linux/security/dummy.c

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/*
* Stub functions for the default security function pointers in case no
* security model is loaded.
*
* Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com>
* Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
* Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*/
#undef DEBUG
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
static int dummy_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t * effective,
kernel_cap_t * inheritable, kernel_cap_t * permitted)
{
V3 file capabilities: alter behavior of cap_setpcap The non-filesystem capability meaning of CAP_SETPCAP is that a process, p1, can change the capabilities of another process, p2. This is not the meaning that was intended for this capability at all, and this implementation came about purely because, without filesystem capabilities, there was no way to use capabilities without one process bestowing them on another. Since we now have a filesystem support for capabilities we can fix the implementation of CAP_SETPCAP. The most significant thing about this change is that, with it in effect, no process can set the capabilities of another process. The capabilities of a program are set via the capability convolution rules: pI(post-exec) = pI(pre-exec) pP(post-exec) = (X(aka cap_bset) & fP) | (pI(post-exec) & fI) pE(post-exec) = fE ? pP(post-exec) : 0 at exec() time. As such, the only influence the pre-exec() program can have on the post-exec() program's capabilities are through the pI capability set. The correct implementation for CAP_SETPCAP (and that enabled by this patch) is that it can be used to add extra pI capabilities to the current process - to be picked up by subsequent exec()s when the above convolution rules are applied. Here is how it works: Let's say we have a process, p. It has capability sets, pE, pP and pI. Generally, p, can change the value of its own pI to pI' where (pI' & ~pI) & ~pP = 0. That is, the only new things in pI' that were not present in pI need to be present in pP. The role of CAP_SETPCAP is basically to permit changes to pI beyond the above: if (pE & CAP_SETPCAP) { pI' = anything; /* ie., even (pI' & ~pI) & ~pP != 0 */ } This capability is useful for things like login, which (say, via pam_cap) might want to raise certain inheritable capabilities for use by the children of the logged-in user's shell, but those capabilities are not useful to or needed by the login program itself. One such use might be to limit who can run ping. You set the capabilities of the 'ping' program to be "= cap_net_raw+i", and then only shells that have (pI & CAP_NET_RAW) will be able to run it. Without CAP_SETPCAP implemented as described above, login(pam_cap) would have to also have (pP & CAP_NET_RAW) in order to raise this capability and pass it on through the inheritable set. Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-18 10:05:59 +00:00
if (target->euid == 0) {
cap_set_full(*permitted);
cap_set_init_eff(*effective);
} else {
cap_clear(*permitted);
cap_clear(*effective);
V3 file capabilities: alter behavior of cap_setpcap The non-filesystem capability meaning of CAP_SETPCAP is that a process, p1, can change the capabilities of another process, p2. This is not the meaning that was intended for this capability at all, and this implementation came about purely because, without filesystem capabilities, there was no way to use capabilities without one process bestowing them on another. Since we now have a filesystem support for capabilities we can fix the implementation of CAP_SETPCAP. The most significant thing about this change is that, with it in effect, no process can set the capabilities of another process. The capabilities of a program are set via the capability convolution rules: pI(post-exec) = pI(pre-exec) pP(post-exec) = (X(aka cap_bset) & fP) | (pI(post-exec) & fI) pE(post-exec) = fE ? pP(post-exec) : 0 at exec() time. As such, the only influence the pre-exec() program can have on the post-exec() program's capabilities are through the pI capability set. The correct implementation for CAP_SETPCAP (and that enabled by this patch) is that it can be used to add extra pI capabilities to the current process - to be picked up by subsequent exec()s when the above convolution rules are applied. Here is how it works: Let's say we have a process, p. It has capability sets, pE, pP and pI. Generally, p, can change the value of its own pI to pI' where (pI' & ~pI) & ~pP = 0. That is, the only new things in pI' that were not present in pI need to be present in pP. The role of CAP_SETPCAP is basically to permit changes to pI beyond the above: if (pE & CAP_SETPCAP) { pI' = anything; /* ie., even (pI' & ~pI) & ~pP != 0 */ } This capability is useful for things like login, which (say, via pam_cap) might want to raise certain inheritable capabilities for use by the children of the logged-in user's shell, but those capabilities are not useful to or needed by the login program itself. One such use might be to limit who can run ping. You set the capabilities of the 'ping' program to be "= cap_net_raw+i", and then only shells that have (pI & CAP_NET_RAW) will be able to run it. Without CAP_SETPCAP implemented as described above, login(pam_cap) would have to also have (pP & CAP_NET_RAW) in order to raise this capability and pass it on through the inheritable set. Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-18 10:05:59 +00:00
}
cap_clear(*inheritable);
if (target->fsuid != 0) {
*permitted = cap_drop_fs_set(*permitted);
*effective = cap_drop_fs_set(*effective);
}
return 0;
}
static int dummy_capset_check (struct task_struct *target,
kernel_cap_t * effective,
kernel_cap_t * inheritable,
kernel_cap_t * permitted)
{
return -EPERM;
}
static void dummy_capset_set (struct task_struct *target,
kernel_cap_t * effective,
kernel_cap_t * inheritable,
kernel_cap_t * permitted)
{
return;
}
static int dummy_acct (struct file *file)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
{
if (cap_raised (tsk->cap_effective, cap))
return 0;
return -EPERM;
}
static int dummy_sysctl (ctl_table * table, int op)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_quotactl (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_quota_on (struct dentry *dentry)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_syslog (int type)
{
if ((type != 3 && type != 10) && current->euid)
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
static int dummy_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
{
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
static int dummy_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
int cap_sys_admin = 0;
if (dummy_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
}
static int dummy_bprm_alloc_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
return 0;
}
static void dummy_bprm_free_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
return;
}
static void dummy_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
{
if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid) {
set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
if ((unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) && !capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
bprm->e_uid = current->uid;
bprm->e_gid = current->gid;
}
}
current->suid = current->euid = current->fsuid = bprm->e_uid;
current->sgid = current->egid = current->fsgid = bprm->e_gid;
dummy_capget(current, &current->cap_effective, &current->cap_inheritable, &current->cap_permitted);
}
static void dummy_bprm_post_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
return;
}
static int dummy_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
/* The new userland will simply use the value provided
in the AT_SECURE field to decide whether secure mode
is required. Hence, this logic is required to preserve
the legacy decision algorithm used by the old userland. */
return (current->euid != current->uid ||
current->egid != current->gid);
}
static int dummy_sb_alloc_security (struct super_block *sb)
{
return 0;
}
static void dummy_sb_free_security (struct super_block *sb)
{
return;
}
static int dummy_sb_copy_data (char *orig, char *copy)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_sb_kern_mount (struct super_block *sb, void *data)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_sb_statfs (struct dentry *dentry)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_sb_mount (char *dev_name, struct path *path, char *type,
unsigned long flags, void *data)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_sb_check_sb (struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *path)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_sb_umount (struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
{
return 0;
}
static void dummy_sb_umount_close (struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
return;
}
static void dummy_sb_umount_busy (struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
return;
}
static void dummy_sb_post_remount (struct vfsmount *mnt, unsigned long flags,
void *data)
{
return;
}
static void dummy_sb_post_addmount (struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *path)
{
return;
}
static int dummy_sb_pivotroot (struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
{
return 0;
}
static void dummy_sb_post_pivotroot (struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
{
return;
}
static int dummy_sb_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
Security: add get, set, and cloning of superblock security information Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux. This will allow filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they so choose. This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future. Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has. I assume future LSM's would do the same. NFS is the primary FS which does not use text mount data and thus must make use of this interface. An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=. If the LSM has no mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops take care of things. An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM. This is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in the FS which owns the options. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-11-30 18:00:35 +00:00
{
security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
Security: add get, set, and cloning of superblock security information Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux. This will allow filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they so choose. This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future. Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has. I assume future LSM's would do the same. NFS is the primary FS which does not use text mount data and thus must make use of this interface. An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=. If the LSM has no mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops take care of things. An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM. This is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in the FS which owns the options. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-11-30 18:00:35 +00:00
return 0;
}
static int dummy_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
Security: add get, set, and cloning of superblock security information Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux. This will allow filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they so choose. This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future. Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has. I assume future LSM's would do the same. NFS is the primary FS which does not use text mount data and thus must make use of this interface. An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=. If the LSM has no mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops take care of things. An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM. This is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in the FS which owns the options. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-11-30 18:00:35 +00:00
{
if (unlikely(opts->num_mnt_opts))
Security: add get, set, and cloning of superblock security information Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux. This will allow filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they so choose. This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future. Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has. I assume future LSM's would do the same. NFS is the primary FS which does not use text mount data and thus must make use of this interface. An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=. If the LSM has no mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops take care of things. An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM. This is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in the FS which owns the options. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-11-30 18:00:35 +00:00
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return 0;
}
static void dummy_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
struct super_block *newsb)
{
return;
}
static int dummy_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_inode_alloc_security (struct inode *inode)
{
return 0;
}
static void dummy_inode_free_security (struct inode *inode)
{
return;
}
[PATCH] security: enable atomic inode security labeling The following patch set enables atomic security labeling of newly created inodes by altering the fs code to invoke a new LSM hook to obtain the security attribute to apply to a newly created inode and to set up the incore inode security state during the inode creation transaction. This parallels the existing processing for setting ACLs on newly created inodes. Otherwise, it is possible for new inodes to be accessed by another thread via the dcache prior to complete security setup (presently handled by the post_create/mkdir/... LSM hooks in the VFS) and a newly created inode may be left unlabeled on the disk in the event of a crash. SELinux presently works around the issue by ensuring that the incore inode security label is initialized to a special SID that is inaccessible to unprivileged processes (in accordance with policy), thereby preventing inappropriate access but potentially causing false denials on legitimate accesses. A simple test program demonstrates such false denials on SELinux, and the patch solves the problem. Similar such false denials have been encountered in real applications. This patch defines a new inode_init_security LSM hook to obtain the security attribute to apply to a newly created inode and to set up the incore inode security state for it, and adds a corresponding hook function implementation to SELinux. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 20:01:35 +00:00
static int dummy_inode_init_security (struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
char **name, void **value, size_t *len)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static int dummy_inode_create (struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
int mask)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_inode_link (struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *inode,
struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_inode_unlink (struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_inode_symlink (struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
const char *name)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_inode_mkdir (struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
int mask)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_inode_rmdir (struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_inode_mknod (struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
int mode, dev_t dev)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_inode_rename (struct inode *old_inode,
struct dentry *old_dentry,
struct inode *new_inode,
struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_inode_readlink (struct dentry *dentry)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_inode_follow_link (struct dentry *dentry,
struct nameidata *nameidata)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_inode_permission (struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata *nd)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_inode_setattr (struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_inode_getattr (struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
{
return 0;
}
static void dummy_inode_delete (struct inode *ino)
{
return;
}
static int dummy_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
static void dummy_inode_post_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size,
int flags)
{
}
static int dummy_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
Implement file posix capabilities Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers. This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Changelog: Nov 27: Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton (security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix) Fix Kconfig dependency. Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in. Nov 13: Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t. Nov 13: Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey Dobriyan. Nov 09: Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper function. Nov 08: For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Nov 07: Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in check_cap_sanity(). Nov 07: Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since capabilities are the default. Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY. Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce audit messages. Nov 05: Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file cap support can be stacked. Sep 05: As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place for capability code. Sep 01: Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which they called a program with some fscaps. One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a cpuset? It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check, fixing it might be tough. task_setscheduler note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset? task_setioprio task_setnice sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another process. Need same checks as setrlimit Aug 21: Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process might still have elevated caps. Aug 15: Handle endianness of xattrs. Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk. Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are set, else return -EPERM. With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than d_instantiate. Aug 10: Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than caching it at d_instantiate. [morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h] [bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 06:31:36 +00:00
static int dummy_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static int dummy_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static int dummy_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
return 0;
}
static void dummy_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
{
*secid = 0;
}
static int dummy_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_file_alloc_security (struct file *file)
{
return 0;
}
static void dummy_file_free_security (struct file *file)
{
return;
}
static int dummy_file_ioctl (struct file *file, unsigned int command,
unsigned long arg)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_file_mmap (struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot,
unsigned long flags,
unsigned long addr,
unsigned long addr_only)
{
if ((addr < mmap_min_addr) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
return -EACCES;
return 0;
}
static int dummy_file_mprotect (struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_file_lock (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_file_fcntl (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_file_set_fowner (struct file *file)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_file_send_sigiotask (struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_file_receive (struct file *file)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_dentry_open (struct file *file)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_task_create (unsigned long clone_flags)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_task_alloc_security (struct task_struct *p)
{
return 0;
}
static void dummy_task_free_security (struct task_struct *p)
{
return;
}
static int dummy_task_setuid (uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_task_post_setuid (uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
{
dummy_capget(current, &current->cap_effective, &current->cap_inheritable, &current->cap_permitted);
return 0;
}
static int dummy_task_setgid (gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_task_setpgid (struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_task_getpgid (struct task_struct *p)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_task_getsid (struct task_struct *p)
{
return 0;
}
static void dummy_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
{
*secid = 0;
}
static int dummy_task_setgroups (struct group_info *group_info)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_task_getioprio (struct task_struct *p)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_task_setrlimit (unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy,
struct sched_param *lp)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_task_getscheduler (struct task_struct *p)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_task_movememory (struct task_struct *p)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_task_kill (struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
int sig, u32 secid)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_task_prctl (int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
capabilities: implement per-process securebits Filesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0 based privilege and use capabilities instead. That is, with filesystem support for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually) possible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain privilege via (set)uid-0. Of course, conceptually isn't quite the same as currently possible since few user applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently prepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege. Further, many applications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel will continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs. Where pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is desirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their privilege. In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable sets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser from the process' tree of children. The feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege associated with (set)uid-0. This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to initiate, and only immediately affects the 'current' process (it is inherited through fork()/exec()). This reimplementation differs significantly from the historical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which has ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel. With this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop all legacy privilege (through uid=0) for itself and all subsequently fork()'d/exec()'d children with: prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f); This patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is enabled at configure time. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning] [serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY] Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-28 09:13:40 +00:00
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p)
{
return 0;
}
static void dummy_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
{
p->euid = p->fsuid = 0;
return;
}
static void dummy_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
{ }
static int dummy_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
{
return 0;
}
static void dummy_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
{
*secid = 0;
}
static int dummy_msg_msg_alloc_security (struct msg_msg *msg)
{
return 0;
}
static void dummy_msg_msg_free_security (struct msg_msg *msg)
{
return;
}
static int dummy_msg_queue_alloc_security (struct msg_queue *msq)
{
return 0;
}
static void dummy_msg_queue_free_security (struct msg_queue *msq)
{
return;
}
static int dummy_msg_queue_associate (struct msg_queue *msq,
int msqflg)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_msg_queue_msgctl (struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_msg_queue_msgsnd (struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
int msgflg)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_msg_queue_msgrcv (struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
struct task_struct *target, long type,
int mode)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_shm_alloc_security (struct shmid_kernel *shp)
{
return 0;
}
static void dummy_shm_free_security (struct shmid_kernel *shp)
{
return;
}
static int dummy_shm_associate (struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_shm_shmctl (struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_shm_shmat (struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
int shmflg)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_sem_alloc_security (struct sem_array *sma)
{
return 0;
}
static void dummy_sem_free_security (struct sem_array *sma)
{
return;
}
static int dummy_sem_associate (struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_sem_semctl (struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_sem_semop (struct sem_array *sma,
struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_netlink_send (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current->cap_effective;
return 0;
}
static int dummy_netlink_recv (struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
{
if (!cap_raised (NETLINK_CB (skb).eff_cap, cap))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static int dummy_unix_stream_connect (struct socket *sock,
struct socket *other,
struct sock *newsk)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_unix_may_send (struct socket *sock,
struct socket *other)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_socket_create (int family, int type,
int protocol, int kern)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_socket_post_create (struct socket *sock, int family, int type,
int protocol, int kern)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_socket_bind (struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
int addrlen)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_socket_connect (struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
int addrlen)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_socket_listen (struct socket *sock, int backlog)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_socket_accept (struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
{
return 0;
}
static void dummy_socket_post_accept (struct socket *sock,
struct socket *newsock)
{
return;
}
static int dummy_socket_sendmsg (struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
int size)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_socket_recvmsg (struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
int size, int flags)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_socket_getsockname (struct socket *sock)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_socket_getpeername (struct socket *sock)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_socket_setsockopt (struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_socket_getsockopt (struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_socket_shutdown (struct socket *sock, int how)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_socket_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return 0;
}
[SECURITY]: TCP/UDP getpeersec This patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking controls whereby an application can determine the label of the security association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to via getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or UDP socket is using. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer at the other end of this connection. In the case of UDP, the security context is for each individual packet. An example application is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start daemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client. Patch design approach: - Design for TCP The patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for a socket based on the security context of the IPSec security association. The application may retrieve this context using getsockopt. When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry cache on the socket to retrieve the security associations. If a security association has a security context, the context string is returned, as for UNIX domain sockets. - Design for UDP Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless. This requires a somewhat different API to retrieve the peer security context. With TCP, the peer security context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can be retrieved at any time between when the connection is established and when it is torn down. With UDP, each read/write can have different peer and thus the security context might change every time. As a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with the packet retrieval. The solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). Patch implementation details: - Implementation for TCP The security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt with the existing SO_PEERSEC flag. As an example (ignoring error checking): getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, &optlen); printf("Socket peer context is: %s\n", optbuf); The SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check for labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED == sk->sk_state) TCP sockets only. If so, the socket has a dst_cache of struct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations. If these have security associations with security contexts, the security context is returned. getsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or the buffer is unmodified. - Implementation for UDP To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for UDP should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_IP && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } ip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. A new ancillary message type SCM_SECURITY. When the packet is received we get the security context from the sec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the ancillary message space. An additional LSM hook, selinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security context from the SELinux space. The existing function, selinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the security context is copied directly to user space, rather than to kernel space. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between applications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in labeled security associations being built. For TCP, we can then extract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end. For UDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 06:41:23 +00:00
static int dummy_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
{
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
static int dummy_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
{
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
static inline int dummy_sk_alloc_security (struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
return 0;
}
static inline void dummy_sk_free_security (struct sock *sk)
{
}
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
static inline void dummy_sk_clone_security (const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
}
static inline void dummy_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
{
}
static inline void dummy_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent)
{
}
static inline int dummy_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req)
{
return 0;
}
static inline void dummy_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
}
static inline void dummy_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
}
static inline void dummy_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
struct flowi *fl)
{
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
static int dummy_xfrm_policy_alloc_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
{
return 0;
}
static inline int dummy_xfrm_policy_clone_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
{
return 0;
}
static void dummy_xfrm_policy_free_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
{
}
static int dummy_xfrm_policy_delete_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
[LSM-IPsec]: SELinux Authorize This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security contexts to IPsec policies and security associations. In the previous patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security assocations with security contexts. Thus a user authorized to change SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply deleteing policies with security contexts. To fix this security hole, an additional authorization check is added for removing security policies and security associations with security contexts. Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change unconditionally. The hook is called on deletion when no context is present, which we may want to change. At present, I left it up to the module. LSM changes: The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and xfrm_state_delete. The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion of IPsec policies that have security contexts. The existing hooks xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM interface. Use: The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy, xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete). SELinux changes: The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-09 06:39:49 +00:00
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_xfrm_state_alloc_security(struct xfrm_state *x,
SELinux: Various xfrm labeling fixes Since the upstreaming of the mlsxfrm modification a few months back, testing has resulted in the identification of the following issues/bugs that are resolved in this patch set. 1. Fix the security context used in the IKE negotiation to be the context of the socket as opposed to the context of the SPD rule. 2. Fix SO_PEERSEC for tcp sockets to return the security context of the peer as opposed to the source. 3. Fix the selection of an SA for an outgoing packet to be at the same context as the originating socket/flow. The following would be the result of applying this patchset: - SO_PEERSEC will now correctly return the peer's context. - IKE deamons will receive the context of the source socket/flow as opposed to the SPD rule's context so that the negotiated SA will be at the same context as the source socket/flow. - The SELinux policy will require one or more of the following for a socket to be able to communicate with/without SAs: 1. To enable a socket to communicate without using labeled-IPSec SAs: allow socket_t unlabeled_t:association { sendto recvfrom } 2. To enable a socket to communicate with labeled-IPSec SAs: allow socket_t self:association { sendto }; allow socket_t peer_sa_t:association { recvfrom }; This Patch: Pass correct security context to IKE for use in negotiation Fix the security context passed to IKE for use in negotiation to be the context of the socket as opposed to the context of the SPD rule so that the SA carries the label of the originating socket/flow. Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-11-08 23:03:44 +00:00
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, u32 secid)
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
{
return 0;
}
static void dummy_xfrm_state_free_security(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
}
[LSM-IPsec]: SELinux Authorize This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security contexts to IPsec policies and security associations. In the previous patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security assocations with security contexts. Thus a user authorized to change SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply deleteing policies with security contexts. To fix this security hole, an additional authorization check is added for removing security policies and security associations with security contexts. Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change unconditionally. The hook is called on deletion when no context is present, which we may want to change. At present, I left it up to the module. LSM changes: The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and xfrm_state_delete. The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion of IPsec policies that have security contexts. The existing hooks xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM interface. Use: The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy, xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete). SELinux changes: The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-09 06:39:49 +00:00
static int dummy_xfrm_state_delete_security(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx,
u32 sk_sid, u8 dir)
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl)
{
return 1;
}
static int dummy_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *fl, int ckall)
{
return 0;
}
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
static int dummy_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
static void dummy_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
{
return;
}
static int dummy_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
static int dummy_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
static int dummy_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static int dummy_secctx_to_secid(char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static void dummy_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
static inline int dummy_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *ctx,
unsigned long flags)
{
return 0;
}
static inline void dummy_key_free(struct key *key)
{
}
static inline int dummy_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
struct task_struct *context,
key_perm_t perm)
{
return 0;
}
static int dummy_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
{
*_buffer = NULL;
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
static inline int dummy_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
void **lsmrule)
{
return 0;
}
static inline int dummy_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
{
return 0;
}
static inline int dummy_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
void *lsmrule,
struct audit_context *actx)
{
return 0;
}
static inline void dummy_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
struct security_operations dummy_security_ops = {
.name = "dummy",
};
#define set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, function) \
do { \
if (!ops->function) { \
ops->function = dummy_##function; \
pr_debug("Had to override the " #function \
" security operation with the dummy one.\n");\
} \
} while (0)
void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
{
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ptrace);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, capget);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, capset_check);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, capset_set);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, acct);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, capable);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, quotactl);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, quota_on);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sysctl);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, syslog);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, settime);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, vm_enough_memory);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_free_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_apply_creds);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_post_apply_creds);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_set_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_check_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, bprm_secureexec);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_free_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_copy_data);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_kern_mount);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_statfs);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_mount);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_check_sb);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_umount);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_umount_close);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_umount_busy);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_post_remount);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_post_addmount);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_pivotroot);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_post_pivotroot);
Security: add get, set, and cloning of superblock security information Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux. This will allow filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if they so choose. This interface deals only with option identifiers and strings so it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the future. Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel (almost all of them) need not currently make use of this interface when dealing with SELinux since it will still parse those strings as it always has. I assume future LSM's would do the same. NFS is the primary FS which does not use text mount data and thus must make use of this interface. An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount time options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=. If the LSM has no mount time options they could simply not implement and let the dummy ops take care of things. An LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in security.h and any FS which decides to own there own security options would need to be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM. This is because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt to understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should be in the FS which owns the options. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2007-11-30 18:00:35 +00:00
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_get_mnt_opts);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_set_mnt_opts);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_clone_mnt_opts);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sb_parse_opts_str);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_free_security);
[PATCH] security: enable atomic inode security labeling The following patch set enables atomic security labeling of newly created inodes by altering the fs code to invoke a new LSM hook to obtain the security attribute to apply to a newly created inode and to set up the incore inode security state during the inode creation transaction. This parallels the existing processing for setting ACLs on newly created inodes. Otherwise, it is possible for new inodes to be accessed by another thread via the dcache prior to complete security setup (presently handled by the post_create/mkdir/... LSM hooks in the VFS) and a newly created inode may be left unlabeled on the disk in the event of a crash. SELinux presently works around the issue by ensuring that the incore inode security label is initialized to a special SID that is inaccessible to unprivileged processes (in accordance with policy), thereby preventing inappropriate access but potentially causing false denials on legitimate accesses. A simple test program demonstrates such false denials on SELinux, and the patch solves the problem. Similar such false denials have been encountered in real applications. This patch defines a new inode_init_security LSM hook to obtain the security attribute to apply to a newly created inode and to set up the incore inode security state for it, and adds a corresponding hook function implementation to SELinux. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2005-09-09 20:01:35 +00:00
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_init_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_create);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_link);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_unlink);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_symlink);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_mkdir);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_rmdir);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_mknod);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_rename);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_readlink);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_follow_link);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_permission);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_setattr);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getattr);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_delete);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_setxattr);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_post_setxattr);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getxattr);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listxattr);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_removexattr);
Implement file posix capabilities Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers. This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Changelog: Nov 27: Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton (security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix) Fix Kconfig dependency. Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in. Nov 13: Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t. Nov 13: Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey Dobriyan. Nov 09: Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper function. Nov 08: For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Nov 07: Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in check_cap_sanity(). Nov 07: Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since capabilities are the default. Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY. Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce audit messages. Nov 05: Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file cap support can be stacked. Sep 05: As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place for capability code. Sep 01: Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which they called a program with some fscaps. One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a cpuset? It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check, fixing it might be tough. task_setscheduler note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset? task_setioprio task_setnice sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another process. Need same checks as setrlimit Aug 21: Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process might still have elevated caps. Aug 15: Handle endianness of xattrs. Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk. Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are set, else return -EPERM. With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than d_instantiate. Aug 10: Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than caching it at d_instantiate. [morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h] [bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-17 06:31:36 +00:00
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_need_killpriv);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_killpriv);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecurity);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_permission);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_free_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_ioctl);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_mmap);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_mprotect);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_lock);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_fcntl);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_set_fowner);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_send_sigiotask);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_receive);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, dentry_open);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_create);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_free_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_setuid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_post_setuid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_setgid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_setpgid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_getpgid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_getsid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_getsecid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_setgroups);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_setnice);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_setioprio);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_getioprio);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_setrlimit);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_setscheduler);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_getscheduler);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_movememory);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_wait);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_kill);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_prctl);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_reparent_to_init);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_to_inode);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_permission);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_free_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_associate);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_msgctl);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_msgsnd);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_msgrcv);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, shm_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, shm_free_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, shm_associate);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, shm_shmctl);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, shm_shmat);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sem_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sem_free_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sem_associate);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sem_semctl);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sem_semop);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, netlink_send);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, netlink_recv);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, register_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, d_instantiate);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, getprocattr);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, setprocattr);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, secid_to_secctx);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, secctx_to_secid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, release_secctx);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, unix_stream_connect);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, unix_may_send);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_create);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_post_create);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_bind);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_connect);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_listen);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_accept);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_post_accept);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_sendmsg);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_recvmsg);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getsockname);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getpeername);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_setsockopt);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getsockopt);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_shutdown);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_sock_rcv_skb);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_stream);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_dgram);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_free_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_clone_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_getsecid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sock_graft);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_conn_request);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_csk_clone);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inet_conn_established);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, req_classify_flow);
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_clone_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_free_security);
[LSM-IPsec]: SELinux Authorize This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security contexts to IPsec policies and security associations. In the previous patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security assocations with security contexts. Thus a user authorized to change SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply deleteing policies with security contexts. To fix this security hole, an additional authorization check is added for removing security policies and security associations with security contexts. Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change unconditionally. The hook is called on deletion when no context is present, which we may want to change. At present, I left it up to the module. LSM changes: The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and xfrm_state_delete. The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion of IPsec policies that have security contexts. The existing hooks xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM interface. Use: The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy, xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete). SELinux changes: The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-09 06:39:49 +00:00
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_delete_security);
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_free_security);
[LSM-IPsec]: SELinux Authorize This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security contexts to IPsec policies and security associations. In the previous patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security assocations with security contexts. Thus a user authorized to change SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply deleteing policies with security contexts. To fix this security hole, an additional authorization check is added for removing security policies and security associations with security contexts. Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change unconditionally. The hook is called on deletion when no context is present, which we may want to change. At present, I left it up to the module. LSM changes: The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and xfrm_state_delete. The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion of IPsec policies that have security contexts. The existing hooks xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM interface. Use: The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy, xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete). SELinux changes: The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-09 06:39:49 +00:00
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_delete_security);
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_lookup);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_pol_flow_match);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_decode_session);
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_alloc);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_free);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_permission);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_getsecurity);
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_init);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_known);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_match);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_free);
#endif
}