linux/drivers/virt/vmgenid.c

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virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper, <https://aka.ms/win10rng>, as: If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows 10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous instantiation of the same VM state. Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution. So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly added add_vmfork_randomness() function. It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter. After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state, then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is described in <https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt>. And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in <https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata>. Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be an accidental QEMU nuance, per <https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt>, so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway, considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end. Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Adrian Catangiu <adrian@parity.io> Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <souradch.linux@gmail.com> # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-02-23 12:46:24 +00:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
*
* The "Virtual Machine Generation ID" is exposed via ACPI or DT and changes when a
virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper, <https://aka.ms/win10rng>, as: If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows 10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous instantiation of the same VM state. Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution. So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly added add_vmfork_randomness() function. It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter. After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state, then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is described in <https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt>. And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in <https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata>. Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be an accidental QEMU nuance, per <https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt>, so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway, considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end. Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Adrian Catangiu <adrian@parity.io> Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <souradch.linux@gmail.com> # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-02-23 12:46:24 +00:00
* virtual machine forks or is cloned. This driver exists for shepherding that
* information to random.c.
*/
#include <linux/acpi.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper, <https://aka.ms/win10rng>, as: If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows 10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous instantiation of the same VM state. Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution. So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly added add_vmfork_randomness() function. It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter. After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state, then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is described in <https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt>. And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in <https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata>. Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be an accidental QEMU nuance, per <https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt>, so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway, considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end. Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Adrian Catangiu <adrian@parity.io> Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <souradch.linux@gmail.com> # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-02-23 12:46:24 +00:00
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/platform_device.h>
virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper, <https://aka.ms/win10rng>, as: If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows 10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous instantiation of the same VM state. Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution. So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly added add_vmfork_randomness() function. It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter. After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state, then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is described in <https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt>. And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in <https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata>. Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be an accidental QEMU nuance, per <https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt>, so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway, considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end. Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Adrian Catangiu <adrian@parity.io> Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <souradch.linux@gmail.com> # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-02-23 12:46:24 +00:00
#include <linux/random.h>
ACPI_MODULE_NAME("vmgenid");
enum { VMGENID_SIZE = 16 };
struct vmgenid_state {
u8 *next_id;
u8 this_id[VMGENID_SIZE];
};
static void vmgenid_notify(struct device *device)
{
struct vmgenid_state *state = device->driver_data;
u8 old_id[VMGENID_SIZE];
memcpy(old_id, state->this_id, sizeof(old_id));
memcpy(state->this_id, state->next_id, sizeof(state->this_id));
if (!memcmp(old_id, state->this_id, sizeof(old_id)))
return;
add_vmfork_randomness(state->this_id, sizeof(state->this_id));
}
static void setup_vmgenid_state(struct vmgenid_state *state, void *virt_addr)
virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper, <https://aka.ms/win10rng>, as: If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows 10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous instantiation of the same VM state. Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution. So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly added add_vmfork_randomness() function. It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter. After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state, then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is described in <https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt>. And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in <https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata>. Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be an accidental QEMU nuance, per <https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt>, so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway, considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end. Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Adrian Catangiu <adrian@parity.io> Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <souradch.linux@gmail.com> # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-02-23 12:46:24 +00:00
{
state->next_id = virt_addr;
memcpy(state->this_id, state->next_id, sizeof(state->this_id));
add_device_randomness(state->this_id, sizeof(state->this_id));
}
#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
static void vmgenid_acpi_handler(acpi_handle __always_unused handle,
u32 __always_unused event, void *dev)
{
vmgenid_notify(dev);
}
static int vmgenid_add_acpi(struct device *dev, struct vmgenid_state *state)
{
struct acpi_device *device = ACPI_COMPANION(dev);
virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper, <https://aka.ms/win10rng>, as: If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows 10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous instantiation of the same VM state. Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution. So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly added add_vmfork_randomness() function. It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter. After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state, then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is described in <https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt>. And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in <https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata>. Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be an accidental QEMU nuance, per <https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt>, so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway, considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end. Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Adrian Catangiu <adrian@parity.io> Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <souradch.linux@gmail.com> # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-02-23 12:46:24 +00:00
struct acpi_buffer parsed = { ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER };
union acpi_object *obj;
phys_addr_t phys_addr;
acpi_status status;
void *virt_addr;
virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper, <https://aka.ms/win10rng>, as: If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows 10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous instantiation of the same VM state. Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution. So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly added add_vmfork_randomness() function. It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter. After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state, then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is described in <https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt>. And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in <https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata>. Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be an accidental QEMU nuance, per <https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt>, so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway, considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end. Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Adrian Catangiu <adrian@parity.io> Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <souradch.linux@gmail.com> # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-02-23 12:46:24 +00:00
int ret = 0;
status = acpi_evaluate_object(device->handle, "ADDR", NULL, &parsed);
if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) {
ACPI_EXCEPTION((AE_INFO, status, "Evaluating ADDR"));
return -ENODEV;
}
obj = parsed.pointer;
if (!obj || obj->type != ACPI_TYPE_PACKAGE || obj->package.count != 2 ||
obj->package.elements[0].type != ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER ||
obj->package.elements[1].type != ACPI_TYPE_INTEGER) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
phys_addr = (obj->package.elements[0].integer.value << 0) |
(obj->package.elements[1].integer.value << 32);
virt_addr = devm_memremap(&device->dev, phys_addr, VMGENID_SIZE, MEMREMAP_WB);
if (IS_ERR(virt_addr)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(virt_addr);
virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper, <https://aka.ms/win10rng>, as: If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows 10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous instantiation of the same VM state. Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution. So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly added add_vmfork_randomness() function. It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter. After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state, then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is described in <https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt>. And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in <https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata>. Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be an accidental QEMU nuance, per <https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt>, so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway, considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end. Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Adrian Catangiu <adrian@parity.io> Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <souradch.linux@gmail.com> # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-02-23 12:46:24 +00:00
goto out;
}
setup_vmgenid_state(state, virt_addr);
virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper, <https://aka.ms/win10rng>, as: If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows 10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous instantiation of the same VM state. Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution. So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly added add_vmfork_randomness() function. It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter. After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state, then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is described in <https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt>. And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in <https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata>. Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be an accidental QEMU nuance, per <https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt>, so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway, considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end. Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Adrian Catangiu <adrian@parity.io> Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <souradch.linux@gmail.com> # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-02-23 12:46:24 +00:00
status = acpi_install_notify_handler(device->handle, ACPI_DEVICE_NOTIFY,
vmgenid_acpi_handler, dev);
if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) {
ret = -ENODEV;
goto out;
}
virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper, <https://aka.ms/win10rng>, as: If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows 10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous instantiation of the same VM state. Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution. So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly added add_vmfork_randomness() function. It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter. After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state, then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is described in <https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt>. And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in <https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata>. Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be an accidental QEMU nuance, per <https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt>, so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway, considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end. Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Adrian Catangiu <adrian@parity.io> Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <souradch.linux@gmail.com> # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-02-23 12:46:24 +00:00
dev->driver_data = state;
virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper, <https://aka.ms/win10rng>, as: If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows 10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous instantiation of the same VM state. Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution. So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly added add_vmfork_randomness() function. It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter. After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state, then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is described in <https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt>. And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in <https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata>. Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be an accidental QEMU nuance, per <https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt>, so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway, considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end. Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Adrian Catangiu <adrian@parity.io> Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <souradch.linux@gmail.com> # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-02-23 12:46:24 +00:00
out:
ACPI_FREE(parsed.pointer);
return ret;
}
#else
static int vmgenid_add_acpi(struct device *dev, struct vmgenid_state *state)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
#endif
static irqreturn_t vmgenid_of_irq_handler(int __always_unused irq, void *dev)
{
vmgenid_notify(dev);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
static int vmgenid_add_of(struct platform_device *pdev,
struct vmgenid_state *state)
{
void *virt_addr;
int ret;
virt_addr = devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource(pdev, 0, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(virt_addr))
return PTR_ERR(virt_addr);
setup_vmgenid_state(state, virt_addr);
ret = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
ret = devm_request_irq(&pdev->dev, ret, vmgenid_of_irq_handler,
IRQF_SHARED, "vmgenid", &pdev->dev);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
pdev->dev.driver_data = state;
return 0;
}
virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper, <https://aka.ms/win10rng>, as: If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows 10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous instantiation of the same VM state. Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution. So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly added add_vmfork_randomness() function. It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter. After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state, then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is described in <https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt>. And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in <https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata>. Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be an accidental QEMU nuance, per <https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt>, so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway, considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end. Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Adrian Catangiu <adrian@parity.io> Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <souradch.linux@gmail.com> # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-02-23 12:46:24 +00:00
static int vmgenid_add(struct platform_device *pdev)
virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper, <https://aka.ms/win10rng>, as: If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows 10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous instantiation of the same VM state. Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution. So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly added add_vmfork_randomness() function. It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter. After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state, then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is described in <https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt>. And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in <https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata>. Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be an accidental QEMU nuance, per <https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt>, so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway, considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end. Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Adrian Catangiu <adrian@parity.io> Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <souradch.linux@gmail.com> # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-02-23 12:46:24 +00:00
{
struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
struct vmgenid_state *state;
int ret;
virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper, <https://aka.ms/win10rng>, as: If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows 10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous instantiation of the same VM state. Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution. So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly added add_vmfork_randomness() function. It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter. After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state, then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is described in <https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt>. And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in <https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata>. Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be an accidental QEMU nuance, per <https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt>, so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway, considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end. Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Adrian Catangiu <adrian@parity.io> Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <souradch.linux@gmail.com> # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-02-23 12:46:24 +00:00
state = devm_kmalloc(dev, sizeof(*state), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!state)
return -ENOMEM;
if (dev->of_node)
ret = vmgenid_add_of(pdev, state);
else
ret = vmgenid_add_acpi(dev, state);
if (ret < 0)
devm_kfree(dev, state);
return ret;
virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper, <https://aka.ms/win10rng>, as: If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows 10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous instantiation of the same VM state. Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution. So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly added add_vmfork_randomness() function. It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter. After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state, then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is described in <https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt>. And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in <https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata>. Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be an accidental QEMU nuance, per <https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt>, so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway, considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end. Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Adrian Catangiu <adrian@parity.io> Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <souradch.linux@gmail.com> # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-02-23 12:46:24 +00:00
}
static const struct of_device_id vmgenid_of_ids[] = {
{ .compatible = "microsoft,vmgenid", },
{ },
};
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, vmgenid_of_ids);
static const struct acpi_device_id vmgenid_acpi_ids[] = {
{ "VMGENCTR", 0 },
virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper, <https://aka.ms/win10rng>, as: If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows 10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous instantiation of the same VM state. Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution. So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly added add_vmfork_randomness() function. It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter. After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state, then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is described in <https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt>. And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in <https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata>. Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be an accidental QEMU nuance, per <https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt>, so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway, considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end. Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Adrian Catangiu <adrian@parity.io> Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <souradch.linux@gmail.com> # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-02-23 12:46:24 +00:00
{ "VM_GEN_COUNTER", 0 },
{ }
};
MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(acpi, vmgenid_acpi_ids);
static struct platform_driver vmgenid_plaform_driver = {
.probe = vmgenid_add,
.driver = {
.name = "vmgenid",
.acpi_match_table = vmgenid_acpi_ids,
.of_match_table = vmgenid_of_ids,
},
virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper, <https://aka.ms/win10rng>, as: If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows 10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous instantiation of the same VM state. Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution. So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly added add_vmfork_randomness() function. It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter. After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state, then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is described in <https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt>. And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in <https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata>. Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be an accidental QEMU nuance, per <https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt>, so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway, considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end. Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Adrian Catangiu <adrian@parity.io> Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <souradch.linux@gmail.com> # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-02-23 12:46:24 +00:00
};
module_platform_driver(vmgenid_plaform_driver)
virt: vmgenid: notify RNG of VM fork and supply generation ID VM Generation ID is a feature from Microsoft, described at <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=260709>, and supported by Hyper-V and QEMU. Its usage is described in Microsoft's RNG whitepaper, <https://aka.ms/win10rng>, as: If the OS is running in a VM, there is a problem that most hypervisors can snapshot the state of the machine and later rewind the VM state to the saved state. This results in the machine running a second time with the exact same RNG state, which leads to serious security problems. To reduce the window of vulnerability, Windows 10 on a Hyper-V VM will detect when the VM state is reset, retrieve a unique (not random) value from the hypervisor, and reseed the root RNG with that unique value. This does not eliminate the vulnerability, but it greatly reduces the time during which the RNG system will produce the same outputs as it did during a previous instantiation of the same VM state. Linux has the same issue, and given that vmgenid is supported already by multiple hypervisors, we can implement more or less the same solution. So this commit wires up the vmgenid ACPI notification to the RNG's newly added add_vmfork_randomness() function. It can be used from qemu via the `-device vmgenid,guid=auto` parameter. After setting that, use `savevm` in the monitor to save the VM state, then quit QEMU, start it again, and use `loadvm`. That will trigger this driver's notify function, which hands the new UUID to the RNG. This is described in <https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=blob;f=docs/specs/vmgenid.txt>. And there are hooks for this in libvirt as well, described in <https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#general-metadata>. Note, however, that the treatment of this as a UUID is considered to be an accidental QEMU nuance, per <https://github.com/libguestfs/virt-v2v/blob/master/docs/vm-generation-id-across-hypervisors.txt>, so this driver simply treats these bytes as an opaque 128-bit binary blob, as per the spec. This doesn't really make a difference anyway, considering that's how it ends up when handed to the RNG in the end. Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Adrian Catangiu <adrian@parity.io> Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Tested-by: Souradeep Chakrabarti <souradch.linux@gmail.com> # With Hyper-V's virtual hardware Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
2022-02-23 12:46:24 +00:00
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Virtual Machine Generation ID");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>");