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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#
# Makefile for some libs needed in the kernel.
#
kbuild: introduce ccflags-remove-y and asflags-remove-y CFLAGS_REMOVE_<file>.o filters out flags when compiling a particular object, but there is no convenient way to do that for every object in a directory. Add ccflags-remove-y and asflags-remove-y to make it easily. Use ccflags-remove-y to clean up some Makefiles. The add/remove order works as follows: [1] KBUILD_CFLAGS specifies compiler flags used globally [2] ccflags-y adds compiler flags for all objects in the current Makefile [3] ccflags-remove-y removes compiler flags for all objects in the current Makefile (New feature) [4] CFLAGS_<file> adds compiler flags per file. [5] CFLAGS_REMOVE_<file> removes compiler flags per file. Having [3] before [4] allows us to remove flags from most (but not all) objects in the current Makefile. For example, kernel/trace/Makefile removes $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) from all objects in the directory, then adds it back to trace_selftest_dynamic.o and CFLAGS_trace_kprobe_selftest.o The same applies to lib/livepatch/Makefile. Please note ccflags-remove-y has no effect to the sub-directories. In contrast, the previous notation got rid of compiler flags also from all the sub-directories. The following are not affected because they have no sub-directories: arch/arm/boot/compressed/ arch/powerpc/xmon/ arch/sh/ kernel/trace/ However, lib/ has several sub-directories. To keep the behavior, I added ccflags-remove-y to all Makefiles in subdirectories of lib/, except the following: lib/vdso/Makefile - Kbuild does not descend into this Makefile lib/raid/test/Makefile - This is not used for the kernel build I think commit 2464a609ded0 ("ftrace: do not trace library functions") excluded too much. In the next commit, I will remove ccflags-remove-y from the sub-directories of lib/. Suggested-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc) Acked-by: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com> (KUnit) Tested-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
2020-07-07 09:21:16 +00:00
ccflags-remove-$(CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER) += $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 21:27:30 +00:00
# These files are disabled because they produce lots of non-interesting and/or
# flaky coverage that is not a function of syscall inputs. For example,
# rbtree can be global and individual rotations don't correlate with inputs.
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_string.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_rbtree.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_list_debug.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_debugobjects.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_dynamic_debug.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_fault-inject.o := n
kernel: add kcov code coverage kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing (randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a system. A notable user-space example is AFL (http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel support. kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs. To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking). Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've dropped the second mode for simplicity. This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296. We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months: https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller. Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire. Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage. With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible. kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible. Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode'] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards] Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 21:27:30 +00:00
# string.o implements standard library functions like memset/memcpy etc.
# Use -ffreestanding to ensure that the compiler does not try to "optimize"
# them into calls to themselves.
CFLAGS_string.o := -ffreestanding
x86/mm/mem_encrypt: Disable all instrumentation for early SME setup Enablement of AMD's Secure Memory Encryption feature is determined very early after start_kernel() is entered. Part of this procedure involves scanning the command line for the parameter 'mem_encrypt'. To determine intended state, the function sme_enable() uses library functions cmdline_find_option() and strncmp(). Their use occurs early enough such that it cannot be assumed that any instrumentation subsystem is initialized. For example, making calls to a KASAN-instrumented function before KASAN is set up will result in the use of uninitialized memory and a boot failure. When AMD's SME support is enabled, conditionally disable instrumentation of these dependent functions in lib/string.c and arch/x86/lib/cmdline.c. [ bp: Get rid of intermediary nostackp var and cleanup whitespace. ] Fixes: aca20d546214 ("x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption") Reported-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com> Signed-off-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Boris Brezillon <bbrezillon@kernel.org> Cc: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Cc: "dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com> Cc: "luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: "mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/155657657552.7116.18363762932464011367.stgit@sosrh3.amd.com
2019-04-29 22:22:58 +00:00
# Early boot use of cmdline, don't instrument it
ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
KASAN_SANITIZE_string.o := n
CFLAGS_string.o += -fno-stack-protector
x86/mm/mem_encrypt: Disable all instrumentation for early SME setup Enablement of AMD's Secure Memory Encryption feature is determined very early after start_kernel() is entered. Part of this procedure involves scanning the command line for the parameter 'mem_encrypt'. To determine intended state, the function sme_enable() uses library functions cmdline_find_option() and strncmp(). Their use occurs early enough such that it cannot be assumed that any instrumentation subsystem is initialized. For example, making calls to a KASAN-instrumented function before KASAN is set up will result in the use of uninitialized memory and a boot failure. When AMD's SME support is enabled, conditionally disable instrumentation of these dependent functions in lib/string.c and arch/x86/lib/cmdline.c. [ bp: Get rid of intermediary nostackp var and cleanup whitespace. ] Fixes: aca20d546214 ("x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption") Reported-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com> Signed-off-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Boris Brezillon <bbrezillon@kernel.org> Cc: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Cc: "dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com> Cc: "luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: "mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/155657657552.7116.18363762932464011367.stgit@sosrh3.amd.com
2019-04-29 22:22:58 +00:00
endif
lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \
rbtree.o radix-tree.o timerqueue.o xarray.o \
Maple Tree: add new data structure Patch series "Introducing the Maple Tree" The maple tree is an RCU-safe range based B-tree designed to use modern processor cache efficiently. There are a number of places in the kernel that a non-overlapping range-based tree would be beneficial, especially one with a simple interface. If you use an rbtree with other data structures to improve performance or an interval tree to track non-overlapping ranges, then this is for you. The tree has a branching factor of 10 for non-leaf nodes and 16 for leaf nodes. With the increased branching factor, it is significantly shorter than the rbtree so it has fewer cache misses. The removal of the linked list between subsequent entries also reduces the cache misses and the need to pull in the previous and next VMA during many tree alterations. The first user that is covered in this patch set is the vm_area_struct, where three data structures are replaced by the maple tree: the augmented rbtree, the vma cache, and the linked list of VMAs in the mm_struct. The long term goal is to reduce or remove the mmap_lock contention. The plan is to get to the point where we use the maple tree in RCU mode. Readers will not block for writers. A single write operation will be allowed at a time. A reader re-walks if stale data is encountered. VMAs would be RCU enabled and this mode would be entered once multiple tasks are using the mm_struct. Davidlor said : Yes I like the maple tree, and at this stage I don't think we can ask for : more from this series wrt the MM - albeit there seems to still be some : folks reporting breakage. Fundamentally I see Liam's work to (re)move : complexity out of the MM (not to say that the actual maple tree is not : complex) by consolidating the three complimentary data structures very : much worth it considering performance does not take a hit. This was very : much a turn off with the range locking approach, which worst case scenario : incurred in prohibitive overhead. Also as Liam and Matthew have : mentioned, RCU opens up a lot of nice performance opportunities, and in : addition academia[1] has shown outstanding scalability of address spaces : with the foundation of replacing the locked rbtree with RCU aware trees. A similar work has been discovered in the academic press https://pdos.csail.mit.edu/papers/rcuvm:asplos12.pdf Sheer coincidence. We designed our tree with the intention of solving the hardest problem first. Upon settling on a b-tree variant and a rough outline, we researched ranged based b-trees and RCU b-trees and did find that article. So it was nice to find reassurances that we were on the right path, but our design choice of using ranges made that paper unusable for us. This patch (of 70): The maple tree is an RCU-safe range based B-tree designed to use modern processor cache efficiently. There are a number of places in the kernel that a non-overlapping range-based tree would be beneficial, especially one with a simple interface. If you use an rbtree with other data structures to improve performance or an interval tree to track non-overlapping ranges, then this is for you. The tree has a branching factor of 10 for non-leaf nodes and 16 for leaf nodes. With the increased branching factor, it is significantly shorter than the rbtree so it has fewer cache misses. The removal of the linked list between subsequent entries also reduces the cache misses and the need to pull in the previous and next VMA during many tree alterations. The first user that is covered in this patch set is the vm_area_struct, where three data structures are replaced by the maple tree: the augmented rbtree, the vma cache, and the linked list of VMAs in the mm_struct. The long term goal is to reduce or remove the mmap_lock contention. The plan is to get to the point where we use the maple tree in RCU mode. Readers will not block for writers. A single write operation will be allowed at a time. A reader re-walks if stale data is encountered. VMAs would be RCU enabled and this mode would be entered once multiple tasks are using the mm_struct. There is additional BUG_ON() calls added within the tree, most of which are in debug code. These will be replaced with a WARN_ON() call in the future. There is also additional BUG_ON() calls within the code which will also be reduced in number at a later date. These exist to catch things such as out-of-range accesses which would crash anyways. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220906194824.2110408-1-Liam.Howlett@oracle.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220906194824.2110408-2-Liam.Howlett@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Tested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-06 19:48:39 +00:00
maple_tree.o idr.o extable.o irq_regs.o argv_split.o \
flex_proportions.o ratelimit.o show_mem.o \
is_single_threaded.o plist.o decompress.o kobject_uevent.o \
alpha: Remove custom dec_and_lock() implementation Alpha provides a custom implementation of dec_and_lock(). The functions is split into two parts: - atomic_add_unless() + return 0 (fast path in assembly) - remaining part including locking (slow path in C) Comparing the result of the alpha implementation with the generic implementation compiled by gcc it looks like the fast path is optimized by avoiding a stack frame (and reloading the GP), register store and all this. This is only done in the slowpath. After marking the slowpath (atomic_dec_and_lock_1()) as "noinline" and doing the slowpath in C (the atomic_add_unless(atomic, -1, 1) part) I noticed differences in the resulting assembly: - the GP is still reloaded - atomic_add_unless() adds more memory barriers compared to the custom assembly - the custom assembly here does "load, sub, beq" while atomic_add_unless() does "load, cmpeq, add, bne". This is okay because it compares against zero after subtraction while the generic code compares against 1 before. I'm not sure if avoiding the stack frame (and GP reloading) brings a lot in terms of performance. Regarding the different barriers, Peter Zijlstra says: |refcount decrement needs to be a RELEASE operation, such that all the |load/stores to the object happen before we decrement the refcount. | |Otherwise things like: | | obj->foo = 5; | refcnt_dec(&obj->ref); | |can be re-ordered, which then allows fun scenarios like: | | CPU0 CPU1 | | refcnt_dec(&obj->ref); | if (dec_and_test(&obj->ref)) | free(obj); | obj->foo = 5; // oops UaF | | |This means (for alpha) that there should be a memory barrier _before_ |the decrement, however the dec_and_lock asm thing only has one _after_, |which, per the above, is too late. | |The generic version using add_unless will result in memory barrier |before and after (because that is the rule for atomic ops with a return |value) which is strictly too many barriers for the refcount story, but |who knows what other ordering requirements code has. Remove the custom alpha implementation of dec_and_lock() and if it is an issue (performance wise) then the fast path could still be inlined. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180606115918.GG12198@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r20180612161621.22645-2-bigeasy@linutronix.de
2018-06-12 16:16:19 +00:00
earlycpio.o seq_buf.o siphash.o dec_and_lock.o \
nmi_backtrace.o win_minmax.o memcat_p.o \
buildid.o
[PATCH] Add initial implementation of klist helpers. This klist interface provides a couple of structures that wrap around struct list_head to provide explicit list "head" (struct klist) and list "node" (struct klist_node) objects. For struct klist, a spinlock is included that protects access to the actual list itself. struct klist_node provides a pointer to the klist that owns it and a kref reference count that indicates the number of current users of that node in the list. The entire point is to provide an interface for iterating over a list that is safe and allows for modification of the list during the iteration (e.g. insertion and removal), including modification of the current node on the list. It works using a 3rd object type - struct klist_iter - that is declared and initialized before an iteration. klist_next() is used to acquire the next element in the list. It returns NULL if there are no more items. This klist interface provides a couple of structures that wrap around struct list_head to provide explicit list "head" (struct klist) and list "node" (struct klist_node) objects. For struct klist, a spinlock is included that protects access to the actual list itself. struct klist_node provides a pointer to the klist that owns it and a kref reference count that indicates the number of current users of that node in the list. The entire point is to provide an interface for iterating over a list that is safe and allows for modification of the list during the iteration (e.g. insertion and removal), including modification of the current node on the list. It works using a 3rd object type - struct klist_iter - that is declared and initialized before an iteration. klist_next() is used to acquire the next element in the list. It returns NULL if there are no more items. Internally, that routine takes the klist's lock, decrements the reference count of the previous klist_node and increments the count of the next klist_node. It then drops the lock and returns. There are primitives for adding and removing nodes to/from a klist. When deleting, klist_del() will simply decrement the reference count. Only when the count goes to 0 is the node removed from the list. klist_remove() will try to delete the node from the list and block until it is actually removed. This is useful for objects (like devices) that have been removed from the system and must be freed (but must wait until all accessors have finished). Internally, that routine takes the klist's lock, decrements the reference count of the previous klist_node and increments the count of the next klist_node. It then drops the lock and returns. There are primitives for adding and removing nodes to/from a klist. When deleting, klist_del() will simply decrement the reference count. Only when the count goes to 0 is the node removed from the list. klist_remove() will try to delete the node from the list and block until it is actually removed. This is useful for objects (like devices) that have been removed from the system and must be freed (but must wait until all accessors have finished). Signed-off-by: Patrick Mochel <mochel@digitalimplant.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de> diff -Nru a/include/linux/klist.h b/include/linux/klist.h
2005-03-21 19:45:16 +00:00
lib-$(CONFIG_PRINTK) += dump_stack.o
lib-$(CONFIG_SMP) += cpumask.o
lib-y += kobject.o klist.o
obj-y += lockref.o
obj-y += bcd.o sort.o parser.o debug_locks.o random32.o \
bust_spinlocks.o kasprintf.o bitmap.o scatterlist.o \
list_sort.o uuid.o iov_iter.o clz_ctz.o \
bsearch.o find_bit.o llist.o memweight.o kfifo.o \
percpu-refcount.o rhashtable.o base64.o \
atomics: Provide rcuref - scalable reference counting atomic_t based reference counting, including refcount_t, uses atomic_inc_not_zero() for acquiring a reference. atomic_inc_not_zero() is implemented with a atomic_try_cmpxchg() loop. High contention of the reference count leads to retry loops and scales badly. There is nothing to improve on this implementation as the semantics have to be preserved. Provide rcuref as a scalable alternative solution which is suitable for RCU managed objects. Similar to refcount_t it comes with overflow and underflow detection and mitigation. rcuref treats the underlying atomic_t as an unsigned integer and partitions this space into zones: 0x00000000 - 0x7FFFFFFF valid zone (1 .. (INT_MAX + 1) references) 0x80000000 - 0xBFFFFFFF saturation zone 0xC0000000 - 0xFFFFFFFE dead zone 0xFFFFFFFF no reference rcuref_get() unconditionally increments the reference count with atomic_add_negative_relaxed(). rcuref_put() unconditionally decrements the reference count with atomic_add_negative_release(). This unconditional increment avoids the inc_not_zero() problem, but requires a more complex implementation on the put() side when the count drops from 0 to -1. When this transition is detected then it is attempted to mark the reference count dead, by setting it to the midpoint of the dead zone with a single atomic_cmpxchg_release() operation. This operation can fail due to a concurrent rcuref_get() elevating the reference count from -1 to 0 again. If the unconditional increment in rcuref_get() hits a reference count which is marked dead (or saturated) it will detect it after the fact and bring back the reference count to the midpoint of the respective zone. The zones provide enough tolerance which makes it practically impossible to escape from a zone. The racy implementation of rcuref_put() requires to protect rcuref_put() against a grace period ending in order to prevent a subtle use after free. As RCU is the only mechanism which allows to protect against that, it is not possible to fully replace the atomic_inc_not_zero() based implementation of refcount_t with this scheme. The final drop is slightly more expensive than the atomic_dec_return() counterpart, but that's not the case which this is optimized for. The optimization is on the high frequeunt get()/put() pairs and their scalability. The performance of an uncontended rcuref_get()/put() pair where the put() is not dropping the last reference is still on par with the plain atomic operations, while at the same time providing overflow and underflow detection and mitigation. The performance of rcuref compared to plain atomic_inc_not_zero() and atomic_dec_return() based reference counting under contention: - Micro benchmark: All CPUs running a increment/decrement loop on an elevated reference count, which means the 0 to -1 transition never happens. The performance gain depends on microarchitecture and the number of CPUs and has been observed in the range of 1.3X to 4.7X - Conversion of dst_entry::__refcnt to rcuref and testing with the localhost memtier/memcached benchmark. That benchmark shows the reference count contention prominently. The performance gain depends on microarchitecture and the number of CPUs and has been observed in the range of 1.1X to 2.6X over the previous fix for the false sharing issue vs. struct dst_entry::__refcnt. When memtier is run over a real 1Gb network connection, there is a small gain on top of the false sharing fix. The two changes combined result in a 2%-5% total gain for that networked test. Reported-by: Wangyang Guo <wangyang.guo@intel.com> Reported-by: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230323102800.158429195@linutronix.de
2023-03-23 20:55:31 +00:00
once.o refcount.o rcuref.o usercopy.o errseq.o bucket_locks.o \
generic-radix-tree.o
obj-$(CONFIG_STRING_SELFTEST) += test_string.o
obj-y += string_helpers.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_STRING_HELPERS) += test-string_helpers.o
obj-y += hexdump.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_HEXDUMP) += test_hexdump.o
obj-y += kstrtox.o
obj-$(CONFIG_FIND_BIT_BENCHMARK) += find_bit_benchmark.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_BPF) += test_bpf.o
lib: add Dhrystone benchmark test When working on SoC bring-up, (a full) userspace may not be available, making it hard to benchmark the CPU performance of the system under development. Still, one may want to have a rough idea of the (relative) performance of one or more CPU cores, especially when working on e.g. the clock driver that controls the CPU core clock(s). Hence make the classical Dhrystone 2.1 benchmark available as a Linux kernel test module, based on[1]. When built-in, this benchmark can be run without any userspace present. Parallel runs (run on multiple CPU cores) are supported, just kick the "run" file multiple times. Note that the actual figures depend on the configuration options that control compiler optimization (e.g. CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE vs. CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE), and on the compiler options used when building the kernel in general. Hence numbers may differ from those obtained by running similar benchmarks in userspace. [1] https://github.com/qris/dhrystone-deb.git Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4d07ad990740a5f1e426ce4566fb514f60ec9bdd.1670509558.git.geert+renesas@glider.be Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com> Cc: David Gow <davidgow@google.com> [geert+renesas@glider.be: fix uninitialized use of ret] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.22.394.2212190857310.137329@ramsan.of.borg Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-12-08 14:31:28 +00:00
test_dhry-objs := dhry_1.o dhry_2.o dhry_run.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_DHRY) += test_dhry.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_FIRMWARE) += test_firmware.o
lib: make a test module with set/clear bit Test some bit clears/sets to make sure assembly doesn't change, and that the set_bit and clear_bit functions work and don't cause sparse warnings. Instruct Kbuild to build this file with extra warning level -Wextra, to catch new issues, and also doesn't hurt to build with C=1. This was used to test changes to arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h. In particular, sparse (C=1) was very concerned when the last bit before a natural boundary, like 7, or 31, was being tested, as this causes sign extension (0xffffff7f) for instance when clearing bit 7. Recommended usage: make defconfig scripts/config -m CONFIG_TEST_BITOPS make modules_prepare make C=1 W=1 lib/test_bitops.ko objdump -S -d lib/test_bitops.ko insmod lib/test_bitops.ko rmmod lib/test_bitops.ko <check dmesg>, there should be no compiler/sparse warnings and no error messages in log. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200310221747.2848474-2-jesse.brandeburg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jesse Brandeburg <jesse.brandeburg@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> CcL Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-04 23:50:27 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_BITOPS) += test_bitops.o
CFLAGS_test_bitops.o += -Werror
obj-$(CONFIG_CPUMASK_KUNIT_TEST) += cpumask_kunit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_SYSCTL) += test_sysctl.o
obj-$(CONFIG_HASH_KUNIT_TEST) += test_hash.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_IDA) += test_ida.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_UBSAN) += test_ubsan.o
CFLAGS_test_ubsan.o += $(call cc-disable-warning, vla)
UBSAN_SANITIZE_test_ubsan.o := y
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_KSTRTOX) += test-kstrtox.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_LIST_SORT) += test_list_sort.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_MIN_HEAP) += test_min_heap.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_LKM) += test_module.o
vmalloc: add test driver to analyse vmalloc allocator This adds a new kernel module for analysis of vmalloc allocator. It is only enabled as a module. There are two main reasons this module should be used for: performance evaluation and stressing of vmalloc subsystem. It consists of several test cases. As of now there are 8. The module has five parameters we can specify to change its the behaviour. 1) run_test_mask - set of tests to be run id: 1, name: fix_size_alloc_test id: 2, name: full_fit_alloc_test id: 4, name: long_busy_list_alloc_test id: 8, name: random_size_alloc_test id: 16, name: fix_align_alloc_test id: 32, name: random_size_align_alloc_test id: 64, name: align_shift_alloc_test id: 128, name: pcpu_alloc_test By default all tests are in run test mask. If you want to select some specific tests it is possible to pass the mask. For example for first, second and fourth tests we go 11 value. 2) test_repeat_count - how many times each test should be repeated By default it is one time per test. It is possible to pass any number. As high the value is the test duration gets increased. 3) test_loop_count - internal test loop counter. By default it is set to 1000000. 4) single_cpu_test - use one CPU to run the tests By default this parameter is set to false. It means that all online CPUs execute tests. By setting it to 1, the tests are executed by first online CPU only. 5) sequential_test_order - run tests in sequential order By default this parameter is set to false. It means that before running tests the order is shuffled. It is possible to make it sequential, just set it to 1. Performance analysis: In order to evaluate performance of vmalloc allocations, usually it makes sense to use only one CPU that runs tests, use sequential order, number of repeat tests can be different as well as set of test mask. For example if we want to run all tests, to use one CPU and repeat each test 3 times. Insert the module passing following parameters: single_cpu_test=1 sequential_test_order=1 test_repeat_count=3 with following output: <snip> Summary: fix_size_alloc_test passed: 3 failed: 0 repeat: 3 loops: 1000000 avg: 901177 usec Summary: full_fit_alloc_test passed: 3 failed: 0 repeat: 3 loops: 1000000 avg: 1039341 usec Summary: long_busy_list_alloc_test passed: 3 failed: 0 repeat: 3 loops: 1000000 avg: 11775763 usec Summary: random_size_alloc_test passed 3: failed: 0 repeat: 3 loops: 1000000 avg: 6081992 usec Summary: fix_align_alloc_test passed: 3 failed: 0 repeat: 3, loops: 1000000 avg: 2003712 usec Summary: random_size_align_alloc_test passed: 3 failed: 0 repeat: 3 loops: 1000000 avg: 2895689 usec Summary: align_shift_alloc_test passed: 0 failed: 3 repeat: 3 loops: 1000000 avg: 573 usec Summary: pcpu_alloc_test passed: 3 failed: 0 repeat: 3 loops: 1000000 avg: 95802 usec All test took CPU0=192945605995 cycles <snip> The align_shift_alloc_test is expected to be failed. Stressing: In order to stress the vmalloc subsystem we run all available test cases on all available CPUs simultaneously. In order to prevent constant behaviour pattern, the test cases array is shuffled by default to randomize the order of test execution. For example if we want to run all tests(default), use all online CPUs(default) with shuffled order(default) and to repeat each test 30 times. The command would be like: modprobe vmalloc_test test_repeat_count=30 Expected results are the system is alive, there are no any BUG_ONs or Kernel Panics the tests are completed, no memory leaks. [urezki@gmail.com: fix 32-bit builds] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190106214839.ffvjvmrn52uqog7k@pc636 [urezki@gmail.com: make CONFIG_TEST_VMALLOC depend on CONFIG_MMU] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190219085441.s6bg2gpy4esny5vw@pc636 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190103142108.20744-3-urezki@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oleksiy Avramchenko <oleksiy.avramchenko@sonymobile.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-05 23:43:34 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_VMALLOC) += test_vmalloc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_RHASHTABLE) += test_rhashtable.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_SORT) += test_sort.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_USER_COPY) += test_user_copy.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_STATIC_KEYS) += test_static_keys.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_STATIC_KEYS) += test_static_key_base.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_DYNAMIC_DEBUG) += test_dynamic_debug.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_PRINTF) += test_printf.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_SCANF) += test_scanf.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_BITMAP) += test_bitmap.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_UUID) += test_uuid.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_XARRAY) += test_xarray.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_MAPLE_TREE) += test_maple_tree.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_PARMAN) += test_parman.o
kmod: add test driver to stress test the module loader This adds a new stress test driver for kmod: the kernel module loader. The new stress test driver, test_kmod, is only enabled as a module right now. It should be possible to load this as built-in and load tests early (refer to the force_init_test module parameter), however since a lot of test can get a system out of memory fast we leave this disabled for now. Using a system with 1024 MiB of RAM can *easily* get your kernel OOM fast with this test driver. The test_kmod driver exposes API knobs for us to fine tune simple request_module() and get_fs_type() calls. Since these API calls only allow each one parameter a test driver for these is rather simple. Other factors that can help out test driver though are the number of calls we issue and knowing current limitations of each. This exposes configuration as much as possible through userspace to be able to build tests directly from userspace. Since it allows multiple misc devices its will eventually (once we add a knob to let us create new devices at will) also be possible to perform more tests in parallel, provided you have enough memory. We only enable tests we know work as of right now. Demo screenshots: # tools/testing/selftests/kmod/kmod.sh kmod_test_0001_driver: OK! - loading kmod test kmod_test_0001_driver: OK! - Return value: 256 (MODULE_NOT_FOUND), expected MODULE_NOT_FOUND kmod_test_0001_fs: OK! - loading kmod test kmod_test_0001_fs: OK! - Return value: -22 (-EINVAL), expected -EINVAL kmod_test_0002_driver: OK! - loading kmod test kmod_test_0002_driver: OK! - Return value: 256 (MODULE_NOT_FOUND), expected MODULE_NOT_FOUND kmod_test_0002_fs: OK! - loading kmod test kmod_test_0002_fs: OK! - Return value: -22 (-EINVAL), expected -EINVAL kmod_test_0003: OK! - loading kmod test kmod_test_0003: OK! - Return value: 0 (SUCCESS), expected SUCCESS kmod_test_0004: OK! - loading kmod test kmod_test_0004: OK! - Return value: 0 (SUCCESS), expected SUCCESS kmod_test_0005: OK! - loading kmod test kmod_test_0005: OK! - Return value: 0 (SUCCESS), expected SUCCESS kmod_test_0006: OK! - loading kmod test kmod_test_0006: OK! - Return value: 0 (SUCCESS), expected SUCCESS kmod_test_0005: OK! - loading kmod test kmod_test_0005: OK! - Return value: 0 (SUCCESS), expected SUCCESS kmod_test_0006: OK! - loading kmod test kmod_test_0006: OK! - Return value: 0 (SUCCESS), expected SUCCESS XXX: add test restult for 0007 Test completed You can also request for specific tests: # tools/testing/selftests/kmod/kmod.sh -t 0001 kmod_test_0001_driver: OK! - loading kmod test kmod_test_0001_driver: OK! - Return value: 256 (MODULE_NOT_FOUND), expected MODULE_NOT_FOUND kmod_test_0001_fs: OK! - loading kmod test kmod_test_0001_fs: OK! - Return value: -22 (-EINVAL), expected -EINVAL Test completed Lastly, the current available number of tests: # tools/testing/selftests/kmod/kmod.sh --help Usage: tools/testing/selftests/kmod/kmod.sh [ -t <4-number-digit> ] Valid tests: 0001-0009 0001 - Simple test - 1 thread for empty string 0002 - Simple test - 1 thread for modules/filesystems that do not exist 0003 - Simple test - 1 thread for get_fs_type() only 0004 - Simple test - 2 threads for get_fs_type() only 0005 - multithreaded tests with default setup - request_module() only 0006 - multithreaded tests with default setup - get_fs_type() only 0007 - multithreaded tests with default setup test request_module() and get_fs_type() 0008 - multithreaded - push kmod_concurrent over max_modprobes for request_module() 0009 - multithreaded - push kmod_concurrent over max_modprobes for get_fs_type() The following test cases currently fail, as such they are not currently enabled by default: # tools/testing/selftests/kmod/kmod.sh -t 0008 # tools/testing/selftests/kmod/kmod.sh -t 0009 To be sure to run them as intended please unload both of the modules: o test_module o xfs And ensure they are not loaded on your system prior to testing them. If you use these paritions for your rootfs you can change the default test driver used for get_fs_type() by exporting it into your environment. For example of other test defaults you can override refer to kmod.sh allow_user_defaults(). Behind the scenes this is how we fine tune at a test case prior to hitting a trigger to run it: cat /sys/devices/virtual/misc/test_kmod0/config echo -n "2" > /sys/devices/virtual/misc/test_kmod0/config_test_case echo -n "ext4" > /sys/devices/virtual/misc/test_kmod0/config_test_fs echo -n "80" > /sys/devices/virtual/misc/test_kmod0/config_num_threads cat /sys/devices/virtual/misc/test_kmod0/config echo -n "1" > /sys/devices/virtual/misc/test_kmod0/config_num_threads Finally to trigger: echo -n "1" > /sys/devices/virtual/misc/test_kmod0/trigger_config The kmod.sh script uses the above constructs to build different test cases. A bit of interpretation of the current failures follows, first two premises: a) When request_module() is used userspace figures out an optimized version of module order for us. Once it finds the modules it needs, as per depmod symbol dep map, it will finit_module() the respective modules which are needed for the original request_module() request. b) We have an optimization in place whereby if a kernel uses request_module() on a module already loaded we never bother userspace as the module already is loaded. This is all handled by kernel/kmod.c. A few things to consider to help identify root causes of issues: 0) kmod 19 has a broken heuristic for modules being assumed to be built-in to your kernel and will return 0 even though request_module() failed. Upgrade to a newer version of kmod. 1) A get_fs_type() call for "xfs" will request_module() for "fs-xfs", not for "xfs". The optimization in kernel described in b) fails to catch if we have a lot of consecutive get_fs_type() calls. The reason is the optimization in place does not look for aliases. This means two consecutive get_fs_type() calls will bump kmod_concurrent, whereas request_module() will not. This one explanation why test case 0009 fails at least once for get_fs_type(). 2) If a module fails to load --- for whatever reason (kmod_concurrent limit reached, file not yet present due to rootfs switch, out of memory) we have a period of time during which module request for the same name either with request_module() or get_fs_type() will *also* fail to load even if the file for the module is ready. This explains why *multiple* NULLs are possible on test 0009. 3) finit_module() consumes quite a bit of memory. 4) Filesystems typically also have more dependent modules than other modules, its important to note though that even though a get_fs_type() call does not incur additional kmod_concurrent bumps, since userspace loads dependencies it finds it needs via finit_module_fd(), it *will* take much more memory to load a module with a lot of dependencies. Because of 3) and 4) we will easily run into out of memory failures with certain tests. For instance test 0006 fails on qemu with 1024 MiB of RAM. It panics a box after reaping all userspace processes and still not having enough memory to reap. [arnd@arndb.de: add dependencies for test module] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170630154834.3689272-1-arnd@arndb.de Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170628223155.26472-3-mcgrof@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-14 21:50:08 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_KMOD) += test_kmod.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_DEBUG_VIRTUAL) += test_debug_virtual.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_MEMCAT_P) += test_memcat_p.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_OBJAGG) += test_objagg.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_BLACKHOLE_DEV) += test_blackhole_dev.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_MEMINIT) += test_meminit.o
lib/test_lockup: test module to generate lockups CONFIG_TEST_LOCKUP=m adds module "test_lockup" that helps to make sure that watchdogs and lockup detectors are working properly. Depending on module parameters test_lockup could emulate soft or hard lockup, "hung task", hold arbitrary lock, allocate bunch of pages. Also it could generate series of lockups with cooling-down periods, in this way it could be used as "ping" for locks or page allocator. Loop checks signals between iteration thus could be stopped by ^C. # modinfo test_lockup ... parm: time_secs:lockup time in seconds, default 0 (uint) parm: time_nsecs:nanoseconds part of lockup time, default 0 (uint) parm: cooldown_secs:cooldown time between iterations in seconds, default 0 (uint) parm: cooldown_nsecs:nanoseconds part of cooldown, default 0 (uint) parm: iterations:lockup iterations, default 1 (uint) parm: all_cpus:trigger lockup at all cpus at once (bool) parm: state:wait in 'R' running (default), 'D' uninterruptible, 'K' killable, 'S' interruptible state (charp) parm: use_hrtimer:use high-resolution timer for sleeping (bool) parm: iowait:account sleep time as iowait (bool) parm: lock_read:lock read-write locks for read (bool) parm: lock_single:acquire locks only at one cpu (bool) parm: reacquire_locks:release and reacquire locks/irq/preempt between iterations (bool) parm: touch_softlockup:touch soft-lockup watchdog between iterations (bool) parm: touch_hardlockup:touch hard-lockup watchdog between iterations (bool) parm: call_cond_resched:call cond_resched() between iterations (bool) parm: measure_lock_wait:measure lock wait time (bool) parm: lock_wait_threshold:print lock wait time longer than this in nanoseconds, default off (ulong) parm: disable_irq:disable interrupts: generate hard-lockups (bool) parm: disable_softirq:disable bottom-half irq handlers (bool) parm: disable_preempt:disable preemption: generate soft-lockups (bool) parm: lock_rcu:grab rcu_read_lock: generate rcu stalls (bool) parm: lock_mmap_sem:lock mm->mmap_sem: block procfs interfaces (bool) parm: lock_rwsem_ptr:lock rw_semaphore at address (ulong) parm: lock_mutex_ptr:lock mutex at address (ulong) parm: lock_spinlock_ptr:lock spinlock at address (ulong) parm: lock_rwlock_ptr:lock rwlock at address (ulong) parm: alloc_pages_nr:allocate and free pages under locks (uint) parm: alloc_pages_order:page order to allocate (uint) parm: alloc_pages_gfp:allocate pages with this gfp_mask, default GFP_KERNEL (uint) parm: alloc_pages_atomic:allocate pages with GFP_ATOMIC (bool) parm: reallocate_pages:free and allocate pages between iterations (bool) Parameters for locking by address are unsafe and taints kernel. With CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK=y they at least check magics for embedded spinlocks. Examples: task hang in D-state: modprobe test_lockup time_secs=1 iterations=60 state=D task hang in io-wait D-state: modprobe test_lockup time_secs=1 iterations=60 state=D iowait softlockup: modprobe test_lockup time_secs=1 iterations=60 state=R hardlockup: modprobe test_lockup time_secs=1 iterations=60 state=R disable_irq system-wide hardlockup: modprobe test_lockup time_secs=1 iterations=60 state=R \ disable_irq all_cpus rcu stall: modprobe test_lockup time_secs=1 iterations=60 state=R \ lock_rcu touch_softlockup lock mmap_sem / block procfs interfaces: modprobe test_lockup time_secs=1 iterations=60 state=S lock_mmap_sem lock tasklist_lock for read / block forks: TASKLIST_LOCK=$(awk '$3 == "tasklist_lock" {print "0x"$1}' /proc/kallsyms) modprobe test_lockup time_secs=1 iterations=60 state=R \ disable_irq lock_read lock_rwlock_ptr=$TASKLIST_LOCK lock namespace_sem / block vfs mount operations: NAMESPACE_SEM=$(awk '$3 == "namespace_sem" {print "0x"$1}' /proc/kallsyms) modprobe test_lockup time_secs=1 iterations=60 state=S \ lock_rwsem_ptr=$NAMESPACE_SEM lock cgroup mutex / block cgroup operations: CGROUP_MUTEX=$(awk '$3 == "cgroup_mutex" {print "0x"$1}' /proc/kallsyms) modprobe test_lockup time_secs=1 iterations=60 state=S \ lock_mutex_ptr=$CGROUP_MUTEX ping cgroup_mutex every second and measure maximum lock wait time: modprobe test_lockup cooldown_secs=1 iterations=60 state=S \ lock_mutex_ptr=$CGROUP_MUTEX reacquire_locks measure_lock_wait [linux@roeck-us.net: rename disable_irq to fix build error] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200317133614.23152-1-linux@roeck-us.net Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Monakhov <dmtrmonakhov@yandex-team.ru Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/158132859146.2797.525923171323227836.stgit@buzz Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-04-07 03:09:47 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_LOCKUP) += test_lockup.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_HMM) += test_hmm.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_FREE_PAGES) += test_free_pages.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KPROBES_SANITY_TEST) += test_kprobes.o
lib: add tests for reference tracker This module uses reference tracker, forcing two issues. 1) Double free of a tracker 2) leak of two trackers, one being allocated from softirq context. "modprobe test_ref_tracker" would emit the following traces. (Use scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh if necessary) [ 171.648681] reference already released. [ 171.653213] allocated in: [ 171.656523] alloctest_ref_tracker_alloc2+0x1c/0x20 [test_ref_tracker] [ 171.656526] init_module+0x86/0x1000 [test_ref_tracker] [ 171.656528] do_one_initcall+0x9c/0x220 [ 171.656532] do_init_module+0x60/0x240 [ 171.656536] load_module+0x32b5/0x3610 [ 171.656538] __do_sys_init_module+0x148/0x1a0 [ 171.656540] __x64_sys_init_module+0x1d/0x20 [ 171.656542] do_syscall_64+0x4a/0xb0 [ 171.656546] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 171.656549] freed in: [ 171.659520] alloctest_ref_tracker_free+0x13/0x20 [test_ref_tracker] [ 171.659522] init_module+0xec/0x1000 [test_ref_tracker] [ 171.659523] do_one_initcall+0x9c/0x220 [ 171.659525] do_init_module+0x60/0x240 [ 171.659527] load_module+0x32b5/0x3610 [ 171.659529] __do_sys_init_module+0x148/0x1a0 [ 171.659532] __x64_sys_init_module+0x1d/0x20 [ 171.659534] do_syscall_64+0x4a/0xb0 [ 171.659536] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 171.659575] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 171.659576] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 13016 at lib/ref_tracker.c:112 ref_tracker_free+0x224/0x270 [ 171.659581] Modules linked in: test_ref_tracker(+) [ 171.659591] CPU: 5 PID: 13016 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G S 5.16.0-smp-DEV #290 [ 171.659595] RIP: 0010:ref_tracker_free+0x224/0x270 [ 171.659599] Code: 5e 41 5f 5d c3 48 c7 c7 04 9c 74 a6 31 c0 e8 62 ee 67 00 83 7b 14 00 75 1a 83 7b 18 00 75 30 4c 89 ff 4c 89 f6 e8 9c 00 69 00 <0f> 0b bb ea ff ff ff eb ae 48 c7 c7 3a 0a 77 a6 31 c0 e8 34 ee 67 [ 171.659601] RSP: 0018:ffff89058ba0bbd0 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 171.659603] RAX: 0000000000000029 RBX: ffff890586b19780 RCX: 08895bff57c7d100 [ 171.659604] RDX: c0000000ffff7fff RSI: 0000000000000282 RDI: ffffffffc0407000 [ 171.659606] RBP: ffff89058ba0bc88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffa6f342e0 [ 171.659607] R10: 00000000ffff7fff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000008f000000 [ 171.659608] R13: 0000000000000014 R14: 0000000000000282 R15: ffffffffc0407000 [ 171.659609] FS: 00007f97ea29d740(0000) GS:ffff8923ff940000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 171.659611] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 171.659613] CR2: 00007f97ea299000 CR3: 0000000186b4a004 CR4: 00000000001706e0 [ 171.659614] Call Trace: [ 171.659615] <TASK> [ 171.659631] ? alloctest_ref_tracker_free+0x13/0x20 [test_ref_tracker] [ 171.659633] ? init_module+0x105/0x1000 [test_ref_tracker] [ 171.659636] ? do_one_initcall+0x9c/0x220 [ 171.659638] ? do_init_module+0x60/0x240 [ 171.659641] ? load_module+0x32b5/0x3610 [ 171.659644] ? __do_sys_init_module+0x148/0x1a0 [ 171.659646] ? __x64_sys_init_module+0x1d/0x20 [ 171.659649] ? do_syscall_64+0x4a/0xb0 [ 171.659652] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 171.659656] ? 0xffffffffc040a000 [ 171.659658] alloctest_ref_tracker_free+0x13/0x20 [test_ref_tracker] [ 171.659660] init_module+0x105/0x1000 [test_ref_tracker] [ 171.659663] do_one_initcall+0x9c/0x220 [ 171.659666] do_init_module+0x60/0x240 [ 171.659669] load_module+0x32b5/0x3610 [ 171.659672] __do_sys_init_module+0x148/0x1a0 [ 171.659676] __x64_sys_init_module+0x1d/0x20 [ 171.659678] do_syscall_64+0x4a/0xb0 [ 171.659694] ? exc_page_fault+0x6e/0x140 [ 171.659696] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 171.659698] RIP: 0033:0x7f97ea3dbe7a [ 171.659700] Code: 48 8b 0d 61 8d 06 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 49 89 ca b8 af 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 2e 8d 06 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 171.659701] RSP: 002b:00007ffea67ce608 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000af [ 171.659703] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f97ea3dbe7a [ 171.659704] RDX: 00000000013a0ba0 RSI: 0000000000002808 RDI: 00007f97ea299000 [ 171.659705] RBP: 00007ffea67ce670 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 171.659706] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000013a1048 [ 171.659707] R13: 00000000013a0ba0 R14: 0000000001399930 R15: 00000000013a1030 [ 171.659709] </TASK> [ 171.659710] ---[ end trace f5dbd6afa41e60a9 ]--- [ 171.659712] leaked reference. [ 171.663393] alloctest_ref_tracker_alloc0+0x1c/0x20 [test_ref_tracker] [ 171.663395] test_ref_tracker_timer_func+0x9/0x20 [test_ref_tracker] [ 171.663397] call_timer_fn+0x31/0x140 [ 171.663401] expire_timers+0x46/0x110 [ 171.663403] __run_timers+0x16f/0x1b0 [ 171.663404] run_timer_softirq+0x1d/0x40 [ 171.663406] __do_softirq+0x148/0x2d3 [ 171.663408] leaked reference. [ 171.667101] alloctest_ref_tracker_alloc1+0x1c/0x20 [test_ref_tracker] [ 171.667103] init_module+0x81/0x1000 [test_ref_tracker] [ 171.667104] do_one_initcall+0x9c/0x220 [ 171.667106] do_init_module+0x60/0x240 [ 171.667108] load_module+0x32b5/0x3610 [ 171.667111] __do_sys_init_module+0x148/0x1a0 [ 171.667113] __x64_sys_init_module+0x1d/0x20 [ 171.667115] do_syscall_64+0x4a/0xb0 [ 171.667117] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 171.667131] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 171.667132] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 13016 at lib/ref_tracker.c:30 ref_tracker_dir_exit+0x104/0x130 [ 171.667136] Modules linked in: test_ref_tracker(+) [ 171.667144] CPU: 5 PID: 13016 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G S W 5.16.0-smp-DEV #290 [ 171.667147] RIP: 0010:ref_tracker_dir_exit+0x104/0x130 [ 171.667150] Code: 01 00 00 00 00 ad de 48 89 03 4c 89 63 08 48 89 df e8 20 a0 d5 ff 4c 89 f3 4d 39 ee 75 a8 4c 89 ff 48 8b 75 d0 e8 7c 05 69 00 <0f> 0b eb 0c 4c 89 ff 48 8b 75 d0 e8 6c 05 69 00 41 8b 47 08 83 f8 [ 171.667151] RSP: 0018:ffff89058ba0bc68 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 171.667154] RAX: 08895bff57c7d100 RBX: ffffffffc0407010 RCX: 000000000000003b [ 171.667156] RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 0000000000000282 RDI: ffffffffc0407000 [ 171.667157] RBP: ffff89058ba0bc98 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffa6f342e0 [ 171.667159] R10: 00000000ffff7fff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: dead000000000122 [ 171.667160] R13: ffffffffc0407010 R14: ffffffffc0407010 R15: ffffffffc0407000 [ 171.667162] FS: 00007f97ea29d740(0000) GS:ffff8923ff940000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 171.667164] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 171.667166] CR2: 00007f97ea299000 CR3: 0000000186b4a004 CR4: 00000000001706e0 [ 171.667169] Call Trace: [ 171.667170] <TASK> [ 171.667171] ? 0xffffffffc040a000 [ 171.667173] init_module+0x126/0x1000 [test_ref_tracker] [ 171.667175] do_one_initcall+0x9c/0x220 [ 171.667179] do_init_module+0x60/0x240 [ 171.667182] load_module+0x32b5/0x3610 [ 171.667186] __do_sys_init_module+0x148/0x1a0 [ 171.667189] __x64_sys_init_module+0x1d/0x20 [ 171.667192] do_syscall_64+0x4a/0xb0 [ 171.667194] ? exc_page_fault+0x6e/0x140 [ 171.667196] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 171.667199] RIP: 0033:0x7f97ea3dbe7a [ 171.667200] Code: 48 8b 0d 61 8d 06 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 49 89 ca b8 af 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 2e 8d 06 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 171.667201] RSP: 002b:00007ffea67ce608 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000af [ 171.667203] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f97ea3dbe7a [ 171.667204] RDX: 00000000013a0ba0 RSI: 0000000000002808 RDI: 00007f97ea299000 [ 171.667205] RBP: 00007ffea67ce670 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 171.667206] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000013a1048 [ 171.667207] R13: 00000000013a0ba0 R14: 0000000001399930 R15: 00000000013a1030 [ 171.667209] </TASK> [ 171.667210] ---[ end trace f5dbd6afa41e60aa ]--- Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2021-12-05 04:21:56 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_REF_TRACKER) += test_ref_tracker.o
CFLAGS_test_fprobe.o += $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
obj-$(CONFIG_FPROBE_SANITY_TEST) += test_fprobe.o
#
# CFLAGS for compiling floating point code inside the kernel. x86/Makefile turns
# off the generation of FPU/SSE* instructions for kernel proper but FPU_FLAGS
# get appended last to CFLAGS and thus override those previous compiler options.
#
FPU_CFLAGS := -msse -msse2
ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC
# Stack alignment mismatch, proceed with caution.
# GCC < 7.1 cannot compile code using `double` and -mpreferred-stack-boundary=3
# (8B stack alignment).
# See https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=53383
#
# The "-msse" in the first argument is there so that the
# -mpreferred-stack-boundary=3 build error:
#
# -mpreferred-stack-boundary=3 is not between 4 and 12
#
# can be triggered. Otherwise gcc doesn't complain.
FPU_CFLAGS += -mhard-float
FPU_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-msse -mpreferred-stack-boundary=3,-mpreferred-stack-boundary=4)
endif
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_FPU) += test_fpu.o
CFLAGS_test_fpu.o += $(FPU_CFLAGS)
obj-$(CONFIG_TEST_LIVEPATCH) += livepatch/
# Some KUnit files (hooks.o) need to be built-in even when KUnit is a module,
# so we can't just use obj-$(CONFIG_KUNIT).
ifdef CONFIG_KUNIT
obj-y += kunit/
endif
ifeq ($(CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT),y)
CFLAGS_kobject.o += -DDEBUG
CFLAGS_kobject_uevent.o += -DDEBUG
endif
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_REDUCED) += debug_info.o
CFLAGS_debug_info.o += $(call cc-option, -femit-struct-debug-detailed=any)
obj-y += math/ crypto/
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_IOMAP) += iomap.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_PCI_IOMAP) += pci_iomap.o
obj-$(CONFIG_HAS_IOMEM) += iomap_copy.o devres.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CHECK_SIGNATURE) += check_signature.o
[PATCH] lockdep: locking API self tests Introduce DEBUG_LOCKING_API_SELFTESTS, which uses the generic lock debugging code's silent-failure feature to run a matrix of testcases. There are 210 testcases currently: +----------------------- | Locking API testsuite: +------------------------------+------+------+------+------+------+------+ | spin |wlock |rlock |mutex | wsem | rsem | -------------------------------+------+------+------+------+------+------+ A-A deadlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | A-B-B-A deadlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | A-B-B-C-C-A deadlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | A-B-C-A-B-C deadlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | A-B-B-C-C-D-D-A deadlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | A-B-C-D-B-D-D-A deadlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | A-B-C-D-B-C-D-A deadlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | double unlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | bad unlock order: ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | ok | --------------------------------------+------+------+------+------+------+ recursive read-lock: | ok | | ok | --------------------------------------+------+------+------+------+------+ non-nested unlock: ok | ok | ok | ok | --------------------------------------+------+------+------+ hard-irqs-on + irq-safe-A/12: ok | ok | ok | soft-irqs-on + irq-safe-A/12: ok | ok | ok | hard-irqs-on + irq-safe-A/21: ok | ok | ok | soft-irqs-on + irq-safe-A/21: ok | ok | ok | sirq-safe-A => hirqs-on/12: ok | ok | ok | sirq-safe-A => hirqs-on/21: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + irqs-on/12: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + irqs-on/12: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + irqs-on/21: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + irqs-on/21: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/123: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/123: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/132: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/132: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/213: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/213: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/231: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/231: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/312: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/312: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/321: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #1/321: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/123: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/123: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/132: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/132: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/213: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/213: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/231: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/231: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/312: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/312: ok | ok | ok | hard-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/321: ok | ok | ok | soft-safe-A + unsafe-B #2/321: ok | ok | ok | hard-irq lock-inversion/123: ok | ok | ok | soft-irq lock-inversion/123: ok | ok | ok | hard-irq lock-inversion/132: ok | ok | ok | soft-irq lock-inversion/132: ok | ok | ok | hard-irq lock-inversion/213: ok | ok | ok | soft-irq lock-inversion/213: ok | ok | ok | hard-irq lock-inversion/231: ok | ok | ok | soft-irq lock-inversion/231: ok | ok | ok | hard-irq lock-inversion/312: ok | ok | ok | soft-irq lock-inversion/312: ok | ok | ok | hard-irq lock-inversion/321: ok | ok | ok | soft-irq lock-inversion/321: ok | ok | ok | hard-irq read-recursion/123: ok | soft-irq read-recursion/123: ok | hard-irq read-recursion/132: ok | soft-irq read-recursion/132: ok | hard-irq read-recursion/213: ok | soft-irq read-recursion/213: ok | hard-irq read-recursion/231: ok | soft-irq read-recursion/231: ok | hard-irq read-recursion/312: ok | soft-irq read-recursion/312: ok | hard-irq read-recursion/321: ok | soft-irq read-recursion/321: ok | --------------------------------+-----+---------------- Good, all 210 testcases passed! | --------------------------------+ Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-03 07:24:48 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCKING_API_SELFTESTS) += locking-selftest.o
lib-y += logic_pio.o
lib: Add generic PIO mapping method 41f8bba7f555 ("of/pci: Add pci_register_io_range() and pci_pio_to_address()") added support for PCI I/O space mapped into CPU physical memory space. With that support, the I/O ranges configured for PCI/PCIe hosts on some architectures can be mapped to logical PIO and converted easily between CPU address and the corresponding logical PIO. Based on this, PCI I/O port space can be accessed via in/out accessors that use memory read/write. But on some platforms, there are bus hosts that access I/O port space with host-local I/O port addresses rather than memory addresses. Add a more generic I/O mapping method to support those devices. With this patch, both the CPU addresses and the host-local port can be mapped into the logical PIO space with different logical/fake PIOs. After this, all the I/O accesses to either PCI MMIO devices or host-local I/O peripherals can be unified into the existing I/O accessors defined in asm-generic/io.h and be redirected to the right device-specific hooks based on the input logical PIO. Tested-by: dann frazier <dann.frazier@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Zhichang Yuan <yuanzhichang@hisilicon.com> Signed-off-by: Gabriele Paoloni <gabriele.paoloni@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com> [bhelgaas: remove -EFAULT return from logic_pio_register_range() per https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180403143909.GA21171@ulmo, fix NULL pointer checking per https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180403211505.GA29612@embeddedor.com] Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
2018-03-14 18:15:50 +00:00
lib-$(CONFIG_INDIRECT_IOMEM) += logic_iomem.o
lib: Add register read/write tracing support Generic MMIO read/write i.e., __raw_{read,write}{b,l,w,q} accessors are typically used to read/write from/to memory mapped registers and can cause hangs or some undefined behaviour in following few cases, * If the access to the register space is unclocked, for example: if there is an access to multimedia(MM) block registers without MM clocks. * If the register space is protected and not set to be accessible from non-secure world, for example: only EL3 (EL: Exception level) access is allowed and any EL2/EL1 access is forbidden. * If xPU(memory/register protection units) is controlling access to certain memory/register space for specific clients. and more... Such cases usually results in instant reboot/SErrors/NOC or interconnect hangs and tracing these register accesses can be very helpful to debug such issues during initial development stages and also in later stages. So use ftrace trace events to log such MMIO register accesses which provides rich feature set such as early enablement of trace events, filtering capability, dumping ftrace logs on console and many more. Sample output: rwmmio_write: __qcom_geni_serial_console_write+0x160/0x1e0 width=32 val=0xa0d5d addr=0xfffffbfffdbff700 rwmmio_post_write: __qcom_geni_serial_console_write+0x160/0x1e0 width=32 val=0xa0d5d addr=0xfffffbfffdbff700 rwmmio_read: qcom_geni_serial_poll_bit+0x94/0x138 width=32 addr=0xfffffbfffdbff610 rwmmio_post_read: qcom_geni_serial_poll_bit+0x94/0x138 width=32 val=0x0 addr=0xfffffbfffdbff610 Co-developed-by: Sai Prakash Ranjan <quic_saipraka@quicinc.com> Signed-off-by: Prasad Sodagudi <psodagud@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Sai Prakash Ranjan <quic_saipraka@quicinc.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2022-05-18 16:44:14 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_TRACE_MMIO_ACCESS) += trace_readwrite.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_HWEIGHT) += hweight.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BTREE) += btree.o
obj-$(CONFIG_INTERVAL_TREE) += interval_tree.o
Add a generic associative array implementation. Add a generic associative array implementation that can be used as the container for keyrings, thereby massively increasing the capacity available whilst also speeding up searching in keyrings that contain a lot of keys. This may also be useful in FS-Cache for tracking cookies. Documentation is added into Documentation/associative_array.txt Some of the properties of the implementation are: (1) Objects are opaque pointers. The implementation does not care where they point (if anywhere) or what they point to (if anything). [!] NOTE: Pointers to objects _must_ be zero in the two least significant bits. (2) Objects do not need to contain linkage blocks for use by the array. This permits an object to be located in multiple arrays simultaneously. Rather, the array is made up of metadata blocks that point to objects. (3) Objects are labelled as being one of two types (the type is a bool value). This information is stored in the array, but has no consequence to the array itself or its algorithms. (4) Objects require index keys to locate them within the array. (5) Index keys must be unique. Inserting an object with the same key as one already in the array will replace the old object. (6) Index keys can be of any length and can be of different lengths. (7) Index keys should encode the length early on, before any variation due to length is seen. (8) Index keys can include a hash to scatter objects throughout the array. (9) The array can iterated over. The objects will not necessarily come out in key order. (10) The array can be iterated whilst it is being modified, provided the RCU readlock is being held by the iterator. Note, however, under these circumstances, some objects may be seen more than once. If this is a problem, the iterator should lock against modification. Objects will not be missed, however, unless deleted. (11) Objects in the array can be looked up by means of their index key. (12) Objects can be looked up whilst the array is being modified, provided the RCU readlock is being held by the thread doing the look up. The implementation uses a tree of 16-pointer nodes internally that are indexed on each level by nibbles from the index key. To improve memory efficiency, shortcuts can be emplaced to skip over what would otherwise be a series of single-occupancy nodes. Further, nodes pack leaf object pointers into spare space in the node rather than making an extra branch until as such time an object needs to be added to a full node. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2013-09-24 09:35:17 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY) += assoc_array.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT) += smp_processor_id.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST) += list_debug.o
infrastructure to debug (dynamic) objects We can see an ever repeating problem pattern with objects of any kind in the kernel: 1) freeing of active objects 2) reinitialization of active objects Both problems can be hard to debug because the crash happens at a point where we have no chance to decode the root cause anymore. One problem spot are kernel timers, where the detection of the problem often happens in interrupt context and usually causes the machine to panic. While working on a timer related bug report I had to hack specialized code into the timer subsystem to get a reasonable hint for the root cause. This debug hack was fine for temporary use, but far from a mergeable solution due to the intrusiveness into the timer code. The code further lacked the ability to detect and report the root cause instantly and keep the system operational. Keeping the system operational is important to get hold of the debug information without special debugging aids like serial consoles and special knowledge of the bug reporter. The problems described above are not restricted to timers, but timers tend to expose it usually in a full system crash. Other objects are less explosive, but the symptoms caused by such mistakes can be even harder to debug. Instead of creating specialized debugging code for the timer subsystem a generic infrastructure is created which allows developers to verify their code and provides an easy to enable debug facility for users in case of trouble. The debugobjects core code keeps track of operations on static and dynamic objects by inserting them into a hashed list and sanity checking them on object operations and provides additional checks whenever kernel memory is freed. The tracked object operations are: - initializing an object - adding an object to a subsystem list - deleting an object from a subsystem list Each operation is sanity checked before the operation is executed and the subsystem specific code can provide a fixup function which allows to prevent the damage of the operation. When the sanity check triggers a warning message and a stack trace is printed. The list of operations can be extended if the need arises. For now it's limited to the requirements of the first user (timers). The core code enqueues the objects into hash buckets. The hash index is generated from the address of the object to simplify the lookup for the check on kfree/vfree. Each bucket has it's own spinlock to avoid contention on a global lock. The debug code can be compiled in without being active. The runtime overhead is minimal and could be optimized by asm alternatives. A kernel command line option enables the debugging code. Thanks to Ingo Molnar for review, suggestions and cleanup patches. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: Kay Sievers <kay.sievers@vrfy.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-30 07:55:01 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS) += debugobjects.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BITREVERSE) += bitrev.o
2020-05-08 15:39:35 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_LINEAR_RANGES) += linear_ranges.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PACKING) += packing.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC_CCITT) += crc-ccitt.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC16) += crc16.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF)+= crc-t10dif.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T) += crc-itu-t.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC32) += crc32.o
lib: add crc64 calculation routines Patch series "add crc64 calculation as kernel library", v5. This patchset adds basic implementation of crc64 calculation as a Linux kernel library. Since bcache already does crc64 by itself, this patchset also modifies bcache code to use the new crc64 library routine. Currently bcache is the only user of crc64 calculation, another potential user is bcachefs which is on the way to be in mainline kernel. Therefore it makes sense to make crc64 calculation to be a public library. bcache uses crc64 as storage checksum, if a change of crc lib routines results an inconsistent result, the unmatched checksum may make bcache 'think' the on-disk is corrupted, such a change should be avoided or detected as early as possible. Therefore a patch is being prepared which adds a crc test framework, to check consistency of different calculations. This patch (of 2): Add the re-write crc64 calculation routines for Linux kernel. The CRC64 polynomical arithmetic follows ECMA-182 specification, inspired by CRC paper of Dr. Ross N. Williams (see http://www.ross.net/crc/download/crc_v3.txt) and other public domain implementations. All the changes work in this way, - When Linux kernel is built, host program lib/gen_crc64table.c will be compiled to lib/gen_crc64table and executed. - The output of gen_crc64table execution is an array called as lookup table (a.k.a POLY 0x42f0e1eba9ea369) which contain 256 64-bit long numbers, this table is dumped into header file lib/crc64table.h. - Then the header file is included by lib/crc64.c for normal 64bit crc calculation. - Function declaration of the crc64 calculation routines is placed in include/linux/crc64.h Currently bcache is the only user of crc64_be(), another potential user is bcachefs which is on the way to be in mainline kernel. Therefore it makes sense to move crc64 calculation into lib/crc64.c as public code. [colyli@suse.de: fix review comments from v4] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180726053352.2781-2-colyli@suse.de Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180718165545.1622-2-colyli@suse.de Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Co-developed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michael Lyle <mlyle@lyle.org> Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Noah Massey <noah.massey@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-08-22 04:57:11 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC64) += crc64.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC32_SELFTEST) += crc32test.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC4) += crc4.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC7) += crc7.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LIBCRC32C) += libcrc32c.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC8) += crc8.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRC64_ROCKSOFT) += crc64-rocksoft.o
lib: Add xxhash module Adds xxhash kernel module with xxh32 and xxh64 hashes. xxhash is an extremely fast non-cryptographic hash algorithm for checksumming. The zstd compression and decompression modules added in the next patch require xxhash. I extracted it out from zstd since it is useful on its own. I copied the code from the upstream XXHash source repository and translated it into kernel style. I ran benchmarks and tests in the kernel and tests in userland. I benchmarked xxhash as a special character device. I ran in four modes, no-op, xxh32, xxh64, and crc32. The no-op mode simply copies the data to kernel space and ignores it. The xxh32, xxh64, and crc32 modes compute hashes on the copied data. I also ran it with four different buffer sizes. The benchmark file is located in the upstream zstd source repository under `contrib/linux-kernel/xxhash_test.c` [1]. I ran the benchmarks on a Ubuntu 14.04 VM with 2 cores and 4 GiB of RAM. The VM is running on a MacBook Pro with a 3.1 GHz Intel Core i7 processor, 16 GB of RAM, and a SSD. I benchmarked using the file `filesystem.squashfs` from `ubuntu-16.10-desktop-amd64.iso`, which is 1,536,217,088 B large. Run the following commands for the benchmark: modprobe xxhash_test mknod xxhash_test c 245 0 time cp filesystem.squashfs xxhash_test The time is reported by the time of the userland `cp`. The GB/s is computed with 1,536,217,008 B / time(buffer size, hash) which includes the time to copy from userland. The Normalized GB/s is computed with 1,536,217,088 B / (time(buffer size, hash) - time(buffer size, none)). | Buffer Size (B) | Hash | Time (s) | GB/s | Adjusted GB/s | |-----------------|-------|----------|------|---------------| | 1024 | none | 0.408 | 3.77 | - | | 1024 | xxh32 | 0.649 | 2.37 | 6.37 | | 1024 | xxh64 | 0.542 | 2.83 | 11.46 | | 1024 | crc32 | 1.290 | 1.19 | 1.74 | | 4096 | none | 0.380 | 4.04 | - | | 4096 | xxh32 | 0.645 | 2.38 | 5.79 | | 4096 | xxh64 | 0.500 | 3.07 | 12.80 | | 4096 | crc32 | 1.168 | 1.32 | 1.95 | | 8192 | none | 0.351 | 4.38 | - | | 8192 | xxh32 | 0.614 | 2.50 | 5.84 | | 8192 | xxh64 | 0.464 | 3.31 | 13.60 | | 8192 | crc32 | 1.163 | 1.32 | 1.89 | | 16384 | none | 0.346 | 4.43 | - | | 16384 | xxh32 | 0.590 | 2.60 | 6.30 | | 16384 | xxh64 | 0.466 | 3.30 | 12.80 | | 16384 | crc32 | 1.183 | 1.30 | 1.84 | Tested in userland using the test-suite in the zstd repo under `contrib/linux-kernel/test/XXHashUserlandTest.cpp` [2] by mocking the kernel functions. A line in each branch of every function in `xxhash.c` was commented out to ensure that the test-suite fails. Additionally tested while testing zstd and with SMHasher [3]. [1] https://phabricator.intern.facebook.com/P57526246 [2] https://github.com/facebook/zstd/blob/dev/contrib/linux-kernel/test/XXHashUserlandTest.cpp [3] https://github.com/aappleby/smhasher zstd source repository: https://github.com/facebook/zstd XXHash source repository: https://github.com/cyan4973/xxhash Signed-off-by: Nick Terrell <terrelln@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
2017-08-04 20:19:17 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_XXHASH) += xxhash.o
[PATCH] ia64 uncached alloc This patch contains the ia64 uncached page allocator and the generic allocator (genalloc). The uncached allocator was formerly part of the SN2 mspec driver but there are several other users of it so it has been split off from the driver. The generic allocator can be used by device driver to manage special memory etc. The generic allocator is based on the allocator from the sym53c8xx_2 driver. Various users on ia64 needs uncached memory. The SGI SN architecture requires it for inter-partition communication between partitions within a large NUMA cluster. The specific user for this is the XPC code. Another application is large MPI style applications which use it for synchronization, on SN this can be done using special 'fetchop' operations but it also benefits non SN hardware which may use regular uncached memory for this purpose. Performance of doing this through uncached vs cached memory is pretty substantial. This is handled by the mspec driver which I will push out in a seperate patch. Rather than creating a specific allocator for just uncached memory I came up with genalloc which is a generic purpose allocator that can be used by device drivers and other subsystems as they please. For instance to handle onboard device memory. It was derived from the sym53c7xx_2 driver's allocator which is also an example of a potential user (I am refraining from modifying sym2 right now as it seems to have been under fairly heavy development recently). On ia64 memory has various properties within a granule, ie. it isn't safe to access memory as uncached within the same granule as currently has memory accessed in cached mode. The regular system therefore doesn't utilize memory in the lower granules which is mixed in with device PAL code etc. The uncached driver walks the EFI memmap and pulls out the spill uncached pages and sticks them into the uncached pool. Only after these chunks have been utilized, will it start converting regular cached memory into uncached memory. Hence the reason for the EFI related code additions. Signed-off-by: Jes Sorensen <jes@wildopensource.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-22 00:15:02 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_ALLOCATOR) += genalloc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_842_COMPRESS) += 842/
obj-$(CONFIG_842_DECOMPRESS) += 842/
obj-$(CONFIG_ZLIB_INFLATE) += zlib_inflate/
obj-$(CONFIG_ZLIB_DEFLATE) += zlib_deflate/
lib/zlib: add s390 hardware support for kernel zlib_deflate Patch series "S390 hardware support for kernel zlib", v3. With IBM z15 mainframe the new DFLTCC instruction is available. It implements deflate algorithm in hardware (Nest Acceleration Unit - NXU) with estimated compression and decompression performance orders of magnitude faster than the current zlib. This patchset adds s390 hardware compression support to kernel zlib. The code is based on the userspace zlib implementation: https://github.com/madler/zlib/pull/410 The coding style is also preserved for future maintainability. There is only limited set of userspace zlib functions represented in kernel. Apart from that, all the memory allocation should be performed in advance. Thus, the workarea structures are extended with the parameter lists required for the DEFLATE CONVENTION CALL instruction. Since kernel zlib itself does not support gzip headers, only Adler-32 checksum is processed (also can be produced by DFLTCC facility). Like it was implemented for userspace, kernel zlib will compress in hardware on level 1, and in software on all other levels. Decompression will always happen in hardware (when enabled). Two DFLTCC compression calls produce the same results only when they both are made on machines of the same generation, and when the respective buffers have the same offset relative to the start of the page. Therefore care should be taken when using hardware compression when reproducible results are desired. However it does always produce the standard conform output which can be inflated anyway. The new kernel command line parameter 'dfltcc' is introduced to configure s390 zlib hardware support: Format: { on | off | def_only | inf_only | always } on: s390 zlib hardware support for compression on level 1 and decompression (default) off: No s390 zlib hardware support def_only: s390 zlib hardware support for deflate only (compression on level 1) inf_only: s390 zlib hardware support for inflate only (decompression) always: Same as 'on' but ignores the selected compression level always using hardware support (used for debugging) The main purpose of the integration of the NXU support into the kernel zlib is the use of hardware deflate in btrfs filesystem with on-the-fly compression enabled. Apart from that, hardware support can also be used during boot for decompressing the kernel or the ramdisk image With the patch for btrfs expanding zlib buffer from 1 to 4 pages (patch 6) the following performance results have been achieved using the ramdisk with btrfs. These are relative numbers based on throughput rate and compression ratio for zlib level 1: Input data Deflate rate Inflate rate Compression ratio NXU/Software NXU/Software NXU/Software stream of zeroes 1.46 1.02 1.00 random ASCII data 10.44 3.00 0.96 ASCII text (dickens) 6,21 3.33 0.94 binary data (vmlinux) 8,37 3.90 1.02 This means that s390 hardware deflate can provide up to 10 times faster compression (on level 1) and up to 4 times faster decompression (refers to all compression levels) for btrfs zlib. Disclaimer: Performance results are based on IBM internal tests using DD command-line utility on btrfs on a Fedora 30 based internal driver in native LPAR on a z15 system. Results may vary based on individual workload, configuration and software levels. This patch (of 9): Create zlib_dfltcc library with the s390 DEFLATE CONVERSION CALL implementation and related compression functions. Update zlib_deflate functions with the hooks for s390 hardware support and adjust workspace structures with extra parameter lists required for hardware deflate. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200103223334.20669-2-zaslonko@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mikhail Zaslonko <zaslonko@linux.ibm.com> Co-developed-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Cc: Eduard Shishkin <edward6@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Cc: Richard Purdie <rpurdie@rpsys.net> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-01-31 06:16:17 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_ZLIB_DFLTCC) += zlib_dfltcc/
obj-$(CONFIG_REED_SOLOMON) += reed_solomon/
lib: add shared BCH ECC library This is a new software BCH encoding/decoding library, similar to the shared Reed-Solomon library. Binary BCH (Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem) codes are widely used to correct errors in NAND flash devices requiring more than 1-bit ecc correction; they are generally better suited for NAND flash than RS codes because NAND bit errors do not occur in bursts. Latest SLC NAND devices typically require at least 4-bit ecc protection per 512 bytes block. This library provides software encoding/decoding, but may also be used with ASIC/SoC hardware BCH engines to perform error correction. It is being currently used for this purpose on an OMAP3630 board (4bit/8bit HW BCH). It has also been used to decode raw dumps of NAND devices with on-die BCH ecc engines (e.g. Micron 4bit ecc SLC devices). Latest NAND devices (including SLC) can exhibit high error rates (typically a dozen or more bitflips per hour during stress tests); in order to minimize the performance impact of error correction, this library implements recently developed algorithms for fast polynomial root finding (see bch.c header for details) instead of the traditional exhaustive Chien root search; a few performance figures are provided below: Platform: arm926ejs @ 468 MHz, 32 KiB icache, 16 KiB dcache BCH ecc : 4-bit per 512 bytes Encoding average throughput: 250 Mbits/s Error correction time (compared with Chien search): average worst average (Chien) worst (Chien) ---------------------------------------------------------- 1 bit 8.5 µs 11 µs 200 µs 383 µs 2 bit 9.7 µs 12.5 µs 477 µs 728 µs 3 bit 18.1 µs 20.6 µs 758 µs 1010 µs 4 bit 19.5 µs 23 µs 1028 µs 1280 µs In the above figures, "worst" is meant in terms of error pattern, not in terms of cache miss / page faults effects (not taken into account here). The library has been extensively tested on the following platforms: x86, x86_64, arm926ejs, omap3630, qemu-ppc64, qemu-mips. Signed-off-by: Ivan Djelic <ivan.djelic@parrot.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
2011-03-11 10:05:32 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_BCH) += bch.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LZO_COMPRESS) += lzo/
obj-$(CONFIG_LZO_DECOMPRESS) += lzo/
lib: add lz4 compressor module This patchset is for supporting LZ4 compression and the crypto API using it. As shown below, the size of data is a little bit bigger but compressing speed is faster under the enabled unaligned memory access. We can use lz4 de/compression through crypto API as well. Also, It will be useful for another potential user of lz4 compression. lz4 Compression Benchmark: Compiler: ARM gcc 4.6.4 ARMv7, 1 GHz based board Kernel: linux 3.4 Uncompressed data Size: 101 MB Compressed Size compression Speed LZO 72.1MB 32.1MB/s, 33.0MB/s(UA) LZ4 75.1MB 30.4MB/s, 35.9MB/s(UA) LZ4HC 59.8MB 2.4MB/s, 2.5MB/s(UA) - UA: Unaligned memory Access support - Latest patch set for LZO applied This patch: Add support for LZ4 compression in the Linux Kernel. LZ4 Compression APIs for kernel are based on LZ4 implementation by Yann Collet and were changed for kernel coding style. LZ4 homepage : http://fastcompression.blogspot.com/p/lz4.html LZ4 source repository : http://code.google.com/p/lz4/ svn revision : r90 Two APIs are added: lz4_compress() support basic lz4 compression whereas lz4hc_compress() support high compression or CPU performance get lower but compression ratio get higher. Also, we require the pre-allocated working memory with the defined size and destination buffer must be allocated with the size of lz4_compressbound. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make lz4_compresshcctx() static] Signed-off-by: Chanho Min <chanho.min@lge.com> Cc: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@us.ibm.com> Cc: Bob Pearson <rpearson@systemfabricworks.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.hengli.com.au> Cc: Yann Collet <yann.collet.73@gmail.com> Cc: Kyungsik Lee <kyungsik.lee@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-07-08 23:01:49 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_LZ4_COMPRESS) += lz4/
obj-$(CONFIG_LZ4HC_COMPRESS) += lz4/
obj-$(CONFIG_LZ4_DECOMPRESS) += lz4/
lib: Add zstd modules Add zstd compression and decompression kernel modules. zstd offers a wide varity of compression speed and quality trade-offs. It can compress at speeds approaching lz4, and quality approaching lzma. zstd decompressions at speeds more than twice as fast as zlib, and decompression speed remains roughly the same across all compression levels. The code was ported from the upstream zstd source repository. The `linux/zstd.h` header was modified to match linux kernel style. The cross-platform and allocation code was stripped out. Instead zstd requires the caller to pass a preallocated workspace. The source files were clang-formatted [1] to match the Linux Kernel style as much as possible. Otherwise, the code was unmodified. We would like to avoid as much further manual modification to the source code as possible, so it will be easier to keep the kernel zstd up to date. I benchmarked zstd compression as a special character device. I ran zstd and zlib compression at several levels, as well as performing no compression, which measure the time spent copying the data to kernel space. Data is passed to the compresser 4096 B at a time. The benchmark file is located in the upstream zstd source repository under `contrib/linux-kernel/zstd_compress_test.c` [2]. I ran the benchmarks on a Ubuntu 14.04 VM with 2 cores and 4 GiB of RAM. The VM is running on a MacBook Pro with a 3.1 GHz Intel Core i7 processor, 16 GB of RAM, and a SSD. I benchmarked using `silesia.tar` [3], which is 211,988,480 B large. Run the following commands for the benchmark: sudo modprobe zstd_compress_test sudo mknod zstd_compress_test c 245 0 sudo cp silesia.tar zstd_compress_test The time is reported by the time of the userland `cp`. The MB/s is computed with 1,536,217,008 B / time(buffer size, hash) which includes the time to copy from userland. The Adjusted MB/s is computed with 1,536,217,088 B / (time(buffer size, hash) - time(buffer size, none)). The memory reported is the amount of memory the compressor requests. | Method | Size (B) | Time (s) | Ratio | MB/s | Adj MB/s | Mem (MB) | |----------|----------|----------|-------|---------|----------|----------| | none | 11988480 | 0.100 | 1 | 2119.88 | - | - | | zstd -1 | 73645762 | 1.044 | 2.878 | 203.05 | 224.56 | 1.23 | | zstd -3 | 66988878 | 1.761 | 3.165 | 120.38 | 127.63 | 2.47 | | zstd -5 | 65001259 | 2.563 | 3.261 | 82.71 | 86.07 | 2.86 | | zstd -10 | 60165346 | 13.242 | 3.523 | 16.01 | 16.13 | 13.22 | | zstd -15 | 58009756 | 47.601 | 3.654 | 4.45 | 4.46 | 21.61 | | zstd -19 | 54014593 | 102.835 | 3.925 | 2.06 | 2.06 | 60.15 | | zlib -1 | 77260026 | 2.895 | 2.744 | 73.23 | 75.85 | 0.27 | | zlib -3 | 72972206 | 4.116 | 2.905 | 51.50 | 52.79 | 0.27 | | zlib -6 | 68190360 | 9.633 | 3.109 | 22.01 | 22.24 | 0.27 | | zlib -9 | 67613382 | 22.554 | 3.135 | 9.40 | 9.44 | 0.27 | I benchmarked zstd decompression using the same method on the same machine. The benchmark file is located in the upstream zstd repo under `contrib/linux-kernel/zstd_decompress_test.c` [4]. The memory reported is the amount of memory required to decompress data compressed with the given compression level. If you know the maximum size of your input, you can reduce the memory usage of decompression irrespective of the compression level. | Method | Time (s) | MB/s | Adjusted MB/s | Memory (MB) | |----------|----------|---------|---------------|-------------| | none | 0.025 | 8479.54 | - | - | | zstd -1 | 0.358 | 592.15 | 636.60 | 0.84 | | zstd -3 | 0.396 | 535.32 | 571.40 | 1.46 | | zstd -5 | 0.396 | 535.32 | 571.40 | 1.46 | | zstd -10 | 0.374 | 566.81 | 607.42 | 2.51 | | zstd -15 | 0.379 | 559.34 | 598.84 | 4.61 | | zstd -19 | 0.412 | 514.54 | 547.77 | 8.80 | | zlib -1 | 0.940 | 225.52 | 231.68 | 0.04 | | zlib -3 | 0.883 | 240.08 | 247.07 | 0.04 | | zlib -6 | 0.844 | 251.17 | 258.84 | 0.04 | | zlib -9 | 0.837 | 253.27 | 287.64 | 0.04 | Tested in userland using the test-suite in the zstd repo under `contrib/linux-kernel/test/UserlandTest.cpp` [5] by mocking the kernel functions. Fuzz tested using libfuzzer [6] with the fuzz harnesses under `contrib/linux-kernel/test/{RoundTripCrash.c,DecompressCrash.c}` [7] [8] with ASAN, UBSAN, and MSAN. Additionaly, it was tested while testing the BtrFS and SquashFS patches coming next. [1] https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ClangFormat.html [2] https://github.com/facebook/zstd/blob/dev/contrib/linux-kernel/zstd_compress_test.c [3] http://sun.aei.polsl.pl/~sdeor/index.php?page=silesia [4] https://github.com/facebook/zstd/blob/dev/contrib/linux-kernel/zstd_decompress_test.c [5] https://github.com/facebook/zstd/blob/dev/contrib/linux-kernel/test/UserlandTest.cpp [6] http://llvm.org/docs/LibFuzzer.html [7] https://github.com/facebook/zstd/blob/dev/contrib/linux-kernel/test/RoundTripCrash.c [8] https://github.com/facebook/zstd/blob/dev/contrib/linux-kernel/test/DecompressCrash.c zstd source repository: https://github.com/facebook/zstd Signed-off-by: Nick Terrell <terrelln@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
2017-08-10 02:35:53 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_ZSTD_COMPRESS) += zstd/
obj-$(CONFIG_ZSTD_DECOMPRESS) += zstd/
obj-$(CONFIG_XZ_DEC) += xz/
obj-$(CONFIG_RAID6_PQ) += raid6/
lib-$(CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_GZIP) += decompress_inflate.o
lib-$(CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_BZIP2) += decompress_bunzip2.o
lib-$(CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_LZMA) += decompress_unlzma.o
lib-$(CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_XZ) += decompress_unxz.o
lib-$(CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_LZO) += decompress_unlzo.o
lib-$(CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_LZ4) += decompress_unlz4.o
lib-$(CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_ZSTD) += decompress_unzstd.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEXTSEARCH) += textsearch.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEXTSEARCH_KMP) += ts_kmp.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEXTSEARCH_BM) += ts_bm.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TEXTSEARCH_FSM) += ts_fsm.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SMP) += percpu_counter.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT_GENERIC) += audit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT_COMPAT_GENERIC) += compat_audit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_IOMMU_HELPER) += iommu-helper.o
obj-$(CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION) += fault-inject.o
lib, include/linux: add usercopy failure capability Patch series "add fault injection to user memory access", v3. The goal of this series is to improve testing of fault-tolerance in usages of user memory access functions, by adding support for fault injection. syzkaller/syzbot are using the existing fault injection modes and will use this particular feature also. The first patch adds failure injection capability for usercopy functions. The second changes usercopy functions to use this new failure capability (copy_from_user, ...). The third patch adds get/put/clear_user failures to x86. This patch (of 3): Add a failure injection capability to improve testing of fault-tolerance in usages of user memory access functions. Add CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_USERCOPY to enable faults in usercopy functions. The should_fail_usercopy function is to be called by these functions (copy_from_user, get_user, ...) in order to fail or not. Signed-off-by: Albert van der Linde <alinde@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200831171733.955393-1-alinde@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200831171733.955393-2-alinde@google.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-16 03:13:46 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_USERCOPY) += fault-inject-usercopy.o
fault-injection: notifier error injection This patchset provides kernel modules that can be used to test the error handling of notifier call chain failures by injecting artifical errors to the following notifier chain callbacks. * CPU notifier * PM notifier * memory hotplug notifier * powerpc pSeries reconfig notifier Example: Inject CPU offline error (-1 == -EPERM) # cd /sys/kernel/debug/notifier-error-inject/cpu # echo -1 > actions/CPU_DOWN_PREPARE/error # echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu1/online bash: echo: write error: Operation not permitted The patchset also adds cpu and memory hotplug tests to tools/testing/selftests These tests first do simple online and offline test and then do fault injection tests if notifier error injection module is available. This patch: The notifier error injection provides the ability to inject artifical errors to specified notifier chain callbacks. It is useful to test the error handling of notifier call chain failures. This adds common basic functions to define which type of events can be fail and to initialize the debugfs interface to control what error code should be returned and which event should be failed. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-07-30 21:43:02 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_NOTIFIER_ERROR_INJECTION) += notifier-error-inject.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PM_NOTIFIER_ERROR_INJECT) += pm-notifier-error-inject.o
obj-$(CONFIG_NETDEV_NOTIFIER_ERROR_INJECT) += netdev-notifier-error-inject.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MEMORY_NOTIFIER_ERROR_INJECT) += memory-notifier-error-inject.o
obj-$(CONFIG_OF_RECONFIG_NOTIFIER_ERROR_INJECT) += \
of-reconfig-notifier-error-inject.o
obj-$(CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION) += error-inject.o
[PATCH] Generic BUG implementation This patch adds common handling for kernel BUGs, for use by architectures as they wish. The code is derived from arch/powerpc. The advantages of having common BUG handling are: - consistent BUG reporting across architectures - shared implementation of out-of-line file/line data - implement CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE consistently This means that in inline impact of BUG is just the illegal instruction itself, which is an improvement for i386 and x86-64. A BUG is represented in the instruction stream as an illegal instruction, which has file/line information associated with it. This extra information is stored in the __bug_table section in the ELF file. When the kernel gets an illegal instruction, it first confirms it might possibly be from a BUG (ie, in kernel mode, the right illegal instruction). It then calls report_bug(). This searches __bug_table for a matching instruction pointer, and if found, prints the corresponding file/line information. If report_bug() determines that it wasn't a BUG which caused the trap, it returns BUG_TRAP_TYPE_NONE. Some architectures (powerpc) implement WARN using the same mechanism; if the illegal instruction was the result of a WARN, then report_bug(Q) returns CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE; otherwise it returns BUG_TRAP_TYPE_BUG. lib/bug.c keeps a list of loaded modules which can be searched for __bug_table entries. The architecture must call module_bug_finalize()/module_bug_cleanup() from its corresponding module_finalize/cleanup functions. Unsetting CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE will reduce the kernel size by some amount. At the very least, filename and line information will not be recorded for each but, but architectures may decide to store no extra information per BUG at all. Unfortunately, gcc doesn't have a general way to mark an asm() as noreturn, so architectures will generally have to include an infinite loop (or similar) in the BUG code, so that gcc knows execution won't continue beyond that point. gcc does have a __builtin_trap() operator which may be useful to achieve the same effect, unfortunately it cannot be used to actually implement the BUG itself, because there's no way to get the instruction's address for use in generating the __bug_table entry. [randy.dunlap@oracle.com: Handle BUG=n, GENERIC_BUG=n to prevent build errors] [bunk@stusta.de: include/linux/bug.h must always #include <linux/module.h] Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> Cc: Hugh Dickens <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-12-08 10:36:19 +00:00
lib-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG) += bug.o
obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK) += syscall.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG_CORE) += dynamic_debug.o
dyndbg: cleanup dynamic usage in ib_srp.c Currently, in dynamic_debug.h we only provide DEFINE_DYNAMIC_DEBUG_METADATA() and DYNAMIC_DEBUG_BRANCH() definitions if CONFIG_DYNAMIC_CORE is enabled. Thus, drivers such as infiniband srp (see: drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c) must provide their own definitions for !CONFIG_DYNAMIC_CORE. Thus, let's move this !CONFIG_DYNAMIC_CORE case into dynamic_debug.h. However, the dynamic debug interfaces should really only be defined if CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG is set or CONFIG_DYNAMIC_CORE is set along with DYNAMIC_DEBUG_MODULE, (see: Documentation/admin-guide/dynamic-debug-howto.rst). Thus, the undefined case becomes: !((CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG || (CONFIG_DYNAMIC_CORE && DYNAMIC_DEBUG_MODULE)). With those changes in place, we can remove the !CONFIG_DYNAMIC_CORE case from ib_srp.c This change was prompted by a build breakeage in ib_srp.c stemming from the inclusion of dynamic_debug.h unconditionally in module.h, due to commit 7deabd674988 ("dyndbg: use the module notifier callbacks"). In that case, if we have CONFIG_DYNAMIC_CORE=y and CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG=n then the definitions for DEFINE_DYNAMIC_DEBUG_METADATA() and DYNAMIC_DEBUG_BRANCH() are defined once in ib_srp.c and then again in the dynamic_debug.h. This had been working prior to the above referenced commit because dynamic_debug.h was only pulled into ib_srp.c conditinally via printk.h if CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG was set. Also, the exported functions in lib/dynamic_debug.c itself may not have a prototype if CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG=n and CONFIG_DYNAMIC_CORE=y. This would trigger the -Wmissing-prototypes warning. The exported functions are behind (include/linux/dynamic_debug.h): if defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG) || \ (defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG_CORE) && defined(DYNAMIC_DEBUG_MODULE)) Thus, by adding -DDYNAMIC_CONFIG_MODULE to the lib/Makefile we can ensure that the exported functions have a prototype in all cases, since lib/dynamic_debug.c is built whenever CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG_CORE=y. Fixes: 7deabd674988 ("dyndbg: use the module notifier callbacks") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202303071444.sIbZTDCy-lkp@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> [mcgrof: adjust commit log, and remove urldefense from URL] Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
2023-03-10 21:27:28 +00:00
#ensure exported functions have prototypes
CFLAGS_dynamic_debug.o := -DDYNAMIC_DEBUG_MODULE
printf: add support for printing symbolic error names It has been suggested several times to extend vsnprintf() to be able to convert the numeric value of ENOSPC to print "ENOSPC". This implements that as a %p extension: With %pe, one can do if (IS_ERR(foo)) { pr_err("Sorry, can't do that: %pe\n", foo); return PTR_ERR(foo); } instead of what is seen in quite a few places in the kernel: if (IS_ERR(foo)) { pr_err("Sorry, can't do that: %ld\n", PTR_ERR(foo)); return PTR_ERR(foo); } If the value passed to %pe is an ERR_PTR, but the library function errname() added here doesn't know about the value, the value is simply printed in decimal. If the value passed to %pe is not an ERR_PTR, we treat it as an ordinary %p and thus print the hashed value (passing non-ERR_PTR values to %pe indicates a bug in the caller, but we can't do much about that). With my embedded hat on, and because it's not very invasive to do, I've made it possible to remove this. The errname() function and associated lookup tables take up about 3K. For most, that's probably quite acceptable and a price worth paying for more readable dmesg (once this starts getting used), while for those that disable printk() it's of very little use - I don't see a procfs/sysfs/seq_printf() file reasonably making use of this - and they clearly want to squeeze vmlinux as much as possible. Hence the default y if PRINTK. The symbols to include have been found by massaging the output of find arch include -iname 'errno*.h' | xargs grep -E 'define\s*E' In the cases where some common aliasing exists (e.g. EAGAIN=EWOULDBLOCK on all platforms, EDEADLOCK=EDEADLK on most), I've moved the more popular one (in terms of 'git grep -w Efoo | wc) to the bottom so that one takes precedence. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191015190706.15989-1-linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk To: "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: "Andy Shevchenko" <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> Cc: "Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: "Joe Perches" <joe@perches.com> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Acked-by: Uwe Kleine-König <uwe@kleine-koenig.org> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> [andy.shevchenko@gmail.com: use abs()] Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
2019-10-15 19:07:05 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_SYMBOLIC_ERRNAME) += errname.o
driver core: basic infrastructure for per-module dynamic debug messages Base infrastructure to enable per-module debug messages. I've introduced CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG, which when enabled centralizes control of debugging statements on a per-module basis in one /proc file, currently, <debugfs>/dynamic_printk/modules. When, CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG, is not set, debugging statements can still be enabled as before, often by defining 'DEBUG' for the proper compilation unit. Thus, this patch set has no affect when CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG is not set. The infrastructure currently ties into all pr_debug() and dev_dbg() calls. That is, if CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG is set, all pr_debug() and dev_dbg() calls can be dynamically enabled/disabled on a per-module basis. Future plans include extending this functionality to subsystems, that define their own debug levels and flags. Usage: Dynamic debugging is controlled by the debugfs file, <debugfs>/dynamic_printk/modules. This file contains a list of the modules that can be enabled. The format of the file is as follows: <module_name> <enabled=0/1> . . . <module_name> : Name of the module in which the debug call resides <enabled=0/1> : whether the messages are enabled or not For example: snd_hda_intel enabled=0 fixup enabled=1 driver enabled=0 Enable a module: $echo "set enabled=1 <module_name>" > dynamic_printk/modules Disable a module: $echo "set enabled=0 <module_name>" > dynamic_printk/modules Enable all modules: $echo "set enabled=1 all" > dynamic_printk/modules Disable all modules: $echo "set enabled=0 all" > dynamic_printk/modules Finally, passing "dynamic_printk" at the command line enables debugging for all modules. This mode can be turned off via the above disable command. [gkh: minor cleanups and tweaks to make the build work quietly] Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2008-08-12 20:46:19 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_NLATTR) += nlattr.o
driver core: basic infrastructure for per-module dynamic debug messages Base infrastructure to enable per-module debug messages. I've introduced CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG, which when enabled centralizes control of debugging statements on a per-module basis in one /proc file, currently, <debugfs>/dynamic_printk/modules. When, CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG, is not set, debugging statements can still be enabled as before, often by defining 'DEBUG' for the proper compilation unit. Thus, this patch set has no affect when CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG is not set. The infrastructure currently ties into all pr_debug() and dev_dbg() calls. That is, if CONFIG_DYNAMIC_PRINTK_DEBUG is set, all pr_debug() and dev_dbg() calls can be dynamically enabled/disabled on a per-module basis. Future plans include extending this functionality to subsystems, that define their own debug levels and flags. Usage: Dynamic debugging is controlled by the debugfs file, <debugfs>/dynamic_printk/modules. This file contains a list of the modules that can be enabled. The format of the file is as follows: <module_name> <enabled=0/1> . . . <module_name> : Name of the module in which the debug call resides <enabled=0/1> : whether the messages are enabled or not For example: snd_hda_intel enabled=0 fixup enabled=1 driver enabled=0 Enable a module: $echo "set enabled=1 <module_name>" > dynamic_printk/modules Disable a module: $echo "set enabled=0 <module_name>" > dynamic_printk/modules Enable all modules: $echo "set enabled=1 all" > dynamic_printk/modules Disable all modules: $echo "set enabled=0 all" > dynamic_printk/modules Finally, passing "dynamic_printk" at the command line enables debugging for all modules. This mode can be turned off via the above disable command. [gkh: minor cleanups and tweaks to make the build work quietly] Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
2008-08-12 20:46:19 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_LRU_CACHE) += lru_cache.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_CSUM) += checksum.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_ATOMIC64) += atomic64.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ATOMIC64_SELFTEST) += atomic64_test.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_RMAP) += cpu_rmap.o
dql: Dynamic queue limits Implementation of dynamic queue limits (dql). This is a libary which allows a queue limit to be dynamically managed. The goal of dql is to set the queue limit, number of objects to the queue, to be minimized without allowing the queue to be starved. dql would be used with a queue which has these properties: 1) Objects are queued up to some limit which can be expressed as a count of objects. 2) Periodically a completion process executes which retires consumed objects. 3) Starvation occurs when limit has been reached, all queued data has actually been consumed but completion processing has not yet run, so queuing new data is blocked. 4) Minimizing the amount of queued data is desirable. A canonical example of such a queue would be a NIC HW transmit queue. The queue limit is dynamic, it will increase or decrease over time depending on the workload. The queue limit is recalculated each time completion processing is done. Increases occur when the queue is starved and can exponentially increase over successive intervals. Decreases occur when more data is being maintained in the queue than needed to prevent starvation. The number of extra objects, or "slack", is measured over successive intervals, and to avoid hysteresis the limit is only reduced by the miminum slack seen over a configurable time period. dql API provides routines to manage the queue: - dql_init is called to intialize the dql structure - dql_reset is called to reset dynamic values - dql_queued called when objects are being enqueued - dql_avail returns availability in the queue - dql_completed is called when objects have be consumed in the queue Configuration consists of: - max_limit, maximum limit - min_limit, minimum limit - slack_hold_time, time to measure instances of slack before reducing queue limit Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-11-28 16:32:35 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_DQL) += dynamic_queue_limits.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GLOB) += glob.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GLOB_SELFTEST) += globtest.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MPILIB) += mpi/
obj-$(CONFIG_DIMLIB) += dim/
obj-$(CONFIG_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o
lib-$(CONFIG_CLZ_TAB) += clz_tab.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_STRNCPY_FROM_USER) += strncpy_from_user.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_STRNLEN_USER) += strnlen_user.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_NET_UTILS) += net_utils.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SG_SPLIT) += sg_split.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SG_POOL) += sg_pool.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MEMREGION) += memregion.o
obj-$(CONFIG_STMP_DEVICE) += stmp_device.o
obj-$(CONFIG_IRQ_POLL) += irq_poll.o
obj-$(CONFIG_POLYNOMIAL) += polynomial.o
# stackdepot.c should not be instrumented or call instrumented functions.
# Prevent the compiler from calling builtins like memcmp() or bcmp() from this
# file.
CFLAGS_stackdepot.o += -fno-builtin
mm, kasan: stackdepot implementation. Enable stackdepot for SLAB Implement the stack depot and provide CONFIG_STACKDEPOT. Stack depot will allow KASAN store allocation/deallocation stack traces for memory chunks. The stack traces are stored in a hash table and referenced by handles which reside in the kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta structures in the allocated memory chunks. IRQ stack traces are cut below the IRQ entry point to avoid unnecessary duplication. Right now stackdepot support is only enabled in SLAB allocator. Once KASAN features in SLAB are on par with those in SLUB we can switch SLUB to stackdepot as well, thus removing the dependency on SLUB stack bookkeeping, which wastes a lot of memory. This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: stack depots" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov. Joonsoo has said that he plans to reuse the stackdepot code for the mm/page_owner.c debugging facility. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/depot_stack_handle/depot_stack_handle_t] [aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: comment style fixes] Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-25 21:22:08 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_STACKDEPOT) += stackdepot.o
KASAN_SANITIZE_stackdepot.o := n
kmsan: disable instrumentation of unsupported common kernel code EFI stub cannot be linked with KMSAN runtime, so we disable instrumentation for it. Instrumenting kcov, stackdepot or lockdep leads to infinite recursion caused by instrumentation hooks calling instrumented code again. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-13-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-09-15 15:03:46 +00:00
# In particular, instrumenting stackdepot.c with KMSAN will result in infinite
# recursion.
KMSAN_SANITIZE_stackdepot.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_stackdepot.o := n
mm, kasan: stackdepot implementation. Enable stackdepot for SLAB Implement the stack depot and provide CONFIG_STACKDEPOT. Stack depot will allow KASAN store allocation/deallocation stack traces for memory chunks. The stack traces are stored in a hash table and referenced by handles which reside in the kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta structures in the allocated memory chunks. IRQ stack traces are cut below the IRQ entry point to avoid unnecessary duplication. Right now stackdepot support is only enabled in SLAB allocator. Once KASAN features in SLAB are on par with those in SLUB we can switch SLUB to stackdepot as well, thus removing the dependency on SLUB stack bookkeeping, which wastes a lot of memory. This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: stack depots" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov. Joonsoo has said that he plans to reuse the stackdepot code for the mm/page_owner.c debugging facility. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/depot_stack_handle/depot_stack_handle_t] [aryabinin@virtuozzo.com: comment style fixes] Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-25 21:22:08 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_REF_TRACKER) += ref_tracker.o
libfdt_files = fdt.o fdt_ro.o fdt_wip.o fdt_rw.o fdt_sw.o fdt_strerror.o \
fdt_empty_tree.o fdt_addresses.o
$(foreach file, $(libfdt_files), \
$(eval CFLAGS_$(file) = -I $(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt))
lib-$(CONFIG_LIBFDT) += $(libfdt_files)
obj-$(CONFIG_BOOT_CONFIG) += bootconfig.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BOOT_CONFIG_EMBED) += bootconfig-data.o
$(obj)/bootconfig-data.o: $(obj)/default.bconf
targets += default.bconf
filechk_defbconf = cat $(or $(real-prereqs), /dev/null)
$(obj)/default.bconf: $(CONFIG_BOOT_CONFIG_EMBED_FILE) FORCE
$(call filechk,defbconf)
obj-$(CONFIG_RBTREE_TEST) += rbtree_test.o
rbtree: add prio tree and interval tree tests Patch 1 implements support for interval trees, on top of the augmented rbtree API. It also adds synthetic tests to compare the performance of interval trees vs prio trees. Short answers is that interval trees are slightly faster (~25%) on insert/erase, and much faster (~2.4 - 3x) on search. It is debatable how realistic the synthetic test is, and I have not made such measurements yet, but my impression is that interval trees would still come out faster. Patch 2 uses a preprocessor template to make the interval tree generic, and uses it as a replacement for the vma prio_tree. Patch 3 takes the other prio_tree user, kmemleak, and converts it to use a basic rbtree. We don't actually need the augmented rbtree support here because the intervals are always non-overlapping. Patch 4 removes the now-unused prio tree library. Patch 5 proposes an additional optimization to rb_erase_augmented, now providing it as an inline function so that the augmented callbacks can be inlined in. This provides an additional 5-10% performance improvement for the interval tree insert/erase benchmark. There is a maintainance cost as it exposes augmented rbtree users to some of the rbtree library internals; however I think this cost shouldn't be too high as I expect the augmented rbtree will always have much less users than the base rbtree. I should probably add a quick summary of why I think it makes sense to replace prio trees with augmented rbtree based interval trees now. One of the drivers is that we need augmented rbtrees for Rik's vma gap finding code, and once you have them, it just makes sense to use them for interval trees as well, as this is the simpler and more well known algorithm. prio trees, in comparison, seem *too* clever: they impose an additional 'heap' constraint on the tree, which they use to guarantee a faster worst-case complexity of O(k+log N) for stabbing queries in a well-balanced prio tree, vs O(k*log N) for interval trees (where k=number of matches, N=number of intervals). Now this sounds great, but in practice prio trees don't realize this theorical benefit. First, the additional constraint makes them harder to update, so that the kernel implementation has to simplify things by balancing them like a radix tree, which is not always ideal. Second, the fact that there are both index and heap properties makes both tree manipulation and search more complex, which results in a higher multiplicative time constant. As it turns out, the simple interval tree algorithm ends up running faster than the more clever prio tree. This patch: Add two test modules: - prio_tree_test measures the performance of lib/prio_tree.c, both for insertion/removal and for stabbing searches - interval_tree_test measures the performance of a library of equivalent functionality, built using the augmented rbtree support. In order to support the second test module, lib/interval_tree.c is introduced. It is kept separate from the interval_tree_test main file for two reasons: first we don't want to provide an unfair advantage over prio_tree_test by having everything in a single compilation unit, and second there is the possibility that the interval tree functionality could get some non-test users in kernel over time. Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-10-08 23:31:23 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_INTERVAL_TREE_TEST) += interval_tree_test.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PERCPU_TEST) += percpu_test.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_decoder.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ASN1_ENCODER) += asn1_encoder.o
obj-$(CONFIG_FONT_SUPPORT) += fonts/
hostprogs := gen_crc32table
hostprogs += gen_crc64table
clean-files := crc32table.h
lib: add crc64 calculation routines Patch series "add crc64 calculation as kernel library", v5. This patchset adds basic implementation of crc64 calculation as a Linux kernel library. Since bcache already does crc64 by itself, this patchset also modifies bcache code to use the new crc64 library routine. Currently bcache is the only user of crc64 calculation, another potential user is bcachefs which is on the way to be in mainline kernel. Therefore it makes sense to make crc64 calculation to be a public library. bcache uses crc64 as storage checksum, if a change of crc lib routines results an inconsistent result, the unmatched checksum may make bcache 'think' the on-disk is corrupted, such a change should be avoided or detected as early as possible. Therefore a patch is being prepared which adds a crc test framework, to check consistency of different calculations. This patch (of 2): Add the re-write crc64 calculation routines for Linux kernel. The CRC64 polynomical arithmetic follows ECMA-182 specification, inspired by CRC paper of Dr. Ross N. Williams (see http://www.ross.net/crc/download/crc_v3.txt) and other public domain implementations. All the changes work in this way, - When Linux kernel is built, host program lib/gen_crc64table.c will be compiled to lib/gen_crc64table and executed. - The output of gen_crc64table execution is an array called as lookup table (a.k.a POLY 0x42f0e1eba9ea369) which contain 256 64-bit long numbers, this table is dumped into header file lib/crc64table.h. - Then the header file is included by lib/crc64.c for normal 64bit crc calculation. - Function declaration of the crc64 calculation routines is placed in include/linux/crc64.h Currently bcache is the only user of crc64_be(), another potential user is bcachefs which is on the way to be in mainline kernel. Therefore it makes sense to move crc64 calculation into lib/crc64.c as public code. [colyli@suse.de: fix review comments from v4] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180726053352.2781-2-colyli@suse.de Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180718165545.1622-2-colyli@suse.de Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Co-developed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michael Lyle <mlyle@lyle.org> Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Noah Massey <noah.massey@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-08-22 04:57:11 +00:00
clean-files += crc64table.h
$(obj)/crc32.o: $(obj)/crc32table.h
quiet_cmd_crc32 = GEN $@
cmd_crc32 = $< > $@
$(obj)/crc32table.h: $(obj)/gen_crc32table
$(call cmd,crc32)
lib: add crc64 calculation routines Patch series "add crc64 calculation as kernel library", v5. This patchset adds basic implementation of crc64 calculation as a Linux kernel library. Since bcache already does crc64 by itself, this patchset also modifies bcache code to use the new crc64 library routine. Currently bcache is the only user of crc64 calculation, another potential user is bcachefs which is on the way to be in mainline kernel. Therefore it makes sense to make crc64 calculation to be a public library. bcache uses crc64 as storage checksum, if a change of crc lib routines results an inconsistent result, the unmatched checksum may make bcache 'think' the on-disk is corrupted, such a change should be avoided or detected as early as possible. Therefore a patch is being prepared which adds a crc test framework, to check consistency of different calculations. This patch (of 2): Add the re-write crc64 calculation routines for Linux kernel. The CRC64 polynomical arithmetic follows ECMA-182 specification, inspired by CRC paper of Dr. Ross N. Williams (see http://www.ross.net/crc/download/crc_v3.txt) and other public domain implementations. All the changes work in this way, - When Linux kernel is built, host program lib/gen_crc64table.c will be compiled to lib/gen_crc64table and executed. - The output of gen_crc64table execution is an array called as lookup table (a.k.a POLY 0x42f0e1eba9ea369) which contain 256 64-bit long numbers, this table is dumped into header file lib/crc64table.h. - Then the header file is included by lib/crc64.c for normal 64bit crc calculation. - Function declaration of the crc64 calculation routines is placed in include/linux/crc64.h Currently bcache is the only user of crc64_be(), another potential user is bcachefs which is on the way to be in mainline kernel. Therefore it makes sense to move crc64 calculation into lib/crc64.c as public code. [colyli@suse.de: fix review comments from v4] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180726053352.2781-2-colyli@suse.de Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180718165545.1622-2-colyli@suse.de Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Co-developed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michael Lyle <mlyle@lyle.org> Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@gmail.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Noah Massey <noah.massey@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-08-22 04:57:11 +00:00
$(obj)/crc64.o: $(obj)/crc64table.h
quiet_cmd_crc64 = GEN $@
cmd_crc64 = $< > $@
$(obj)/crc64table.h: $(obj)/gen_crc64table
$(call cmd,crc64)
#
# Build a fast OID lookip registry from include/linux/oid_registry.h
#
obj-$(CONFIG_OID_REGISTRY) += oid_registry.o
$(obj)/oid_registry.o: $(obj)/oid_registry_data.c
$(obj)/oid_registry_data.c: $(srctree)/include/linux/oid_registry.h \
$(src)/build_OID_registry
$(call cmd,build_OID_registry)
quiet_cmd_build_OID_registry = GEN $@
cmd_build_OID_registry = perl $(srctree)/$(src)/build_OID_registry $< $@
clean-files += oid_registry_data.c
obj-$(CONFIG_UCS2_STRING) += ucs2_string.o
UBSAN: run-time undefined behavior sanity checker UBSAN uses compile-time instrumentation to catch undefined behavior (UB). Compiler inserts code that perform certain kinds of checks before operations that could cause UB. If check fails (i.e. UB detected) __ubsan_handle_* function called to print error message. So the most of the work is done by compiler. This patch just implements ubsan handlers printing errors. GCC has this capability since 4.9.x [1] (see -fsanitize=undefined option and its suboptions). However GCC 5.x has more checkers implemented [2]. Article [3] has a bit more details about UBSAN in the GCC. [1] - https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.9.0/gcc/Debugging-Options.html [2] - https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Debugging-Options.html [3] - http://developerblog.redhat.com/2014/10/16/gcc-undefined-behavior-sanitizer-ubsan/ Issues which UBSAN has found thus far are: Found bugs: * out-of-bounds access - 97840cb67ff5 ("netfilter: nfnetlink: fix insufficient validation in nfnetlink_bind") undefined shifts: * d48458d4a768 ("jbd2: use a better hash function for the revoke table") * 10632008b9e1 ("clockevents: Prevent shift out of bounds") * 'x << -1' shift in ext4 - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<5444EF21.8020501@samsung.com> * undefined rol32(0) - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<1449198241-20654-1-git-send-email-sasha.levin@oracle.com> * undefined dirty_ratelimit calculation - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<566594E2.3050306@odin.com> * undefined roundown_pow_of_two(0) - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<1449156616-11474-1-git-send-email-sasha.levin@oracle.com> * [WONTFIX] undefined shift in __bpf_prog_run - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CACT4Y+ZxoR3UjLgcNdUm4fECLMx2VdtfrENMtRRCdgHB2n0bJA@mail.gmail.com> WONTFIX here because it should be fixed in bpf program, not in kernel. signed overflows: * 32a8df4e0b33f ("sched: Fix odd values in effective_load() calculations") * mul overflow in ntp - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<1449175608-1146-1-git-send-email-sasha.levin@oracle.com> * incorrect conversion into rtc_time in rtc_time64_to_tm() - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<1449187944-11730-1-git-send-email-sasha.levin@oracle.com> * unvalidated timespec in io_getevents() - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CACT4Y+bBxVYLQ6LtOKrKtnLthqLHcw-BMp3aqP3mjdAvr9FULQ@mail.gmail.com> * [NOTABUG] signed overflow in ktime_add_safe() - http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<CACT4Y+aJ4muRnWxsUe1CMnA6P8nooO33kwG-c8YZg=0Xc8rJqw@mail.gmail.com> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix unused local warning] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix __int128 build woes] Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Yury Gribov <y.gribov@samsung.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-01-20 23:00:55 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_UBSAN) += ubsan.o
UBSAN_SANITIZE_ubsan.o := n
ubsan: build ubsan.c more conservatively objtool points out several conditions that it does not like, depending on the combination with other configuration options and compiler variants: stack protector: lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch()+0xbf: call to __stack_chk_fail() with UACCESS enabled lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1()+0xbe: call to __stack_chk_fail() with UACCESS enabled stackleak plugin: lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch()+0x4a: call to stackleak_track_stack() with UACCESS enabled lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1()+0x4a: call to stackleak_track_stack() with UACCESS enabled kasan: lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch()+0x25: call to memcpy() with UACCESS enabled lib/ubsan.o: warning: objtool: __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1()+0x25: call to memcpy() with UACCESS enabled The stackleak and kasan options just need to be disabled for this file as we do for other files already. For the stack protector, we already attempt to disable it, but this fails on clang because the check is mixed with the gcc specific -fno-conserve-stack option. According to Andrey Ryabinin, that option is not even needed, dropping it here fixes the stackprotector issue. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190722125139.1335385-1-arnd@arndb.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190617123109.667090-1-arnd@arndb.de/t/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190722091050.2188664-1-arnd@arndb.de/t/ Fixes: d08965a27e84 ("x86/uaccess, ubsan: Fix UBSAN vs. SMAP") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-08-03 04:48:58 +00:00
KASAN_SANITIZE_ubsan.o := n
KCSAN_SANITIZE_ubsan.o := n
CFLAGS_ubsan.o := -fno-stack-protector $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
obj-$(CONFIG_SBITMAP) += sbitmap.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PARMAN) += parman.o
obj-y += group_cpus.o
# GCC library routines
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_LIB_ASHLDI3) += ashldi3.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_LIB_ASHRDI3) += ashrdi3.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_LIB_LSHRDI3) += lshrdi3.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_LIB_MULDI3) += muldi3.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_LIB_CMPDI2) += cmpdi2.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_LIB_UCMPDI2) += ucmpdi2.o
obj-$(CONFIG_OBJAGG) += objagg.o
# pldmfw library
obj-$(CONFIG_PLDMFW) += pldmfw/
# KUnit tests
CFLAGS_bitfield_kunit.o := $(DISABLE_STRUCTLEAK_PLUGIN)
obj-$(CONFIG_BITFIELD_KUNIT) += bitfield_kunit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LIST_KUNIT_TEST) += list-test.o
obj-$(CONFIG_HASHTABLE_KUNIT_TEST) += hashtable_test.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LINEAR_RANGES_TEST) += test_linear_ranges.o
obj-$(CONFIG_BITS_TEST) += test_bits.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CMDLINE_KUNIT_TEST) += cmdline_kunit.o
mm/slub, kunit: add a KUnit test for SLUB debugging functionality SLUB has resiliency_test() function which is hidden behind #ifdef SLUB_RESILIENCY_TEST that is not part of Kconfig, so nobody runs it. KUnit should be a proper replacement for it. Try changing byte in redzone after allocation and changing pointer to next free node, first byte, 50th byte and redzone byte. Check if validation finds errors. There are several differences from the original resiliency test: Tests create own caches with known state instead of corrupting shared kmalloc caches. The corruption of freepointer uses correct offset, the original resiliency test got broken with freepointer changes. Scratch changing random byte test, because it does not have meaning in this form where we need deterministic results. Add new option CONFIG_SLUB_KUNIT_TEST in Kconfig. Tests next_pointer, first_word and clobber_50th_byte do not run with KASAN option on. Because the test deliberately modifies non-allocated objects. Use kunit_resource to count errors in cache and silence bug reports. Count error whenever slab_bug() or slab_fix() is called or when the count of pages is wrong. [glittao@gmail.com: remove unused function test_exit(), from SLUB KUnit test] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210512140656.12083-1-glittao@gmail.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: export kasan_enable/disable_current to modules] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210511150734.3492-2-glittao@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Oliver Glitta <glittao@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Daniel Latypov <dlatypov@google.com> Acked-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-29 02:34:33 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_SLUB_KUNIT_TEST) += slub_kunit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MEMCPY_KUNIT_TEST) += memcpy_kunit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_IS_SIGNED_TYPE_KUNIT_TEST) += is_signed_type_kunit.o
overflow: Introduce overflows_type() and castable_to_type() Implement a robust overflows_type() macro to test if a variable or constant value would overflow another variable or type. This can be used as a constant expression for static_assert() (which requires a constant expression[1][2]) when used on constant values. This must be constructed manually, since __builtin_add_overflow() does not produce a constant expression[3]. Additionally adds castable_to_type(), similar to __same_type(), but for checking if a constant value would overflow if cast to a given type. Add unit tests for overflows_type(), __same_type(), and castable_to_type() to the existing KUnit "overflow" test: [16:03:33] ================== overflow (21 subtests) ================== ... [16:03:33] [PASSED] overflows_type_test [16:03:33] [PASSED] same_type_test [16:03:33] [PASSED] castable_to_type_test [16:03:33] ==================== [PASSED] overflow ===================== [16:03:33] ============================================================ [16:03:33] Testing complete. Ran 21 tests: passed: 21 [16:03:33] Elapsed time: 24.022s total, 0.002s configuring, 22.598s building, 0.767s running [1] https://en.cppreference.com/w/c/language/_Static_assert [2] C11 standard (ISO/IEC 9899:2011): 6.7.10 Static assertions [3] https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Integer-Overflow-Builtins.html 6.56 Built-in Functions to Perform Arithmetic with Overflow Checking Built-in Function: bool __builtin_add_overflow (type1 a, type2 b, Cc: Luc Van Oostenryck <luc.vanoostenryck@gmail.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Latypov <dlatypov@google.com> Cc: Vitor Massaru Iha <vitor@massaru.org> Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org> Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org> Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev Co-developed-by: Gwan-gyeong Mun <gwan-gyeong.mun@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Gwan-gyeong Mun <gwan-gyeong.mun@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221024201125.1416422-1-gwan-gyeong.mun@intel.com
2022-10-24 20:11:25 +00:00
CFLAGS_overflow_kunit.o = $(call cc-disable-warning, tautological-constant-out-of-range-compare)
lib: overflow: Convert to Kunit Convert overflow unit tests to KUnit, for better integration into the kernel self test framework. Includes a rename of test_overflow.c to overflow_kunit.c, and CONFIG_TEST_OVERFLOW to CONFIG_OVERFLOW_KUNIT_TEST. $ ./tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run overflow ... [14:33:51] Starting KUnit Kernel (1/1)... [14:33:51] ============================================================ [14:33:51] ================== overflow (11 subtests) ================== [14:33:51] [PASSED] u8_overflow_test [14:33:51] [PASSED] s8_overflow_test [14:33:51] [PASSED] u16_overflow_test [14:33:51] [PASSED] s16_overflow_test [14:33:51] [PASSED] u32_overflow_test [14:33:51] [PASSED] s32_overflow_test [14:33:51] [PASSED] u64_overflow_test [14:33:51] [PASSED] s64_overflow_test [14:33:51] [PASSED] overflow_shift_test [14:33:51] [PASSED] overflow_allocation_test [14:33:51] [PASSED] overflow_size_helpers_test [14:33:51] ==================== [PASSED] overflow ===================== [14:33:51] ============================================================ [14:33:51] Testing complete. Passed: 11, Failed: 0, Crashed: 0, Skipped: 0, Errors: 0 [14:33:51] Elapsed time: 12.525s total, 0.001s configuring, 12.402s building, 0.101s running Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Co-developed-by: Vitor Massaru Iha <vitor@massaru.org> Signed-off-by: Vitor Massaru Iha <vitor@massaru.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200720224418.200495-1-vitor@massaru.org/ Co-developed-by: Daniel Latypov <dlatypov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Latypov <dlatypov@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kselftest/20210503211536.1384578-1-dlatypov@google.com/ Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAKwvOdm62iA1dNiC6Q11UJ-MnTqtc4kXkm-ubPaFMK824_k0nw@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CABVgOS=TWVh649_Vjo3wnMu9gZnq66gkV-LtGgsksAWMqc+MSA@mail.gmail.com
2022-02-16 22:17:49 +00:00
obj-$(CONFIG_OVERFLOW_KUNIT_TEST) += overflow_kunit.o
lib: stackinit: Convert to KUnit Convert stackinit unit tests to KUnit, for better integration into the kernel self test framework. Includes a rename of test_stackinit.c to stackinit_kunit.c, and CONFIG_TEST_STACKINIT to CONFIG_STACKINIT_KUNIT_TEST. Adjust expected test results based on which stack initialization method was chosen: $ CMD="./tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run stackinit --raw_output \ --arch=x86_64 --kconfig_add" $ $CMD | grep stackinit: # stackinit: pass:36 fail:0 skip:29 total:65 $ $CMD CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_USER=y | grep stackinit: # stackinit: pass:37 fail:0 skip:28 total:65 $ $CMD CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF=y | grep stackinit: # stackinit: pass:55 fail:0 skip:10 total:65 $ $CMD CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL=y | grep stackinit: # stackinit: pass:62 fail:0 skip:3 total:65 $ $CMD CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN=y --make_option LLVM=1 | grep stackinit: # stackinit: pass:60 fail:0 skip:5 total:65 $ $CMD CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO=y --make_option LLVM=1 | grep stackinit: # stackinit: pass:60 fail:0 skip:5 total:65 Temporarily remove the userspace-build mode, which will be restored in a later patch. Expand the size of the pre-case switch variable so it doesn't get accidentally cleared. Cc: David Gow <davidgow@google.com> Cc: Daniel Latypov <dlatypov@google.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220224055145.1853657-1-keescook@chromium.org v2: - split "userspace KUnit stub" into separate header and patch (Daniel) - Improve commit log and comments (David) - Provide mapping of expected XFAIL tests to CONFIGs (David)
2022-02-17 00:03:41 +00:00
CFLAGS_stackinit_kunit.o += $(call cc-disable-warning, switch-unreachable)
obj-$(CONFIG_STACKINIT_KUNIT_TEST) += stackinit_kunit.o
kunit/fortify: Validate __alloc_size attribute results Validate the effect of the __alloc_size attribute on allocators. If the compiler doesn't support __builtin_dynamic_object_size(), skip the associated tests. (For GCC, just remove the "--make_options" line below...) $ ./tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run --arch x86_64 \ --kconfig_add CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y \ --make_options LLVM=1 fortify ... [15:16:30] ================== fortify (10 subtests) =================== [15:16:30] [PASSED] known_sizes_test [15:16:30] [PASSED] control_flow_split_test [15:16:30] [PASSED] alloc_size_kmalloc_const_test [15:16:30] [PASSED] alloc_size_kmalloc_dynamic_test [15:16:30] [PASSED] alloc_size_vmalloc_const_test [15:16:30] [PASSED] alloc_size_vmalloc_dynamic_test [15:16:30] [PASSED] alloc_size_kvmalloc_const_test [15:16:30] [PASSED] alloc_size_kvmalloc_dynamic_test [15:16:30] [PASSED] alloc_size_devm_kmalloc_const_test [15:16:30] [PASSED] alloc_size_devm_kmalloc_dynamic_test [15:16:30] ===================== [PASSED] fortify ===================== [15:16:30] ============================================================ [15:16:30] Testing complete. Ran 10 tests: passed: 10 [15:16:31] Elapsed time: 8.348s total, 0.002s configuring, 6.923s building, 1.075s running For earlier GCC prior to version 12, the dynamic tests will be skipped: [15:18:59] ================== fortify (10 subtests) =================== [15:18:59] [PASSED] known_sizes_test [15:18:59] [PASSED] control_flow_split_test [15:18:59] [PASSED] alloc_size_kmalloc_const_test [15:18:59] [SKIPPED] alloc_size_kmalloc_dynamic_test [15:18:59] [PASSED] alloc_size_vmalloc_const_test [15:18:59] [SKIPPED] alloc_size_vmalloc_dynamic_test [15:18:59] [PASSED] alloc_size_kvmalloc_const_test [15:18:59] [SKIPPED] alloc_size_kvmalloc_dynamic_test [15:18:59] [PASSED] alloc_size_devm_kmalloc_const_test [15:18:59] [SKIPPED] alloc_size_devm_kmalloc_dynamic_test [15:18:59] ===================== [PASSED] fortify ===================== [15:18:59] ============================================================ [15:18:59] Testing complete. Ran 10 tests: passed: 6, skipped: 4 [15:18:59] Elapsed time: 11.965s total, 0.002s configuring, 10.540s building, 1.068s running Cc: David Gow <davidgow@google.com> Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2022-09-29 08:58:59 +00:00
CFLAGS_fortify_kunit.o += $(call cc-disable-warning, unsequenced)
CFLAGS_fortify_kunit.o += $(DISABLE_STRUCTLEAK_PLUGIN)
obj-$(CONFIG_FORTIFY_KUNIT_TEST) += fortify_kunit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_STRSCPY_KUNIT_TEST) += strscpy_kunit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SIPHASH_KUNIT_TEST) += siphash_kunit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_LIB_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED) += devmem_is_allowed.o
# FORTIFY_SOURCE compile-time behavior tests
TEST_FORTIFY_SRCS = $(wildcard $(srctree)/$(src)/test_fortify/*-*.c)
TEST_FORTIFY_LOGS = $(patsubst $(srctree)/$(src)/%.c, %.log, $(TEST_FORTIFY_SRCS))
TEST_FORTIFY_LOG = test_fortify.log
quiet_cmd_test_fortify = TEST $@
cmd_test_fortify = $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(srctree)/scripts/test_fortify.sh \
$< $@ "$(NM)" $(CC) $(c_flags) \
fortify: Detect struct member overflows in memcpy() at compile-time memcpy() is dead; long live memcpy() tl;dr: In order to eliminate a large class of common buffer overflow flaws that continue to persist in the kernel, have memcpy() (under CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE) perform bounds checking of the destination struct member when they have a known size. This would have caught all of the memcpy()-related buffer write overflow flaws identified in at least the last three years. Background and analysis: While stack-based buffer overflow flaws are largely mitigated by stack canaries (and similar) features, heap-based buffer overflow flaws continue to regularly appear in the kernel. Many classes of heap buffer overflows are mitigated by FORTIFY_SOURCE when using the strcpy() family of functions, but a significant number remain exposed through the memcpy() family of functions. At its core, FORTIFY_SOURCE uses the compiler's __builtin_object_size() internal[0] to determine the available size at a target address based on the compile-time known structure layout details. It operates in two modes: outer bounds (0) and inner bounds (1). In mode 0, the size of the enclosing structure is used. In mode 1, the size of the specific field is used. For example: struct object { u16 scalar1; /* 2 bytes */ char array[6]; /* 6 bytes */ u64 scalar2; /* 8 bytes */ u32 scalar3; /* 4 bytes */ u32 scalar4; /* 4 bytes */ } instance; __builtin_object_size(instance.array, 0) == 22, since the remaining size of the enclosing structure starting from "array" is 22 bytes (6 + 8 + 4 + 4). __builtin_object_size(instance.array, 1) == 6, since the remaining size of the specific field "array" is 6 bytes. The initial implementation of FORTIFY_SOURCE used mode 0 because there were many cases of both strcpy() and memcpy() functions being used to write (or read) across multiple fields in a structure. For example, it would catch this, which is writing 2 bytes beyond the end of "instance": memcpy(&instance.array, data, 25); While this didn't protect against overwriting adjacent fields in a given structure, it would at least stop overflows from reaching beyond the end of the structure into neighboring memory, and provided a meaningful mitigation of a subset of buffer overflow flaws. However, many desirable targets remain within the enclosing structure (for example function pointers). As it happened, there were very few cases of strcpy() family functions intentionally writing beyond the end of a string buffer. Once all known cases were removed from the kernel, the strcpy() family was tightened[1] to use mode 1, providing greater mitigation coverage. What remains is switching memcpy() to mode 1 as well, but making the switch is much more difficult because of how frustrating it can be to find existing "normal" uses of memcpy() that expect to write (or read) across multiple fields. The root cause of the problem is that the C language lacks a common pattern to indicate the intent of an author's use of memcpy(), and is further complicated by the available compile-time and run-time mitigation behaviors. The FORTIFY_SOURCE mitigation comes in two halves: the compile-time half, when both the buffer size _and_ the length of the copy is known, and the run-time half, when only the buffer size is known. If neither size is known, there is no bounds checking possible. At compile-time when the compiler sees that a length will always exceed a known buffer size, a warning can be deterministically emitted. For the run-time half, the length is tested against the known size of the buffer, and the overflowing operation is detected. (The performance overhead for these tests is virtually zero.) It is relatively easy to find compile-time false-positives since a warning is always generated. Fixing the false positives, however, can be very time-consuming as there are hundreds of instances. While it's possible some over-read conditions could lead to kernel memory exposures, the bulk of the risk comes from the run-time flaws where the length of a write may end up being attacker-controlled and lead to an overflow. Many of the compile-time false-positives take a form similar to this: memcpy(&instance.scalar2, data, sizeof(instance.scalar2) + sizeof(instance.scalar3)); and the run-time ones are similar, but lack a constant expression for the size of the copy: memcpy(instance.array, data, length); The former is meant to cover multiple fields (though its style has been frowned upon more recently), but has been technically legal. Both lack any expressivity in the C language about the author's _intent_ in a way that a compiler can check when the length isn't known at compile time. A comment doesn't work well because what's needed is something a compiler can directly reason about. Is a given memcpy() call expected to overflow into neighbors? Is it not? By using the new struct_group() macro, this intent can be much more easily encoded. It is not as easy to find the run-time false-positives since the code path to exercise a seemingly out-of-bounds condition that is actually expected may not be trivially reachable. Tightening the restrictions to block an operation for a false positive will either potentially create a greater flaw (if a copy is truncated by the mitigation), or destabilize the kernel (e.g. with a BUG()), making things completely useless for the end user. As a result, tightening the memcpy() restriction (when there is a reasonable level of uncertainty of the number of false positives), needs to first WARN() with no truncation. (Though any sufficiently paranoid end-user can always opt to set the panic_on_warn=1 sysctl.) Once enough development time has passed, the mitigation can be further intensified. (Note that this patch is only the compile-time checking step, which is a prerequisite to doing run-time checking, which will come in future patches.) Given the potential frustrations of weeding out all the false positives when tightening the run-time checks, it is reasonable to wonder if these changes would actually add meaningful protection. Looking at just the last three years, there are 23 identified flaws with a CVE that mention "buffer overflow", and 11 are memcpy()-related buffer overflows. (For the remaining 12: 7 are array index overflows that would be mitigated by systems built with CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS=y: CVE-2019-0145, CVE-2019-14835, CVE-2019-14896, CVE-2019-14897, CVE-2019-14901, CVE-2019-17666, CVE-2021-28952. 2 are miscalculated allocation sizes which could be mitigated with memory tagging: CVE-2019-16746, CVE-2019-2181. 1 is an iovec buffer bug maybe mitigated by memory tagging: CVE-2020-10742. 1 is a type confusion bug mitigated by stack canaries: CVE-2020-10942. 1 is a string handling logic bug with no mitigation I'm aware of: CVE-2021-28972.) At my last count on an x86_64 allmodconfig build, there are 35,294 calls to memcpy(). With callers instrumented to report all places where the buffer size is known but the length remains unknown (i.e. a run-time bounds check is added), we can count how many new run-time bounds checks are added when the destination and source arguments of memcpy() are changed to use "mode 1" bounds checking: 1,276. This means for the future run-time checking, there is a worst-case upper bounds of 3.6% false positives to fix. In addition, there were around 150 new compile-time warnings to evaluate and fix (which have now been fixed). With this instrumentation it's also possible to compare the places where the known 11 memcpy() flaw overflows manifested against the resulting list of potential new run-time bounds checks, as a measure of potential efficacy of the tightened mitigation. Much to my surprise, horror, and delight, all 11 flaws would have been detected by the newly added run-time bounds checks, making this a distinctly clear mitigation improvement: 100% coverage for known memcpy() flaws, with a possible 2 orders of magnitude gain in coverage over existing but undiscovered run-time dynamic length flaws (i.e. 1265 newly covered sites in addition to the 11 known), against only <4% of all memcpy() callers maybe gaining a false positive run-time check, with only about 150 new compile-time instances needing evaluation. Specifically these would have been mitigated: CVE-2020-24490 https://git.kernel.org/linus/a2ec905d1e160a33b2e210e45ad30445ef26ce0e CVE-2020-12654 https://git.kernel.org/linus/3a9b153c5591548612c3955c9600a98150c81875 CVE-2020-12653 https://git.kernel.org/linus/b70261a288ea4d2f4ac7cd04be08a9f0f2de4f4d CVE-2019-14895 https://git.kernel.org/linus/3d94a4a8373bf5f45cf5f939e88b8354dbf2311b CVE-2019-14816 https://git.kernel.org/linus/7caac62ed598a196d6ddf8d9c121e12e082cac3a CVE-2019-14815 https://git.kernel.org/linus/7caac62ed598a196d6ddf8d9c121e12e082cac3a CVE-2019-14814 https://git.kernel.org/linus/7caac62ed598a196d6ddf8d9c121e12e082cac3a CVE-2019-10126 https://git.kernel.org/linus/69ae4f6aac1578575126319d3f55550e7e440449 CVE-2019-9500 https://git.kernel.org/linus/1b5e2423164b3670e8bc9174e4762d297990deff no-CVE-yet https://git.kernel.org/linus/130f634da1af649205f4a3dd86cbe5c126b57914 no-CVE-yet https://git.kernel.org/linus/d10a87a3535cce2b890897914f5d0d83df669c63 To accelerate the review of potential run-time false positives, it's also worth noting that it is possible to partially automate checking by examining the memcpy() buffer argument to check for the destination struct member having a neighboring array member. It is reasonable to expect that the vast majority of run-time false positives would look like the already evaluated and fixed compile-time false positives, where the most common pattern is neighboring arrays. (And, FWIW, many of the compile-time fixes were actual bugs, so it is reasonable to assume we'll have similar cases of actual bugs getting fixed for run-time checks.) Implementation: Tighten the memcpy() destination buffer size checking to use the actual ("mode 1") target buffer size as the bounds check instead of their enclosing structure's ("mode 0") size. Use a common inline for memcpy() (and memmove() in a following patch), since all the tests are the same. All new cross-field memcpy() uses must use the struct_group() macro or similar to target a specific range of fields, so that FORTIFY_SOURCE can reason about the size and safety of the copy. For now, cross-member "mode 1" _read_ detection at compile-time will be limited to W=1 builds, since it is, unfortunately, very common. As the priority is solving write overflows, read overflows will be part of a future phase (and can be fixed in parallel, for anyone wanting to look at W=1 build output). For run-time, the "mode 0" size checking and mitigation is left unchanged, with "mode 1" to be added in stages. In this patch, no new run-time checks are added. Future patches will first bounds-check writes, and only perform a WARN() for now. This way any missed run-time false positives can be flushed out over the coming several development cycles, but system builders who have tested their workloads to be WARN()-free can enable the panic_on_warn=1 sysctl to immediately gain a mitigation against this class of buffer overflows. Once that is under way, run-time bounds-checking of reads can be similarly enabled. Related classes of flaws that will remain unmitigated: - memcpy() with flexible array structures, as the compiler does not currently have visibility into the size of the trailing flexible array. These can be fixed in the future by refactoring such cases to use a new set of flexible array structure helpers to perform the common serialization/deserialization code patterns doing allocation and/or copying. - memcpy() with raw pointers (e.g. void *, char *, etc), or otherwise having their buffer size unknown at compile time, have no good mitigation beyond memory tagging (and even that would only protect against inter-object overflow, not intra-object neighboring field overflows), or refactoring. Some kind of "fat pointer" solution is likely needed to gain proper size-of-buffer awareness. (e.g. see struct membuf) - type confusion where a higher level type's allocation size does not match the resulting cast type eventually passed to a deeper memcpy() call where the compiler cannot see the true type. In theory, greater static analysis could catch these, and the use of -Warray-bounds will help find some of these. [0] https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Object-Size-Checking.html [1] https://git.kernel.org/linus/6a39e62abbafd1d58d1722f40c7d26ef379c6a2f Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2021-04-21 06:22:52 +00:00
$(call cc-disable-warning,fortify-source) \
-DKBUILD_EXTRA_WARN1
targets += $(TEST_FORTIFY_LOGS)
clean-files += $(TEST_FORTIFY_LOGS)
clean-files += $(addsuffix .o, $(TEST_FORTIFY_LOGS))
$(obj)/test_fortify/%.log: $(src)/test_fortify/%.c \
$(src)/test_fortify/test_fortify.h \
$(srctree)/include/linux/fortify-string.h \
$(srctree)/scripts/test_fortify.sh \
FORCE
$(call if_changed,test_fortify)
quiet_cmd_gen_fortify_log = GEN $@
cmd_gen_fortify_log = cat </dev/null $(filter-out FORCE,$^) 2>/dev/null > $@ || true
targets += $(TEST_FORTIFY_LOG)
clean-files += $(TEST_FORTIFY_LOG)
$(obj)/$(TEST_FORTIFY_LOG): $(addprefix $(obj)/, $(TEST_FORTIFY_LOGS)) FORCE
$(call if_changed,gen_fortify_log)
# Fake dependency to trigger the fortify tests.
ifeq ($(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE),y)
$(obj)/string.o: $(obj)/$(TEST_FORTIFY_LOG)
endif