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linux/kernel/pid_sysctl.h

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mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC The new MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC flags allows application to set executable bit at creation time (memfd_create). When MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is set, memfd is created without executable bit (mode:0666), and sealed with F_SEAL_EXEC, so it can't be chmod to be executable (mode: 0777) after creation. when MFD_EXEC flag is set, memfd is created with executable bit (mode:0777), this is the same as the old behavior of memfd_create. The new pid namespaced sysctl vm.memfd_noexec has 3 values: 0: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like MFD_EXEC was set. 1: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was set. 2: memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected. The sysctl allows finer control of memfd_create for old-software that doesn't set the executable bit, for example, a container with vm.memfd_noexec=1 means the old-software will create non-executable memfd by default. Also, the value of memfd_noexec is passed to child namespace at creation time. For example, if the init namespace has vm.memfd_noexec=2, all its children namespaces will be created with 2. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add stub functions to fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded register_pid_ns_ctl_table_vm() stub, per Jeff] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/pr_warn_ratelimited/pr_warn_once/, per review] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix CONFIG_SYSCTL=n warning] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215001205.51969-4-jeffxu@google.com Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Co-developed-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-12-15 00:12:03 +00:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef LINUX_PID_SYSCTL_H
#define LINUX_PID_SYSCTL_H
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) && defined(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE)
sysctl: treewide: constify the ctl_table argument of proc_handlers const qualify the struct ctl_table argument in the proc_handler function signatures. This is a prerequisite to moving the static ctl_table structs into .rodata data which will ensure that proc_handler function pointers cannot be modified. This patch has been generated by the following coccinelle script: ``` virtual patch @r1@ identifier ctl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos; identifier func !~ "appldata_(timer|interval)_handler|sched_(rt|rr)_handler|rds_tcp_skbuf_handler|proc_sctp_do_(hmac_alg|rto_min|rto_max|udp_port|alpha_beta|auth|probe_interval)"; @@ int func( - struct ctl_table *ctl + const struct ctl_table *ctl ,int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); @r2@ identifier func, ctl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos; @@ int func( - struct ctl_table *ctl + const struct ctl_table *ctl ,int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { ... } @r3@ identifier func; @@ int func( - struct ctl_table * + const struct ctl_table * ,int , void *, size_t *, loff_t *); @r4@ identifier func, ctl; @@ int func( - struct ctl_table *ctl + const struct ctl_table *ctl ,int , void *, size_t *, loff_t *); @r5@ identifier func, write, buffer, lenp, ppos; @@ int func( - struct ctl_table * + const struct ctl_table * ,int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos); ``` * Code formatting was adjusted in xfs_sysctl.c to comply with code conventions. The xfs_stats_clear_proc_handler, xfs_panic_mask_proc_handler and xfs_deprecated_dointvec_minmax where adjusted. * The ctl_table argument in proc_watchdog_common was const qualified. This is called from a proc_handler itself and is calling back into another proc_handler, making it necessary to change it as part of the proc_handler migration. Co-developed-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net> Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net> Co-developed-by: Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com>
2024-07-24 18:59:29 +00:00
static int pid_mfd_noexec_dointvec_minmax(const struct ctl_table *table,
mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC The new MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC flags allows application to set executable bit at creation time (memfd_create). When MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is set, memfd is created without executable bit (mode:0666), and sealed with F_SEAL_EXEC, so it can't be chmod to be executable (mode: 0777) after creation. when MFD_EXEC flag is set, memfd is created with executable bit (mode:0777), this is the same as the old behavior of memfd_create. The new pid namespaced sysctl vm.memfd_noexec has 3 values: 0: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like MFD_EXEC was set. 1: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was set. 2: memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected. The sysctl allows finer control of memfd_create for old-software that doesn't set the executable bit, for example, a container with vm.memfd_noexec=1 means the old-software will create non-executable memfd by default. Also, the value of memfd_noexec is passed to child namespace at creation time. For example, if the init namespace has vm.memfd_noexec=2, all its children namespaces will be created with 2. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add stub functions to fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded register_pid_ns_ctl_table_vm() stub, per Jeff] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/pr_warn_ratelimited/pr_warn_once/, per review] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix CONFIG_SYSCTL=n warning] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215001205.51969-4-jeffxu@google.com Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Co-developed-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-12-15 00:12:03 +00:00
int write, void *buf, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct pid_namespace *ns = task_active_pid_ns(current);
struct ctl_table table_copy;
memfd: replace ratcheting feature from vm.memfd_noexec with hierarchy This sysctl has the very unusual behaviour of not allowing any user (even CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to reduce the restriction setting, meaning that if you were to set this sysctl to a more restrictive option in the host pidns you would need to reboot your machine in order to reset it. The justification given in [1] is that this is a security feature and thus it should not be possible to disable. Aside from the fact that we have plenty of security-related sysctls that can be disabled after being enabled (fs.protected_symlinks for instance), the protection provided by the sysctl is to stop users from being able to create a binary and then execute it. A user with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can trivially do this without memfd_create(2): % cat mount-memfd.c #include <fcntl.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/mount.h> #define SHELLCODE "#!/bin/echo this file was executed from this totally private tmpfs:" int main(void) { int fsfd = fsopen("tmpfs", FSOPEN_CLOEXEC); assert(fsfd >= 0); assert(!fsconfig(fsfd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 2)); int dfd = fsmount(fsfd, FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC, 0); assert(dfd >= 0); int execfd = openat(dfd, "exe", O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0782); assert(execfd >= 0); assert(write(execfd, SHELLCODE, strlen(SHELLCODE)) == strlen(SHELLCODE)); assert(!close(execfd)); char *execpath = NULL; char *argv[] = { "bad-exe", NULL }, *envp[] = { NULL }; execfd = openat(dfd, "exe", O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC); assert(execfd >= 0); assert(asprintf(&execpath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", execfd) > 0); assert(!execve(execpath, argv, envp)); } % ./mount-memfd this file was executed from this totally private tmpfs: /proc/self/fd/5 % Given that it is possible for CAP_SYS_ADMIN users to create executable binaries without memfd_create(2) and without touching the host filesystem (not to mention the many other things a CAP_SYS_ADMIN process would be able to do that would be equivalent or worse), it seems strange to cause a fair amount of headache to admins when there doesn't appear to be an actual security benefit to blocking this. There appear to be concerns about confused-deputy-esque attacks[2] but a confused deputy that can write to arbitrary sysctls is a bigger security issue than executable memfds. /* New API */ The primary requirement from the original author appears to be more based on the need to be able to restrict an entire system in a hierarchical manner[3], such that child namespaces cannot re-enable executable memfds. So, implement that behaviour explicitly -- the vm.memfd_noexec scope is evaluated up the pidns tree to &init_pid_ns and you have the most restrictive value applied to you. The new lower limit you can set vm.memfd_noexec is whatever limit applies to your parent. Note that a pidns will inherit a copy of the parent pidns's effective vm.memfd_noexec setting at unshare() time. This matches the existing behaviour, and it also ensures that a pidns will never have its vm.memfd_noexec setting *lowered* behind its back (but it will be raised if the parent raises theirs). /* Backwards Compatibility */ As the previous version of the sysctl didn't allow you to lower the setting at all, there are no backwards compatibility issues with this aspect of the change. However it should be noted that now that the setting is completely hierarchical. Previously, a cloned pidns would just copy the current pidns setting, meaning that if the parent's vm.memfd_noexec was changed it wouldn't propoagate to existing pid namespaces. Now, the restriction applies recursively. This is a uAPI change, however: * The sysctl is very new, having been merged in 6.3. * Several aspects of the sysctl were broken up until this patchset and the other patchset by Jeff Xu last month. And thus it seems incredibly unlikely that any real users would run into this issue. In the worst case, if this causes userspace isues we could make it so that modifying the setting follows the hierarchical rules but the restriction checking uses the cached copy. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/CABi2SkWnAgHK1i6iqSqPMYuNEhtHBkO8jUuCvmG3RmUB5TKHJw@mail.gmail.com/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/CALmYWFs_dNCzw_pW1yRAo4bGCPEtykroEQaowNULp7svwMLjOg@mail.gmail.com/ [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/CALmYWFuahdUF7cT4cm7_TGLqPanuHXJ-hVSfZt7vpTnc18DPrw@mail.gmail.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814-memfd-vm-noexec-uapi-fixes-v2-4-7ff9e3e10ba6@cyphar.com Fixes: 105ff5339f49 ("mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC") Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-08-14 08:41:00 +00:00
int err, scope, parent_scope;
mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC The new MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC flags allows application to set executable bit at creation time (memfd_create). When MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is set, memfd is created without executable bit (mode:0666), and sealed with F_SEAL_EXEC, so it can't be chmod to be executable (mode: 0777) after creation. when MFD_EXEC flag is set, memfd is created with executable bit (mode:0777), this is the same as the old behavior of memfd_create. The new pid namespaced sysctl vm.memfd_noexec has 3 values: 0: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like MFD_EXEC was set. 1: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was set. 2: memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected. The sysctl allows finer control of memfd_create for old-software that doesn't set the executable bit, for example, a container with vm.memfd_noexec=1 means the old-software will create non-executable memfd by default. Also, the value of memfd_noexec is passed to child namespace at creation time. For example, if the init namespace has vm.memfd_noexec=2, all its children namespaces will be created with 2. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add stub functions to fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded register_pid_ns_ctl_table_vm() stub, per Jeff] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/pr_warn_ratelimited/pr_warn_once/, per review] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix CONFIG_SYSCTL=n warning] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215001205.51969-4-jeffxu@google.com Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Co-developed-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-12-15 00:12:03 +00:00
if (write && !ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
table_copy = *table;
memfd: replace ratcheting feature from vm.memfd_noexec with hierarchy This sysctl has the very unusual behaviour of not allowing any user (even CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to reduce the restriction setting, meaning that if you were to set this sysctl to a more restrictive option in the host pidns you would need to reboot your machine in order to reset it. The justification given in [1] is that this is a security feature and thus it should not be possible to disable. Aside from the fact that we have plenty of security-related sysctls that can be disabled after being enabled (fs.protected_symlinks for instance), the protection provided by the sysctl is to stop users from being able to create a binary and then execute it. A user with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can trivially do this without memfd_create(2): % cat mount-memfd.c #include <fcntl.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/mount.h> #define SHELLCODE "#!/bin/echo this file was executed from this totally private tmpfs:" int main(void) { int fsfd = fsopen("tmpfs", FSOPEN_CLOEXEC); assert(fsfd >= 0); assert(!fsconfig(fsfd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 2)); int dfd = fsmount(fsfd, FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC, 0); assert(dfd >= 0); int execfd = openat(dfd, "exe", O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0782); assert(execfd >= 0); assert(write(execfd, SHELLCODE, strlen(SHELLCODE)) == strlen(SHELLCODE)); assert(!close(execfd)); char *execpath = NULL; char *argv[] = { "bad-exe", NULL }, *envp[] = { NULL }; execfd = openat(dfd, "exe", O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC); assert(execfd >= 0); assert(asprintf(&execpath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", execfd) > 0); assert(!execve(execpath, argv, envp)); } % ./mount-memfd this file was executed from this totally private tmpfs: /proc/self/fd/5 % Given that it is possible for CAP_SYS_ADMIN users to create executable binaries without memfd_create(2) and without touching the host filesystem (not to mention the many other things a CAP_SYS_ADMIN process would be able to do that would be equivalent or worse), it seems strange to cause a fair amount of headache to admins when there doesn't appear to be an actual security benefit to blocking this. There appear to be concerns about confused-deputy-esque attacks[2] but a confused deputy that can write to arbitrary sysctls is a bigger security issue than executable memfds. /* New API */ The primary requirement from the original author appears to be more based on the need to be able to restrict an entire system in a hierarchical manner[3], such that child namespaces cannot re-enable executable memfds. So, implement that behaviour explicitly -- the vm.memfd_noexec scope is evaluated up the pidns tree to &init_pid_ns and you have the most restrictive value applied to you. The new lower limit you can set vm.memfd_noexec is whatever limit applies to your parent. Note that a pidns will inherit a copy of the parent pidns's effective vm.memfd_noexec setting at unshare() time. This matches the existing behaviour, and it also ensures that a pidns will never have its vm.memfd_noexec setting *lowered* behind its back (but it will be raised if the parent raises theirs). /* Backwards Compatibility */ As the previous version of the sysctl didn't allow you to lower the setting at all, there are no backwards compatibility issues with this aspect of the change. However it should be noted that now that the setting is completely hierarchical. Previously, a cloned pidns would just copy the current pidns setting, meaning that if the parent's vm.memfd_noexec was changed it wouldn't propoagate to existing pid namespaces. Now, the restriction applies recursively. This is a uAPI change, however: * The sysctl is very new, having been merged in 6.3. * Several aspects of the sysctl were broken up until this patchset and the other patchset by Jeff Xu last month. And thus it seems incredibly unlikely that any real users would run into this issue. In the worst case, if this causes userspace isues we could make it so that modifying the setting follows the hierarchical rules but the restriction checking uses the cached copy. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/CABi2SkWnAgHK1i6iqSqPMYuNEhtHBkO8jUuCvmG3RmUB5TKHJw@mail.gmail.com/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/CALmYWFs_dNCzw_pW1yRAo4bGCPEtykroEQaowNULp7svwMLjOg@mail.gmail.com/ [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/CALmYWFuahdUF7cT4cm7_TGLqPanuHXJ-hVSfZt7vpTnc18DPrw@mail.gmail.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814-memfd-vm-noexec-uapi-fixes-v2-4-7ff9e3e10ba6@cyphar.com Fixes: 105ff5339f49 ("mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC") Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-08-14 08:41:00 +00:00
/* You cannot set a lower enforcement value than your parent. */
parent_scope = pidns_memfd_noexec_scope(ns->parent);
/* Equivalent to pidns_memfd_noexec_scope(ns). */
scope = max(READ_ONCE(ns->memfd_noexec_scope), parent_scope);
table_copy.data = &scope;
table_copy.extra1 = &parent_scope;
mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC The new MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC flags allows application to set executable bit at creation time (memfd_create). When MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is set, memfd is created without executable bit (mode:0666), and sealed with F_SEAL_EXEC, so it can't be chmod to be executable (mode: 0777) after creation. when MFD_EXEC flag is set, memfd is created with executable bit (mode:0777), this is the same as the old behavior of memfd_create. The new pid namespaced sysctl vm.memfd_noexec has 3 values: 0: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like MFD_EXEC was set. 1: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was set. 2: memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected. The sysctl allows finer control of memfd_create for old-software that doesn't set the executable bit, for example, a container with vm.memfd_noexec=1 means the old-software will create non-executable memfd by default. Also, the value of memfd_noexec is passed to child namespace at creation time. For example, if the init namespace has vm.memfd_noexec=2, all its children namespaces will be created with 2. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add stub functions to fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded register_pid_ns_ctl_table_vm() stub, per Jeff] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/pr_warn_ratelimited/pr_warn_once/, per review] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix CONFIG_SYSCTL=n warning] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215001205.51969-4-jeffxu@google.com Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Co-developed-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-12-15 00:12:03 +00:00
memfd: replace ratcheting feature from vm.memfd_noexec with hierarchy This sysctl has the very unusual behaviour of not allowing any user (even CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to reduce the restriction setting, meaning that if you were to set this sysctl to a more restrictive option in the host pidns you would need to reboot your machine in order to reset it. The justification given in [1] is that this is a security feature and thus it should not be possible to disable. Aside from the fact that we have plenty of security-related sysctls that can be disabled after being enabled (fs.protected_symlinks for instance), the protection provided by the sysctl is to stop users from being able to create a binary and then execute it. A user with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can trivially do this without memfd_create(2): % cat mount-memfd.c #include <fcntl.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <linux/mount.h> #define SHELLCODE "#!/bin/echo this file was executed from this totally private tmpfs:" int main(void) { int fsfd = fsopen("tmpfs", FSOPEN_CLOEXEC); assert(fsfd >= 0); assert(!fsconfig(fsfd, FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE, NULL, NULL, 2)); int dfd = fsmount(fsfd, FSMOUNT_CLOEXEC, 0); assert(dfd >= 0); int execfd = openat(dfd, "exe", O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0782); assert(execfd >= 0); assert(write(execfd, SHELLCODE, strlen(SHELLCODE)) == strlen(SHELLCODE)); assert(!close(execfd)); char *execpath = NULL; char *argv[] = { "bad-exe", NULL }, *envp[] = { NULL }; execfd = openat(dfd, "exe", O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC); assert(execfd >= 0); assert(asprintf(&execpath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", execfd) > 0); assert(!execve(execpath, argv, envp)); } % ./mount-memfd this file was executed from this totally private tmpfs: /proc/self/fd/5 % Given that it is possible for CAP_SYS_ADMIN users to create executable binaries without memfd_create(2) and without touching the host filesystem (not to mention the many other things a CAP_SYS_ADMIN process would be able to do that would be equivalent or worse), it seems strange to cause a fair amount of headache to admins when there doesn't appear to be an actual security benefit to blocking this. There appear to be concerns about confused-deputy-esque attacks[2] but a confused deputy that can write to arbitrary sysctls is a bigger security issue than executable memfds. /* New API */ The primary requirement from the original author appears to be more based on the need to be able to restrict an entire system in a hierarchical manner[3], such that child namespaces cannot re-enable executable memfds. So, implement that behaviour explicitly -- the vm.memfd_noexec scope is evaluated up the pidns tree to &init_pid_ns and you have the most restrictive value applied to you. The new lower limit you can set vm.memfd_noexec is whatever limit applies to your parent. Note that a pidns will inherit a copy of the parent pidns's effective vm.memfd_noexec setting at unshare() time. This matches the existing behaviour, and it also ensures that a pidns will never have its vm.memfd_noexec setting *lowered* behind its back (but it will be raised if the parent raises theirs). /* Backwards Compatibility */ As the previous version of the sysctl didn't allow you to lower the setting at all, there are no backwards compatibility issues with this aspect of the change. However it should be noted that now that the setting is completely hierarchical. Previously, a cloned pidns would just copy the current pidns setting, meaning that if the parent's vm.memfd_noexec was changed it wouldn't propoagate to existing pid namespaces. Now, the restriction applies recursively. This is a uAPI change, however: * The sysctl is very new, having been merged in 6.3. * Several aspects of the sysctl were broken up until this patchset and the other patchset by Jeff Xu last month. And thus it seems incredibly unlikely that any real users would run into this issue. In the worst case, if this causes userspace isues we could make it so that modifying the setting follows the hierarchical rules but the restriction checking uses the cached copy. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/CABi2SkWnAgHK1i6iqSqPMYuNEhtHBkO8jUuCvmG3RmUB5TKHJw@mail.gmail.com/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/CALmYWFs_dNCzw_pW1yRAo4bGCPEtykroEQaowNULp7svwMLjOg@mail.gmail.com/ [3]: https://lore.kernel.org/CALmYWFuahdUF7cT4cm7_TGLqPanuHXJ-hVSfZt7vpTnc18DPrw@mail.gmail.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814-memfd-vm-noexec-uapi-fixes-v2-4-7ff9e3e10ba6@cyphar.com Fixes: 105ff5339f49 ("mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC") Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com> Cc: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-08-14 08:41:00 +00:00
err = proc_dointvec_minmax(&table_copy, write, buf, lenp, ppos);
if (!err && write)
WRITE_ONCE(ns->memfd_noexec_scope, scope);
return err;
mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC The new MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC flags allows application to set executable bit at creation time (memfd_create). When MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is set, memfd is created without executable bit (mode:0666), and sealed with F_SEAL_EXEC, so it can't be chmod to be executable (mode: 0777) after creation. when MFD_EXEC flag is set, memfd is created with executable bit (mode:0777), this is the same as the old behavior of memfd_create. The new pid namespaced sysctl vm.memfd_noexec has 3 values: 0: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like MFD_EXEC was set. 1: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was set. 2: memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected. The sysctl allows finer control of memfd_create for old-software that doesn't set the executable bit, for example, a container with vm.memfd_noexec=1 means the old-software will create non-executable memfd by default. Also, the value of memfd_noexec is passed to child namespace at creation time. For example, if the init namespace has vm.memfd_noexec=2, all its children namespaces will be created with 2. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add stub functions to fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded register_pid_ns_ctl_table_vm() stub, per Jeff] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/pr_warn_ratelimited/pr_warn_once/, per review] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix CONFIG_SYSCTL=n warning] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215001205.51969-4-jeffxu@google.com Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Co-developed-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-12-15 00:12:03 +00:00
}
static struct ctl_table pid_ns_ctl_table_vm[] = {
{
.procname = "memfd_noexec",
.data = &init_pid_ns.memfd_noexec_scope,
.maxlen = sizeof(init_pid_ns.memfd_noexec_scope),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = pid_mfd_noexec_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_TWO,
},
};
static inline void register_pid_ns_sysctl_table_vm(void)
{
kernel: pid_namespace: simplify sysctls with register_sysctl() register_sysctl_paths() is only required if your child (directories) have entries and pid_namespace does not. So use register_sysctl_init() instead where we don't care about the return value and use register_sysctl() where we do. Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230302202826.776286-9-mcgrof@kernel.org
2023-03-02 20:28:23 +00:00
register_sysctl("vm", pid_ns_ctl_table_vm);
mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC The new MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC flags allows application to set executable bit at creation time (memfd_create). When MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is set, memfd is created without executable bit (mode:0666), and sealed with F_SEAL_EXEC, so it can't be chmod to be executable (mode: 0777) after creation. when MFD_EXEC flag is set, memfd is created with executable bit (mode:0777), this is the same as the old behavior of memfd_create. The new pid namespaced sysctl vm.memfd_noexec has 3 values: 0: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like MFD_EXEC was set. 1: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was set. 2: memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected. The sysctl allows finer control of memfd_create for old-software that doesn't set the executable bit, for example, a container with vm.memfd_noexec=1 means the old-software will create non-executable memfd by default. Also, the value of memfd_noexec is passed to child namespace at creation time. For example, if the init namespace has vm.memfd_noexec=2, all its children namespaces will be created with 2. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add stub functions to fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded register_pid_ns_ctl_table_vm() stub, per Jeff] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/pr_warn_ratelimited/pr_warn_once/, per review] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix CONFIG_SYSCTL=n warning] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215001205.51969-4-jeffxu@google.com Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Co-developed-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-12-15 00:12:03 +00:00
}
#else
static inline void register_pid_ns_sysctl_table_vm(void) {}
#endif
#endif /* LINUX_PID_SYSCTL_H */
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