linux/net/smc/smc.h

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* Shared Memory Communications over RDMA (SMC-R) and RoCE
*
* Definitions for the SMC module (socket related)
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2016
*
* Author(s): Ursula Braun <ubraun@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
*/
#ifndef __SMC_H
#define __SMC_H
#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h> /* __aligned */
#include <net/genetlink.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include "smc_ib.h"
#define SMC_V1 1 /* SMC version V1 */
#define SMC_V2 2 /* SMC version V2 */
#define SMC_RELEASE_0 0
#define SMC_RELEASE_1 1
#define SMC_RELEASE SMC_RELEASE_1 /* the latest release version */
#define SMCPROTO_SMC 0 /* SMC protocol, IPv4 */
#define SMCPROTO_SMC6 1 /* SMC protocol, IPv6 */
net/smc: add autocorking support This patch adds autocorking support for SMC which could improve throughput for small message by x3+. The main idea is borrowed from TCP autocorking with some RDMA specific modification: 1. The first message should never cork to make sure we won't bring extra latency 2. If we have posted any Tx WRs to the NIC that have not completed, cork the new messages until: a) Receive CQE for the last Tx WR b) We have corked enough message on the connection 3. Try to push the corked data out when we receive CQE of the last Tx WR to prevent the corked messages hang in the send queue. Both SMC autocorking and TCP autocorking check the TX completion to decide whether we should cork or not. The difference is when we got a SMC Tx WR completion, the data have been confirmed by the RNIC while TCP TX completion just tells us the data have been sent out by the local NIC. Add an atomic variable tx_pushing in smc_connection to make sure only one can send to let it cork more and save CDC slot. SMC autocorking should not bring extra latency since the first message will always been sent out immediately. The qperf tcp_bw test shows more than x4 increase under small message size with Mellanox connectX4-Lx, same result with other throughput benchmarks like sockperf/netperf. The qperf tcp_lat test shows SMC autocorking has not increase any ping-pong latency. Test command: client: smc_run taskset -c 1 qperf smc-server -oo msg_size:1:64K:*2 \ -t 30 -vu tcp_{bw|lat} server: smc_run taskset -c 1 qperf === Bandwidth ==== MsgSize(Bytes) SMC-NoCork TCP SMC-AutoCorking 1 0.578 MB/s 2.392 MB/s(313.57%) 2.647 MB/s(357.72%) 2 1.159 MB/s 4.780 MB/s(312.53%) 5.153 MB/s(344.71%) 4 2.283 MB/s 10.266 MB/s(349.77%) 10.363 MB/s(354.02%) 8 4.668 MB/s 19.040 MB/s(307.86%) 21.215 MB/s(354.45%) 16 9.147 MB/s 38.904 MB/s(325.31%) 41.740 MB/s(356.32%) 32 18.369 MB/s 79.587 MB/s(333.25%) 82.392 MB/s(348.52%) 64 36.562 MB/s 148.668 MB/s(306.61%) 161.564 MB/s(341.89%) 128 72.961 MB/s 274.913 MB/s(276.80%) 325.363 MB/s(345.94%) 256 144.705 MB/s 512.059 MB/s(253.86%) 633.743 MB/s(337.96%) 512 288.873 MB/s 884.977 MB/s(206.35%) 1250.681 MB/s(332.95%) 1024 574.180 MB/s 1337.736 MB/s(132.98%) 2246.121 MB/s(291.19%) 2048 1095.192 MB/s 1865.952 MB/s( 70.38%) 2057.767 MB/s( 87.89%) 4096 2066.157 MB/s 2380.337 MB/s( 15.21%) 2173.983 MB/s( 5.22%) 8192 3717.198 MB/s 2733.073 MB/s(-26.47%) 3491.223 MB/s( -6.08%) 16384 4742.221 MB/s 2958.693 MB/s(-37.61%) 4637.692 MB/s( -2.20%) 32768 5349.550 MB/s 3061.285 MB/s(-42.77%) 5385.796 MB/s( 0.68%) 65536 5162.919 MB/s 3731.408 MB/s(-27.73%) 5223.890 MB/s( 1.18%) ==== Latency ==== MsgSize(Bytes) SMC-NoCork TCP SMC-AutoCorking 1 10.540 us 11.938 us( 13.26%) 10.573 us( 0.31%) 2 10.996 us 11.992 us( 9.06%) 10.269 us( -6.61%) 4 10.229 us 11.687 us( 14.25%) 10.240 us( 0.11%) 8 10.203 us 11.653 us( 14.21%) 10.402 us( 1.95%) 16 10.530 us 11.313 us( 7.44%) 10.599 us( 0.66%) 32 10.241 us 11.586 us( 13.13%) 10.223 us( -0.18%) 64 10.693 us 11.652 us( 8.97%) 10.251 us( -4.13%) 128 10.597 us 11.579 us( 9.27%) 10.494 us( -0.97%) 256 10.409 us 11.957 us( 14.87%) 10.710 us( 2.89%) 512 11.088 us 12.505 us( 12.78%) 10.547 us( -4.88%) 1024 11.240 us 12.255 us( 9.03%) 10.787 us( -4.03%) 2048 11.485 us 16.970 us( 47.76%) 11.256 us( -1.99%) 4096 12.077 us 13.948 us( 15.49%) 12.230 us( 1.27%) 8192 13.683 us 16.693 us( 22.00%) 13.786 us( 0.75%) 16384 16.470 us 23.615 us( 43.38%) 16.459 us( -0.07%) 32768 22.540 us 40.966 us( 81.75%) 23.284 us( 3.30%) 65536 34.192 us 73.003 us(113.51%) 34.233 us( 0.12%) With SMC autocorking support, we can archive better throughput than TCP in most message sizes without any latency trade-off. Signed-off-by: Dust Li <dust.li@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-03-01 09:43:57 +00:00
#define SMC_AUTOCORKING_DEFAULT_SIZE 0x10000 /* 64K by default */
extern struct proto smc_proto;
extern struct proto smc_proto6;
#ifdef ATOMIC64_INIT
#define KERNEL_HAS_ATOMIC64
#endif
enum smc_state { /* possible states of an SMC socket */
SMC_ACTIVE = 1,
SMC_INIT = 2,
SMC_CLOSED = 7,
SMC_LISTEN = 10,
/* normal close */
SMC_PEERCLOSEWAIT1 = 20,
SMC_PEERCLOSEWAIT2 = 21,
SMC_APPFINCLOSEWAIT = 24,
SMC_APPCLOSEWAIT1 = 22,
SMC_APPCLOSEWAIT2 = 23,
SMC_PEERFINCLOSEWAIT = 25,
/* abnormal close */
SMC_PEERABORTWAIT = 26,
SMC_PROCESSABORT = 27,
};
enum smc_supplemental_features {
SMC_SPF_EMULATED_ISM_DEV = 0,
};
#define SMC_FEATURE_MASK \
(BIT(SMC_SPF_EMULATED_ISM_DEV))
struct smc_link_group;
struct smc_wr_rx_hdr { /* common prefix part of LLC and CDC to demultiplex */
union {
u8 type;
#if defined(__BIG_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)
struct {
u8 llc_version:4,
llc_type:4;
};
#elif defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)
struct {
u8 llc_type:4,
llc_version:4;
};
#endif
};
} __aligned(1);
struct smc_cdc_conn_state_flags {
#if defined(__BIG_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)
u8 peer_done_writing : 1; /* Sending done indicator */
u8 peer_conn_closed : 1; /* Peer connection closed indicator */
u8 peer_conn_abort : 1; /* Abnormal close indicator */
u8 reserved : 5;
#elif defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)
u8 reserved : 5;
u8 peer_conn_abort : 1;
u8 peer_conn_closed : 1;
u8 peer_done_writing : 1;
#endif
};
struct smc_cdc_producer_flags {
#if defined(__BIG_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)
u8 write_blocked : 1; /* Writing Blocked, no rx buf space */
u8 urg_data_pending : 1; /* Urgent Data Pending */
u8 urg_data_present : 1; /* Urgent Data Present */
u8 cons_curs_upd_req : 1; /* cursor update requested */
u8 failover_validation : 1;/* message replay due to failover */
u8 reserved : 3;
#elif defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN_BITFIELD)
u8 reserved : 3;
u8 failover_validation : 1;
u8 cons_curs_upd_req : 1;
u8 urg_data_present : 1;
u8 urg_data_pending : 1;
u8 write_blocked : 1;
#endif
};
/* in host byte order */
union smc_host_cursor { /* SMC cursor - an offset in an RMBE */
struct {
u16 reserved;
u16 wrap; /* window wrap sequence number */
u32 count; /* cursor (= offset) part */
};
#ifdef KERNEL_HAS_ATOMIC64
atomic64_t acurs; /* for atomic processing */
#else
u64 acurs; /* for atomic processing */
#endif
} __aligned(8);
/* in host byte order, except for flag bitfields in network byte order */
struct smc_host_cdc_msg { /* Connection Data Control message */
struct smc_wr_rx_hdr common; /* .type = 0xFE */
u8 len; /* length = 44 */
u16 seqno; /* connection seq # */
u32 token; /* alert_token */
union smc_host_cursor prod; /* producer cursor */
union smc_host_cursor cons; /* consumer cursor,
* piggy backed "ack"
*/
struct smc_cdc_producer_flags prod_flags; /* conn. tx/rx status */
struct smc_cdc_conn_state_flags conn_state_flags; /* peer conn. status*/
u8 reserved[18];
} __aligned(8);
enum smc_urg_state {
SMC_URG_VALID = 1, /* data present */
SMC_URG_NOTYET = 2, /* data pending */
SMC_URG_READ = 3, /* data was already read */
};
net/smc: Forward wakeup to smc socket waitqueue after fallback When we replace TCP with SMC and a fallback occurs, there may be some socket waitqueue entries remaining in smc socket->wq, such as eppoll_entries inserted by userspace applications. After the fallback, data flows over TCP/IP and only clcsocket->wq will be woken up. Applications can't be notified by the entries which were inserted in smc socket->wq before fallback. So we need a mechanism to wake up smc socket->wq at the same time if some entries remaining in it. The current workaround is to transfer the entries from smc socket->wq to clcsock->wq during the fallback. But this may cause a crash like this: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000100: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.16.0+ #107 RIP: 0010:__wake_up_common+0x65/0x170 Call Trace: <IRQ> __wake_up_common_lock+0x7a/0xc0 sock_def_readable+0x3c/0x70 tcp_data_queue+0x4a7/0xc40 tcp_rcv_established+0x32f/0x660 ? sk_filter_trim_cap+0xcb/0x2e0 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x10b/0x260 tcp_v4_rcv+0xd2a/0xde0 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x3b/0x1d0 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x54/0x60 ip_local_deliver+0x6a/0x110 ? tcp_v4_early_demux+0xa2/0x140 ? tcp_v4_early_demux+0x10d/0x140 ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x49/0x60 ip_sublist_rcv+0x19d/0x230 ip_list_rcv+0x13e/0x170 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1c2/0x240 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1e6/0x320 napi_complete_done+0x11d/0x190 mlx5e_napi_poll+0x163/0x6b0 [mlx5_core] __napi_poll+0x3c/0x1b0 net_rx_action+0x27c/0x300 __do_softirq+0x114/0x2d2 irq_exit_rcu+0xb4/0xe0 common_interrupt+0xba/0xe0 </IRQ> <TASK> The crash is caused by privately transferring waitqueue entries from smc socket->wq to clcsock->wq. The owners of these entries, such as epoll, have no idea that the entries have been transferred to a different socket wait queue and still use original waitqueue spinlock (smc socket->wq.wait.lock) to make the entries operation exclusive, but it doesn't work. The operations to the entries, such as removing from the waitqueue (now is clcsock->wq after fallback), may cause a crash when clcsock waitqueue is being iterated over at the moment. This patch tries to fix this by no longer transferring wait queue entries privately, but introducing own implementations of clcsock's callback functions in fallback situation. The callback functions will forward the wakeup to smc socket->wq if clcsock->wq is actually woken up and smc socket->wq has remaining entries. Fixes: 2153bd1e3d3d ("net/smc: Transfer remaining wait queue entries during fallback") Suggested-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com> Acked-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-01-26 15:33:04 +00:00
struct smc_mark_woken {
bool woken;
void *key;
wait_queue_entry_t wait_entry;
};
struct smc_connection {
struct rb_node alert_node;
struct smc_link_group *lgr; /* link group of connection */
struct smc_link *lnk; /* assigned SMC-R link */
u32 alert_token_local; /* unique conn. id */
u8 peer_rmbe_idx; /* from tcp handshake */
int peer_rmbe_size; /* size of peer rx buffer */
atomic_t peer_rmbe_space;/* remaining free bytes in peer
* rmbe
*/
int rtoken_idx; /* idx to peer RMB rkey/addr */
struct smc_buf_desc *sndbuf_desc; /* send buffer descriptor */
struct smc_buf_desc *rmb_desc; /* RMBE descriptor */
net/smc: Fix setsockopt and sysctl to specify same buffer size again Commit 0227f058aa29 ("net/smc: Unbind r/w buffer size from clcsock and make them tunable") introduced the net.smc.rmem and net.smc.wmem sysctls to specify the size of buffers to be used for SMC type connections. This created a regression for users that specified the buffer size via setsockopt() as the effective buffer size was now doubled. Re-introduce the division by 2 in the SMC buffer create code and level this out by duplicating the net.smc.[rw]mem values used for initializing sk_rcvbuf/sk_sndbuf at socket creation time. This gives users of both methods (setsockopt or sysctl) the effective buffer size that they expect. Initialize net.smc.[rw]mem from its own constant of 64kB, respectively. Internal performance tests show that this value is a good compromise between throughput/latency and memory consumption. Also, this decouples it from any tuning that was done to net.ipv4.tcp_[rw]mem[1] before the module for SMC protocol was loaded. Check that no more than INT_MAX / 2 is assigned to net.smc.[rw]mem, in order to avoid any overflow condition when that is doubled for use in sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf. While at it, drop the confusing sk_buf_size variable from __smc_buf_create and name "compressed" buffer size variables more consistently. Background: Before the commit mentioned above, SMC's buffer allocator in __smc_buf_create() always used half of the sockets' sk_rcvbuf/sk_sndbuf value as initial value to search for appropriate buffers. If the search resorted to using a bigger buffer when all buffers of the specified size were busy, the duplicate of the used effective buffer size is stored back to sk_rcvbuf/sk_sndbuf. When available, buffers of exactly the size that a user had specified as input to setsockopt() were used, despite setsockopt()'s documentation in "man 7 socket" talking of a mandatory duplication: [...] SO_SNDBUF Sets or gets the maximum socket send buffer in bytes. The kernel doubles this value (to allow space for book‐ keeping overhead) when it is set using setsockopt(2), and this doubled value is returned by getsockopt(2). The default value is set by the /proc/sys/net/core/wmem_default file and the maximum allowed value is set by the /proc/sys/net/core/wmem_max file. The minimum (doubled) value for this option is 2048. [...] Fixes: 0227f058aa29 ("net/smc: Unbind r/w buffer size from clcsock and make them tunable") Co-developed-by: Jan Karcher <jaka@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Karcher <jaka@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Lu <tonylu@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Gerd Bayer <gbayer@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2023-08-04 17:06:23 +00:00
int rmbe_size_comp; /* compressed notation */
int rmbe_update_limit;
/* lower limit for consumer
* cursor update
*/
struct smc_host_cdc_msg local_tx_ctrl; /* host byte order staging
* buffer for CDC msg send
* .prod cf. TCP snd_nxt
* .cons cf. TCP sends ack
*/
union smc_host_cursor local_tx_ctrl_fin;
/* prod crsr - confirmed by peer
*/
union smc_host_cursor tx_curs_prep; /* tx - prepared data
* snd_max..wmem_alloc
*/
union smc_host_cursor tx_curs_sent; /* tx - sent data
* snd_nxt ?
*/
union smc_host_cursor tx_curs_fin; /* tx - confirmed by peer
* snd-wnd-begin ?
*/
atomic_t sndbuf_space; /* remaining space in sndbuf */
u16 tx_cdc_seq; /* sequence # for CDC send */
u16 tx_cdc_seq_fin; /* sequence # - tx completed */
spinlock_t send_lock; /* protect wr_sends */
net/smc: fix kernel panic caused by race of smc_sock A crash occurs when smc_cdc_tx_handler() tries to access smc_sock but smc_release() has already freed it. [ 4570.695099] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000002eae9e88 [ 4570.696048] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 4570.696728] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 4570.697401] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 4570.697716] Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 4570.698228] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc4+ #111 [ 4570.699013] Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 8c24b4c 04/0 [ 4570.699933] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock+0x1a/0x30 <...> [ 4570.711446] Call Trace: [ 4570.711746] <IRQ> [ 4570.711992] smc_cdc_tx_handler+0x41/0xc0 [ 4570.712470] smc_wr_tx_tasklet_fn+0x213/0x560 [ 4570.712981] ? smc_cdc_tx_dismisser+0x10/0x10 [ 4570.713489] tasklet_action_common.isra.17+0x66/0x140 [ 4570.714083] __do_softirq+0x123/0x2f4 [ 4570.714521] irq_exit_rcu+0xc4/0xf0 [ 4570.714934] common_interrupt+0xba/0xe0 Though smc_cdc_tx_handler() checked the existence of smc connection, smc_release() may have already dismissed and released the smc socket before smc_cdc_tx_handler() further visits it. smc_cdc_tx_handler() |smc_release() if (!conn) | | |smc_cdc_tx_dismiss_slots() | smc_cdc_tx_dismisser() | |sock_put(&smc->sk) <- last sock_put, | smc_sock freed bh_lock_sock(&smc->sk) (panic) | To make sure we won't receive any CDC messages after we free the smc_sock, add a refcount on the smc_connection for inflight CDC message(posted to the QP but haven't received related CQE), and don't release the smc_connection until all the inflight CDC messages haven been done, for both success or failed ones. Using refcount on CDC messages brings another problem: when the link is going to be destroyed, smcr_link_clear() will reset the QP, which then remove all the pending CQEs related to the QP in the CQ. To make sure all the CQEs will always come back so the refcount on the smc_connection can always reach 0, smc_ib_modify_qp_reset() was replaced by smc_ib_modify_qp_error(). And remove the timeout in smc_wr_tx_wait_no_pending_sends() since we need to wait for all pending WQEs done, or we may encounter use-after- free when handling CQEs. For IB device removal routine, we need to wait for all the QPs on that device been destroyed before we can destroy CQs on the device, or the refcount on smc_connection won't reach 0 and smc_sock cannot be released. Fixes: 5f08318f617b ("smc: connection data control (CDC)") Reported-by: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Dust Li <dust.li@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-12-28 09:03:25 +00:00
atomic_t cdc_pend_tx_wr; /* number of pending tx CDC wqe
* - inc when post wqe,
* - dec on polled tx cqe
*/
wait_queue_head_t cdc_pend_tx_wq; /* wakeup on no cdc_pend_tx_wr*/
struct delayed_work tx_work; /* retry of smc_cdc_msg_send */
u32 tx_off; /* base offset in peer rmb */
struct smc_host_cdc_msg local_rx_ctrl; /* filled during event_handl.
* .prod cf. TCP rcv_nxt
* .cons cf. TCP snd_una
*/
union smc_host_cursor rx_curs_confirmed; /* confirmed to peer
* source of snd_una ?
*/
union smc_host_cursor urg_curs; /* points at urgent byte */
enum smc_urg_state urg_state;
bool urg_tx_pend; /* urgent data staged */
bool urg_rx_skip_pend;
/* indicate urgent oob data
* read, but previous regular
* data still pending
*/
char urg_rx_byte; /* urgent byte */
bool tx_in_release_sock;
/* flush pending tx data in
* sock release_cb()
*/
atomic_t bytes_to_rcv; /* arrived data,
* not yet received
*/
atomic_t splice_pending; /* number of spliced bytes
* pending processing
*/
#ifndef KERNEL_HAS_ATOMIC64
spinlock_t acurs_lock; /* protect cursors */
#endif
struct work_struct close_work; /* peer sent some closing */
struct work_struct abort_work; /* abort the connection */
struct tasklet_struct rx_tsklet; /* Receiver tasklet for SMC-D */
u8 rx_off; /* receive offset:
* 0 for SMC-R, 32 for SMC-D
*/
u64 peer_token; /* SMC-D token of peer */
u8 killed : 1; /* abnormal termination */
net/smc: Resolve the race between link group access and termination We encountered some crashes caused by the race between the access and the termination of link groups. Here are some of panic stacks we met: 1) Race between smc_clc_wait_msg() and __smc_lgr_terminate() BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000002f0 Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_work [smc] RIP: 0010:smc_clc_wait_msg+0x3eb/0x5c0 [smc] Call Trace: <TASK> ? smc_clc_send_accept+0x45/0xa0 [smc] ? smc_clc_send_accept+0x45/0xa0 [smc] smc_listen_work+0x783/0x1220 [smc] ? finish_task_switch+0xc4/0x2e0 ? process_one_work+0x1ad/0x3c0 process_one_work+0x1ad/0x3c0 worker_thread+0x4c/0x390 ? rescuer_thread+0x320/0x320 kthread+0x149/0x190 ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> smc_listen_work() abnormal case like port error --------------------------------------------------------------- | __smc_lgr_terminate() | |- smc_conn_kill() | |- smc_lgr_unregister_conn() | |- set conn->lgr = NULL smc_clc_wait_msg() | |- access conn->lgr (panic) | 2) Race between smc_setsockopt() and __smc_lgr_terminate() BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000002e8 RIP: 0010:smc_setsockopt+0x17a/0x280 [smc] Call Trace: <TASK> __sys_setsockopt+0xfc/0x190 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x34/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae </TASK> smc_setsockopt() abnormal case like port error -------------------------------------------------------------- | __smc_lgr_terminate() | |- smc_conn_kill() | |- smc_lgr_unregister_conn() | |- set conn->lgr = NULL mod_delayed_work() | |- access conn->lgr (panic) | There are some other panic places and they are caused by the similar reason as described above, which is accessing link group after termination, thus getting a NULL pointer or invalid resource. Currently, there seems to be no synchronization between the link group access and a sudden termination of it. This patch tries to fix this by introducing reference count of link group and not freeing link group until reference count is zero. Link group might be referred to by links or smc connections. So the operation to the link group reference count can be concluded as follows: object [hold or initialized as 1] [put] ------------------------------------------------------------------- link group smc_lgr_create() smc_lgr_free() connections smc_conn_create() smc_conn_free() links smcr_link_init() smcr_link_clear() Througth this way, we extend the life cycle of link group and ensure it is longer than the life cycle of connections and links above it, so that avoid invalid access to link group after its termination. Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-01-13 08:36:40 +00:00
u8 freed : 1; /* normal termiation */
u8 out_of_sync : 1; /* out of sync with peer */
};
struct smc_sock { /* smc sock container */
struct sock sk;
struct socket *clcsock; /* internal tcp socket */
net/smc: Forward wakeup to smc socket waitqueue after fallback When we replace TCP with SMC and a fallback occurs, there may be some socket waitqueue entries remaining in smc socket->wq, such as eppoll_entries inserted by userspace applications. After the fallback, data flows over TCP/IP and only clcsocket->wq will be woken up. Applications can't be notified by the entries which were inserted in smc socket->wq before fallback. So we need a mechanism to wake up smc socket->wq at the same time if some entries remaining in it. The current workaround is to transfer the entries from smc socket->wq to clcsock->wq during the fallback. But this may cause a crash like this: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000100: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.16.0+ #107 RIP: 0010:__wake_up_common+0x65/0x170 Call Trace: <IRQ> __wake_up_common_lock+0x7a/0xc0 sock_def_readable+0x3c/0x70 tcp_data_queue+0x4a7/0xc40 tcp_rcv_established+0x32f/0x660 ? sk_filter_trim_cap+0xcb/0x2e0 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x10b/0x260 tcp_v4_rcv+0xd2a/0xde0 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x3b/0x1d0 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x54/0x60 ip_local_deliver+0x6a/0x110 ? tcp_v4_early_demux+0xa2/0x140 ? tcp_v4_early_demux+0x10d/0x140 ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x49/0x60 ip_sublist_rcv+0x19d/0x230 ip_list_rcv+0x13e/0x170 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1c2/0x240 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1e6/0x320 napi_complete_done+0x11d/0x190 mlx5e_napi_poll+0x163/0x6b0 [mlx5_core] __napi_poll+0x3c/0x1b0 net_rx_action+0x27c/0x300 __do_softirq+0x114/0x2d2 irq_exit_rcu+0xb4/0xe0 common_interrupt+0xba/0xe0 </IRQ> <TASK> The crash is caused by privately transferring waitqueue entries from smc socket->wq to clcsock->wq. The owners of these entries, such as epoll, have no idea that the entries have been transferred to a different socket wait queue and still use original waitqueue spinlock (smc socket->wq.wait.lock) to make the entries operation exclusive, but it doesn't work. The operations to the entries, such as removing from the waitqueue (now is clcsock->wq after fallback), may cause a crash when clcsock waitqueue is being iterated over at the moment. This patch tries to fix this by no longer transferring wait queue entries privately, but introducing own implementations of clcsock's callback functions in fallback situation. The callback functions will forward the wakeup to smc socket->wq if clcsock->wq is actually woken up and smc socket->wq has remaining entries. Fixes: 2153bd1e3d3d ("net/smc: Transfer remaining wait queue entries during fallback") Suggested-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com> Acked-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-01-26 15:33:04 +00:00
void (*clcsk_state_change)(struct sock *sk);
/* original stat_change fct. */
void (*clcsk_data_ready)(struct sock *sk);
net/smc: Forward wakeup to smc socket waitqueue after fallback When we replace TCP with SMC and a fallback occurs, there may be some socket waitqueue entries remaining in smc socket->wq, such as eppoll_entries inserted by userspace applications. After the fallback, data flows over TCP/IP and only clcsocket->wq will be woken up. Applications can't be notified by the entries which were inserted in smc socket->wq before fallback. So we need a mechanism to wake up smc socket->wq at the same time if some entries remaining in it. The current workaround is to transfer the entries from smc socket->wq to clcsock->wq during the fallback. But this may cause a crash like this: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000100: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.16.0+ #107 RIP: 0010:__wake_up_common+0x65/0x170 Call Trace: <IRQ> __wake_up_common_lock+0x7a/0xc0 sock_def_readable+0x3c/0x70 tcp_data_queue+0x4a7/0xc40 tcp_rcv_established+0x32f/0x660 ? sk_filter_trim_cap+0xcb/0x2e0 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x10b/0x260 tcp_v4_rcv+0xd2a/0xde0 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x3b/0x1d0 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x54/0x60 ip_local_deliver+0x6a/0x110 ? tcp_v4_early_demux+0xa2/0x140 ? tcp_v4_early_demux+0x10d/0x140 ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x49/0x60 ip_sublist_rcv+0x19d/0x230 ip_list_rcv+0x13e/0x170 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1c2/0x240 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1e6/0x320 napi_complete_done+0x11d/0x190 mlx5e_napi_poll+0x163/0x6b0 [mlx5_core] __napi_poll+0x3c/0x1b0 net_rx_action+0x27c/0x300 __do_softirq+0x114/0x2d2 irq_exit_rcu+0xb4/0xe0 common_interrupt+0xba/0xe0 </IRQ> <TASK> The crash is caused by privately transferring waitqueue entries from smc socket->wq to clcsock->wq. The owners of these entries, such as epoll, have no idea that the entries have been transferred to a different socket wait queue and still use original waitqueue spinlock (smc socket->wq.wait.lock) to make the entries operation exclusive, but it doesn't work. The operations to the entries, such as removing from the waitqueue (now is clcsock->wq after fallback), may cause a crash when clcsock waitqueue is being iterated over at the moment. This patch tries to fix this by no longer transferring wait queue entries privately, but introducing own implementations of clcsock's callback functions in fallback situation. The callback functions will forward the wakeup to smc socket->wq if clcsock->wq is actually woken up and smc socket->wq has remaining entries. Fixes: 2153bd1e3d3d ("net/smc: Transfer remaining wait queue entries during fallback") Suggested-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com> Acked-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-01-26 15:33:04 +00:00
/* original data_ready fct. */
void (*clcsk_write_space)(struct sock *sk);
/* original write_space fct. */
void (*clcsk_error_report)(struct sock *sk);
/* original error_report fct. */
struct smc_connection conn; /* smc connection */
struct smc_sock *listen_smc; /* listen parent */
struct work_struct connect_work; /* handle non-blocking connect*/
struct work_struct tcp_listen_work;/* handle tcp socket accepts */
struct work_struct smc_listen_work;/* prepare new accept socket */
struct list_head accept_q; /* sockets to be accepted */
spinlock_t accept_q_lock; /* protects accept_q */
bool limit_smc_hs; /* put constraint on handshake */
bool use_fallback; /* fallback to tcp */
int fallback_rsn; /* reason for fallback */
u32 peer_diagnosis; /* decline reason from peer */
net/smc: Limit backlog connections Current implementation does not handling backlog semantics, one potential risk is that server will be flooded by infinite amount connections, even if client was SMC-incapable. This patch works to put a limit on backlog connections, referring to the TCP implementation, we divides SMC connections into two categories: 1. Half SMC connection, which includes all TCP established while SMC not connections. 2. Full SMC connection, which includes all SMC established connections. For half SMC connection, since all half SMC connections starts with TCP established, we can achieve our goal by put a limit before TCP established. Refer to the implementation of TCP, this limits will based on not only the half SMC connections but also the full connections, which is also a constraint on full SMC connections. For full SMC connections, although we know exactly where it starts, it's quite hard to put a limit before it. The easiest way is to block wait before receive SMC confirm CLC message, while it's under protection by smc_server_lgr_pending, a global lock, which leads this limit to the entire host instead of a single listen socket. Another way is to drop the full connections, but considering the cast of SMC connections, we prefer to keep full SMC connections. Even so, the limits of full SMC connections still exists, see commits about half SMC connection below. After this patch, the limits of backend connection shows like: For SMC: 1. Client with SMC-capability can makes 2 * backlog full SMC connections or 1 * backlog half SMC connections and 1 * backlog full SMC connections at most. 2. Client without SMC-capability can only makes 1 * backlog half TCP connections and 1 * backlog full TCP connections. Signed-off-by: D. Wythe <alibuda@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-02-10 09:11:35 +00:00
atomic_t queued_smc_hs; /* queued smc handshakes */
struct inet_connection_sock_af_ops af_ops;
const struct inet_connection_sock_af_ops *ori_af_ops;
/* original af ops */
int sockopt_defer_accept;
/* sockopt TCP_DEFER_ACCEPT
* value
*/
u8 wait_close_tx_prepared : 1;
/* shutdown wr or close
* started, waiting for unsent
* data to be sent
*/
u8 connect_nonblock : 1;
/* non-blocking connect in
* flight
*/
struct mutex clcsock_release_lock;
/* protects clcsock of a listen
* socket
* */
};
#define smc_sk(ptr) container_of_const(ptr, struct smc_sock, sk)
static inline void smc_init_saved_callbacks(struct smc_sock *smc)
{
smc->clcsk_state_change = NULL;
smc->clcsk_data_ready = NULL;
smc->clcsk_write_space = NULL;
smc->clcsk_error_report = NULL;
}
net/smc: Limit backlog connections Current implementation does not handling backlog semantics, one potential risk is that server will be flooded by infinite amount connections, even if client was SMC-incapable. This patch works to put a limit on backlog connections, referring to the TCP implementation, we divides SMC connections into two categories: 1. Half SMC connection, which includes all TCP established while SMC not connections. 2. Full SMC connection, which includes all SMC established connections. For half SMC connection, since all half SMC connections starts with TCP established, we can achieve our goal by put a limit before TCP established. Refer to the implementation of TCP, this limits will based on not only the half SMC connections but also the full connections, which is also a constraint on full SMC connections. For full SMC connections, although we know exactly where it starts, it's quite hard to put a limit before it. The easiest way is to block wait before receive SMC confirm CLC message, while it's under protection by smc_server_lgr_pending, a global lock, which leads this limit to the entire host instead of a single listen socket. Another way is to drop the full connections, but considering the cast of SMC connections, we prefer to keep full SMC connections. Even so, the limits of full SMC connections still exists, see commits about half SMC connection below. After this patch, the limits of backend connection shows like: For SMC: 1. Client with SMC-capability can makes 2 * backlog full SMC connections or 1 * backlog half SMC connections and 1 * backlog full SMC connections at most. 2. Client without SMC-capability can only makes 1 * backlog half TCP connections and 1 * backlog full TCP connections. Signed-off-by: D. Wythe <alibuda@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-02-10 09:11:35 +00:00
static inline struct smc_sock *smc_clcsock_user_data(const struct sock *clcsk)
net/smc: Forward wakeup to smc socket waitqueue after fallback When we replace TCP with SMC and a fallback occurs, there may be some socket waitqueue entries remaining in smc socket->wq, such as eppoll_entries inserted by userspace applications. After the fallback, data flows over TCP/IP and only clcsocket->wq will be woken up. Applications can't be notified by the entries which were inserted in smc socket->wq before fallback. So we need a mechanism to wake up smc socket->wq at the same time if some entries remaining in it. The current workaround is to transfer the entries from smc socket->wq to clcsock->wq during the fallback. But this may cause a crash like this: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000100: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.16.0+ #107 RIP: 0010:__wake_up_common+0x65/0x170 Call Trace: <IRQ> __wake_up_common_lock+0x7a/0xc0 sock_def_readable+0x3c/0x70 tcp_data_queue+0x4a7/0xc40 tcp_rcv_established+0x32f/0x660 ? sk_filter_trim_cap+0xcb/0x2e0 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x10b/0x260 tcp_v4_rcv+0xd2a/0xde0 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x3b/0x1d0 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x54/0x60 ip_local_deliver+0x6a/0x110 ? tcp_v4_early_demux+0xa2/0x140 ? tcp_v4_early_demux+0x10d/0x140 ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x49/0x60 ip_sublist_rcv+0x19d/0x230 ip_list_rcv+0x13e/0x170 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1c2/0x240 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1e6/0x320 napi_complete_done+0x11d/0x190 mlx5e_napi_poll+0x163/0x6b0 [mlx5_core] __napi_poll+0x3c/0x1b0 net_rx_action+0x27c/0x300 __do_softirq+0x114/0x2d2 irq_exit_rcu+0xb4/0xe0 common_interrupt+0xba/0xe0 </IRQ> <TASK> The crash is caused by privately transferring waitqueue entries from smc socket->wq to clcsock->wq. The owners of these entries, such as epoll, have no idea that the entries have been transferred to a different socket wait queue and still use original waitqueue spinlock (smc socket->wq.wait.lock) to make the entries operation exclusive, but it doesn't work. The operations to the entries, such as removing from the waitqueue (now is clcsock->wq after fallback), may cause a crash when clcsock waitqueue is being iterated over at the moment. This patch tries to fix this by no longer transferring wait queue entries privately, but introducing own implementations of clcsock's callback functions in fallback situation. The callback functions will forward the wakeup to smc socket->wq if clcsock->wq is actually woken up and smc socket->wq has remaining entries. Fixes: 2153bd1e3d3d ("net/smc: Transfer remaining wait queue entries during fallback") Suggested-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Wen Gu <guwen@linux.alibaba.com> Acked-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-01-26 15:33:04 +00:00
{
return (struct smc_sock *)
((uintptr_t)clcsk->sk_user_data & ~SK_USER_DATA_NOCOPY);
}
/* save target_cb in saved_cb, and replace target_cb with new_cb */
static inline void smc_clcsock_replace_cb(void (**target_cb)(struct sock *),
void (*new_cb)(struct sock *),
void (**saved_cb)(struct sock *))
{
/* only save once */
if (!*saved_cb)
*saved_cb = *target_cb;
*target_cb = new_cb;
}
/* restore target_cb to saved_cb, and reset saved_cb to NULL */
static inline void smc_clcsock_restore_cb(void (**target_cb)(struct sock *),
void (**saved_cb)(struct sock *))
{
if (!*saved_cb)
return;
*target_cb = *saved_cb;
*saved_cb = NULL;
}
extern struct workqueue_struct *smc_hs_wq; /* wq for handshake work */
extern struct workqueue_struct *smc_close_wq; /* wq for close work */
#define SMC_SYSTEMID_LEN 8
extern u8 local_systemid[SMC_SYSTEMID_LEN]; /* unique system identifier */
#define ntohll(x) be64_to_cpu(x)
#define htonll(x) cpu_to_be64(x)
/* convert an u32 value into network byte order, store it into a 3 byte field */
static inline void hton24(u8 *net, u32 host)
{
__be32 t;
t = cpu_to_be32(host);
memcpy(net, ((u8 *)&t) + 1, 3);
}
/* convert a received 3 byte field into host byte order*/
static inline u32 ntoh24(u8 *net)
{
__be32 t = 0;
memcpy(((u8 *)&t) + 1, net, 3);
return be32_to_cpu(t);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
static inline bool using_ipsec(struct smc_sock *smc)
{
return (smc->clcsock->sk->sk_policy[0] ||
smc->clcsock->sk->sk_policy[1]) ? true : false;
}
#else
static inline bool using_ipsec(struct smc_sock *smc)
{
return false;
}
#endif
struct smc_gidlist;
struct sock *smc_accept_dequeue(struct sock *parent, struct socket *new_sock);
void smc_close_non_accepted(struct sock *sk);
void smc_fill_gid_list(struct smc_link_group *lgr,
struct smc_gidlist *gidlist,
struct smc_ib_device *known_dev, u8 *known_gid);
/* smc handshake limitation interface for netlink */
int smc_nl_dump_hs_limitation(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb);
int smc_nl_enable_hs_limitation(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info);
int smc_nl_disable_hs_limitation(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info);
static inline void smc_sock_set_flag(struct sock *sk, enum sock_flags flag)
{
set_bit(flag, &sk->sk_flags);
}
#endif /* __SMC_H */