constant argument and comparison of the previous futex value with another
constant).
It has been implemented just for ppc*, x86_64 and i?86, for other
architectures I'm including just a stub header which can be used as a
starting point by maintainers to write support for their arches and ATM
will just return -ENOSYS for FUTEX_WAKE_OP. The requeue patch has been
(lightly) tested just on x86_64, the wake_op patch on ppc64 kernel running
32-bit and 64-bit NPTL and x86_64 kernel running 32-bit and 64-bit NPTL.
With the following benchmark on UP x86-64 I get:
for i in nptl-orig nptl-requeue nptl-wake_op; do echo time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench; \
for j in 1 2; do echo ( time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench ) 2>&1; done; done
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-orig /tmp/bench
real 0m0.655s user 0m0.253s sys 0m0.403s
real 0m0.657s user 0m0.269s sys 0m0.388s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-requeue /tmp/bench
real 0m0.496s user 0m0.225s sys 0m0.271s
real 0m0.531s user 0m0.242s sys 0m0.288s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-wake_op /tmp/bench
real 0m0.380s user 0m0.176s sys 0m0.204s
real 0m0.382s user 0m0.175s sys 0m0.207s
The benchmark is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00001.txt
Older futex-requeue-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00002.txt
Older futex-wake_op-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00003.txt
Will post a new version (just x86-64 fixes so that the patch
applies against pthread_cond_signal.S) to libc-hacker ml soon.
Attached is the kernel FUTEX_WAKE_OP patch as well as a simple-minded
testcase that will not test the atomicity of the operation, but at least
check if the threads that should have been woken up are woken up and
whether the arithmetic operation in the kernel gave the expected results.
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yuasa@hh.iij4u.or.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-06 22:16:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(op_ret < 0)) {
|
2009-03-12 07:55:52 +00:00
|
|
|
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
|
[PATCH] FUTEX_WAKE_OP: pthread_cond_signal() speedup
ATM pthread_cond_signal is unnecessarily slow, because it wakes one waiter
(which at least on UP usually means an immediate context switch to one of
the waiter threads). This waiter wakes up and after a few instructions it
attempts to acquire the cv internal lock, but that lock is still held by
the thread calling pthread_cond_signal. So it goes to sleep and eventually
the signalling thread is scheduled in, unlocks the internal lock and wakes
the waiter again.
Now, before 2003-09-21 NPTL was using FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal
to avoid this performance issue, but it was removed when locks were
redesigned to the 3 state scheme (unlocked, locked uncontended, locked
contended).
Following scenario shows why simply using FUTEX_REQUEUE in
pthread_cond_signal together with using lll_mutex_unlock_force in place of
lll_mutex_unlock is not enough and probably why it has been disabled at
that time:
The number is value in cv->__data.__lock.
thr1 thr2 thr3
0 pthread_cond_wait
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__futex, futexval)
0 pthread_cond_signal
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
1 pthread_cond_signal
2 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
2 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__lock, 2)
2 lll_futex_requeue (&cv->__data.__futex, 0, 1, &cv->__data.__lock)
# FUTEX_REQUEUE, not FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
2 lll_mutex_unlock_force (cv->__data.__lock)
0 cv->__data.__lock = 0
0 lll_futex_wake (&cv->__data.__lock, 1)
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
# Here, lll_mutex_unlock doesn't know there are threads waiting
# on the internal cv's lock
Now, I believe it is possible to use FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal,
but it will cost us not one, but 2 extra syscalls and, what's worse, one of
these extra syscalls will be done for every single waiting loop in
pthread_cond_*wait.
We would need to use lll_mutex_unlock_force in pthread_cond_signal after
requeue and lll_mutex_cond_lock in pthread_cond_*wait after lll_futex_wait.
Another alternative is to do the unlocking pthread_cond_signal needs to do
(the lock can't be unlocked before lll_futex_wake, as that is racy) in the
kernel.
I have implemented both variants, futex-requeue-glibc.patch is the first
one and futex-wake_op{,-glibc}.patch is the unlocking inside of the kernel.
The kernel interface allows userland to specify how exactly an unlocking
operation should look like (some atomic arithmetic operation with optional
constant argument and comparison of the previous futex value with another
constant).
It has been implemented just for ppc*, x86_64 and i?86, for other
architectures I'm including just a stub header which can be used as a
starting point by maintainers to write support for their arches and ATM
will just return -ENOSYS for FUTEX_WAKE_OP. The requeue patch has been
(lightly) tested just on x86_64, the wake_op patch on ppc64 kernel running
32-bit and 64-bit NPTL and x86_64 kernel running 32-bit and 64-bit NPTL.
With the following benchmark on UP x86-64 I get:
for i in nptl-orig nptl-requeue nptl-wake_op; do echo time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench; \
for j in 1 2; do echo ( time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench ) 2>&1; done; done
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-orig /tmp/bench
real 0m0.655s user 0m0.253s sys 0m0.403s
real 0m0.657s user 0m0.269s sys 0m0.388s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-requeue /tmp/bench
real 0m0.496s user 0m0.225s sys 0m0.271s
real 0m0.531s user 0m0.242s sys 0m0.288s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-wake_op /tmp/bench
real 0m0.380s user 0m0.176s sys 0m0.204s
real 0m0.382s user 0m0.175s sys 0m0.207s
The benchmark is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00001.txt
Older futex-requeue-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00002.txt
Older futex-wake_op-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00003.txt
Will post a new version (just x86-64 fixes so that the patch
applies against pthread_cond_signal.S) to libc-hacker ml soon.
Attached is the kernel FUTEX_WAKE_OP patch as well as a simple-minded
testcase that will not test the atomicity of the operation, but at least
check if the threads that should have been woken up are woken up and
whether the arithmetic operation in the kernel gave the expected results.
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yuasa@hh.iij4u.or.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-06 22:16:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MMU) ||
|
|
|
|
unlikely(op_ret != -EFAULT && op_ret != -EAGAIN)) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* we don't get EFAULT from MMU faults if we don't have
|
|
|
|
* an MMU, but we might get them from range checking
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-11-07 08:59:33 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = op_ret;
|
2020-07-02 20:28:41 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2005-11-07 08:59:33 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
if (op_ret == -EFAULT) {
|
|
|
|
ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr2);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
2020-07-02 20:28:41 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
[PATCH] FUTEX_WAKE_OP: pthread_cond_signal() speedup
ATM pthread_cond_signal is unnecessarily slow, because it wakes one waiter
(which at least on UP usually means an immediate context switch to one of
the waiter threads). This waiter wakes up and after a few instructions it
attempts to acquire the cv internal lock, but that lock is still held by
the thread calling pthread_cond_signal. So it goes to sleep and eventually
the signalling thread is scheduled in, unlocks the internal lock and wakes
the waiter again.
Now, before 2003-09-21 NPTL was using FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal
to avoid this performance issue, but it was removed when locks were
redesigned to the 3 state scheme (unlocked, locked uncontended, locked
contended).
Following scenario shows why simply using FUTEX_REQUEUE in
pthread_cond_signal together with using lll_mutex_unlock_force in place of
lll_mutex_unlock is not enough and probably why it has been disabled at
that time:
The number is value in cv->__data.__lock.
thr1 thr2 thr3
0 pthread_cond_wait
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__futex, futexval)
0 pthread_cond_signal
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
1 pthread_cond_signal
2 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
2 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__lock, 2)
2 lll_futex_requeue (&cv->__data.__futex, 0, 1, &cv->__data.__lock)
# FUTEX_REQUEUE, not FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
2 lll_mutex_unlock_force (cv->__data.__lock)
0 cv->__data.__lock = 0
0 lll_futex_wake (&cv->__data.__lock, 1)
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
# Here, lll_mutex_unlock doesn't know there are threads waiting
# on the internal cv's lock
Now, I believe it is possible to use FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal,
but it will cost us not one, but 2 extra syscalls and, what's worse, one of
these extra syscalls will be done for every single waiting loop in
pthread_cond_*wait.
We would need to use lll_mutex_unlock_force in pthread_cond_signal after
requeue and lll_mutex_cond_lock in pthread_cond_*wait after lll_futex_wait.
Another alternative is to do the unlocking pthread_cond_signal needs to do
(the lock can't be unlocked before lll_futex_wake, as that is racy) in the
kernel.
I have implemented both variants, futex-requeue-glibc.patch is the first
one and futex-wake_op{,-glibc}.patch is the unlocking inside of the kernel.
The kernel interface allows userland to specify how exactly an unlocking
operation should look like (some atomic arithmetic operation with optional
constant argument and comparison of the previous futex value with another
constant).
It has been implemented just for ppc*, x86_64 and i?86, for other
architectures I'm including just a stub header which can be used as a
starting point by maintainers to write support for their arches and ATM
will just return -ENOSYS for FUTEX_WAKE_OP. The requeue patch has been
(lightly) tested just on x86_64, the wake_op patch on ppc64 kernel running
32-bit and 64-bit NPTL and x86_64 kernel running 32-bit and 64-bit NPTL.
With the following benchmark on UP x86-64 I get:
for i in nptl-orig nptl-requeue nptl-wake_op; do echo time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench; \
for j in 1 2; do echo ( time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench ) 2>&1; done; done
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-orig /tmp/bench
real 0m0.655s user 0m0.253s sys 0m0.403s
real 0m0.657s user 0m0.269s sys 0m0.388s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-requeue /tmp/bench
real 0m0.496s user 0m0.225s sys 0m0.271s
real 0m0.531s user 0m0.242s sys 0m0.288s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-wake_op /tmp/bench
real 0m0.380s user 0m0.176s sys 0m0.204s
real 0m0.382s user 0m0.175s sys 0m0.207s
The benchmark is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00001.txt
Older futex-requeue-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00002.txt
Older futex-wake_op-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00003.txt
Will post a new version (just x86-64 fixes so that the patch
applies against pthread_cond_signal.S) to libc-hacker ml soon.
Attached is the kernel FUTEX_WAKE_OP patch as well as a simple-minded
testcase that will not test the atomicity of the operation, but at least
check if the threads that should have been woken up are woken up and
whether the arithmetic operation in the kernel gave the expected results.
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yuasa@hh.iij4u.or.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-06 22:16:25 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
cond_resched();
|
2021-05-17 13:30:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(flags & FLAGS_SHARED))
|
|
|
|
goto retry_private;
|
2009-03-12 07:56:13 +00:00
|
|
|
goto retry;
|
[PATCH] FUTEX_WAKE_OP: pthread_cond_signal() speedup
ATM pthread_cond_signal is unnecessarily slow, because it wakes one waiter
(which at least on UP usually means an immediate context switch to one of
the waiter threads). This waiter wakes up and after a few instructions it
attempts to acquire the cv internal lock, but that lock is still held by
the thread calling pthread_cond_signal. So it goes to sleep and eventually
the signalling thread is scheduled in, unlocks the internal lock and wakes
the waiter again.
Now, before 2003-09-21 NPTL was using FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal
to avoid this performance issue, but it was removed when locks were
redesigned to the 3 state scheme (unlocked, locked uncontended, locked
contended).
Following scenario shows why simply using FUTEX_REQUEUE in
pthread_cond_signal together with using lll_mutex_unlock_force in place of
lll_mutex_unlock is not enough and probably why it has been disabled at
that time:
The number is value in cv->__data.__lock.
thr1 thr2 thr3
0 pthread_cond_wait
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__futex, futexval)
0 pthread_cond_signal
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
1 pthread_cond_signal
2 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
2 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__lock, 2)
2 lll_futex_requeue (&cv->__data.__futex, 0, 1, &cv->__data.__lock)
# FUTEX_REQUEUE, not FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
2 lll_mutex_unlock_force (cv->__data.__lock)
0 cv->__data.__lock = 0
0 lll_futex_wake (&cv->__data.__lock, 1)
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
# Here, lll_mutex_unlock doesn't know there are threads waiting
# on the internal cv's lock
Now, I believe it is possible to use FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal,
but it will cost us not one, but 2 extra syscalls and, what's worse, one of
these extra syscalls will be done for every single waiting loop in
pthread_cond_*wait.
We would need to use lll_mutex_unlock_force in pthread_cond_signal after
requeue and lll_mutex_cond_lock in pthread_cond_*wait after lll_futex_wait.
Another alternative is to do the unlocking pthread_cond_signal needs to do
(the lock can't be unlocked before lll_futex_wake, as that is racy) in the
kernel.
I have implemented both variants, futex-requeue-glibc.patch is the first
one and futex-wake_op{,-glibc}.patch is the unlocking inside of the kernel.
The kernel interface allows userland to specify how exactly an unlocking
operation should look like (some atomic arithmetic operation with optional
constant argument and comparison of the previous futex value with another
constant).
It has been implemented just for ppc*, x86_64 and i?86, for other
architectures I'm including just a stub header which can be used as a
starting point by maintainers to write support for their arches and ATM
will just return -ENOSYS for FUTEX_WAKE_OP. The requeue patch has been
(lightly) tested just on x86_64, the wake_op patch on ppc64 kernel running
32-bit and 64-bit NPTL and x86_64 kernel running 32-bit and 64-bit NPTL.
With the following benchmark on UP x86-64 I get:
for i in nptl-orig nptl-requeue nptl-wake_op; do echo time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench; \
for j in 1 2; do echo ( time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench ) 2>&1; done; done
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-orig /tmp/bench
real 0m0.655s user 0m0.253s sys 0m0.403s
real 0m0.657s user 0m0.269s sys 0m0.388s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-requeue /tmp/bench
real 0m0.496s user 0m0.225s sys 0m0.271s
real 0m0.531s user 0m0.242s sys 0m0.288s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-wake_op /tmp/bench
real 0m0.380s user 0m0.176s sys 0m0.204s
real 0m0.382s user 0m0.175s sys 0m0.207s
The benchmark is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00001.txt
Older futex-requeue-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00002.txt
Older futex-wake_op-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00003.txt
Will post a new version (just x86-64 fixes so that the patch
applies against pthread_cond_signal.S) to libc-hacker ml soon.
Attached is the kernel FUTEX_WAKE_OP patch as well as a simple-minded
testcase that will not test the atomicity of the operation, but at least
check if the threads that should have been woken up are woken up and
whether the arithmetic operation in the kernel gave the expected results.
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yuasa@hh.iij4u.or.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-06 22:16:25 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-01-12 23:31:22 +00:00
|
|
|
plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, &hb1->chain, list) {
|
[PATCH] FUTEX_WAKE_OP: pthread_cond_signal() speedup
ATM pthread_cond_signal is unnecessarily slow, because it wakes one waiter
(which at least on UP usually means an immediate context switch to one of
the waiter threads). This waiter wakes up and after a few instructions it
attempts to acquire the cv internal lock, but that lock is still held by
the thread calling pthread_cond_signal. So it goes to sleep and eventually
the signalling thread is scheduled in, unlocks the internal lock and wakes
the waiter again.
Now, before 2003-09-21 NPTL was using FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal
to avoid this performance issue, but it was removed when locks were
redesigned to the 3 state scheme (unlocked, locked uncontended, locked
contended).
Following scenario shows why simply using FUTEX_REQUEUE in
pthread_cond_signal together with using lll_mutex_unlock_force in place of
lll_mutex_unlock is not enough and probably why it has been disabled at
that time:
The number is value in cv->__data.__lock.
thr1 thr2 thr3
0 pthread_cond_wait
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__futex, futexval)
0 pthread_cond_signal
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
1 pthread_cond_signal
2 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
2 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__lock, 2)
2 lll_futex_requeue (&cv->__data.__futex, 0, 1, &cv->__data.__lock)
# FUTEX_REQUEUE, not FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
2 lll_mutex_unlock_force (cv->__data.__lock)
0 cv->__data.__lock = 0
0 lll_futex_wake (&cv->__data.__lock, 1)
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
# Here, lll_mutex_unlock doesn't know there are threads waiting
# on the internal cv's lock
Now, I believe it is possible to use FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal,
but it will cost us not one, but 2 extra syscalls and, what's worse, one of
these extra syscalls will be done for every single waiting loop in
pthread_cond_*wait.
We would need to use lll_mutex_unlock_force in pthread_cond_signal after
requeue and lll_mutex_cond_lock in pthread_cond_*wait after lll_futex_wait.
Another alternative is to do the unlocking pthread_cond_signal needs to do
(the lock can't be unlocked before lll_futex_wake, as that is racy) in the
kernel.
I have implemented both variants, futex-requeue-glibc.patch is the first
one and futex-wake_op{,-glibc}.patch is the unlocking inside of the kernel.
The kernel interface allows userland to specify how exactly an unlocking
operation should look like (some atomic arithmetic operation with optional
constant argument and comparison of the previous futex value with another
constant).
It has been implemented just for ppc*, x86_64 and i?86, for other
architectures I'm including just a stub header which can be used as a
starting point by maintainers to write support for their arches and ATM
will just return -ENOSYS for FUTEX_WAKE_OP. The requeue patch has been
(lightly) tested just on x86_64, the wake_op patch on ppc64 kernel running
32-bit and 64-bit NPTL and x86_64 kernel running 32-bit and 64-bit NPTL.
With the following benchmark on UP x86-64 I get:
for i in nptl-orig nptl-requeue nptl-wake_op; do echo time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench; \
for j in 1 2; do echo ( time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench ) 2>&1; done; done
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-orig /tmp/bench
real 0m0.655s user 0m0.253s sys 0m0.403s
real 0m0.657s user 0m0.269s sys 0m0.388s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-requeue /tmp/bench
real 0m0.496s user 0m0.225s sys 0m0.271s
real 0m0.531s user 0m0.242s sys 0m0.288s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-wake_op /tmp/bench
real 0m0.380s user 0m0.176s sys 0m0.204s
real 0m0.382s user 0m0.175s sys 0m0.207s
The benchmark is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00001.txt
Older futex-requeue-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00002.txt
Older futex-wake_op-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00003.txt
Will post a new version (just x86-64 fixes so that the patch
applies against pthread_cond_signal.S) to libc-hacker ml soon.
Attached is the kernel FUTEX_WAKE_OP patch as well as a simple-minded
testcase that will not test the atomicity of the operation, but at least
check if the threads that should have been woken up are woken up and
whether the arithmetic operation in the kernel gave the expected results.
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yuasa@hh.iij4u.or.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-06 22:16:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if (match_futex (&this->key, &key1)) {
|
2012-11-27 00:29:56 +00:00
|
|
|
if (this->pi_state || this->rt_waiter) {
|
|
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
goto out_unlock;
|
|
|
|
}
|
futex: Implement lockless wakeups
Given the overall futex architecture, any chance of reducing
hb->lock contention is welcome. In this particular case, using
wake-queues to enable lockless wakeups addresses very much real
world performance concerns, even cases of soft-lockups in cases
of large amounts of blocked tasks (which is not hard to find in
large boxes, using but just a handful of futex).
At the lowest level, this patch can reduce latency of a single thread
attempting to acquire hb->lock in highly contended scenarios by a
up to 2x. At lower counts of nr_wake there are no regressions,
confirming, of course, that the wake_q handling overhead is practically
non existent. For instance, while a fair amount of variation,
the extended pef-bench wakeup benchmark shows for a 20 core machine
the following avg per-thread time to wakeup its share of tasks:
nr_thr ms-before ms-after
16 0.0590 0.0215
32 0.0396 0.0220
48 0.0417 0.0182
64 0.0536 0.0236
80 0.0414 0.0097
96 0.0672 0.0152
Naturally, this can cause spurious wakeups. However there is no core code
that cannot handle them afaict, and furthermore tglx does have the point
that other events can already trigger them anyway.
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1430494072-30283-3-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-05-01 15:27:51 +00:00
|
|
|
mark_wake_futex(&wake_q, this);
|
[PATCH] FUTEX_WAKE_OP: pthread_cond_signal() speedup
ATM pthread_cond_signal is unnecessarily slow, because it wakes one waiter
(which at least on UP usually means an immediate context switch to one of
the waiter threads). This waiter wakes up and after a few instructions it
attempts to acquire the cv internal lock, but that lock is still held by
the thread calling pthread_cond_signal. So it goes to sleep and eventually
the signalling thread is scheduled in, unlocks the internal lock and wakes
the waiter again.
Now, before 2003-09-21 NPTL was using FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal
to avoid this performance issue, but it was removed when locks were
redesigned to the 3 state scheme (unlocked, locked uncontended, locked
contended).
Following scenario shows why simply using FUTEX_REQUEUE in
pthread_cond_signal together with using lll_mutex_unlock_force in place of
lll_mutex_unlock is not enough and probably why it has been disabled at
that time:
The number is value in cv->__data.__lock.
thr1 thr2 thr3
0 pthread_cond_wait
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__futex, futexval)
0 pthread_cond_signal
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
1 pthread_cond_signal
2 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
2 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__lock, 2)
2 lll_futex_requeue (&cv->__data.__futex, 0, 1, &cv->__data.__lock)
# FUTEX_REQUEUE, not FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
2 lll_mutex_unlock_force (cv->__data.__lock)
0 cv->__data.__lock = 0
0 lll_futex_wake (&cv->__data.__lock, 1)
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
# Here, lll_mutex_unlock doesn't know there are threads waiting
# on the internal cv's lock
Now, I believe it is possible to use FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal,
but it will cost us not one, but 2 extra syscalls and, what's worse, one of
these extra syscalls will be done for every single waiting loop in
pthread_cond_*wait.
We would need to use lll_mutex_unlock_force in pthread_cond_signal after
requeue and lll_mutex_cond_lock in pthread_cond_*wait after lll_futex_wait.
Another alternative is to do the unlocking pthread_cond_signal needs to do
(the lock can't be unlocked before lll_futex_wake, as that is racy) in the
kernel.
I have implemented both variants, futex-requeue-glibc.patch is the first
one and futex-wake_op{,-glibc}.patch is the unlocking inside of the kernel.
The kernel interface allows userland to specify how exactly an unlocking
operation should look like (some atomic arithmetic operation with optional
constant argument and comparison of the previous futex value with another
constant).
It has been implemented just for ppc*, x86_64 and i?86, for other
architectures I'm including just a stub header which can be used as a
starting point by maintainers to write support for their arches and ATM
will just return -ENOSYS for FUTEX_WAKE_OP. The requeue patch has been
(lightly) tested just on x86_64, the wake_op patch on ppc64 kernel running
32-bit and 64-bit NPTL and x86_64 kernel running 32-bit and 64-bit NPTL.
With the following benchmark on UP x86-64 I get:
for i in nptl-orig nptl-requeue nptl-wake_op; do echo time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench; \
for j in 1 2; do echo ( time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench ) 2>&1; done; done
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-orig /tmp/bench
real 0m0.655s user 0m0.253s sys 0m0.403s
real 0m0.657s user 0m0.269s sys 0m0.388s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-requeue /tmp/bench
real 0m0.496s user 0m0.225s sys 0m0.271s
real 0m0.531s user 0m0.242s sys 0m0.288s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-wake_op /tmp/bench
real 0m0.380s user 0m0.176s sys 0m0.204s
real 0m0.382s user 0m0.175s sys 0m0.207s
The benchmark is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00001.txt
Older futex-requeue-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00002.txt
Older futex-wake_op-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00003.txt
Will post a new version (just x86-64 fixes so that the patch
applies against pthread_cond_signal.S) to libc-hacker ml soon.
Attached is the kernel FUTEX_WAKE_OP patch as well as a simple-minded
testcase that will not test the atomicity of the operation, but at least
check if the threads that should have been woken up are woken up and
whether the arithmetic operation in the kernel gave the expected results.
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yuasa@hh.iij4u.or.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-06 22:16:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if (++ret >= nr_wake)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (op_ret > 0) {
|
|
|
|
op_ret = 0;
|
2014-01-12 23:31:22 +00:00
|
|
|
plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, &hb2->chain, list) {
|
[PATCH] FUTEX_WAKE_OP: pthread_cond_signal() speedup
ATM pthread_cond_signal is unnecessarily slow, because it wakes one waiter
(which at least on UP usually means an immediate context switch to one of
the waiter threads). This waiter wakes up and after a few instructions it
attempts to acquire the cv internal lock, but that lock is still held by
the thread calling pthread_cond_signal. So it goes to sleep and eventually
the signalling thread is scheduled in, unlocks the internal lock and wakes
the waiter again.
Now, before 2003-09-21 NPTL was using FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal
to avoid this performance issue, but it was removed when locks were
redesigned to the 3 state scheme (unlocked, locked uncontended, locked
contended).
Following scenario shows why simply using FUTEX_REQUEUE in
pthread_cond_signal together with using lll_mutex_unlock_force in place of
lll_mutex_unlock is not enough and probably why it has been disabled at
that time:
The number is value in cv->__data.__lock.
thr1 thr2 thr3
0 pthread_cond_wait
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__futex, futexval)
0 pthread_cond_signal
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
1 pthread_cond_signal
2 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
2 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__lock, 2)
2 lll_futex_requeue (&cv->__data.__futex, 0, 1, &cv->__data.__lock)
# FUTEX_REQUEUE, not FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
2 lll_mutex_unlock_force (cv->__data.__lock)
0 cv->__data.__lock = 0
0 lll_futex_wake (&cv->__data.__lock, 1)
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
# Here, lll_mutex_unlock doesn't know there are threads waiting
# on the internal cv's lock
Now, I believe it is possible to use FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal,
but it will cost us not one, but 2 extra syscalls and, what's worse, one of
these extra syscalls will be done for every single waiting loop in
pthread_cond_*wait.
We would need to use lll_mutex_unlock_force in pthread_cond_signal after
requeue and lll_mutex_cond_lock in pthread_cond_*wait after lll_futex_wait.
Another alternative is to do the unlocking pthread_cond_signal needs to do
(the lock can't be unlocked before lll_futex_wake, as that is racy) in the
kernel.
I have implemented both variants, futex-requeue-glibc.patch is the first
one and futex-wake_op{,-glibc}.patch is the unlocking inside of the kernel.
The kernel interface allows userland to specify how exactly an unlocking
operation should look like (some atomic arithmetic operation with optional
constant argument and comparison of the previous futex value with another
constant).
It has been implemented just for ppc*, x86_64 and i?86, for other
architectures I'm including just a stub header which can be used as a
starting point by maintainers to write support for their arches and ATM
will just return -ENOSYS for FUTEX_WAKE_OP. The requeue patch has been
(lightly) tested just on x86_64, the wake_op patch on ppc64 kernel running
32-bit and 64-bit NPTL and x86_64 kernel running 32-bit and 64-bit NPTL.
With the following benchmark on UP x86-64 I get:
for i in nptl-orig nptl-requeue nptl-wake_op; do echo time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench; \
for j in 1 2; do echo ( time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench ) 2>&1; done; done
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-orig /tmp/bench
real 0m0.655s user 0m0.253s sys 0m0.403s
real 0m0.657s user 0m0.269s sys 0m0.388s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-requeue /tmp/bench
real 0m0.496s user 0m0.225s sys 0m0.271s
real 0m0.531s user 0m0.242s sys 0m0.288s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-wake_op /tmp/bench
real 0m0.380s user 0m0.176s sys 0m0.204s
real 0m0.382s user 0m0.175s sys 0m0.207s
The benchmark is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00001.txt
Older futex-requeue-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00002.txt
Older futex-wake_op-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00003.txt
Will post a new version (just x86-64 fixes so that the patch
applies against pthread_cond_signal.S) to libc-hacker ml soon.
Attached is the kernel FUTEX_WAKE_OP patch as well as a simple-minded
testcase that will not test the atomicity of the operation, but at least
check if the threads that should have been woken up are woken up and
whether the arithmetic operation in the kernel gave the expected results.
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yuasa@hh.iij4u.or.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-06 22:16:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if (match_futex (&this->key, &key2)) {
|
2012-11-27 00:29:56 +00:00
|
|
|
if (this->pi_state || this->rt_waiter) {
|
|
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
goto out_unlock;
|
|
|
|
}
|
futex: Implement lockless wakeups
Given the overall futex architecture, any chance of reducing
hb->lock contention is welcome. In this particular case, using
wake-queues to enable lockless wakeups addresses very much real
world performance concerns, even cases of soft-lockups in cases
of large amounts of blocked tasks (which is not hard to find in
large boxes, using but just a handful of futex).
At the lowest level, this patch can reduce latency of a single thread
attempting to acquire hb->lock in highly contended scenarios by a
up to 2x. At lower counts of nr_wake there are no regressions,
confirming, of course, that the wake_q handling overhead is practically
non existent. For instance, while a fair amount of variation,
the extended pef-bench wakeup benchmark shows for a 20 core machine
the following avg per-thread time to wakeup its share of tasks:
nr_thr ms-before ms-after
16 0.0590 0.0215
32 0.0396 0.0220
48 0.0417 0.0182
64 0.0536 0.0236
80 0.0414 0.0097
96 0.0672 0.0152
Naturally, this can cause spurious wakeups. However there is no core code
that cannot handle them afaict, and furthermore tglx does have the point
that other events can already trigger them anyway.
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1430494072-30283-3-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-05-01 15:27:51 +00:00
|
|
|
mark_wake_futex(&wake_q, this);
|
[PATCH] FUTEX_WAKE_OP: pthread_cond_signal() speedup
ATM pthread_cond_signal is unnecessarily slow, because it wakes one waiter
(which at least on UP usually means an immediate context switch to one of
the waiter threads). This waiter wakes up and after a few instructions it
attempts to acquire the cv internal lock, but that lock is still held by
the thread calling pthread_cond_signal. So it goes to sleep and eventually
the signalling thread is scheduled in, unlocks the internal lock and wakes
the waiter again.
Now, before 2003-09-21 NPTL was using FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal
to avoid this performance issue, but it was removed when locks were
redesigned to the 3 state scheme (unlocked, locked uncontended, locked
contended).
Following scenario shows why simply using FUTEX_REQUEUE in
pthread_cond_signal together with using lll_mutex_unlock_force in place of
lll_mutex_unlock is not enough and probably why it has been disabled at
that time:
The number is value in cv->__data.__lock.
thr1 thr2 thr3
0 pthread_cond_wait
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__futex, futexval)
0 pthread_cond_signal
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
1 pthread_cond_signal
2 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
2 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__lock, 2)
2 lll_futex_requeue (&cv->__data.__futex, 0, 1, &cv->__data.__lock)
# FUTEX_REQUEUE, not FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
2 lll_mutex_unlock_force (cv->__data.__lock)
0 cv->__data.__lock = 0
0 lll_futex_wake (&cv->__data.__lock, 1)
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
# Here, lll_mutex_unlock doesn't know there are threads waiting
# on the internal cv's lock
Now, I believe it is possible to use FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal,
but it will cost us not one, but 2 extra syscalls and, what's worse, one of
these extra syscalls will be done for every single waiting loop in
pthread_cond_*wait.
We would need to use lll_mutex_unlock_force in pthread_cond_signal after
requeue and lll_mutex_cond_lock in pthread_cond_*wait after lll_futex_wait.
Another alternative is to do the unlocking pthread_cond_signal needs to do
(the lock can't be unlocked before lll_futex_wake, as that is racy) in the
kernel.
I have implemented both variants, futex-requeue-glibc.patch is the first
one and futex-wake_op{,-glibc}.patch is the unlocking inside of the kernel.
The kernel interface allows userland to specify how exactly an unlocking
operation should look like (some atomic arithmetic operation with optional
constant argument and comparison of the previous futex value with another
constant).
It has been implemented just for ppc*, x86_64 and i?86, for other
architectures I'm including just a stub header which can be used as a
starting point by maintainers to write support for their arches and ATM
will just return -ENOSYS for FUTEX_WAKE_OP. The requeue patch has been
(lightly) tested just on x86_64, the wake_op patch on ppc64 kernel running
32-bit and 64-bit NPTL and x86_64 kernel running 32-bit and 64-bit NPTL.
With the following benchmark on UP x86-64 I get:
for i in nptl-orig nptl-requeue nptl-wake_op; do echo time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench; \
for j in 1 2; do echo ( time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench ) 2>&1; done; done
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-orig /tmp/bench
real 0m0.655s user 0m0.253s sys 0m0.403s
real 0m0.657s user 0m0.269s sys 0m0.388s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-requeue /tmp/bench
real 0m0.496s user 0m0.225s sys 0m0.271s
real 0m0.531s user 0m0.242s sys 0m0.288s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-wake_op /tmp/bench
real 0m0.380s user 0m0.176s sys 0m0.204s
real 0m0.382s user 0m0.175s sys 0m0.207s
The benchmark is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00001.txt
Older futex-requeue-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00002.txt
Older futex-wake_op-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00003.txt
Will post a new version (just x86-64 fixes so that the patch
applies against pthread_cond_signal.S) to libc-hacker ml soon.
Attached is the kernel FUTEX_WAKE_OP patch as well as a simple-minded
testcase that will not test the atomicity of the operation, but at least
check if the threads that should have been woken up are woken up and
whether the arithmetic operation in the kernel gave the expected results.
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yuasa@hh.iij4u.or.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-06 22:16:25 +00:00
|
|
|
if (++op_ret >= nr_wake2)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret += op_ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-11-27 00:29:56 +00:00
|
|
|
out_unlock:
|
2009-03-12 07:55:52 +00:00
|
|
|
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
|
futex: Implement lockless wakeups
Given the overall futex architecture, any chance of reducing
hb->lock contention is welcome. In this particular case, using
wake-queues to enable lockless wakeups addresses very much real
world performance concerns, even cases of soft-lockups in cases
of large amounts of blocked tasks (which is not hard to find in
large boxes, using but just a handful of futex).
At the lowest level, this patch can reduce latency of a single thread
attempting to acquire hb->lock in highly contended scenarios by a
up to 2x. At lower counts of nr_wake there are no regressions,
confirming, of course, that the wake_q handling overhead is practically
non existent. For instance, while a fair amount of variation,
the extended pef-bench wakeup benchmark shows for a 20 core machine
the following avg per-thread time to wakeup its share of tasks:
nr_thr ms-before ms-after
16 0.0590 0.0215
32 0.0396 0.0220
48 0.0417 0.0182
64 0.0536 0.0236
80 0.0414 0.0097
96 0.0672 0.0152
Naturally, this can cause spurious wakeups. However there is no core code
that cannot handle them afaict, and furthermore tglx does have the point
that other events can already trigger them anyway.
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1430494072-30283-3-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-05-01 15:27:51 +00:00
|
|
|
wake_up_q(&wake_q);
|
[PATCH] FUTEX_WAKE_OP: pthread_cond_signal() speedup
ATM pthread_cond_signal is unnecessarily slow, because it wakes one waiter
(which at least on UP usually means an immediate context switch to one of
the waiter threads). This waiter wakes up and after a few instructions it
attempts to acquire the cv internal lock, but that lock is still held by
the thread calling pthread_cond_signal. So it goes to sleep and eventually
the signalling thread is scheduled in, unlocks the internal lock and wakes
the waiter again.
Now, before 2003-09-21 NPTL was using FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal
to avoid this performance issue, but it was removed when locks were
redesigned to the 3 state scheme (unlocked, locked uncontended, locked
contended).
Following scenario shows why simply using FUTEX_REQUEUE in
pthread_cond_signal together with using lll_mutex_unlock_force in place of
lll_mutex_unlock is not enough and probably why it has been disabled at
that time:
The number is value in cv->__data.__lock.
thr1 thr2 thr3
0 pthread_cond_wait
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__futex, futexval)
0 pthread_cond_signal
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
1 pthread_cond_signal
2 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
2 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__lock, 2)
2 lll_futex_requeue (&cv->__data.__futex, 0, 1, &cv->__data.__lock)
# FUTEX_REQUEUE, not FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
2 lll_mutex_unlock_force (cv->__data.__lock)
0 cv->__data.__lock = 0
0 lll_futex_wake (&cv->__data.__lock, 1)
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
# Here, lll_mutex_unlock doesn't know there are threads waiting
# on the internal cv's lock
Now, I believe it is possible to use FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal,
but it will cost us not one, but 2 extra syscalls and, what's worse, one of
these extra syscalls will be done for every single waiting loop in
pthread_cond_*wait.
We would need to use lll_mutex_unlock_force in pthread_cond_signal after
requeue and lll_mutex_cond_lock in pthread_cond_*wait after lll_futex_wait.
Another alternative is to do the unlocking pthread_cond_signal needs to do
(the lock can't be unlocked before lll_futex_wake, as that is racy) in the
kernel.
I have implemented both variants, futex-requeue-glibc.patch is the first
one and futex-wake_op{,-glibc}.patch is the unlocking inside of the kernel.
The kernel interface allows userland to specify how exactly an unlocking
operation should look like (some atomic arithmetic operation with optional
constant argument and comparison of the previous futex value with another
constant).
It has been implemented just for ppc*, x86_64 and i?86, for other
architectures I'm including just a stub header which can be used as a
starting point by maintainers to write support for their arches and ATM
will just return -ENOSYS for FUTEX_WAKE_OP. The requeue patch has been
(lightly) tested just on x86_64, the wake_op patch on ppc64 kernel running
32-bit and 64-bit NPTL and x86_64 kernel running 32-bit and 64-bit NPTL.
With the following benchmark on UP x86-64 I get:
for i in nptl-orig nptl-requeue nptl-wake_op; do echo time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench; \
for j in 1 2; do echo ( time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench ) 2>&1; done; done
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-orig /tmp/bench
real 0m0.655s user 0m0.253s sys 0m0.403s
real 0m0.657s user 0m0.269s sys 0m0.388s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-requeue /tmp/bench
real 0m0.496s user 0m0.225s sys 0m0.271s
real 0m0.531s user 0m0.242s sys 0m0.288s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-wake_op /tmp/bench
real 0m0.380s user 0m0.176s sys 0m0.204s
real 0m0.382s user 0m0.175s sys 0m0.207s
The benchmark is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00001.txt
Older futex-requeue-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00002.txt
Older futex-wake_op-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00003.txt
Will post a new version (just x86-64 fixes so that the patch
applies against pthread_cond_signal.S) to libc-hacker ml soon.
Attached is the kernel FUTEX_WAKE_OP patch as well as a simple-minded
testcase that will not test the atomicity of the operation, but at least
check if the threads that should have been woken up are woken up and
whether the arithmetic operation in the kernel gave the expected results.
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yuasa@hh.iij4u.or.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-06 22:16:25 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:40:31 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* requeue_futex() - Requeue a futex_q from one hb to another
|
|
|
|
* @q: the futex_q to requeue
|
|
|
|
* @hb1: the source hash_bucket
|
|
|
|
* @hb2: the target hash_bucket
|
|
|
|
* @key2: the new key for the requeued futex_q
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline
|
|
|
|
void requeue_futex(struct futex_q *q, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1,
|
|
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb2, union futex_key *key2)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If key1 and key2 hash to the same bucket, no need to
|
|
|
|
* requeue.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (likely(&hb1->chain != &hb2->chain)) {
|
|
|
|
plist_del(&q->list, &hb1->chain);
|
2014-03-21 05:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
hb_waiters_dec(hb1);
|
|
|
|
hb_waiters_inc(hb2);
|
2016-04-21 03:09:24 +00:00
|
|
|
plist_add(&q->list, &hb2->chain);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:31 +00:00
|
|
|
q->lock_ptr = &hb2->lock;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
q->key = *key2;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* requeue_pi_wake_futex() - Wake a task that acquired the lock during requeue
|
2009-09-22 05:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
* @q: the futex_q
|
|
|
|
* @key: the key of the requeue target futex
|
|
|
|
* @hb: the hash_bucket of the requeue target futex
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* During futex_requeue, with requeue_pi=1, it is possible to acquire the
|
|
|
|
* target futex if it is uncontended or via a lock steal. Set the futex_q key
|
|
|
|
* to the requeue target futex so the waiter can detect the wakeup on the right
|
|
|
|
* futex, but remove it from the hb and NULL the rt_waiter so it can detect
|
2009-08-09 22:34:39 +00:00
|
|
|
* atomic lock acquisition. Set the q->lock_ptr to the requeue target hb->lock
|
|
|
|
* to protect access to the pi_state to fixup the owner later. Must be called
|
|
|
|
* with both q->lock_ptr and hb->lock held.
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline
|
2009-08-09 22:34:39 +00:00
|
|
|
void requeue_pi_wake_futex(struct futex_q *q, union futex_key *key,
|
|
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
q->key = *key;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-12-22 06:18:50 +00:00
|
|
|
__unqueue_futex(q);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON(!q->rt_waiter);
|
|
|
|
q->rt_waiter = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-08-09 22:34:39 +00:00
|
|
|
q->lock_ptr = &hb->lock;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-05-05 17:21:40 +00:00
|
|
|
wake_up_state(q->task, TASK_NORMAL);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* futex_proxy_trylock_atomic() - Attempt an atomic lock for the top waiter
|
2009-04-08 06:23:50 +00:00
|
|
|
* @pifutex: the user address of the to futex
|
|
|
|
* @hb1: the from futex hash bucket, must be locked by the caller
|
|
|
|
* @hb2: the to futex hash bucket, must be locked by the caller
|
|
|
|
* @key1: the from futex key
|
|
|
|
* @key2: the to futex key
|
|
|
|
* @ps: address to store the pi_state pointer
|
futex: Prevent exit livelock
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
2019-11-06 21:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
* @exiting: Pointer to store the task pointer of the owner task
|
|
|
|
* which is in the middle of exiting
|
2009-04-08 06:23:50 +00:00
|
|
|
* @set_waiters: force setting the FUTEX_WAITERS bit (1) or not (0)
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Try and get the lock on behalf of the top waiter if we can do it atomically.
|
2009-04-08 06:23:50 +00:00
|
|
|
* Wake the top waiter if we succeed. If the caller specified set_waiters,
|
|
|
|
* then direct futex_lock_pi_atomic() to force setting the FUTEX_WAITERS bit.
|
|
|
|
* hb1 and hb2 must be held by the caller.
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
futex: Prevent exit livelock
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
2019-11-06 21:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
* @exiting is only set when the return value is -EBUSY. If so, this holds
|
|
|
|
* a refcount on the exiting task on return and the caller needs to drop it
|
|
|
|
* after waiting for the exit to complete.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2013-03-05 18:00:24 +00:00
|
|
|
* Return:
|
2017-05-11 13:17:45 +00:00
|
|
|
* - 0 - failed to acquire the lock atomically;
|
|
|
|
* - >0 - acquired the lock, return value is vpid of the top_waiter
|
|
|
|
* - <0 - error
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
futex: Prevent exit livelock
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
2019-11-06 21:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
futex_proxy_trylock_atomic(u32 __user *pifutex, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1,
|
|
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb2, union futex_key *key1,
|
|
|
|
union futex_key *key2, struct futex_pi_state **ps,
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct **exiting, int set_waiters)
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-04-08 06:23:50 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_q *top_waiter = NULL;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
u32 curval;
|
2014-05-12 20:45:34 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret, vpid;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (get_futex_value_locked(&curval, pifutex))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
2015-06-30 06:26:02 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-08 06:23:50 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Find the top_waiter and determine if there are additional waiters.
|
|
|
|
* If the caller intends to requeue more than 1 waiter to pifutex,
|
|
|
|
* force futex_lock_pi_atomic() to set the FUTEX_WAITERS bit now,
|
|
|
|
* as we have means to handle the possible fault. If not, don't set
|
2021-05-12 18:04:28 +00:00
|
|
|
* the bit unnecessarily as it will force the subsequent unlock to enter
|
2009-04-08 06:23:50 +00:00
|
|
|
* the kernel.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
top_waiter = futex_top_waiter(hb1, key1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* There are no waiters, nothing for us to do. */
|
|
|
|
if (!top_waiter)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-08-14 00:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Ensure we requeue to the expected futex. */
|
|
|
|
if (!match_futex(top_waiter->requeue_pi_key, key2))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2009-04-08 06:23:50 +00:00
|
|
|
* Try to take the lock for top_waiter. Set the FUTEX_WAITERS bit in
|
|
|
|
* the contended case or if set_waiters is 1. The pi_state is returned
|
|
|
|
* in ps in contended cases.
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-05-12 20:45:34 +00:00
|
|
|
vpid = task_pid_vnr(top_waiter->task);
|
2009-04-08 06:23:50 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = futex_lock_pi_atomic(pifutex, hb2, key2, ps, top_waiter->task,
|
futex: Prevent exit livelock
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
2019-11-06 21:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
exiting, set_waiters);
|
2014-05-12 20:45:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret == 1) {
|
2009-08-09 22:34:39 +00:00
|
|
|
requeue_pi_wake_futex(top_waiter, key2, hb2);
|
2014-05-12 20:45:34 +00:00
|
|
|
return vpid;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* futex_requeue() - Requeue waiters from uaddr1 to uaddr2
|
2010-10-13 18:02:34 +00:00
|
|
|
* @uaddr1: source futex user address
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
* @flags: futex flags (FLAGS_SHARED, etc.)
|
2010-10-13 18:02:34 +00:00
|
|
|
* @uaddr2: target futex user address
|
|
|
|
* @nr_wake: number of waiters to wake (must be 1 for requeue_pi)
|
|
|
|
* @nr_requeue: number of waiters to requeue (0-INT_MAX)
|
|
|
|
* @cmpval: @uaddr1 expected value (or %NULL)
|
|
|
|
* @requeue_pi: if we are attempting to requeue from a non-pi futex to a
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
* pi futex (pi to pi requeue is not supported)
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Requeue waiters on uaddr1 to uaddr2. In the requeue_pi case, try to acquire
|
|
|
|
* uaddr2 atomically on behalf of the top waiter.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2013-03-05 18:00:24 +00:00
|
|
|
* Return:
|
2017-05-11 13:17:45 +00:00
|
|
|
* - >=0 - on success, the number of tasks requeued or woken;
|
|
|
|
* - <0 - on error
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
static int futex_requeue(u32 __user *uaddr1, unsigned int flags,
|
|
|
|
u32 __user *uaddr2, int nr_wake, int nr_requeue,
|
|
|
|
u32 *cmpval, int requeue_pi)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-09-26 17:32:20 +00:00
|
|
|
union futex_key key1 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT, key2 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
|
2020-03-04 12:24:24 +00:00
|
|
|
int task_count = 0, ret;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = NULL;
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1, *hb2;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_q *this, *next;
|
2016-11-17 16:46:38 +00:00
|
|
|
DEFINE_WAKE_Q(wake_q);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-12-14 09:04:54 +00:00
|
|
|
if (nr_wake < 0 || nr_requeue < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-01 04:31:32 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* When PI not supported: return -ENOSYS if requeue_pi is true,
|
|
|
|
* consequently the compiler knows requeue_pi is always false past
|
|
|
|
* this point which will optimize away all the conditional code
|
|
|
|
* further down.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FUTEX_PI) && requeue_pi)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
if (requeue_pi) {
|
2014-06-03 12:27:06 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Requeue PI only works on two distinct uaddrs. This
|
|
|
|
* check is only valid for private futexes. See below.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (uaddr1 == uaddr2)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* requeue_pi requires a pi_state, try to allocate it now
|
|
|
|
* without any locks in case it fails.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (refill_pi_state_cache())
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* requeue_pi must wake as many tasks as it can, up to nr_wake
|
|
|
|
* + nr_requeue, since it acquires the rt_mutex prior to
|
|
|
|
* returning to userspace, so as to not leave the rt_mutex with
|
|
|
|
* waiters and no owner. However, second and third wake-ups
|
|
|
|
* cannot be predicted as they involve race conditions with the
|
|
|
|
* first wake and a fault while looking up the pi_state. Both
|
|
|
|
* pthread_cond_signal() and pthread_cond_broadcast() should
|
|
|
|
* use nr_wake=1.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (nr_wake != 1)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-12-29 23:49:53 +00:00
|
|
|
retry:
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 02:57:57 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr1, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key1, FUTEX_READ);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
|
2020-07-02 20:28:41 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
futex: Fix regression with read only mappings
commit 7485d0d3758e8e6491a5c9468114e74dc050785d (futexes: Remove rw
parameter from get_futex_key()) in 2.6.33 fixed two problems: First, It
prevented a loop when encountering a ZERO_PAGE. Second, it fixed RW
MAP_PRIVATE futex operations by forcing the COW to occur by
unconditionally performing a write access get_user_pages_fast() to get
the page. The commit also introduced a user-mode regression in that it
broke futex operations on read-only memory maps. For example, this
breaks workloads that have one or more reader processes doing a
FUTEX_WAIT on a futex within a read only shared file mapping, and a
writer processes that has a writable mapping issuing the FUTEX_WAKE.
This fixes the regression for valid futex operations on RO mappings by
trying a RO get_user_pages_fast() when the RW get_user_pages_fast()
fails. This change makes it necessary to also check for invalid use
cases, such as anonymous RO mappings (which can never change) and the
ZERO_PAGE which the commit referenced above was written to address.
This patch does restore the original behavior with RO MAP_PRIVATE
mappings, which have inherent user-mode usage problems and don't really
make sense. With this patch performing a FUTEX_WAIT within a RO
MAP_PRIVATE mapping will be successfully woken provided another process
updates the region of the underlying mapped file. However, the mmap()
man page states that for a MAP_PRIVATE mapping:
It is unspecified whether changes made to the file after
the mmap() call are visible in the mapped region.
So user-mode users attempting to use futex operations on RO MAP_PRIVATE
mappings are depending on unspecified behavior. Additionally a
RO MAP_PRIVATE mapping could fail to wake up in the following case.
Thread-A: call futex(FUTEX_WAIT, memory-region-A).
get_futex_key() return inode based key.
sleep on the key
Thread-B: call mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, memory-region-A)
Thread-B: write memory-region-A.
COW happen. This process's memory-region-A become related
to new COWed private (ie PageAnon=1) page.
Thread-B: call futex(FUETX_WAKE, memory-region-A).
get_futex_key() return mm based key.
IOW, we fail to wake up Thread-A.
Once again doing something like this is just silly and users who do
something like this get what they deserve.
While RO MAP_PRIVATE mappings are nonsensical, checking for a private
mapping requires walking the vmas and was deemed too costly to avoid a
userspace hang.
This Patch is based on Peter Zijlstra's initial patch with modifications to
only allow RO mappings for futex operations that need VERIFY_READ access.
Reported-by: David Oliver <david@rgmadvisors.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Bohrer <sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Cc: zvonler@rgmadvisors.com
Cc: hughd@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1309450892-30676-1-git-send-email-sbohrer@rgmadvisors.com
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2011-06-30 16:21:32 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key2,
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 02:57:57 +00:00
|
|
|
requeue_pi ? FUTEX_WRITE : FUTEX_READ);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
|
2020-07-02 20:28:41 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-03 12:27:06 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The check above which compares uaddrs is not sufficient for
|
|
|
|
* shared futexes. We need to compare the keys:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-07-02 20:28:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if (requeue_pi && match_futex(&key1, &key2))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2014-06-03 12:27:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
hb1 = hash_futex(&key1);
|
|
|
|
hb2 = hash_futex(&key2);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-12 07:56:13 +00:00
|
|
|
retry_private:
|
futex: avoid race between requeue and wake
Jan Stancek reported:
"pthread_cond_broadcast/4-1.c testcase from openposix testsuite (LTP)
occasionally fails, because some threads fail to wake up.
Testcase creates 5 threads, which are all waiting on same condition.
Main thread then calls pthread_cond_broadcast() without holding mutex,
which calls:
futex(uaddr1, FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PRIVATE, 1, 2147483647, uaddr2, ..)
This immediately wakes up single thread A, which unlocks mutex and
tries to wake up another thread:
futex(uaddr2, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE, 1)
If thread A manages to call futex_wake() before any waiters are
requeued for uaddr2, no other thread is woken up"
The ordering constraints for the hash bucket waiter counting are that
the waiter counts have to be incremented _before_ getting the spinlock
(because the spinlock acts as part of the memory barrier), but the
"requeue" operation didn't honor those rules, and nobody had even
thought about that case.
This fairly simple patch just increments the waiter count for the target
hash bucket (hb2) when requeing a futex before taking the locks. It
then decrements them again after releasing the lock - the code that
actually moves the futex(es) between hash buckets will do the additional
required waiter count housekeeping.
Reported-and-tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.14
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-08 22:30:07 +00:00
|
|
|
hb_waiters_inc(hb2);
|
2006-07-03 07:25:05 +00:00
|
|
|
double_lock_hb(hb1, hb2);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (likely(cmpval != NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
u32 curval;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = get_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr1);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(ret)) {
|
2009-03-12 07:55:52 +00:00
|
|
|
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
|
futex: avoid race between requeue and wake
Jan Stancek reported:
"pthread_cond_broadcast/4-1.c testcase from openposix testsuite (LTP)
occasionally fails, because some threads fail to wake up.
Testcase creates 5 threads, which are all waiting on same condition.
Main thread then calls pthread_cond_broadcast() without holding mutex,
which calls:
futex(uaddr1, FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PRIVATE, 1, 2147483647, uaddr2, ..)
This immediately wakes up single thread A, which unlocks mutex and
tries to wake up another thread:
futex(uaddr2, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE, 1)
If thread A manages to call futex_wake() before any waiters are
requeued for uaddr2, no other thread is woken up"
The ordering constraints for the hash bucket waiter counting are that
the waiter counts have to be incremented _before_ getting the spinlock
(because the spinlock acts as part of the memory barrier), but the
"requeue" operation didn't honor those rules, and nobody had even
thought about that case.
This fairly simple patch just increments the waiter count for the target
hash bucket (hb2) when requeing a futex before taking the locks. It
then decrements them again after releasing the lock - the code that
actually moves the futex(es) between hash buckets will do the additional
required waiter count housekeeping.
Reported-and-tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.14
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-08 22:30:07 +00:00
|
|
|
hb_waiters_dec(hb2);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = get_user(curval, uaddr1);
|
2009-03-12 07:56:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
2020-07-02 20:28:41 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(flags & FLAGS_SHARED))
|
2009-03-12 07:56:13 +00:00
|
|
|
goto retry_private;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-12 07:56:13 +00:00
|
|
|
goto retry;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
if (curval != *cmpval) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = -EAGAIN;
|
|
|
|
goto out_unlock;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
if (requeue_pi && (task_count - nr_wake < nr_requeue)) {
|
futex: Prevent exit livelock
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
2019-11-06 21:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
struct task_struct *exiting = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-08 06:23:50 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Attempt to acquire uaddr2 and wake the top waiter. If we
|
|
|
|
* intend to requeue waiters, force setting the FUTEX_WAITERS
|
|
|
|
* bit. We force this here where we are able to easily handle
|
|
|
|
* faults rather in the requeue loop below.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = futex_proxy_trylock_atomic(uaddr2, hb1, hb2, &key1,
|
futex: Prevent exit livelock
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
2019-11-06 21:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
&key2, &pi_state,
|
|
|
|
&exiting, nr_requeue);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* At this point the top_waiter has either taken uaddr2 or is
|
|
|
|
* waiting on it. If the former, then the pi_state will not
|
|
|
|
* exist yet, look it up one more time to ensure we have a
|
2014-05-12 20:45:34 +00:00
|
|
|
* reference to it. If the lock was taken, ret contains the
|
|
|
|
* vpid of the top waiter task.
|
2015-12-19 20:07:39 +00:00
|
|
|
* If the lock was not taken, we have pi_state and an initial
|
|
|
|
* refcount on it. In case of an error we have nothing.
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-05-12 20:45:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret > 0) {
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
WARN_ON(pi_state);
|
|
|
|
task_count++;
|
2014-05-12 20:45:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2015-12-19 20:07:39 +00:00
|
|
|
* If we acquired the lock, then the user space value
|
|
|
|
* of uaddr2 should be vpid. It cannot be changed by
|
|
|
|
* the top waiter as it is blocked on hb2 lock if it
|
|
|
|
* tries to do so. If something fiddled with it behind
|
|
|
|
* our back the pi state lookup might unearth it. So
|
|
|
|
* we rather use the known value than rereading and
|
|
|
|
* handing potential crap to lookup_pi_state.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If that call succeeds then we have pi_state and an
|
|
|
|
* initial refcount on it.
|
2014-05-12 20:45:34 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
futex: Prevent exit livelock
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
2019-11-06 21:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = lookup_pi_state(uaddr2, ret, hb2, &key2,
|
|
|
|
&pi_state, &exiting);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (ret) {
|
|
|
|
case 0:
|
2015-12-19 20:07:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/* We hold a reference on the pi state. */
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2015-12-19 20:07:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the above failed, then pi_state is NULL */
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
case -EFAULT:
|
|
|
|
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
|
futex: avoid race between requeue and wake
Jan Stancek reported:
"pthread_cond_broadcast/4-1.c testcase from openposix testsuite (LTP)
occasionally fails, because some threads fail to wake up.
Testcase creates 5 threads, which are all waiting on same condition.
Main thread then calls pthread_cond_broadcast() without holding mutex,
which calls:
futex(uaddr1, FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PRIVATE, 1, 2147483647, uaddr2, ..)
This immediately wakes up single thread A, which unlocks mutex and
tries to wake up another thread:
futex(uaddr2, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE, 1)
If thread A manages to call futex_wake() before any waiters are
requeued for uaddr2, no other thread is woken up"
The ordering constraints for the hash bucket waiter counting are that
the waiter counts have to be incremented _before_ getting the spinlock
(because the spinlock acts as part of the memory barrier), but the
"requeue" operation didn't honor those rules, and nobody had even
thought about that case.
This fairly simple patch just increments the waiter count for the target
hash bucket (hb2) when requeing a futex before taking the locks. It
then decrements them again after releasing the lock - the code that
actually moves the futex(es) between hash buckets will do the additional
required waiter count housekeeping.
Reported-and-tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.14
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-08 22:30:07 +00:00
|
|
|
hb_waiters_dec(hb2);
|
2009-06-11 21:15:43 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr2);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ret)
|
|
|
|
goto retry;
|
2020-07-02 20:28:41 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2019-11-06 21:55:45 +00:00
|
|
|
case -EBUSY:
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
case -EAGAIN:
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Two reasons for this:
|
2019-11-06 21:55:45 +00:00
|
|
|
* - EBUSY: Owner is exiting and we just wait for the
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
* exit to complete.
|
2019-11-06 21:55:45 +00:00
|
|
|
* - EAGAIN: The user space value changed.
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
|
futex: avoid race between requeue and wake
Jan Stancek reported:
"pthread_cond_broadcast/4-1.c testcase from openposix testsuite (LTP)
occasionally fails, because some threads fail to wake up.
Testcase creates 5 threads, which are all waiting on same condition.
Main thread then calls pthread_cond_broadcast() without holding mutex,
which calls:
futex(uaddr1, FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PRIVATE, 1, 2147483647, uaddr2, ..)
This immediately wakes up single thread A, which unlocks mutex and
tries to wake up another thread:
futex(uaddr2, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE, 1)
If thread A manages to call futex_wake() before any waiters are
requeued for uaddr2, no other thread is woken up"
The ordering constraints for the hash bucket waiter counting are that
the waiter counts have to be incremented _before_ getting the spinlock
(because the spinlock acts as part of the memory barrier), but the
"requeue" operation didn't honor those rules, and nobody had even
thought about that case.
This fairly simple patch just increments the waiter count for the target
hash bucket (hb2) when requeing a futex before taking the locks. It
then decrements them again after releasing the lock - the code that
actually moves the futex(es) between hash buckets will do the additional
required waiter count housekeeping.
Reported-and-tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.14
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-08 22:30:07 +00:00
|
|
|
hb_waiters_dec(hb2);
|
futex: Prevent exit livelock
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
2019-11-06 21:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Handle the case where the owner is in the middle of
|
|
|
|
* exiting. Wait for the exit to complete otherwise
|
|
|
|
* this task might loop forever, aka. live lock.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
wait_for_owner_exiting(ret, exiting);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
cond_resched();
|
|
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
goto out_unlock;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-01-12 23:31:22 +00:00
|
|
|
plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, &hb1->chain, list) {
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
if (task_count - nr_wake >= nr_requeue)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!match_futex(&this->key, &key1))
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-08-07 22:20:48 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2021-05-12 18:04:28 +00:00
|
|
|
* FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI and FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI should always
|
2009-08-07 22:20:48 +00:00
|
|
|
* be paired with each other and no other futex ops.
|
2012-11-27 00:29:56 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We should never be requeueing a futex_q with a pi_state,
|
|
|
|
* which is awaiting a futex_unlock_pi().
|
2009-08-07 22:20:48 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((requeue_pi && !this->rt_waiter) ||
|
2012-11-27 00:29:56 +00:00
|
|
|
(!requeue_pi && this->rt_waiter) ||
|
|
|
|
this->pi_state) {
|
2009-08-07 22:20:48 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Wake nr_wake waiters. For requeue_pi, if we acquired the
|
|
|
|
* lock, we already woke the top_waiter. If not, it will be
|
|
|
|
* woken by futex_unlock_pi().
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (++task_count <= nr_wake && !requeue_pi) {
|
futex: Implement lockless wakeups
Given the overall futex architecture, any chance of reducing
hb->lock contention is welcome. In this particular case, using
wake-queues to enable lockless wakeups addresses very much real
world performance concerns, even cases of soft-lockups in cases
of large amounts of blocked tasks (which is not hard to find in
large boxes, using but just a handful of futex).
At the lowest level, this patch can reduce latency of a single thread
attempting to acquire hb->lock in highly contended scenarios by a
up to 2x. At lower counts of nr_wake there are no regressions,
confirming, of course, that the wake_q handling overhead is practically
non existent. For instance, while a fair amount of variation,
the extended pef-bench wakeup benchmark shows for a 20 core machine
the following avg per-thread time to wakeup its share of tasks:
nr_thr ms-before ms-after
16 0.0590 0.0215
32 0.0396 0.0220
48 0.0417 0.0182
64 0.0536 0.0236
80 0.0414 0.0097
96 0.0672 0.0152
Naturally, this can cause spurious wakeups. However there is no core code
that cannot handle them afaict, and furthermore tglx does have the point
that other events can already trigger them anyway.
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1430494072-30283-3-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-05-01 15:27:51 +00:00
|
|
|
mark_wake_futex(&wake_q, this);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-08-14 00:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Ensure we requeue to the expected futex for requeue_pi. */
|
|
|
|
if (requeue_pi && !match_futex(this->requeue_pi_key, &key2)) {
|
|
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Requeue nr_requeue waiters and possibly one more in the case
|
|
|
|
* of requeue_pi if we couldn't acquire the lock atomically.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (requeue_pi) {
|
2015-12-19 20:07:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Prepare the waiter to take the rt_mutex. Take a
|
|
|
|
* refcount on the pi_state and store the pointer in
|
|
|
|
* the futex_q object of the waiter.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-03-22 10:35:53 +00:00
|
|
|
get_pi_state(pi_state);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
this->pi_state = pi_state;
|
|
|
|
ret = rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(&pi_state->pi_mutex,
|
|
|
|
this->rt_waiter,
|
2014-05-22 03:25:50 +00:00
|
|
|
this->task);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret == 1) {
|
2015-12-19 20:07:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We got the lock. We do neither drop the
|
|
|
|
* refcount on pi_state nor clear
|
|
|
|
* this->pi_state because the waiter needs the
|
|
|
|
* pi_state for cleaning up the user space
|
|
|
|
* value. It will drop the refcount after
|
|
|
|
* doing so.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-08-09 22:34:39 +00:00
|
|
|
requeue_pi_wake_futex(this, &key2, hb2);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
} else if (ret) {
|
2015-12-19 20:07:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() detected a
|
|
|
|
* potential deadlock when we tried to queue
|
|
|
|
* that waiter. Drop the pi_state reference
|
|
|
|
* which we took above and remove the pointer
|
|
|
|
* to the state from the waiters futex_q
|
|
|
|
* object.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
this->pi_state = NULL;
|
2015-12-19 20:07:39 +00:00
|
|
|
put_pi_state(pi_state);
|
2015-12-19 20:07:41 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We stop queueing more waiters and let user
|
|
|
|
* space deal with the mess.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
requeue_futex(this, hb1, hb2, &key2);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-12-19 20:07:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We took an extra initial reference to the pi_state either
|
|
|
|
* in futex_proxy_trylock_atomic() or in lookup_pi_state(). We
|
|
|
|
* need to drop it here again.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-12-19 20:07:39 +00:00
|
|
|
put_pi_state(pi_state);
|
2015-12-19 20:07:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out_unlock:
|
2009-03-12 07:55:52 +00:00
|
|
|
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
|
futex: Implement lockless wakeups
Given the overall futex architecture, any chance of reducing
hb->lock contention is welcome. In this particular case, using
wake-queues to enable lockless wakeups addresses very much real
world performance concerns, even cases of soft-lockups in cases
of large amounts of blocked tasks (which is not hard to find in
large boxes, using but just a handful of futex).
At the lowest level, this patch can reduce latency of a single thread
attempting to acquire hb->lock in highly contended scenarios by a
up to 2x. At lower counts of nr_wake there are no regressions,
confirming, of course, that the wake_q handling overhead is practically
non existent. For instance, while a fair amount of variation,
the extended pef-bench wakeup benchmark shows for a 20 core machine
the following avg per-thread time to wakeup its share of tasks:
nr_thr ms-before ms-after
16 0.0590 0.0215
32 0.0396 0.0220
48 0.0417 0.0182
64 0.0536 0.0236
80 0.0414 0.0097
96 0.0672 0.0152
Naturally, this can cause spurious wakeups. However there is no core code
that cannot handle them afaict, and furthermore tglx does have the point
that other events can already trigger them anyway.
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1430494072-30283-3-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-05-01 15:27:51 +00:00
|
|
|
wake_up_q(&wake_q);
|
futex: avoid race between requeue and wake
Jan Stancek reported:
"pthread_cond_broadcast/4-1.c testcase from openposix testsuite (LTP)
occasionally fails, because some threads fail to wake up.
Testcase creates 5 threads, which are all waiting on same condition.
Main thread then calls pthread_cond_broadcast() without holding mutex,
which calls:
futex(uaddr1, FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PRIVATE, 1, 2147483647, uaddr2, ..)
This immediately wakes up single thread A, which unlocks mutex and
tries to wake up another thread:
futex(uaddr2, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE, 1)
If thread A manages to call futex_wake() before any waiters are
requeued for uaddr2, no other thread is woken up"
The ordering constraints for the hash bucket waiter counting are that
the waiter counts have to be incremented _before_ getting the spinlock
(because the spinlock acts as part of the memory barrier), but the
"requeue" operation didn't honor those rules, and nobody had even
thought about that case.
This fairly simple patch just increments the waiter count for the target
hash bucket (hb2) when requeing a futex before taking the locks. It
then decrements them again after releasing the lock - the code that
actually moves the futex(es) between hash buckets will do the additional
required waiter count housekeeping.
Reported-and-tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.14
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-04-08 22:30:07 +00:00
|
|
|
hb_waiters_dec(hb2);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret ? ret : task_count;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The key must be already stored in q->key. */
|
2008-01-25 09:40:46 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline struct futex_hash_bucket *queue_lock(struct futex_q *q)
|
2010-09-14 12:43:48 +00:00
|
|
|
__acquires(&hb->lock)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
hb = hash_futex(&q->key);
|
2014-03-21 05:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Increment the counter before taking the lock so that
|
|
|
|
* a potential waker won't miss a to-be-slept task that is
|
|
|
|
* waiting for the spinlock. This is safe as all queue_lock()
|
|
|
|
* users end up calling queue_me(). Similarly, for housekeeping,
|
|
|
|
* decrement the counter at queue_unlock() when some error has
|
|
|
|
* occurred and we don't end up adding the task to the list.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-02-06 18:56:02 +00:00
|
|
|
hb_waiters_inc(hb); /* implies smp_mb(); (A) */
|
2014-03-21 05:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
q->lock_ptr = &hb->lock;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-02-06 18:56:02 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
return hb;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-09-22 05:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline void
|
2014-01-12 23:31:22 +00:00
|
|
|
queue_unlock(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
|
2010-09-14 12:43:48 +00:00
|
|
|
__releases(&hb->lock)
|
2009-09-22 05:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
|
2014-03-21 05:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
hb_waiters_dec(hb);
|
2009-09-22 05:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 10:35:58 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline void __queue_me(struct futex_q *q, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2007-05-09 09:35:00 +00:00
|
|
|
int prio;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The priority used to register this element is
|
|
|
|
* - either the real thread-priority for the real-time threads
|
|
|
|
* (i.e. threads with a priority lower than MAX_RT_PRIO)
|
|
|
|
* - or MAX_RT_PRIO for non-RT threads.
|
|
|
|
* Thus, all RT-threads are woken first in priority order, and
|
|
|
|
* the others are woken last, in FIFO order.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
prio = min(current->normal_prio, MAX_RT_PRIO);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
plist_node_init(&q->list, prio);
|
|
|
|
plist_add(&q->list, &hb->chain);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
q->task = current;
|
2017-03-22 10:35:58 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* queue_me() - Enqueue the futex_q on the futex_hash_bucket
|
|
|
|
* @q: The futex_q to enqueue
|
|
|
|
* @hb: The destination hash bucket
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The hb->lock must be held by the caller, and is released here. A call to
|
|
|
|
* queue_me() is typically paired with exactly one call to unqueue_me(). The
|
|
|
|
* exceptions involve the PI related operations, which may use unqueue_me_pi()
|
|
|
|
* or nothing if the unqueue is done as part of the wake process and the unqueue
|
|
|
|
* state is implicit in the state of woken task (see futex_wait_requeue_pi() for
|
|
|
|
* an example).
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline void queue_me(struct futex_q *q, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
|
|
|
|
__releases(&hb->lock)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
__queue_me(q, hb);
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-09-22 05:30:15 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* unqueue_me() - Remove the futex_q from its futex_hash_bucket
|
|
|
|
* @q: The futex_q to unqueue
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The q->lock_ptr must not be held by the caller. A call to unqueue_me() must
|
|
|
|
* be paired with exactly one earlier call to queue_me().
|
|
|
|
*
|
2013-03-05 18:00:24 +00:00
|
|
|
* Return:
|
2017-05-11 13:17:45 +00:00
|
|
|
* - 1 - if the futex_q was still queued (and we removed unqueued it);
|
|
|
|
* - 0 - if the futex_q was already removed by the waking thread
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int unqueue_me(struct futex_q *q)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
spinlock_t *lock_ptr;
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* In the common case we don't take the spinlock, which is nice. */
|
2008-12-29 23:49:53 +00:00
|
|
|
retry:
|
2016-03-07 01:32:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* q->lock_ptr can change between this read and the following spin_lock.
|
|
|
|
* Use READ_ONCE to forbid the compiler from reloading q->lock_ptr and
|
|
|
|
* optimizing lock_ptr out of the logic below.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
lock_ptr = READ_ONCE(q->lock_ptr);
|
2007-10-18 10:07:05 +00:00
|
|
|
if (lock_ptr != NULL) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_lock(lock_ptr);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* q->lock_ptr can change between reading it and
|
|
|
|
* spin_lock(), causing us to take the wrong lock. This
|
|
|
|
* corrects the race condition.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Reasoning goes like this: if we have the wrong lock,
|
|
|
|
* q->lock_ptr must have changed (maybe several times)
|
|
|
|
* between reading it and the spin_lock(). It can
|
|
|
|
* change again after the spin_lock() but only if it was
|
|
|
|
* already changed before the spin_lock(). It cannot,
|
|
|
|
* however, change back to the original value. Therefore
|
|
|
|
* we can detect whether we acquired the correct lock.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(lock_ptr != q->lock_ptr)) {
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(lock_ptr);
|
|
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-12-22 06:18:50 +00:00
|
|
|
__unqueue_futex(q);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(q->pi_state);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock(lock_ptr);
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2021-05-12 18:04:28 +00:00
|
|
|
* PI futexes can not be requeued and must remove themselves from the
|
2021-02-26 17:50:28 +00:00
|
|
|
* hash bucket. The hash bucket lock (i.e. lock_ptr) is held.
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2007-05-09 09:35:02 +00:00
|
|
|
static void unqueue_me_pi(struct futex_q *q)
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2010-12-22 06:18:50 +00:00
|
|
|
__unqueue_futex(q);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(!q->pi_state);
|
2015-12-19 20:07:39 +00:00
|
|
|
put_pi_state(q->pi_state);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
q->pi_state = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-01-19 15:26:38 +00:00
|
|
|
static int __fixup_pi_state_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_q *q,
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct *argowner)
|
2007-05-09 09:35:02 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = q->pi_state;
|
futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex
Julia reported futex state corruption in the following scenario:
waiter waker stealer (prio > waiter)
futex(WAIT_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr, uaddr2,
timeout=[N ms])
futex_wait_requeue_pi()
futex_wait_queue_me()
freezable_schedule()
<scheduled out>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
futex(CMP_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr,
uaddr2, 1, 0)
/* requeues waiter to uaddr2 */
futex(UNLOCK_PI, uaddr2)
wake_futex_pi()
cmp_futex_value_locked(uaddr2, waiter)
wake_up_q()
<woken by waker>
<hrtimer_wakeup() fires,
clears sleeper->task>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
__rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* steals lock */
rt_mutex_set_owner(lock, stealer)
<preempted>
<scheduled in>
rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock()
__rt_mutex_slowlock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* fails, lock held by stealer */
if (timeout && !timeout->task)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
fixup_owner()
/* lock wasn't acquired, so,
fixup_pi_state_owner skipped */
return -ETIMEDOUT;
/* At this point, we've returned -ETIMEDOUT to userspace, but the
* futex word shows waiter to be the owner, and the pi_mutex has
* stealer as the owner */
futex_lock(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
-> bails with EDEADLK, futex word says we're owner.
And suggested that what commit:
73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
removes from fixup_owner() looks to be just what is needed. And indeed
it is -- I completely missed that requeue_pi could also result in this
case. So we need to restore that, except that subsequent patches, like
commit:
16ffa12d7425 ("futex: Pull rt_mutex_futex_unlock() out from under hb->lock")
changed all the locking rules. Even without that, the sequence:
- if (rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex)) {
- locked = 1;
- goto out;
- }
- raw_spin_lock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- owner = rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- if (!owner)
- owner = rt_mutex_next_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, owner);
already suggests there were races; otherwise we'd never have to look
at next_owner.
So instead of doing 3 consecutive wait_lock sections with who knows
what races, we do it all in a single section. Additionally, the usage
of pi_state->owner in fixup_owner() was only safe because only the
rt_mutex owner would modify it, which this additional case wrecks.
Luckily the values can only change away and not to the value we're
testing, this means we can do a speculative test and double check once
we have the wait_lock.
Fixes: 73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
Reported-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Reported-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Tested-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171208124939.7livp7no2ov65rrc@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
2017-12-08 12:49:39 +00:00
|
|
|
struct task_struct *oldowner, *newowner;
|
2021-01-19 15:26:38 +00:00
|
|
|
u32 uval, curval, newval, newtid;
|
|
|
|
int err = 0;
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
oldowner = pi_state->owner;
|
2008-06-23 09:21:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex
Julia reported futex state corruption in the following scenario:
waiter waker stealer (prio > waiter)
futex(WAIT_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr, uaddr2,
timeout=[N ms])
futex_wait_requeue_pi()
futex_wait_queue_me()
freezable_schedule()
<scheduled out>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
futex(CMP_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr,
uaddr2, 1, 0)
/* requeues waiter to uaddr2 */
futex(UNLOCK_PI, uaddr2)
wake_futex_pi()
cmp_futex_value_locked(uaddr2, waiter)
wake_up_q()
<woken by waker>
<hrtimer_wakeup() fires,
clears sleeper->task>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
__rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* steals lock */
rt_mutex_set_owner(lock, stealer)
<preempted>
<scheduled in>
rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock()
__rt_mutex_slowlock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* fails, lock held by stealer */
if (timeout && !timeout->task)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
fixup_owner()
/* lock wasn't acquired, so,
fixup_pi_state_owner skipped */
return -ETIMEDOUT;
/* At this point, we've returned -ETIMEDOUT to userspace, but the
* futex word shows waiter to be the owner, and the pi_mutex has
* stealer as the owner */
futex_lock(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
-> bails with EDEADLK, futex word says we're owner.
And suggested that what commit:
73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
removes from fixup_owner() looks to be just what is needed. And indeed
it is -- I completely missed that requeue_pi could also result in this
case. So we need to restore that, except that subsequent patches, like
commit:
16ffa12d7425 ("futex: Pull rt_mutex_futex_unlock() out from under hb->lock")
changed all the locking rules. Even without that, the sequence:
- if (rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex)) {
- locked = 1;
- goto out;
- }
- raw_spin_lock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- owner = rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- if (!owner)
- owner = rt_mutex_next_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, owner);
already suggests there were races; otherwise we'd never have to look
at next_owner.
So instead of doing 3 consecutive wait_lock sections with who knows
what races, we do it all in a single section. Additionally, the usage
of pi_state->owner in fixup_owner() was only safe because only the
rt_mutex owner would modify it, which this additional case wrecks.
Luckily the values can only change away and not to the value we're
testing, this means we can do a speculative test and double check once
we have the wait_lock.
Fixes: 73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
Reported-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Reported-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Tested-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171208124939.7livp7no2ov65rrc@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
2017-12-08 12:49:39 +00:00
|
|
|
* We are here because either:
|
2017-03-22 10:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex
Julia reported futex state corruption in the following scenario:
waiter waker stealer (prio > waiter)
futex(WAIT_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr, uaddr2,
timeout=[N ms])
futex_wait_requeue_pi()
futex_wait_queue_me()
freezable_schedule()
<scheduled out>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
futex(CMP_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr,
uaddr2, 1, 0)
/* requeues waiter to uaddr2 */
futex(UNLOCK_PI, uaddr2)
wake_futex_pi()
cmp_futex_value_locked(uaddr2, waiter)
wake_up_q()
<woken by waker>
<hrtimer_wakeup() fires,
clears sleeper->task>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
__rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* steals lock */
rt_mutex_set_owner(lock, stealer)
<preempted>
<scheduled in>
rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock()
__rt_mutex_slowlock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* fails, lock held by stealer */
if (timeout && !timeout->task)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
fixup_owner()
/* lock wasn't acquired, so,
fixup_pi_state_owner skipped */
return -ETIMEDOUT;
/* At this point, we've returned -ETIMEDOUT to userspace, but the
* futex word shows waiter to be the owner, and the pi_mutex has
* stealer as the owner */
futex_lock(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
-> bails with EDEADLK, futex word says we're owner.
And suggested that what commit:
73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
removes from fixup_owner() looks to be just what is needed. And indeed
it is -- I completely missed that requeue_pi could also result in this
case. So we need to restore that, except that subsequent patches, like
commit:
16ffa12d7425 ("futex: Pull rt_mutex_futex_unlock() out from under hb->lock")
changed all the locking rules. Even without that, the sequence:
- if (rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex)) {
- locked = 1;
- goto out;
- }
- raw_spin_lock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- owner = rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- if (!owner)
- owner = rt_mutex_next_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, owner);
already suggests there were races; otherwise we'd never have to look
at next_owner.
So instead of doing 3 consecutive wait_lock sections with who knows
what races, we do it all in a single section. Additionally, the usage
of pi_state->owner in fixup_owner() was only safe because only the
rt_mutex owner would modify it, which this additional case wrecks.
Luckily the values can only change away and not to the value we're
testing, this means we can do a speculative test and double check once
we have the wait_lock.
Fixes: 73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
Reported-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Reported-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Tested-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171208124939.7livp7no2ov65rrc@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
2017-12-08 12:49:39 +00:00
|
|
|
* - we stole the lock and pi_state->owner needs updating to reflect
|
|
|
|
* that (@argowner == current),
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* or:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - someone stole our lock and we need to fix things to point to the
|
|
|
|
* new owner (@argowner == NULL).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Either way, we have to replace the TID in the user space variable.
|
rtmutex: Simplify PI algorithm and make highest prio task get lock
In current rtmutex, the pending owner may be boosted by the tasks
in the rtmutex's waitlist when the pending owner is deboosted
or a task in the waitlist is boosted. This boosting is unrelated,
because the pending owner does not really take the rtmutex.
It is not reasonable.
Example.
time1:
A(high prio) onwers the rtmutex.
B(mid prio) and C (low prio) in the waitlist.
time2
A release the lock, B becomes the pending owner
A(or other high prio task) continues to run. B's prio is lower
than A, so B is just queued at the runqueue.
time3
A or other high prio task sleeps, but we have passed some time
The B and C's prio are changed in the period (time2 ~ time3)
due to boosting or deboosting. Now C has the priority higher
than B. ***Is it reasonable that C has to boost B and help B to
get the rtmutex?
NO!! I think, it is unrelated/unneed boosting before B really
owns the rtmutex. We should give C a chance to beat B and
win the rtmutex.
This is the motivation of this patch. This patch *ensures*
only the top waiter or higher priority task can take the lock.
How?
1) we don't dequeue the top waiter when unlock, if the top waiter
is changed, the old top waiter will fail and go to sleep again.
2) when requiring lock, it will get the lock when the lock is not taken and:
there is no waiter OR higher priority than waiters OR it is top waiter.
3) In any time, the top waiter is changed, the top waiter will be woken up.
The algorithm is much simpler than before, no pending owner, no
boosting for pending owner.
Other advantage of this patch:
1) The states of a rtmutex are reduced a half, easier to read the code.
2) the codes become shorter.
3) top waiter is not dequeued until it really take the lock:
they will retain FIFO when it is stolen.
Not advantage nor disadvantage
1) Even we may wakeup multiple waiters(any time when top waiter changed),
we hardly cause "thundering herd",
the number of wokenup task is likely 1 or very little.
2) two APIs are changed.
rt_mutex_owner() will not return pending owner, it will return NULL when
the top waiter is going to take the lock.
rt_mutex_next_owner() always return the top waiter.
will not return NULL if we have waiters
because the top waiter is not dequeued.
I have fixed the code that use these APIs.
need updated after this patch is accepted
1) Document/*
2) the testcase scripts/rt-tester/t4-l2-pi-deboost.tst
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
LKML-Reference: <4D3012D5.4060709@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2011-01-14 09:09:41 +00:00
|
|
|
* This must be atomic as we have to preserve the owner died bit here.
|
2008-06-23 09:21:58 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2009-03-12 07:55:37 +00:00
|
|
|
* Note: We write the user space value _before_ changing the pi_state
|
|
|
|
* because we can fault here. Imagine swapped out pages or a fork
|
|
|
|
* that marked all the anonymous memory readonly for cow.
|
2008-06-23 09:21:58 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
* Modifying pi_state _before_ the user space value would leave the
|
|
|
|
* pi_state in an inconsistent state when we fault here, because we
|
|
|
|
* need to drop the locks to handle the fault. This might be observed
|
|
|
|
* in the PID check in lookup_pi_state.
|
2008-06-23 09:21:58 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
retry:
|
futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex
Julia reported futex state corruption in the following scenario:
waiter waker stealer (prio > waiter)
futex(WAIT_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr, uaddr2,
timeout=[N ms])
futex_wait_requeue_pi()
futex_wait_queue_me()
freezable_schedule()
<scheduled out>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
futex(CMP_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr,
uaddr2, 1, 0)
/* requeues waiter to uaddr2 */
futex(UNLOCK_PI, uaddr2)
wake_futex_pi()
cmp_futex_value_locked(uaddr2, waiter)
wake_up_q()
<woken by waker>
<hrtimer_wakeup() fires,
clears sleeper->task>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
__rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* steals lock */
rt_mutex_set_owner(lock, stealer)
<preempted>
<scheduled in>
rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock()
__rt_mutex_slowlock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* fails, lock held by stealer */
if (timeout && !timeout->task)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
fixup_owner()
/* lock wasn't acquired, so,
fixup_pi_state_owner skipped */
return -ETIMEDOUT;
/* At this point, we've returned -ETIMEDOUT to userspace, but the
* futex word shows waiter to be the owner, and the pi_mutex has
* stealer as the owner */
futex_lock(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
-> bails with EDEADLK, futex word says we're owner.
And suggested that what commit:
73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
removes from fixup_owner() looks to be just what is needed. And indeed
it is -- I completely missed that requeue_pi could also result in this
case. So we need to restore that, except that subsequent patches, like
commit:
16ffa12d7425 ("futex: Pull rt_mutex_futex_unlock() out from under hb->lock")
changed all the locking rules. Even without that, the sequence:
- if (rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex)) {
- locked = 1;
- goto out;
- }
- raw_spin_lock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- owner = rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- if (!owner)
- owner = rt_mutex_next_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, owner);
already suggests there were races; otherwise we'd never have to look
at next_owner.
So instead of doing 3 consecutive wait_lock sections with who knows
what races, we do it all in a single section. Additionally, the usage
of pi_state->owner in fixup_owner() was only safe because only the
rt_mutex owner would modify it, which this additional case wrecks.
Luckily the values can only change away and not to the value we're
testing, this means we can do a speculative test and double check once
we have the wait_lock.
Fixes: 73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
Reported-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Reported-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Tested-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171208124939.7livp7no2ov65rrc@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
2017-12-08 12:49:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!argowner) {
|
|
|
|
if (oldowner != current) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We raced against a concurrent self; things are
|
|
|
|
* already fixed up. Nothing to do.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2021-01-19 15:26:38 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex
Julia reported futex state corruption in the following scenario:
waiter waker stealer (prio > waiter)
futex(WAIT_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr, uaddr2,
timeout=[N ms])
futex_wait_requeue_pi()
futex_wait_queue_me()
freezable_schedule()
<scheduled out>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
futex(CMP_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr,
uaddr2, 1, 0)
/* requeues waiter to uaddr2 */
futex(UNLOCK_PI, uaddr2)
wake_futex_pi()
cmp_futex_value_locked(uaddr2, waiter)
wake_up_q()
<woken by waker>
<hrtimer_wakeup() fires,
clears sleeper->task>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
__rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* steals lock */
rt_mutex_set_owner(lock, stealer)
<preempted>
<scheduled in>
rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock()
__rt_mutex_slowlock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* fails, lock held by stealer */
if (timeout && !timeout->task)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
fixup_owner()
/* lock wasn't acquired, so,
fixup_pi_state_owner skipped */
return -ETIMEDOUT;
/* At this point, we've returned -ETIMEDOUT to userspace, but the
* futex word shows waiter to be the owner, and the pi_mutex has
* stealer as the owner */
futex_lock(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
-> bails with EDEADLK, futex word says we're owner.
And suggested that what commit:
73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
removes from fixup_owner() looks to be just what is needed. And indeed
it is -- I completely missed that requeue_pi could also result in this
case. So we need to restore that, except that subsequent patches, like
commit:
16ffa12d7425 ("futex: Pull rt_mutex_futex_unlock() out from under hb->lock")
changed all the locking rules. Even without that, the sequence:
- if (rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex)) {
- locked = 1;
- goto out;
- }
- raw_spin_lock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- owner = rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- if (!owner)
- owner = rt_mutex_next_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, owner);
already suggests there were races; otherwise we'd never have to look
at next_owner.
So instead of doing 3 consecutive wait_lock sections with who knows
what races, we do it all in a single section. Additionally, the usage
of pi_state->owner in fixup_owner() was only safe because only the
rt_mutex owner would modify it, which this additional case wrecks.
Luckily the values can only change away and not to the value we're
testing, this means we can do a speculative test and double check once
we have the wait_lock.
Fixes: 73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
Reported-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Reported-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Tested-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171208124939.7livp7no2ov65rrc@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
2017-12-08 12:49:39 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (__rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&pi_state->pi_mutex)) {
|
2021-01-20 15:00:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/* We got the lock. pi_state is correct. Tell caller. */
|
2021-01-19 15:26:38 +00:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex
Julia reported futex state corruption in the following scenario:
waiter waker stealer (prio > waiter)
futex(WAIT_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr, uaddr2,
timeout=[N ms])
futex_wait_requeue_pi()
futex_wait_queue_me()
freezable_schedule()
<scheduled out>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
futex(CMP_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr,
uaddr2, 1, 0)
/* requeues waiter to uaddr2 */
futex(UNLOCK_PI, uaddr2)
wake_futex_pi()
cmp_futex_value_locked(uaddr2, waiter)
wake_up_q()
<woken by waker>
<hrtimer_wakeup() fires,
clears sleeper->task>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
__rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* steals lock */
rt_mutex_set_owner(lock, stealer)
<preempted>
<scheduled in>
rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock()
__rt_mutex_slowlock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* fails, lock held by stealer */
if (timeout && !timeout->task)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
fixup_owner()
/* lock wasn't acquired, so,
fixup_pi_state_owner skipped */
return -ETIMEDOUT;
/* At this point, we've returned -ETIMEDOUT to userspace, but the
* futex word shows waiter to be the owner, and the pi_mutex has
* stealer as the owner */
futex_lock(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
-> bails with EDEADLK, futex word says we're owner.
And suggested that what commit:
73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
removes from fixup_owner() looks to be just what is needed. And indeed
it is -- I completely missed that requeue_pi could also result in this
case. So we need to restore that, except that subsequent patches, like
commit:
16ffa12d7425 ("futex: Pull rt_mutex_futex_unlock() out from under hb->lock")
changed all the locking rules. Even without that, the sequence:
- if (rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex)) {
- locked = 1;
- goto out;
- }
- raw_spin_lock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- owner = rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- if (!owner)
- owner = rt_mutex_next_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, owner);
already suggests there were races; otherwise we'd never have to look
at next_owner.
So instead of doing 3 consecutive wait_lock sections with who knows
what races, we do it all in a single section. Additionally, the usage
of pi_state->owner in fixup_owner() was only safe because only the
rt_mutex owner would modify it, which this additional case wrecks.
Luckily the values can only change away and not to the value we're
testing, this means we can do a speculative test and double check once
we have the wait_lock.
Fixes: 73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
Reported-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Reported-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Tested-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171208124939.7livp7no2ov65rrc@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
2017-12-08 12:49:39 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2020-11-04 15:12:44 +00:00
|
|
|
* The trylock just failed, so either there is an owner or
|
|
|
|
* there is a higher priority waiter than this one.
|
futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex
Julia reported futex state corruption in the following scenario:
waiter waker stealer (prio > waiter)
futex(WAIT_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr, uaddr2,
timeout=[N ms])
futex_wait_requeue_pi()
futex_wait_queue_me()
freezable_schedule()
<scheduled out>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
futex(CMP_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr,
uaddr2, 1, 0)
/* requeues waiter to uaddr2 */
futex(UNLOCK_PI, uaddr2)
wake_futex_pi()
cmp_futex_value_locked(uaddr2, waiter)
wake_up_q()
<woken by waker>
<hrtimer_wakeup() fires,
clears sleeper->task>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
__rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* steals lock */
rt_mutex_set_owner(lock, stealer)
<preempted>
<scheduled in>
rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock()
__rt_mutex_slowlock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* fails, lock held by stealer */
if (timeout && !timeout->task)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
fixup_owner()
/* lock wasn't acquired, so,
fixup_pi_state_owner skipped */
return -ETIMEDOUT;
/* At this point, we've returned -ETIMEDOUT to userspace, but the
* futex word shows waiter to be the owner, and the pi_mutex has
* stealer as the owner */
futex_lock(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
-> bails with EDEADLK, futex word says we're owner.
And suggested that what commit:
73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
removes from fixup_owner() looks to be just what is needed. And indeed
it is -- I completely missed that requeue_pi could also result in this
case. So we need to restore that, except that subsequent patches, like
commit:
16ffa12d7425 ("futex: Pull rt_mutex_futex_unlock() out from under hb->lock")
changed all the locking rules. Even without that, the sequence:
- if (rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex)) {
- locked = 1;
- goto out;
- }
- raw_spin_lock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- owner = rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- if (!owner)
- owner = rt_mutex_next_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, owner);
already suggests there were races; otherwise we'd never have to look
at next_owner.
So instead of doing 3 consecutive wait_lock sections with who knows
what races, we do it all in a single section. Additionally, the usage
of pi_state->owner in fixup_owner() was only safe because only the
rt_mutex owner would modify it, which this additional case wrecks.
Luckily the values can only change away and not to the value we're
testing, this means we can do a speculative test and double check once
we have the wait_lock.
Fixes: 73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
Reported-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Reported-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Tested-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171208124939.7livp7no2ov65rrc@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
2017-12-08 12:49:39 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
newowner = rt_mutex_owner(&pi_state->pi_mutex);
|
2020-11-04 15:12:44 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If the higher priority waiter has not yet taken over the
|
|
|
|
* rtmutex then newowner is NULL. We can't return here with
|
|
|
|
* that state because it's inconsistent vs. the user space
|
|
|
|
* state. So drop the locks and try again. It's a valid
|
|
|
|
* situation and not any different from the other retry
|
|
|
|
* conditions.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(!newowner)) {
|
|
|
|
err = -EAGAIN;
|
|
|
|
goto handle_err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex
Julia reported futex state corruption in the following scenario:
waiter waker stealer (prio > waiter)
futex(WAIT_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr, uaddr2,
timeout=[N ms])
futex_wait_requeue_pi()
futex_wait_queue_me()
freezable_schedule()
<scheduled out>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
futex(CMP_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr,
uaddr2, 1, 0)
/* requeues waiter to uaddr2 */
futex(UNLOCK_PI, uaddr2)
wake_futex_pi()
cmp_futex_value_locked(uaddr2, waiter)
wake_up_q()
<woken by waker>
<hrtimer_wakeup() fires,
clears sleeper->task>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
__rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* steals lock */
rt_mutex_set_owner(lock, stealer)
<preempted>
<scheduled in>
rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock()
__rt_mutex_slowlock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* fails, lock held by stealer */
if (timeout && !timeout->task)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
fixup_owner()
/* lock wasn't acquired, so,
fixup_pi_state_owner skipped */
return -ETIMEDOUT;
/* At this point, we've returned -ETIMEDOUT to userspace, but the
* futex word shows waiter to be the owner, and the pi_mutex has
* stealer as the owner */
futex_lock(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
-> bails with EDEADLK, futex word says we're owner.
And suggested that what commit:
73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
removes from fixup_owner() looks to be just what is needed. And indeed
it is -- I completely missed that requeue_pi could also result in this
case. So we need to restore that, except that subsequent patches, like
commit:
16ffa12d7425 ("futex: Pull rt_mutex_futex_unlock() out from under hb->lock")
changed all the locking rules. Even without that, the sequence:
- if (rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex)) {
- locked = 1;
- goto out;
- }
- raw_spin_lock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- owner = rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- if (!owner)
- owner = rt_mutex_next_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, owner);
already suggests there were races; otherwise we'd never have to look
at next_owner.
So instead of doing 3 consecutive wait_lock sections with who knows
what races, we do it all in a single section. Additionally, the usage
of pi_state->owner in fixup_owner() was only safe because only the
rt_mutex owner would modify it, which this additional case wrecks.
Luckily the values can only change away and not to the value we're
testing, this means we can do a speculative test and double check once
we have the wait_lock.
Fixes: 73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
Reported-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Reported-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Tested-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171208124939.7livp7no2ov65rrc@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
2017-12-08 12:49:39 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(argowner != current);
|
|
|
|
if (oldowner == current) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We raced against a concurrent self; things are
|
|
|
|
* already fixed up. Nothing to do.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2021-01-19 15:26:38 +00:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex
Julia reported futex state corruption in the following scenario:
waiter waker stealer (prio > waiter)
futex(WAIT_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr, uaddr2,
timeout=[N ms])
futex_wait_requeue_pi()
futex_wait_queue_me()
freezable_schedule()
<scheduled out>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
futex(CMP_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr,
uaddr2, 1, 0)
/* requeues waiter to uaddr2 */
futex(UNLOCK_PI, uaddr2)
wake_futex_pi()
cmp_futex_value_locked(uaddr2, waiter)
wake_up_q()
<woken by waker>
<hrtimer_wakeup() fires,
clears sleeper->task>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
__rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* steals lock */
rt_mutex_set_owner(lock, stealer)
<preempted>
<scheduled in>
rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock()
__rt_mutex_slowlock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* fails, lock held by stealer */
if (timeout && !timeout->task)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
fixup_owner()
/* lock wasn't acquired, so,
fixup_pi_state_owner skipped */
return -ETIMEDOUT;
/* At this point, we've returned -ETIMEDOUT to userspace, but the
* futex word shows waiter to be the owner, and the pi_mutex has
* stealer as the owner */
futex_lock(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
-> bails with EDEADLK, futex word says we're owner.
And suggested that what commit:
73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
removes from fixup_owner() looks to be just what is needed. And indeed
it is -- I completely missed that requeue_pi could also result in this
case. So we need to restore that, except that subsequent patches, like
commit:
16ffa12d7425 ("futex: Pull rt_mutex_futex_unlock() out from under hb->lock")
changed all the locking rules. Even without that, the sequence:
- if (rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex)) {
- locked = 1;
- goto out;
- }
- raw_spin_lock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- owner = rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- if (!owner)
- owner = rt_mutex_next_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, owner);
already suggests there were races; otherwise we'd never have to look
at next_owner.
So instead of doing 3 consecutive wait_lock sections with who knows
what races, we do it all in a single section. Additionally, the usage
of pi_state->owner in fixup_owner() was only safe because only the
rt_mutex owner would modify it, which this additional case wrecks.
Luckily the values can only change away and not to the value we're
testing, this means we can do a speculative test and double check once
we have the wait_lock.
Fixes: 73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
Reported-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Reported-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Tested-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171208124939.7livp7no2ov65rrc@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
2017-12-08 12:49:39 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
newowner = argowner;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
newtid = task_pid_vnr(newowner) | FUTEX_WAITERS;
|
2018-01-22 10:39:47 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Owner died? */
|
|
|
|
if (!pi_state->owner)
|
|
|
|
newtid |= FUTEX_OWNER_DIED;
|
futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex
Julia reported futex state corruption in the following scenario:
waiter waker stealer (prio > waiter)
futex(WAIT_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr, uaddr2,
timeout=[N ms])
futex_wait_requeue_pi()
futex_wait_queue_me()
freezable_schedule()
<scheduled out>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
futex(CMP_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr,
uaddr2, 1, 0)
/* requeues waiter to uaddr2 */
futex(UNLOCK_PI, uaddr2)
wake_futex_pi()
cmp_futex_value_locked(uaddr2, waiter)
wake_up_q()
<woken by waker>
<hrtimer_wakeup() fires,
clears sleeper->task>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
__rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* steals lock */
rt_mutex_set_owner(lock, stealer)
<preempted>
<scheduled in>
rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock()
__rt_mutex_slowlock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* fails, lock held by stealer */
if (timeout && !timeout->task)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
fixup_owner()
/* lock wasn't acquired, so,
fixup_pi_state_owner skipped */
return -ETIMEDOUT;
/* At this point, we've returned -ETIMEDOUT to userspace, but the
* futex word shows waiter to be the owner, and the pi_mutex has
* stealer as the owner */
futex_lock(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
-> bails with EDEADLK, futex word says we're owner.
And suggested that what commit:
73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
removes from fixup_owner() looks to be just what is needed. And indeed
it is -- I completely missed that requeue_pi could also result in this
case. So we need to restore that, except that subsequent patches, like
commit:
16ffa12d7425 ("futex: Pull rt_mutex_futex_unlock() out from under hb->lock")
changed all the locking rules. Even without that, the sequence:
- if (rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex)) {
- locked = 1;
- goto out;
- }
- raw_spin_lock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- owner = rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- if (!owner)
- owner = rt_mutex_next_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, owner);
already suggests there were races; otherwise we'd never have to look
at next_owner.
So instead of doing 3 consecutive wait_lock sections with who knows
what races, we do it all in a single section. Additionally, the usage
of pi_state->owner in fixup_owner() was only safe because only the
rt_mutex owner would modify it, which this additional case wrecks.
Luckily the values can only change away and not to the value we're
testing, this means we can do a speculative test and double check once
we have the wait_lock.
Fixes: 73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
Reported-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Reported-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Tested-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171208124939.7livp7no2ov65rrc@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
2017-12-08 12:49:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
err = get_futex_value_locked(&uval, uaddr);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
goto handle_err;
|
2008-06-23 09:21:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 10:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
2008-06-23 09:21:58 +00:00
|
|
|
newval = (uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) | newtid;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
err = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval);
|
|
|
|
if (err)
|
|
|
|
goto handle_err;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-06-23 09:21:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (curval == uval)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
uval = curval;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We fixed up user space. Now we need to fix the pi_state
|
|
|
|
* itself.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2021-01-19 14:21:35 +00:00
|
|
|
pi_state_update_owner(pi_state, newowner);
|
2007-05-09 09:35:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-01-20 15:00:24 +00:00
|
|
|
return argowner == current;
|
2007-05-09 09:35:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
* In order to reschedule or handle a page fault, we need to drop the
|
|
|
|
* locks here. In the case of a fault, this gives the other task
|
|
|
|
* (either the highest priority waiter itself or the task which stole
|
|
|
|
* the rtmutex) the chance to try the fixup of the pi_state. So once we
|
|
|
|
* are back from handling the fault we need to check the pi_state after
|
|
|
|
* reacquiring the locks and before trying to do another fixup. When
|
|
|
|
* the fixup has been done already we simply return.
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Note: we hold both hb->lock and pi_mutex->wait_lock. We can safely
|
|
|
|
* drop hb->lock since the caller owns the hb -> futex_q relation.
|
|
|
|
* Dropping the pi_mutex->wait_lock requires the state revalidate.
|
2007-05-09 09:35:02 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
handle_err:
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
|
2008-06-23 09:21:58 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock(q->lock_ptr);
|
2007-06-08 20:47:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (err) {
|
|
|
|
case -EFAULT:
|
2021-01-19 15:26:38 +00:00
|
|
|
err = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr);
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case -EAGAIN:
|
|
|
|
cond_resched();
|
2021-01-19 15:26:38 +00:00
|
|
|
err = 0;
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-06-08 20:47:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-06-23 09:21:58 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_lock(q->lock_ptr);
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
|
2007-06-08 20:47:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-06-23 09:21:58 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check if someone else fixed it for us:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2021-01-19 15:26:38 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pi_state->owner != oldowner)
|
|
|
|
return argowner == current;
|
2008-06-23 09:21:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-01-19 15:26:38 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Retry if err was -EAGAIN or the fault in succeeded */
|
|
|
|
if (!err)
|
|
|
|
goto retry;
|
2008-06-23 09:21:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-01-18 18:01:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* fault_in_user_writeable() failed so user state is immutable. At
|
|
|
|
* best we can make the kernel state consistent but user state will
|
|
|
|
* be most likely hosed and any subsequent unlock operation will be
|
|
|
|
* rejected due to PI futex rule [10].
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Ensure that the rtmutex owner is also the pi_state owner despite
|
|
|
|
* the user space value claiming something different. There is no
|
|
|
|
* point in unlocking the rtmutex if current is the owner as it
|
|
|
|
* would need to wait until the next waiter has taken the rtmutex
|
|
|
|
* to guarantee consistent state. Keep it simple. Userspace asked
|
|
|
|
* for this wreckaged state.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The rtmutex has an owner - either current or some other
|
|
|
|
* task. See the EAGAIN loop above.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
pi_state_update_owner(pi_state, rt_mutex_owner(&pi_state->pi_mutex));
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-01-19 15:26:38 +00:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-01-19 15:26:38 +00:00
|
|
|
static int fixup_pi_state_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_q *q,
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct *argowner)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = q->pi_state;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
lockdep_assert_held(q->lock_ptr);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
|
|
|
|
ret = __fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, argowner);
|
2017-03-22 10:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2007-05-09 09:35:02 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-08 07:26:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static long futex_wait_restart(struct restart_block *restart);
|
2007-07-16 06:41:20 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:40:02 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* fixup_owner() - Post lock pi_state and corner case management
|
|
|
|
* @uaddr: user address of the futex
|
|
|
|
* @q: futex_q (contains pi_state and access to the rt_mutex)
|
|
|
|
* @locked: if the attempt to take the rt_mutex succeeded (1) or not (0)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* After attempting to lock an rt_mutex, this function is called to cleanup
|
|
|
|
* the pi_state owner as well as handle race conditions that may allow us to
|
|
|
|
* acquire the lock. Must be called with the hb lock held.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2013-03-05 18:00:24 +00:00
|
|
|
* Return:
|
2017-05-11 13:17:45 +00:00
|
|
|
* - 1 - success, lock taken;
|
|
|
|
* - 0 - success, lock not taken;
|
|
|
|
* - <0 - on error (-EFAULT)
|
2009-04-03 20:40:02 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2010-11-10 12:30:36 +00:00
|
|
|
static int fixup_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_q *q, int locked)
|
2009-04-03 20:40:02 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (locked) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Got the lock. We might not be the anticipated owner if we
|
|
|
|
* did a lock-steal - fix up the PI-state in that case:
|
2017-03-22 10:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex
Julia reported futex state corruption in the following scenario:
waiter waker stealer (prio > waiter)
futex(WAIT_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr, uaddr2,
timeout=[N ms])
futex_wait_requeue_pi()
futex_wait_queue_me()
freezable_schedule()
<scheduled out>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
futex(CMP_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr,
uaddr2, 1, 0)
/* requeues waiter to uaddr2 */
futex(UNLOCK_PI, uaddr2)
wake_futex_pi()
cmp_futex_value_locked(uaddr2, waiter)
wake_up_q()
<woken by waker>
<hrtimer_wakeup() fires,
clears sleeper->task>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
__rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* steals lock */
rt_mutex_set_owner(lock, stealer)
<preempted>
<scheduled in>
rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock()
__rt_mutex_slowlock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* fails, lock held by stealer */
if (timeout && !timeout->task)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
fixup_owner()
/* lock wasn't acquired, so,
fixup_pi_state_owner skipped */
return -ETIMEDOUT;
/* At this point, we've returned -ETIMEDOUT to userspace, but the
* futex word shows waiter to be the owner, and the pi_mutex has
* stealer as the owner */
futex_lock(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
-> bails with EDEADLK, futex word says we're owner.
And suggested that what commit:
73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
removes from fixup_owner() looks to be just what is needed. And indeed
it is -- I completely missed that requeue_pi could also result in this
case. So we need to restore that, except that subsequent patches, like
commit:
16ffa12d7425 ("futex: Pull rt_mutex_futex_unlock() out from under hb->lock")
changed all the locking rules. Even without that, the sequence:
- if (rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex)) {
- locked = 1;
- goto out;
- }
- raw_spin_lock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- owner = rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- if (!owner)
- owner = rt_mutex_next_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, owner);
already suggests there were races; otherwise we'd never have to look
at next_owner.
So instead of doing 3 consecutive wait_lock sections with who knows
what races, we do it all in a single section. Additionally, the usage
of pi_state->owner in fixup_owner() was only safe because only the
rt_mutex owner would modify it, which this additional case wrecks.
Luckily the values can only change away and not to the value we're
testing, this means we can do a speculative test and double check once
we have the wait_lock.
Fixes: 73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
Reported-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Reported-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Tested-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171208124939.7livp7no2ov65rrc@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
2017-12-08 12:49:39 +00:00
|
|
|
* Speculative pi_state->owner read (we don't hold wait_lock);
|
|
|
|
* since we own the lock pi_state->owner == current is the
|
|
|
|
* stable state, anything else needs more attention.
|
2009-04-03 20:40:02 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (q->pi_state->owner != current)
|
2021-01-20 15:00:24 +00:00
|
|
|
return fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, current);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:02 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex
Julia reported futex state corruption in the following scenario:
waiter waker stealer (prio > waiter)
futex(WAIT_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr, uaddr2,
timeout=[N ms])
futex_wait_requeue_pi()
futex_wait_queue_me()
freezable_schedule()
<scheduled out>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
futex(CMP_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr,
uaddr2, 1, 0)
/* requeues waiter to uaddr2 */
futex(UNLOCK_PI, uaddr2)
wake_futex_pi()
cmp_futex_value_locked(uaddr2, waiter)
wake_up_q()
<woken by waker>
<hrtimer_wakeup() fires,
clears sleeper->task>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
__rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* steals lock */
rt_mutex_set_owner(lock, stealer)
<preempted>
<scheduled in>
rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock()
__rt_mutex_slowlock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* fails, lock held by stealer */
if (timeout && !timeout->task)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
fixup_owner()
/* lock wasn't acquired, so,
fixup_pi_state_owner skipped */
return -ETIMEDOUT;
/* At this point, we've returned -ETIMEDOUT to userspace, but the
* futex word shows waiter to be the owner, and the pi_mutex has
* stealer as the owner */
futex_lock(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
-> bails with EDEADLK, futex word says we're owner.
And suggested that what commit:
73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
removes from fixup_owner() looks to be just what is needed. And indeed
it is -- I completely missed that requeue_pi could also result in this
case. So we need to restore that, except that subsequent patches, like
commit:
16ffa12d7425 ("futex: Pull rt_mutex_futex_unlock() out from under hb->lock")
changed all the locking rules. Even without that, the sequence:
- if (rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex)) {
- locked = 1;
- goto out;
- }
- raw_spin_lock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- owner = rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- if (!owner)
- owner = rt_mutex_next_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, owner);
already suggests there were races; otherwise we'd never have to look
at next_owner.
So instead of doing 3 consecutive wait_lock sections with who knows
what races, we do it all in a single section. Additionally, the usage
of pi_state->owner in fixup_owner() was only safe because only the
rt_mutex owner would modify it, which this additional case wrecks.
Luckily the values can only change away and not to the value we're
testing, this means we can do a speculative test and double check once
we have the wait_lock.
Fixes: 73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
Reported-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Reported-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Tested-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171208124939.7livp7no2ov65rrc@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
2017-12-08 12:49:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we didn't get the lock; check if anybody stole it from us. In
|
|
|
|
* that case, we need to fix up the uval to point to them instead of
|
|
|
|
* us, otherwise bad things happen. [10]
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Another speculative read; pi_state->owner == current is unstable
|
|
|
|
* but needs our attention.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2021-01-20 15:00:24 +00:00
|
|
|
if (q->pi_state->owner == current)
|
|
|
|
return fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, NULL);
|
futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex
Julia reported futex state corruption in the following scenario:
waiter waker stealer (prio > waiter)
futex(WAIT_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr, uaddr2,
timeout=[N ms])
futex_wait_requeue_pi()
futex_wait_queue_me()
freezable_schedule()
<scheduled out>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
futex(CMP_REQUEUE_PI, uaddr,
uaddr2, 1, 0)
/* requeues waiter to uaddr2 */
futex(UNLOCK_PI, uaddr2)
wake_futex_pi()
cmp_futex_value_locked(uaddr2, waiter)
wake_up_q()
<woken by waker>
<hrtimer_wakeup() fires,
clears sleeper->task>
futex(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
__rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* steals lock */
rt_mutex_set_owner(lock, stealer)
<preempted>
<scheduled in>
rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock()
__rt_mutex_slowlock()
try_to_take_rt_mutex() /* fails, lock held by stealer */
if (timeout && !timeout->task)
return -ETIMEDOUT;
fixup_owner()
/* lock wasn't acquired, so,
fixup_pi_state_owner skipped */
return -ETIMEDOUT;
/* At this point, we've returned -ETIMEDOUT to userspace, but the
* futex word shows waiter to be the owner, and the pi_mutex has
* stealer as the owner */
futex_lock(LOCK_PI, uaddr2)
-> bails with EDEADLK, futex word says we're owner.
And suggested that what commit:
73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
removes from fixup_owner() looks to be just what is needed. And indeed
it is -- I completely missed that requeue_pi could also result in this
case. So we need to restore that, except that subsequent patches, like
commit:
16ffa12d7425 ("futex: Pull rt_mutex_futex_unlock() out from under hb->lock")
changed all the locking rules. Even without that, the sequence:
- if (rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex)) {
- locked = 1;
- goto out;
- }
- raw_spin_lock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- owner = rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- if (!owner)
- owner = rt_mutex_next_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
- raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
- ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, owner);
already suggests there were races; otherwise we'd never have to look
at next_owner.
So instead of doing 3 consecutive wait_lock sections with who knows
what races, we do it all in a single section. Additionally, the usage
of pi_state->owner in fixup_owner() was only safe because only the
rt_mutex owner would modify it, which this additional case wrecks.
Luckily the values can only change away and not to the value we're
testing, this means we can do a speculative test and double check once
we have the wait_lock.
Fixes: 73d786bd043e ("futex: Rework inconsistent rt_mutex/futex_q state")
Reported-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Reported-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>
Tested-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171208124939.7livp7no2ov65rrc@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
2017-12-08 12:49:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:40:02 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Paranoia check. If we did not take the lock, then we should not be
|
2021-01-19 15:06:10 +00:00
|
|
|
* the owner of the rt_mutex. Warn and establish consistent state.
|
2009-04-03 20:40:02 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2021-01-19 15:06:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex) == current))
|
|
|
|
return fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, current);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-01-20 15:00:24 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:02 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:39:33 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* futex_wait_queue_me() - queue_me() and wait for wakeup, timeout, or signal
|
|
|
|
* @hb: the futex hash bucket, must be locked by the caller
|
|
|
|
* @q: the futex_q to queue up on
|
|
|
|
* @timeout: the prepared hrtimer_sleeper, or null for no timeout
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void futex_wait_queue_me(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, struct futex_q *q,
|
2009-05-05 17:21:40 +00:00
|
|
|
struct hrtimer_sleeper *timeout)
|
2009-04-03 20:39:33 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-09-24 18:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The task state is guaranteed to be set before another task can
|
2015-05-12 08:51:55 +00:00
|
|
|
* wake it. set_current_state() is implemented using smp_store_mb() and
|
2009-09-24 18:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
* queue_me() calls spin_unlock() upon completion, both serializing
|
|
|
|
* access to the hash list and forcing another memory barrier.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-05-05 17:21:40 +00:00
|
|
|
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
|
2009-09-22 05:30:38 +00:00
|
|
|
queue_me(q, hb);
|
2009-04-03 20:39:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Arm the timer */
|
2015-04-14 21:09:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if (timeout)
|
2019-07-30 19:16:55 +00:00
|
|
|
hrtimer_sleeper_start_expires(timeout, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
|
2009-04-03 20:39:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2009-09-22 05:30:38 +00:00
|
|
|
* If we have been removed from the hash list, then another task
|
|
|
|
* has tried to wake us, and we can skip the call to schedule().
|
2009-04-03 20:39:33 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (likely(!plist_node_empty(&q->list))) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If the timer has already expired, current will already be
|
|
|
|
* flagged for rescheduling. Only call schedule if there
|
|
|
|
* is no timeout, or if it has yet to expire.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!timeout || timeout->task)
|
2013-05-02 01:35:05 +00:00
|
|
|
freezable_schedule();
|
2009-04-03 20:39:33 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:40:40 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* futex_wait_setup() - Prepare to wait on a futex
|
|
|
|
* @uaddr: the futex userspace address
|
|
|
|
* @val: the expected value
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
* @flags: futex flags (FLAGS_SHARED, etc.)
|
2009-04-03 20:40:40 +00:00
|
|
|
* @q: the associated futex_q
|
|
|
|
* @hb: storage for hash_bucket pointer to be returned to caller
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Setup the futex_q and locate the hash_bucket. Get the futex value and
|
|
|
|
* compare it with the expected value. Handle atomic faults internally.
|
|
|
|
* Return with the hb lock held and a q.key reference on success, and unlocked
|
|
|
|
* with no q.key reference on failure.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2013-03-05 18:00:24 +00:00
|
|
|
* Return:
|
2017-05-11 13:17:45 +00:00
|
|
|
* - 0 - uaddr contains val and hb has been locked;
|
|
|
|
* - <1 - -EFAULT or -EWOULDBLOCK (uaddr does not contain val) and hb is unlocked
|
2009-04-03 20:40:40 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
static int futex_wait_setup(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 val, unsigned int flags,
|
2009-04-03 20:40:40 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_q *q, struct futex_hash_bucket **hb)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
u32 uval;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2009-03-12 07:55:37 +00:00
|
|
|
* Access the page AFTER the hash-bucket is locked.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
* Order is important:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Userspace waiter: val = var; if (cond(val)) futex_wait(&var, val);
|
|
|
|
* Userspace waker: if (cond(var)) { var = new; futex_wake(&var); }
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The basic logical guarantee of a futex is that it blocks ONLY
|
|
|
|
* if cond(var) is known to be true at the time of blocking, for
|
2011-03-07 02:07:50 +00:00
|
|
|
* any cond. If we locked the hash-bucket after testing *uaddr, that
|
|
|
|
* would open a race condition where we could block indefinitely with
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
* cond(var) false, which would violate the guarantee.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2011-03-07 02:07:50 +00:00
|
|
|
* On the other hand, we insert q and release the hash-bucket only
|
|
|
|
* after testing *uaddr. This guarantees that futex_wait() will NOT
|
|
|
|
* absorb a wakeup if *uaddr does not match the desired values
|
|
|
|
* while the syscall executes.
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-04-03 20:40:40 +00:00
|
|
|
retry:
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 02:57:57 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &q->key, FUTEX_READ);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:40 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
|
2009-04-10 16:50:05 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:40 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
retry_private:
|
|
|
|
*hb = queue_lock(q);
|
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = get_futex_value_locked(&uval, uaddr);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:40:40 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret) {
|
2014-01-12 23:31:22 +00:00
|
|
|
queue_unlock(*hb);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = get_user(uval, uaddr);
|
2009-03-12 07:56:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
2020-07-02 20:28:41 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(flags & FLAGS_SHARED))
|
2009-03-12 07:56:13 +00:00
|
|
|
goto retry_private;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
goto retry;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-04-03 20:39:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:40:40 +00:00
|
|
|
if (uval != val) {
|
2014-01-12 23:31:22 +00:00
|
|
|
queue_unlock(*hb);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:40 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = -EWOULDBLOCK;
|
2009-02-11 17:10:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:40:40 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
static int futex_wait(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags, u32 val,
|
|
|
|
ktime_t *abs_time, u32 bitset)
|
2009-04-03 20:40:40 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-05-28 16:03:45 +00:00
|
|
|
struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:40 +00:00
|
|
|
struct restart_block *restart;
|
|
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
|
2010-11-08 21:40:28 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_q q = futex_q_init;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:40 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!bitset)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
q.bitset = bitset;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-05-28 16:03:45 +00:00
|
|
|
to = futex_setup_timer(abs_time, &timeout, flags,
|
|
|
|
current->timer_slack_ns);
|
2009-10-13 18:40:43 +00:00
|
|
|
retry:
|
2010-10-17 15:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Prepare to wait on uaddr. On success, holds hb lock and increments
|
|
|
|
* q.key refs.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = futex_wait_setup(uaddr, val, flags, &q, &hb);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:40 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:39:33 +00:00
|
|
|
/* queue_me and wait for wakeup, timeout, or a signal. */
|
2009-05-05 17:21:40 +00:00
|
|
|
futex_wait_queue_me(hb, &q, to);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If we were woken (and unqueued), we succeeded, whatever. */
|
2009-02-11 17:10:10 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
2010-10-17 15:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
/* unqueue_me() drops q.key ref */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!unqueue_me(&q))
|
2010-10-17 15:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2009-02-11 17:10:10 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
|
2009-04-03 20:39:33 +00:00
|
|
|
if (to && !to->task)
|
2010-10-17 15:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2007-05-08 07:26:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2009-10-13 18:40:43 +00:00
|
|
|
* We expect signal_pending(current), but we might be the
|
|
|
|
* victim of a spurious wakeup as well.
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2010-10-17 15:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!signal_pending(current))
|
2009-10-13 18:40:43 +00:00
|
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-02-11 17:10:10 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
|
2007-05-09 09:35:02 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!abs_time)
|
2010-10-17 15:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2015-02-12 23:01:14 +00:00
|
|
|
restart = ¤t->restart_block;
|
2010-09-14 12:43:47 +00:00
|
|
|
restart->futex.uaddr = uaddr;
|
2009-02-11 17:10:10 +00:00
|
|
|
restart->futex.val = val;
|
2016-12-25 10:38:40 +00:00
|
|
|
restart->futex.time = *abs_time;
|
2009-02-11 17:10:10 +00:00
|
|
|
restart->futex.bitset = bitset;
|
2011-04-14 22:41:57 +00:00
|
|
|
restart->futex.flags = flags | FLAGS_HAS_TIMEOUT;
|
2008-12-29 23:49:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-02-01 17:46:41 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = set_restart_fn(restart, futex_wait_restart);
|
2009-02-11 17:10:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-12-29 23:49:53 +00:00
|
|
|
out:
|
2009-04-03 20:39:33 +00:00
|
|
|
if (to) {
|
|
|
|
hrtimer_cancel(&to->timer);
|
|
|
|
destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(&to->timer);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-08 07:26:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static long futex_wait_restart(struct restart_block *restart)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2010-09-14 12:43:47 +00:00
|
|
|
u32 __user *uaddr = restart->futex.uaddr;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:22 +00:00
|
|
|
ktime_t t, *tp = NULL;
|
2007-05-08 07:26:43 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:40:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (restart->futex.flags & FLAGS_HAS_TIMEOUT) {
|
2016-12-25 10:38:40 +00:00
|
|
|
t = restart->futex.time;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:22 +00:00
|
|
|
tp = &t;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-05-08 07:26:43 +00:00
|
|
|
restart->fn = do_no_restart_syscall;
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (long)futex_wait(uaddr, restart->futex.flags,
|
|
|
|
restart->futex.val, tp, restart->futex.bitset);
|
2007-05-08 07:26:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Userspace tried a 0 -> TID atomic transition of the futex value
|
|
|
|
* and failed. The kernel side here does the whole locking operation:
|
2015-06-30 06:26:01 +00:00
|
|
|
* if there are waiters then it will block as a consequence of relying
|
|
|
|
* on rt-mutexes, it does PI, etc. (Due to races the kernel might see
|
|
|
|
* a 0 value of the futex too.).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Also serves as futex trylock_pi()'ing, and due semantics.
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-01-16 19:28:06 +00:00
|
|
|
static int futex_lock_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags,
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
ktime_t *time, int trylock)
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-05-28 16:03:45 +00:00
|
|
|
struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to;
|
futex: Prevent exit livelock
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
2019-11-06 21:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
struct task_struct *exiting = NULL;
|
2017-03-22 10:35:58 +00:00
|
|
|
struct rt_mutex_waiter rt_waiter;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
|
2010-11-08 21:40:28 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_q q = futex_q_init;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:02 +00:00
|
|
|
int res, ret;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-01 04:31:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FUTEX_PI))
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (refill_pi_state_cache())
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-22 19:44:22 +00:00
|
|
|
to = futex_setup_timer(time, &timeout, flags, 0);
|
2006-09-08 16:47:15 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-12-29 23:49:53 +00:00
|
|
|
retry:
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 02:57:57 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &q.key, FUTEX_WRITE);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
|
2008-12-29 23:49:53 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-12 07:56:13 +00:00
|
|
|
retry_private:
|
2008-01-25 09:40:46 +00:00
|
|
|
hb = queue_lock(&q);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
futex: Prevent exit livelock
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
2019-11-06 21:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = futex_lock_pi_atomic(uaddr, hb, &q.key, &q.pi_state, current,
|
|
|
|
&exiting, 0);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(ret)) {
|
2015-06-30 06:26:01 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Atomic work succeeded and we got the lock,
|
|
|
|
* or failed. Either way, we do _not_ block.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2007-06-08 20:47:00 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (ret) {
|
2009-04-03 20:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
case 1:
|
|
|
|
/* We got the lock. */
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
goto out_unlock_put_key;
|
|
|
|
case -EFAULT:
|
|
|
|
goto uaddr_faulted;
|
2019-11-06 21:55:45 +00:00
|
|
|
case -EBUSY:
|
2007-06-08 20:47:00 +00:00
|
|
|
case -EAGAIN:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
* Two reasons for this:
|
2019-11-06 21:55:45 +00:00
|
|
|
* - EBUSY: Task is exiting and we just wait for the
|
2014-06-11 20:45:41 +00:00
|
|
|
* exit to complete.
|
2019-11-06 21:55:45 +00:00
|
|
|
* - EAGAIN: The user space value changed.
|
2007-06-08 20:47:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2014-01-12 23:31:22 +00:00
|
|
|
queue_unlock(hb);
|
futex: Prevent exit livelock
Oleg provided the following test case:
int main(void)
{
struct sched_param sp = {};
sp.sched_priority = 2;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
int lock = vfork();
if (!lock) {
sp.sched_priority = 1;
assert(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &sp) == 0);
_exit(0);
}
syscall(__NR_futex, &lock, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0,0,0);
return 0;
}
This creates an unkillable RT process spinning in futex_lock_pi() on a UP
machine or if the process is affine to a single CPU. The reason is:
parent child
set FIFO prio 2
vfork() -> set FIFO prio 1
implies wait_for_child() sched_setscheduler(...)
exit()
do_exit()
....
mm_release()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
exit_futex(); (NOOP in this case)
complete() --> wakes parent
sys_futex()
loop infinite because
tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING
The same problem can happen just by regular preemption as well:
task holds futex
...
do_exit()
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
--> preemption (unrelated wakeup of some other higher prio task, e.g. timer)
switch_to(other_task)
return to user
sys_futex()
loop infinite as above
Just for the fun of it the futex exit cleanup could trigger the wakeup
itself before the task sets its futex state to DEAD.
To cure this, the handling of the exiting owner is changed so:
- A refcount is held on the task
- The task pointer is stored in a caller visible location
- The caller drops all locks (hash bucket, mmap_sem) and blocks
on task::futex_exit_mutex. When the mutex is acquired then
the exiting task has completed the cleanup and the state
is consistent and can be reevaluated.
This is not a pretty solution, but there is no choice other than returning
an error code to user space, which would break the state consistency
guarantee and open another can of problems including regressions.
For stable backports the preparatory commits ac31c7ff8624 .. ba31c1a48538
are required as well, but for anything older than 5.3.y the backports are
going to be provided when this hits mainline as the other dependencies for
those kernels are definitely not stable material.
Fixes: 778e9a9c3e71 ("pi-futex: fix exit races and locking problems")
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stable Team <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224557.041676471@linutronix.de
2019-11-06 21:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Handle the case where the owner is in the middle of
|
|
|
|
* exiting. Wait for the exit to complete otherwise
|
|
|
|
* this task might loop forever, aka. live lock.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
wait_for_owner_exiting(ret, exiting);
|
2007-06-08 20:47:00 +00:00
|
|
|
cond_resched();
|
|
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2008-12-29 23:49:53 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out_unlock_put_key;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 10:35:58 +00:00
|
|
|
WARN_ON(!q.pi_state);
|
|
|
|
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Only actually queue now that the atomic ops are done:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-03-22 10:35:58 +00:00
|
|
|
__queue_me(&q, hb);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 10:35:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (trylock) {
|
2017-03-22 10:35:51 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Fixup the trylock return value: */
|
|
|
|
ret = ret ? 0 : -EWOULDBLOCK;
|
2017-03-22 10:35:58 +00:00
|
|
|
goto no_block;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 10:36:00 +00:00
|
|
|
rt_mutex_init_waiter(&rt_waiter);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 10:35:58 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-03-22 10:36:00 +00:00
|
|
|
* On PREEMPT_RT_FULL, when hb->lock becomes an rt_mutex, we must not
|
|
|
|
* hold it while doing rt_mutex_start_proxy(), because then it will
|
|
|
|
* include hb->lock in the blocking chain, even through we'll not in
|
|
|
|
* fact hold it while blocking. This will lead it to report -EDEADLK
|
|
|
|
* and BUG when futex_unlock_pi() interleaves with this.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Therefore acquire wait_lock while holding hb->lock, but drop the
|
2019-01-29 22:15:12 +00:00
|
|
|
* latter before calling __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(). This
|
|
|
|
* interleaves with futex_unlock_pi() -- which does a similar lock
|
|
|
|
* handoff -- such that the latter can observe the futex_q::pi_state
|
|
|
|
* before __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() is done.
|
2017-03-22 10:35:58 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-03-22 10:36:00 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irq(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
|
2019-01-29 22:15:12 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() unconditionally enqueues the @rt_waiter
|
|
|
|
* such that futex_unlock_pi() is guaranteed to observe the waiter when
|
|
|
|
* it sees the futex_q::pi_state.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-03-22 10:36:00 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex, &rt_waiter, current);
|
|
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 10:35:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 1)
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
2019-01-29 22:15:12 +00:00
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
2017-03-22 10:35:58 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(to))
|
2019-07-30 19:16:55 +00:00
|
|
|
hrtimer_sleeper_start_expires(to, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
|
2017-03-22 10:35:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex, to, &rt_waiter);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-01-29 22:15:12 +00:00
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
2006-07-01 11:35:42 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
|
2017-03-22 10:35:58 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2019-01-29 22:15:12 +00:00
|
|
|
* If we failed to acquire the lock (deadlock/signal/timeout), we must
|
2017-03-22 10:35:58 +00:00
|
|
|
* first acquire the hb->lock before removing the lock from the
|
2019-01-29 22:15:12 +00:00
|
|
|
* rt_mutex waitqueue, such that we can keep the hb and rt_mutex wait
|
|
|
|
* lists consistent.
|
2017-03-22 10:36:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* In particular; it is important that futex_unlock_pi() can not
|
|
|
|
* observe this inconsistency.
|
2017-03-22 10:35:58 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ret && !rt_mutex_cleanup_proxy_lock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex, &rt_waiter))
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
no_block:
|
2009-04-03 20:40:02 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Fixup the pi_state owner and possibly acquire the lock if we
|
|
|
|
* haven't already.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2010-11-10 12:30:36 +00:00
|
|
|
res = fixup_owner(uaddr, &q, !ret);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:02 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2021-05-12 18:04:28 +00:00
|
|
|
* If fixup_owner() returned an error, propagate that. If it acquired
|
2009-04-03 20:40:02 +00:00
|
|
|
* the lock, clear our -ETIMEDOUT or -EINTR.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (res)
|
|
|
|
ret = (res < 0) ? res : 0;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-06-08 20:47:00 +00:00
|
|
|
unqueue_me_pi(&q);
|
2021-02-26 17:50:28 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
|
2020-07-02 20:28:40 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-12-29 23:49:53 +00:00
|
|
|
out_unlock_put_key:
|
2014-01-12 23:31:22 +00:00
|
|
|
queue_unlock(hb);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-12-29 23:49:53 +00:00
|
|
|
out:
|
2017-04-10 16:03:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (to) {
|
|
|
|
hrtimer_cancel(&to->timer);
|
2008-04-30 07:55:04 +00:00
|
|
|
destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(&to->timer);
|
2017-04-10 16:03:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-04-03 20:40:02 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret != -EINTR ? ret : -ERESTARTNOINTR;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-12-29 23:49:53 +00:00
|
|
|
uaddr_faulted:
|
2014-01-12 23:31:22 +00:00
|
|
|
queue_unlock(hb);
|
2007-06-08 20:47:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-06-11 21:15:43 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr);
|
2009-03-12 07:56:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
2020-07-02 20:28:40 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(flags & FLAGS_SHARED))
|
2009-03-12 07:56:13 +00:00
|
|
|
goto retry_private;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
goto retry;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Userspace attempted a TID -> 0 atomic transition, and failed.
|
|
|
|
* This is the in-kernel slowpath: we look up the PI state (if any),
|
|
|
|
* and do the rt-mutex unlock.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
static int futex_unlock_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags)
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
treewide: Remove uninitialized_var() usage
Using uninitialized_var() is dangerous as it papers over real bugs[1]
(or can in the future), and suppresses unrelated compiler warnings
(e.g. "unused variable"). If the compiler thinks it is uninitialized,
either simply initialize the variable or make compiler changes.
In preparation for removing[2] the[3] macro[4], remove all remaining
needless uses with the following script:
git grep '\buninitialized_var\b' | cut -d: -f1 | sort -u | \
xargs perl -pi -e \
's/\buninitialized_var\(([^\)]+)\)/\1/g;
s:\s*/\* (GCC be quiet|to make compiler happy) \*/$::g;'
drivers/video/fbdev/riva/riva_hw.c was manually tweaked to avoid
pathological white-space.
No outstanding warnings were found building allmodconfig with GCC 9.3.0
for x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, powerpc64le, s390x, mips, sparc64,
alpha, and m68k.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200603174714.192027-1-glider@google.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFw+Vbj0i=1TGqCR5vQkCzWJ0QxK6CernOU6eedsudAixw@mail.gmail.com/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFwgbgqhbp1fkxvRKEpzyR5J8n1vKT1VZdz9knmPuXhOeg@mail.gmail.com/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFz2500WfbKXAx8s67wrm9=yVJu65TpLgN_ybYNv0VEOKA@mail.gmail.com/
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> # drivers/infiniband and mlx4/mlx5
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> # IB
Acked-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> # wireless drivers
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> # erofs
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2020-06-03 20:09:38 +00:00
|
|
|
u32 curval, uval, vpid = task_pid_vnr(current);
|
2008-09-26 17:32:20 +00:00
|
|
|
union futex_key key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
|
2014-06-11 20:45:38 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
|
2017-03-22 10:35:48 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_q *top_waiter;
|
2009-03-12 07:56:13 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-01 04:31:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FUTEX_PI))
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
retry:
|
|
|
|
if (get_user(uval, uaddr))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We release only a lock we actually own:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2011-03-11 10:51:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != vpid)
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 02:57:57 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key, FUTEX_WRITE);
|
2014-06-11 20:45:38 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hb = hash_futex(&key);
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-06-11 20:45:38 +00:00
|
|
|
* Check waiters first. We do not trust user space values at
|
|
|
|
* all and we at least want to know if user space fiddled
|
|
|
|
* with the futex value instead of blindly unlocking.
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-03-22 10:35:48 +00:00
|
|
|
top_waiter = futex_top_waiter(hb, &key);
|
|
|
|
if (top_waiter) {
|
2017-03-22 10:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = top_waiter->pi_state;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (!pi_state)
|
|
|
|
goto out_unlock;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If current does not own the pi_state then the futex is
|
|
|
|
* inconsistent and user space fiddled with the futex value.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (pi_state->owner != current)
|
|
|
|
goto out_unlock;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-22 10:35:59 +00:00
|
|
|
get_pi_state(pi_state);
|
2015-06-17 08:33:50 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2017-03-22 10:35:59 +00:00
|
|
|
* By taking wait_lock while still holding hb->lock, we ensure
|
|
|
|
* there is no point where we hold neither; and therefore
|
|
|
|
* wake_futex_pi() must observe a state consistent with what we
|
|
|
|
* observed.
|
2019-01-29 22:15:12 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* In particular; this forces __rt_mutex_start_proxy() to
|
|
|
|
* complete such that we're guaranteed to observe the
|
|
|
|
* rt_waiter. Also see the WARN in wake_futex_pi().
|
2017-03-22 10:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-03-22 10:35:59 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
|
2017-03-22 10:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-22 15:48:06 +00:00
|
|
|
/* drops pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock */
|
2017-03-22 10:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = wake_futex_pi(uaddr, uval, pi_state);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
put_pi_state(pi_state);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Success, we're done! No tricky corner cases.
|
2015-06-17 08:33:50 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!ret)
|
2020-12-30 12:29:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-06-11 20:45:38 +00:00
|
|
|
* The atomic access to the futex value generated a
|
|
|
|
* pagefault, so retry the user-access and the wakeup:
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ret == -EFAULT)
|
|
|
|
goto pi_faulted;
|
2016-04-15 12:35:39 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* A unconditional UNLOCK_PI op raced against a waiter
|
|
|
|
* setting the FUTEX_WAITERS bit. Try again.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret == -EAGAIN)
|
|
|
|
goto pi_retry;
|
2015-06-17 08:33:50 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* wake_futex_pi has detected invalid state. Tell user
|
|
|
|
* space.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2020-12-30 12:29:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-06-11 20:45:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2014-06-11 20:45:38 +00:00
|
|
|
* We have no kernel internal state, i.e. no waiters in the
|
|
|
|
* kernel. Waiters which are about to queue themselves are stuck
|
|
|
|
* on hb->lock. So we can safely ignore them. We do neither
|
|
|
|
* preserve the WAITERS bit not the OWNER_DIED one. We are the
|
|
|
|
* owner.
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((ret = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, 0))) {
|
2017-03-22 10:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (ret) {
|
|
|
|
case -EFAULT:
|
|
|
|
goto pi_faulted;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case -EAGAIN:
|
|
|
|
goto pi_retry;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
|
2020-12-30 12:29:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-03-22 10:35:55 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-11 20:45:38 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If uval has changed, let user space handle it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ret = (curval == uval) ? 0 : -EAGAIN;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
out_unlock:
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
pi_retry:
|
|
|
|
cond_resched();
|
|
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
pi_faulted:
|
|
|
|
|
2009-06-11 21:15:43 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr);
|
2008-12-18 23:06:34 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ret)
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup() - Detect early wakeup on the initial futex
|
|
|
|
* @hb: the hash_bucket futex_q was original enqueued on
|
|
|
|
* @q: the futex_q woken while waiting to be requeued
|
|
|
|
* @key2: the futex_key of the requeue target futex
|
|
|
|
* @timeout: the timeout associated with the wait (NULL if none)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Detect if the task was woken on the initial futex as opposed to the requeue
|
|
|
|
* target futex. If so, determine if it was a timeout or a signal that caused
|
|
|
|
* the wakeup and return the appropriate error code to the caller. Must be
|
|
|
|
* called with the hb lock held.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2013-03-05 18:00:24 +00:00
|
|
|
* Return:
|
2017-05-11 13:17:45 +00:00
|
|
|
* - 0 = no early wakeup detected;
|
|
|
|
* - <0 = -ETIMEDOUT or -ERESTARTNOINTR
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline
|
|
|
|
int handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb,
|
|
|
|
struct futex_q *q, union futex_key *key2,
|
|
|
|
struct hrtimer_sleeper *timeout)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* With the hb lock held, we avoid races while we process the wakeup.
|
|
|
|
* We only need to hold hb (and not hb2) to ensure atomicity as the
|
|
|
|
* wakeup code can't change q.key from uaddr to uaddr2 if we hold hb.
|
|
|
|
* It can't be requeued from uaddr2 to something else since we don't
|
|
|
|
* support a PI aware source futex for requeue.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!match_futex(&q->key, key2)) {
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON(q->lock_ptr && (&hb->lock != q->lock_ptr));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We were woken prior to requeue by a timeout or a signal.
|
|
|
|
* Unqueue the futex_q and determine which it was.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2010-12-22 06:18:50 +00:00
|
|
|
plist_del(&q->list, &hb->chain);
|
2014-03-21 05:11:17 +00:00
|
|
|
hb_waiters_dec(hb);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-10-13 18:40:43 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Handle spurious wakeups gracefully */
|
2009-10-28 19:26:48 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = -EWOULDBLOCK;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
if (timeout && !timeout->task)
|
|
|
|
ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
|
2009-10-13 18:40:43 +00:00
|
|
|
else if (signal_pending(current))
|
2009-05-20 07:22:40 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = -ERESTARTNOINTR;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* futex_wait_requeue_pi() - Wait on uaddr and take uaddr2
|
2009-09-22 05:29:59 +00:00
|
|
|
* @uaddr: the futex we initially wait on (non-pi)
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
* @flags: futex flags (FLAGS_SHARED, FLAGS_CLOCKRT, etc.), they must be
|
2015-06-30 06:26:02 +00:00
|
|
|
* the same type, no requeueing from private to shared, etc.
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
* @val: the expected value of uaddr
|
|
|
|
* @abs_time: absolute timeout
|
2009-09-22 05:29:59 +00:00
|
|
|
* @bitset: 32 bit wakeup bitset set by userspace, defaults to all
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
* @uaddr2: the pi futex we will take prior to returning to user-space
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The caller will wait on uaddr and will be requeued by futex_requeue() to
|
2012-07-20 18:53:31 +00:00
|
|
|
* uaddr2 which must be PI aware and unique from uaddr. Normal wakeup will wake
|
|
|
|
* on uaddr2 and complete the acquisition of the rt_mutex prior to returning to
|
|
|
|
* userspace. This ensures the rt_mutex maintains an owner when it has waiters;
|
|
|
|
* without one, the pi logic would not know which task to boost/deboost, if
|
|
|
|
* there was a need to.
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We call schedule in futex_wait_queue_me() when we enqueue and return there
|
2013-03-05 18:00:24 +00:00
|
|
|
* via the following--
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
* 1) wakeup on uaddr2 after an atomic lock acquisition by futex_requeue()
|
2009-07-31 23:20:10 +00:00
|
|
|
* 2) wakeup on uaddr2 after a requeue
|
|
|
|
* 3) signal
|
|
|
|
* 4) timeout
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
2009-07-31 23:20:10 +00:00
|
|
|
* If 3, cleanup and return -ERESTARTNOINTR.
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If 2, we may then block on trying to take the rt_mutex and return via:
|
|
|
|
* 5) successful lock
|
|
|
|
* 6) signal
|
|
|
|
* 7) timeout
|
|
|
|
* 8) other lock acquisition failure
|
|
|
|
*
|
2009-07-31 23:20:10 +00:00
|
|
|
* If 6, return -EWOULDBLOCK (restarting the syscall would do the same).
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If 4 or 7, we cleanup and return with -ETIMEDOUT.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2013-03-05 18:00:24 +00:00
|
|
|
* Return:
|
2017-05-11 13:17:45 +00:00
|
|
|
* - 0 - On success;
|
|
|
|
* - <0 - On error
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
static int futex_wait_requeue_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags,
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
u32 val, ktime_t *abs_time, u32 bitset,
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
u32 __user *uaddr2)
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-05-28 16:03:45 +00:00
|
|
|
struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
struct rt_mutex_waiter rt_waiter;
|
|
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
|
2010-11-08 21:40:28 +00:00
|
|
|
union futex_key key2 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
|
|
|
|
struct futex_q q = futex_q_init;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
int res, ret;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-01 04:31:32 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FUTEX_PI))
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
|
2012-07-20 18:53:31 +00:00
|
|
|
if (uaddr == uaddr2)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!bitset)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-05-28 16:03:45 +00:00
|
|
|
to = futex_setup_timer(abs_time, &timeout, flags,
|
|
|
|
current->timer_slack_ns);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The waiter is allocated on our stack, manipulated by the requeue
|
|
|
|
* code while we sleep on uaddr.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-03-22 10:35:56 +00:00
|
|
|
rt_mutex_init_waiter(&rt_waiter);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-01-04 02:57:57 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key2, FUTEX_WRITE);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-08-14 00:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
q.bitset = bitset;
|
|
|
|
q.rt_waiter = &rt_waiter;
|
|
|
|
q.requeue_pi_key = &key2;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-10-17 15:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Prepare to wait on uaddr. On success, increments q.key (key1) ref
|
|
|
|
* count.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = futex_wait_setup(uaddr, val, flags, &q, &hb);
|
2009-05-20 07:18:50 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
2020-07-02 20:28:40 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-06-03 12:27:06 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The check above which compares uaddrs is not sufficient for
|
|
|
|
* shared futexes. We need to compare the keys:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (match_futex(&q.key, &key2)) {
|
2014-09-11 21:44:35 +00:00
|
|
|
queue_unlock(hb);
|
2014-06-03 12:27:06 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = -EINVAL;
|
2020-07-02 20:28:40 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2014-06-03 12:27:06 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Queue the futex_q, drop the hb lock, wait for wakeup. */
|
2009-05-05 17:21:40 +00:00
|
|
|
futex_wait_queue_me(hb, &q, to);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
|
|
|
|
ret = handle_early_requeue_pi_wakeup(hb, &q, &key2, to);
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
2020-07-02 20:28:40 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* In order for us to be here, we know our q.key == key2, and since
|
|
|
|
* we took the hb->lock above, we also know that futex_requeue() has
|
|
|
|
* completed and we no longer have to concern ourselves with a wakeup
|
2010-10-17 15:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
* race with the atomic proxy lock acquisition by the requeue code. The
|
|
|
|
* futex_requeue dropped our key1 reference and incremented our key2
|
|
|
|
* reference count.
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2021-02-26 17:50:27 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check if the requeue code acquired the second futex for us and do
|
|
|
|
* any pertinent fixup.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!q.rt_waiter) {
|
|
|
|
if (q.pi_state && (q.pi_state->owner != current)) {
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
|
2021-02-26 17:50:27 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = fixup_owner(uaddr2, &q, true);
|
2015-12-19 20:07:38 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Drop the reference to the pi state which
|
|
|
|
* the requeue_pi() code acquired for us.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2015-12-19 20:07:39 +00:00
|
|
|
put_pi_state(q.pi_state);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
|
2021-01-20 15:00:24 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Adjust the return value. It's either -EFAULT or
|
|
|
|
* success (1) but the caller expects 0 for success.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ret = ret < 0 ? ret : 0;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2017-03-04 09:27:18 +00:00
|
|
|
struct rt_mutex *pi_mutex;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We have been woken up by futex_unlock_pi(), a timeout, or a
|
|
|
|
* signal. futex_unlock_pi() will not destroy the lock_ptr nor
|
|
|
|
* the pi_state.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-07-20 18:53:30 +00:00
|
|
|
WARN_ON(!q.pi_state);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
pi_mutex = &q.pi_state->pi_mutex;
|
2017-03-22 10:35:57 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock(pi_mutex, to, &rt_waiter);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
|
2017-03-22 10:35:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret && !rt_mutex_cleanup_proxy_lock(pi_mutex, &rt_waiter))
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
debug_rt_mutex_free_waiter(&rt_waiter);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Fixup the pi_state owner and possibly acquire the lock if we
|
|
|
|
* haven't already.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2010-11-10 12:30:36 +00:00
|
|
|
res = fixup_owner(uaddr2, &q, !ret);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2021-05-12 18:04:28 +00:00
|
|
|
* If fixup_owner() returned an error, propagate that. If it
|
2009-09-22 05:29:59 +00:00
|
|
|
* acquired the lock, clear -ETIMEDOUT or -EINTR.
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (res)
|
|
|
|
ret = (res < 0) ? res : 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
unqueue_me_pi(&q);
|
2021-02-26 17:50:28 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-04 09:27:18 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret == -EINTR) {
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2009-07-31 23:20:10 +00:00
|
|
|
* We've already been requeued, but cannot restart by calling
|
|
|
|
* futex_lock_pi() directly. We could restart this syscall, but
|
|
|
|
* it would detect that the user space "val" changed and return
|
|
|
|
* -EWOULDBLOCK. Save the overhead of the restart and return
|
|
|
|
* -EWOULDBLOCK directly.
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-05-19 21:04:59 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = -EWOULDBLOCK;
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
if (to) {
|
|
|
|
hrtimer_cancel(&to->timer);
|
|
|
|
destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(&to->timer);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Support for robust futexes: the kernel cleans up held futexes at
|
|
|
|
* thread exit time.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Implementation: user-space maintains a per-thread list of locks it
|
|
|
|
* is holding. Upon do_exit(), the kernel carefully walks this list,
|
|
|
|
* and marks all locks that are owned by this thread with the
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
* FUTEX_OWNER_DIED bit, and wakes up a waiter (if any). The list is
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
* always manipulated with the lock held, so the list is private and
|
|
|
|
* per-thread. Userspace also maintains a per-thread 'list_op_pending'
|
|
|
|
* field, to allow the kernel to clean up if the thread dies after
|
|
|
|
* acquiring the lock, but just before it could have added itself to
|
|
|
|
* the list. There can only be one such pending lock.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
2009-09-22 05:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
* sys_set_robust_list() - Set the robust-futex list head of a task
|
|
|
|
* @head: pointer to the list-head
|
|
|
|
* @len: length of the list-head, as userspace expects
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-01-14 13:14:33 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(set_robust_list, struct robust_list_head __user *, head,
|
|
|
|
size_t, len)
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-02-23 23:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The kernel knows only one size for now:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(len != sizeof(*head)))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
current->robust_list = head;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
2009-09-22 05:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
* sys_get_robust_list() - Get the robust-futex list head of a task
|
|
|
|
* @pid: pid of the process [zero for current task]
|
|
|
|
* @head_ptr: pointer to a list-head pointer, the kernel fills it in
|
|
|
|
* @len_ptr: pointer to a length field, the kernel fills in the header size
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-01-14 13:14:33 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
|
|
|
|
struct robust_list_head __user * __user *, head_ptr,
|
|
|
|
size_t __user *, len_ptr)
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-10-10 21:46:07 +00:00
|
|
|
struct robust_list_head __user *head;
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long ret;
|
2012-03-19 23:12:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct task_struct *p;
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-23 23:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-19 23:12:53 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = -ESRCH;
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!pid)
|
2012-03-19 23:12:53 +00:00
|
|
|
p = current;
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
else {
|
2007-10-19 06:40:16 +00:00
|
|
|
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!p)
|
|
|
|
goto err_unlock;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-19 23:12:53 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = -EPERM;
|
ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks
By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.
To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.
The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.
While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.
In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:
/proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
this scenario:
lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
drwx------ root root /root
drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
-rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret
Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-01-20 23:00:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
|
2012-03-19 23:12:53 +00:00
|
|
|
goto err_unlock;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
head = p->robust_list;
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (put_user(sizeof(*head), len_ptr))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
return put_user(head, head_ptr);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err_unlock:
|
2006-09-29 09:00:55 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-06 21:55:35 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Constants for the pending_op argument of handle_futex_death */
|
|
|
|
#define HANDLE_DEATH_PENDING true
|
|
|
|
#define HANDLE_DEATH_LIST false
|
|
|
|
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Process a futex-list entry, check whether it's owned by the
|
|
|
|
* dying task, and do notification if so:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-11-06 21:55:35 +00:00
|
|
|
static int handle_futex_death(u32 __user *uaddr, struct task_struct *curr,
|
|
|
|
bool pi, bool pending_op)
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
treewide: Remove uninitialized_var() usage
Using uninitialized_var() is dangerous as it papers over real bugs[1]
(or can in the future), and suppresses unrelated compiler warnings
(e.g. "unused variable"). If the compiler thinks it is uninitialized,
either simply initialize the variable or make compiler changes.
In preparation for removing[2] the[3] macro[4], remove all remaining
needless uses with the following script:
git grep '\buninitialized_var\b' | cut -d: -f1 | sort -u | \
xargs perl -pi -e \
's/\buninitialized_var\(([^\)]+)\)/\1/g;
s:\s*/\* (GCC be quiet|to make compiler happy) \*/$::g;'
drivers/video/fbdev/riva/riva_hw.c was manually tweaked to avoid
pathological white-space.
No outstanding warnings were found building allmodconfig with GCC 9.3.0
for x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, powerpc64le, s390x, mips, sparc64,
alpha, and m68k.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200603174714.192027-1-glider@google.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFw+Vbj0i=1TGqCR5vQkCzWJ0QxK6CernOU6eedsudAixw@mail.gmail.com/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFwgbgqhbp1fkxvRKEpzyR5J8n1vKT1VZdz9knmPuXhOeg@mail.gmail.com/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFz2500WfbKXAx8s67wrm9=yVJu65TpLgN_ybYNv0VEOKA@mail.gmail.com/
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> # drivers/infiniband and mlx4/mlx5
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> # IB
Acked-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> # wireless drivers
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> # erofs
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2020-06-03 20:09:38 +00:00
|
|
|
u32 uval, nval, mval;
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
int err;
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-03-15 03:44:38 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Futex address must be 32bit aligned */
|
|
|
|
if ((((unsigned long)uaddr) % sizeof(*uaddr)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-03-27 09:16:27 +00:00
|
|
|
retry:
|
|
|
|
if (get_user(uval, uaddr))
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-06 21:55:35 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Special case for regular (non PI) futexes. The unlock path in
|
|
|
|
* user space has two race scenarios:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 1. The unlock path releases the user space futex value and
|
|
|
|
* before it can execute the futex() syscall to wake up
|
|
|
|
* waiters it is killed.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 2. A woken up waiter is killed before it can acquire the
|
|
|
|
* futex in user space.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* In both cases the TID validation below prevents a wakeup of
|
|
|
|
* potential waiters which can cause these waiters to block
|
|
|
|
* forever.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* In both cases the following conditions are met:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* 1) task->robust_list->list_op_pending != NULL
|
|
|
|
* @pending_op == true
|
|
|
|
* 2) User space futex value == 0
|
|
|
|
* 3) Regular futex: @pi == false
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If these conditions are met, it is safe to attempt waking up a
|
|
|
|
* potential waiter without touching the user space futex value and
|
|
|
|
* trying to set the OWNER_DIED bit. The user space futex value is
|
|
|
|
* uncontended and the rest of the user space mutex state is
|
|
|
|
* consistent, so a woken waiter will just take over the
|
|
|
|
* uncontended futex. Setting the OWNER_DIED bit would create
|
|
|
|
* inconsistent state and malfunction of the user space owner died
|
|
|
|
* handling.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (pending_op && !pi && !uval) {
|
|
|
|
futex_wake(uaddr, 1, 1, FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != task_pid_vnr(curr))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Ok, this dying thread is truly holding a futex
|
|
|
|
* of interest. Set the OWNER_DIED bit atomically
|
|
|
|
* via cmpxchg, and if the value had FUTEX_WAITERS
|
|
|
|
* set, wake up a waiter (if any). (We have to do a
|
|
|
|
* futex_wake() even if OWNER_DIED is already set -
|
|
|
|
* to handle the rare but possible case of recursive
|
|
|
|
* thread-death.) The rest of the cleanup is done in
|
|
|
|
* userspace.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mval = (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS) | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* We are not holding a lock here, but we want to have
|
|
|
|
* the pagefault_disable/enable() protection because
|
|
|
|
* we want to handle the fault gracefully. If the
|
|
|
|
* access fails we try to fault in the futex with R/W
|
|
|
|
* verification via get_user_pages. get_user() above
|
|
|
|
* does not guarantee R/W access. If that fails we
|
|
|
|
* give up and leave the futex locked.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((err = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&nval, uaddr, uval, mval))) {
|
|
|
|
switch (err) {
|
|
|
|
case -EFAULT:
|
2011-03-14 09:34:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr))
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
goto retry;
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case -EAGAIN:
|
|
|
|
cond_resched();
|
2006-03-27 09:16:27 +00:00
|
|
|
goto retry;
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-02-28 11:58:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (nval != uval)
|
|
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Wake robust non-PI futexes here. The wakeup of
|
|
|
|
* PI futexes happens in exit_pi_state():
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!pi && (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS))
|
|
|
|
futex_wake(uaddr, 1, 1, FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY);
|
|
|
|
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-07-29 03:17:57 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Fetch a robust-list pointer. Bit 0 signals PI futexes:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline int fetch_robust_entry(struct robust_list __user **entry,
|
2006-10-10 21:46:07 +00:00
|
|
|
struct robust_list __user * __user *head,
|
2010-09-14 12:43:46 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int *pi)
|
2006-07-29 03:17:57 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long uentry;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-10-10 21:46:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if (get_user(uentry, (unsigned long __user *)head))
|
2006-07-29 03:17:57 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-10-10 21:46:07 +00:00
|
|
|
*entry = (void __user *)(uentry & ~1UL);
|
2006-07-29 03:17:57 +00:00
|
|
|
*pi = uentry & 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Walk curr->robust_list (very carefully, it's a userspace list!)
|
|
|
|
* and mark any locks found there dead, and notify any waiters.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We silently return on any sign of list-walking problem.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-11-06 21:55:36 +00:00
|
|
|
static void exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr)
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct robust_list_head __user *head = curr->robust_list;
|
2007-10-01 08:20:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct robust_list __user *entry, *next_entry, *pending;
|
2010-11-04 19:00:00 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int limit = ROBUST_LIST_LIMIT, pi, pip;
|
treewide: Remove uninitialized_var() usage
Using uninitialized_var() is dangerous as it papers over real bugs[1]
(or can in the future), and suppresses unrelated compiler warnings
(e.g. "unused variable"). If the compiler thinks it is uninitialized,
either simply initialize the variable or make compiler changes.
In preparation for removing[2] the[3] macro[4], remove all remaining
needless uses with the following script:
git grep '\buninitialized_var\b' | cut -d: -f1 | sort -u | \
xargs perl -pi -e \
's/\buninitialized_var\(([^\)]+)\)/\1/g;
s:\s*/\* (GCC be quiet|to make compiler happy) \*/$::g;'
drivers/video/fbdev/riva/riva_hw.c was manually tweaked to avoid
pathological white-space.
No outstanding warnings were found building allmodconfig with GCC 9.3.0
for x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, powerpc64le, s390x, mips, sparc64,
alpha, and m68k.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200603174714.192027-1-glider@google.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFw+Vbj0i=1TGqCR5vQkCzWJ0QxK6CernOU6eedsudAixw@mail.gmail.com/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFwgbgqhbp1fkxvRKEpzyR5J8n1vKT1VZdz9knmPuXhOeg@mail.gmail.com/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFz2500WfbKXAx8s67wrm9=yVJu65TpLgN_ybYNv0VEOKA@mail.gmail.com/
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> # drivers/infiniband and mlx4/mlx5
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> # IB
Acked-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> # wireless drivers
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> # erofs
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2020-06-03 20:09:38 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int next_pi;
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned long futex_offset;
|
2007-10-01 08:20:13 +00:00
|
|
|
int rc;
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-23 23:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Fetch the list head (which was registered earlier, via
|
|
|
|
* sys_set_robust_list()):
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-07-29 03:17:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (fetch_robust_entry(&entry, &head->list.next, &pi))
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Fetch the relative futex offset:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (get_user(futex_offset, &head->futex_offset))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Fetch any possibly pending lock-add first, and handle it
|
|
|
|
* if it exists:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-07-29 03:17:57 +00:00
|
|
|
if (fetch_robust_entry(&pending, &head->list_op_pending, &pip))
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2006-07-29 03:17:57 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-10-01 08:20:13 +00:00
|
|
|
next_entry = NULL; /* avoid warning with gcc */
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
while (entry != &head->list) {
|
2007-10-01 08:20:13 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Fetch the next entry in the list before calling
|
|
|
|
* handle_futex_death:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
rc = fetch_robust_entry(&next_entry, &entry->next, &next_pi);
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* A pending lock might already be on the list, so
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
* don't process it twice:
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-11-06 21:55:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (entry != pending) {
|
2006-10-10 21:46:07 +00:00
|
|
|
if (handle_futex_death((void __user *)entry + futex_offset,
|
2019-11-06 21:55:35 +00:00
|
|
|
curr, pi, HANDLE_DEATH_LIST))
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2019-11-06 21:55:35 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-10-01 08:20:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2007-10-01 08:20:13 +00:00
|
|
|
entry = next_entry;
|
|
|
|
pi = next_pi;
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Avoid excessively long or circular lists:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!--limit)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cond_resched();
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-10-01 08:20:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-11-06 21:55:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pending) {
|
2007-10-01 08:20:13 +00:00
|
|
|
handle_futex_death((void __user *)pending + futex_offset,
|
2019-11-06 21:55:35 +00:00
|
|
|
curr, pip, HANDLE_DEATH_PENDING);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-03-27 09:16:22 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-06 21:55:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static void futex_cleanup(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
2019-11-06 21:55:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(tsk->robust_list)) {
|
|
|
|
exit_robust_list(tsk);
|
|
|
|
tsk->robust_list = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(tsk->compat_robust_list)) {
|
|
|
|
compat_exit_robust_list(tsk);
|
|
|
|
tsk->compat_robust_list = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(!list_empty(&tsk->pi_state_list)))
|
|
|
|
exit_pi_state_list(tsk);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-06 21:55:41 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* futex_exit_recursive - Set the tasks futex state to FUTEX_STATE_DEAD
|
|
|
|
* @tsk: task to set the state on
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Set the futex exit state of the task lockless. The futex waiter code
|
|
|
|
* observes that state when a task is exiting and loops until the task has
|
|
|
|
* actually finished the futex cleanup. The worst case for this is that the
|
|
|
|
* waiter runs through the wait loop until the state becomes visible.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This is called from the recursive fault handling path in do_exit().
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This is best effort. Either the futex exit code has run already or
|
|
|
|
* not. If the OWNER_DIED bit has been set on the futex then the waiter can
|
|
|
|
* take it over. If not, the problem is pushed back to user space. If the
|
|
|
|
* futex exit code did not run yet, then an already queued waiter might
|
|
|
|
* block forever, but there is nothing which can be done about that.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void futex_exit_recursive(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2019-11-06 21:55:44 +00:00
|
|
|
/* If the state is FUTEX_STATE_EXITING then futex_exit_mutex is held */
|
|
|
|
if (tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING)
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&tsk->futex_exit_mutex);
|
2019-11-06 21:55:41 +00:00
|
|
|
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_DEAD;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-06 21:55:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static void futex_cleanup_begin(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
2019-11-06 21:55:39 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2019-11-06 21:55:44 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Prevent various race issues against a concurrent incoming waiter
|
|
|
|
* including live locks by forcing the waiter to block on
|
|
|
|
* tsk->futex_exit_mutex when it observes FUTEX_STATE_EXITING in
|
|
|
|
* attach_to_pi_owner().
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&tsk->futex_exit_mutex);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-06 21:55:41 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2019-11-06 21:55:42 +00:00
|
|
|
* Switch the state to FUTEX_STATE_EXITING under tsk->pi_lock.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This ensures that all subsequent checks of tsk->futex_state in
|
|
|
|
* attach_to_pi_owner() must observe FUTEX_STATE_EXITING with
|
|
|
|
* tsk->pi_lock held.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* It guarantees also that a pi_state which was queued right before
|
|
|
|
* the state change under tsk->pi_lock by a concurrent waiter must
|
|
|
|
* be observed in exit_pi_state_list().
|
2019-11-06 21:55:41 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irq(&tsk->pi_lock);
|
2019-11-06 21:55:42 +00:00
|
|
|
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
|
2019-11-06 21:55:41 +00:00
|
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->pi_lock);
|
2019-11-06 21:55:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-11-06 21:55:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-11-06 21:55:43 +00:00
|
|
|
static void futex_cleanup_end(struct task_struct *tsk, int state)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Lockless store. The only side effect is that an observer might
|
|
|
|
* take another loop until it becomes visible.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
tsk->futex_state = state;
|
2019-11-06 21:55:44 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Drop the exit protection. This unblocks waiters which observed
|
|
|
|
* FUTEX_STATE_EXITING to reevaluate the state.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&tsk->futex_exit_mutex);
|
2019-11-06 21:55:43 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2019-11-06 21:55:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2019-11-06 21:55:43 +00:00
|
|
|
void futex_exec_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The state handling is done for consistency, but in the case of
|
2021-05-12 18:04:28 +00:00
|
|
|
* exec() there is no way to prevent further damage as the PID stays
|
2019-11-06 21:55:43 +00:00
|
|
|
* the same. But for the unlikely and arguably buggy case that a
|
|
|
|
* futex is held on exec(), this provides at least as much state
|
|
|
|
* consistency protection which is possible.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
futex_cleanup_begin(tsk);
|
|
|
|
futex_cleanup(tsk);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Reset the state to FUTEX_STATE_OK. The task is alive and about
|
|
|
|
* exec a new binary.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
futex_cleanup_end(tsk, FUTEX_STATE_OK);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void futex_exit_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
futex_cleanup_begin(tsk);
|
|
|
|
futex_cleanup(tsk);
|
|
|
|
futex_cleanup_end(tsk, FUTEX_STATE_DEAD);
|
2019-11-06 21:55:39 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-09 09:35:02 +00:00
|
|
|
long do_futex(u32 __user *uaddr, int op, u32 val, ktime_t *timeout,
|
[PATCH] pi-futex: futex code cleanups
We are pleased to announce "lightweight userspace priority inheritance" (PI)
support for futexes. The following patchset and glibc patch implements it,
ontop of the robust-futexes patchset which is included in 2.6.16-mm1.
We are calling it lightweight for 3 reasons:
- in the user-space fastpath a PI-enabled futex involves no kernel work
(or any other PI complexity) at all. No registration, no extra kernel
calls - just pure fast atomic ops in userspace.
- in the slowpath (in the lock-contention case), the system call and
scheduling pattern is in fact better than that of normal futexes, due to
the 'integrated' nature of FUTEX_LOCK_PI. [more about that further down]
- the in-kernel PI implementation is streamlined around the mutex
abstraction, with strict rules that keep the implementation relatively
simple: only a single owner may own a lock (i.e. no read-write lock
support), only the owner may unlock a lock, no recursive locking, etc.
Priority Inheritance - why, oh why???
-------------------------------------
Many of you heard the horror stories about the evil PI code circling Linux for
years, which makes no real sense at all and is only used by buggy applications
and which has horrible overhead. Some of you have dreaded this very moment,
when someone actually submits working PI code ;-)
So why would we like to see PI support for futexes?
We'd like to see it done purely for technological reasons. We dont think it's
a buggy concept, we think it's useful functionality to offer to applications,
which functionality cannot be achieved in other ways. We also think it's the
right thing to do, and we think we've got the right arguments and the right
numbers to prove that. We also believe that we can address all the
counter-arguments as well. For these reasons (and the reasons outlined below)
we are submitting this patch-set for upstream kernel inclusion.
What are the benefits of PI?
The short reply:
----------------
User-space PI helps achieving/improving determinism for user-space
applications. In the best-case, it can help achieve determinism and
well-bound latencies. Even in the worst-case, PI will improve the statistical
distribution of locking related application delays.
The longer reply:
-----------------
Firstly, sharing locks between multiple tasks is a common programming
technique that often cannot be replaced with lockless algorithms. As we can
see it in the kernel [which is a quite complex program in itself], lockless
structures are rather the exception than the norm - the current ratio of
lockless vs. locky code for shared data structures is somewhere between 1:10
and 1:100. Lockless is hard, and the complexity of lockless algorithms often
endangers to ability to do robust reviews of said code. I.e. critical RT
apps often choose lock structures to protect critical data structures, instead
of lockless algorithms. Furthermore, there are cases (like shared hardware,
or other resource limits) where lockless access is mathematically impossible.
Media players (such as Jack) are an example of reasonable application design
with multiple tasks (with multiple priority levels) sharing short-held locks:
for example, a highprio audio playback thread is combined with medium-prio
construct-audio-data threads and low-prio display-colory-stuff threads. Add
video and decoding to the mix and we've got even more priority levels.
So once we accept that synchronization objects (locks) are an unavoidable fact
of life, and once we accept that multi-task userspace apps have a very fair
expectation of being able to use locks, we've got to think about how to offer
the option of a deterministic locking implementation to user-space.
Most of the technical counter-arguments against doing priority inheritance
only apply to kernel-space locks. But user-space locks are different, there
we cannot disable interrupts or make the task non-preemptible in a critical
section, so the 'use spinlocks' argument does not apply (user-space spinlocks
have the same priority inversion problems as other user-space locking
constructs). Fact is, pretty much the only technique that currently enables
good determinism for userspace locks (such as futex-based pthread mutexes) is
priority inheritance:
Currently (without PI), if a high-prio and a low-prio task shares a lock [this
is a quite common scenario for most non-trivial RT applications], even if all
critical sections are coded carefully to be deterministic (i.e. all critical
sections are short in duration and only execute a limited number of
instructions), the kernel cannot guarantee any deterministic execution of the
high-prio task: any medium-priority task could preempt the low-prio task while
it holds the shared lock and executes the critical section, and could delay it
indefinitely.
Implementation:
---------------
As mentioned before, the userspace fastpath of PI-enabled pthread mutexes
involves no kernel work at all - they behave quite similarly to normal
futex-based locks: a 0 value means unlocked, and a value==TID means locked.
(This is the same method as used by list-based robust futexes.) Userspace uses
atomic ops to lock/unlock these mutexes without entering the kernel.
To handle the slowpath, we have added two new futex ops:
FUTEX_LOCK_PI
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
If the lock-acquire fastpath fails, [i.e. an atomic transition from 0 to TID
fails], then FUTEX_LOCK_PI is called. The kernel does all the remaining work:
if there is no futex-queue attached to the futex address yet then the code
looks up the task that owns the futex [it has put its own TID into the futex
value], and attaches a 'PI state' structure to the futex-queue. The pi_state
includes an rt-mutex, which is a PI-aware, kernel-based synchronization
object. The 'other' task is made the owner of the rt-mutex, and the
FUTEX_WAITERS bit is atomically set in the futex value. Then this task tries
to lock the rt-mutex, on which it blocks. Once it returns, it has the mutex
acquired, and it sets the futex value to its own TID and returns. Userspace
has no other work to perform - it now owns the lock, and futex value contains
FUTEX_WAITERS|TID.
If the unlock side fastpath succeeds, [i.e. userspace manages to do a TID ->
0 atomic transition of the futex value], then no kernel work is triggered.
If the unlock fastpath fails (because the FUTEX_WAITERS bit is set), then
FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI is called, and the kernel unlocks the futex on the behalf of
userspace - and it also unlocks the attached pi_state->rt_mutex and thus wakes
up any potential waiters.
Note that under this approach, contrary to other PI-futex approaches, there is
no prior 'registration' of a PI-futex. [which is not quite possible anyway,
due to existing ABI properties of pthread mutexes.]
Also, under this scheme, 'robustness' and 'PI' are two orthogonal properties
of futexes, and all four combinations are possible: futex, robust-futex,
PI-futex, robust+PI-futex.
glibc support:
--------------
Ulrich Drepper and Jakub Jelinek have written glibc support for PI-futexes
(and robust futexes), enabling robust and PI (PTHREAD_PRIO_INHERIT) POSIX
mutexes. (PTHREAD_PRIO_PROTECT support will be added later on too, no
additional kernel changes are needed for that). [NOTE: The glibc patch is
obviously inofficial and unsupported without matching upstream kernel
functionality.]
the patch-queue and the glibc patch can also be downloaded from:
http://redhat.com/~mingo/PI-futex-patches/
Many thanks go to the people who helped us create this kernel feature: Steven
Rostedt, Esben Nielsen, Benedikt Spranger, Daniel Walker, John Cooper, Arjan
van de Ven, Oleg Nesterov and others. Credits for related prior projects goes
to Dirk Grambow, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez, Bill Huey and many others.
Clean up the futex code, before adding more features to it:
- use u32 as the futex field type - that's the ABI
- use __user and pointers to u32 instead of unsigned long
- code style / comment style cleanups
- rename hash-bucket name from 'bh' to 'hb'.
I checked the pre and post futex.o object files to make sure this
patch has no code effects.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Jelinek <jakub@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 09:54:47 +00:00
|
|
|
u32 __user *uaddr2, u32 val2, u32 val3)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2012-02-15 11:17:09 +00:00
|
|
|
int cmd = op & FUTEX_CMD_MASK;
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int flags = 0;
|
FUTEX: new PRIVATE futexes
Analysis of current linux futex code :
--------------------------------------
A central hash table futex_queues[] holds all contexts (futex_q) of waiting
threads.
Each futex_wait()/futex_wait() has to obtain a spinlock on a hash slot to
perform lookups or insert/deletion of a futex_q.
When a futex_wait() is done, calling thread has to :
1) - Obtain a read lock on mmap_sem to be able to validate the user pointer
(calling find_vma()). This validation tells us if the futex uses
an inode based store (mapped file), or mm based store (anonymous mem)
2) - compute a hash key
3) - Atomic increment of reference counter on an inode or a mm_struct
4) - lock part of futex_queues[] hash table
5) - perform the test on value of futex.
(rollback is value != expected_value, returns EWOULDBLOCK)
(various loops if test triggers mm faults)
6) queue the context into hash table, release the lock got in 4)
7) - release the read_lock on mmap_sem
<block>
8) Eventually unqueue the context (but rarely, as this part may be done
by the futex_wake())
Futexes were designed to improve scalability but current implementation has
various problems :
- Central hashtable :
This means scalability problems if many processes/threads want to use
futexes at the same time.
This means NUMA unbalance because this hashtable is located on one node.
- Using mmap_sem on every futex() syscall :
Even if mmap_sem is a rw_semaphore, up_read()/down_read() are doing atomic
ops on mmap_sem, dirtying cache line :
- lot of cache line ping pongs on SMP configurations.
mmap_sem is also extensively used by mm code (page faults, mmap()/munmap())
Highly threaded processes might suffer from mmap_sem contention.
mmap_sem is also used by oprofile code. Enabling oprofile hurts threaded
programs because of contention on the mmap_sem cache line.
- Using an atomic_inc()/atomic_dec() on inode ref counter or mm ref counter:
It's also a cache line ping pong on SMP. It also increases mmap_sem hold time
because of cache misses.
Most of these scalability problems come from the fact that futexes are in
one global namespace. As we use a central hash table, we must make sure
they are all using the same reference (given by the mm subsystem). We
chose to force all futexes be 'shared'. This has a cost.
But fact is POSIX defined PRIVATE and SHARED, allowing clear separation,
and optimal performance if carefuly implemented. Time has come for linux
to have better threading performance.
The goal is to permit new futex commands to avoid :
- Taking the mmap_sem semaphore, conflicting with other subsystems.
- Modifying a ref_count on mm or an inode, still conflicting with mm or fs.
This is possible because, for one process using PTHREAD_PROCESS_PRIVATE
futexes, we only need to distinguish futexes by their virtual address, no
matter the underlying mm storage is.
If glibc wants to exploit this new infrastructure, it should use new
_PRIVATE futex subcommands for PTHREAD_PROCESS_PRIVATE futexes. And be
prepared to fallback on old subcommands for old kernels. Using one global
variable with the FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG or 0 value should be OK.
PTHREAD_PROCESS_SHARED futexes should still use the old subcommands.
Compatibility with old applications is preserved, they still hit the
scalability problems, but new applications can fly :)
Note : the same SHARED futex (mapped on a file) can be used by old binaries
*and* new binaries, because both binaries will use the old subcommands.
Note : Vast majority of futexes should be using PROCESS_PRIVATE semantic,
as this is the default semantic. Almost all applications should benefit
of this changes (new kernel and updated libc)
Some bench results on a Pentium M 1.6 GHz (SMP kernel on a UP machine)
/* calling futex_wait(addr, value) with value != *addr */
433 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT) call (mixing 2 futexes)
424 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT) call (using one futex)
334 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE) call (mixing 2 futexes)
334 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE) call (using one futex)
For reference :
187 cycles per getppid() call
188 cycles per umask() call
181 cycles per ni_syscall() call
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Pierre Peiffer <pierre.peiffer@bull.net>
Cc: "Ulrich Drepper" <drepper@gmail.com>
Cc: "Nick Piggin" <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Cc: "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-09 09:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!(op & FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG))
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
flags |= FLAGS_SHARED;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (op & FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME) {
|
|
|
|
flags |= FLAGS_CLOCKRT;
|
2021-04-22 19:44:18 +00:00
|
|
|
if (cmd != FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET && cmd != FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI)
|
2010-11-08 21:10:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-02-15 11:08:34 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (cmd) {
|
|
|
|
case FUTEX_LOCK_PI:
|
|
|
|
case FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI:
|
|
|
|
case FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI:
|
|
|
|
case FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI:
|
|
|
|
case FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI:
|
|
|
|
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
FUTEX: new PRIVATE futexes
Analysis of current linux futex code :
--------------------------------------
A central hash table futex_queues[] holds all contexts (futex_q) of waiting
threads.
Each futex_wait()/futex_wait() has to obtain a spinlock on a hash slot to
perform lookups or insert/deletion of a futex_q.
When a futex_wait() is done, calling thread has to :
1) - Obtain a read lock on mmap_sem to be able to validate the user pointer
(calling find_vma()). This validation tells us if the futex uses
an inode based store (mapped file), or mm based store (anonymous mem)
2) - compute a hash key
3) - Atomic increment of reference counter on an inode or a mm_struct
4) - lock part of futex_queues[] hash table
5) - perform the test on value of futex.
(rollback is value != expected_value, returns EWOULDBLOCK)
(various loops if test triggers mm faults)
6) queue the context into hash table, release the lock got in 4)
7) - release the read_lock on mmap_sem
<block>
8) Eventually unqueue the context (but rarely, as this part may be done
by the futex_wake())
Futexes were designed to improve scalability but current implementation has
various problems :
- Central hashtable :
This means scalability problems if many processes/threads want to use
futexes at the same time.
This means NUMA unbalance because this hashtable is located on one node.
- Using mmap_sem on every futex() syscall :
Even if mmap_sem is a rw_semaphore, up_read()/down_read() are doing atomic
ops on mmap_sem, dirtying cache line :
- lot of cache line ping pongs on SMP configurations.
mmap_sem is also extensively used by mm code (page faults, mmap()/munmap())
Highly threaded processes might suffer from mmap_sem contention.
mmap_sem is also used by oprofile code. Enabling oprofile hurts threaded
programs because of contention on the mmap_sem cache line.
- Using an atomic_inc()/atomic_dec() on inode ref counter or mm ref counter:
It's also a cache line ping pong on SMP. It also increases mmap_sem hold time
because of cache misses.
Most of these scalability problems come from the fact that futexes are in
one global namespace. As we use a central hash table, we must make sure
they are all using the same reference (given by the mm subsystem). We
chose to force all futexes be 'shared'. This has a cost.
But fact is POSIX defined PRIVATE and SHARED, allowing clear separation,
and optimal performance if carefuly implemented. Time has come for linux
to have better threading performance.
The goal is to permit new futex commands to avoid :
- Taking the mmap_sem semaphore, conflicting with other subsystems.
- Modifying a ref_count on mm or an inode, still conflicting with mm or fs.
This is possible because, for one process using PTHREAD_PROCESS_PRIVATE
futexes, we only need to distinguish futexes by their virtual address, no
matter the underlying mm storage is.
If glibc wants to exploit this new infrastructure, it should use new
_PRIVATE futex subcommands for PTHREAD_PROCESS_PRIVATE futexes. And be
prepared to fallback on old subcommands for old kernels. Using one global
variable with the FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG or 0 value should be OK.
PTHREAD_PROCESS_SHARED futexes should still use the old subcommands.
Compatibility with old applications is preserved, they still hit the
scalability problems, but new applications can fly :)
Note : the same SHARED futex (mapped on a file) can be used by old binaries
*and* new binaries, because both binaries will use the old subcommands.
Note : Vast majority of futexes should be using PROCESS_PRIVATE semantic,
as this is the default semantic. Almost all applications should benefit
of this changes (new kernel and updated libc)
Some bench results on a Pentium M 1.6 GHz (SMP kernel on a UP machine)
/* calling futex_wait(addr, value) with value != *addr */
433 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT) call (mixing 2 futexes)
424 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT) call (using one futex)
334 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE) call (mixing 2 futexes)
334 cycles per futex(FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE) call (using one futex)
For reference :
187 cycles per getppid() call
188 cycles per umask() call
181 cycles per ni_syscall() call
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Pierre Peiffer <pierre.peiffer@bull.net>
Cc: "Ulrich Drepper" <drepper@gmail.com>
Cc: "Nick Piggin" <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Cc: "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-05-09 09:35:04 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (cmd) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
case FUTEX_WAIT:
|
2008-02-01 16:45:14 +00:00
|
|
|
val3 = FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY;
|
2020-08-13 12:21:17 +00:00
|
|
|
fallthrough;
|
2008-02-01 16:45:14 +00:00
|
|
|
case FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET:
|
2012-02-15 11:17:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return futex_wait(uaddr, flags, val, timeout, val3);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
case FUTEX_WAKE:
|
2008-02-01 16:45:14 +00:00
|
|
|
val3 = FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY;
|
2020-08-13 12:21:17 +00:00
|
|
|
fallthrough;
|
2008-02-01 16:45:14 +00:00
|
|
|
case FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET:
|
2012-02-15 11:17:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return futex_wake(uaddr, flags, val, val3);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
case FUTEX_REQUEUE:
|
2012-02-15 11:17:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return futex_requeue(uaddr, flags, uaddr2, val, val2, NULL, 0);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
case FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE:
|
2012-02-15 11:17:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return futex_requeue(uaddr, flags, uaddr2, val, val2, &val3, 0);
|
[PATCH] FUTEX_WAKE_OP: pthread_cond_signal() speedup
ATM pthread_cond_signal is unnecessarily slow, because it wakes one waiter
(which at least on UP usually means an immediate context switch to one of
the waiter threads). This waiter wakes up and after a few instructions it
attempts to acquire the cv internal lock, but that lock is still held by
the thread calling pthread_cond_signal. So it goes to sleep and eventually
the signalling thread is scheduled in, unlocks the internal lock and wakes
the waiter again.
Now, before 2003-09-21 NPTL was using FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal
to avoid this performance issue, but it was removed when locks were
redesigned to the 3 state scheme (unlocked, locked uncontended, locked
contended).
Following scenario shows why simply using FUTEX_REQUEUE in
pthread_cond_signal together with using lll_mutex_unlock_force in place of
lll_mutex_unlock is not enough and probably why it has been disabled at
that time:
The number is value in cv->__data.__lock.
thr1 thr2 thr3
0 pthread_cond_wait
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__futex, futexval)
0 pthread_cond_signal
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
1 pthread_cond_signal
2 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
2 lll_futex_wait (&cv->__data.__lock, 2)
2 lll_futex_requeue (&cv->__data.__futex, 0, 1, &cv->__data.__lock)
# FUTEX_REQUEUE, not FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE
2 lll_mutex_unlock_force (cv->__data.__lock)
0 cv->__data.__lock = 0
0 lll_futex_wake (&cv->__data.__lock, 1)
1 lll_mutex_lock (cv->__data.__lock)
0 lll_mutex_unlock (cv->__data.__lock)
# Here, lll_mutex_unlock doesn't know there are threads waiting
# on the internal cv's lock
Now, I believe it is possible to use FUTEX_REQUEUE in pthread_cond_signal,
but it will cost us not one, but 2 extra syscalls and, what's worse, one of
these extra syscalls will be done for every single waiting loop in
pthread_cond_*wait.
We would need to use lll_mutex_unlock_force in pthread_cond_signal after
requeue and lll_mutex_cond_lock in pthread_cond_*wait after lll_futex_wait.
Another alternative is to do the unlocking pthread_cond_signal needs to do
(the lock can't be unlocked before lll_futex_wake, as that is racy) in the
kernel.
I have implemented both variants, futex-requeue-glibc.patch is the first
one and futex-wake_op{,-glibc}.patch is the unlocking inside of the kernel.
The kernel interface allows userland to specify how exactly an unlocking
operation should look like (some atomic arithmetic operation with optional
constant argument and comparison of the previous futex value with another
constant).
It has been implemented just for ppc*, x86_64 and i?86, for other
architectures I'm including just a stub header which can be used as a
starting point by maintainers to write support for their arches and ATM
will just return -ENOSYS for FUTEX_WAKE_OP. The requeue patch has been
(lightly) tested just on x86_64, the wake_op patch on ppc64 kernel running
32-bit and 64-bit NPTL and x86_64 kernel running 32-bit and 64-bit NPTL.
With the following benchmark on UP x86-64 I get:
for i in nptl-orig nptl-requeue nptl-wake_op; do echo time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench; \
for j in 1 2; do echo ( time elf/ld.so --library-path .:$i /tmp/bench ) 2>&1; done; done
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-orig /tmp/bench
real 0m0.655s user 0m0.253s sys 0m0.403s
real 0m0.657s user 0m0.269s sys 0m0.388s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-requeue /tmp/bench
real 0m0.496s user 0m0.225s sys 0m0.271s
real 0m0.531s user 0m0.242s sys 0m0.288s
time elf/ld.so --library-path .:nptl-wake_op /tmp/bench
real 0m0.380s user 0m0.176s sys 0m0.204s
real 0m0.382s user 0m0.175s sys 0m0.207s
The benchmark is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00001.txt
Older futex-requeue-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00002.txt
Older futex-wake_op-glibc.patch version is at:
http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2005-03/txt00003.txt
Will post a new version (just x86-64 fixes so that the patch
applies against pthread_cond_signal.S) to libc-hacker ml soon.
Attached is the kernel FUTEX_WAKE_OP patch as well as a simple-minded
testcase that will not test the atomicity of the operation, but at least
check if the threads that should have been woken up are woken up and
whether the arithmetic operation in the kernel gave the expected results.
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Cc: Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yuasa@hh.iij4u.or.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-06 22:16:25 +00:00
|
|
|
case FUTEX_WAKE_OP:
|
2012-02-15 11:17:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return futex_wake_op(uaddr, flags, uaddr2, val, val2, val3);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
case FUTEX_LOCK_PI:
|
2021-04-22 19:44:22 +00:00
|
|
|
flags |= FLAGS_CLOCKRT;
|
2015-01-16 19:28:06 +00:00
|
|
|
return futex_lock_pi(uaddr, flags, timeout, 0);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
case FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI:
|
2012-02-15 11:17:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return futex_unlock_pi(uaddr, flags);
|
2006-06-27 09:54:58 +00:00
|
|
|
case FUTEX_TRYLOCK_PI:
|
2015-01-16 19:28:06 +00:00
|
|
|
return futex_lock_pi(uaddr, flags, NULL, 1);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
case FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI:
|
|
|
|
val3 = FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY;
|
2012-02-15 11:17:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return futex_wait_requeue_pi(uaddr, flags, val, timeout, val3,
|
|
|
|
uaddr2);
|
2009-04-03 20:40:49 +00:00
|
|
|
case FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI:
|
2012-02-15 11:17:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return futex_requeue(uaddr, flags, uaddr2, val, val2, &val3, 1);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2012-02-15 11:17:09 +00:00
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-22 19:44:21 +00:00
|
|
|
static __always_inline bool futex_cmd_has_timeout(u32 cmd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
switch (cmd) {
|
|
|
|
case FUTEX_WAIT:
|
|
|
|
case FUTEX_LOCK_PI:
|
|
|
|
case FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET:
|
|
|
|
case FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI:
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static __always_inline int
|
|
|
|
futex_init_timeout(u32 cmd, u32 op, struct timespec64 *ts, ktime_t *t)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!timespec64_valid(ts))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*t = timespec64_to_ktime(*ts);
|
|
|
|
if (cmd == FUTEX_WAIT)
|
|
|
|
*t = ktime_add_safe(ktime_get(), *t);
|
|
|
|
else if (cmd != FUTEX_LOCK_PI && !(op & FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME))
|
|
|
|
*t = timens_ktime_to_host(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, *t);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2009-01-14 13:14:10 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE6(futex, u32 __user *, uaddr, int, op, u32, val,
|
2020-11-28 12:39:46 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct __kernel_timespec __user *, utime,
|
|
|
|
u32 __user *, uaddr2, u32, val3)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2021-04-22 19:44:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret, cmd = op & FUTEX_CMD_MASK;
|
2007-05-09 09:35:02 +00:00
|
|
|
ktime_t t, *tp = NULL;
|
2021-04-22 19:44:21 +00:00
|
|
|
struct timespec64 ts;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-22 19:44:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (utime && futex_cmd_has_timeout(cmd)) {
|
2015-06-30 06:26:02 +00:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(!(op & FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG))))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
2018-04-17 15:23:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (get_timespec64(&ts, utime))
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
2021-04-22 19:44:21 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = futex_init_timeout(cmd, op, &ts, &t);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2007-05-09 09:35:02 +00:00
|
|
|
tp = &t;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-22 19:44:20 +00:00
|
|
|
return do_futex(uaddr, op, val, tp, uaddr2, (unsigned long)utime, val3);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-04-17 14:31:07 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Fetch a robust-list pointer. Bit 0 signals PI futexes:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static inline int
|
|
|
|
compat_fetch_robust_entry(compat_uptr_t *uentry, struct robust_list __user **entry,
|
|
|
|
compat_uptr_t __user *head, unsigned int *pi)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (get_user(*uentry, head))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*entry = compat_ptr((*uentry) & ~1);
|
|
|
|
*pi = (unsigned int)(*uentry) & 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void __user *futex_uaddr(struct robust_list __user *entry,
|
|
|
|
compat_long_t futex_offset)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
compat_uptr_t base = ptr_to_compat(entry);
|
|
|
|
void __user *uaddr = compat_ptr(base + futex_offset);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return uaddr;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Walk curr->robust_list (very carefully, it's a userspace list!)
|
|
|
|
* and mark any locks found there dead, and notify any waiters.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We silently return on any sign of list-walking problem.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-11-06 21:55:36 +00:00
|
|
|
static void compat_exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr)
|
2018-04-17 14:31:07 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head = curr->compat_robust_list;
|
|
|
|
struct robust_list __user *entry, *next_entry, *pending;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int limit = ROBUST_LIST_LIMIT, pi, pip;
|
treewide: Remove uninitialized_var() usage
Using uninitialized_var() is dangerous as it papers over real bugs[1]
(or can in the future), and suppresses unrelated compiler warnings
(e.g. "unused variable"). If the compiler thinks it is uninitialized,
either simply initialize the variable or make compiler changes.
In preparation for removing[2] the[3] macro[4], remove all remaining
needless uses with the following script:
git grep '\buninitialized_var\b' | cut -d: -f1 | sort -u | \
xargs perl -pi -e \
's/\buninitialized_var\(([^\)]+)\)/\1/g;
s:\s*/\* (GCC be quiet|to make compiler happy) \*/$::g;'
drivers/video/fbdev/riva/riva_hw.c was manually tweaked to avoid
pathological white-space.
No outstanding warnings were found building allmodconfig with GCC 9.3.0
for x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, powerpc64le, s390x, mips, sparc64,
alpha, and m68k.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200603174714.192027-1-glider@google.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFw+Vbj0i=1TGqCR5vQkCzWJ0QxK6CernOU6eedsudAixw@mail.gmail.com/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFwgbgqhbp1fkxvRKEpzyR5J8n1vKT1VZdz9knmPuXhOeg@mail.gmail.com/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CA+55aFz2500WfbKXAx8s67wrm9=yVJu65TpLgN_ybYNv0VEOKA@mail.gmail.com/
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> # drivers/infiniband and mlx4/mlx5
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> # IB
Acked-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> # wireless drivers
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> # erofs
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2020-06-03 20:09:38 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int next_pi;
|
2018-04-17 14:31:07 +00:00
|
|
|
compat_uptr_t uentry, next_uentry, upending;
|
|
|
|
compat_long_t futex_offset;
|
|
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Fetch the list head (which was registered earlier, via
|
|
|
|
* sys_set_robust_list()):
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (compat_fetch_robust_entry(&uentry, &entry, &head->list.next, &pi))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Fetch the relative futex offset:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (get_user(futex_offset, &head->futex_offset))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Fetch any possibly pending lock-add first, and handle it
|
|
|
|
* if it exists:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (compat_fetch_robust_entry(&upending, &pending,
|
|
|
|
&head->list_op_pending, &pip))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
next_entry = NULL; /* avoid warning with gcc */
|
|
|
|
while (entry != (struct robust_list __user *) &head->list) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Fetch the next entry in the list before calling
|
|
|
|
* handle_futex_death:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
rc = compat_fetch_robust_entry(&next_uentry, &next_entry,
|
|
|
|
(compat_uptr_t __user *)&entry->next, &next_pi);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* A pending lock might already be on the list, so
|
|
|
|
* dont process it twice:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (entry != pending) {
|
|
|
|
void __user *uaddr = futex_uaddr(entry, futex_offset);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-06 21:55:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pi,
|
|
|
|
HANDLE_DEATH_LIST))
|
2018-04-17 14:31:07 +00:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
uentry = next_uentry;
|
|
|
|
entry = next_entry;
|
|
|
|
pi = next_pi;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Avoid excessively long or circular lists:
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (!--limit)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cond_resched();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pending) {
|
|
|
|
void __user *uaddr = futex_uaddr(pending, futex_offset);
|
|
|
|
|
2019-11-06 21:55:35 +00:00
|
|
|
handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pip, HANDLE_DEATH_PENDING);
|
2018-04-17 14:31:07 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(set_robust_list,
|
|
|
|
struct compat_robust_list_head __user *, head,
|
|
|
|
compat_size_t, len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(len != sizeof(*head)))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
current->compat_robust_list = head;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
|
|
|
|
compat_uptr_t __user *, head_ptr,
|
|
|
|
compat_size_t __user *, len_ptr)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long ret;
|
|
|
|
struct task_struct *p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = -ESRCH;
|
|
|
|
if (!pid)
|
|
|
|
p = current;
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
|
|
|
|
if (!p)
|
|
|
|
goto err_unlock;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
|
|
|
|
goto err_unlock;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
head = p->compat_robust_list;
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (put_user(sizeof(*head), len_ptr))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
return put_user(ptr_to_compat(head), head_ptr);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err_unlock:
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-04-17 15:23:35 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
|
2018-04-17 14:31:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-04-17 15:23:35 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT_32BIT_TIME
|
2019-01-06 23:33:08 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE6(futex_time32, u32 __user *, uaddr, int, op, u32, val,
|
2020-11-28 12:39:46 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct old_timespec32 __user *, utime, u32 __user *, uaddr2,
|
2018-04-17 14:31:07 +00:00
|
|
|
u32, val3)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2021-04-22 19:44:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int ret, cmd = op & FUTEX_CMD_MASK;
|
2018-04-17 14:31:07 +00:00
|
|
|
ktime_t t, *tp = NULL;
|
2021-04-22 19:44:21 +00:00
|
|
|
struct timespec64 ts;
|
2018-04-17 14:31:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-04-22 19:44:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (utime && futex_cmd_has_timeout(cmd)) {
|
2018-04-17 15:23:35 +00:00
|
|
|
if (get_old_timespec32(&ts, utime))
|
2018-04-17 14:31:07 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
2021-04-22 19:44:21 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = futex_init_timeout(cmd, op, &ts, &t);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
2018-04-17 14:31:07 +00:00
|
|
|
tp = &t;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-04-22 19:44:20 +00:00
|
|
|
return do_futex(uaddr, op, val, tp, uaddr2, (unsigned long)utime, val3);
|
2018-04-17 14:31:07 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2018-04-17 15:23:35 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT_32BIT_TIME */
|
2018-04-17 14:31:07 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-03-02 12:09:47 +00:00
|
|
|
static void __init futex_detect_cmpxchg(void)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-03-02 12:09:47 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_FUTEX_CMPXCHG
|
2008-02-23 23:23:57 +00:00
|
|
|
u32 curval;
|
2014-03-02 12:09:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This will fail and we want it. Some arch implementations do
|
|
|
|
* runtime detection of the futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic()
|
|
|
|
* functionality. We want to know that before we call in any
|
|
|
|
* of the complex code paths. Also we want to prevent
|
|
|
|
* registration of robust lists in that case. NULL is
|
|
|
|
* guaranteed to fault and we get -EFAULT on functional
|
|
|
|
* implementation, the non-functional ones will return
|
|
|
|
* -ENOSYS.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, NULL, 0, 0) == -EFAULT)
|
|
|
|
futex_cmpxchg_enabled = 1;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init futex_init(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-01-16 13:54:50 +00:00
|
|
|
unsigned int futex_shift;
|
futexes: Increase hash table size for better performance
Currently, the futex global hash table suffers from its fixed,
smallish (for today's standards) size of 256 entries, as well as
its lack of NUMA awareness. Large systems, using many futexes,
can be prone to high amounts of collisions; where these futexes
hash to the same bucket and lead to extra contention on the same
hb->lock. Furthermore, cacheline bouncing is a reality when we
have multiple hb->locks residing on the same cacheline and
different futexes hash to adjacent buckets.
This patch keeps the current static size of 16 entries for small
systems, or otherwise, 256 * ncpus (or larger as we need to
round the number to a power of 2). Note that this number of CPUs
accounts for all CPUs that can ever be available in the system,
taking into consideration things like hotpluging. While we do
impose extra overhead at bootup by making the hash table larger,
this is a one time thing, and does not shadow the benefits of
this patch.
Furthermore, as suggested by tglx, by cache aligning the hash
buckets we can avoid access across cacheline boundaries and also
avoid massive cache line bouncing if multiple cpus are hammering
away at different hash buckets which happen to reside in the
same cache line.
Also, similar to other core kernel components (pid, dcache,
tcp), by using alloc_large_system_hash() we benefit from its
NUMA awareness and thus the table is distributed among the nodes
instead of in a single one.
For a custom microbenchmark that pounds on the uaddr hashing --
making the wait path fail at futex_wait_setup() returning
-EWOULDBLOCK for large amounts of futexes, we can see the
following benefits on a 80-core, 8-socket 1Tb server:
+---------+--------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+
| threads | baseline (ops/sec) | aligned-only (ops/sec) | large table (ops/sec) | large table+aligned (ops/sec) |
+---------+--------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+
| 512 | 32426 | 50531 (+55.8%) | 255274 (+687.2%) | 292553 (+802.2%) |
| 256 | 65360 | 99588 (+52.3%) | 443563 (+578.6%) | 508088 (+677.3%) |
| 128 | 125635 | 200075 (+59.2%) | 742613 (+491.1%) | 835452 (+564.9%) |
| 80 | 193559 | 323425 (+67.1%) | 1028147 (+431.1%) | 1130304 (+483.9%) |
| 64 | 247667 | 443740 (+79.1%) | 997300 (+302.6%) | 1145494 (+362.5%) |
| 32 | 628412 | 721401 (+14.7%) | 965996 (+53.7%) | 1122115 (+78.5%) |
+---------+--------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Scott Norton <scott.norton@hp.com>
Cc: Tom Vaden <tom.vaden@hp.com>
Cc: Aswin Chandramouleeswaran <aswin@hp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1389569486-25487-3-git-send-email-davidlohr@hp.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2014-01-12 23:31:23 +00:00
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unsigned long i;
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#if CONFIG_BASE_SMALL
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futex_hashsize = 16;
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#else
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futex_hashsize = roundup_pow_of_two(256 * num_possible_cpus());
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#endif
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futex_queues = alloc_large_system_hash("futex", sizeof(*futex_queues),
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futex_hashsize, 0,
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futex_hashsize < 256 ? HASH_SMALL : 0,
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2014-01-16 13:54:50 +00:00
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&futex_shift, NULL,
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futex_hashsize, futex_hashsize);
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futex_hashsize = 1UL << futex_shift;
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2014-03-02 12:09:47 +00:00
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futex_detect_cmpxchg();
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2008-02-23 23:23:57 +00:00
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futexes: Increase hash table size for better performance
Currently, the futex global hash table suffers from its fixed,
smallish (for today's standards) size of 256 entries, as well as
its lack of NUMA awareness. Large systems, using many futexes,
can be prone to high amounts of collisions; where these futexes
hash to the same bucket and lead to extra contention on the same
hb->lock. Furthermore, cacheline bouncing is a reality when we
have multiple hb->locks residing on the same cacheline and
different futexes hash to adjacent buckets.
This patch keeps the current static size of 16 entries for small
systems, or otherwise, 256 * ncpus (or larger as we need to
round the number to a power of 2). Note that this number of CPUs
accounts for all CPUs that can ever be available in the system,
taking into consideration things like hotpluging. While we do
impose extra overhead at bootup by making the hash table larger,
this is a one time thing, and does not shadow the benefits of
this patch.
Furthermore, as suggested by tglx, by cache aligning the hash
buckets we can avoid access across cacheline boundaries and also
avoid massive cache line bouncing if multiple cpus are hammering
away at different hash buckets which happen to reside in the
same cache line.
Also, similar to other core kernel components (pid, dcache,
tcp), by using alloc_large_system_hash() we benefit from its
NUMA awareness and thus the table is distributed among the nodes
instead of in a single one.
For a custom microbenchmark that pounds on the uaddr hashing --
making the wait path fail at futex_wait_setup() returning
-EWOULDBLOCK for large amounts of futexes, we can see the
following benefits on a 80-core, 8-socket 1Tb server:
+---------+--------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+
| threads | baseline (ops/sec) | aligned-only (ops/sec) | large table (ops/sec) | large table+aligned (ops/sec) |
+---------+--------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+
| 512 | 32426 | 50531 (+55.8%) | 255274 (+687.2%) | 292553 (+802.2%) |
| 256 | 65360 | 99588 (+52.3%) | 443563 (+578.6%) | 508088 (+677.3%) |
| 128 | 125635 | 200075 (+59.2%) | 742613 (+491.1%) | 835452 (+564.9%) |
| 80 | 193559 | 323425 (+67.1%) | 1028147 (+431.1%) | 1130304 (+483.9%) |
| 64 | 247667 | 443740 (+79.1%) | 997300 (+302.6%) | 1145494 (+362.5%) |
| 32 | 628412 | 721401 (+14.7%) | 965996 (+53.7%) | 1122115 (+78.5%) |
+---------+--------------------+------------------------+-----------------------+-------------------------------+
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Scott Norton <scott.norton@hp.com>
Cc: Tom Vaden <tom.vaden@hp.com>
Cc: Aswin Chandramouleeswaran <aswin@hp.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1389569486-25487-3-git-send-email-davidlohr@hp.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2014-01-12 23:31:23 +00:00
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for (i = 0; i < futex_hashsize; i++) {
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2014-03-21 05:11:17 +00:00
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atomic_set(&futex_queues[i].waiters, 0);
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2011-07-08 00:27:59 +00:00
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plist_head_init(&futex_queues[i].chain);
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2008-02-23 23:23:55 +00:00
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spin_lock_init(&futex_queues[i].lock);
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}
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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return 0;
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}
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2016-12-30 08:17:55 +00:00
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core_initcall(futex_init);
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