License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
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# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#
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# Makefile for the linux memory manager.
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#
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2015-02-13 22:39:42 +00:00
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KASAN_SANITIZE_slab_common.o := n
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KASAN_SANITIZE_slub.o := n
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2020-04-02 04:04:37 +00:00
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KCSAN_SANITIZE_kmemleak.o := n
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2015-02-13 22:39:42 +00:00
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2019-11-14 18:02:58 +00:00
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# These produce frequent data race reports: most of them are due to races on
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# the same word but accesses to different bits of that word. Re-enable KCSAN
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# for these when we have more consensus on what to do about them.
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KCSAN_SANITIZE_slab_common.o := n
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KCSAN_SANITIZE_slub.o := n
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KCSAN_SANITIZE_page_alloc.o := n
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2021-11-30 11:44:28 +00:00
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# But enable explicit instrumentation for memory barriers.
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KCSAN_INSTRUMENT_BARRIERS := y
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2019-11-14 18:02:58 +00:00
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kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 21:27:30 +00:00
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# These files are disabled because they produce non-interesting and/or
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# flaky coverage that is not a function of syscall inputs. E.g. slab is out of
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# free pages, or a task is migrated between nodes.
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KCOV_INSTRUMENT_slab_common.o := n
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KCOV_INSTRUMENT_slub.o := n
|
|
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KCOV_INSTRUMENT_page_alloc.o := n
|
|
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KCOV_INSTRUMENT_debug-pagealloc.o := n
|
|
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KCOV_INSTRUMENT_kmemleak.o := n
|
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KCOV_INSTRUMENT_memcontrol.o := n
|
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KCOV_INSTRUMENT_mmzone.o := n
|
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KCOV_INSTRUMENT_vmstat.o := n
|
2020-01-31 06:17:35 +00:00
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KCOV_INSTRUMENT_failslab.o := n
|
kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 21:27:30 +00:00
|
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|
2024-03-26 14:47:16 +00:00
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CFLAGS_init-mm.o += -Wno-override-init
|
2019-09-23 22:36:48 +00:00
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|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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mmu-y := nommu.o
|
2019-07-12 03:57:21 +00:00
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mmu-$(CONFIG_MMU) := highmem.o memory.o mincore.o \
|
2018-09-03 14:07:36 +00:00
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mlock.o mmap.o mmu_gather.o mprotect.o mremap.o \
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msync.o page_vma_mapped.o pagewalk.o \
|
2021-09-08 02:56:01 +00:00
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pgtable-generic.o rmap.o vmalloc.o
|
2017-02-24 22:57:45 +00:00
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2012-05-29 22:06:27 +00:00
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ifdef CONFIG_CROSS_MEMORY_ATTACH
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mmu-$(CONFIG_MMU) += process_vm_access.o
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endif
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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2018-08-29 05:41:29 +00:00
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obj-y := filemap.o mempool.o oom_kill.o fadvise.o \
|
mm/util: Add folio_mapping() and folio_file_mapping()
These are the folio equivalent of page_mapping() and page_file_mapping().
Add an out-of-line page_mapping() wrapper around folio_mapping()
in order to prevent the page_folio() call from bloating every caller
of page_mapping(). Adjust page_file_mapping() and page_mapping_file()
to use folios internally. Rename __page_file_mapping() to
swapcache_mapping() and change it to take a folio.
This ends up saving 122 bytes of text overall. folio_mapping() is
45 bytes shorter than page_mapping() was, but the new page_mapping()
wrapper is 30 bytes. The major reduction is a few bytes less in dozens
of nfs functions (which call page_file_mapping()). Most of these appear
to be a slight change in gcc's register allocation decisions, which allow:
48 8b 56 08 mov 0x8(%rsi),%rdx
48 8d 42 ff lea -0x1(%rdx),%rax
83 e2 01 and $0x1,%edx
48 0f 44 c6 cmove %rsi,%rax
to become:
48 8b 46 08 mov 0x8(%rsi),%rax
48 8d 78 ff lea -0x1(%rax),%rdi
a8 01 test $0x1,%al
48 0f 44 fe cmove %rsi,%rdi
for a reduction of a single byte. Once the NFS client is converted to
use folios, this entire sequence will disappear.
Also add folio_mapping() documentation.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2020-12-10 15:55:05 +00:00
|
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maccess.o page-writeback.o folio-compat.o \
|
2023-09-11 09:25:15 +00:00
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readahead.o swap.o truncate.o vmscan.o shrinker.o \
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shmem.o util.o mmzone.o vmstat.o backing-dev.o \
|
2020-06-11 01:41:59 +00:00
|
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mm_init.o percpu.o slab_common.o \
|
2023-07-25 14:45:07 +00:00
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compaction.o show_mem.o shmem_quota.o\
|
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs updates from Al Viro:
"The first vfs pile, with deep apologies for being very late in this
window.
Assorted cleanups and fixes, plus a large preparatory part of iov_iter
work. There's a lot more of that, but it'll probably go into the next
merge window - it *does* shape up nicely, removes a lot of
boilerplate, gets rid of locking inconsistencie between aio_write and
splice_write and I hope to get Kent's direct-io rewrite merged into
the same queue, but some of the stuff after this point is having
(mostly trivial) conflicts with the things already merged into
mainline and with some I want more testing.
This one passes LTP and xfstests without regressions, in addition to
usual beating. BTW, readahead02 in ltp syscalls testsuite has started
giving failures since "mm/readahead.c: fix readahead failure for
memoryless NUMA nodes and limit readahead pages" - might be a false
positive, might be a real regression..."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
missing bits of "splice: fix racy pipe->buffers uses"
cifs: fix the race in cifs_writev()
ceph_sync_{,direct_}write: fix an oops on ceph_osdc_new_request() failure
kill generic_file_buffered_write()
ocfs2_file_aio_write(): switch to generic_perform_write()
ceph_aio_write(): switch to generic_perform_write()
xfs_file_buffered_aio_write(): switch to generic_perform_write()
export generic_perform_write(), start getting rid of generic_file_buffer_write()
generic_file_direct_write(): get rid of ppos argument
btrfs_file_aio_write(): get rid of ppos
kill the 5th argument of generic_file_buffered_write()
kill the 4th argument of __generic_file_aio_write()
lustre: don't open-code kernel_recvmsg()
ocfs2: don't open-code kernel_recvmsg()
drbd: don't open-code kernel_recvmsg()
constify blk_rq_map_user_iov() and friends
lustre: switch to kernel_sendmsg()
ocfs2: don't open-code kernel_sendmsg()
take iov_iter stuff to mm/iov_iter.c
process_vm_access: tidy up a bit
...
2014-04-12 21:49:50 +00:00
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interval_tree.o list_lru.o workingset.o \
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mm: mmap_lock: add tracepoints around lock acquisition
The goal of these tracepoints is to be able to debug lock contention
issues. This lock is acquired on most (all?) mmap / munmap / page fault
operations, so a multi-threaded process which does a lot of these can
experience significant contention.
We trace just before we start acquisition, when the acquisition returns
(whether it succeeded or not), and when the lock is released (or
downgraded). The events are broken out by lock type (read / write).
The events are also broken out by memcg path. For container-based
workloads, users often think of several processes in a memcg as a single
logical "task", so collecting statistics at this level is useful.
The end goal is to get latency information. This isn't directly included
in the trace events. Instead, users are expected to compute the time
between "start locking" and "acquire returned", using e.g. synthetic
events or BPF. The benefit we get from this is simpler code.
Because we use tracepoint_enabled() to decide whether or not to trace,
this patch has effectively no overhead unless tracepoints are enabled at
runtime. If tracepoints are enabled, there is a performance impact, but
how much depends on exactly what e.g. the BPF program does.
[axelrasmussen@google.com: fix use-after-free race and css ref leak in tracepoints]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201130233504.3725241-1-axelrasmussen@google.com
[axelrasmussen@google.com: v3]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201207213358.573750-1-axelrasmussen@google.com
[rostedt@goodmis.org: in-depth examples of tracepoint_enabled() usage, and per-cpu-per-context buffer design]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201105211739.568279-2-axelrasmussen@google.com
Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Chinwen Chang <chinwen.chang@mediatek.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 03:07:55 +00:00
|
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debug.o gup.o mmap_lock.o $(mmu-y)
|
2012-07-06 20:25:10 +00:00
|
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mm: shuffle initial free memory to improve memory-side-cache utilization
Patch series "mm: Randomize free memory", v10.
This patch (of 3):
Randomization of the page allocator improves the average utilization of
a direct-mapped memory-side-cache. Memory side caching is a platform
capability that Linux has been previously exposed to in HPC
(high-performance computing) environments on specialty platforms. In
that instance it was a smaller pool of high-bandwidth-memory relative to
higher-capacity / lower-bandwidth DRAM. Now, this capability is going
to be found on general purpose server platforms where DRAM is a cache in
front of higher latency persistent memory [1].
Robert offered an explanation of the state of the art of Linux
interactions with memory-side-caches [2], and I copy it here:
It's been a problem in the HPC space:
http://www.nersc.gov/research-and-development/knl-cache-mode-performance-coe/
A kernel module called zonesort is available to try to help:
https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/xeon-phi-software
and this abandoned patch series proposed that for the kernel:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823100205.17311-1-lukasz.daniluk@intel.com
Dan's patch series doesn't attempt to ensure buffers won't conflict, but
also reduces the chance that the buffers will. This will make performance
more consistent, albeit slower than "optimal" (which is near impossible
to attain in a general-purpose kernel). That's better than forcing
users to deploy remedies like:
"To eliminate this gradual degradation, we have added a Stream
measurement to the Node Health Check that follows each job;
nodes are rebooted whenever their measured memory bandwidth
falls below 300 GB/s."
A replacement for zonesort was merged upstream in commit cc9aec03e58f
("x86/numa_emulation: Introduce uniform split capability"). With this
numa_emulation capability, memory can be split into cache sized
("near-memory" sized) numa nodes. A bind operation to such a node, and
disabling workloads on other nodes, enables full cache performance.
However, once the workload exceeds the cache size then cache conflicts
are unavoidable. While HPC environments might be able to tolerate
time-scheduling of cache sized workloads, for general purpose server
platforms, the oversubscribed cache case will be the common case.
The worst case scenario is that a server system owner benchmarks a
workload at boot with an un-contended cache only to see that performance
degrade over time, even below the average cache performance due to
excessive conflicts. Randomization clips the peaks and fills in the
valleys of cache utilization to yield steady average performance.
Here are some performance impact details of the patches:
1/ An Intel internal synthetic memory bandwidth measurement tool, saw a
3X speedup in a contrived case that tries to force cache conflicts.
The contrived cased used the numa_emulation capability to force an
instance of the benchmark to be run in two of the near-memory sized
numa nodes. If both instances were placed on the same emulated they
would fit and cause zero conflicts. While on separate emulated nodes
without randomization they underutilized the cache and conflicted
unnecessarily due to the in-order allocation per node.
2/ A well known Java server application benchmark was run with a heap
size that exceeded cache size by 3X. The cache conflict rate was 8%
for the first run and degraded to 21% after page allocator aging. With
randomization enabled the rate levelled out at 11%.
3/ A MongoDB workload did not observe measurable difference in
cache-conflict rates, but the overall throughput dropped by 7% with
randomization in one case.
4/ Mel Gorman ran his suite of performance workloads with randomization
enabled on platforms without a memory-side-cache and saw a mix of some
improvements and some losses [3].
While there is potentially significant improvement for applications that
depend on low latency access across a wide working-set, the performance
may be negligible to negative for other workloads. For this reason the
shuffle capability defaults to off unless a direct-mapped
memory-side-cache is detected. Even then, the page_alloc.shuffle=0
parameter can be specified to disable the randomization on those systems.
Outside of memory-side-cache utilization concerns there is potentially
security benefit from randomization. Some data exfiltration and
return-oriented-programming attacks rely on the ability to infer the
location of sensitive data objects. The kernel page allocator, especially
early in system boot, has predictable first-in-first out behavior for
physical pages. Pages are freed in physical address order when first
onlined.
Quoting Kees:
"While we already have a base-address randomization
(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY), attacks against the same hardware and
memory layouts would certainly be using the predictability of
allocation ordering (i.e. for attacks where the base address isn't
important: only the relative positions between allocated memory).
This is common in lots of heap-style attacks. They try to gain
control over ordering by spraying allocations, etc.
I'd really like to see this because it gives us something similar
to CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM but for the page allocator."
While SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM reduces the predictability of some local slab
caches it leaves vast bulk of memory to be predictably in order allocated.
However, it should be noted, the concrete security benefits are hard to
quantify, and no known CVE is mitigated by this randomization.
Introduce shuffle_free_memory(), and its helper shuffle_zone(), to perform
a Fisher-Yates shuffle of the page allocator 'free_area' lists when they
are initially populated with free memory at boot and at hotplug time. Do
this based on either the presence of a page_alloc.shuffle=Y command line
parameter, or autodetection of a memory-side-cache (to be added in a
follow-on patch).
The shuffling is done in terms of CONFIG_SHUFFLE_PAGE_ORDER sized free
pages where the default CONFIG_SHUFFLE_PAGE_ORDER is MAX_ORDER-1 i.e. 10,
4MB this trades off randomization granularity for time spent shuffling.
MAX_ORDER-1 was chosen to be minimally invasive to the page allocator
while still showing memory-side cache behavior improvements, and the
expectation that the security implications of finer granularity
randomization is mitigated by CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM. The
performance impact of the shuffling appears to be in the noise compared to
other memory initialization work.
This initial randomization can be undone over time so a follow-on patch is
introduced to inject entropy on page free decisions. It is reasonable to
ask if the page free entropy is sufficient, but it is not enough due to
the in-order initial freeing of pages. At the start of that process
putting page1 in front or behind page0 still keeps them close together,
page2 is still near page1 and has a high chance of being adjacent. As
more pages are added ordering diversity improves, but there is still high
page locality for the low address pages and this leads to no significant
impact to the cache conflict rate.
[1]: https://itpeernetwork.intel.com/intel-optane-dc-persistent-memory-operating-modes/
[2]: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/AT5PR8401MB1169D656C8B5E121752FC0F8AB120@AT5PR8401MB1169.NAMPRD84.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM
[3]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/10/12/309
[dan.j.williams@intel.com: fix shuffle enable]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/154943713038.3858443.4125180191382062871.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
[cai@lca.pw: fix SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR help texts]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190425201300.75650-1-cai@lca.pw
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/154899811738.3165233.12325692939590944259.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Cc: Robert Elliott <elliott@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-05-14 22:41:28 +00:00
|
|
|
# Give 'page_alloc' its own module-parameter namespace
|
|
|
|
page-alloc-y := page_alloc.o
|
|
|
|
page-alloc-$(CONFIG_SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR) += shuffle.o
|
|
|
|
|
2021-05-05 01:39:48 +00:00
|
|
|
# Give 'memory_hotplug' its own module-parameter namespace
|
|
|
|
memory-hotplug-$(CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG) += memory_hotplug.o
|
|
|
|
|
mm: shuffle initial free memory to improve memory-side-cache utilization
Patch series "mm: Randomize free memory", v10.
This patch (of 3):
Randomization of the page allocator improves the average utilization of
a direct-mapped memory-side-cache. Memory side caching is a platform
capability that Linux has been previously exposed to in HPC
(high-performance computing) environments on specialty platforms. In
that instance it was a smaller pool of high-bandwidth-memory relative to
higher-capacity / lower-bandwidth DRAM. Now, this capability is going
to be found on general purpose server platforms where DRAM is a cache in
front of higher latency persistent memory [1].
Robert offered an explanation of the state of the art of Linux
interactions with memory-side-caches [2], and I copy it here:
It's been a problem in the HPC space:
http://www.nersc.gov/research-and-development/knl-cache-mode-performance-coe/
A kernel module called zonesort is available to try to help:
https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/xeon-phi-software
and this abandoned patch series proposed that for the kernel:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823100205.17311-1-lukasz.daniluk@intel.com
Dan's patch series doesn't attempt to ensure buffers won't conflict, but
also reduces the chance that the buffers will. This will make performance
more consistent, albeit slower than "optimal" (which is near impossible
to attain in a general-purpose kernel). That's better than forcing
users to deploy remedies like:
"To eliminate this gradual degradation, we have added a Stream
measurement to the Node Health Check that follows each job;
nodes are rebooted whenever their measured memory bandwidth
falls below 300 GB/s."
A replacement for zonesort was merged upstream in commit cc9aec03e58f
("x86/numa_emulation: Introduce uniform split capability"). With this
numa_emulation capability, memory can be split into cache sized
("near-memory" sized) numa nodes. A bind operation to such a node, and
disabling workloads on other nodes, enables full cache performance.
However, once the workload exceeds the cache size then cache conflicts
are unavoidable. While HPC environments might be able to tolerate
time-scheduling of cache sized workloads, for general purpose server
platforms, the oversubscribed cache case will be the common case.
The worst case scenario is that a server system owner benchmarks a
workload at boot with an un-contended cache only to see that performance
degrade over time, even below the average cache performance due to
excessive conflicts. Randomization clips the peaks and fills in the
valleys of cache utilization to yield steady average performance.
Here are some performance impact details of the patches:
1/ An Intel internal synthetic memory bandwidth measurement tool, saw a
3X speedup in a contrived case that tries to force cache conflicts.
The contrived cased used the numa_emulation capability to force an
instance of the benchmark to be run in two of the near-memory sized
numa nodes. If both instances were placed on the same emulated they
would fit and cause zero conflicts. While on separate emulated nodes
without randomization they underutilized the cache and conflicted
unnecessarily due to the in-order allocation per node.
2/ A well known Java server application benchmark was run with a heap
size that exceeded cache size by 3X. The cache conflict rate was 8%
for the first run and degraded to 21% after page allocator aging. With
randomization enabled the rate levelled out at 11%.
3/ A MongoDB workload did not observe measurable difference in
cache-conflict rates, but the overall throughput dropped by 7% with
randomization in one case.
4/ Mel Gorman ran his suite of performance workloads with randomization
enabled on platforms without a memory-side-cache and saw a mix of some
improvements and some losses [3].
While there is potentially significant improvement for applications that
depend on low latency access across a wide working-set, the performance
may be negligible to negative for other workloads. For this reason the
shuffle capability defaults to off unless a direct-mapped
memory-side-cache is detected. Even then, the page_alloc.shuffle=0
parameter can be specified to disable the randomization on those systems.
Outside of memory-side-cache utilization concerns there is potentially
security benefit from randomization. Some data exfiltration and
return-oriented-programming attacks rely on the ability to infer the
location of sensitive data objects. The kernel page allocator, especially
early in system boot, has predictable first-in-first out behavior for
physical pages. Pages are freed in physical address order when first
onlined.
Quoting Kees:
"While we already have a base-address randomization
(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY), attacks against the same hardware and
memory layouts would certainly be using the predictability of
allocation ordering (i.e. for attacks where the base address isn't
important: only the relative positions between allocated memory).
This is common in lots of heap-style attacks. They try to gain
control over ordering by spraying allocations, etc.
I'd really like to see this because it gives us something similar
to CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM but for the page allocator."
While SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM reduces the predictability of some local slab
caches it leaves vast bulk of memory to be predictably in order allocated.
However, it should be noted, the concrete security benefits are hard to
quantify, and no known CVE is mitigated by this randomization.
Introduce shuffle_free_memory(), and its helper shuffle_zone(), to perform
a Fisher-Yates shuffle of the page allocator 'free_area' lists when they
are initially populated with free memory at boot and at hotplug time. Do
this based on either the presence of a page_alloc.shuffle=Y command line
parameter, or autodetection of a memory-side-cache (to be added in a
follow-on patch).
The shuffling is done in terms of CONFIG_SHUFFLE_PAGE_ORDER sized free
pages where the default CONFIG_SHUFFLE_PAGE_ORDER is MAX_ORDER-1 i.e. 10,
4MB this trades off randomization granularity for time spent shuffling.
MAX_ORDER-1 was chosen to be minimally invasive to the page allocator
while still showing memory-side cache behavior improvements, and the
expectation that the security implications of finer granularity
randomization is mitigated by CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM. The
performance impact of the shuffling appears to be in the noise compared to
other memory initialization work.
This initial randomization can be undone over time so a follow-on patch is
introduced to inject entropy on page free decisions. It is reasonable to
ask if the page free entropy is sufficient, but it is not enough due to
the in-order initial freeing of pages. At the start of that process
putting page1 in front or behind page0 still keeps them close together,
page2 is still near page1 and has a high chance of being adjacent. As
more pages are added ordering diversity improves, but there is still high
page locality for the low address pages and this leads to no significant
impact to the cache conflict rate.
[1]: https://itpeernetwork.intel.com/intel-optane-dc-persistent-memory-operating-modes/
[2]: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/AT5PR8401MB1169D656C8B5E121752FC0F8AB120@AT5PR8401MB1169.NAMPRD84.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM
[3]: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/10/12/309
[dan.j.williams@intel.com: fix shuffle enable]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/154943713038.3858443.4125180191382062871.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
[cai@lca.pw: fix SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR help texts]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190425201300.75650-1-cai@lca.pw
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/154899811738.3165233.12325692939590944259.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Cc: Robert Elliott <elliott@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-05-14 22:41:28 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-y += page-alloc.o
|
2009-06-16 22:31:18 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-y += init-mm.o
|
2018-10-30 22:07:44 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-y += memblock.o
|
2021-05-05 01:39:48 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-y += $(memory-hotplug-y)
|
2023-10-02 13:43:03 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-y += slub.o
|
2011-02-24 13:43:05 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-08-18 00:41:09 +00:00
|
|
|
ifdef CONFIG_MMU
|
2014-10-10 20:12:28 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_ADVISE_SYSCALLS) += madvise.o
|
2014-08-18 00:41:09 +00:00
|
|
|
endif
|
2010-07-12 04:36:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-04-05 23:22:23 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_SWAP) += page_io.o swap_state.o swapfile.o swap_slots.o
|
2013-07-10 23:05:03 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_ZSWAP) += zswap.o
|
2007-12-03 16:57:48 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_HAS_DMA) += dmapool.o
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_HUGETLBFS) += hugetlb.o
|
2022-04-29 06:16:15 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE_OPTIMIZE_VMEMMAP) += hugetlb_vmemmap.o
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA) += mempolicy.o
|
[PATCH] sparsemem memory model
Sparsemem abstracts the use of discontiguous mem_maps[]. This kind of
mem_map[] is needed by discontiguous memory machines (like in the old
CONFIG_DISCONTIGMEM case) as well as memory hotplug systems. Sparsemem
replaces DISCONTIGMEM when enabled, and it is hoped that it can eventually
become a complete replacement.
A significant advantage over DISCONTIGMEM is that it's completely separated
from CONFIG_NUMA. When producing this patch, it became apparent in that NUMA
and DISCONTIG are often confused.
Another advantage is that sparse doesn't require each NUMA node's ranges to be
contiguous. It can handle overlapping ranges between nodes with no problems,
where DISCONTIGMEM currently throws away that memory.
Sparsemem uses an array to provide different pfn_to_page() translations for
each SECTION_SIZE area of physical memory. This is what allows the mem_map[]
to be chopped up.
In order to do quick pfn_to_page() operations, the section number of the page
is encoded in page->flags. Part of the sparsemem infrastructure enables
sharing of these bits more dynamically (at compile-time) between the
page_zone() and sparsemem operations. However, on 32-bit architectures, the
number of bits is quite limited, and may require growing the size of the
page->flags type in certain conditions. Several things might force this to
occur: a decrease in the SECTION_SIZE (if you want to hotplug smaller areas of
memory), an increase in the physical address space, or an increase in the
number of used page->flags.
One thing to note is that, once sparsemem is present, the NUMA node
information no longer needs to be stored in the page->flags. It might provide
speed increases on certain platforms and will be stored there if there is
room. But, if out of room, an alternate (theoretically slower) mechanism is
used.
This patch introduces CONFIG_FLATMEM. It is used in almost all cases where
there used to be an #ifndef DISCONTIG, because SPARSEMEM and DISCONTIGMEM
often have to compile out the same areas of code.
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@shadowen.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Bligh <mbligh@aracnet.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: Yasunori Goto <y-goto@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Picco <bob.picco@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-06-23 07:07:54 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_SPARSEMEM) += sparse.o
|
2007-10-16 08:24:13 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP) += sparse-vmemmap.o
|
mmu-notifiers: core
With KVM/GFP/XPMEM there isn't just the primary CPU MMU pointing to pages.
There are secondary MMUs (with secondary sptes and secondary tlbs) too.
sptes in the kvm case are shadow pagetables, but when I say spte in
mmu-notifier context, I mean "secondary pte". In GRU case there's no
actual secondary pte and there's only a secondary tlb because the GRU
secondary MMU has no knowledge about sptes and every secondary tlb miss
event in the MMU always generates a page fault that has to be resolved by
the CPU (this is not the case of KVM where the a secondary tlb miss will
walk sptes in hardware and it will refill the secondary tlb transparently
to software if the corresponding spte is present). The same way
zap_page_range has to invalidate the pte before freeing the page, the spte
(and secondary tlb) must also be invalidated before any page is freed and
reused.
Currently we take a page_count pin on every page mapped by sptes, but that
means the pages can't be swapped whenever they're mapped by any spte
because they're part of the guest working set. Furthermore a spte unmap
event can immediately lead to a page to be freed when the pin is released
(so requiring the same complex and relatively slow tlb_gather smp safe
logic we have in zap_page_range and that can be avoided completely if the
spte unmap event doesn't require an unpin of the page previously mapped in
the secondary MMU).
The mmu notifiers allow kvm/GRU/XPMEM to attach to the tsk->mm and know
when the VM is swapping or freeing or doing anything on the primary MMU so
that the secondary MMU code can drop sptes before the pages are freed,
avoiding all page pinning and allowing 100% reliable swapping of guest
physical address space. Furthermore it avoids the code that teardown the
mappings of the secondary MMU, to implement a logic like tlb_gather in
zap_page_range that would require many IPI to flush other cpu tlbs, for
each fixed number of spte unmapped.
To make an example: if what happens on the primary MMU is a protection
downgrade (from writeable to wrprotect) the secondary MMU mappings will be
invalidated, and the next secondary-mmu-page-fault will call
get_user_pages and trigger a do_wp_page through get_user_pages if it
called get_user_pages with write=1, and it'll re-establishing an updated
spte or secondary-tlb-mapping on the copied page. Or it will setup a
readonly spte or readonly tlb mapping if it's a guest-read, if it calls
get_user_pages with write=0. This is just an example.
This allows to map any page pointed by any pte (and in turn visible in the
primary CPU MMU), into a secondary MMU (be it a pure tlb like GRU, or an
full MMU with both sptes and secondary-tlb like the shadow-pagetable layer
with kvm), or a remote DMA in software like XPMEM (hence needing of
schedule in XPMEM code to send the invalidate to the remote node, while no
need to schedule in kvm/gru as it's an immediate event like invalidating
primary-mmu pte).
At least for KVM without this patch it's impossible to swap guests
reliably. And having this feature and removing the page pin allows
several other optimizations that simplify life considerably.
Dependencies:
1) mm_take_all_locks() to register the mmu notifier when the whole VM
isn't doing anything with "mm". This allows mmu notifier users to keep
track if the VM is in the middle of the invalidate_range_begin/end
critical section with an atomic counter incraese in range_begin and
decreased in range_end. No secondary MMU page fault is allowed to map
any spte or secondary tlb reference, while the VM is in the middle of
range_begin/end as any page returned by get_user_pages in that critical
section could later immediately be freed without any further
->invalidate_page notification (invalidate_range_begin/end works on
ranges and ->invalidate_page isn't called immediately before freeing
the page). To stop all page freeing and pagetable overwrites the
mmap_sem must be taken in write mode and all other anon_vma/i_mmap
locks must be taken too.
2) It'd be a waste to add branches in the VM if nobody could possibly
run KVM/GRU/XPMEM on the kernel, so mmu notifiers will only enabled if
CONFIG_KVM=m/y. In the current kernel kvm won't yet take advantage of
mmu notifiers, but this already allows to compile a KVM external module
against a kernel with mmu notifiers enabled and from the next pull from
kvm.git we'll start using them. And GRU/XPMEM will also be able to
continue the development by enabling KVM=m in their config, until they
submit all GRU/XPMEM GPLv2 code to the mainline kernel. Then they can
also enable MMU_NOTIFIERS in the same way KVM does it (even if KVM=n).
This guarantees nobody selects MMU_NOTIFIER=y if KVM and GRU and XPMEM
are all =n.
The mmu_notifier_register call can fail because mm_take_all_locks may be
interrupted by a signal and return -EINTR. Because mmu_notifier_reigster
is used when a driver startup, a failure can be gracefully handled. Here
an example of the change applied to kvm to register the mmu notifiers.
Usually when a driver startups other allocations are required anyway and
-ENOMEM failure paths exists already.
struct kvm *kvm_arch_create_vm(void)
{
struct kvm *kvm = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm), GFP_KERNEL);
+ int err;
if (!kvm)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages);
+ kvm->arch.mmu_notifier.ops = &kvm_mmu_notifier_ops;
+ err = mmu_notifier_register(&kvm->arch.mmu_notifier, current->mm);
+ if (err) {
+ kfree(kvm);
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
+ }
+
return kvm;
}
mmu_notifier_unregister returns void and it's reliable.
The patch also adds a few needed but missing includes that would prevent
kernel to compile after these changes on non-x86 archs (x86 didn't need
them by luck).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix mm/filemap_xip.c build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix mm/mmu_notifier.c build]
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@qumranet.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Jack Steiner <steiner@sgi.com>
Cc: Robin Holt <holt@sgi.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Kanoj Sarcar <kanojsarcar@yahoo.com>
Cc: Roland Dreier <rdreier@cisco.com>
Cc: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Cc: Avi Kivity <avi@qumranet.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <marcelo@kvack.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Izik Eidus <izike@qumranet.com>
Cc: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-28 22:46:29 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_MMU_NOTIFIER) += mmu_notifier.o
|
2009-09-22 00:01:57 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_KSM) += ksm.o
|
2016-03-15 21:56:27 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING) += page_poison.o
|
kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure
Kernel Address sanitizer (KASan) is a dynamic memory error detector. It
provides fast and comprehensive solution for finding use-after-free and
out-of-bounds bugs.
KASAN uses compile-time instrumentation for checking every memory access,
therefore GCC > v4.9.2 required. v4.9.2 almost works, but has issues with
putting symbol aliases into the wrong section, which breaks kasan
instrumentation of globals.
This patch only adds infrastructure for kernel address sanitizer. It's
not available for use yet. The idea and some code was borrowed from [1].
Basic idea:
The main idea of KASAN is to use shadow memory to record whether each byte
of memory is safe to access or not, and use compiler's instrumentation to
check the shadow memory on each memory access.
Address sanitizer uses 1/8 of the memory addressable in kernel for shadow
memory and uses direct mapping with a scale and offset to translate a
memory address to its corresponding shadow address.
Here is function to translate address to corresponding shadow address:
unsigned long kasan_mem_to_shadow(unsigned long addr)
{
return (addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT) + KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET;
}
where KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT = 3.
So for every 8 bytes there is one corresponding byte of shadow memory.
The following encoding used for each shadow byte: 0 means that all 8 bytes
of the corresponding memory region are valid for access; k (1 <= k <= 7)
means that the first k bytes are valid for access, and other (8 - k) bytes
are not; Any negative value indicates that the entire 8-bytes are
inaccessible. Different negative values used to distinguish between
different kinds of inaccessible memory (redzones, freed memory) (see
mm/kasan/kasan.h).
To be able to detect accesses to bad memory we need a special compiler.
Such compiler inserts a specific function calls (__asan_load*(addr),
__asan_store*(addr)) before each memory access of size 1, 2, 4, 8 or 16.
These functions check whether memory region is valid to access or not by
checking corresponding shadow memory. If access is not valid an error
printed.
Historical background of the address sanitizer from Dmitry Vyukov:
"We've developed the set of tools, AddressSanitizer (Asan),
ThreadSanitizer and MemorySanitizer, for user space. We actively use
them for testing inside of Google (continuous testing, fuzzing,
running prod services). To date the tools have found more than 10'000
scary bugs in Chromium, Google internal codebase and various
open-source projects (Firefox, OpenSSL, gcc, clang, ffmpeg, MySQL and
lots of others): [2] [3] [4].
The tools are part of both gcc and clang compilers.
We have not yet done massive testing under the Kernel AddressSanitizer
(it's kind of chicken and egg problem, you need it to be upstream to
start applying it extensively). To date it has found about 50 bugs.
Bugs that we've found in upstream kernel are listed in [5].
We've also found ~20 bugs in out internal version of the kernel. Also
people from Samsung and Oracle have found some.
[...]
As others noted, the main feature of AddressSanitizer is its
performance due to inline compiler instrumentation and simple linear
shadow memory. User-space Asan has ~2x slowdown on computational
programs and ~2x memory consumption increase. Taking into account that
kernel usually consumes only small fraction of CPU and memory when
running real user-space programs, I would expect that kernel Asan will
have ~10-30% slowdown and similar memory consumption increase (when we
finish all tuning).
I agree that Asan can well replace kmemcheck. We have plans to start
working on Kernel MemorySanitizer that finds uses of unitialized
memory. Asan+Msan will provide feature-parity with kmemcheck. As
others noted, Asan will unlikely replace debug slab and pagealloc that
can be enabled at runtime. Asan uses compiler instrumentation, so even
if it is disabled, it still incurs visible overheads.
Asan technology is easily portable to other architectures. Compiler
instrumentation is fully portable. Runtime has some arch-dependent
parts like shadow mapping and atomic operation interception. They are
relatively easy to port."
Comparison with other debugging features:
========================================
KMEMCHECK:
- KASan can do almost everything that kmemcheck can. KASan uses
compile-time instrumentation, which makes it significantly faster than
kmemcheck. The only advantage of kmemcheck over KASan is detection of
uninitialized memory reads.
Some brief performance testing showed that kasan could be
x500-x600 times faster than kmemcheck:
$ netperf -l 30
MIGRATED TCP STREAM TEST from 0.0.0.0 (0.0.0.0) port 0 AF_INET to localhost (127.0.0.1) port 0 AF_INET
Recv Send Send
Socket Socket Message Elapsed
Size Size Size Time Throughput
bytes bytes bytes secs. 10^6bits/sec
no debug: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 41624.72
kasan inline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 12870.54
kasan outline: 87380 16384 16384 30.00 10586.39
kmemcheck: 87380 16384 16384 30.03 20.23
- Also kmemcheck couldn't work on several CPUs. It always sets
number of CPUs to 1. KASan doesn't have such limitation.
DEBUG_PAGEALLOC:
- KASan is slower than DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, but KASan works on sub-page
granularity level, so it able to find more bugs.
SLUB_DEBUG (poisoning, redzones):
- SLUB_DEBUG has lower overhead than KASan.
- SLUB_DEBUG in most cases are not able to detect bad reads,
KASan able to detect both reads and writes.
- In some cases (e.g. redzone overwritten) SLUB_DEBUG detect
bugs only on allocation/freeing of object. KASan catch
bugs right before it will happen, so we always know exact
place of first bad read/write.
[1] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel
[2] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[3] https://code.google.com/p/thread-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[4] https://code.google.com/p/memory-sanitizer/wiki/FoundBugs
[5] https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel#Trophies
Based on work by Andrey Konovalov.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <adech.fo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Cc: Yuri Gribov <tetra2005@gmail.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-13 22:39:17 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN) += kasan/
|
mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure
Patch series "KFENCE: A low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector", v7.
This adds the Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE) infrastructure. KFENCE is a
low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector of heap
use-after-free, invalid-free, and out-of-bounds access errors. This
series enables KFENCE for the x86 and arm64 architectures, and adds
KFENCE hooks to the SLAB and SLUB allocators.
KFENCE is designed to be enabled in production kernels, and has near
zero performance overhead. Compared to KASAN, KFENCE trades performance
for precision. The main motivation behind KFENCE's design, is that with
enough total uptime KFENCE will detect bugs in code paths not typically
exercised by non-production test workloads. One way to quickly achieve a
large enough total uptime is when the tool is deployed across a large
fleet of machines.
KFENCE objects each reside on a dedicated page, at either the left or
right page boundaries. The pages to the left and right of the object
page are "guard pages", whose attributes are changed to a protected
state, and cause page faults on any attempted access to them. Such page
faults are then intercepted by KFENCE, which handles the fault
gracefully by reporting a memory access error.
Guarded allocations are set up based on a sample interval (can be set
via kfence.sample_interval). After expiration of the sample interval,
the next allocation through the main allocator (SLAB or SLUB) returns a
guarded allocation from the KFENCE object pool. At this point, the timer
is reset, and the next allocation is set up after the expiration of the
interval.
To enable/disable a KFENCE allocation through the main allocator's
fast-path without overhead, KFENCE relies on static branches via the
static keys infrastructure. The static branch is toggled to redirect the
allocation to KFENCE.
The KFENCE memory pool is of fixed size, and if the pool is exhausted no
further KFENCE allocations occur. The default config is conservative
with only 255 objects, resulting in a pool size of 2 MiB (with 4 KiB
pages).
We have verified by running synthetic benchmarks (sysbench I/O,
hackbench) and production server-workload benchmarks that a kernel with
KFENCE (using sample intervals 100-500ms) is performance-neutral
compared to a non-KFENCE baseline kernel.
KFENCE is inspired by GWP-ASan [1], a userspace tool with similar
properties. The name "KFENCE" is a homage to the Electric Fence Malloc
Debugger [2].
For more details, see Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst added in the
series -- also viewable here:
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/google/kasan/kfence/Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst
[1] http://llvm.org/docs/GwpAsan.html
[2] https://linux.die.net/man/3/efence
This patch (of 9):
This adds the Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE) infrastructure. KFENCE is a
low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector of heap
use-after-free, invalid-free, and out-of-bounds access errors.
KFENCE is designed to be enabled in production kernels, and has near
zero performance overhead. Compared to KASAN, KFENCE trades performance
for precision. The main motivation behind KFENCE's design, is that with
enough total uptime KFENCE will detect bugs in code paths not typically
exercised by non-production test workloads. One way to quickly achieve a
large enough total uptime is when the tool is deployed across a large
fleet of machines.
KFENCE objects each reside on a dedicated page, at either the left or
right page boundaries. The pages to the left and right of the object
page are "guard pages", whose attributes are changed to a protected
state, and cause page faults on any attempted access to them. Such page
faults are then intercepted by KFENCE, which handles the fault
gracefully by reporting a memory access error. To detect out-of-bounds
writes to memory within the object's page itself, KFENCE also uses
pattern-based redzones. The following figure illustrates the page
layout:
---+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+---
| xxxxxxxxx | O : | xxxxxxxxx | : O | xxxxxxxxx |
| xxxxxxxxx | B : | xxxxxxxxx | : B | xxxxxxxxx |
| x GUARD x | J : RED- | x GUARD x | RED- : J | x GUARD x |
| xxxxxxxxx | E : ZONE | xxxxxxxxx | ZONE : E | xxxxxxxxx |
| xxxxxxxxx | C : | xxxxxxxxx | : C | xxxxxxxxx |
| xxxxxxxxx | T : | xxxxxxxxx | : T | xxxxxxxxx |
---+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+---
Guarded allocations are set up based on a sample interval (can be set
via kfence.sample_interval). After expiration of the sample interval, a
guarded allocation from the KFENCE object pool is returned to the main
allocator (SLAB or SLUB). At this point, the timer is reset, and the
next allocation is set up after the expiration of the interval.
To enable/disable a KFENCE allocation through the main allocator's
fast-path without overhead, KFENCE relies on static branches via the
static keys infrastructure. The static branch is toggled to redirect the
allocation to KFENCE. To date, we have verified by running synthetic
benchmarks (sysbench I/O, hackbench) that a kernel compiled with KFENCE
is performance-neutral compared to the non-KFENCE baseline.
For more details, see Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst (added later in
the series).
[elver@google.com: fix parameter description for kfence_object_start()]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201106092149.GA2851373@elver.google.com
[elver@google.com: avoid stalling work queue task without allocations]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CADYN=9J0DQhizAGB0-jz4HOBBh+05kMBXb4c0cXMS7Qi5NAJiw@mail.gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201110135320.3309507-1-elver@google.com
[elver@google.com: fix potential deadlock due to wake_up()]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/000000000000c0645805b7f982e4@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210104130749.1768991-1-elver@google.com
[elver@google.com: add option to use KFENCE without static keys]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210111091544.3287013-1-elver@google.com
[elver@google.com: add missing copyright and description headers]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210118092159.145934-1-elver@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201103175841.3495947-2-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de>
Co-developed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Joern Engel <joern@purestorage.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26 01:18:53 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_KFENCE) += kfence/
|
2022-09-15 15:03:45 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_KMSAN) += kmsan/
|
2008-12-23 10:37:01 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_FAILSLAB) += failslab.o
|
2023-05-16 06:38:15 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_FAIL_PAGE_ALLOC) += fail_page_alloc.o
|
2015-04-14 22:48:27 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_MEMTEST) += memtest.o
|
2006-03-22 08:09:12 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_MIGRATION) += migrate.o
|
mm/demotion: add support for explicit memory tiers
Patch series "mm/demotion: Memory tiers and demotion", v15.
The current kernel has the basic memory tiering support: Inactive pages on
a higher tier NUMA node can be migrated (demoted) to a lower tier NUMA
node to make room for new allocations on the higher tier NUMA node.
Frequently accessed pages on a lower tier NUMA node can be migrated
(promoted) to a higher tier NUMA node to improve the performance.
In the current kernel, memory tiers are defined implicitly via a demotion
path relationship between NUMA nodes, which is created during the kernel
initialization and updated when a NUMA node is hot-added or hot-removed.
The current implementation puts all nodes with CPU into the highest tier,
and builds the tier hierarchy tier-by-tier by establishing the per-node
demotion targets based on the distances between nodes.
This current memory tier kernel implementation needs to be improved for
several important use cases:
* The current tier initialization code always initializes each
memory-only NUMA node into a lower tier. But a memory-only NUMA node
may have a high performance memory device (e.g. a DRAM-backed
memory-only node on a virtual machine) and that should be put into a
higher tier.
* The current tier hierarchy always puts CPU nodes into the top tier.
But on a system with HBM (e.g. GPU memory) devices, these memory-only
HBM NUMA nodes should be in the top tier, and DRAM nodes with CPUs are
better to be placed into the next lower tier.
* Also because the current tier hierarchy always puts CPU nodes into the
top tier, when a CPU is hot-added (or hot-removed) and triggers a memory
node from CPU-less into a CPU node (or vice versa), the memory tier
hierarchy gets changed, even though no memory node is added or removed.
This can make the tier hierarchy unstable and make it difficult to
support tier-based memory accounting.
* A higher tier node can only be demoted to nodes with shortest distance
on the next lower tier as defined by the demotion path, not any other
node from any lower tier. This strict, demotion order does not work in
all use cases (e.g. some use cases may want to allow cross-socket
demotion to another node in the same demotion tier as a fallback when
the preferred demotion node is out of space), and has resulted in the
feature request for an interface to override the system-wide, per-node
demotion order from the userspace. This demotion order is also
inconsistent with the page allocation fallback order when all the nodes
in a higher tier are out of space: The page allocation can fall back to
any node from any lower tier, whereas the demotion order doesn't allow
that.
This patch series make the creation of memory tiers explicit under the
control of device driver.
Memory Tier Initialization
==========================
Linux kernel presents memory devices as NUMA nodes and each memory device
is of a specific type. The memory type of a device is represented by its
abstract distance. A memory tier corresponds to a range of abstract
distance. This allows for classifying memory devices with a specific
performance range into a memory tier.
By default, all memory nodes are assigned to the default tier with
abstract distance 512.
A device driver can move its memory nodes from the default tier. For
example, PMEM can move its memory nodes below the default tier, whereas
GPU can move its memory nodes above the default tier.
The kernel initialization code makes the decision on which exact tier a
memory node should be assigned to based on the requests from the device
drivers as well as the memory device hardware information provided by the
firmware.
Hot-adding/removing CPUs doesn't affect memory tier hierarchy.
This patch (of 10):
In the current kernel, memory tiers are defined implicitly via a demotion
path relationship between NUMA nodes, which is created during the kernel
initialization and updated when a NUMA node is hot-added or hot-removed.
The current implementation puts all nodes with CPU into the highest tier,
and builds the tier hierarchy by establishing the per-node demotion
targets based on the distances between nodes.
This current memory tier kernel implementation needs to be improved for
several important use cases,
The current tier initialization code always initializes each memory-only
NUMA node into a lower tier. But a memory-only NUMA node may have a high
performance memory device (e.g. a DRAM-backed memory-only node on a
virtual machine) that should be put into a higher tier.
The current tier hierarchy always puts CPU nodes into the top tier. But
on a system with HBM or GPU devices, the memory-only NUMA nodes mapping
these devices should be in the top tier, and DRAM nodes with CPUs are
better to be placed into the next lower tier.
With current kernel higher tier node can only be demoted to nodes with
shortest distance on the next lower tier as defined by the demotion path,
not any other node from any lower tier. This strict, demotion order does
not work in all use cases (e.g. some use cases may want to allow
cross-socket demotion to another node in the same demotion tier as a
fallback when the preferred demotion node is out of space), This demotion
order is also inconsistent with the page allocation fallback order when
all the nodes in a higher tier are out of space: The page allocation can
fall back to any node from any lower tier, whereas the demotion order
doesn't allow that.
This patch series address the above by defining memory tiers explicitly.
Linux kernel presents memory devices as NUMA nodes and each memory device
is of a specific type. The memory type of a device is represented by its
abstract distance. A memory tier corresponds to a range of abstract
distance. This allows for classifying memory devices with a specific
performance range into a memory tier.
This patch configures the range/chunk size to be 128. The default DRAM
abstract distance is 512. We can have 4 memory tiers below the default
DRAM with abstract distance range 0 - 127, 127 - 255, 256- 383, 384 - 511.
Faster memory devices can be placed in these faster(higher) memory tiers.
Slower memory devices like persistent memory will have abstract distance
higher than the default DRAM level.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment, per Aneesh]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220818131042.113280-1-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220818131042.113280-2-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Wei Xu <weixugc@google.com>
Cc: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
Cc: Bharata B Rao <bharata@amd.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Hesham Almatary <hesham.almatary@huawei.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@intel.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Cc: Jagdish Gediya <jvgediya.oss@gmail.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-08-18 13:10:33 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA) += memory-tiers.o
|
2022-02-16 04:31:38 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_DEVICE_MIGRATION) += migrate_device.o
|
2016-07-26 22:26:24 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE) += huge_memory.o khugepaged.o
|
mm: memcontrol: lockless page counters
Memory is internally accounted in bytes, using spinlock-protected 64-bit
counters, even though the smallest accounting delta is a page. The
counter interface is also convoluted and does too many things.
Introduce a new lockless word-sized page counter API, then change all
memory accounting over to it. The translation from and to bytes then only
happens when interfacing with userspace.
The removed locking overhead is noticable when scaling beyond the per-cpu
charge caches - on a 4-socket machine with 144-threads, the following test
shows the performance differences of 288 memcgs concurrently running a
page fault benchmark:
vanilla:
18631648.500498 task-clock (msec) # 140.643 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.33% )
1,380,638 context-switches # 0.074 K/sec ( +- 0.75% )
24,390 cpu-migrations # 0.001 K/sec ( +- 8.44% )
1,843,305,768 page-faults # 0.099 M/sec ( +- 0.00% )
50,134,994,088,218 cycles # 2.691 GHz ( +- 0.33% )
<not supported> stalled-cycles-frontend
<not supported> stalled-cycles-backend
8,049,712,224,651 instructions # 0.16 insns per cycle ( +- 0.04% )
1,586,970,584,979 branches # 85.176 M/sec ( +- 0.05% )
1,724,989,949 branch-misses # 0.11% of all branches ( +- 0.48% )
132.474343877 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.21% )
lockless:
12195979.037525 task-clock (msec) # 133.480 CPUs utilized ( +- 0.18% )
832,850 context-switches # 0.068 K/sec ( +- 0.54% )
15,624 cpu-migrations # 0.001 K/sec ( +- 10.17% )
1,843,304,774 page-faults # 0.151 M/sec ( +- 0.00% )
32,811,216,801,141 cycles # 2.690 GHz ( +- 0.18% )
<not supported> stalled-cycles-frontend
<not supported> stalled-cycles-backend
9,999,265,091,727 instructions # 0.30 insns per cycle ( +- 0.10% )
2,076,759,325,203 branches # 170.282 M/sec ( +- 0.12% )
1,656,917,214 branch-misses # 0.08% of all branches ( +- 0.55% )
91.369330729 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.45% )
On top of improved scalability, this also gets rid of the icky long long
types in the very heart of memcg, which is great for 32 bit and also makes
the code a lot more readable.
Notable differences between the old and new API:
- res_counter_charge() and res_counter_charge_nofail() become
page_counter_try_charge() and page_counter_charge() resp. to match
the more common kernel naming scheme of try_do()/do()
- res_counter_uncharge_until() is only ever used to cancel a local
counter and never to uncharge bigger segments of a hierarchy, so
it's replaced by the simpler page_counter_cancel()
- res_counter_set_limit() is replaced by page_counter_limit(), which
expects its callers to serialize against themselves
- res_counter_memparse_write_strategy() is replaced by
page_counter_limit(), which rounds down to the nearest page size -
rather than up. This is more reasonable for explicitely requested
hard upper limits.
- to keep charging light-weight, page_counter_try_charge() charges
speculatively, only to roll back if the result exceeds the limit.
Because of this, a failing bigger charge can temporarily lock out
smaller charges that would otherwise succeed. The error is bounded
to the difference between the smallest and the biggest possible
charge size, so for memcg, this means that a failing THP charge can
send base page charges into reclaim upto 2MB (4MB) before the limit
would have been reached. This should be acceptable.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add includes for WARN_ON_ONCE and memparse]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add includes for WARN_ON_ONCE, memparse, strncmp, and PAGE_SIZE]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-10 23:42:31 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_COUNTER) += page_counter.o
|
2014-12-10 23:44:55 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_MEMCG) += memcontrol.o vmpressure.o
|
2022-09-26 13:57:04 +00:00
|
|
|
ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
|
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_MEMCG) += swap_cgroup.o
|
|
|
|
endif
|
2012-07-31 23:42:12 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_HUGETLB) += hugetlb_cgroup.o
|
mm/gup_benchmark: rename to mm/gup_test
Patch series "selftests/vm: gup_test, hmm-tests, assorted improvements", v3.
Summary: This series provides two main things, and a number of smaller
supporting goodies. The two main points are:
1) Add a new sub-test to gup_test, which in turn is a renamed version
of gup_benchmark. This sub-test allows nicer testing of dump_pages(),
at least on user-space pages.
For quite a while, I was doing a quick hack to gup_test.c whenever I
wanted to try out changes to dump_page(). Then Matthew Wilcox asked me
what I meant when I said "I used my dump_page() unit test", and I
realized that it might be nice to check in a polished up version of
that.
Details about how it works and how to use it are in the commit
description for patch #6 ("selftests/vm: gup_test: introduce the
dump_pages() sub-test").
2) Fixes a limitation of hmm-tests: these tests are incredibly useful,
but only if people actually build and run them. And it turns out that
libhugetlbfs is a little too effective at throwing a wrench in the
works, there. So I've added a little configuration check that removes
just two of the 21 hmm-tests, if libhugetlbfs is not available.
Further details in the commit description of patch #8
("selftests/vm: hmm-tests: remove the libhugetlbfs dependency").
Other smaller things that this series does:
a) Remove code duplication by creating gup_test.h.
b) Clear up the sub-test organization, and their invocation within
run_vmtests.sh.
c) Other minor assorted improvements.
[1] v2 is here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-doc/20200929212747.251804-1-jhubbard@nvidia.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wgh-TMPHLY3jueHX7Y2fWh3D+nMBqVS__AZm6-oorquWA@mail.gmail.com
This patch (of 9):
Rename nearly every "gup_benchmark" reference and file name to "gup_test".
The one exception is for the actual gup benchmark test itself.
The current code already does a *little* bit more than benchmarking, and
definitely covers more than get_user_pages_fast(). More importantly,
however, subsequent patches are about to add some functionality that is
non-benchmark related.
Closely related changes:
* Kconfig: in addition to renaming the options from GUP_BENCHMARK to
GUP_TEST, update the help text to reflect that it's no longer a
benchmark-only test.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201026064021.3545418-1-jhubbard@nvidia.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201026064021.3545418-2-jhubbard@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: Ralph Campbell <rcampbell@nvidia.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 03:05:05 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_GUP_TEST) += gup_test.o
|
2023-01-26 21:51:14 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_DMAPOOL_TEST) += dmapool_test.o
|
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE) += memory-failure.o
|
2009-09-16 09:50:17 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_HWPOISON_INJECT) += hwpoison-inject.o
|
2009-06-11 12:24:13 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK) += kmemleak.o
|
2017-02-27 22:30:22 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA_TEST) += rodata_test.o
|
mm/debug: add tests validating architecture page table helpers
This adds tests which will validate architecture page table helpers and
other accessors in their compliance with expected generic MM semantics.
This will help various architectures in validating changes to existing
page table helpers or addition of new ones.
This test covers basic page table entry transformations including but not
limited to old, young, dirty, clean, write, write protect etc at various
level along with populating intermediate entries with next page table page
and validating them.
Test page table pages are allocated from system memory with required size
and alignments. The mapped pfns at page table levels are derived from a
real pfn representing a valid kernel text symbol. This test gets called
via late_initcall().
This test gets built and run when CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE is selected.
Any architecture, which is willing to subscribe this test will need to
select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE. For now this is limited to arc, arm64,
x86, s390 and powerpc platforms where the test is known to build and run
successfully Going forward, other architectures too can subscribe the test
after fixing any build or runtime problems with their page table helpers.
Folks interested in making sure that a given platform's page table helpers
conform to expected generic MM semantics should enable the above config
which will just trigger this test during boot. Any non conformity here
will be reported as an warning which would need to be fixed. This test
will help catch any changes to the agreed upon semantics expected from
generic MM and enable platforms to accommodate it thereafter.
[anshuman.khandual@arm.com: v17]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1587436495-22033-3-git-send-email-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
[anshuman.khandual@arm.com: v18]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1588564865-31160-3-git-send-email-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Suggested-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Tested-by: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com> [s390]
Tested-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> [ppc32]
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1583919272-24178-1-git-send-email-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-04 23:47:15 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE) += debug_vm_pgtable.o
|
mm/page_owner: keep track of page owners
This is the page owner tracking code which is introduced so far ago. It
is resident on Andrew's tree, though, nobody tried to upstream so it
remain as is. Our company uses this feature actively to debug memory leak
or to find a memory hogger so I decide to upstream this feature.
This functionality help us to know who allocates the page. When
allocating a page, we store some information about allocation in extra
memory. Later, if we need to know status of all pages, we can get and
analyze it from this stored information.
In previous version of this feature, extra memory is statically defined in
struct page, but, in this version, extra memory is allocated outside of
struct page. It enables us to turn on/off this feature at boottime
without considerable memory waste.
Although we already have tracepoint for tracing page allocation/free,
using it to analyze page owner is rather complex. We need to enlarge the
trace buffer for preventing overlapping until userspace program launched.
And, launched program continually dump out the trace buffer for later
analysis and it would change system behaviour with more possibility rather
than just keeping it in memory, so bad for debug.
Moreover, we can use page_owner feature further for various purposes. For
example, we can use it for fragmentation statistics implemented in this
patch. And, I also plan to implement some CMA failure debugging feature
using this interface.
I'd like to give the credit for all developers contributed this feature,
but, it's not easy because I don't know exact history. Sorry about that.
Below is people who has "Signed-off-by" in the patches in Andrew's tree.
Contributor:
Alexander Nyberg <alexn@dsv.su.se>
Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com>
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Jungsoo Son <jungsoo.son@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com>
Cc: Jungsoo Son <jungsoo.son@lge.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-13 00:56:01 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER) += page_owner.o
|
2012-07-31 23:43:50 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_MEMORY_ISOLATION) += page_isolation.o
|
2014-08-06 23:08:36 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_ZPOOL) += zpool.o
|
2013-07-10 23:04:55 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_ZBUD) += zbud.o
|
2014-01-30 23:45:50 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_ZSMALLOC) += zsmalloc.o
|
2016-05-20 23:58:30 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_Z3FOLD) += z3fold.o
|
2014-04-07 22:39:48 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP) += early_ioremap.o
|
2014-08-06 23:05:25 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CMA) += cma.o
|
2014-10-09 22:29:32 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_MEMORY_BALLOON) += balloon_compaction.o
|
mm/page_ext: resurrect struct page extending code for debugging
When we debug something, we'd like to insert some information to every
page. For this purpose, we sometimes modify struct page itself. But,
this has drawbacks. First, it requires re-compile. This makes us
hesitate to use the powerful debug feature so development process is
slowed down. And, second, sometimes it is impossible to rebuild the
kernel due to third party module dependency. At third, system behaviour
would be largely different after re-compile, because it changes size of
struct page greatly and this structure is accessed by every part of
kernel. Keeping this as it is would be better to reproduce errornous
situation.
This feature is intended to overcome above mentioned problems. This
feature allocates memory for extended data per page in certain place
rather than the struct page itself. This memory can be accessed by the
accessor functions provided by this code. During the boot process, it
checks whether allocation of huge chunk of memory is needed or not. If
not, it avoids allocating memory at all. With this advantage, we can
include this feature into the kernel in default and can avoid rebuild and
solve related problems.
Until now, memcg uses this technique. But, now, memcg decides to embed
their variable to struct page itself and it's code to extend struct page
has been removed. I'd like to use this code to develop debug feature, so
this patch resurrect it.
To help these things to work well, this patch introduces two callbacks for
clients. One is the need callback which is mandatory if user wants to
avoid useless memory allocation at boot-time. The other is optional, init
callback, which is used to do proper initialization after memory is
allocated. Detailed explanation about purpose of these functions is in
code comment. Please refer it.
Others are completely same with previous extension code in memcg.
Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com>
Cc: Jungsoo Son <jungsoo.son@lge.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-13 00:55:46 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_EXTENSION) += page_ext.o
|
2022-01-14 22:06:37 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_CHECK) += page_table_check.o
|
2015-04-14 22:44:57 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CMA_DEBUGFS) += cma_debug.o
|
mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Introduce "memfd_secret" system call with the ability to create memory
areas visible only in the context of the owning process and not mapped not
only to other processes but in the kernel page tables as well.
The secretmem feature is off by default and the user must explicitly
enable it at the boot time.
Once secretmem is enabled, the user will be able to create a file
descriptor using the memfd_secret() system call. The memory areas created
by mmap() calls from this file descriptor will be unmapped from the kernel
direct map and they will be only mapped in the page table of the processes
that have access to the file descriptor.
Secretmem is designed to provide the following protections:
* Enhanced protection (in conjunction with all the other in-kernel
attack prevention systems) against ROP attacks. Seceretmem makes
"simple" ROP insufficient to perform exfiltration, which increases the
required complexity of the attack. Along with other protections like
the kernel stack size limit and address space layout randomization which
make finding gadgets is really hard, absence of any in-kernel primitive
for accessing secret memory means the one gadget ROP attack can't work.
Since the only way to access secret memory is to reconstruct the missing
mapping entry, the attacker has to recover the physical page and insert
a PTE pointing to it in the kernel and then retrieve the contents. That
takes at least three gadgets which is a level of difficulty beyond most
standard attacks.
* Prevent cross-process secret userspace memory exposures. Once the
secret memory is allocated, the user can't accidentally pass it into the
kernel to be transmitted somewhere. The secreremem pages cannot be
accessed via the direct map and they are disallowed in GUP.
* Harden against exploited kernel flaws. In order to access secretmem,
a kernel-side attack would need to either walk the page tables and
create new ones, or spawn a new privileged uiserspace process to perform
secrets exfiltration using ptrace.
The file descriptor based memory has several advantages over the
"traditional" mm interfaces, such as mlock(), mprotect(), madvise(). File
descriptor approach allows explicit and controlled sharing of the memory
areas, it allows to seal the operations. Besides, file descriptor based
memory paves the way for VMMs to remove the secret memory range from the
userspace hipervisor process, for instance QEMU. Andy Lutomirski says:
"Getting fd-backed memory into a guest will take some possibly major
work in the kernel, but getting vma-backed memory into a guest without
mapping it in the host user address space seems much, much worse."
memfd_secret() is made a dedicated system call rather than an extension to
memfd_create() because it's purpose is to allow the user to create more
secure memory mappings rather than to simply allow file based access to
the memory. Nowadays a new system call cost is negligible while it is way
simpler for userspace to deal with a clear-cut system calls than with a
multiplexer or an overloaded syscall. Moreover, the initial
implementation of memfd_secret() is completely distinct from
memfd_create() so there is no much sense in overloading memfd_create() to
begin with. If there will be a need for code sharing between these
implementation it can be easily achieved without a need to adjust user
visible APIs.
The secret memory remains accessible in the process context using uaccess
primitives, but it is not exposed to the kernel otherwise; secret memory
areas are removed from the direct map and functions in the
follow_page()/get_user_page() family will refuse to return a page that
belongs to the secret memory area.
Once there will be a use case that will require exposing secretmem to the
kernel it will be an opt-in request in the system call flags so that user
would have to decide what data can be exposed to the kernel.
Removing of the pages from the direct map may cause its fragmentation on
architectures that use large pages to map the physical memory which
affects the system performance. However, the original Kconfig text for
CONFIG_DIRECT_GBPAGES said that gigabyte pages in the direct map "... can
improve the kernel's performance a tiny bit ..." (commit 00d1c5e05736
("x86: add gbpages switches")) and the recent report [1] showed that "...
although 1G mappings are a good default choice, there is no compelling
evidence that it must be the only choice". Hence, it is sufficient to
have secretmem disabled by default with the ability of a system
administrator to enable it at boot time.
Pages in the secretmem regions are unevictable and unmovable to avoid
accidental exposure of the sensitive data via swap or during page
migration.
Since the secretmem mappings are locked in memory they cannot exceed
RLIMIT_MEMLOCK. Since these mappings are already locked independently
from mlock(), an attempt to mlock()/munlock() secretmem range would fail
and mlockall()/munlockall() will ignore secretmem mappings.
However, unlike mlock()ed memory, secretmem currently behaves more like
long-term GUP: secretmem mappings are unmovable mappings directly consumed
by user space. With default limits, there is no excessive use of
secretmem and it poses no real problem in combination with
ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA, but in the future this should be addressed to allow
balanced use of large amounts of secretmem along with ZONE_MOVABLE/CMA.
A page that was a part of the secret memory area is cleared when it is
freed to ensure the data is not exposed to the next user of that page.
The following example demonstrates creation of a secret mapping (error
handling is omitted):
fd = memfd_secret(0);
ftruncate(fd, MAP_SIZE);
ptr = mmap(NULL, MAP_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/213b4567-46ce-f116-9cdf-bbd0c884eb3c@linux.intel.com/
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: suppress Kconfig whine]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-5-rppt@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-08 01:08:03 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_SECRETMEM) += secretmem.o
|
2021-05-05 01:37:28 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CMA_SYSFS) += cma_sysfs.o
|
2015-09-04 22:47:04 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_USERFAULTFD) += userfaultfd.o
|
mm: introduce idle page tracking
Knowing the portion of memory that is not used by a certain application or
memory cgroup (idle memory) can be useful for partitioning the system
efficiently, e.g. by setting memory cgroup limits appropriately.
Currently, the only means to estimate the amount of idle memory provided
by the kernel is /proc/PID/{clear_refs,smaps}: the user can clear the
access bit for all pages mapped to a particular process by writing 1 to
clear_refs, wait for some time, and then count smaps:Referenced. However,
this method has two serious shortcomings:
- it does not count unmapped file pages
- it affects the reclaimer logic
To overcome these drawbacks, this patch introduces two new page flags,
Idle and Young, and a new sysfs file, /sys/kernel/mm/page_idle/bitmap.
A page's Idle flag can only be set from userspace by setting bit in
/sys/kernel/mm/page_idle/bitmap at the offset corresponding to the page,
and it is cleared whenever the page is accessed either through page tables
(it is cleared in page_referenced() in this case) or using the read(2)
system call (mark_page_accessed()). Thus by setting the Idle flag for
pages of a particular workload, which can be found e.g. by reading
/proc/PID/pagemap, waiting for some time to let the workload access its
working set, and then reading the bitmap file, one can estimate the amount
of pages that are not used by the workload.
The Young page flag is used to avoid interference with the memory
reclaimer. A page's Young flag is set whenever the Access bit of a page
table entry pointing to the page is cleared by writing to the bitmap file.
If page_referenced() is called on a Young page, it will add 1 to its
return value, therefore concealing the fact that the Access bit was
cleared.
Note, since there is no room for extra page flags on 32 bit, this feature
uses extended page flags when compiled on 32 bit.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: kpageidle requires an MMU]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: decouple from page-flags rework]
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com>
Reviewed-by: Andres Lagar-Cavilla <andreslc@google.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-09 22:35:45 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_IDLE_PAGE_TRACKING) += page_idle.o
|
2023-05-16 06:38:16 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC) += debug_page_alloc.o
|
mm/page_ref: add tracepoint to track down page reference manipulation
CMA allocation should be guaranteed to succeed by definition, but,
unfortunately, it would be failed sometimes. It is hard to track down
the problem, because it is related to page reference manipulation and we
don't have any facility to analyze it.
This patch adds tracepoints to track down page reference manipulation.
With it, we can find exact reason of failure and can fix the problem.
Following is an example of tracepoint output. (note: this example is
stale version that printing flags as the number. Recent version will
print it as human readable string.)
<...>-9018 [004] 92.678375: page_ref_set: pfn=0x17ac9 flags=0x0 count=1 mapcount=0 mapping=(nil) mt=4 val=1
<...>-9018 [004] 92.678378: kernel_stack:
=> get_page_from_freelist (ffffffff81176659)
=> __alloc_pages_nodemask (ffffffff81176d22)
=> alloc_pages_vma (ffffffff811bf675)
=> handle_mm_fault (ffffffff8119e693)
=> __do_page_fault (ffffffff810631ea)
=> trace_do_page_fault (ffffffff81063543)
=> do_async_page_fault (ffffffff8105c40a)
=> async_page_fault (ffffffff817581d8)
[snip]
<...>-9018 [004] 92.678379: page_ref_mod: pfn=0x17ac9 flags=0x40048 count=2 mapcount=1 mapping=0xffff880015a78dc1 mt=4 val=1
[snip]
...
...
<...>-9131 [001] 93.174468: test_pages_isolated: start_pfn=0x17800 end_pfn=0x17c00 fin_pfn=0x17ac9 ret=fail
[snip]
<...>-9018 [004] 93.174843: page_ref_mod_and_test: pfn=0x17ac9 flags=0x40068 count=0 mapcount=0 mapping=0xffff880015a78dc1 mt=4 val=-1 ret=1
=> release_pages (ffffffff8117c9e4)
=> free_pages_and_swap_cache (ffffffff811b0697)
=> tlb_flush_mmu_free (ffffffff81199616)
=> tlb_finish_mmu (ffffffff8119a62c)
=> exit_mmap (ffffffff811a53f7)
=> mmput (ffffffff81073f47)
=> do_exit (ffffffff810794e9)
=> do_group_exit (ffffffff81079def)
=> SyS_exit_group (ffffffff81079e74)
=> entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath (ffffffff817560b6)
This output shows that problem comes from exit path. In exit path, to
improve performance, pages are not freed immediately. They are gathered
and processed by batch. During this process, migration cannot be
possible and CMA allocation is failed. This problem is hard to find
without this page reference tracepoint facility.
Enabling this feature bloat kernel text 30 KB in my configuration.
text data bss dec hex filename
12127327 2243616 1507328 15878271 f2487f vmlinux_disabled
12157208 2258880 1507328 15923416 f2f8d8 vmlinux_enabled
Note that, due to header file dependency problem between mm.h and
tracepoint.h, this feature has to open code the static key functions for
tracepoints. Proposed by Steven Rostedt in following link.
https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/12/9/699
[arnd@arndb.de: crypto/async_pq: use __free_page() instead of put_page()]
[iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com: fix build failure for xtensa]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak Kconfig text, per Vlastimil]
Signed-off-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Acked-by: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-17 21:19:29 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGE_REF) += debug_page_ref.o
|
mm: introduce Data Access MONitor (DAMON)
Patch series "Introduce Data Access MONitor (DAMON)", v34.
Introduction
============
DAMON is a data access monitoring framework for the Linux kernel. The
core mechanisms of DAMON called 'region based sampling' and 'adaptive
regions adjustment' (refer to 'mechanisms.rst' in the 11th patch of this
patchset for the detail) make it
- accurate (The monitored information is useful for DRAM level memory
management. It might not appropriate for Cache-level accuracy,
though.),
- light-weight (The monitoring overhead is low enough to be applied
online while making no impact on the performance of the target
workloads.), and
- scalable (the upper-bound of the instrumentation overhead is
controllable regardless of the size of target workloads.).
Using this framework, therefore, several memory management mechanisms such
as reclamation and THP can be optimized to aware real data access
patterns. Experimental access pattern aware memory management
optimization works that incurring high instrumentation overhead will be
able to have another try.
Though DAMON is for kernel subsystems, it can be easily exposed to the
user space by writing a DAMON-wrapper kernel subsystem. Then, user space
users who have some special workloads will be able to write personalized
tools or applications for deeper understanding and specialized
optimizations of their systems.
DAMON is also merged in two public Amazon Linux kernel trees that based on
v5.4.y[1] and v5.10.y[2].
[1] https://github.com/amazonlinux/linux/tree/amazon-5.4.y/master/mm/damon
[2] https://github.com/amazonlinux/linux/tree/amazon-5.10.y/master/mm/damon
The userspace tool[1] is available, released under GPLv2, and actively
being maintained. I am also planning to implement another basic user
interface in perf[2]. Also, the basic test suite for DAMON is available
under GPLv2[3].
[1] https://github.com/awslabs/damo
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210107120729.22328-1-sjpark@amazon.com/
[3] https://github.com/awslabs/damon-tests
Long-term Plan
--------------
DAMON is a part of a project called Data Access-aware Operating System
(DAOS). As the name implies, I want to improve the performance and
efficiency of systems using fine-grained data access patterns. The
optimizations are for both kernel and user spaces. I will therefore
modify or create kernel subsystems, export some of those to user space and
implement user space library / tools. Below shows the layers and
components for the project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Primitives: PTE Accessed bit, PG_idle, rmap, (Intel CMT), ...
Framework: DAMON
Features: DAMOS, virtual addr, physical addr, ...
Applications: DAMON-debugfs, (DARC), ...
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ KERNEL SPACE ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Raw Interface: debugfs, (sysfs), (damonfs), tracepoints, (sys_damon), ...
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv USER SPACE vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv
Library: (libdamon), ...
Tools: DAMO, (perf), ...
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The components in parentheses or marked as '...' are not implemented yet
but in the future plan. IOW, those are the TODO tasks of DAOS project.
For more detail, please refer to the plans:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20201202082731.24828-1-sjpark@amazon.com/
Evaluations
===========
We evaluated DAMON's overhead, monitoring quality and usefulness using 24
realistic workloads on my QEMU/KVM based virtual machine running a kernel
that v24 DAMON patchset is applied.
DAMON is lightweight. It increases system memory usage by 0.39% and slows
target workloads down by 1.16%.
DAMON is accurate and useful for memory management optimizations. An
experimental DAMON-based operation scheme for THP, namely 'ethp', removes
76.15% of THP memory overheads while preserving 51.25% of THP speedup.
Another experimental DAMON-based 'proactive reclamation' implementation,
'prcl', reduces 93.38% of residential sets and 23.63% of system memory
footprint while incurring only 1.22% runtime overhead in the best case
(parsec3/freqmine).
NOTE that the experimental THP optimization and proactive reclamation are
not for production but only for proof of concepts.
Please refer to the official document[1] or "Documentation/admin-guide/mm:
Add a document for DAMON" patch in this patchset for detailed evaluation
setup and results.
[1] https://damonitor.github.io/doc/html/latest-damon/admin-guide/mm/damon/eval.html
Real-world User Story
=====================
In summary, DAMON has used on production systems and proved its usefulness.
DAMON as a profiler
-------------------
We analyzed characteristics of a large scale production systems of our
customers using DAMON. The systems utilize 70GB DRAM and 36 CPUs. From
this, we were able to find interesting things below.
There were obviously different access pattern under idle workload and
active workload. Under the idle workload, it accessed large memory
regions with low frequency, while the active workload accessed small
memory regions with high freuqnecy.
DAMON found a 7GB memory region that showing obviously high access
frequency under the active workload. We believe this is the
performance-effective working set and need to be protected.
There was a 4KB memory region that showing highest access frequency under
not only active but also idle workloads. We think this must be a hottest
code section like thing that should never be paged out.
For this analysis, DAMON used only 0.3-1% of single CPU time. Because we
used recording-based analysis, it consumed about 3-12 MB of disk space per
20 minutes. This is only small amount of disk space, but we can further
reduce the disk usage by using non-recording-based DAMON features. I'd
like to argue that only DAMON can do such detailed analysis (finding 4KB
highest region in 70GB memory) with the light overhead.
DAMON as a system optimization tool
-----------------------------------
We also found below potential performance problems on the systems and made
DAMON-based solutions.
The system doesn't want to make the workload suffer from the page
reclamation and thus it utilizes enough DRAM but no swap device. However,
we found the system is actively reclaiming file-backed pages, because the
system has intensive file IO. The file IO turned out to be not
performance critical for the workload, but the customer wanted to ensure
performance critical file-backed pages like code section to not mistakenly
be evicted.
Using direct IO should or `mlock()` would be a straightforward solution,
but modifying the user space code is not easy for the customer.
Alternatively, we could use DAMON-based operation scheme[1]. By using it,
we can ask DAMON to track access frequency of each region and make
'process_madvise(MADV_WILLNEED)[2]' call for regions having specific size
and access frequency for a time interval.
We also found the system is having high number of TLB misses. We tried
'always' THP enabled policy and it greatly reduced TLB misses, but the
page reclamation also been more frequent due to the THP internal
fragmentation caused memory bloat. We could try another DAMON-based
operation scheme that applies 'MADV_HUGEPAGE' to memory regions having
>=2MB size and high access frequency, while applying 'MADV_NOHUGEPAGE' to
regions having <2MB size and low access frequency.
We do not own the systems so we only reported the analysis results and
possible optimization solutions to the customers. The customers satisfied
about the analysis results and promised to try the optimization guides.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20201006123931.5847-1-sjpark@amazon.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-api/20200622192900.22757-4-minchan@kernel.org/
Comparison with Idle Page Tracking
==================================
Idle Page Tracking allows users to set and read idleness of pages using a
bitmap file which represents each page with each bit of the file. One
recommended usage of it is working set size detection. Users can do that
by
1. find PFN of each page for workloads in interest,
2. set all the pages as idle by doing writes to the bitmap file,
3. wait until the workload accesses its working set, and
4. read the idleness of the pages again and count pages became not idle.
NOTE: While Idle Page Tracking is for user space users, DAMON is primarily
designed for kernel subsystems though it can easily exposed to the user
space. Hence, this section only assumes such user space use of DAMON.
For what use cases Idle Page Tracking would be better?
------------------------------------------------------
1. Flexible usecases other than hotness monitoring.
Because Idle Page Tracking allows users to control the primitive (Page
idleness) by themselves, Idle Page Tracking users can do anything they
want. Meanwhile, DAMON is primarily designed to monitor the hotness of
each memory region. For this, DAMON asks users to provide sampling
interval and aggregation interval. For the reason, there could be some
use case that using Idle Page Tracking is simpler.
2. Physical memory monitoring.
Idle Page Tracking receives PFN range as input, so natively supports
physical memory monitoring.
DAMON is designed to be extensible for multiple address spaces and use
cases by implementing and using primitives for the given use case.
Therefore, by theory, DAMON has no limitation in the type of target
address space as long as primitives for the given address space exists.
However, the default primitives introduced by this patchset supports only
virtual address spaces.
Therefore, for physical memory monitoring, you should implement your own
primitives and use it, or simply use Idle Page Tracking.
Nonetheless, RFC patchsets[1] for the physical memory address space
primitives is already available. It also supports user memory same to
Idle Page Tracking.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200831104730.28970-1-sjpark@amazon.com/
For what use cases DAMON is better?
-----------------------------------
1. Hotness Monitoring.
Idle Page Tracking let users know only if a page frame is accessed or not.
For hotness check, the user should write more code and use more memory.
DAMON do that by itself.
2. Low Monitoring Overhead
DAMON receives user's monitoring request with one step and then provide
the results. So, roughly speaking, DAMON require only O(1) user/kernel
context switches.
In case of Idle Page Tracking, however, because the interface receives
contiguous page frames, the number of user/kernel context switches
increases as the monitoring target becomes complex and huge. As a result,
the context switch overhead could be not negligible.
Moreover, DAMON is born to handle with the monitoring overhead. Because
the core mechanism is pure logical, Idle Page Tracking users might be able
to implement the mechanism on their own, but it would be time consuming
and the user/kernel context switching will still more frequent than that
of DAMON. Also, the kernel subsystems cannot use the logic in this case.
3. Page granularity working set size detection.
Until v22 of this patchset, this was categorized as the thing Idle Page
Tracking could do better, because DAMON basically maintains additional
metadata for each of the monitoring target regions. So, in the page
granularity working set size detection use case, DAMON would incur (number
of monitoring target pages * size of metadata) memory overhead. Size of
the single metadata item is about 54 bytes, so assuming 4KB pages, about
1.3% of monitoring target pages will be additionally used.
All essential metadata for Idle Page Tracking are embedded in 'struct
page' and page table entries. Therefore, in this use case, only one
counter variable for working set size accounting is required if Idle Page
Tracking is used.
There are more details to consider, but roughly speaking, this is true in
most cases.
However, the situation changed from v23. Now DAMON supports arbitrary
types of monitoring targets, which don't use the metadata. Using that,
DAMON can do the working set size detection with no additional space
overhead but less user-kernel context switch. A first draft for the
implementation of monitoring primitives for this usage is available in a
DAMON development tree[1]. An RFC patchset for it based on this patchset
will also be available soon.
Since v24, the arbitrary type support is dropped from this patchset
because this patchset doesn't introduce real use of the type. You can
still get it from the DAMON development tree[2], though.
[1] https://github.com/sjp38/linux/tree/damon/pgidle_hack
[2] https://github.com/sjp38/linux/tree/damon/master
4. More future usecases
While Idle Page Tracking has tight coupling with base primitives (PG_Idle
and page table Accessed bits), DAMON is designed to be extensible for many
use cases and address spaces. If you need some special address type or
want to use special h/w access check primitives, you can write your own
primitives for that and configure DAMON to use those. Therefore, if your
use case could be changed a lot in future, using DAMON could be better.
Can I use both Idle Page Tracking and DAMON?
--------------------------------------------
Yes, though using them concurrently for overlapping memory regions could
result in interference to each other. Nevertheless, such use case would
be rare or makes no sense at all. Even in the case, the noise would bot
be really significant. So, you can choose whatever you want depending on
the characteristics of your use cases.
More Information
================
We prepared a showcase web site[1] that you can get more information.
There are
- the official documentations[2],
- the heatmap format dynamic access pattern of various realistic workloads for
heap area[3], mmap()-ed area[4], and stack[5] area,
- the dynamic working set size distribution[6] and chronological working set
size changes[7], and
- the latest performance test results[8].
[1] https://damonitor.github.io/_index
[2] https://damonitor.github.io/doc/html/latest-damon
[3] https://damonitor.github.io/test/result/visual/latest/rec.heatmap.0.png.html
[4] https://damonitor.github.io/test/result/visual/latest/rec.heatmap.1.png.html
[5] https://damonitor.github.io/test/result/visual/latest/rec.heatmap.2.png.html
[6] https://damonitor.github.io/test/result/visual/latest/rec.wss_sz.png.html
[7] https://damonitor.github.io/test/result/visual/latest/rec.wss_time.png.html
[8] https://damonitor.github.io/test/result/perf/latest/html/index.html
Baseline and Complete Git Trees
===============================
The patches are based on the latest -mm tree, specifically
v5.14-rc1-mmots-2021-07-15-18-47 of https://github.com/hnaz/linux-mm. You can
also clone the complete git tree:
$ git clone git://github.com/sjp38/linux -b damon/patches/v34
The web is also available:
https://github.com/sjp38/linux/releases/tag/damon/patches/v34
Development Trees
-----------------
There are a couple of trees for entire DAMON patchset series and features
for future release.
- For latest release: https://github.com/sjp38/linux/tree/damon/master
- For next release: https://github.com/sjp38/linux/tree/damon/next
Long-term Support Trees
-----------------------
For people who want to test DAMON but using LTS kernels, there are another
couple of trees based on two latest LTS kernels respectively and
containing the 'damon/master' backports.
- For v5.4.y: https://github.com/sjp38/linux/tree/damon/for-v5.4.y
- For v5.10.y: https://github.com/sjp38/linux/tree/damon/for-v5.10.y
Amazon Linux Kernel Trees
-------------------------
DAMON is also merged in two public Amazon Linux kernel trees that based on
v5.4.y[1] and v5.10.y[2].
[1] https://github.com/amazonlinux/linux/tree/amazon-5.4.y/master/mm/damon
[2] https://github.com/amazonlinux/linux/tree/amazon-5.10.y/master/mm/damon
Git Tree for Diff of Patches
============================
For easy review of diff between different versions of each patch, I
prepared a git tree containing all versions of the DAMON patchset series:
https://github.com/sjp38/damon-patches
You can clone it and use 'diff' for easy review of changes between
different versions of the patchset. For example:
$ git clone https://github.com/sjp38/damon-patches && cd damon-patches
$ diff -u damon/v33 damon/v34
Sequence Of Patches
===================
First three patches implement the core logics of DAMON. The 1st patch
introduces basic sampling based hotness monitoring for arbitrary types of
targets. Following two patches implement the core mechanisms for control
of overhead and accuracy, namely regions based sampling (patch 2) and
adaptive regions adjustment (patch 3).
Now the essential parts of DAMON is complete, but it cannot work unless
someone provides monitoring primitives for a specific use case. The
following two patches make it just work for virtual address spaces
monitoring. The 4th patch makes 'PG_idle' can be used by DAMON and the
5th patch implements the virtual memory address space specific monitoring
primitives using page table Accessed bits and the 'PG_idle' page flag.
Now DAMON just works for virtual address space monitoring via the kernel
space api. To let the user space users can use DAMON, following four
patches add interfaces for them. The 6th patch adds a tracepoint for
monitoring results. The 7th patch implements a DAMON application kernel
module, namely damon-dbgfs, that simply wraps DAMON and exposes DAMON
interface to the user space via the debugfs interface. The 8th patch
further exports pid of monitoring thread (kdamond) to user space for
easier cpu usage accounting, and the 9th patch makes the debugfs interface
to support multiple contexts.
Three patches for maintainability follows. The 10th patch adds
documentations for both the user space and the kernel space. The 11th
patch provides unit tests (based on the kunit) while the 12th patch adds
user space tests (based on the kselftest).
Finally, the last patch (13th) updates the MAINTAINERS file.
This patch (of 13):
DAMON is a data access monitoring framework for the Linux kernel. The
core mechanisms of DAMON make it
- accurate (the monitoring output is useful enough for DRAM level
performance-centric memory management; It might be inappropriate for
CPU cache levels, though),
- light-weight (the monitoring overhead is normally low enough to be
applied online), and
- scalable (the upper-bound of the overhead is in constant range
regardless of the size of target workloads).
Using this framework, hence, we can easily write efficient kernel space
data access monitoring applications. For example, the kernel's memory
management mechanisms can make advanced decisions using this.
Experimental data access aware optimization works that incurring high
access monitoring overhead could again be implemented on top of this.
Due to its simple and flexible interface, providing user space interface
would be also easy. Then, user space users who have some special
workloads can write personalized applications for better understanding and
optimizations of their workloads and systems.
===
Nevertheless, this commit is defining and implementing only basic access
check part without the overhead-accuracy handling core logic. The basic
access check is as below.
The output of DAMON says what memory regions are how frequently accessed
for a given duration. The resolution of the access frequency is
controlled by setting ``sampling interval`` and ``aggregation interval``.
In detail, DAMON checks access to each page per ``sampling interval`` and
aggregates the results. In other words, counts the number of the accesses
to each region. After each ``aggregation interval`` passes, DAMON calls
callback functions that previously registered by users so that users can
read the aggregated results and then clears the results. This can be
described in below simple pseudo-code::
init()
while monitoring_on:
for page in monitoring_target:
if accessed(page):
nr_accesses[page] += 1
if time() % aggregation_interval == 0:
for callback in user_registered_callbacks:
callback(monitoring_target, nr_accesses)
for page in monitoring_target:
nr_accesses[page] = 0
if time() % update_interval == 0:
update()
sleep(sampling interval)
The target regions constructed at the beginning of the monitoring and
updated after each ``regions_update_interval``, because the target regions
could be dynamically changed (e.g., mmap() or memory hotplug). The
monitoring overhead of this mechanism will arbitrarily increase as the
size of the target workload grows.
The basic monitoring primitives for actual access check and dynamic target
regions construction aren't in the core part of DAMON. Instead, it allows
users to implement their own primitives that are optimized for their use
case and configure DAMON to use those. In other words, users cannot use
current version of DAMON without some additional works.
Following commits will implement the core mechanisms for the
overhead-accuracy control and default primitives implementations.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210716081449.22187-1-sj38.park@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210716081449.22187-2-sj38.park@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de>
Reviewed-by: Leonard Foerster <foersleo@amazon.de>
Reviewed-by: Fernand Sieber <sieberf@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Amit Shah <amit@kernel.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Fan Du <fan.du@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Maximilian Heyne <mheyne@amazon.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com>
Cc: Markus Boehme <markubo@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-08 02:56:28 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_DAMON) += damon/
|
2016-06-07 18:05:33 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY) += usercopy.o
|
2017-06-19 23:28:31 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_PERCPU_STATS) += percpu-stats.o
|
2019-08-03 04:49:26 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_ZONE_DEVICE) += memremap.o
|
2019-06-26 12:27:23 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_HMM_MIRROR) += hmm.o
|
2018-06-08 00:06:01 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE) += memfd.o
|
2019-03-19 12:12:30 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_MAPPING_DIRTY_HELPERS) += mapping_dirty_helpers.o
|
2020-02-04 01:36:20 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_PTDUMP_CORE) += ptdump.o
|
2020-04-07 03:04:56 +00:00
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|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_REPORTING) += page_reporting.o
|
2021-04-30 05:57:32 +00:00
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|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_IO_MAPPING) += io-mapping.o
|
mm: memory_hotplug: factor out bootmem core functions to bootmem_info.c
Patch series "Free some vmemmap pages of HugeTLB page", v23.
This patch series will free some vmemmap pages(struct page structures)
associated with each HugeTLB page when preallocated to save memory.
In order to reduce the difficulty of the first version of code review. In
this version, we disable PMD/huge page mapping of vmemmap if this feature
was enabled. This acutely eliminates a bunch of the complex code doing
page table manipulation. When this patch series is solid, we cam add the
code of vmemmap page table manipulation in the future.
The struct page structures (page structs) are used to describe a physical
page frame. By default, there is an one-to-one mapping from a page frame
to it's corresponding page struct.
The HugeTLB pages consist of multiple base page size pages and is
supported by many architectures. See hugetlbpage.rst in the Documentation
directory for more details. On the x86 architecture, HugeTLB pages of
size 2MB and 1GB are currently supported. Since the base page size on x86
is 4KB, a 2MB HugeTLB page consists of 512 base pages and a 1GB HugeTLB
page consists of 4096 base pages. For each base page, there is a
corresponding page struct.
Within the HugeTLB subsystem, only the first 4 page structs are used to
contain unique information about a HugeTLB page. HUGETLB_CGROUP_MIN_ORDER
provides this upper limit. The only 'useful' information in the remaining
page structs is the compound_head field, and this field is the same for
all tail pages.
By removing redundant page structs for HugeTLB pages, memory can returned
to the buddy allocator for other uses.
When the system boot up, every 2M HugeTLB has 512 struct page structs which
size is 8 pages(sizeof(struct page) * 512 / PAGE_SIZE).
HugeTLB struct pages(8 pages) page frame(8 pages)
+-----------+ ---virt_to_page---> +-----------+ mapping to +-----------+
| | | 0 | -------------> | 0 |
| | +-----------+ +-----------+
| | | 1 | -------------> | 1 |
| | +-----------+ +-----------+
| | | 2 | -------------> | 2 |
| | +-----------+ +-----------+
| | | 3 | -------------> | 3 |
| | +-----------+ +-----------+
| | | 4 | -------------> | 4 |
| 2MB | +-----------+ +-----------+
| | | 5 | -------------> | 5 |
| | +-----------+ +-----------+
| | | 6 | -------------> | 6 |
| | +-----------+ +-----------+
| | | 7 | -------------> | 7 |
| | +-----------+ +-----------+
| |
| |
| |
+-----------+
The value of page->compound_head is the same for all tail pages. The
first page of page structs (page 0) associated with the HugeTLB page
contains the 4 page structs necessary to describe the HugeTLB. The only
use of the remaining pages of page structs (page 1 to page 7) is to point
to page->compound_head. Therefore, we can remap pages 2 to 7 to page 1.
Only 2 pages of page structs will be used for each HugeTLB page. This
will allow us to free the remaining 6 pages to the buddy allocator.
Here is how things look after remapping.
HugeTLB struct pages(8 pages) page frame(8 pages)
+-----------+ ---virt_to_page---> +-----------+ mapping to +-----------+
| | | 0 | -------------> | 0 |
| | +-----------+ +-----------+
| | | 1 | -------------> | 1 |
| | +-----------+ +-----------+
| | | 2 | ----------------^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
| | +-----------+ | | | | |
| | | 3 | ------------------+ | | | |
| | +-----------+ | | | |
| | | 4 | --------------------+ | | |
| 2MB | +-----------+ | | |
| | | 5 | ----------------------+ | |
| | +-----------+ | |
| | | 6 | ------------------------+ |
| | +-----------+ |
| | | 7 | --------------------------+
| | +-----------+
| |
| |
| |
+-----------+
When a HugeTLB is freed to the buddy system, we should allocate 6 pages
for vmemmap pages and restore the previous mapping relationship.
Apart from 2MB HugeTLB page, we also have 1GB HugeTLB page. It is similar
to the 2MB HugeTLB page. We also can use this approach to free the
vmemmap pages.
In this case, for the 1GB HugeTLB page, we can save 4094 pages. This is a
very substantial gain. On our server, run some SPDK/QEMU applications
which will use 1024GB HugeTLB page. With this feature enabled, we can
save ~16GB (1G hugepage)/~12GB (2MB hugepage) memory.
Because there are vmemmap page tables reconstruction on the
freeing/allocating path, it increases some overhead. Here are some
overhead analysis.
1) Allocating 10240 2MB HugeTLB pages.
a) With this patch series applied:
# time echo 10240 > /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages
real 0m0.166s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m0.166s
# bpftrace -e 'kprobe:alloc_fresh_huge_page { @start[tid] = nsecs; }
kretprobe:alloc_fresh_huge_page /@start[tid]/ { @latency = hist(nsecs -
@start[tid]); delete(@start[tid]); }'
Attaching 2 probes...
@latency:
[8K, 16K) 5476 |@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@|
[16K, 32K) 4760 |@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ |
[32K, 64K) 4 | |
b) Without this patch series:
# time echo 10240 > /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages
real 0m0.067s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m0.067s
# bpftrace -e 'kprobe:alloc_fresh_huge_page { @start[tid] = nsecs; }
kretprobe:alloc_fresh_huge_page /@start[tid]/ { @latency = hist(nsecs -
@start[tid]); delete(@start[tid]); }'
Attaching 2 probes...
@latency:
[4K, 8K) 10147 |@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@|
[8K, 16K) 93 | |
Summarize: this feature is about ~2x slower than before.
2) Freeing 10240 2MB HugeTLB pages.
a) With this patch series applied:
# time echo 0 > /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages
real 0m0.213s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m0.213s
# bpftrace -e 'kprobe:free_pool_huge_page { @start[tid] = nsecs; }
kretprobe:free_pool_huge_page /@start[tid]/ { @latency = hist(nsecs -
@start[tid]); delete(@start[tid]); }'
Attaching 2 probes...
@latency:
[8K, 16K) 6 | |
[16K, 32K) 10227 |@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@|
[32K, 64K) 7 | |
b) Without this patch series:
# time echo 0 > /proc/sys/vm/nr_hugepages
real 0m0.081s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m0.081s
# bpftrace -e 'kprobe:free_pool_huge_page { @start[tid] = nsecs; }
kretprobe:free_pool_huge_page /@start[tid]/ { @latency = hist(nsecs -
@start[tid]); delete(@start[tid]); }'
Attaching 2 probes...
@latency:
[4K, 8K) 6805 |@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@|
[8K, 16K) 3427 |@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ |
[16K, 32K) 8 | |
Summary: The overhead of __free_hugepage is about ~2-3x slower than before.
Although the overhead has increased, the overhead is not significant.
Like Mike said, "However, remember that the majority of use cases create
HugeTLB pages at or shortly after boot time and add them to the pool. So,
additional overhead is at pool creation time. There is no change to
'normal run time' operations of getting a page from or returning a page to
the pool (think page fault/unmap)".
Despite the overhead and in addition to the memory gains from this series.
The following data is obtained by Joao Martins. Very thanks to his
effort.
There's an additional benefit which is page (un)pinners will see an improvement
and Joao presumes because there are fewer memmap pages and thus the tail/head
pages are staying in cache more often.
Out of the box Joao saw (when comparing linux-next against linux-next +
this series) with gup_test and pinning a 16G HugeTLB file (with 1G pages):
get_user_pages(): ~32k -> ~9k
unpin_user_pages(): ~75k -> ~70k
Usually any tight loop fetching compound_head(), or reading tail pages
data (e.g. compound_head) benefit a lot. There's some unpinning
inefficiencies Joao was fixing[2], but with that in added it shows even
more:
unpin_user_pages(): ~27k -> ~3.8k
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210409205254.242291-1-mike.kravetz@oracle.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210204202500.26474-1-joao.m.martins@oracle.com/
This patch (of 9):
Move bootmem info registration common API to individual bootmem_info.c.
And we will use {get,put}_page_bootmem() to initialize the page for the
vmemmap pages or free the vmemmap pages to buddy in the later patch. So
move them out of CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG_SPARSE. This is just code movement
without any functional change.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210510030027.56044-1-songmuchun@bytedance.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210510030027.56044-2-songmuchun@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Chen Huang <chenhuang5@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Bodeddula Balasubramaniam <bodeddub@amazon.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Cc: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Barry Song <song.bao.hua@hisilicon.com>
Cc: HORIGUCHI NAOYA <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Cc: Xiongchun Duan <duanxiongchun@bytedance.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-07-01 01:47:00 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_BOOTMEM_INFO_NODE) += bootmem_info.o
|
2021-09-08 02:56:01 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_IOREMAP) += ioremap.o
|
2022-06-01 03:22:23 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_SHRINKER_DEBUG) += shrinker_debug.o
|