linux/mm/memory-failure.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
/*
* Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 Intel Corporation
* Authors: Andi Kleen, Fengguang Wu
*
* High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the
* hardware as being corrupted usually due to a multi-bit ECC memory or cache
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
* failure.
*
* In addition there is a "soft offline" entry point that allows stop using
* not-yet-corrupted-by-suspicious pages without killing anything.
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
*
* Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part
* here is that we can access any page asynchronously in respect to
* other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and
* anywhere. This could violate some of their assumptions. This is why
* this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use
* normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means
* the error handling takes potentially a long time.
*
* It can be very tempting to add handling for obscure cases here.
* In general any code for handling new cases should only be added iff:
* - You know how to test it.
* - You have a test that can be added to mce-test
* https://git.kernel.org/cgit/utils/cpu/mce/mce-test.git/
* - The case actually shows up as a frequent (top 10) page state in
* tools/vm/page-types when running a real workload.
*
* There are several operations here with exponential complexity because
* of unsuitable VM data structures. For example the operation to map back
* from RMAP chains to processes has to walk the complete process list and
* has non linear complexity with the number. But since memory corruptions
* are rare we hope to get away with this. This avoids impacting the core
* VM.
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/page-flags.h>
#include <linux/kernel-page-flags.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/sched/task.h>
#include <linux/dax.h>
#include <linux/ksm.h>
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
#include <linux/rmap.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
#include <linux/migrate.h>
#include <linux/suspend.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 08:04:11 +00:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/swapops.h>
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <linux/memory_hotplug.h>
#include <linux/mm_inline.h>
mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at af34214200 {1}[Hardware Error]: It has been corrected by h/w and requires no further action mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged {1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: corrected Memory failure: 0xaf34214: reserved kernel page still referenced by 1 users [..] Memory failure: 0xaf34214: recovery action for reserved kernel page: Failed mce: Memory error not recovered In contrast to typical memory, dev_pagemap pages may be dax mapped. With dax there is no possibility to map in another page dynamically since dax establishes 1:1 physical address to file offset associations. Also dev_pagemap pages associated with NVDIMM / persistent memory devices can internal remap/repair addresses with poison. While memory_failure() assumes that it can discard typical poisoned pages and keep them unmapped indefinitely, dev_pagemap pages may be returned to service after the error is cleared. Teach memory_failure() to detect and handle MEMORY_DEVICE_HOST dev_pagemap pages that have poison consumed by userspace. Mark the memory as UC instead of unmapping it completely to allow ongoing access via the device driver (nd_pmem). Later, nd_pmem will grow support for marking the page back to WB when the error is cleared. Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
2018-07-14 04:50:21 +00:00
#include <linux/memremap.h>
#include <linux/kfifo.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#include <linux/page-isolation.h>
#include <linux/pagewalk.h>
mm: shmem: don't truncate page if memory failure happens The current behavior of memory failure is to truncate the page cache regardless of dirty or clean. If the page is dirty the later access will get the obsolete data from disk without any notification to the users. This may cause silent data loss. It is even worse for shmem since shmem is in-memory filesystem, truncating page cache means discarding data blocks. The later read would return all zero. The right approach is to keep the corrupted page in page cache, any later access would return error for syscalls or SIGBUS for page fault, until the file is truncated, hole punched or removed. The regular storage backed filesystems would be more complicated so this patch is focused on shmem. This also unblock the support for soft offlining shmem THP. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes] [arnd@arndb.de: fix uninitialized variable use in me_pagecache_clean()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211022064748.4173718-1-arnd@kernel.org [Fix invalid pointer dereference in shmem_read_mapping_page_gfp() with a slight different implementation from what Ajay Garg <ajaygargnsit@gmail.com> and Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com> proposed and reworked the error handling of shmem_write_begin() suggested by Linus] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211111084617.6746-1-ajaygargnsit@gmail.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211020210755.23964-6-shy828301@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211116193247.21102-1-shy828301@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Ajay Garg <ajaygargnsit@gmail.com> Cc: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com> Cc: Andy Lavr <andy.lavr@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:05:19 +00:00
#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
mm: create new mm/swap.h header file Patch series "MM changes to improve swap-over-NFS support". Assorted improvements for swap-via-filesystem. This is a resend of these patches, rebased on current HEAD. The only substantial changes is that swap_dirty_folio has replaced swap_set_page_dirty. Currently swap-via-fs (SWP_FS_OPS) doesn't work for any filesystem. It has previously worked for NFS but that broke a few releases back. This series changes to use a new ->swap_rw rather than ->readpage and ->direct_IO. It also makes other improvements. There is a companion series already in linux-next which fixes various issues with NFS. Once both series land, a final patch is needed which changes NFS over to use ->swap_rw. This patch (of 10): Many functions declared in include/linux/swap.h are only used within mm/ Create a new "mm/swap.h" and move some of these declarations there. Remove the redundant 'extern' from the function declarations. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: mm/memory-failure.c needs mm/swap.h] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/164859751830.29473.5309689752169286816.stgit@noble.brown Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/164859778120.29473.11725907882296224053.stgit@noble.brown Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Tested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-05-10 01:20:47 +00:00
#include "swap.h"
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
#include "internal.h"
#include "ras/ras_event.h"
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
int sysctl_memory_failure_early_kill __read_mostly = 0;
int sysctl_memory_failure_recovery __read_mostly = 1;
atomic_long_t num_poisoned_pages __read_mostly = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
mm/memory-failure: disable unpoison once hw error happens Currently unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn) is designed for soft poison(hwpoison-inject) only. Since 17fae1294ad9d, the KPTE gets cleared on a x86 platform once hardware memory corrupts. Unpoisoning a hardware corrupted page puts page back buddy only, the kernel has a chance to access the page with *NOT PRESENT* KPTE. This leads BUG during accessing on the corrupted KPTE. Suggested by David&Naoya, disable unpoison mechanism when a real HW error happens to avoid BUG like this: Unpoison: Software-unpoisoned page 0x61234 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888061234000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 2c01067 P4D 2c01067 PUD 107267063 PMD 10382b063 PTE 800fffff9edcb062 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 4 PID: 26551 Comm: stress Kdump: loaded Tainted: G M OE 5.18.0.bm.1-amd64 #7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) ... RIP: 0010:clear_page_erms+0x7/0x10 Code: ... RSP: 0000:ffffc90001107bc8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000901 RCX: 0000000000001000 RDX: ffffea0001848d00 RSI: ffffea0001848d40 RDI: ffff888061234000 RBP: ffffea0001848d00 R08: 0000000000000901 R09: 0000000000001276 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000140dca R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007fd8b2333740(0000) GS:ffff88813fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff888061234000 CR3: 00000001023d2005 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> prep_new_page+0x151/0x170 get_page_from_freelist+0xca0/0xe20 ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xab/0xc0 ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20 __alloc_pages+0x17e/0x340 __folio_alloc+0x17/0x40 vma_alloc_folio+0x84/0x280 __handle_mm_fault+0x8d4/0xeb0 handle_mm_fault+0xd5/0x2a0 do_user_addr_fault+0x1d0/0x680 ? kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags+0x3b/0x50 exc_page_fault+0x78/0x170 asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220615093209.259374-2-pizhenwei@bytedance.com Fixes: 847ce401df392 ("HWPOISON: Add unpoisoning support") Fixes: 17fae1294ad9d ("x86/{mce,mm}: Unmap the entire page if the whole page is affected and poisoned") Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi <pizhenwei@bytedance.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-06-15 09:32:09 +00:00
static bool hw_memory_failure __read_mostly = false;
static bool __page_handle_poison(struct page *page)
{
mm: fix panic caused by __page_handle_poison() In commit 510d25c92ec4 ("mm/hwpoison: disable pcp for page_handle_poison()"), __page_handle_poison() was introduced, and if we mark: RET_A = dissolve_free_huge_page(); RET_B = take_page_off_buddy(); then __page_handle_poison was supposed to return TRUE When RET_A == 0 && RET_B == TRUE But since it failed to take care the case when RET_A is -EBUSY or -ENOMEM, and just return the ret as a bool which actually become TRUE, it break the original logic. The following result is a huge page in freelist but was referenced as poisoned, and lead into the final panic: kernel BUG at mm/internal.h:95! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI skip... RIP: 0010:set_page_refcounted mm/internal.h:95 [inline] RIP: 0010:remove_hugetlb_page+0x23c/0x240 mm/hugetlb.c:1371 skip... Call Trace: remove_pool_huge_page+0xe4/0x110 mm/hugetlb.c:1892 return_unused_surplus_pages+0x8d/0x150 mm/hugetlb.c:2272 hugetlb_acct_memory.part.91+0x524/0x690 mm/hugetlb.c:4017 This patch replaces 'bool' with 'int' to handle RET_A correctly. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/61782ac6-1e8a-4f6f-35e6-e94fce3b37f5@linux.alibaba.com Fixes: 510d25c92ec4 ("mm/hwpoison: disable pcp for page_handle_poison()") Signed-off-by: Michael Wang <yun.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reported-by: Abaci <abaci@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.14+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-02 21:58:40 +00:00
int ret;
zone_pcp_disable(page_zone(page));
ret = dissolve_free_huge_page(page);
if (!ret)
ret = take_page_off_buddy(page);
zone_pcp_enable(page_zone(page));
mm: fix panic caused by __page_handle_poison() In commit 510d25c92ec4 ("mm/hwpoison: disable pcp for page_handle_poison()"), __page_handle_poison() was introduced, and if we mark: RET_A = dissolve_free_huge_page(); RET_B = take_page_off_buddy(); then __page_handle_poison was supposed to return TRUE When RET_A == 0 && RET_B == TRUE But since it failed to take care the case when RET_A is -EBUSY or -ENOMEM, and just return the ret as a bool which actually become TRUE, it break the original logic. The following result is a huge page in freelist but was referenced as poisoned, and lead into the final panic: kernel BUG at mm/internal.h:95! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI skip... RIP: 0010:set_page_refcounted mm/internal.h:95 [inline] RIP: 0010:remove_hugetlb_page+0x23c/0x240 mm/hugetlb.c:1371 skip... Call Trace: remove_pool_huge_page+0xe4/0x110 mm/hugetlb.c:1892 return_unused_surplus_pages+0x8d/0x150 mm/hugetlb.c:2272 hugetlb_acct_memory.part.91+0x524/0x690 mm/hugetlb.c:4017 This patch replaces 'bool' with 'int' to handle RET_A correctly. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/61782ac6-1e8a-4f6f-35e6-e94fce3b37f5@linux.alibaba.com Fixes: 510d25c92ec4 ("mm/hwpoison: disable pcp for page_handle_poison()") Signed-off-by: Michael Wang <yun.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reported-by: Abaci <abaci@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.14+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-02 21:58:40 +00:00
return ret > 0;
}
static bool page_handle_poison(struct page *page, bool hugepage_or_freepage, bool release)
{
if (hugepage_or_freepage) {
/*
* Doing this check for free pages is also fine since dissolve_free_huge_page
* returns 0 for non-hugetlb pages as well.
*/
if (!__page_handle_poison(page))
/*
* We could fail to take off the target page from buddy
* for example due to racy page allocation, but that's
* acceptable because soft-offlined page is not broken
* and if someone really want to use it, they should
* take it.
*/
return false;
}
SetPageHWPoison(page);
mm,hwpoison: rework soft offline for in-use pages This patch changes the way we set and handle in-use poisoned pages. Until now, poisoned pages were released to the buddy allocator, trusting that the checks that take place at allocation time would act as a safe net and would skip that page. This has proved to be wrong, as we got some pfn walkers out there, like compaction, that all they care is the page to be in a buddy freelist. Although this might not be the only user, having poisoned pages in the buddy allocator seems a bad idea as we should only have free pages that are ready and meant to be used as such. Before explaining the taken approach, let us break down the kind of pages we can soft offline. - Anonymous THP (after the split, they end up being 4K pages) - Hugetlb - Order-0 pages (that can be either migrated or invalited) * Normal pages (order-0 and anon-THP) - If they are clean and unmapped page cache pages, we invalidate then by means of invalidate_inode_page(). - If they are mapped/dirty, we do the isolate-and-migrate dance. Either way, do not call put_page directly from those paths. Instead, we keep the page and send it to page_handle_poison to perform the right handling. page_handle_poison sets the HWPoison flag and does the last put_page. Down the chain, we placed a check for HWPoison page in free_pages_prepare, that just skips any poisoned page, so those pages do not end up in any pcplist/freelist. After that, we set the refcount on the page to 1 and we increment the poisoned pages counter. If we see that the check in free_pages_prepare creates trouble, we can always do what we do for free pages: - wait until the page hits buddy's freelists - take it off, and flag it The downside of the above approach is that we could race with an allocation, so by the time we want to take the page off the buddy, the page has been already allocated so we cannot soft offline it. But the user could always retry it. * Hugetlb pages - We isolate-and-migrate them After the migration has been successful, we call dissolve_free_huge_page, and we set HWPoison on the page if we succeed. Hugetlb has a slightly different handling though. While for non-hugetlb pages we cared about closing the race with an allocation, doing so for hugetlb pages requires quite some additional and intrusive code (we would need to hook in free_huge_page and some other places). So I decided to not make the code overly complicated and just fail normally if the page we allocated in the meantime. We can always build on top of this. As a bonus, because of the way we handle now in-use pages, we no longer need the put-as-isolation-migratetype dance, that was guarding for poisoned pages to end up in pcplists. Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@ruivo.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Yakunin <zeil@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.com> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200922135650.1634-10-osalvador@suse.de Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-16 03:07:09 +00:00
if (release)
put_page(page);
page_ref_inc(page);
num_poisoned_pages_inc();
return true;
}
#if defined(CONFIG_HWPOISON_INJECT) || defined(CONFIG_HWPOISON_INJECT_MODULE)
u32 hwpoison_filter_enable = 0;
u32 hwpoison_filter_dev_major = ~0U;
u32 hwpoison_filter_dev_minor = ~0U;
u64 hwpoison_filter_flags_mask;
u64 hwpoison_filter_flags_value;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hwpoison_filter_enable);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hwpoison_filter_dev_major);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hwpoison_filter_dev_minor);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hwpoison_filter_flags_mask);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hwpoison_filter_flags_value);
static int hwpoison_filter_dev(struct page *p)
{
struct address_space *mapping;
dev_t dev;
if (hwpoison_filter_dev_major == ~0U &&
hwpoison_filter_dev_minor == ~0U)
return 0;
mapping = page_mapping(p);
if (mapping == NULL || mapping->host == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
dev = mapping->host->i_sb->s_dev;
if (hwpoison_filter_dev_major != ~0U &&
hwpoison_filter_dev_major != MAJOR(dev))
return -EINVAL;
if (hwpoison_filter_dev_minor != ~0U &&
hwpoison_filter_dev_minor != MINOR(dev))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
static int hwpoison_filter_flags(struct page *p)
{
if (!hwpoison_filter_flags_mask)
return 0;
if ((stable_page_flags(p) & hwpoison_filter_flags_mask) ==
hwpoison_filter_flags_value)
return 0;
else
return -EINVAL;
}
HWPOISON: add memory cgroup filter The hwpoison test suite need to inject hwpoison to a collection of selected task pages, and must not touch pages not owned by them and thus kill important system processes such as init. (But it's OK to mis-hwpoison free/unowned pages as well as shared clean pages. Mis-hwpoison of shared dirty pages will kill all tasks, so the test suite will target all or non of such tasks in the first place.) The memory cgroup serves this purpose well. We can put the target processes under the control of a memory cgroup, and tell the hwpoison injection code to only kill pages associated with some active memory cgroup. The prerequisite for doing hwpoison stress tests with mem_cgroup is, the mem_cgroup code tracks task pages _accurately_ (unless page is locked). Which we believe is/should be true. The benefits are simplification of hwpoison injector code. Also the mem_cgroup code will automatically be tested by hwpoison test cases. The alternative interfaces pin-pfn/unpin-pfn can also delegate the (process and page flags) filtering functions reliably to user space. However prototype implementation shows that this scheme adds more complexity than we wanted. Example test case: mkdir /cgroup/hwpoison usemem -m 100 -s 1000 & echo `jobs -p` > /cgroup/hwpoison/tasks memcg_ino=$(ls -id /cgroup/hwpoison | cut -f1 -d' ') echo $memcg_ino > /debug/hwpoison/corrupt-filter-memcg page-types -p `pidof init` --hwpoison # shall do nothing page-types -p `pidof usemem` --hwpoison # poison its pages [AK: Fix documentation] [Add fix for problem noticed by Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>; dentry in the css could be NULL] CC: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> CC: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk> CC: Daisuke Nishimura <nishimura@mxp.nes.nec.co.jp> CC: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> CC: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> CC: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> CC: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> CC: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> CC: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Signed-off-by: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
2009-12-16 11:19:59 +00:00
/*
* This allows stress tests to limit test scope to a collection of tasks
* by putting them under some memcg. This prevents killing unrelated/important
* processes such as /sbin/init. Note that the target task may share clean
* pages with init (eg. libc text), which is harmless. If the target task
* share _dirty_ pages with another task B, the test scheme must make sure B
* is also included in the memcg. At last, due to race conditions this filter
* can only guarantee that the page either belongs to the memcg tasks, or is
* a freed page.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
HWPOISON: add memory cgroup filter The hwpoison test suite need to inject hwpoison to a collection of selected task pages, and must not touch pages not owned by them and thus kill important system processes such as init. (But it's OK to mis-hwpoison free/unowned pages as well as shared clean pages. Mis-hwpoison of shared dirty pages will kill all tasks, so the test suite will target all or non of such tasks in the first place.) The memory cgroup serves this purpose well. We can put the target processes under the control of a memory cgroup, and tell the hwpoison injection code to only kill pages associated with some active memory cgroup. The prerequisite for doing hwpoison stress tests with mem_cgroup is, the mem_cgroup code tracks task pages _accurately_ (unless page is locked). Which we believe is/should be true. The benefits are simplification of hwpoison injector code. Also the mem_cgroup code will automatically be tested by hwpoison test cases. The alternative interfaces pin-pfn/unpin-pfn can also delegate the (process and page flags) filtering functions reliably to user space. However prototype implementation shows that this scheme adds more complexity than we wanted. Example test case: mkdir /cgroup/hwpoison usemem -m 100 -s 1000 & echo `jobs -p` > /cgroup/hwpoison/tasks memcg_ino=$(ls -id /cgroup/hwpoison | cut -f1 -d' ') echo $memcg_ino > /debug/hwpoison/corrupt-filter-memcg page-types -p `pidof init` --hwpoison # shall do nothing page-types -p `pidof usemem` --hwpoison # poison its pages [AK: Fix documentation] [Add fix for problem noticed by Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>; dentry in the css could be NULL] CC: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> CC: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk> CC: Daisuke Nishimura <nishimura@mxp.nes.nec.co.jp> CC: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> CC: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> CC: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> CC: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> CC: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> CC: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Signed-off-by: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
2009-12-16 11:19:59 +00:00
u64 hwpoison_filter_memcg;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hwpoison_filter_memcg);
static int hwpoison_filter_task(struct page *p)
{
if (!hwpoison_filter_memcg)
return 0;
if (page_cgroup_ino(p) != hwpoison_filter_memcg)
HWPOISON: add memory cgroup filter The hwpoison test suite need to inject hwpoison to a collection of selected task pages, and must not touch pages not owned by them and thus kill important system processes such as init. (But it's OK to mis-hwpoison free/unowned pages as well as shared clean pages. Mis-hwpoison of shared dirty pages will kill all tasks, so the test suite will target all or non of such tasks in the first place.) The memory cgroup serves this purpose well. We can put the target processes under the control of a memory cgroup, and tell the hwpoison injection code to only kill pages associated with some active memory cgroup. The prerequisite for doing hwpoison stress tests with mem_cgroup is, the mem_cgroup code tracks task pages _accurately_ (unless page is locked). Which we believe is/should be true. The benefits are simplification of hwpoison injector code. Also the mem_cgroup code will automatically be tested by hwpoison test cases. The alternative interfaces pin-pfn/unpin-pfn can also delegate the (process and page flags) filtering functions reliably to user space. However prototype implementation shows that this scheme adds more complexity than we wanted. Example test case: mkdir /cgroup/hwpoison usemem -m 100 -s 1000 & echo `jobs -p` > /cgroup/hwpoison/tasks memcg_ino=$(ls -id /cgroup/hwpoison | cut -f1 -d' ') echo $memcg_ino > /debug/hwpoison/corrupt-filter-memcg page-types -p `pidof init` --hwpoison # shall do nothing page-types -p `pidof usemem` --hwpoison # poison its pages [AK: Fix documentation] [Add fix for problem noticed by Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>; dentry in the css could be NULL] CC: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> CC: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk> CC: Daisuke Nishimura <nishimura@mxp.nes.nec.co.jp> CC: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> CC: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> CC: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> CC: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> CC: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> CC: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Signed-off-by: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
2009-12-16 11:19:59 +00:00
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
#else
static int hwpoison_filter_task(struct page *p) { return 0; }
#endif
int hwpoison_filter(struct page *p)
{
if (!hwpoison_filter_enable)
return 0;
if (hwpoison_filter_dev(p))
return -EINVAL;
if (hwpoison_filter_flags(p))
return -EINVAL;
HWPOISON: add memory cgroup filter The hwpoison test suite need to inject hwpoison to a collection of selected task pages, and must not touch pages not owned by them and thus kill important system processes such as init. (But it's OK to mis-hwpoison free/unowned pages as well as shared clean pages. Mis-hwpoison of shared dirty pages will kill all tasks, so the test suite will target all or non of such tasks in the first place.) The memory cgroup serves this purpose well. We can put the target processes under the control of a memory cgroup, and tell the hwpoison injection code to only kill pages associated with some active memory cgroup. The prerequisite for doing hwpoison stress tests with mem_cgroup is, the mem_cgroup code tracks task pages _accurately_ (unless page is locked). Which we believe is/should be true. The benefits are simplification of hwpoison injector code. Also the mem_cgroup code will automatically be tested by hwpoison test cases. The alternative interfaces pin-pfn/unpin-pfn can also delegate the (process and page flags) filtering functions reliably to user space. However prototype implementation shows that this scheme adds more complexity than we wanted. Example test case: mkdir /cgroup/hwpoison usemem -m 100 -s 1000 & echo `jobs -p` > /cgroup/hwpoison/tasks memcg_ino=$(ls -id /cgroup/hwpoison | cut -f1 -d' ') echo $memcg_ino > /debug/hwpoison/corrupt-filter-memcg page-types -p `pidof init` --hwpoison # shall do nothing page-types -p `pidof usemem` --hwpoison # poison its pages [AK: Fix documentation] [Add fix for problem noticed by Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>; dentry in the css could be NULL] CC: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> CC: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk> CC: Daisuke Nishimura <nishimura@mxp.nes.nec.co.jp> CC: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> CC: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> CC: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com> CC: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> CC: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> CC: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Signed-off-by: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
2009-12-16 11:19:59 +00:00
if (hwpoison_filter_task(p))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
#else
int hwpoison_filter(struct page *p)
{
return 0;
}
#endif
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hwpoison_filter);
/*
* Kill all processes that have a poisoned page mapped and then isolate
* the page.
*
* General strategy:
* Find all processes having the page mapped and kill them.
* But we keep a page reference around so that the page is not
* actually freed yet.
* Then stash the page away
*
* There's no convenient way to get back to mapped processes
* from the VMAs. So do a brute-force search over all
* running processes.
*
* Remember that machine checks are not common (or rather
* if they are common you have other problems), so this shouldn't
* be a performance issue.
*
* Also there are some races possible while we get from the
* error detection to actually handle it.
*/
struct to_kill {
struct list_head nd;
struct task_struct *tsk;
unsigned long addr;
short size_shift;
};
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
/*
* Send all the processes who have the page mapped a signal.
* ``action optional'' if they are not immediately affected by the error
* ``action required'' if error happened in current execution context
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
*/
static int kill_proc(struct to_kill *tk, unsigned long pfn, int flags)
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{
struct task_struct *t = tk->tsk;
short addr_lsb = tk->size_shift;
int ret = 0;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
pr_err("Memory failure: %#lx: Sending SIGBUS to %s:%d due to hardware memory corruption\n",
pfn, t->comm, t->pid);
if ((flags & MF_ACTION_REQUIRED) && (t == current))
ret = force_sig_mceerr(BUS_MCEERR_AR,
(void __user *)tk->addr, addr_lsb);
else
/*
* Signal other processes sharing the page if they have
* PF_MCE_EARLY set.
* Don't use force here, it's convenient if the signal
* can be temporarily blocked.
* This could cause a loop when the user sets SIGBUS
* to SIG_IGN, but hopefully no one will do that?
*/
ret = send_sig_mceerr(BUS_MCEERR_AO, (void __user *)tk->addr,
addr_lsb, t); /* synchronous? */
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
if (ret < 0)
pr_info("Memory failure: Error sending signal to %s:%d: %d\n",
t->comm, t->pid, ret);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
return ret;
}
/*
* Unknown page type encountered. Try to check whether it can turn PageLRU by
mm: hwpoison: don't drop slab caches for offlining non-LRU page In the current implementation of soft offline, if non-LRU page is met, all the slab caches will be dropped to free the page then offline. But if the page is not slab page all the effort is wasted in vain. Even though it is a slab page, it is not guaranteed the page could be freed at all. However the side effect and cost is quite high. It does not only drop the slab caches, but also may drop a significant amount of page caches which are associated with inode caches. It could make the most workingset gone in order to just offline a page. And the offline is not guaranteed to succeed at all, actually I really doubt the success rate for real life workload. Furthermore the worse consequence is the system may be locked up and unusable since the page cache release may incur huge amount of works queued for memcg release. Actually we ran into such unpleasant case in our production environment. Firstly, the workqueue of memory_failure_work_func is locked up as below: BUG: workqueue lockup - pool cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 stuck for 53s! Showing busy workqueues and worker pools: workqueue events: flags=0x0 pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=14/256 refcnt=15 in-flight: 409271:memory_failure_work_func pending: kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_monitor, kfree_rcu_work, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, drain_local_stock, kfree_rcu_work workqueue mm_percpu_wq: flags=0x8 pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256 refcnt=2 pending: vmstat_update workqueue cgroup_destroy: flags=0x0 pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/1 refcnt=12072 pending: css_release_work_fn There were over 12K css_release_work_fn queued, and this caused a few lockups due to the contention of worker pool lock with IRQ disabled, for example: NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 1 Modules linked in: amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel xt_DSCP iptable_mangle kvm_amd bpfilter vfat fat acpi_ipmi i2c_piix4 usb_storage ipmi_si k10temp i2c_core ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_cpufreq sch_fq_codel xfs libcrc32c crc32c_intel mlx5_core mlxfw nvme xhci_pci ptp nvme_core pps_core xhci_hcd CPU: 1 PID: 205500 Comm: kworker/1:0 Tainted: G L 5.10.32-t1.el7.twitter.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: TYAN F5AMT /z /S8026GM2NRE-CGN, BIOS V8.030 03/30/2021 Workqueue: events memory_failure_work_func RIP: 0010:queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x41/0x1a0 Code: 41 f0 0f ba 2f 08 0f 92 c0 0f b6 c0 c1 e0 08 89 c2 8b 07 30 e4 09 d0 a9 00 01 ff ff 75 1b 85 c0 74 0e 8b 07 84 c0 74 08 f3 90 <8b> 07 84 c0 75 f8 b8 01 00 00 00 66 89 07 c3 f6 c4 01 75 04 c6 47 RSP: 0018:ffff9b2ac278f900 EFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: 0000000000480101 RBX: ffff8ce98ce71800 RCX: 0000000000000084 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ce98ce6a140 RBP: 00000000000284c8 R08: ffffd7248dcb6808 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff9b2ac278f9b0 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffff8cb44dab9c00 R14: ffffffffbd1ce6a0 R15: ffff8cacaa37f068 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ce98ce40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fcf6e8cb000 CR3: 0000000a0c60a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 Call Trace: __queue_work+0xd6/0x3c0 queue_work_on+0x1c/0x30 uncharge_batch+0x10e/0x110 mem_cgroup_uncharge_list+0x6d/0x80 release_pages+0x37f/0x3f0 __pagevec_release+0x1c/0x50 __invalidate_mapping_pages+0x348/0x380 inode_lru_isolate+0x10a/0x160 __list_lru_walk_one+0x7b/0x170 list_lru_walk_one+0x4a/0x60 prune_icache_sb+0x37/0x50 super_cache_scan+0x123/0x1a0 do_shrink_slab+0x10c/0x2c0 shrink_slab+0x1f1/0x290 drop_slab_node+0x4d/0x70 soft_offline_page+0x1ac/0x5b0 memory_failure_work_func+0x6a/0x90 process_one_work+0x19e/0x340 worker_thread+0x30/0x360 kthread+0x116/0x130 The lockup made the machine is quite unusable. And it also made the most workingset gone, the reclaimabled slab caches were reduced from 12G to 300MB, the page caches were decreased from 17G to 4G. But the most disappointing thing is all the effort doesn't make the page offline, it just returns: soft_offline: 0x1469f2: unknown non LRU page type 5ffff0000000000 () It seems the aggressive behavior for non-LRU page didn't pay back, so it doesn't make too much sense to keep it considering the terrible side effect. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210819054116.266126-1-shy828301@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Reported-by: David Mackey <tdmackey@twitter.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-02 21:58:31 +00:00
* lru_add_drain_all.
*/
mm: hwpoison: don't drop slab caches for offlining non-LRU page In the current implementation of soft offline, if non-LRU page is met, all the slab caches will be dropped to free the page then offline. But if the page is not slab page all the effort is wasted in vain. Even though it is a slab page, it is not guaranteed the page could be freed at all. However the side effect and cost is quite high. It does not only drop the slab caches, but also may drop a significant amount of page caches which are associated with inode caches. It could make the most workingset gone in order to just offline a page. And the offline is not guaranteed to succeed at all, actually I really doubt the success rate for real life workload. Furthermore the worse consequence is the system may be locked up and unusable since the page cache release may incur huge amount of works queued for memcg release. Actually we ran into such unpleasant case in our production environment. Firstly, the workqueue of memory_failure_work_func is locked up as below: BUG: workqueue lockup - pool cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 stuck for 53s! Showing busy workqueues and worker pools: workqueue events: flags=0x0 pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=14/256 refcnt=15 in-flight: 409271:memory_failure_work_func pending: kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_monitor, kfree_rcu_work, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, drain_local_stock, kfree_rcu_work workqueue mm_percpu_wq: flags=0x8 pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256 refcnt=2 pending: vmstat_update workqueue cgroup_destroy: flags=0x0 pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/1 refcnt=12072 pending: css_release_work_fn There were over 12K css_release_work_fn queued, and this caused a few lockups due to the contention of worker pool lock with IRQ disabled, for example: NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 1 Modules linked in: amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel xt_DSCP iptable_mangle kvm_amd bpfilter vfat fat acpi_ipmi i2c_piix4 usb_storage ipmi_si k10temp i2c_core ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_cpufreq sch_fq_codel xfs libcrc32c crc32c_intel mlx5_core mlxfw nvme xhci_pci ptp nvme_core pps_core xhci_hcd CPU: 1 PID: 205500 Comm: kworker/1:0 Tainted: G L 5.10.32-t1.el7.twitter.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: TYAN F5AMT /z /S8026GM2NRE-CGN, BIOS V8.030 03/30/2021 Workqueue: events memory_failure_work_func RIP: 0010:queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x41/0x1a0 Code: 41 f0 0f ba 2f 08 0f 92 c0 0f b6 c0 c1 e0 08 89 c2 8b 07 30 e4 09 d0 a9 00 01 ff ff 75 1b 85 c0 74 0e 8b 07 84 c0 74 08 f3 90 <8b> 07 84 c0 75 f8 b8 01 00 00 00 66 89 07 c3 f6 c4 01 75 04 c6 47 RSP: 0018:ffff9b2ac278f900 EFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: 0000000000480101 RBX: ffff8ce98ce71800 RCX: 0000000000000084 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ce98ce6a140 RBP: 00000000000284c8 R08: ffffd7248dcb6808 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff9b2ac278f9b0 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffff8cb44dab9c00 R14: ffffffffbd1ce6a0 R15: ffff8cacaa37f068 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ce98ce40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fcf6e8cb000 CR3: 0000000a0c60a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 Call Trace: __queue_work+0xd6/0x3c0 queue_work_on+0x1c/0x30 uncharge_batch+0x10e/0x110 mem_cgroup_uncharge_list+0x6d/0x80 release_pages+0x37f/0x3f0 __pagevec_release+0x1c/0x50 __invalidate_mapping_pages+0x348/0x380 inode_lru_isolate+0x10a/0x160 __list_lru_walk_one+0x7b/0x170 list_lru_walk_one+0x4a/0x60 prune_icache_sb+0x37/0x50 super_cache_scan+0x123/0x1a0 do_shrink_slab+0x10c/0x2c0 shrink_slab+0x1f1/0x290 drop_slab_node+0x4d/0x70 soft_offline_page+0x1ac/0x5b0 memory_failure_work_func+0x6a/0x90 process_one_work+0x19e/0x340 worker_thread+0x30/0x360 kthread+0x116/0x130 The lockup made the machine is quite unusable. And it also made the most workingset gone, the reclaimabled slab caches were reduced from 12G to 300MB, the page caches were decreased from 17G to 4G. But the most disappointing thing is all the effort doesn't make the page offline, it just returns: soft_offline: 0x1469f2: unknown non LRU page type 5ffff0000000000 () It seems the aggressive behavior for non-LRU page didn't pay back, so it doesn't make too much sense to keep it considering the terrible side effect. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210819054116.266126-1-shy828301@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Reported-by: David Mackey <tdmackey@twitter.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-02 21:58:31 +00:00
void shake_page(struct page *p)
{
if (PageHuge(p))
return;
if (!PageSlab(p)) {
lru_add_drain_all();
if (PageLRU(p) || is_free_buddy_page(p))
return;
}
/*
mm: hwpoison: don't drop slab caches for offlining non-LRU page In the current implementation of soft offline, if non-LRU page is met, all the slab caches will be dropped to free the page then offline. But if the page is not slab page all the effort is wasted in vain. Even though it is a slab page, it is not guaranteed the page could be freed at all. However the side effect and cost is quite high. It does not only drop the slab caches, but also may drop a significant amount of page caches which are associated with inode caches. It could make the most workingset gone in order to just offline a page. And the offline is not guaranteed to succeed at all, actually I really doubt the success rate for real life workload. Furthermore the worse consequence is the system may be locked up and unusable since the page cache release may incur huge amount of works queued for memcg release. Actually we ran into such unpleasant case in our production environment. Firstly, the workqueue of memory_failure_work_func is locked up as below: BUG: workqueue lockup - pool cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 stuck for 53s! Showing busy workqueues and worker pools: workqueue events: flags=0x0 pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=14/256 refcnt=15 in-flight: 409271:memory_failure_work_func pending: kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_monitor, kfree_rcu_work, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, drain_local_stock, kfree_rcu_work workqueue mm_percpu_wq: flags=0x8 pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256 refcnt=2 pending: vmstat_update workqueue cgroup_destroy: flags=0x0 pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/1 refcnt=12072 pending: css_release_work_fn There were over 12K css_release_work_fn queued, and this caused a few lockups due to the contention of worker pool lock with IRQ disabled, for example: NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 1 Modules linked in: amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel xt_DSCP iptable_mangle kvm_amd bpfilter vfat fat acpi_ipmi i2c_piix4 usb_storage ipmi_si k10temp i2c_core ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_cpufreq sch_fq_codel xfs libcrc32c crc32c_intel mlx5_core mlxfw nvme xhci_pci ptp nvme_core pps_core xhci_hcd CPU: 1 PID: 205500 Comm: kworker/1:0 Tainted: G L 5.10.32-t1.el7.twitter.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: TYAN F5AMT /z /S8026GM2NRE-CGN, BIOS V8.030 03/30/2021 Workqueue: events memory_failure_work_func RIP: 0010:queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x41/0x1a0 Code: 41 f0 0f ba 2f 08 0f 92 c0 0f b6 c0 c1 e0 08 89 c2 8b 07 30 e4 09 d0 a9 00 01 ff ff 75 1b 85 c0 74 0e 8b 07 84 c0 74 08 f3 90 <8b> 07 84 c0 75 f8 b8 01 00 00 00 66 89 07 c3 f6 c4 01 75 04 c6 47 RSP: 0018:ffff9b2ac278f900 EFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: 0000000000480101 RBX: ffff8ce98ce71800 RCX: 0000000000000084 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ce98ce6a140 RBP: 00000000000284c8 R08: ffffd7248dcb6808 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff9b2ac278f9b0 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffff8cb44dab9c00 R14: ffffffffbd1ce6a0 R15: ffff8cacaa37f068 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ce98ce40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fcf6e8cb000 CR3: 0000000a0c60a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 Call Trace: __queue_work+0xd6/0x3c0 queue_work_on+0x1c/0x30 uncharge_batch+0x10e/0x110 mem_cgroup_uncharge_list+0x6d/0x80 release_pages+0x37f/0x3f0 __pagevec_release+0x1c/0x50 __invalidate_mapping_pages+0x348/0x380 inode_lru_isolate+0x10a/0x160 __list_lru_walk_one+0x7b/0x170 list_lru_walk_one+0x4a/0x60 prune_icache_sb+0x37/0x50 super_cache_scan+0x123/0x1a0 do_shrink_slab+0x10c/0x2c0 shrink_slab+0x1f1/0x290 drop_slab_node+0x4d/0x70 soft_offline_page+0x1ac/0x5b0 memory_failure_work_func+0x6a/0x90 process_one_work+0x19e/0x340 worker_thread+0x30/0x360 kthread+0x116/0x130 The lockup made the machine is quite unusable. And it also made the most workingset gone, the reclaimabled slab caches were reduced from 12G to 300MB, the page caches were decreased from 17G to 4G. But the most disappointing thing is all the effort doesn't make the page offline, it just returns: soft_offline: 0x1469f2: unknown non LRU page type 5ffff0000000000 () It seems the aggressive behavior for non-LRU page didn't pay back, so it doesn't make too much sense to keep it considering the terrible side effect. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210819054116.266126-1-shy828301@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Reported-by: David Mackey <tdmackey@twitter.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-02 21:58:31 +00:00
* TODO: Could shrink slab caches here if a lightweight range-based
* shrinker will be available.
*/
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(shake_page);
mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at af34214200 {1}[Hardware Error]: It has been corrected by h/w and requires no further action mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged {1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: corrected Memory failure: 0xaf34214: reserved kernel page still referenced by 1 users [..] Memory failure: 0xaf34214: recovery action for reserved kernel page: Failed mce: Memory error not recovered In contrast to typical memory, dev_pagemap pages may be dax mapped. With dax there is no possibility to map in another page dynamically since dax establishes 1:1 physical address to file offset associations. Also dev_pagemap pages associated with NVDIMM / persistent memory devices can internal remap/repair addresses with poison. While memory_failure() assumes that it can discard typical poisoned pages and keep them unmapped indefinitely, dev_pagemap pages may be returned to service after the error is cleared. Teach memory_failure() to detect and handle MEMORY_DEVICE_HOST dev_pagemap pages that have poison consumed by userspace. Mark the memory as UC instead of unmapping it completely to allow ongoing access via the device driver (nd_pmem). Later, nd_pmem will grow support for marking the page back to WB when the error is cleared. Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
2018-07-14 04:50:21 +00:00
static unsigned long dev_pagemap_mapping_shift(struct page *page,
struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
unsigned long address = vma_address(page, vma);
unsigned long ret = 0;
mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at af34214200 {1}[Hardware Error]: It has been corrected by h/w and requires no further action mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged {1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: corrected Memory failure: 0xaf34214: reserved kernel page still referenced by 1 users [..] Memory failure: 0xaf34214: recovery action for reserved kernel page: Failed mce: Memory error not recovered In contrast to typical memory, dev_pagemap pages may be dax mapped. With dax there is no possibility to map in another page dynamically since dax establishes 1:1 physical address to file offset associations. Also dev_pagemap pages associated with NVDIMM / persistent memory devices can internal remap/repair addresses with poison. While memory_failure() assumes that it can discard typical poisoned pages and keep them unmapped indefinitely, dev_pagemap pages may be returned to service after the error is cleared. Teach memory_failure() to detect and handle MEMORY_DEVICE_HOST dev_pagemap pages that have poison consumed by userspace. Mark the memory as UC instead of unmapping it completely to allow ongoing access via the device driver (nd_pmem). Later, nd_pmem will grow support for marking the page back to WB when the error is cleared. Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
2018-07-14 04:50:21 +00:00
pgd_t *pgd;
p4d_t *p4d;
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
pte_t *pte;
VM_BUG_ON_VMA(address == -EFAULT, vma);
mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at af34214200 {1}[Hardware Error]: It has been corrected by h/w and requires no further action mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged {1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: corrected Memory failure: 0xaf34214: reserved kernel page still referenced by 1 users [..] Memory failure: 0xaf34214: recovery action for reserved kernel page: Failed mce: Memory error not recovered In contrast to typical memory, dev_pagemap pages may be dax mapped. With dax there is no possibility to map in another page dynamically since dax establishes 1:1 physical address to file offset associations. Also dev_pagemap pages associated with NVDIMM / persistent memory devices can internal remap/repair addresses with poison. While memory_failure() assumes that it can discard typical poisoned pages and keep them unmapped indefinitely, dev_pagemap pages may be returned to service after the error is cleared. Teach memory_failure() to detect and handle MEMORY_DEVICE_HOST dev_pagemap pages that have poison consumed by userspace. Mark the memory as UC instead of unmapping it completely to allow ongoing access via the device driver (nd_pmem). Later, nd_pmem will grow support for marking the page back to WB when the error is cleared. Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
2018-07-14 04:50:21 +00:00
pgd = pgd_offset(vma->vm_mm, address);
if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
return 0;
p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, address);
if (!p4d_present(*p4d))
return 0;
pud = pud_offset(p4d, address);
if (!pud_present(*pud))
return 0;
if (pud_devmap(*pud))
return PUD_SHIFT;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
return 0;
if (pmd_devmap(*pmd))
return PMD_SHIFT;
pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, address);
if (pte_present(*pte) && pte_devmap(*pte))
ret = PAGE_SHIFT;
pte_unmap(pte);
return ret;
mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at af34214200 {1}[Hardware Error]: It has been corrected by h/w and requires no further action mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged {1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: corrected Memory failure: 0xaf34214: reserved kernel page still referenced by 1 users [..] Memory failure: 0xaf34214: recovery action for reserved kernel page: Failed mce: Memory error not recovered In contrast to typical memory, dev_pagemap pages may be dax mapped. With dax there is no possibility to map in another page dynamically since dax establishes 1:1 physical address to file offset associations. Also dev_pagemap pages associated with NVDIMM / persistent memory devices can internal remap/repair addresses with poison. While memory_failure() assumes that it can discard typical poisoned pages and keep them unmapped indefinitely, dev_pagemap pages may be returned to service after the error is cleared. Teach memory_failure() to detect and handle MEMORY_DEVICE_HOST dev_pagemap pages that have poison consumed by userspace. Mark the memory as UC instead of unmapping it completely to allow ongoing access via the device driver (nd_pmem). Later, nd_pmem will grow support for marking the page back to WB when the error is cleared. Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
2018-07-14 04:50:21 +00:00
}
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
/*
* Failure handling: if we can't find or can't kill a process there's
* not much we can do. We just print a message and ignore otherwise.
*/
/*
* Schedule a process for later kill.
* Uses GFP_ATOMIC allocations to avoid potential recursions in the VM.
*/
static void add_to_kill(struct task_struct *tsk, struct page *p,
struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct list_head *to_kill)
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{
struct to_kill *tk;
tk = kmalloc(sizeof(struct to_kill), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!tk) {
pr_err("Memory failure: Out of memory while machine check handling\n");
return;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
tk->addr = page_address_in_vma(p, vma);
mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at af34214200 {1}[Hardware Error]: It has been corrected by h/w and requires no further action mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged {1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: corrected Memory failure: 0xaf34214: reserved kernel page still referenced by 1 users [..] Memory failure: 0xaf34214: recovery action for reserved kernel page: Failed mce: Memory error not recovered In contrast to typical memory, dev_pagemap pages may be dax mapped. With dax there is no possibility to map in another page dynamically since dax establishes 1:1 physical address to file offset associations. Also dev_pagemap pages associated with NVDIMM / persistent memory devices can internal remap/repair addresses with poison. While memory_failure() assumes that it can discard typical poisoned pages and keep them unmapped indefinitely, dev_pagemap pages may be returned to service after the error is cleared. Teach memory_failure() to detect and handle MEMORY_DEVICE_HOST dev_pagemap pages that have poison consumed by userspace. Mark the memory as UC instead of unmapping it completely to allow ongoing access via the device driver (nd_pmem). Later, nd_pmem will grow support for marking the page back to WB when the error is cleared. Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
2018-07-14 04:50:21 +00:00
if (is_zone_device_page(p))
tk->size_shift = dev_pagemap_mapping_shift(p, vma);
else
tk->size_shift = page_shift(compound_head(p));
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
/*
mm/memory-failure: poison read receives SIGKILL instead of SIGBUS if mmaped more than once Mmap /dev/dax more than once, then read the poison location using address from one of the mappings. The other mappings due to not having the page mapped in will cause SIGKILLs delivered to the process. SIGKILL succeeds over SIGBUS, so user process loses the opportunity to handle the UE. Although one may add MAP_POPULATE to mmap(2) to work around the issue, MAP_POPULATE makes mapping 128GB of pmem several magnitudes slower, so isn't always an option. Details - ndctl inject-error --block=10 --count=1 namespace6.0 ./read_poison -x dax6.0 -o 5120 -m 2 mmaped address 0x7f5bb6600000 mmaped address 0x7f3cf3600000 doing local read at address 0x7f3cf3601400 Killed Console messages in instrumented kernel - mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at edbe201400 Memory failure: tk->addr = 7f5bb6601000 Memory failure: address edbe201: call dev_pagemap_mapping_shift dev_pagemap_mapping_shift: page edbe201: no PUD Memory failure: tk->size_shift == 0 Memory failure: Unable to find user space address edbe201 in read_poison Memory failure: tk->addr = 7f3cf3601000 Memory failure: address edbe201: call dev_pagemap_mapping_shift Memory failure: tk->size_shift = 21 Memory failure: 0xedbe201: forcibly killing read_poison:22434 because of failure to unmap corrupted page => to deliver SIGKILL Memory failure: 0xedbe201: Killing read_poison:22434 due to hardware memory corruption => to deliver SIGBUS Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1565112345-28754-3-git-send-email-jane.chu@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com> Suggested-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-10-14 21:12:29 +00:00
* Send SIGKILL if "tk->addr == -EFAULT". Also, as
* "tk->size_shift" is always non-zero for !is_zone_device_page(),
* so "tk->size_shift == 0" effectively checks no mapping on
* ZONE_DEVICE. Indeed, when a devdax page is mmapped N times
* to a process' address space, it's possible not all N VMAs
* contain mappings for the page, but at least one VMA does.
* Only deliver SIGBUS with payload derived from the VMA that
* has a mapping for the page.
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
*/
mm/memory-failure: poison read receives SIGKILL instead of SIGBUS if mmaped more than once Mmap /dev/dax more than once, then read the poison location using address from one of the mappings. The other mappings due to not having the page mapped in will cause SIGKILLs delivered to the process. SIGKILL succeeds over SIGBUS, so user process loses the opportunity to handle the UE. Although one may add MAP_POPULATE to mmap(2) to work around the issue, MAP_POPULATE makes mapping 128GB of pmem several magnitudes slower, so isn't always an option. Details - ndctl inject-error --block=10 --count=1 namespace6.0 ./read_poison -x dax6.0 -o 5120 -m 2 mmaped address 0x7f5bb6600000 mmaped address 0x7f3cf3600000 doing local read at address 0x7f3cf3601400 Killed Console messages in instrumented kernel - mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at edbe201400 Memory failure: tk->addr = 7f5bb6601000 Memory failure: address edbe201: call dev_pagemap_mapping_shift dev_pagemap_mapping_shift: page edbe201: no PUD Memory failure: tk->size_shift == 0 Memory failure: Unable to find user space address edbe201 in read_poison Memory failure: tk->addr = 7f3cf3601000 Memory failure: address edbe201: call dev_pagemap_mapping_shift Memory failure: tk->size_shift = 21 Memory failure: 0xedbe201: forcibly killing read_poison:22434 because of failure to unmap corrupted page => to deliver SIGKILL Memory failure: 0xedbe201: Killing read_poison:22434 due to hardware memory corruption => to deliver SIGBUS Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1565112345-28754-3-git-send-email-jane.chu@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com> Suggested-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-10-14 21:12:29 +00:00
if (tk->addr == -EFAULT) {
pr_info("Memory failure: Unable to find user space address %lx in %s\n",
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
page_to_pfn(p), tsk->comm);
mm/memory-failure: poison read receives SIGKILL instead of SIGBUS if mmaped more than once Mmap /dev/dax more than once, then read the poison location using address from one of the mappings. The other mappings due to not having the page mapped in will cause SIGKILLs delivered to the process. SIGKILL succeeds over SIGBUS, so user process loses the opportunity to handle the UE. Although one may add MAP_POPULATE to mmap(2) to work around the issue, MAP_POPULATE makes mapping 128GB of pmem several magnitudes slower, so isn't always an option. Details - ndctl inject-error --block=10 --count=1 namespace6.0 ./read_poison -x dax6.0 -o 5120 -m 2 mmaped address 0x7f5bb6600000 mmaped address 0x7f3cf3600000 doing local read at address 0x7f3cf3601400 Killed Console messages in instrumented kernel - mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at edbe201400 Memory failure: tk->addr = 7f5bb6601000 Memory failure: address edbe201: call dev_pagemap_mapping_shift dev_pagemap_mapping_shift: page edbe201: no PUD Memory failure: tk->size_shift == 0 Memory failure: Unable to find user space address edbe201 in read_poison Memory failure: tk->addr = 7f3cf3601000 Memory failure: address edbe201: call dev_pagemap_mapping_shift Memory failure: tk->size_shift = 21 Memory failure: 0xedbe201: forcibly killing read_poison:22434 because of failure to unmap corrupted page => to deliver SIGKILL Memory failure: 0xedbe201: Killing read_poison:22434 due to hardware memory corruption => to deliver SIGBUS Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1565112345-28754-3-git-send-email-jane.chu@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com> Suggested-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-10-14 21:12:29 +00:00
} else if (tk->size_shift == 0) {
kfree(tk);
return;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
get_task_struct(tsk);
tk->tsk = tsk;
list_add_tail(&tk->nd, to_kill);
}
/*
* Kill the processes that have been collected earlier.
*
* Only do anything when FORCEKILL is set, otherwise just free the
* list (this is used for clean pages which do not need killing)
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
* Also when FAIL is set do a force kill because something went
* wrong earlier.
*/
static void kill_procs(struct list_head *to_kill, int forcekill, bool fail,
unsigned long pfn, int flags)
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{
struct to_kill *tk, *next;
list_for_each_entry_safe (tk, next, to_kill, nd) {
if (forcekill) {
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
/*
* In case something went wrong with munmapping
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
* make sure the process doesn't catch the
* signal and then access the memory. Just kill it.
*/
mm/memory-failure: poison read receives SIGKILL instead of SIGBUS if mmaped more than once Mmap /dev/dax more than once, then read the poison location using address from one of the mappings. The other mappings due to not having the page mapped in will cause SIGKILLs delivered to the process. SIGKILL succeeds over SIGBUS, so user process loses the opportunity to handle the UE. Although one may add MAP_POPULATE to mmap(2) to work around the issue, MAP_POPULATE makes mapping 128GB of pmem several magnitudes slower, so isn't always an option. Details - ndctl inject-error --block=10 --count=1 namespace6.0 ./read_poison -x dax6.0 -o 5120 -m 2 mmaped address 0x7f5bb6600000 mmaped address 0x7f3cf3600000 doing local read at address 0x7f3cf3601400 Killed Console messages in instrumented kernel - mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at edbe201400 Memory failure: tk->addr = 7f5bb6601000 Memory failure: address edbe201: call dev_pagemap_mapping_shift dev_pagemap_mapping_shift: page edbe201: no PUD Memory failure: tk->size_shift == 0 Memory failure: Unable to find user space address edbe201 in read_poison Memory failure: tk->addr = 7f3cf3601000 Memory failure: address edbe201: call dev_pagemap_mapping_shift Memory failure: tk->size_shift = 21 Memory failure: 0xedbe201: forcibly killing read_poison:22434 because of failure to unmap corrupted page => to deliver SIGKILL Memory failure: 0xedbe201: Killing read_poison:22434 due to hardware memory corruption => to deliver SIGBUS Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1565112345-28754-3-git-send-email-jane.chu@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com> Suggested-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-10-14 21:12:29 +00:00
if (fail || tk->addr == -EFAULT) {
pr_err("Memory failure: %#lx: forcibly killing %s:%d because of failure to unmap corrupted page\n",
pfn, tk->tsk->comm, tk->tsk->pid);
mm: hwpoison: use do_send_sig_info() instead of force_sig() Currently memory_failure() is racy against process's exiting, which results in kernel crash by null pointer dereference. The root cause is that memory_failure() uses force_sig() to forcibly kill asynchronous (meaning not in the current context) processes. As discussed in thread https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/6/8/236 years ago for OOM fixes, this is not a right thing to do. OOM solves this issue by using do_send_sig_info() as done in commit d2d393099de2 ("signal: oom_kill_task: use SEND_SIG_FORCED instead of force_sig()"), so this patch is suggesting to do the same for hwpoison. do_send_sig_info() properly accesses to siglock with lock_task_sighand(), so is free from the reported race. I confirmed that the reported bug reproduces with inserting some delay in kill_procs(), and it never reproduces with this patch. Note that memory_failure() can send another type of signal using force_sig_mceerr(), and the reported race shouldn't happen on it because force_sig_mceerr() is called only for synchronous processes (i.e. BUS_MCEERR_AR happens only when some process accesses to the corrupted memory.) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190116093046.GA29835@hori1.linux.bs1.fc.nec.co.jp Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reported-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reviewed-by: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-02-01 22:21:08 +00:00
do_send_sig_info(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_PRIV,
tk->tsk, PIDTYPE_PID);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
/*
* In theory the process could have mapped
* something else on the address in-between. We could
* check for that, but we need to tell the
* process anyways.
*/
else if (kill_proc(tk, pfn, flags) < 0)
pr_err("Memory failure: %#lx: Cannot send advisory machine check signal to %s:%d\n",
pfn, tk->tsk->comm, tk->tsk->pid);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
put_task_struct(tk->tsk);
kfree(tk);
}
}
mm/memory-failure.c: support use of a dedicated thread to handle SIGBUS(BUS_MCEERR_AO) Currently memory error handler handles action optional errors in the deferred manner by default. And if a recovery aware application wants to handle it immediately, it can do it by setting PF_MCE_EARLY flag. However, such signal can be sent only to the main thread, so it's problematic if the application wants to have a dedicated thread to handler such signals. So this patch adds dedicated thread support to memory error handler. We have PF_MCE_EARLY flags for each thread separately, so with this patch AO signal is sent to the thread with PF_MCE_EARLY flag set, not the main thread. If you want to implement a dedicated thread, you call prctl() to set PF_MCE_EARLY on the thread. Memory error handler collects processes to be killed, so this patch lets it check PF_MCE_EARLY flag on each thread in the collecting routines. No behavioral change for all non-early kill cases. Tony said: : The old behavior was crazy - someone with a multithreaded process might : well expect that if they call prctl(PF_MCE_EARLY) in just one thread, then : that thread would see the SIGBUS with si_code = BUS_MCEERR_A0 - even if : that thread wasn't the main thread for the process. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Kamil Iskra <iskra@mcs.anl.gov> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chen Gong <gong.chen@linux.jf.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.2+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-04 23:11:02 +00:00
/*
* Find a dedicated thread which is supposed to handle SIGBUS(BUS_MCEERR_AO)
* on behalf of the thread group. Return task_struct of the (first found)
* dedicated thread if found, and return NULL otherwise.
*
* We already hold read_lock(&tasklist_lock) in the caller, so we don't
* have to call rcu_read_lock/unlock() in this function.
*/
static struct task_struct *find_early_kill_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{
mm/memory-failure.c: support use of a dedicated thread to handle SIGBUS(BUS_MCEERR_AO) Currently memory error handler handles action optional errors in the deferred manner by default. And if a recovery aware application wants to handle it immediately, it can do it by setting PF_MCE_EARLY flag. However, such signal can be sent only to the main thread, so it's problematic if the application wants to have a dedicated thread to handler such signals. So this patch adds dedicated thread support to memory error handler. We have PF_MCE_EARLY flags for each thread separately, so with this patch AO signal is sent to the thread with PF_MCE_EARLY flag set, not the main thread. If you want to implement a dedicated thread, you call prctl() to set PF_MCE_EARLY on the thread. Memory error handler collects processes to be killed, so this patch lets it check PF_MCE_EARLY flag on each thread in the collecting routines. No behavioral change for all non-early kill cases. Tony said: : The old behavior was crazy - someone with a multithreaded process might : well expect that if they call prctl(PF_MCE_EARLY) in just one thread, then : that thread would see the SIGBUS with si_code = BUS_MCEERR_A0 - even if : that thread wasn't the main thread for the process. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Kamil Iskra <iskra@mcs.anl.gov> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chen Gong <gong.chen@linux.jf.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.2+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-04 23:11:02 +00:00
struct task_struct *t;
mm/memory-failure: prioritize prctl(PR_MCE_KILL) over vm.memory_failure_early_kill Patch series "hwpoison: fixes signaling on memory error" This is a small patchset to solve issues in memory error handler to send SIGBUS to proper process/thread as expected in configuration. Please see descriptions in individual patches for more details. This patch (of 2): Early-kill policy is controlled from two types of settings, one is per-process setting prctl(PR_MCE_KILL) and the other is system-wide setting vm.memory_failure_early_kill. Users expect per-process setting to override system-wide setting as many other settings do, but early-kill setting doesn't work as such. For example, if a system configures vm.memory_failure_early_kill to 1 (enabled), a process receives SIGBUS even if it's configured to explicitly disable PF_MCE_KILL by prctl(). That's not desirable for applications with their own policies. This patch is suggesting to change the priority of these two types of settings, by checking sysctl_memory_failure_early_kill only when a given process has the default kill policy. Note that this patch is solving a thread choice issue too. Originally, collect_procs() always chooses the main thread when vm.memory_failure_early_kill is 1, even if the process has a dedicated thread for memory error handling. SIGBUS should be sent to the dedicated thread if early-kill is enabled via vm.memory_failure_early_kill as we are doing for PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY processes. Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta.linux@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1591321039-22141-1-git-send-email-naoya.horiguchi@nec.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1591321039-22141-2-git-send-email-naoya.horiguchi@nec.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-12 00:34:45 +00:00
for_each_thread(tsk, t) {
if (t->flags & PF_MCE_PROCESS) {
if (t->flags & PF_MCE_EARLY)
return t;
} else {
if (sysctl_memory_failure_early_kill)
return t;
}
}
mm/memory-failure.c: support use of a dedicated thread to handle SIGBUS(BUS_MCEERR_AO) Currently memory error handler handles action optional errors in the deferred manner by default. And if a recovery aware application wants to handle it immediately, it can do it by setting PF_MCE_EARLY flag. However, such signal can be sent only to the main thread, so it's problematic if the application wants to have a dedicated thread to handler such signals. So this patch adds dedicated thread support to memory error handler. We have PF_MCE_EARLY flags for each thread separately, so with this patch AO signal is sent to the thread with PF_MCE_EARLY flag set, not the main thread. If you want to implement a dedicated thread, you call prctl() to set PF_MCE_EARLY on the thread. Memory error handler collects processes to be killed, so this patch lets it check PF_MCE_EARLY flag on each thread in the collecting routines. No behavioral change for all non-early kill cases. Tony said: : The old behavior was crazy - someone with a multithreaded process might : well expect that if they call prctl(PF_MCE_EARLY) in just one thread, then : that thread would see the SIGBUS with si_code = BUS_MCEERR_A0 - even if : that thread wasn't the main thread for the process. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Kamil Iskra <iskra@mcs.anl.gov> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chen Gong <gong.chen@linux.jf.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.2+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-04 23:11:02 +00:00
return NULL;
}
/*
* Determine whether a given process is "early kill" process which expects
* to be signaled when some page under the process is hwpoisoned.
* Return task_struct of the dedicated thread (main thread unless explicitly
* specified) if the process is "early kill" and otherwise returns NULL.
*
* Note that the above is true for Action Optional case. For Action Required
* case, it's only meaningful to the current thread which need to be signaled
* with SIGBUS, this error is Action Optional for other non current
* processes sharing the same error page,if the process is "early kill", the
* task_struct of the dedicated thread will also be returned.
mm/memory-failure.c: support use of a dedicated thread to handle SIGBUS(BUS_MCEERR_AO) Currently memory error handler handles action optional errors in the deferred manner by default. And if a recovery aware application wants to handle it immediately, it can do it by setting PF_MCE_EARLY flag. However, such signal can be sent only to the main thread, so it's problematic if the application wants to have a dedicated thread to handler such signals. So this patch adds dedicated thread support to memory error handler. We have PF_MCE_EARLY flags for each thread separately, so with this patch AO signal is sent to the thread with PF_MCE_EARLY flag set, not the main thread. If you want to implement a dedicated thread, you call prctl() to set PF_MCE_EARLY on the thread. Memory error handler collects processes to be killed, so this patch lets it check PF_MCE_EARLY flag on each thread in the collecting routines. No behavioral change for all non-early kill cases. Tony said: : The old behavior was crazy - someone with a multithreaded process might : well expect that if they call prctl(PF_MCE_EARLY) in just one thread, then : that thread would see the SIGBUS with si_code = BUS_MCEERR_A0 - even if : that thread wasn't the main thread for the process. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Kamil Iskra <iskra@mcs.anl.gov> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chen Gong <gong.chen@linux.jf.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.2+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-04 23:11:02 +00:00
*/
static struct task_struct *task_early_kill(struct task_struct *tsk,
int force_early)
{
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
if (!tsk->mm)
mm/memory-failure.c: support use of a dedicated thread to handle SIGBUS(BUS_MCEERR_AO) Currently memory error handler handles action optional errors in the deferred manner by default. And if a recovery aware application wants to handle it immediately, it can do it by setting PF_MCE_EARLY flag. However, such signal can be sent only to the main thread, so it's problematic if the application wants to have a dedicated thread to handler such signals. So this patch adds dedicated thread support to memory error handler. We have PF_MCE_EARLY flags for each thread separately, so with this patch AO signal is sent to the thread with PF_MCE_EARLY flag set, not the main thread. If you want to implement a dedicated thread, you call prctl() to set PF_MCE_EARLY on the thread. Memory error handler collects processes to be killed, so this patch lets it check PF_MCE_EARLY flag on each thread in the collecting routines. No behavioral change for all non-early kill cases. Tony said: : The old behavior was crazy - someone with a multithreaded process might : well expect that if they call prctl(PF_MCE_EARLY) in just one thread, then : that thread would see the SIGBUS with si_code = BUS_MCEERR_A0 - even if : that thread wasn't the main thread for the process. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Kamil Iskra <iskra@mcs.anl.gov> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chen Gong <gong.chen@linux.jf.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.2+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-04 23:11:02 +00:00
return NULL;
/*
* Comparing ->mm here because current task might represent
* a subthread, while tsk always points to the main thread.
*/
if (force_early && tsk->mm == current->mm)
return current;
mm/memory-failure: prioritize prctl(PR_MCE_KILL) over vm.memory_failure_early_kill Patch series "hwpoison: fixes signaling on memory error" This is a small patchset to solve issues in memory error handler to send SIGBUS to proper process/thread as expected in configuration. Please see descriptions in individual patches for more details. This patch (of 2): Early-kill policy is controlled from two types of settings, one is per-process setting prctl(PR_MCE_KILL) and the other is system-wide setting vm.memory_failure_early_kill. Users expect per-process setting to override system-wide setting as many other settings do, but early-kill setting doesn't work as such. For example, if a system configures vm.memory_failure_early_kill to 1 (enabled), a process receives SIGBUS even if it's configured to explicitly disable PF_MCE_KILL by prctl(). That's not desirable for applications with their own policies. This patch is suggesting to change the priority of these two types of settings, by checking sysctl_memory_failure_early_kill only when a given process has the default kill policy. Note that this patch is solving a thread choice issue too. Originally, collect_procs() always chooses the main thread when vm.memory_failure_early_kill is 1, even if the process has a dedicated thread for memory error handling. SIGBUS should be sent to the dedicated thread if early-kill is enabled via vm.memory_failure_early_kill as we are doing for PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY processes. Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta.linux@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1591321039-22141-1-git-send-email-naoya.horiguchi@nec.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1591321039-22141-2-git-send-email-naoya.horiguchi@nec.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-12 00:34:45 +00:00
return find_early_kill_thread(tsk);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
/*
* Collect processes when the error hit an anonymous page.
*/
static void collect_procs_anon(struct page *page, struct list_head *to_kill,
int force_early)
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{
struct folio *folio = page_folio(page);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct anon_vma *av;
mm anon rmap: replace same_anon_vma linked list with an interval tree. When a large VMA (anon or private file mapping) is first touched, which will populate its anon_vma field, and then split into many regions through the use of mprotect(), the original anon_vma ends up linking all of the vmas on a linked list. This can cause rmap to become inefficient, as we have to walk potentially thousands of irrelevent vmas before finding the one a given anon page might fall into. By replacing the same_anon_vma linked list with an interval tree (where each avc's interval is determined by its vma's start and last pgoffs), we can make rmap efficient for this use case again. While the change is large, all of its pieces are fairly simple. Most places that were walking the same_anon_vma list were looking for a known pgoff, so they can just use the anon_vma_interval_tree_foreach() interval tree iterator instead. The exception here is ksm, where the page's index is not known. It would probably be possible to rework ksm so that the index would be known, but for now I have decided to keep things simple and just walk the entirety of the interval tree there. When updating vma's that already have an anon_vma assigned, we must take care to re-index the corresponding avc's on their interval tree. This is done through the use of anon_vma_interval_tree_pre_update_vma() and anon_vma_interval_tree_post_update_vma(), which remove the avc's from their interval tree before the update and re-insert them after the update. The anon_vma stays locked during the update, so there is no chance that rmap would miss the vmas that are being updated. Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Daniel Santos <daniel.santos@pobox.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-10-08 23:31:39 +00:00
pgoff_t pgoff;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
mm: don't be stuck to rmap lock on reclaim path The rmap locks(i_mmap_rwsem and anon_vma->root->rwsem) could be contended under memory pressure if processes keep working on their vmas(e.g., fork, mmap, munmap). It makes reclaim path stuck. In our real workload traces, we see kswapd is waiting the lock for 300ms+(worst case, a sec) and it makes other processes entering direct reclaim, which were also stuck on the lock. This patch makes lru aging path try_lock mode like shink_page_list so the reclaim context will keep working with next lru pages without being stuck. if it found the rmap lock contended, it rotates the page back to head of lru in both active/inactive lrus to make them consistent behavior, which is basic starting point rather than adding more heristic. Since this patch introduces a new "contended" field as out-param along with try_lock in-param in rmap_walk_control, it's not immutable any longer if the try_lock is set so remove const keywords on rmap related functions. Since rmap walking is already expensive operation, I doubt the const would help sizable benefit( And we didn't have it until 5.17). In a heavy app workload in Android, trace shows following statistics. It almost removes rmap lock contention from reclaim path. Martin Liu reported: Before: max_dur(ms) min_dur(ms) max-min(dur)ms avg_dur(ms) sum_dur(ms) count blocked_function 1632 0 1631 151.542173 31672 209 page_lock_anon_vma_read 601 0 601 145.544681 28817 198 rmap_walk_file After: max_dur(ms) min_dur(ms) max-min(dur)ms avg_dur(ms) sum_dur(ms) count blocked_function NaN NaN NaN NaN NaN 0.0 NaN 0 0 0 0.127645 1 12 rmap_walk_file [minchan@kernel.org: add comment, per Matthew] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YnNqeB5tUf6LZ57b@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220510215423.164547-1-minchan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: John Dias <joaodias@google.com> Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Cc: Martin Liu <liumartin@google.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-05-19 21:08:54 +00:00
av = folio_lock_anon_vma_read(folio, NULL);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
if (av == NULL) /* Not actually mapped anymore */
return;
pgoff = page_to_pgoff(page);
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
for_each_process (tsk) {
mm: change anon_vma linking to fix multi-process server scalability issue The old anon_vma code can lead to scalability issues with heavily forking workloads. Specifically, each anon_vma will be shared between the parent process and all its child processes. In a workload with 1000 child processes and a VMA with 1000 anonymous pages per process that get COWed, this leads to a system with a million anonymous pages in the same anon_vma, each of which is mapped in just one of the 1000 processes. However, the current rmap code needs to walk them all, leading to O(N) scanning complexity for each page. This can result in systems where one CPU is walking the page tables of 1000 processes in page_referenced_one, while all other CPUs are stuck on the anon_vma lock. This leads to catastrophic failure for a benchmark like AIM7, where the total number of processes can reach in the tens of thousands. Real workloads are still a factor 10 less process intensive than AIM7, but they are catching up. This patch changes the way anon_vmas and VMAs are linked, which allows us to associate multiple anon_vmas with a VMA. At fork time, each child process gets its own anon_vmas, in which its COWed pages will be instantiated. The parents' anon_vma is also linked to the VMA, because non-COWed pages could be present in any of the children. This reduces rmap scanning complexity to O(1) for the pages of the 1000 child processes, with O(N) complexity for at most 1/N pages in the system. This reduces the average scanning cost in heavily forking workloads from O(N) to 2. The only real complexity in this patch stems from the fact that linking a VMA to anon_vmas now involves memory allocations. This means vma_adjust can fail, if it needs to attach a VMA to anon_vma structures. This in turn means error handling needs to be added to the calling functions. A second source of complexity is that, because there can be multiple anon_vmas, the anon_vma linking in vma_adjust can no longer be done under "the" anon_vma lock. To prevent the rmap code from walking up an incomplete VMA, this patch introduces the VM_LOCK_RMAP VMA flag. This bit flag uses the same slot as the NOMMU VM_MAPPED_COPY, with an ifdef in mm.h to make sure it is impossible to compile a kernel that needs both symbolic values for the same bitflag. Some test results: Without the anon_vma changes, when AIM7 hits around 9.7k users (on a test box with 16GB RAM and not quite enough IO), the system ends up running >99% in system time, with every CPU on the same anon_vma lock in the pageout code. With these changes, AIM7 hits the cross-over point around 29.7k users. This happens with ~99% IO wait time, there never seems to be any spike in system time. The anon_vma lock contention appears to be resolved. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-03-05 21:42:07 +00:00
struct anon_vma_chain *vmac;
mm/memory-failure.c: support use of a dedicated thread to handle SIGBUS(BUS_MCEERR_AO) Currently memory error handler handles action optional errors in the deferred manner by default. And if a recovery aware application wants to handle it immediately, it can do it by setting PF_MCE_EARLY flag. However, such signal can be sent only to the main thread, so it's problematic if the application wants to have a dedicated thread to handler such signals. So this patch adds dedicated thread support to memory error handler. We have PF_MCE_EARLY flags for each thread separately, so with this patch AO signal is sent to the thread with PF_MCE_EARLY flag set, not the main thread. If you want to implement a dedicated thread, you call prctl() to set PF_MCE_EARLY on the thread. Memory error handler collects processes to be killed, so this patch lets it check PF_MCE_EARLY flag on each thread in the collecting routines. No behavioral change for all non-early kill cases. Tony said: : The old behavior was crazy - someone with a multithreaded process might : well expect that if they call prctl(PF_MCE_EARLY) in just one thread, then : that thread would see the SIGBUS with si_code = BUS_MCEERR_A0 - even if : that thread wasn't the main thread for the process. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Kamil Iskra <iskra@mcs.anl.gov> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chen Gong <gong.chen@linux.jf.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.2+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-04 23:11:02 +00:00
struct task_struct *t = task_early_kill(tsk, force_early);
mm: change anon_vma linking to fix multi-process server scalability issue The old anon_vma code can lead to scalability issues with heavily forking workloads. Specifically, each anon_vma will be shared between the parent process and all its child processes. In a workload with 1000 child processes and a VMA with 1000 anonymous pages per process that get COWed, this leads to a system with a million anonymous pages in the same anon_vma, each of which is mapped in just one of the 1000 processes. However, the current rmap code needs to walk them all, leading to O(N) scanning complexity for each page. This can result in systems where one CPU is walking the page tables of 1000 processes in page_referenced_one, while all other CPUs are stuck on the anon_vma lock. This leads to catastrophic failure for a benchmark like AIM7, where the total number of processes can reach in the tens of thousands. Real workloads are still a factor 10 less process intensive than AIM7, but they are catching up. This patch changes the way anon_vmas and VMAs are linked, which allows us to associate multiple anon_vmas with a VMA. At fork time, each child process gets its own anon_vmas, in which its COWed pages will be instantiated. The parents' anon_vma is also linked to the VMA, because non-COWed pages could be present in any of the children. This reduces rmap scanning complexity to O(1) for the pages of the 1000 child processes, with O(N) complexity for at most 1/N pages in the system. This reduces the average scanning cost in heavily forking workloads from O(N) to 2. The only real complexity in this patch stems from the fact that linking a VMA to anon_vmas now involves memory allocations. This means vma_adjust can fail, if it needs to attach a VMA to anon_vma structures. This in turn means error handling needs to be added to the calling functions. A second source of complexity is that, because there can be multiple anon_vmas, the anon_vma linking in vma_adjust can no longer be done under "the" anon_vma lock. To prevent the rmap code from walking up an incomplete VMA, this patch introduces the VM_LOCK_RMAP VMA flag. This bit flag uses the same slot as the NOMMU VM_MAPPED_COPY, with an ifdef in mm.h to make sure it is impossible to compile a kernel that needs both symbolic values for the same bitflag. Some test results: Without the anon_vma changes, when AIM7 hits around 9.7k users (on a test box with 16GB RAM and not quite enough IO), the system ends up running >99% in system time, with every CPU on the same anon_vma lock in the pageout code. With these changes, AIM7 hits the cross-over point around 29.7k users. This happens with ~99% IO wait time, there never seems to be any spike in system time. The anon_vma lock contention appears to be resolved. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-03-05 21:42:07 +00:00
mm/memory-failure.c: support use of a dedicated thread to handle SIGBUS(BUS_MCEERR_AO) Currently memory error handler handles action optional errors in the deferred manner by default. And if a recovery aware application wants to handle it immediately, it can do it by setting PF_MCE_EARLY flag. However, such signal can be sent only to the main thread, so it's problematic if the application wants to have a dedicated thread to handler such signals. So this patch adds dedicated thread support to memory error handler. We have PF_MCE_EARLY flags for each thread separately, so with this patch AO signal is sent to the thread with PF_MCE_EARLY flag set, not the main thread. If you want to implement a dedicated thread, you call prctl() to set PF_MCE_EARLY on the thread. Memory error handler collects processes to be killed, so this patch lets it check PF_MCE_EARLY flag on each thread in the collecting routines. No behavioral change for all non-early kill cases. Tony said: : The old behavior was crazy - someone with a multithreaded process might : well expect that if they call prctl(PF_MCE_EARLY) in just one thread, then : that thread would see the SIGBUS with si_code = BUS_MCEERR_A0 - even if : that thread wasn't the main thread for the process. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Kamil Iskra <iskra@mcs.anl.gov> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chen Gong <gong.chen@linux.jf.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.2+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-04 23:11:02 +00:00
if (!t)
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
continue;
mm anon rmap: replace same_anon_vma linked list with an interval tree. When a large VMA (anon or private file mapping) is first touched, which will populate its anon_vma field, and then split into many regions through the use of mprotect(), the original anon_vma ends up linking all of the vmas on a linked list. This can cause rmap to become inefficient, as we have to walk potentially thousands of irrelevent vmas before finding the one a given anon page might fall into. By replacing the same_anon_vma linked list with an interval tree (where each avc's interval is determined by its vma's start and last pgoffs), we can make rmap efficient for this use case again. While the change is large, all of its pieces are fairly simple. Most places that were walking the same_anon_vma list were looking for a known pgoff, so they can just use the anon_vma_interval_tree_foreach() interval tree iterator instead. The exception here is ksm, where the page's index is not known. It would probably be possible to rework ksm so that the index would be known, but for now I have decided to keep things simple and just walk the entirety of the interval tree there. When updating vma's that already have an anon_vma assigned, we must take care to re-index the corresponding avc's on their interval tree. This is done through the use of anon_vma_interval_tree_pre_update_vma() and anon_vma_interval_tree_post_update_vma(), which remove the avc's from their interval tree before the update and re-insert them after the update. The anon_vma stays locked during the update, so there is no chance that rmap would miss the vmas that are being updated. Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Daniel Santos <daniel.santos@pobox.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-10-08 23:31:39 +00:00
anon_vma_interval_tree_foreach(vmac, &av->rb_root,
pgoff, pgoff) {
mm: change anon_vma linking to fix multi-process server scalability issue The old anon_vma code can lead to scalability issues with heavily forking workloads. Specifically, each anon_vma will be shared between the parent process and all its child processes. In a workload with 1000 child processes and a VMA with 1000 anonymous pages per process that get COWed, this leads to a system with a million anonymous pages in the same anon_vma, each of which is mapped in just one of the 1000 processes. However, the current rmap code needs to walk them all, leading to O(N) scanning complexity for each page. This can result in systems where one CPU is walking the page tables of 1000 processes in page_referenced_one, while all other CPUs are stuck on the anon_vma lock. This leads to catastrophic failure for a benchmark like AIM7, where the total number of processes can reach in the tens of thousands. Real workloads are still a factor 10 less process intensive than AIM7, but they are catching up. This patch changes the way anon_vmas and VMAs are linked, which allows us to associate multiple anon_vmas with a VMA. At fork time, each child process gets its own anon_vmas, in which its COWed pages will be instantiated. The parents' anon_vma is also linked to the VMA, because non-COWed pages could be present in any of the children. This reduces rmap scanning complexity to O(1) for the pages of the 1000 child processes, with O(N) complexity for at most 1/N pages in the system. This reduces the average scanning cost in heavily forking workloads from O(N) to 2. The only real complexity in this patch stems from the fact that linking a VMA to anon_vmas now involves memory allocations. This means vma_adjust can fail, if it needs to attach a VMA to anon_vma structures. This in turn means error handling needs to be added to the calling functions. A second source of complexity is that, because there can be multiple anon_vmas, the anon_vma linking in vma_adjust can no longer be done under "the" anon_vma lock. To prevent the rmap code from walking up an incomplete VMA, this patch introduces the VM_LOCK_RMAP VMA flag. This bit flag uses the same slot as the NOMMU VM_MAPPED_COPY, with an ifdef in mm.h to make sure it is impossible to compile a kernel that needs both symbolic values for the same bitflag. Some test results: Without the anon_vma changes, when AIM7 hits around 9.7k users (on a test box with 16GB RAM and not quite enough IO), the system ends up running >99% in system time, with every CPU on the same anon_vma lock in the pageout code. With these changes, AIM7 hits the cross-over point around 29.7k users. This happens with ~99% IO wait time, there never seems to be any spike in system time. The anon_vma lock contention appears to be resolved. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups] Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh.dickins@tiscali.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-03-05 21:42:07 +00:00
vma = vmac->vma;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
if (!page_mapped_in_vma(page, vma))
continue;
mm/memory-failure.c: support use of a dedicated thread to handle SIGBUS(BUS_MCEERR_AO) Currently memory error handler handles action optional errors in the deferred manner by default. And if a recovery aware application wants to handle it immediately, it can do it by setting PF_MCE_EARLY flag. However, such signal can be sent only to the main thread, so it's problematic if the application wants to have a dedicated thread to handler such signals. So this patch adds dedicated thread support to memory error handler. We have PF_MCE_EARLY flags for each thread separately, so with this patch AO signal is sent to the thread with PF_MCE_EARLY flag set, not the main thread. If you want to implement a dedicated thread, you call prctl() to set PF_MCE_EARLY on the thread. Memory error handler collects processes to be killed, so this patch lets it check PF_MCE_EARLY flag on each thread in the collecting routines. No behavioral change for all non-early kill cases. Tony said: : The old behavior was crazy - someone with a multithreaded process might : well expect that if they call prctl(PF_MCE_EARLY) in just one thread, then : that thread would see the SIGBUS with si_code = BUS_MCEERR_A0 - even if : that thread wasn't the main thread for the process. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Kamil Iskra <iskra@mcs.anl.gov> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chen Gong <gong.chen@linux.jf.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.2+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-04 23:11:02 +00:00
if (vma->vm_mm == t->mm)
add_to_kill(t, page, vma, to_kill);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
}
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
mm/rmap, migration: Make rmap_walk_anon() and try_to_unmap_anon() more scalable rmap_walk_anon() and try_to_unmap_anon() appears to be too careful about locking the anon vma: while it needs protection against anon vma list modifications, it does not need exclusive access to the list itself. Transforming this exclusive lock to a read-locked rwsem removes a global lock from the hot path of page-migration intense threaded workloads which can cause pathological performance like this: 96.43% process 0 [kernel.kallsyms] [k] perf_trace_sched_switch | --- perf_trace_sched_switch __schedule schedule schedule_preempt_disabled __mutex_lock_common.isra.6 __mutex_lock_slowpath mutex_lock | |--50.61%-- rmap_walk | move_to_new_page | migrate_pages | migrate_misplaced_page | __do_numa_page.isra.69 | handle_pte_fault | handle_mm_fault | __do_page_fault | do_page_fault | page_fault | __memset_sse2 | | | --100.00%-- worker_thread | | | --100.00%-- start_thread | --49.39%-- page_lock_anon_vma try_to_unmap_anon try_to_unmap migrate_pages migrate_misplaced_page __do_numa_page.isra.69 handle_pte_fault handle_mm_fault __do_page_fault do_page_fault page_fault __memset_sse2 | --100.00%-- worker_thread start_thread With this change applied the profile is now nicely flat and there's no anon-vma related scheduling/blocking. Rename anon_vma_[un]lock() => anon_vma_[un]lock_write(), to make it clearer that it's an exclusive write-lock in that case - suggested by Rik van Riel. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
2012-12-02 19:56:50 +00:00
page_unlock_anon_vma_read(av);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
/*
* Collect processes when the error hit a file mapped page.
*/
static void collect_procs_file(struct page *page, struct list_head *to_kill,
int force_early)
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct address_space *mapping = page->mapping;
pgoff_t pgoff;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
i_mmap_lock_read(mapping);
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
pgoff = page_to_pgoff(page);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
for_each_process(tsk) {
mm/memory-failure.c: support use of a dedicated thread to handle SIGBUS(BUS_MCEERR_AO) Currently memory error handler handles action optional errors in the deferred manner by default. And if a recovery aware application wants to handle it immediately, it can do it by setting PF_MCE_EARLY flag. However, such signal can be sent only to the main thread, so it's problematic if the application wants to have a dedicated thread to handler such signals. So this patch adds dedicated thread support to memory error handler. We have PF_MCE_EARLY flags for each thread separately, so with this patch AO signal is sent to the thread with PF_MCE_EARLY flag set, not the main thread. If you want to implement a dedicated thread, you call prctl() to set PF_MCE_EARLY on the thread. Memory error handler collects processes to be killed, so this patch lets it check PF_MCE_EARLY flag on each thread in the collecting routines. No behavioral change for all non-early kill cases. Tony said: : The old behavior was crazy - someone with a multithreaded process might : well expect that if they call prctl(PF_MCE_EARLY) in just one thread, then : that thread would see the SIGBUS with si_code = BUS_MCEERR_A0 - even if : that thread wasn't the main thread for the process. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Kamil Iskra <iskra@mcs.anl.gov> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chen Gong <gong.chen@linux.jf.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.2+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-04 23:11:02 +00:00
struct task_struct *t = task_early_kill(tsk, force_early);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
mm/memory-failure.c: support use of a dedicated thread to handle SIGBUS(BUS_MCEERR_AO) Currently memory error handler handles action optional errors in the deferred manner by default. And if a recovery aware application wants to handle it immediately, it can do it by setting PF_MCE_EARLY flag. However, such signal can be sent only to the main thread, so it's problematic if the application wants to have a dedicated thread to handler such signals. So this patch adds dedicated thread support to memory error handler. We have PF_MCE_EARLY flags for each thread separately, so with this patch AO signal is sent to the thread with PF_MCE_EARLY flag set, not the main thread. If you want to implement a dedicated thread, you call prctl() to set PF_MCE_EARLY on the thread. Memory error handler collects processes to be killed, so this patch lets it check PF_MCE_EARLY flag on each thread in the collecting routines. No behavioral change for all non-early kill cases. Tony said: : The old behavior was crazy - someone with a multithreaded process might : well expect that if they call prctl(PF_MCE_EARLY) in just one thread, then : that thread would see the SIGBUS with si_code = BUS_MCEERR_A0 - even if : that thread wasn't the main thread for the process. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Kamil Iskra <iskra@mcs.anl.gov> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chen Gong <gong.chen@linux.jf.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.2+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-04 23:11:02 +00:00
if (!t)
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
continue;
vma_interval_tree_foreach(vma, &mapping->i_mmap, pgoff,
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
pgoff) {
/*
* Send early kill signal to tasks where a vma covers
* the page but the corrupted page is not necessarily
* mapped it in its pte.
* Assume applications who requested early kill want
* to be informed of all such data corruptions.
*/
mm/memory-failure.c: support use of a dedicated thread to handle SIGBUS(BUS_MCEERR_AO) Currently memory error handler handles action optional errors in the deferred manner by default. And if a recovery aware application wants to handle it immediately, it can do it by setting PF_MCE_EARLY flag. However, such signal can be sent only to the main thread, so it's problematic if the application wants to have a dedicated thread to handler such signals. So this patch adds dedicated thread support to memory error handler. We have PF_MCE_EARLY flags for each thread separately, so with this patch AO signal is sent to the thread with PF_MCE_EARLY flag set, not the main thread. If you want to implement a dedicated thread, you call prctl() to set PF_MCE_EARLY on the thread. Memory error handler collects processes to be killed, so this patch lets it check PF_MCE_EARLY flag on each thread in the collecting routines. No behavioral change for all non-early kill cases. Tony said: : The old behavior was crazy - someone with a multithreaded process might : well expect that if they call prctl(PF_MCE_EARLY) in just one thread, then : that thread would see the SIGBUS with si_code = BUS_MCEERR_A0 - even if : that thread wasn't the main thread for the process. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Kamil Iskra <iskra@mcs.anl.gov> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Chen Gong <gong.chen@linux.jf.intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [3.2+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-04 23:11:02 +00:00
if (vma->vm_mm == t->mm)
add_to_kill(t, page, vma, to_kill);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
}
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
i_mmap_unlock_read(mapping);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
/*
* Collect the processes who have the corrupted page mapped to kill.
*/
static void collect_procs(struct page *page, struct list_head *tokill,
int force_early)
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{
if (!page->mapping)
return;
if (PageAnon(page))
collect_procs_anon(page, tokill, force_early);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
else
collect_procs_file(page, tokill, force_early);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
struct hwp_walk {
struct to_kill tk;
unsigned long pfn;
int flags;
};
static void set_to_kill(struct to_kill *tk, unsigned long addr, short shift)
{
tk->addr = addr;
tk->size_shift = shift;
}
static int check_hwpoisoned_entry(pte_t pte, unsigned long addr, short shift,
unsigned long poisoned_pfn, struct to_kill *tk)
{
unsigned long pfn = 0;
if (pte_present(pte)) {
pfn = pte_pfn(pte);
} else {
swp_entry_t swp = pte_to_swp_entry(pte);
if (is_hwpoison_entry(swp))
pfn = hwpoison_entry_to_pfn(swp);
}
if (!pfn || pfn != poisoned_pfn)
return 0;
set_to_kill(tk, addr, shift);
return 1;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
static int check_hwpoisoned_pmd_entry(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr,
struct hwp_walk *hwp)
{
pmd_t pmd = *pmdp;
unsigned long pfn;
unsigned long hwpoison_vaddr;
if (!pmd_present(pmd))
return 0;
pfn = pmd_pfn(pmd);
if (pfn <= hwp->pfn && hwp->pfn < pfn + HPAGE_PMD_NR) {
hwpoison_vaddr = addr + ((hwp->pfn - pfn) << PAGE_SHIFT);
set_to_kill(&hwp->tk, hwpoison_vaddr, PAGE_SHIFT);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
#else
static int check_hwpoisoned_pmd_entry(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr,
struct hwp_walk *hwp)
{
return 0;
}
#endif
static int hwpoison_pte_range(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end, struct mm_walk *walk)
{
struct hwp_walk *hwp = walk->private;
int ret = 0;
pte_t *ptep, *mapped_pte;
spinlock_t *ptl;
ptl = pmd_trans_huge_lock(pmdp, walk->vma);
if (ptl) {
ret = check_hwpoisoned_pmd_entry(pmdp, addr, hwp);
spin_unlock(ptl);
goto out;
}
if (pmd_trans_unstable(pmdp))
goto out;
mapped_pte = ptep = pte_offset_map_lock(walk->vma->vm_mm, pmdp,
addr, &ptl);
for (; addr != end; ptep++, addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
ret = check_hwpoisoned_entry(*ptep, addr, PAGE_SHIFT,
hwp->pfn, &hwp->tk);
if (ret == 1)
break;
}
pte_unmap_unlock(mapped_pte, ptl);
out:
cond_resched();
return ret;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE
static int hwpoison_hugetlb_range(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long hmask,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
struct mm_walk *walk)
{
struct hwp_walk *hwp = walk->private;
pte_t pte = huge_ptep_get(ptep);
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(walk->vma);
return check_hwpoisoned_entry(pte, addr, huge_page_shift(h),
hwp->pfn, &hwp->tk);
}
#else
#define hwpoison_hugetlb_range NULL
#endif
static const struct mm_walk_ops hwp_walk_ops = {
.pmd_entry = hwpoison_pte_range,
.hugetlb_entry = hwpoison_hugetlb_range,
};
/*
* Sends SIGBUS to the current process with error info.
*
* This function is intended to handle "Action Required" MCEs on already
* hardware poisoned pages. They could happen, for example, when
* memory_failure() failed to unmap the error page at the first call, or
* when multiple local machine checks happened on different CPUs.
*
* MCE handler currently has no easy access to the error virtual address,
* so this function walks page table to find it. The returned virtual address
* is proper in most cases, but it could be wrong when the application
* process has multiple entries mapping the error page.
*/
static int kill_accessing_process(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long pfn,
int flags)
{
int ret;
struct hwp_walk priv = {
.pfn = pfn,
};
priv.tk.tsk = p;
mmap_read_lock(p->mm);
ret = walk_page_range(p->mm, 0, TASK_SIZE, &hwp_walk_ops,
(void *)&priv);
if (ret == 1 && priv.tk.addr)
kill_proc(&priv.tk, pfn, flags);
mm/hwpoison: fix error page recovered but reported "not recovered" When an uncorrected memory error is consumed there is a race between the CMCI from the memory controller reporting an uncorrected error with a UCNA signature, and the core reporting and SRAR signature machine check when the data is about to be consumed. If the CMCI wins that race, the page is marked poisoned when uc_decode_notifier() calls memory_failure() and the machine check processing code finds the page already poisoned. It calls kill_accessing_process() to make sure a SIGBUS is sent. But returns the wrong error code. Console log looks like this: mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at 3710b3400 Memory failure: 0x3710b3: recovery action for dirty LRU page: Recovered Memory failure: 0x3710b3: already hardware poisoned Memory failure: 0x3710b3: Sending SIGBUS to einj_mem_uc:361438 due to hardware memory corruption mce: Memory error not recovered kill_accessing_process() is supposed to return -EHWPOISON to notify that SIGBUS is already set to the process and kill_me_maybe() doesn't have to send it again. But current code simply fails to do this, so fix it to make sure to work as intended. This change avoids the noise message "Memory error not recovered" and skips duplicate SIGBUSs. [tony.luck@intel.com: reword some parts of commit message] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220113231117.1021405-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Fixes: a3f5d80ea401 ("mm,hwpoison: send SIGBUS with error virutal address") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reported-by: Youquan Song <youquan.song@intel.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-03-22 21:44:06 +00:00
else
ret = 0;
mmap_read_unlock(p->mm);
mm/hwpoison: fix error page recovered but reported "not recovered" When an uncorrected memory error is consumed there is a race between the CMCI from the memory controller reporting an uncorrected error with a UCNA signature, and the core reporting and SRAR signature machine check when the data is about to be consumed. If the CMCI wins that race, the page is marked poisoned when uc_decode_notifier() calls memory_failure() and the machine check processing code finds the page already poisoned. It calls kill_accessing_process() to make sure a SIGBUS is sent. But returns the wrong error code. Console log looks like this: mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at 3710b3400 Memory failure: 0x3710b3: recovery action for dirty LRU page: Recovered Memory failure: 0x3710b3: already hardware poisoned Memory failure: 0x3710b3: Sending SIGBUS to einj_mem_uc:361438 due to hardware memory corruption mce: Memory error not recovered kill_accessing_process() is supposed to return -EHWPOISON to notify that SIGBUS is already set to the process and kill_me_maybe() doesn't have to send it again. But current code simply fails to do this, so fix it to make sure to work as intended. This change avoids the noise message "Memory error not recovered" and skips duplicate SIGBUSs. [tony.luck@intel.com: reword some parts of commit message] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220113231117.1021405-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Fixes: a3f5d80ea401 ("mm,hwpoison: send SIGBUS with error virutal address") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reported-by: Youquan Song <youquan.song@intel.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-03-22 21:44:06 +00:00
return ret > 0 ? -EHWPOISON : -EFAULT;
}
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
static const char *action_name[] = {
[MF_IGNORED] = "Ignored",
[MF_FAILED] = "Failed",
[MF_DELAYED] = "Delayed",
[MF_RECOVERED] = "Recovered",
};
static const char * const action_page_types[] = {
[MF_MSG_KERNEL] = "reserved kernel page",
[MF_MSG_KERNEL_HIGH_ORDER] = "high-order kernel page",
[MF_MSG_SLAB] = "kernel slab page",
[MF_MSG_DIFFERENT_COMPOUND] = "different compound page after locking",
[MF_MSG_HUGE] = "huge page",
[MF_MSG_FREE_HUGE] = "free huge page",
mm: hwpoison: disable memory error handling on 1GB hugepage Recently the following BUG was reported: Injecting memory failure for pfn 0x3c0000 at process virtual address 0x7fe300000000 Memory failure: 0x3c0000: recovery action for huge page: Recovered BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff8dfcc0003000 IP: gup_pgd_range+0x1f0/0xc20 PGD 17ae72067 P4D 17ae72067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI ... CPU: 3 PID: 5467 Comm: hugetlb_1gb Not tainted 4.15.0-rc8-mm1-abc+ #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.9.3-1.fc25 04/01/2014 You can easily reproduce this by calling madvise(MADV_HWPOISON) twice on a 1GB hugepage. This happens because get_user_pages_fast() is not aware of a migration entry on pud that was created in the 1st madvise() event. I think that conversion to pud-aligned migration entry is working, but other MM code walking over page table isn't prepared for it. We need some time and effort to make all this work properly, so this patch avoids the reported bug by just disabling error handling for 1GB hugepage. [n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com: v2] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517284444-18149-1-git-send-email-n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517207283-15769-1-git-send-email-n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Acked-by: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@arm.com> Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-05 23:23:05 +00:00
[MF_MSG_NON_PMD_HUGE] = "non-pmd-sized huge page",
[MF_MSG_UNMAP_FAILED] = "unmapping failed page",
[MF_MSG_DIRTY_SWAPCACHE] = "dirty swapcache page",
[MF_MSG_CLEAN_SWAPCACHE] = "clean swapcache page",
[MF_MSG_DIRTY_MLOCKED_LRU] = "dirty mlocked LRU page",
[MF_MSG_CLEAN_MLOCKED_LRU] = "clean mlocked LRU page",
[MF_MSG_DIRTY_UNEVICTABLE_LRU] = "dirty unevictable LRU page",
[MF_MSG_CLEAN_UNEVICTABLE_LRU] = "clean unevictable LRU page",
[MF_MSG_DIRTY_LRU] = "dirty LRU page",
[MF_MSG_CLEAN_LRU] = "clean LRU page",
[MF_MSG_TRUNCATED_LRU] = "already truncated LRU page",
[MF_MSG_BUDDY] = "free buddy page",
mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at af34214200 {1}[Hardware Error]: It has been corrected by h/w and requires no further action mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged {1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: corrected Memory failure: 0xaf34214: reserved kernel page still referenced by 1 users [..] Memory failure: 0xaf34214: recovery action for reserved kernel page: Failed mce: Memory error not recovered In contrast to typical memory, dev_pagemap pages may be dax mapped. With dax there is no possibility to map in another page dynamically since dax establishes 1:1 physical address to file offset associations. Also dev_pagemap pages associated with NVDIMM / persistent memory devices can internal remap/repair addresses with poison. While memory_failure() assumes that it can discard typical poisoned pages and keep them unmapped indefinitely, dev_pagemap pages may be returned to service after the error is cleared. Teach memory_failure() to detect and handle MEMORY_DEVICE_HOST dev_pagemap pages that have poison consumed by userspace. Mark the memory as UC instead of unmapping it completely to allow ongoing access via the device driver (nd_pmem). Later, nd_pmem will grow support for marking the page back to WB when the error is cleared. Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
2018-07-14 04:50:21 +00:00
[MF_MSG_DAX] = "dax page",
[MF_MSG_UNSPLIT_THP] = "unsplit thp",
[MF_MSG_UNKNOWN] = "unknown page",
};
/*
* XXX: It is possible that a page is isolated from LRU cache,
* and then kept in swap cache or failed to remove from page cache.
* The page count will stop it from being freed by unpoison.
* Stress tests should be aware of this memory leak problem.
*/
static int delete_from_lru_cache(struct page *p)
{
if (!isolate_lru_page(p)) {
/*
* Clear sensible page flags, so that the buddy system won't
* complain when the page is unpoison-and-freed.
*/
ClearPageActive(p);
ClearPageUnevictable(p);
2017-05-12 22:46:26 +00:00
/*
* Poisoned page might never drop its ref count to 0 so we have
* to uncharge it manually from its memcg.
*/
mem_cgroup_uncharge(page_folio(p));
2017-05-12 22:46:26 +00:00
/*
* drop the page count elevated by isolate_lru_page()
*/
mm, fs: get rid of PAGE_CACHE_* and page_cache_{get,release} macros PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} macros were introduced *long* time ago with promise that one day it will be possible to implement page cache with bigger chunks than PAGE_SIZE. This promise never materialized. And unlikely will. We have many places where PAGE_CACHE_SIZE assumed to be equal to PAGE_SIZE. And it's constant source of confusion on whether PAGE_CACHE_* or PAGE_* constant should be used in a particular case, especially on the border between fs and mm. Global switching to PAGE_CACHE_SIZE != PAGE_SIZE would cause to much breakage to be doable. Let's stop pretending that pages in page cache are special. They are not. The changes are pretty straight-forward: - <foo> << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - <foo> >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) -> <foo>; - PAGE_CACHE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN} -> PAGE_{SIZE,SHIFT,MASK,ALIGN}; - page_cache_get() -> get_page(); - page_cache_release() -> put_page(); This patch contains automated changes generated with coccinelle using script below. For some reason, coccinelle doesn't patch header files. I've called spatch for them manually. The only adjustment after coccinelle is revert of changes to PAGE_CAHCE_ALIGN definition: we are going to drop it later. There are few places in the code where coccinelle didn't reach. I'll fix them manually in a separate patch. Comments and documentation also will be addressed with the separate patch. virtual patch @@ expression E; @@ - E << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ expression E; @@ - E >> (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + E @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT + PAGE_SHIFT @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_SIZE + PAGE_SIZE @@ @@ - PAGE_CACHE_MASK + PAGE_MASK @@ expression E; @@ - PAGE_CACHE_ALIGN(E) + PAGE_ALIGN(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_get(E) + get_page(E) @@ expression E; @@ - page_cache_release(E) + put_page(E) Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-04-01 12:29:47 +00:00
put_page(p);
return 0;
}
return -EIO;
}
mm: hwpoison: dissolve in-use hugepage in unrecoverable memory error Currently me_huge_page() relies on dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page() to keep the error hugepage away from the system, which is OK but not good enough because the hugepage still has a refcount and unpoison doesn't work on the error hugepage (PageHWPoison flags are cleared but pages are still leaked.) And there's "wasting health subpages" issue too. This patch reworks on me_huge_page() to solve these issues. For hugetlb file, recently we have truncating code so let's use it in hugetlbfs specific ->error_remove_page(). For anonymous hugepage, it's helpful to dissolve the error page after freeing it into free hugepage list. Migration entry and PageHWPoison in the head page prevent the access to it. TODO: dissolve_free_huge_page() can fail but we don't considered it yet. It's not critical (and at least no worse that now) because in such case the error hugepage just stays in free hugepage list without being dissolved. By virtue of PageHWPoison in head page, it's never allocated to processes. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix unused var warnings] Fixes: 23a003bfd23ea9ea0b7756b920e51f64b284b468 ("mm/madvise: pass return code of memory_failure() to userspace") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170417055948.GM31394@yexl-desktop Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496305019-5493-8-git-send-email-n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-10 22:47:50 +00:00
static int truncate_error_page(struct page *p, unsigned long pfn,
struct address_space *mapping)
{
int ret = MF_FAILED;
if (mapping->a_ops->error_remove_page) {
int err = mapping->a_ops->error_remove_page(mapping, p);
if (err != 0) {
pr_info("Memory failure: %#lx: Failed to punch page: %d\n",
pfn, err);
} else if (page_has_private(p) &&
!try_to_release_page(p, GFP_NOIO)) {
pr_info("Memory failure: %#lx: failed to release buffers\n",
pfn);
} else {
ret = MF_RECOVERED;
}
} else {
/*
* If the file system doesn't support it just invalidate
* This fails on dirty or anything with private pages
*/
if (invalidate_inode_page(p))
ret = MF_RECOVERED;
else
pr_info("Memory failure: %#lx: Failed to invalidate\n",
pfn);
}
return ret;
}
struct page_state {
unsigned long mask;
unsigned long res;
enum mf_action_page_type type;
/* Callback ->action() has to unlock the relevant page inside it. */
int (*action)(struct page_state *ps, struct page *p);
};
/*
* Return true if page is still referenced by others, otherwise return
* false.
*
* The extra_pins is true when one extra refcount is expected.
*/
static bool has_extra_refcount(struct page_state *ps, struct page *p,
bool extra_pins)
{
int count = page_count(p) - 1;
if (extra_pins)
count -= 1;
if (count > 0) {
pr_err("Memory failure: %#lx: %s still referenced by %d users\n",
page_to_pfn(p), action_page_types[ps->type], count);
return true;
}
return false;
}
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
/*
* Error hit kernel page.
* Do nothing, try to be lucky and not touch this instead. For a few cases we
* could be more sophisticated.
*/
static int me_kernel(struct page_state *ps, struct page *p)
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{
unlock_page(p);
return MF_IGNORED;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
/*
* Page in unknown state. Do nothing.
*/
static int me_unknown(struct page_state *ps, struct page *p)
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{
pr_err("Memory failure: %#lx: Unknown page state\n", page_to_pfn(p));
unlock_page(p);
return MF_FAILED;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
/*
* Clean (or cleaned) page cache page.
*/
static int me_pagecache_clean(struct page_state *ps, struct page *p)
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{
int ret;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
struct address_space *mapping;
mm: shmem: don't truncate page if memory failure happens The current behavior of memory failure is to truncate the page cache regardless of dirty or clean. If the page is dirty the later access will get the obsolete data from disk without any notification to the users. This may cause silent data loss. It is even worse for shmem since shmem is in-memory filesystem, truncating page cache means discarding data blocks. The later read would return all zero. The right approach is to keep the corrupted page in page cache, any later access would return error for syscalls or SIGBUS for page fault, until the file is truncated, hole punched or removed. The regular storage backed filesystems would be more complicated so this patch is focused on shmem. This also unblock the support for soft offlining shmem THP. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes] [arnd@arndb.de: fix uninitialized variable use in me_pagecache_clean()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211022064748.4173718-1-arnd@kernel.org [Fix invalid pointer dereference in shmem_read_mapping_page_gfp() with a slight different implementation from what Ajay Garg <ajaygargnsit@gmail.com> and Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com> proposed and reworked the error handling of shmem_write_begin() suggested by Linus] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211111084617.6746-1-ajaygargnsit@gmail.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211020210755.23964-6-shy828301@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211116193247.21102-1-shy828301@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Ajay Garg <ajaygargnsit@gmail.com> Cc: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com> Cc: Andy Lavr <andy.lavr@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:05:19 +00:00
bool extra_pins;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
delete_from_lru_cache(p);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
/*
* For anonymous pages we're done the only reference left
* should be the one m_f() holds.
*/
if (PageAnon(p)) {
ret = MF_RECOVERED;
goto out;
}
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
/*
* Now truncate the page in the page cache. This is really
* more like a "temporary hole punch"
* Don't do this for block devices when someone else
* has a reference, because it could be file system metadata
* and that's not safe to truncate.
*/
mapping = page_mapping(p);
if (!mapping) {
/*
* Page has been teared down in the meanwhile
*/
ret = MF_FAILED;
goto out;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
mm: shmem: don't truncate page if memory failure happens The current behavior of memory failure is to truncate the page cache regardless of dirty or clean. If the page is dirty the later access will get the obsolete data from disk without any notification to the users. This may cause silent data loss. It is even worse for shmem since shmem is in-memory filesystem, truncating page cache means discarding data blocks. The later read would return all zero. The right approach is to keep the corrupted page in page cache, any later access would return error for syscalls or SIGBUS for page fault, until the file is truncated, hole punched or removed. The regular storage backed filesystems would be more complicated so this patch is focused on shmem. This also unblock the support for soft offlining shmem THP. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes] [arnd@arndb.de: fix uninitialized variable use in me_pagecache_clean()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211022064748.4173718-1-arnd@kernel.org [Fix invalid pointer dereference in shmem_read_mapping_page_gfp() with a slight different implementation from what Ajay Garg <ajaygargnsit@gmail.com> and Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com> proposed and reworked the error handling of shmem_write_begin() suggested by Linus] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211111084617.6746-1-ajaygargnsit@gmail.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211020210755.23964-6-shy828301@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211116193247.21102-1-shy828301@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Ajay Garg <ajaygargnsit@gmail.com> Cc: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com> Cc: Andy Lavr <andy.lavr@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:05:19 +00:00
/*
* The shmem page is kept in page cache instead of truncating
* so is expected to have an extra refcount after error-handling.
*/
extra_pins = shmem_mapping(mapping);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
/*
* Truncation is a bit tricky. Enable it per file system for now.
*
* Open: to take i_rwsem or not for this? Right now we don't.
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
*/
ret = truncate_error_page(p, page_to_pfn(p), mapping);
mm: shmem: don't truncate page if memory failure happens The current behavior of memory failure is to truncate the page cache regardless of dirty or clean. If the page is dirty the later access will get the obsolete data from disk without any notification to the users. This may cause silent data loss. It is even worse for shmem since shmem is in-memory filesystem, truncating page cache means discarding data blocks. The later read would return all zero. The right approach is to keep the corrupted page in page cache, any later access would return error for syscalls or SIGBUS for page fault, until the file is truncated, hole punched or removed. The regular storage backed filesystems would be more complicated so this patch is focused on shmem. This also unblock the support for soft offlining shmem THP. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes] [arnd@arndb.de: fix uninitialized variable use in me_pagecache_clean()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211022064748.4173718-1-arnd@kernel.org [Fix invalid pointer dereference in shmem_read_mapping_page_gfp() with a slight different implementation from what Ajay Garg <ajaygargnsit@gmail.com> and Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com> proposed and reworked the error handling of shmem_write_begin() suggested by Linus] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211111084617.6746-1-ajaygargnsit@gmail.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211020210755.23964-6-shy828301@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211116193247.21102-1-shy828301@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Ajay Garg <ajaygargnsit@gmail.com> Cc: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com> Cc: Andy Lavr <andy.lavr@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:05:19 +00:00
if (has_extra_refcount(ps, p, extra_pins))
ret = MF_FAILED;
out:
unlock_page(p);
return ret;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
/*
* Dirty pagecache page
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
* Issues: when the error hit a hole page the error is not properly
* propagated.
*/
static int me_pagecache_dirty(struct page_state *ps, struct page *p)
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{
struct address_space *mapping = page_mapping(p);
SetPageError(p);
/* TBD: print more information about the file. */
if (mapping) {
/*
* IO error will be reported by write(), fsync(), etc.
* who check the mapping.
* This way the application knows that something went
* wrong with its dirty file data.
*
* There's one open issue:
*
* The EIO will be only reported on the next IO
* operation and then cleared through the IO map.
* Normally Linux has two mechanisms to pass IO error
* first through the AS_EIO flag in the address space
* and then through the PageError flag in the page.
* Since we drop pages on memory failure handling the
* only mechanism open to use is through AS_AIO.
*
* This has the disadvantage that it gets cleared on
* the first operation that returns an error, while
* the PageError bit is more sticky and only cleared
* when the page is reread or dropped. If an
* application assumes it will always get error on
* fsync, but does other operations on the fd before
* and the page is dropped between then the error
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
* will not be properly reported.
*
* This can already happen even without hwpoisoned
* pages: first on metadata IO errors (which only
* report through AS_EIO) or when the page is dropped
* at the wrong time.
*
* So right now we assume that the application DTRT on
* the first EIO, but we're not worse than other parts
* of the kernel.
*/
mapping_set_error(mapping, -EIO);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
return me_pagecache_clean(ps, p);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
/*
* Clean and dirty swap cache.
*
* Dirty swap cache page is tricky to handle. The page could live both in page
* cache and swap cache(ie. page is freshly swapped in). So it could be
* referenced concurrently by 2 types of PTEs:
* normal PTEs and swap PTEs. We try to handle them consistently by calling
* try_to_unmap(TTU_IGNORE_HWPOISON) to convert the normal PTEs to swap PTEs,
* and then
* - clear dirty bit to prevent IO
* - remove from LRU
* - but keep in the swap cache, so that when we return to it on
* a later page fault, we know the application is accessing
* corrupted data and shall be killed (we installed simple
* interception code in do_swap_page to catch it).
*
* Clean swap cache pages can be directly isolated. A later page fault will
* bring in the known good data from disk.
*/
static int me_swapcache_dirty(struct page_state *ps, struct page *p)
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{
int ret;
bool extra_pins = false;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
ClearPageDirty(p);
/* Trigger EIO in shmem: */
ClearPageUptodate(p);
ret = delete_from_lru_cache(p) ? MF_FAILED : MF_DELAYED;
unlock_page(p);
if (ret == MF_DELAYED)
extra_pins = true;
if (has_extra_refcount(ps, p, extra_pins))
ret = MF_FAILED;
return ret;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
static int me_swapcache_clean(struct page_state *ps, struct page *p)
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{
struct folio *folio = page_folio(p);
int ret;
delete_from_swap_cache(folio);
ret = delete_from_lru_cache(p) ? MF_FAILED : MF_RECOVERED;
folio_unlock(folio);
if (has_extra_refcount(ps, p, false))
ret = MF_FAILED;
return ret;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
/*
* Huge pages. Needs work.
* Issues:
* - Error on hugepage is contained in hugepage unit (not in raw page unit.)
* To narrow down kill region to one page, we need to break up pmd.
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
*/
static int me_huge_page(struct page_state *ps, struct page *p)
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{
mm,hwpoison: take free pages off the buddy freelists The crux of the matter is that historically we left poisoned pages in the buddy system because we have some checks in place when allocating a page that are gatekeeper for poisoned pages. Unfortunately, we do have other users (e.g: compaction [1]) that scan buddy freelists and try to get a page from there without checking whether the page is HWPoison. As I stated already, I think it is fundamentally wrong to keep HWPoison pages within the buddy systems, checks in place or not. Let us fix this the same way we did for soft_offline [2], taking the page off the buddy freelist so it is completely unreachable. Note that this is fairly simple to trigger, as we only need to poison free buddy pages (madvise MADV_HWPOISON) and then run some sort of memory stress system. Just for a matter of reference, I put a dump_page() in compaction_alloc() to trigger for HWPoison patches: page:0000000012b2982b refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x1d5db flags: 0xfffffc0800000(hwpoison) raw: 000fffffc0800000 ffffea00007573c8 ffffc90000857de0 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: compaction_alloc CPU: 4 PID: 123 Comm: kcompactd0 Tainted: G E 5.9.0-rc2-mm1-1-default+ #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.2-0-g5f4c7b1-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x6d/0x8b compaction_alloc+0xb2/0xc0 migrate_pages+0x2a6/0x12a0 compact_zone+0x5eb/0x11c0 proactive_compact_node+0x89/0xf0 kcompactd+0x2d0/0x3a0 kthread+0x118/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 After that, if e.g: a process faults in the page, it will get killed unexpectedly. Fix it by containing the page immediatelly. Besides that, two more changes can be noticed: * MF_DELAYED no longer suits as we are fixing the issue by containing the page immediately, so it does no longer rely on the allocation-time checks to stop HWPoison to be handed over. gain unless it is unpoisoned, so we fixed the situation. Because of that, let us use MF_RECOVERED from now on. * The second block that handles PageBuddy pages is no longer needed: We call shake_page and then check whether the page is Buddy because shake_page calls drain_all_pages, which sends pcp-pages back to the buddy freelists, so we could have a chance to handle free pages. Currently, get_hwpoison_page already calls drain_all_pages, and we call get_hwpoison_page right before coming here, so we should be on the safe side. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190826104144.GA7849@linux/T/#u [2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/11792607/ [osalvador@suse.de: take the poisoned subpage off the buddy frelists] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-4-osalvador@suse.de Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-3-osalvador@suse.de Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 03:11:32 +00:00
int res;
struct page *hpage = compound_head(p);
mm: hwpoison: dissolve in-use hugepage in unrecoverable memory error Currently me_huge_page() relies on dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page() to keep the error hugepage away from the system, which is OK but not good enough because the hugepage still has a refcount and unpoison doesn't work on the error hugepage (PageHWPoison flags are cleared but pages are still leaked.) And there's "wasting health subpages" issue too. This patch reworks on me_huge_page() to solve these issues. For hugetlb file, recently we have truncating code so let's use it in hugetlbfs specific ->error_remove_page(). For anonymous hugepage, it's helpful to dissolve the error page after freeing it into free hugepage list. Migration entry and PageHWPoison in the head page prevent the access to it. TODO: dissolve_free_huge_page() can fail but we don't considered it yet. It's not critical (and at least no worse that now) because in such case the error hugepage just stays in free hugepage list without being dissolved. By virtue of PageHWPoison in head page, it's never allocated to processes. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix unused var warnings] Fixes: 23a003bfd23ea9ea0b7756b920e51f64b284b468 ("mm/madvise: pass return code of memory_failure() to userspace") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170417055948.GM31394@yexl-desktop Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496305019-5493-8-git-send-email-n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-10 22:47:50 +00:00
struct address_space *mapping;
if (!PageHuge(hpage))
return MF_DELAYED;
mm: hwpoison: dissolve in-use hugepage in unrecoverable memory error Currently me_huge_page() relies on dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page() to keep the error hugepage away from the system, which is OK but not good enough because the hugepage still has a refcount and unpoison doesn't work on the error hugepage (PageHWPoison flags are cleared but pages are still leaked.) And there's "wasting health subpages" issue too. This patch reworks on me_huge_page() to solve these issues. For hugetlb file, recently we have truncating code so let's use it in hugetlbfs specific ->error_remove_page(). For anonymous hugepage, it's helpful to dissolve the error page after freeing it into free hugepage list. Migration entry and PageHWPoison in the head page prevent the access to it. TODO: dissolve_free_huge_page() can fail but we don't considered it yet. It's not critical (and at least no worse that now) because in such case the error hugepage just stays in free hugepage list without being dissolved. By virtue of PageHWPoison in head page, it's never allocated to processes. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix unused var warnings] Fixes: 23a003bfd23ea9ea0b7756b920e51f64b284b468 ("mm/madvise: pass return code of memory_failure() to userspace") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170417055948.GM31394@yexl-desktop Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496305019-5493-8-git-send-email-n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-10 22:47:50 +00:00
mapping = page_mapping(hpage);
if (mapping) {
res = truncate_error_page(hpage, page_to_pfn(p), mapping);
unlock_page(hpage);
mm: hwpoison: dissolve in-use hugepage in unrecoverable memory error Currently me_huge_page() relies on dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page() to keep the error hugepage away from the system, which is OK but not good enough because the hugepage still has a refcount and unpoison doesn't work on the error hugepage (PageHWPoison flags are cleared but pages are still leaked.) And there's "wasting health subpages" issue too. This patch reworks on me_huge_page() to solve these issues. For hugetlb file, recently we have truncating code so let's use it in hugetlbfs specific ->error_remove_page(). For anonymous hugepage, it's helpful to dissolve the error page after freeing it into free hugepage list. Migration entry and PageHWPoison in the head page prevent the access to it. TODO: dissolve_free_huge_page() can fail but we don't considered it yet. It's not critical (and at least no worse that now) because in such case the error hugepage just stays in free hugepage list without being dissolved. By virtue of PageHWPoison in head page, it's never allocated to processes. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix unused var warnings] Fixes: 23a003bfd23ea9ea0b7756b920e51f64b284b468 ("mm/madvise: pass return code of memory_failure() to userspace") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170417055948.GM31394@yexl-desktop Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496305019-5493-8-git-send-email-n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-10 22:47:50 +00:00
} else {
mm,hwpoison: take free pages off the buddy freelists The crux of the matter is that historically we left poisoned pages in the buddy system because we have some checks in place when allocating a page that are gatekeeper for poisoned pages. Unfortunately, we do have other users (e.g: compaction [1]) that scan buddy freelists and try to get a page from there without checking whether the page is HWPoison. As I stated already, I think it is fundamentally wrong to keep HWPoison pages within the buddy systems, checks in place or not. Let us fix this the same way we did for soft_offline [2], taking the page off the buddy freelist so it is completely unreachable. Note that this is fairly simple to trigger, as we only need to poison free buddy pages (madvise MADV_HWPOISON) and then run some sort of memory stress system. Just for a matter of reference, I put a dump_page() in compaction_alloc() to trigger for HWPoison patches: page:0000000012b2982b refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x1d5db flags: 0xfffffc0800000(hwpoison) raw: 000fffffc0800000 ffffea00007573c8 ffffc90000857de0 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: compaction_alloc CPU: 4 PID: 123 Comm: kcompactd0 Tainted: G E 5.9.0-rc2-mm1-1-default+ #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.2-0-g5f4c7b1-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x6d/0x8b compaction_alloc+0xb2/0xc0 migrate_pages+0x2a6/0x12a0 compact_zone+0x5eb/0x11c0 proactive_compact_node+0x89/0xf0 kcompactd+0x2d0/0x3a0 kthread+0x118/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 After that, if e.g: a process faults in the page, it will get killed unexpectedly. Fix it by containing the page immediatelly. Besides that, two more changes can be noticed: * MF_DELAYED no longer suits as we are fixing the issue by containing the page immediately, so it does no longer rely on the allocation-time checks to stop HWPoison to be handed over. gain unless it is unpoisoned, so we fixed the situation. Because of that, let us use MF_RECOVERED from now on. * The second block that handles PageBuddy pages is no longer needed: We call shake_page and then check whether the page is Buddy because shake_page calls drain_all_pages, which sends pcp-pages back to the buddy freelists, so we could have a chance to handle free pages. Currently, get_hwpoison_page already calls drain_all_pages, and we call get_hwpoison_page right before coming here, so we should be on the safe side. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190826104144.GA7849@linux/T/#u [2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/11792607/ [osalvador@suse.de: take the poisoned subpage off the buddy frelists] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-4-osalvador@suse.de Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-3-osalvador@suse.de Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 03:11:32 +00:00
res = MF_FAILED;
mm: hwpoison: dissolve in-use hugepage in unrecoverable memory error Currently me_huge_page() relies on dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page() to keep the error hugepage away from the system, which is OK but not good enough because the hugepage still has a refcount and unpoison doesn't work on the error hugepage (PageHWPoison flags are cleared but pages are still leaked.) And there's "wasting health subpages" issue too. This patch reworks on me_huge_page() to solve these issues. For hugetlb file, recently we have truncating code so let's use it in hugetlbfs specific ->error_remove_page(). For anonymous hugepage, it's helpful to dissolve the error page after freeing it into free hugepage list. Migration entry and PageHWPoison in the head page prevent the access to it. TODO: dissolve_free_huge_page() can fail but we don't considered it yet. It's not critical (and at least no worse that now) because in such case the error hugepage just stays in free hugepage list without being dissolved. By virtue of PageHWPoison in head page, it's never allocated to processes. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix unused var warnings] Fixes: 23a003bfd23ea9ea0b7756b920e51f64b284b468 ("mm/madvise: pass return code of memory_failure() to userspace") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170417055948.GM31394@yexl-desktop Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496305019-5493-8-git-send-email-n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-10 22:47:50 +00:00
unlock_page(hpage);
/*
* migration entry prevents later access on error hugepage,
* so we can free and dissolve it into buddy to save healthy
* subpages.
mm: hwpoison: dissolve in-use hugepage in unrecoverable memory error Currently me_huge_page() relies on dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page() to keep the error hugepage away from the system, which is OK but not good enough because the hugepage still has a refcount and unpoison doesn't work on the error hugepage (PageHWPoison flags are cleared but pages are still leaked.) And there's "wasting health subpages" issue too. This patch reworks on me_huge_page() to solve these issues. For hugetlb file, recently we have truncating code so let's use it in hugetlbfs specific ->error_remove_page(). For anonymous hugepage, it's helpful to dissolve the error page after freeing it into free hugepage list. Migration entry and PageHWPoison in the head page prevent the access to it. TODO: dissolve_free_huge_page() can fail but we don't considered it yet. It's not critical (and at least no worse that now) because in such case the error hugepage just stays in free hugepage list without being dissolved. By virtue of PageHWPoison in head page, it's never allocated to processes. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix unused var warnings] Fixes: 23a003bfd23ea9ea0b7756b920e51f64b284b468 ("mm/madvise: pass return code of memory_failure() to userspace") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170417055948.GM31394@yexl-desktop Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496305019-5493-8-git-send-email-n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-10 22:47:50 +00:00
*/
put_page(hpage);
if (__page_handle_poison(p)) {
mm,hwpoison: take free pages off the buddy freelists The crux of the matter is that historically we left poisoned pages in the buddy system because we have some checks in place when allocating a page that are gatekeeper for poisoned pages. Unfortunately, we do have other users (e.g: compaction [1]) that scan buddy freelists and try to get a page from there without checking whether the page is HWPoison. As I stated already, I think it is fundamentally wrong to keep HWPoison pages within the buddy systems, checks in place or not. Let us fix this the same way we did for soft_offline [2], taking the page off the buddy freelist so it is completely unreachable. Note that this is fairly simple to trigger, as we only need to poison free buddy pages (madvise MADV_HWPOISON) and then run some sort of memory stress system. Just for a matter of reference, I put a dump_page() in compaction_alloc() to trigger for HWPoison patches: page:0000000012b2982b refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x1d5db flags: 0xfffffc0800000(hwpoison) raw: 000fffffc0800000 ffffea00007573c8 ffffc90000857de0 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: compaction_alloc CPU: 4 PID: 123 Comm: kcompactd0 Tainted: G E 5.9.0-rc2-mm1-1-default+ #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.2-0-g5f4c7b1-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x6d/0x8b compaction_alloc+0xb2/0xc0 migrate_pages+0x2a6/0x12a0 compact_zone+0x5eb/0x11c0 proactive_compact_node+0x89/0xf0 kcompactd+0x2d0/0x3a0 kthread+0x118/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 After that, if e.g: a process faults in the page, it will get killed unexpectedly. Fix it by containing the page immediatelly. Besides that, two more changes can be noticed: * MF_DELAYED no longer suits as we are fixing the issue by containing the page immediately, so it does no longer rely on the allocation-time checks to stop HWPoison to be handed over. gain unless it is unpoisoned, so we fixed the situation. Because of that, let us use MF_RECOVERED from now on. * The second block that handles PageBuddy pages is no longer needed: We call shake_page and then check whether the page is Buddy because shake_page calls drain_all_pages, which sends pcp-pages back to the buddy freelists, so we could have a chance to handle free pages. Currently, get_hwpoison_page already calls drain_all_pages, and we call get_hwpoison_page right before coming here, so we should be on the safe side. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190826104144.GA7849@linux/T/#u [2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/11792607/ [osalvador@suse.de: take the poisoned subpage off the buddy frelists] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-4-osalvador@suse.de Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-3-osalvador@suse.de Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 03:11:32 +00:00
page_ref_inc(p);
res = MF_RECOVERED;
}
}
mm: hwpoison: dissolve in-use hugepage in unrecoverable memory error Currently me_huge_page() relies on dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page() to keep the error hugepage away from the system, which is OK but not good enough because the hugepage still has a refcount and unpoison doesn't work on the error hugepage (PageHWPoison flags are cleared but pages are still leaked.) And there's "wasting health subpages" issue too. This patch reworks on me_huge_page() to solve these issues. For hugetlb file, recently we have truncating code so let's use it in hugetlbfs specific ->error_remove_page(). For anonymous hugepage, it's helpful to dissolve the error page after freeing it into free hugepage list. Migration entry and PageHWPoison in the head page prevent the access to it. TODO: dissolve_free_huge_page() can fail but we don't considered it yet. It's not critical (and at least no worse that now) because in such case the error hugepage just stays in free hugepage list without being dissolved. By virtue of PageHWPoison in head page, it's never allocated to processes. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix unused var warnings] Fixes: 23a003bfd23ea9ea0b7756b920e51f64b284b468 ("mm/madvise: pass return code of memory_failure() to userspace") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170417055948.GM31394@yexl-desktop Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496305019-5493-8-git-send-email-n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-10 22:47:50 +00:00
if (has_extra_refcount(ps, p, false))
res = MF_FAILED;
mm: hwpoison: dissolve in-use hugepage in unrecoverable memory error Currently me_huge_page() relies on dequeue_hwpoisoned_huge_page() to keep the error hugepage away from the system, which is OK but not good enough because the hugepage still has a refcount and unpoison doesn't work on the error hugepage (PageHWPoison flags are cleared but pages are still leaked.) And there's "wasting health subpages" issue too. This patch reworks on me_huge_page() to solve these issues. For hugetlb file, recently we have truncating code so let's use it in hugetlbfs specific ->error_remove_page(). For anonymous hugepage, it's helpful to dissolve the error page after freeing it into free hugepage list. Migration entry and PageHWPoison in the head page prevent the access to it. TODO: dissolve_free_huge_page() can fail but we don't considered it yet. It's not critical (and at least no worse that now) because in such case the error hugepage just stays in free hugepage list without being dissolved. By virtue of PageHWPoison in head page, it's never allocated to processes. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix unused var warnings] Fixes: 23a003bfd23ea9ea0b7756b920e51f64b284b468 ("mm/madvise: pass return code of memory_failure() to userspace") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170417055948.GM31394@yexl-desktop Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496305019-5493-8-git-send-email-n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-10 22:47:50 +00:00
return res;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
/*
* Various page states we can handle.
*
* A page state is defined by its current page->flags bits.
* The table matches them in order and calls the right handler.
*
* This is quite tricky because we can access page at any time
* in its live cycle, so all accesses have to be extremely careful.
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
*
* This is not complete. More states could be added.
* For any missing state don't attempt recovery.
*/
#define dirty (1UL << PG_dirty)
#define sc ((1UL << PG_swapcache) | (1UL << PG_swapbacked))
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
#define unevict (1UL << PG_unevictable)
#define mlock (1UL << PG_mlocked)
#define lru (1UL << PG_lru)
#define head (1UL << PG_head)
#define slab (1UL << PG_slab)
#define reserved (1UL << PG_reserved)
static struct page_state error_states[] = {
{ reserved, reserved, MF_MSG_KERNEL, me_kernel },
/*
* free pages are specially detected outside this table:
* PG_buddy pages only make a small fraction of all free pages.
*/
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
/*
* Could in theory check if slab page is free or if we can drop
* currently unused objects without touching them. But just
* treat it as standard kernel for now.
*/
{ slab, slab, MF_MSG_SLAB, me_kernel },
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{ head, head, MF_MSG_HUGE, me_huge_page },
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{ sc|dirty, sc|dirty, MF_MSG_DIRTY_SWAPCACHE, me_swapcache_dirty },
{ sc|dirty, sc, MF_MSG_CLEAN_SWAPCACHE, me_swapcache_clean },
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{ mlock|dirty, mlock|dirty, MF_MSG_DIRTY_MLOCKED_LRU, me_pagecache_dirty },
{ mlock|dirty, mlock, MF_MSG_CLEAN_MLOCKED_LRU, me_pagecache_clean },
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{ unevict|dirty, unevict|dirty, MF_MSG_DIRTY_UNEVICTABLE_LRU, me_pagecache_dirty },
{ unevict|dirty, unevict, MF_MSG_CLEAN_UNEVICTABLE_LRU, me_pagecache_clean },
{ lru|dirty, lru|dirty, MF_MSG_DIRTY_LRU, me_pagecache_dirty },
{ lru|dirty, lru, MF_MSG_CLEAN_LRU, me_pagecache_clean },
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
/*
* Catchall entry: must be at end.
*/
{ 0, 0, MF_MSG_UNKNOWN, me_unknown },
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
};
#undef dirty
#undef sc
#undef unevict
#undef mlock
#undef lru
#undef head
#undef slab
#undef reserved
/*
* "Dirty/Clean" indication is not 100% accurate due to the possibility of
* setting PG_dirty outside page lock. See also comment above set_page_dirty().
*/
static void action_result(unsigned long pfn, enum mf_action_page_type type,
enum mf_result result)
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{
trace_memory_failure_event(pfn, type, result);
num_poisoned_pages_inc();
pr_err("Memory failure: %#lx: recovery action for %s: %s\n",
pfn, action_page_types[type], action_name[result]);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
static int page_action(struct page_state *ps, struct page *p,
unsigned long pfn)
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{
int result;
/* page p should be unlocked after returning from ps->action(). */
result = ps->action(ps, p);
action_result(pfn, ps->type, result);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
/* Could do more checks here if page looks ok */
/*
* Could adjust zone counters here to correct for the missing page.
*/
return (result == MF_RECOVERED || result == MF_DELAYED) ? 0 : -EBUSY;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory() After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on __get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY (meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good. To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON(). Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events injected only by madvise() or /sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE injection. [lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:09 +00:00
static inline bool PageHWPoisonTakenOff(struct page *page)
{
return PageHWPoison(page) && page_private(page) == MAGIC_HWPOISON;
}
void SetPageHWPoisonTakenOff(struct page *page)
{
set_page_private(page, MAGIC_HWPOISON);
}
void ClearPageHWPoisonTakenOff(struct page *page)
{
if (PageHWPoison(page))
set_page_private(page, 0);
}
mm,hwpoison: fix race with hugetlb page allocation When hugetlb page fault (under overcommitting situation) and memory_failure() race, VM_BUG_ON_PAGE() is triggered by the following race: CPU0: CPU1: gather_surplus_pages() page = alloc_surplus_huge_page() memory_failure_hugetlb() get_hwpoison_page(page) __get_hwpoison_page(page) get_page_unless_zero(page) zero = put_page_testzero(page) VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!zero, page) enqueue_huge_page(h, page) put_page(page) __get_hwpoison_page() only checks the page refcount before taking an additional one for memory error handling, which is not enough because there's a time window where compound pages have non-zero refcount during hugetlb page initialization. So make __get_hwpoison_page() check page status a bit more for hugetlb pages with get_hwpoison_huge_page(). Checking hugetlb-specific flags under hugetlb_lock makes sure that the hugetlb page is not transitive. It's notable that another new function, HWPoisonHandlable(), is helpful to prevent a race against other transitive page states (like a generic compound page just before PageHuge becomes true). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210603233632.2964832-2-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Fixes: ead07f6a867b ("mm/memory-failure: introduce get_hwpoison_page() for consistent refcount handling") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reported-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com> Acked-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.12+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-16 01:23:13 +00:00
/*
* Return true if a page type of a given page is supported by hwpoison
* mechanism (while handling could fail), otherwise false. This function
* does not return true for hugetlb or device memory pages, so it's assumed
* to be called only in the context where we never have such pages.
*/
static inline bool HWPoisonHandlable(struct page *page, unsigned long flags)
mm,hwpoison: fix race with hugetlb page allocation When hugetlb page fault (under overcommitting situation) and memory_failure() race, VM_BUG_ON_PAGE() is triggered by the following race: CPU0: CPU1: gather_surplus_pages() page = alloc_surplus_huge_page() memory_failure_hugetlb() get_hwpoison_page(page) __get_hwpoison_page(page) get_page_unless_zero(page) zero = put_page_testzero(page) VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!zero, page) enqueue_huge_page(h, page) put_page(page) __get_hwpoison_page() only checks the page refcount before taking an additional one for memory error handling, which is not enough because there's a time window where compound pages have non-zero refcount during hugetlb page initialization. So make __get_hwpoison_page() check page status a bit more for hugetlb pages with get_hwpoison_huge_page(). Checking hugetlb-specific flags under hugetlb_lock makes sure that the hugetlb page is not transitive. It's notable that another new function, HWPoisonHandlable(), is helpful to prevent a race against other transitive page states (like a generic compound page just before PageHuge becomes true). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210603233632.2964832-2-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Fixes: ead07f6a867b ("mm/memory-failure: introduce get_hwpoison_page() for consistent refcount handling") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reported-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com> Acked-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.12+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-16 01:23:13 +00:00
{
/* Soft offline could migrate non-LRU movable pages */
if ((flags & MF_SOFT_OFFLINE) && __PageMovable(page))
return true;
return PageLRU(page) || is_free_buddy_page(page);
mm,hwpoison: fix race with hugetlb page allocation When hugetlb page fault (under overcommitting situation) and memory_failure() race, VM_BUG_ON_PAGE() is triggered by the following race: CPU0: CPU1: gather_surplus_pages() page = alloc_surplus_huge_page() memory_failure_hugetlb() get_hwpoison_page(page) __get_hwpoison_page(page) get_page_unless_zero(page) zero = put_page_testzero(page) VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!zero, page) enqueue_huge_page(h, page) put_page(page) __get_hwpoison_page() only checks the page refcount before taking an additional one for memory error handling, which is not enough because there's a time window where compound pages have non-zero refcount during hugetlb page initialization. So make __get_hwpoison_page() check page status a bit more for hugetlb pages with get_hwpoison_huge_page(). Checking hugetlb-specific flags under hugetlb_lock makes sure that the hugetlb page is not transitive. It's notable that another new function, HWPoisonHandlable(), is helpful to prevent a race against other transitive page states (like a generic compound page just before PageHuge becomes true). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210603233632.2964832-2-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Fixes: ead07f6a867b ("mm/memory-failure: introduce get_hwpoison_page() for consistent refcount handling") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reported-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com> Acked-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.12+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-16 01:23:13 +00:00
}
static int __get_hwpoison_page(struct page *page, unsigned long flags)
mm/memory-failure: introduce get_hwpoison_page() for consistent refcount handling memory_failure() can run in 2 different mode (specified by MF_COUNT_INCREASED) in page refcount perspective. When MF_COUNT_INCREASED is set, memory_failure() assumes that the caller takes a refcount of the target page. And if cleared, memory_failure() takes it in it's own. In current code, however, refcounting is done differently in each caller. For example, madvise_hwpoison() uses get_user_pages_fast() and hwpoison_inject() uses get_page_unless_zero(). So this inconsistent refcounting causes refcount failure especially for thp tail pages. Typical user visible effects are like memory leak or VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!page_count(page)) in isolate_lru_page(). To fix this refcounting issue, this patch introduces get_hwpoison_page() to handle thp tail pages in the same manner for each caller of hwpoison code. memory_failure() might fail to split thp and in such case it returns without completing page isolation. This is not good because PageHWPoison on the thp is still set and there's no easy way to unpoison such thps. So this patch try to roll back any action to the thp in "non anonymous thp" case and "thp split failed" case, expecting an MCE(SRAR) generated by later access afterward will properly free such thps. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix CONFIG_HWPOISON_INJECT=m] Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-24 23:56:48 +00:00
{
struct page *head = compound_head(page);
mm,hwpoison: fix race with hugetlb page allocation When hugetlb page fault (under overcommitting situation) and memory_failure() race, VM_BUG_ON_PAGE() is triggered by the following race: CPU0: CPU1: gather_surplus_pages() page = alloc_surplus_huge_page() memory_failure_hugetlb() get_hwpoison_page(page) __get_hwpoison_page(page) get_page_unless_zero(page) zero = put_page_testzero(page) VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!zero, page) enqueue_huge_page(h, page) put_page(page) __get_hwpoison_page() only checks the page refcount before taking an additional one for memory error handling, which is not enough because there's a time window where compound pages have non-zero refcount during hugetlb page initialization. So make __get_hwpoison_page() check page status a bit more for hugetlb pages with get_hwpoison_huge_page(). Checking hugetlb-specific flags under hugetlb_lock makes sure that the hugetlb page is not transitive. It's notable that another new function, HWPoisonHandlable(), is helpful to prevent a race against other transitive page states (like a generic compound page just before PageHuge becomes true). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210603233632.2964832-2-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Fixes: ead07f6a867b ("mm/memory-failure: introduce get_hwpoison_page() for consistent refcount handling") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reported-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun@bytedance.com> Acked-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.12+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-16 01:23:13 +00:00
int ret = 0;
bool hugetlb = false;
ret = get_hwpoison_huge_page(head, &hugetlb);
if (hugetlb)
return ret;
/*
* This check prevents from calling get_hwpoison_unless_zero()
* for any unsupported type of page in order to reduce the risk of
* unexpected races caused by taking a page refcount.
*/
if (!HWPoisonHandlable(head, flags))
return -EBUSY;
mm/memory-failure: introduce get_hwpoison_page() for consistent refcount handling memory_failure() can run in 2 different mode (specified by MF_COUNT_INCREASED) in page refcount perspective. When MF_COUNT_INCREASED is set, memory_failure() assumes that the caller takes a refcount of the target page. And if cleared, memory_failure() takes it in it's own. In current code, however, refcounting is done differently in each caller. For example, madvise_hwpoison() uses get_user_pages_fast() and hwpoison_inject() uses get_page_unless_zero(). So this inconsistent refcounting causes refcount failure especially for thp tail pages. Typical user visible effects are like memory leak or VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!page_count(page)) in isolate_lru_page(). To fix this refcounting issue, this patch introduces get_hwpoison_page() to handle thp tail pages in the same manner for each caller of hwpoison code. memory_failure() might fail to split thp and in such case it returns without completing page isolation. This is not good because PageHWPoison on the thp is still set and there's no easy way to unpoison such thps. So this patch try to roll back any action to the thp in "non anonymous thp" case and "thp split failed" case, expecting an MCE(SRAR) generated by later access afterward will properly free such thps. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix CONFIG_HWPOISON_INJECT=m] Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-24 23:56:48 +00:00
if (get_page_unless_zero(head)) {
if (head == compound_head(page))
return 1;
pr_info("Memory failure: %#lx cannot catch tail\n",
page_to_pfn(page));
put_page(head);
}
return 0;
mm/memory-failure: introduce get_hwpoison_page() for consistent refcount handling memory_failure() can run in 2 different mode (specified by MF_COUNT_INCREASED) in page refcount perspective. When MF_COUNT_INCREASED is set, memory_failure() assumes that the caller takes a refcount of the target page. And if cleared, memory_failure() takes it in it's own. In current code, however, refcounting is done differently in each caller. For example, madvise_hwpoison() uses get_user_pages_fast() and hwpoison_inject() uses get_page_unless_zero(). So this inconsistent refcounting causes refcount failure especially for thp tail pages. Typical user visible effects are like memory leak or VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!page_count(page)) in isolate_lru_page(). To fix this refcounting issue, this patch introduces get_hwpoison_page() to handle thp tail pages in the same manner for each caller of hwpoison code. memory_failure() might fail to split thp and in such case it returns without completing page isolation. This is not good because PageHWPoison on the thp is still set and there's no easy way to unpoison such thps. So this patch try to roll back any action to the thp in "non anonymous thp" case and "thp split failed" case, expecting an MCE(SRAR) generated by later access afterward will properly free such thps. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix CONFIG_HWPOISON_INJECT=m] Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-06-24 23:56:48 +00:00
}
static int get_any_page(struct page *p, unsigned long flags)
{
int ret = 0, pass = 0;
bool count_increased = false;
if (flags & MF_COUNT_INCREASED)
count_increased = true;
try_again:
if (!count_increased) {
ret = __get_hwpoison_page(p, flags);
if (!ret) {
if (page_count(p)) {
/* We raced with an allocation, retry. */
if (pass++ < 3)
goto try_again;
ret = -EBUSY;
} else if (!PageHuge(p) && !is_free_buddy_page(p)) {
/* We raced with put_page, retry. */
if (pass++ < 3)
goto try_again;
ret = -EIO;
}
goto out;
} else if (ret == -EBUSY) {
/*
* We raced with (possibly temporary) unhandlable
* page, retry.
*/
if (pass++ < 3) {
mm: hwpoison: don't drop slab caches for offlining non-LRU page In the current implementation of soft offline, if non-LRU page is met, all the slab caches will be dropped to free the page then offline. But if the page is not slab page all the effort is wasted in vain. Even though it is a slab page, it is not guaranteed the page could be freed at all. However the side effect and cost is quite high. It does not only drop the slab caches, but also may drop a significant amount of page caches which are associated with inode caches. It could make the most workingset gone in order to just offline a page. And the offline is not guaranteed to succeed at all, actually I really doubt the success rate for real life workload. Furthermore the worse consequence is the system may be locked up and unusable since the page cache release may incur huge amount of works queued for memcg release. Actually we ran into such unpleasant case in our production environment. Firstly, the workqueue of memory_failure_work_func is locked up as below: BUG: workqueue lockup - pool cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 stuck for 53s! Showing busy workqueues and worker pools: workqueue events: flags=0x0 pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=14/256 refcnt=15 in-flight: 409271:memory_failure_work_func pending: kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_monitor, kfree_rcu_work, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, drain_local_stock, kfree_rcu_work workqueue mm_percpu_wq: flags=0x8 pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256 refcnt=2 pending: vmstat_update workqueue cgroup_destroy: flags=0x0 pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/1 refcnt=12072 pending: css_release_work_fn There were over 12K css_release_work_fn queued, and this caused a few lockups due to the contention of worker pool lock with IRQ disabled, for example: NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 1 Modules linked in: amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel xt_DSCP iptable_mangle kvm_amd bpfilter vfat fat acpi_ipmi i2c_piix4 usb_storage ipmi_si k10temp i2c_core ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_cpufreq sch_fq_codel xfs libcrc32c crc32c_intel mlx5_core mlxfw nvme xhci_pci ptp nvme_core pps_core xhci_hcd CPU: 1 PID: 205500 Comm: kworker/1:0 Tainted: G L 5.10.32-t1.el7.twitter.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: TYAN F5AMT /z /S8026GM2NRE-CGN, BIOS V8.030 03/30/2021 Workqueue: events memory_failure_work_func RIP: 0010:queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x41/0x1a0 Code: 41 f0 0f ba 2f 08 0f 92 c0 0f b6 c0 c1 e0 08 89 c2 8b 07 30 e4 09 d0 a9 00 01 ff ff 75 1b 85 c0 74 0e 8b 07 84 c0 74 08 f3 90 <8b> 07 84 c0 75 f8 b8 01 00 00 00 66 89 07 c3 f6 c4 01 75 04 c6 47 RSP: 0018:ffff9b2ac278f900 EFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: 0000000000480101 RBX: ffff8ce98ce71800 RCX: 0000000000000084 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ce98ce6a140 RBP: 00000000000284c8 R08: ffffd7248dcb6808 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff9b2ac278f9b0 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffff8cb44dab9c00 R14: ffffffffbd1ce6a0 R15: ffff8cacaa37f068 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ce98ce40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fcf6e8cb000 CR3: 0000000a0c60a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 Call Trace: __queue_work+0xd6/0x3c0 queue_work_on+0x1c/0x30 uncharge_batch+0x10e/0x110 mem_cgroup_uncharge_list+0x6d/0x80 release_pages+0x37f/0x3f0 __pagevec_release+0x1c/0x50 __invalidate_mapping_pages+0x348/0x380 inode_lru_isolate+0x10a/0x160 __list_lru_walk_one+0x7b/0x170 list_lru_walk_one+0x4a/0x60 prune_icache_sb+0x37/0x50 super_cache_scan+0x123/0x1a0 do_shrink_slab+0x10c/0x2c0 shrink_slab+0x1f1/0x290 drop_slab_node+0x4d/0x70 soft_offline_page+0x1ac/0x5b0 memory_failure_work_func+0x6a/0x90 process_one_work+0x19e/0x340 worker_thread+0x30/0x360 kthread+0x116/0x130 The lockup made the machine is quite unusable. And it also made the most workingset gone, the reclaimabled slab caches were reduced from 12G to 300MB, the page caches were decreased from 17G to 4G. But the most disappointing thing is all the effort doesn't make the page offline, it just returns: soft_offline: 0x1469f2: unknown non LRU page type 5ffff0000000000 () It seems the aggressive behavior for non-LRU page didn't pay back, so it doesn't make too much sense to keep it considering the terrible side effect. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210819054116.266126-1-shy828301@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Reported-by: David Mackey <tdmackey@twitter.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-02 21:58:31 +00:00
shake_page(p);
goto try_again;
}
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
}
if (PageHuge(p) || HWPoisonHandlable(p, flags)) {
ret = 1;
} else {
/*
* A page we cannot handle. Check whether we can turn
* it into something we can handle.
*/
if (pass++ < 3) {
put_page(p);
mm: hwpoison: don't drop slab caches for offlining non-LRU page In the current implementation of soft offline, if non-LRU page is met, all the slab caches will be dropped to free the page then offline. But if the page is not slab page all the effort is wasted in vain. Even though it is a slab page, it is not guaranteed the page could be freed at all. However the side effect and cost is quite high. It does not only drop the slab caches, but also may drop a significant amount of page caches which are associated with inode caches. It could make the most workingset gone in order to just offline a page. And the offline is not guaranteed to succeed at all, actually I really doubt the success rate for real life workload. Furthermore the worse consequence is the system may be locked up and unusable since the page cache release may incur huge amount of works queued for memcg release. Actually we ran into such unpleasant case in our production environment. Firstly, the workqueue of memory_failure_work_func is locked up as below: BUG: workqueue lockup - pool cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 stuck for 53s! Showing busy workqueues and worker pools: workqueue events: flags=0x0 pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=14/256 refcnt=15 in-flight: 409271:memory_failure_work_func pending: kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_monitor, kfree_rcu_work, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, drain_local_stock, kfree_rcu_work workqueue mm_percpu_wq: flags=0x8 pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256 refcnt=2 pending: vmstat_update workqueue cgroup_destroy: flags=0x0 pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/1 refcnt=12072 pending: css_release_work_fn There were over 12K css_release_work_fn queued, and this caused a few lockups due to the contention of worker pool lock with IRQ disabled, for example: NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 1 Modules linked in: amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel xt_DSCP iptable_mangle kvm_amd bpfilter vfat fat acpi_ipmi i2c_piix4 usb_storage ipmi_si k10temp i2c_core ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_cpufreq sch_fq_codel xfs libcrc32c crc32c_intel mlx5_core mlxfw nvme xhci_pci ptp nvme_core pps_core xhci_hcd CPU: 1 PID: 205500 Comm: kworker/1:0 Tainted: G L 5.10.32-t1.el7.twitter.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: TYAN F5AMT /z /S8026GM2NRE-CGN, BIOS V8.030 03/30/2021 Workqueue: events memory_failure_work_func RIP: 0010:queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x41/0x1a0 Code: 41 f0 0f ba 2f 08 0f 92 c0 0f b6 c0 c1 e0 08 89 c2 8b 07 30 e4 09 d0 a9 00 01 ff ff 75 1b 85 c0 74 0e 8b 07 84 c0 74 08 f3 90 <8b> 07 84 c0 75 f8 b8 01 00 00 00 66 89 07 c3 f6 c4 01 75 04 c6 47 RSP: 0018:ffff9b2ac278f900 EFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: 0000000000480101 RBX: ffff8ce98ce71800 RCX: 0000000000000084 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ce98ce6a140 RBP: 00000000000284c8 R08: ffffd7248dcb6808 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff9b2ac278f9b0 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffff8cb44dab9c00 R14: ffffffffbd1ce6a0 R15: ffff8cacaa37f068 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ce98ce40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fcf6e8cb000 CR3: 0000000a0c60a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 Call Trace: __queue_work+0xd6/0x3c0 queue_work_on+0x1c/0x30 uncharge_batch+0x10e/0x110 mem_cgroup_uncharge_list+0x6d/0x80 release_pages+0x37f/0x3f0 __pagevec_release+0x1c/0x50 __invalidate_mapping_pages+0x348/0x380 inode_lru_isolate+0x10a/0x160 __list_lru_walk_one+0x7b/0x170 list_lru_walk_one+0x4a/0x60 prune_icache_sb+0x37/0x50 super_cache_scan+0x123/0x1a0 do_shrink_slab+0x10c/0x2c0 shrink_slab+0x1f1/0x290 drop_slab_node+0x4d/0x70 soft_offline_page+0x1ac/0x5b0 memory_failure_work_func+0x6a/0x90 process_one_work+0x19e/0x340 worker_thread+0x30/0x360 kthread+0x116/0x130 The lockup made the machine is quite unusable. And it also made the most workingset gone, the reclaimabled slab caches were reduced from 12G to 300MB, the page caches were decreased from 17G to 4G. But the most disappointing thing is all the effort doesn't make the page offline, it just returns: soft_offline: 0x1469f2: unknown non LRU page type 5ffff0000000000 () It seems the aggressive behavior for non-LRU page didn't pay back, so it doesn't make too much sense to keep it considering the terrible side effect. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210819054116.266126-1-shy828301@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Reported-by: David Mackey <tdmackey@twitter.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-02 21:58:31 +00:00
shake_page(p);
count_increased = false;
goto try_again;
}
put_page(p);
ret = -EIO;
}
out:
if (ret == -EIO)
mm/hwpoison: use pr_err() instead of dump_page() in get_any_page() The following VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO() is triggered when memory error event happens on the (thp/folio) pages which are about to be freed: [ 1160.232771] page:00000000b36a8a0f refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x16a000 [ 1160.236916] page:00000000b36a8a0f refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x16a000 [ 1160.240684] flags: 0x57ffffc0800000(hwpoison|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) [ 1160.243458] raw: 0057ffffc0800000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 1160.246268] raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 1160.249197] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_large(folio)) [ 1160.251815] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 1160.253438] kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:788! [ 1160.256162] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 1160.258172] CPU: 2 PID: 115368 Comm: mceinj.sh Tainted: G E 5.18.0-rc1-v5.18-rc1-220404-2353-005-g83111+ #3 [ 1160.262049] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1.fc35 04/01/2014 [ 1160.265103] RIP: 0010:dump_page.cold+0x27e/0x2bd [ 1160.266757] Code: fe ff ff 48 c7 c6 81 f1 5a 98 e9 4c fe ff ff 48 c7 c6 a1 95 59 98 e9 40 fe ff ff 48 c7 c6 50 bf 5a 98 48 89 ef e8 9d 04 6d ff <0f> 0b 41 f7 c4 ff 0f 00 00 0f 85 9f fd ff ff 49 8b 04 24 a9 00 00 [ 1160.273180] RSP: 0018:ffffaa2c4d59fd18 EFLAGS: 00010292 [ 1160.274969] RAX: 000000000000003e RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1160.277263] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff985995a1 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 1160.279571] RBP: ffffdc9c45a80000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffdfff [ 1160.281794] R10: ffffaa2c4d59fb08 R11: ffffffff98940d08 R12: ffffdc9c45a80000 [ 1160.283920] R13: ffffffff985b6f94 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffdc9c45a80000 [ 1160.286641] FS: 00007eff54ce1740(0000) GS:ffff99c67bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1160.289498] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1160.291106] CR2: 00005628381a5f68 CR3: 0000000104712003 CR4: 0000000000170ee0 [ 1160.293031] Call Trace: [ 1160.293724] <TASK> [ 1160.294334] get_hwpoison_page+0x47d/0x570 [ 1160.295474] memory_failure+0x106/0xaa0 [ 1160.296474] ? security_capable+0x36/0x50 [ 1160.297524] hard_offline_page_store+0x43/0x80 [ 1160.298684] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1b0 [ 1160.299829] new_sync_write+0xf9/0x160 [ 1160.300810] vfs_write+0x209/0x290 [ 1160.301835] ksys_write+0x4f/0xc0 [ 1160.302718] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 1160.303664] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 1160.304981] RIP: 0033:0x7eff54b018b7 As shown in the RIP address, this VM_BUG_ON in folio_entire_mapcount() is called from dump_page("hwpoison: unhandlable page") in get_any_page(). The below explains the mechanism of the race: CPU 0 CPU 1 memory_failure get_hwpoison_page get_any_page dump_page compound = PageCompound free_pages_prepare page->flags &= ~PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_PREP folio_entire_mapcount VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_large(folio)) So replace dump_page() with safer one, pr_err(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220427053220.719866-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Fixes: 74e8ee4708a8 ("mm: Turn head_compound_mapcount() into folio_entire_mapcount()") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Cc: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-29 06:14:44 +00:00
pr_err("Memory failure: %#lx: unhandlable page.\n", page_to_pfn(p));
return ret;
}
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory() After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on __get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY (meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good. To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON(). Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events injected only by madvise() or /sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE injection. [lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:09 +00:00
static int __get_unpoison_page(struct page *page)
{
struct page *head = compound_head(page);
int ret = 0;
bool hugetlb = false;
ret = get_hwpoison_huge_page(head, &hugetlb);
if (hugetlb)
return ret;
/*
* PageHWPoisonTakenOff pages are not only marked as PG_hwpoison,
* but also isolated from buddy freelist, so need to identify the
* state and have to cancel both operations to unpoison.
*/
if (PageHWPoisonTakenOff(page))
return -EHWPOISON;
return get_page_unless_zero(page) ? 1 : 0;
}
/**
* get_hwpoison_page() - Get refcount for memory error handling
* @p: Raw error page (hit by memory error)
* @flags: Flags controlling behavior of error handling
*
* get_hwpoison_page() takes a page refcount of an error page to handle memory
* error on it, after checking that the error page is in a well-defined state
* (defined as a page-type we can successfully handle the memory error on it,
* such as LRU page and hugetlb page).
*
* Memory error handling could be triggered at any time on any type of page,
* so it's prone to race with typical memory management lifecycle (like
* allocation and free). So to avoid such races, get_hwpoison_page() takes
* extra care for the error page's state (as done in __get_hwpoison_page()),
* and has some retry logic in get_any_page().
*
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory() After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on __get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY (meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good. To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON(). Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events injected only by madvise() or /sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE injection. [lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:09 +00:00
* When called from unpoison_memory(), the caller should already ensure that
* the given page has PG_hwpoison. So it's never reused for other page
* allocations, and __get_unpoison_page() never races with them.
*
* Return: 0 on failure,
* 1 on success for in-use pages in a well-defined state,
* -EIO for pages on which we can not handle memory errors,
* -EBUSY when get_hwpoison_page() has raced with page lifecycle
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory() After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on __get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY (meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good. To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON(). Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events injected only by madvise() or /sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE injection. [lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:09 +00:00
* operations like allocation and free,
* -EHWPOISON when the page is hwpoisoned and taken off from buddy.
*/
static int get_hwpoison_page(struct page *p, unsigned long flags)
{
int ret;
zone_pcp_disable(page_zone(p));
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory() After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on __get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY (meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good. To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON(). Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events injected only by madvise() or /sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE injection. [lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:09 +00:00
if (flags & MF_UNPOISON)
ret = __get_unpoison_page(p);
else
ret = get_any_page(p, flags);
zone_pcp_enable(page_zone(p));
return ret;
}
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
/*
* Do all that is necessary to remove user space mappings. Unmap
* the pages and send SIGBUS to the processes if the data was dirty.
*/
static bool hwpoison_user_mappings(struct page *p, unsigned long pfn,
int flags, struct page *hpage)
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{
struct folio *folio = page_folio(hpage);
enum ttu_flags ttu = TTU_IGNORE_MLOCK | TTU_SYNC;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
struct address_space *mapping;
LIST_HEAD(tokill);
bool unmap_success;
int kill = 1, forcekill;
bool mlocked = PageMlocked(hpage);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
/*
* Here we are interested only in user-mapped pages, so skip any
* other types of pages.
*/
if (PageReserved(p) || PageSlab(p))
return true;
if (!(PageLRU(hpage) || PageHuge(p)))
return true;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
/*
* This check implies we don't kill processes if their pages
* are in the swap cache early. Those are always late kills.
*/
if (!page_mapped(hpage))
return true;
if (PageKsm(p)) {
pr_err("Memory failure: %#lx: can't handle KSM pages.\n", pfn);
return false;
}
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
if (PageSwapCache(p)) {
pr_err("Memory failure: %#lx: keeping poisoned page in swap cache\n",
pfn);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
ttu |= TTU_IGNORE_HWPOISON;
}
/*
* Propagate the dirty bit from PTEs to struct page first, because we
* need this to decide if we should kill or just drop the page.
* XXX: the dirty test could be racy: set_page_dirty() may not always
* be called inside page lock (it's recommended but not enforced).
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
*/
mapping = page_mapping(hpage);
if (!(flags & MF_MUST_KILL) && !PageDirty(hpage) && mapping &&
mapping_can_writeback(mapping)) {
if (page_mkclean(hpage)) {
SetPageDirty(hpage);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
} else {
kill = 0;
ttu |= TTU_IGNORE_HWPOISON;
pr_info("Memory failure: %#lx: corrupted page was clean: dropped without side effects\n",
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
pfn);
}
}
/*
* First collect all the processes that have the page
* mapped in dirty form. This has to be done before try_to_unmap,
* because ttu takes the rmap data structures down.
*
* Error handling: We ignore errors here because
* there's nothing that can be done.
*/
if (kill)
collect_procs(hpage, &tokill, flags & MF_ACTION_REQUIRED);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
if (PageHuge(hpage) && !PageAnon(hpage)) {
/*
* For hugetlb pages in shared mappings, try_to_unmap
* could potentially call huge_pmd_unshare. Because of
* this, take semaphore in write mode here and set
* TTU_RMAP_LOCKED to indicate we have taken the lock
* at this higher level.
*/
mapping = hugetlb_page_mapping_lock_write(hpage);
if (mapping) {
Folio changes for 5.18 - Rewrite how munlock works to massively reduce the contention on i_mmap_rwsem (Hugh Dickins): https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/8e4356d-9622-a7f0-b2c-f116b5f2efea@google.com/ - Sort out the page refcount mess for ZONE_DEVICE pages (Christoph Hellwig): https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20220210072828.2930359-1-hch@lst.de/ - Convert GUP to use folios and make pincount available for order-1 pages. (Matthew Wilcox) - Convert a few more truncation functions to use folios (Matthew Wilcox) - Convert page_vma_mapped_walk to use PFNs instead of pages (Matthew Wilcox) - Convert rmap_walk to use folios (Matthew Wilcox) - Convert most of shrink_page_list() to use a folio (Matthew Wilcox) - Add support for creating large folios in readahead (Matthew Wilcox) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEzBAABCgAdFiEEejHryeLBw/spnjHrDpNsjXcpgj4FAmI4ucgACgkQDpNsjXcp gj69Wgf6AwqwmO5Tmy+fLScDPqWxmXJofbocae1kyoGHf7Ui91OK4U2j6IpvAr+g P/vLIK+JAAcTQcrSCjymuEkf4HkGZOR03QQn7maPIEe4eLrZRQDEsmHC1L9gpeJp s/GMvDWiGE0Tnxu0EOzfVi/yT+qjIl/S8VvqtCoJv1HdzxitZ7+1RDuqImaMC5MM Qi3uHag78vLmCltLXpIOdpgZhdZexCdL2Y/1npf+b6FVkAJRRNUnA0gRbS7YpoVp CbxEJcmAl9cpJLuj5i5kIfS9trr+/QcvbUlzRxh4ggC58iqnmF2V09l2MJ7YU3XL v1O/Elq4lRhXninZFQEm9zjrri7LDQ== =n9Ad -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'folio-5.18c' of git://git.infradead.org/users/willy/pagecache Pull folio updates from Matthew Wilcox: - Rewrite how munlock works to massively reduce the contention on i_mmap_rwsem (Hugh Dickins): https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/8e4356d-9622-a7f0-b2c-f116b5f2efea@google.com/ - Sort out the page refcount mess for ZONE_DEVICE pages (Christoph Hellwig): https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20220210072828.2930359-1-hch@lst.de/ - Convert GUP to use folios and make pincount available for order-1 pages. (Matthew Wilcox) - Convert a few more truncation functions to use folios (Matthew Wilcox) - Convert page_vma_mapped_walk to use PFNs instead of pages (Matthew Wilcox) - Convert rmap_walk to use folios (Matthew Wilcox) - Convert most of shrink_page_list() to use a folio (Matthew Wilcox) - Add support for creating large folios in readahead (Matthew Wilcox) * tag 'folio-5.18c' of git://git.infradead.org/users/willy/pagecache: (114 commits) mm/damon: minor cleanup for damon_pa_young selftests/vm/transhuge-stress: Support file-backed PMD folios mm/filemap: Support VM_HUGEPAGE for file mappings mm/readahead: Switch to page_cache_ra_order mm/readahead: Align file mappings for non-DAX mm/readahead: Add large folio readahead mm: Support arbitrary THP sizes mm: Make large folios depend on THP mm: Fix READ_ONLY_THP warning mm/filemap: Allow large folios to be added to the page cache mm: Turn can_split_huge_page() into can_split_folio() mm/vmscan: Convert pageout() to take a folio mm/vmscan: Turn page_check_references() into folio_check_references() mm/vmscan: Account large folios correctly mm/vmscan: Optimise shrink_page_list for non-PMD-sized folios mm/vmscan: Free non-shmem folios without splitting them mm/rmap: Constify the rmap_walk_control argument mm/rmap: Convert rmap_walk() to take a folio mm: Turn page_anon_vma() into folio_anon_vma() mm/rmap: Turn page_lock_anon_vma_read() into folio_lock_anon_vma_read() ...
2022-03-23 00:03:12 +00:00
try_to_unmap(folio, ttu|TTU_RMAP_LOCKED);
i_mmap_unlock_write(mapping);
} else
pr_info("Memory failure: %#lx: could not lock mapping for mapped huge page\n", pfn);
hugetlbfs: use i_mmap_rwsem for more pmd sharing synchronization Patch series "hugetlbfs: use i_mmap_rwsem for more synchronization", v2. While discussing the issue with huge_pte_offset [1], I remembered that there were more outstanding hugetlb races. These issues are: 1) For shared pmds, huge PTE pointers returned by huge_pte_alloc can become invalid via a call to huge_pmd_unshare by another thread. 2) hugetlbfs page faults can race with truncation causing invalid global reserve counts and state. A previous attempt was made to use i_mmap_rwsem in this manner as described at [2]. However, those patches were reverted starting with [3] due to locking issues. To effectively use i_mmap_rwsem to address the above issues it needs to be held (in read mode) during page fault processing. However, during fault processing we need to lock the page we will be adding. Lock ordering requires we take page lock before i_mmap_rwsem. Waiting until after taking the page lock is too late in the fault process for the synchronization we want to do. To address this lock ordering issue, the following patches change the lock ordering for hugetlb pages. This is not too invasive as hugetlbfs processing is done separate from core mm in many places. However, I don't really like this idea. Much ugliness is contained in the new routine hugetlb_page_mapping_lock_write() of patch 1. The only other way I can think of to address these issues is by catching all the races. After catching a race, cleanup, backout, retry ... etc, as needed. This can get really ugly, especially for huge page reservations. At one time, I started writing some of the reservation backout code for page faults and it got so ugly and complicated I went down the path of adding synchronization to avoid the races. Any other suggestions would be welcome. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/1582342427-230392-1-git-send-email-longpeng2@huawei.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20181222223013.22193-1-mike.kravetz@oracle.com/ [3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190103235452.29335-1-mike.kravetz@oracle.com [4] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/1584028670.7365.182.camel@lca.pw/ [5] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200312183142.108df9ac@canb.auug.org.au/ This patch (of 2): While looking at BUGs associated with invalid huge page map counts, it was discovered and observed that a huge pte pointer could become 'invalid' and point to another task's page table. Consider the following: A task takes a page fault on a shared hugetlbfs file and calls huge_pte_alloc to get a ptep. Suppose the returned ptep points to a shared pmd. Now, another task truncates the hugetlbfs file. As part of truncation, it unmaps everyone who has the file mapped. If the range being truncated is covered by a shared pmd, huge_pmd_unshare will be called. For all but the last user of the shared pmd, huge_pmd_unshare will clear the pud pointing to the pmd. If the task in the middle of the page fault is not the last user, the ptep returned by huge_pte_alloc now points to another task's page table or worse. This leads to bad things such as incorrect page map/reference counts or invalid memory references. To fix, expand the use of i_mmap_rwsem as follows: - i_mmap_rwsem is held in read mode whenever huge_pmd_share is called. huge_pmd_share is only called via huge_pte_alloc, so callers of huge_pte_alloc take i_mmap_rwsem before calling. In addition, callers of huge_pte_alloc continue to hold the semaphore until finished with the ptep. - i_mmap_rwsem is held in write mode whenever huge_pmd_unshare is called. One problem with this scheme is that it requires taking i_mmap_rwsem before taking the page lock during page faults. This is not the order specified in the rest of mm code. Handling of hugetlbfs pages is mostly isolated today. Therefore, we use this alternative locking order for PageHuge() pages. mapping->i_mmap_rwsem hugetlb_fault_mutex (hugetlbfs specific page fault mutex) page->flags PG_locked (lock_page) To help with lock ordering issues, hugetlb_page_mapping_lock_write() is introduced to write lock the i_mmap_rwsem associated with a page. In most cases it is easy to get address_space via vma->vm_file->f_mapping. However, in the case of migration or memory errors for anon pages we do not have an associated vma. A new routine _get_hugetlb_page_mapping() will use anon_vma to get address_space in these cases. Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K . V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Prakash Sangappa <prakash.sangappa@oracle.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200316205756.146666-2-mike.kravetz@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-04-02 04:11:05 +00:00
} else {
Folio changes for 5.18 - Rewrite how munlock works to massively reduce the contention on i_mmap_rwsem (Hugh Dickins): https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/8e4356d-9622-a7f0-b2c-f116b5f2efea@google.com/ - Sort out the page refcount mess for ZONE_DEVICE pages (Christoph Hellwig): https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20220210072828.2930359-1-hch@lst.de/ - Convert GUP to use folios and make pincount available for order-1 pages. (Matthew Wilcox) - Convert a few more truncation functions to use folios (Matthew Wilcox) - Convert page_vma_mapped_walk to use PFNs instead of pages (Matthew Wilcox) - Convert rmap_walk to use folios (Matthew Wilcox) - Convert most of shrink_page_list() to use a folio (Matthew Wilcox) - Add support for creating large folios in readahead (Matthew Wilcox) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEzBAABCgAdFiEEejHryeLBw/spnjHrDpNsjXcpgj4FAmI4ucgACgkQDpNsjXcp gj69Wgf6AwqwmO5Tmy+fLScDPqWxmXJofbocae1kyoGHf7Ui91OK4U2j6IpvAr+g P/vLIK+JAAcTQcrSCjymuEkf4HkGZOR03QQn7maPIEe4eLrZRQDEsmHC1L9gpeJp s/GMvDWiGE0Tnxu0EOzfVi/yT+qjIl/S8VvqtCoJv1HdzxitZ7+1RDuqImaMC5MM Qi3uHag78vLmCltLXpIOdpgZhdZexCdL2Y/1npf+b6FVkAJRRNUnA0gRbS7YpoVp CbxEJcmAl9cpJLuj5i5kIfS9trr+/QcvbUlzRxh4ggC58iqnmF2V09l2MJ7YU3XL v1O/Elq4lRhXninZFQEm9zjrri7LDQ== =n9Ad -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'folio-5.18c' of git://git.infradead.org/users/willy/pagecache Pull folio updates from Matthew Wilcox: - Rewrite how munlock works to massively reduce the contention on i_mmap_rwsem (Hugh Dickins): https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/8e4356d-9622-a7f0-b2c-f116b5f2efea@google.com/ - Sort out the page refcount mess for ZONE_DEVICE pages (Christoph Hellwig): https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20220210072828.2930359-1-hch@lst.de/ - Convert GUP to use folios and make pincount available for order-1 pages. (Matthew Wilcox) - Convert a few more truncation functions to use folios (Matthew Wilcox) - Convert page_vma_mapped_walk to use PFNs instead of pages (Matthew Wilcox) - Convert rmap_walk to use folios (Matthew Wilcox) - Convert most of shrink_page_list() to use a folio (Matthew Wilcox) - Add support for creating large folios in readahead (Matthew Wilcox) * tag 'folio-5.18c' of git://git.infradead.org/users/willy/pagecache: (114 commits) mm/damon: minor cleanup for damon_pa_young selftests/vm/transhuge-stress: Support file-backed PMD folios mm/filemap: Support VM_HUGEPAGE for file mappings mm/readahead: Switch to page_cache_ra_order mm/readahead: Align file mappings for non-DAX mm/readahead: Add large folio readahead mm: Support arbitrary THP sizes mm: Make large folios depend on THP mm: Fix READ_ONLY_THP warning mm/filemap: Allow large folios to be added to the page cache mm: Turn can_split_huge_page() into can_split_folio() mm/vmscan: Convert pageout() to take a folio mm/vmscan: Turn page_check_references() into folio_check_references() mm/vmscan: Account large folios correctly mm/vmscan: Optimise shrink_page_list for non-PMD-sized folios mm/vmscan: Free non-shmem folios without splitting them mm/rmap: Constify the rmap_walk_control argument mm/rmap: Convert rmap_walk() to take a folio mm: Turn page_anon_vma() into folio_anon_vma() mm/rmap: Turn page_lock_anon_vma_read() into folio_lock_anon_vma_read() ...
2022-03-23 00:03:12 +00:00
try_to_unmap(folio, ttu);
hugetlbfs: use i_mmap_rwsem for more pmd sharing synchronization Patch series "hugetlbfs: use i_mmap_rwsem for more synchronization", v2. While discussing the issue with huge_pte_offset [1], I remembered that there were more outstanding hugetlb races. These issues are: 1) For shared pmds, huge PTE pointers returned by huge_pte_alloc can become invalid via a call to huge_pmd_unshare by another thread. 2) hugetlbfs page faults can race with truncation causing invalid global reserve counts and state. A previous attempt was made to use i_mmap_rwsem in this manner as described at [2]. However, those patches were reverted starting with [3] due to locking issues. To effectively use i_mmap_rwsem to address the above issues it needs to be held (in read mode) during page fault processing. However, during fault processing we need to lock the page we will be adding. Lock ordering requires we take page lock before i_mmap_rwsem. Waiting until after taking the page lock is too late in the fault process for the synchronization we want to do. To address this lock ordering issue, the following patches change the lock ordering for hugetlb pages. This is not too invasive as hugetlbfs processing is done separate from core mm in many places. However, I don't really like this idea. Much ugliness is contained in the new routine hugetlb_page_mapping_lock_write() of patch 1. The only other way I can think of to address these issues is by catching all the races. After catching a race, cleanup, backout, retry ... etc, as needed. This can get really ugly, especially for huge page reservations. At one time, I started writing some of the reservation backout code for page faults and it got so ugly and complicated I went down the path of adding synchronization to avoid the races. Any other suggestions would be welcome. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/1582342427-230392-1-git-send-email-longpeng2@huawei.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20181222223013.22193-1-mike.kravetz@oracle.com/ [3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190103235452.29335-1-mike.kravetz@oracle.com [4] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/1584028670.7365.182.camel@lca.pw/ [5] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200312183142.108df9ac@canb.auug.org.au/ This patch (of 2): While looking at BUGs associated with invalid huge page map counts, it was discovered and observed that a huge pte pointer could become 'invalid' and point to another task's page table. Consider the following: A task takes a page fault on a shared hugetlbfs file and calls huge_pte_alloc to get a ptep. Suppose the returned ptep points to a shared pmd. Now, another task truncates the hugetlbfs file. As part of truncation, it unmaps everyone who has the file mapped. If the range being truncated is covered by a shared pmd, huge_pmd_unshare will be called. For all but the last user of the shared pmd, huge_pmd_unshare will clear the pud pointing to the pmd. If the task in the middle of the page fault is not the last user, the ptep returned by huge_pte_alloc now points to another task's page table or worse. This leads to bad things such as incorrect page map/reference counts or invalid memory references. To fix, expand the use of i_mmap_rwsem as follows: - i_mmap_rwsem is held in read mode whenever huge_pmd_share is called. huge_pmd_share is only called via huge_pte_alloc, so callers of huge_pte_alloc take i_mmap_rwsem before calling. In addition, callers of huge_pte_alloc continue to hold the semaphore until finished with the ptep. - i_mmap_rwsem is held in write mode whenever huge_pmd_unshare is called. One problem with this scheme is that it requires taking i_mmap_rwsem before taking the page lock during page faults. This is not the order specified in the rest of mm code. Handling of hugetlbfs pages is mostly isolated today. Therefore, we use this alternative locking order for PageHuge() pages. mapping->i_mmap_rwsem hugetlb_fault_mutex (hugetlbfs specific page fault mutex) page->flags PG_locked (lock_page) To help with lock ordering issues, hugetlb_page_mapping_lock_write() is introduced to write lock the i_mmap_rwsem associated with a page. In most cases it is easy to get address_space via vma->vm_file->f_mapping. However, in the case of migration or memory errors for anon pages we do not have an associated vma. A new routine _get_hugetlb_page_mapping() will use anon_vma to get address_space in these cases. Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K . V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Prakash Sangappa <prakash.sangappa@oracle.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200316205756.146666-2-mike.kravetz@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-04-02 04:11:05 +00:00
}
unmap_success = !page_mapped(hpage);
if (!unmap_success)
pr_err("Memory failure: %#lx: failed to unmap page (mapcount=%d)\n",
pfn, page_mapcount(hpage));
/*
* try_to_unmap() might put mlocked page in lru cache, so call
* shake_page() again to ensure that it's flushed.
*/
if (mlocked)
mm: hwpoison: don't drop slab caches for offlining non-LRU page In the current implementation of soft offline, if non-LRU page is met, all the slab caches will be dropped to free the page then offline. But if the page is not slab page all the effort is wasted in vain. Even though it is a slab page, it is not guaranteed the page could be freed at all. However the side effect and cost is quite high. It does not only drop the slab caches, but also may drop a significant amount of page caches which are associated with inode caches. It could make the most workingset gone in order to just offline a page. And the offline is not guaranteed to succeed at all, actually I really doubt the success rate for real life workload. Furthermore the worse consequence is the system may be locked up and unusable since the page cache release may incur huge amount of works queued for memcg release. Actually we ran into such unpleasant case in our production environment. Firstly, the workqueue of memory_failure_work_func is locked up as below: BUG: workqueue lockup - pool cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 stuck for 53s! Showing busy workqueues and worker pools: workqueue events: flags=0x0 pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=14/256 refcnt=15 in-flight: 409271:memory_failure_work_func pending: kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_monitor, kfree_rcu_work, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, drain_local_stock, kfree_rcu_work workqueue mm_percpu_wq: flags=0x8 pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256 refcnt=2 pending: vmstat_update workqueue cgroup_destroy: flags=0x0 pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/1 refcnt=12072 pending: css_release_work_fn There were over 12K css_release_work_fn queued, and this caused a few lockups due to the contention of worker pool lock with IRQ disabled, for example: NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 1 Modules linked in: amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel xt_DSCP iptable_mangle kvm_amd bpfilter vfat fat acpi_ipmi i2c_piix4 usb_storage ipmi_si k10temp i2c_core ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_cpufreq sch_fq_codel xfs libcrc32c crc32c_intel mlx5_core mlxfw nvme xhci_pci ptp nvme_core pps_core xhci_hcd CPU: 1 PID: 205500 Comm: kworker/1:0 Tainted: G L 5.10.32-t1.el7.twitter.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: TYAN F5AMT /z /S8026GM2NRE-CGN, BIOS V8.030 03/30/2021 Workqueue: events memory_failure_work_func RIP: 0010:queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x41/0x1a0 Code: 41 f0 0f ba 2f 08 0f 92 c0 0f b6 c0 c1 e0 08 89 c2 8b 07 30 e4 09 d0 a9 00 01 ff ff 75 1b 85 c0 74 0e 8b 07 84 c0 74 08 f3 90 <8b> 07 84 c0 75 f8 b8 01 00 00 00 66 89 07 c3 f6 c4 01 75 04 c6 47 RSP: 0018:ffff9b2ac278f900 EFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: 0000000000480101 RBX: ffff8ce98ce71800 RCX: 0000000000000084 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ce98ce6a140 RBP: 00000000000284c8 R08: ffffd7248dcb6808 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff9b2ac278f9b0 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffff8cb44dab9c00 R14: ffffffffbd1ce6a0 R15: ffff8cacaa37f068 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ce98ce40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fcf6e8cb000 CR3: 0000000a0c60a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 Call Trace: __queue_work+0xd6/0x3c0 queue_work_on+0x1c/0x30 uncharge_batch+0x10e/0x110 mem_cgroup_uncharge_list+0x6d/0x80 release_pages+0x37f/0x3f0 __pagevec_release+0x1c/0x50 __invalidate_mapping_pages+0x348/0x380 inode_lru_isolate+0x10a/0x160 __list_lru_walk_one+0x7b/0x170 list_lru_walk_one+0x4a/0x60 prune_icache_sb+0x37/0x50 super_cache_scan+0x123/0x1a0 do_shrink_slab+0x10c/0x2c0 shrink_slab+0x1f1/0x290 drop_slab_node+0x4d/0x70 soft_offline_page+0x1ac/0x5b0 memory_failure_work_func+0x6a/0x90 process_one_work+0x19e/0x340 worker_thread+0x30/0x360 kthread+0x116/0x130 The lockup made the machine is quite unusable. And it also made the most workingset gone, the reclaimabled slab caches were reduced from 12G to 300MB, the page caches were decreased from 17G to 4G. But the most disappointing thing is all the effort doesn't make the page offline, it just returns: soft_offline: 0x1469f2: unknown non LRU page type 5ffff0000000000 () It seems the aggressive behavior for non-LRU page didn't pay back, so it doesn't make too much sense to keep it considering the terrible side effect. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210819054116.266126-1-shy828301@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Reported-by: David Mackey <tdmackey@twitter.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-02 21:58:31 +00:00
shake_page(hpage);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
/*
* Now that the dirty bit has been propagated to the
* struct page and all unmaps done we can decide if
* killing is needed or not. Only kill when the page
* was dirty or the process is not restartable,
* otherwise the tokill list is merely
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
* freed. When there was a problem unmapping earlier
* use a more force-full uncatchable kill to prevent
* any accesses to the poisoned memory.
*/
forcekill = PageDirty(hpage) || (flags & MF_MUST_KILL);
kill_procs(&tokill, forcekill, !unmap_success, pfn, flags);
return unmap_success;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
static int identify_page_state(unsigned long pfn, struct page *p,
unsigned long page_flags)
{
struct page_state *ps;
/*
* The first check uses the current page flags which may not have any
* relevant information. The second check with the saved page flags is
* carried out only if the first check can't determine the page status.
*/
for (ps = error_states;; ps++)
if ((p->flags & ps->mask) == ps->res)
break;
page_flags |= (p->flags & (1UL << PG_dirty));
if (!ps->mask)
for (ps = error_states;; ps++)
if ((page_flags & ps->mask) == ps->res)
break;
return page_action(ps, p, pfn);
}
static int try_to_split_thp_page(struct page *page, const char *msg)
{
lock_page(page);
if (unlikely(split_huge_page(page))) {
unsigned long pfn = page_to_pfn(page);
unlock_page(page);
pr_info("%s: %#lx: thp split failed\n", msg, pfn);
put_page(page);
return -EBUSY;
}
unlock_page(page);
return 0;
}
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb() There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page. The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another (more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results like consuming corrupted data. Think about the below race window: CPU 1 CPU 2 memory_failure_hugetlb struct page *head = compound_head(p); hugetlb page might be freed to buddy, or even changed to another compound page. get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now... The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated, so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range. A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-21 23:35:33 +00:00
/*
* Called from hugetlb code with hugetlb_lock held.
*
* Return values:
* 0 - free hugepage
* 1 - in-use hugepage
* 2 - not a hugepage
* -EBUSY - the hugepage is busy (try to retry)
* -EHWPOISON - the hugepage is already hwpoisoned
*/
int __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(unsigned long pfn, int flags)
{
struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
struct page *head = compound_head(page);
int ret = 2; /* fallback to normal page handling */
bool count_increased = false;
if (!PageHeadHuge(head))
goto out;
if (flags & MF_COUNT_INCREASED) {
ret = 1;
count_increased = true;
} else if (HPageFreed(head)) {
ret = 0;
} else if (HPageMigratable(head)) {
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb() There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page. The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another (more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results like consuming corrupted data. Think about the below race window: CPU 1 CPU 2 memory_failure_hugetlb struct page *head = compound_head(p); hugetlb page might be freed to buddy, or even changed to another compound page. get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now... The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated, so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range. A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-21 23:35:33 +00:00
ret = get_page_unless_zero(head);
if (ret)
count_increased = true;
} else {
ret = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
if (TestSetPageHWPoison(head)) {
ret = -EHWPOISON;
goto out;
}
return ret;
out:
if (count_increased)
put_page(head);
return ret;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE
/*
* Taking refcount of hugetlb pages needs extra care about race conditions
* with basic operations like hugepage allocation/free/demotion.
* So some of prechecks for hwpoison (pinning, and testing/setting
* PageHWPoison) should be done in single hugetlb_lock range.
*/
static int try_memory_failure_hugetlb(unsigned long pfn, int flags, int *hugetlb)
{
int res;
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb() There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page. The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another (more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results like consuming corrupted data. Think about the below race window: CPU 1 CPU 2 memory_failure_hugetlb struct page *head = compound_head(p); hugetlb page might be freed to buddy, or even changed to another compound page. get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now... The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated, so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range. A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-21 23:35:33 +00:00
struct page *p = pfn_to_page(pfn);
struct page *head;
unsigned long page_flags;
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb() There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page. The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another (more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results like consuming corrupted data. Think about the below race window: CPU 1 CPU 2 memory_failure_hugetlb struct page *head = compound_head(p); hugetlb page might be freed to buddy, or even changed to another compound page. get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now... The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated, so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range. A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-21 23:35:33 +00:00
bool retry = true;
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb() There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page. The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another (more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results like consuming corrupted data. Think about the below race window: CPU 1 CPU 2 memory_failure_hugetlb struct page *head = compound_head(p); hugetlb page might be freed to buddy, or even changed to another compound page. get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now... The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated, so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range. A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-21 23:35:33 +00:00
*hugetlb = 1;
retry:
res = get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(pfn, flags);
if (res == 2) { /* fallback to normal page handling */
*hugetlb = 0;
return 0;
} else if (res == -EHWPOISON) {
pr_err("Memory failure: %#lx: already hardware poisoned\n", pfn);
if (flags & MF_ACTION_REQUIRED) {
head = compound_head(p);
res = kill_accessing_process(current, page_to_pfn(head), flags);
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb() There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page. The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another (more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results like consuming corrupted data. Think about the below race window: CPU 1 CPU 2 memory_failure_hugetlb struct page *head = compound_head(p); hugetlb page might be freed to buddy, or even changed to another compound page. get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now... The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated, so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range. A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-21 23:35:33 +00:00
}
return res;
} else if (res == -EBUSY) {
if (retry) {
retry = false;
goto retry;
}
action_result(pfn, MF_MSG_UNKNOWN, MF_IGNORED);
return res;
}
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb() There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page. The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another (more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results like consuming corrupted data. Think about the below race window: CPU 1 CPU 2 memory_failure_hugetlb struct page *head = compound_head(p); hugetlb page might be freed to buddy, or even changed to another compound page. get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now... The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated, so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range. A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-21 23:35:33 +00:00
head = compound_head(p);
lock_page(head);
if (hwpoison_filter(p)) {
ClearPageHWPoison(head);
res = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
/*
* Handling free hugepage. The possible race with hugepage allocation
* or demotion can be prevented by PageHWPoison flag.
*/
if (res == 0) {
unlock_page(head);
res = MF_FAILED;
if (__page_handle_poison(p)) {
page_ref_inc(p);
res = MF_RECOVERED;
}
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb() There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page. The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another (more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results like consuming corrupted data. Think about the below race window: CPU 1 CPU 2 memory_failure_hugetlb struct page *head = compound_head(p); hugetlb page might be freed to buddy, or even changed to another compound page. get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now... The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated, so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range. A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-21 23:35:33 +00:00
action_result(pfn, MF_MSG_FREE_HUGE, res);
return res == MF_RECOVERED ? 0 : -EBUSY;
}
page_flags = head->flags;
mm: hwpoison: disable memory error handling on 1GB hugepage Recently the following BUG was reported: Injecting memory failure for pfn 0x3c0000 at process virtual address 0x7fe300000000 Memory failure: 0x3c0000: recovery action for huge page: Recovered BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff8dfcc0003000 IP: gup_pgd_range+0x1f0/0xc20 PGD 17ae72067 P4D 17ae72067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI ... CPU: 3 PID: 5467 Comm: hugetlb_1gb Not tainted 4.15.0-rc8-mm1-abc+ #3 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.9.3-1.fc25 04/01/2014 You can easily reproduce this by calling madvise(MADV_HWPOISON) twice on a 1GB hugepage. This happens because get_user_pages_fast() is not aware of a migration entry on pud that was created in the 1st madvise() event. I think that conversion to pud-aligned migration entry is working, but other MM code walking over page table isn't prepared for it. We need some time and effort to make all this work properly, so this patch avoids the reported bug by just disabling error handling for 1GB hugepage. [n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com: v2] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517284444-18149-1-git-send-email-n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1517207283-15769-1-git-send-email-n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Acked-by: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@arm.com> Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-04-05 23:23:05 +00:00
/*
* TODO: hwpoison for pud-sized hugetlb doesn't work right now, so
* simply disable it. In order to make it work properly, we need
* make sure that:
* - conversion of a pud that maps an error hugetlb into hwpoison
* entry properly works, and
* - other mm code walking over page table is aware of pud-aligned
* hwpoison entries.
*/
if (huge_page_size(page_hstate(head)) > PMD_SIZE) {
action_result(pfn, MF_MSG_NON_PMD_HUGE, MF_IGNORED);
res = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
if (!hwpoison_user_mappings(p, pfn, flags, head)) {
action_result(pfn, MF_MSG_UNMAP_FAILED, MF_IGNORED);
res = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
return identify_page_state(pfn, p, page_flags);
out:
unlock_page(head);
return res;
}
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb() There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page. The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another (more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results like consuming corrupted data. Think about the below race window: CPU 1 CPU 2 memory_failure_hugetlb struct page *head = compound_head(p); hugetlb page might be freed to buddy, or even changed to another compound page. get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now... The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated, so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range. A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-21 23:35:33 +00:00
#else
static inline int try_memory_failure_hugetlb(unsigned long pfn, int flags, int *hugetlb)
{
return 0;
}
#endif
mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at af34214200 {1}[Hardware Error]: It has been corrected by h/w and requires no further action mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged {1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: corrected Memory failure: 0xaf34214: reserved kernel page still referenced by 1 users [..] Memory failure: 0xaf34214: recovery action for reserved kernel page: Failed mce: Memory error not recovered In contrast to typical memory, dev_pagemap pages may be dax mapped. With dax there is no possibility to map in another page dynamically since dax establishes 1:1 physical address to file offset associations. Also dev_pagemap pages associated with NVDIMM / persistent memory devices can internal remap/repair addresses with poison. While memory_failure() assumes that it can discard typical poisoned pages and keep them unmapped indefinitely, dev_pagemap pages may be returned to service after the error is cleared. Teach memory_failure() to detect and handle MEMORY_DEVICE_HOST dev_pagemap pages that have poison consumed by userspace. Mark the memory as UC instead of unmapping it completely to allow ongoing access via the device driver (nd_pmem). Later, nd_pmem will grow support for marking the page back to WB when the error is cleared. Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
2018-07-14 04:50:21 +00:00
static int memory_failure_dev_pagemap(unsigned long pfn, int flags,
struct dev_pagemap *pgmap)
{
struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
unsigned long size = 0;
struct to_kill *tk;
LIST_HEAD(tokill);
int rc = -EBUSY;
loff_t start;
dax: Fix unlock mismatch with updated API Internal to dax_unlock_mapping_entry(), dax_unlock_entry() is used to store a replacement entry in the Xarray at the given xas-index with the DAX_LOCKED bit clear. When called, dax_unlock_entry() expects the unlocked value of the entry relative to the current Xarray state to be specified. In most contexts dax_unlock_entry() is operating in the same scope as the matched dax_lock_entry(). However, in the dax_unlock_mapping_entry() case the implementation needs to recall the original entry. In the case where the original entry is a 'pmd' entry it is possible that the pfn performed to do the lookup is misaligned to the value retrieved in the Xarray. Change the api to return the unlock cookie from dax_lock_page() and pass it to dax_unlock_page(). This fixes a bug where dax_unlock_page() was assuming that the page was PMD-aligned if the entry was a PMD entry with signatures like: WARNING: CPU: 38 PID: 1396 at fs/dax.c:340 dax_insert_entry+0x2b2/0x2d0 RIP: 0010:dax_insert_entry+0x2b2/0x2d0 [..] Call Trace: dax_iomap_pte_fault.isra.41+0x791/0xde0 ext4_dax_huge_fault+0x16f/0x1f0 ? up_read+0x1c/0xa0 __do_fault+0x1f/0x160 __handle_mm_fault+0x1033/0x1490 handle_mm_fault+0x18b/0x3d0 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181130154902.GL10377@bombadil.infradead.org Fixes: 9f32d221301c ("dax: Convert dax_lock_mapping_entry to XArray") Reported-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Tested-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2018-11-30 16:05:06 +00:00
dax_entry_t cookie;
mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at af34214200 {1}[Hardware Error]: It has been corrected by h/w and requires no further action mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged {1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: corrected Memory failure: 0xaf34214: reserved kernel page still referenced by 1 users [..] Memory failure: 0xaf34214: recovery action for reserved kernel page: Failed mce: Memory error not recovered In contrast to typical memory, dev_pagemap pages may be dax mapped. With dax there is no possibility to map in another page dynamically since dax establishes 1:1 physical address to file offset associations. Also dev_pagemap pages associated with NVDIMM / persistent memory devices can internal remap/repair addresses with poison. While memory_failure() assumes that it can discard typical poisoned pages and keep them unmapped indefinitely, dev_pagemap pages may be returned to service after the error is cleared. Teach memory_failure() to detect and handle MEMORY_DEVICE_HOST dev_pagemap pages that have poison consumed by userspace. Mark the memory as UC instead of unmapping it completely to allow ongoing access via the device driver (nd_pmem). Later, nd_pmem will grow support for marking the page back to WB when the error is cleared. Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
2018-07-14 04:50:21 +00:00
mm,memory_failure: always pin the page in madvise_inject_error madvise_inject_error() uses get_user_pages_fast to translate the address we specified to a page. After [1], we drop the extra reference count for memory_failure() path. That commit says that memory_failure wanted to keep the pin in order to take the page out of circulation. The truth is that we need to keep the page pinned, otherwise the page might be re-used after the put_page() and we can end up messing with someone else's memory. E.g: CPU0 process X CPU1 madvise_inject_error get_user_pages put_page page gets reclaimed process Y allocates the page memory_failure // We mess with process Y memory madvise() is meant to operate on a self address space, so messing with pages that do not belong to us seems the wrong thing to do. To avoid that, let us keep the page pinned for memory_failure as well. Pages for DAX mappings will release this extra refcount in memory_failure_dev_pagemap. [1] ("23e7b5c2e271: mm, madvise_inject_error: Let memory_failure() optionally take a page reference") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201207094818.8518-1-osalvador@suse.de Fixes: 23e7b5c2e271 ("mm, madvise_inject_error: Let memory_failure() optionally take a page reference") Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 03:11:48 +00:00
if (flags & MF_COUNT_INCREASED)
/*
* Drop the extra refcount in case we come from madvise().
*/
put_page(page);
/* device metadata space is not recoverable */
if (!pgmap_pfn_valid(pgmap, pfn)) {
rc = -ENXIO;
goto out;
}
/*
* Pages instantiated by device-dax (not filesystem-dax)
* may be compound pages.
*/
page = compound_head(page);
mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at af34214200 {1}[Hardware Error]: It has been corrected by h/w and requires no further action mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged {1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: corrected Memory failure: 0xaf34214: reserved kernel page still referenced by 1 users [..] Memory failure: 0xaf34214: recovery action for reserved kernel page: Failed mce: Memory error not recovered In contrast to typical memory, dev_pagemap pages may be dax mapped. With dax there is no possibility to map in another page dynamically since dax establishes 1:1 physical address to file offset associations. Also dev_pagemap pages associated with NVDIMM / persistent memory devices can internal remap/repair addresses with poison. While memory_failure() assumes that it can discard typical poisoned pages and keep them unmapped indefinitely, dev_pagemap pages may be returned to service after the error is cleared. Teach memory_failure() to detect and handle MEMORY_DEVICE_HOST dev_pagemap pages that have poison consumed by userspace. Mark the memory as UC instead of unmapping it completely to allow ongoing access via the device driver (nd_pmem). Later, nd_pmem will grow support for marking the page back to WB when the error is cleared. Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
2018-07-14 04:50:21 +00:00
/*
* Prevent the inode from being freed while we are interrogating
* the address_space, typically this would be handled by
* lock_page(), but dax pages do not use the page lock. This
* also prevents changes to the mapping of this pfn until
* poison signaling is complete.
*/
dax: Fix unlock mismatch with updated API Internal to dax_unlock_mapping_entry(), dax_unlock_entry() is used to store a replacement entry in the Xarray at the given xas-index with the DAX_LOCKED bit clear. When called, dax_unlock_entry() expects the unlocked value of the entry relative to the current Xarray state to be specified. In most contexts dax_unlock_entry() is operating in the same scope as the matched dax_lock_entry(). However, in the dax_unlock_mapping_entry() case the implementation needs to recall the original entry. In the case where the original entry is a 'pmd' entry it is possible that the pfn performed to do the lookup is misaligned to the value retrieved in the Xarray. Change the api to return the unlock cookie from dax_lock_page() and pass it to dax_unlock_page(). This fixes a bug where dax_unlock_page() was assuming that the page was PMD-aligned if the entry was a PMD entry with signatures like: WARNING: CPU: 38 PID: 1396 at fs/dax.c:340 dax_insert_entry+0x2b2/0x2d0 RIP: 0010:dax_insert_entry+0x2b2/0x2d0 [..] Call Trace: dax_iomap_pte_fault.isra.41+0x791/0xde0 ext4_dax_huge_fault+0x16f/0x1f0 ? up_read+0x1c/0xa0 __do_fault+0x1f/0x160 __handle_mm_fault+0x1033/0x1490 handle_mm_fault+0x18b/0x3d0 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181130154902.GL10377@bombadil.infradead.org Fixes: 9f32d221301c ("dax: Convert dax_lock_mapping_entry to XArray") Reported-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Tested-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2018-11-30 16:05:06 +00:00
cookie = dax_lock_page(page);
if (!cookie)
mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at af34214200 {1}[Hardware Error]: It has been corrected by h/w and requires no further action mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged {1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: corrected Memory failure: 0xaf34214: reserved kernel page still referenced by 1 users [..] Memory failure: 0xaf34214: recovery action for reserved kernel page: Failed mce: Memory error not recovered In contrast to typical memory, dev_pagemap pages may be dax mapped. With dax there is no possibility to map in another page dynamically since dax establishes 1:1 physical address to file offset associations. Also dev_pagemap pages associated with NVDIMM / persistent memory devices can internal remap/repair addresses with poison. While memory_failure() assumes that it can discard typical poisoned pages and keep them unmapped indefinitely, dev_pagemap pages may be returned to service after the error is cleared. Teach memory_failure() to detect and handle MEMORY_DEVICE_HOST dev_pagemap pages that have poison consumed by userspace. Mark the memory as UC instead of unmapping it completely to allow ongoing access via the device driver (nd_pmem). Later, nd_pmem will grow support for marking the page back to WB when the error is cleared. Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
2018-07-14 04:50:21 +00:00
goto out;
if (hwpoison_filter(page)) {
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at af34214200 {1}[Hardware Error]: It has been corrected by h/w and requires no further action mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged {1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: corrected Memory failure: 0xaf34214: reserved kernel page still referenced by 1 users [..] Memory failure: 0xaf34214: recovery action for reserved kernel page: Failed mce: Memory error not recovered In contrast to typical memory, dev_pagemap pages may be dax mapped. With dax there is no possibility to map in another page dynamically since dax establishes 1:1 physical address to file offset associations. Also dev_pagemap pages associated with NVDIMM / persistent memory devices can internal remap/repair addresses with poison. While memory_failure() assumes that it can discard typical poisoned pages and keep them unmapped indefinitely, dev_pagemap pages may be returned to service after the error is cleared. Teach memory_failure() to detect and handle MEMORY_DEVICE_HOST dev_pagemap pages that have poison consumed by userspace. Mark the memory as UC instead of unmapping it completely to allow ongoing access via the device driver (nd_pmem). Later, nd_pmem will grow support for marking the page back to WB when the error is cleared. Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
2018-07-14 04:50:21 +00:00
goto unlock;
}
if (pgmap->type == MEMORY_DEVICE_PRIVATE) {
mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at af34214200 {1}[Hardware Error]: It has been corrected by h/w and requires no further action mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged {1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: corrected Memory failure: 0xaf34214: reserved kernel page still referenced by 1 users [..] Memory failure: 0xaf34214: recovery action for reserved kernel page: Failed mce: Memory error not recovered In contrast to typical memory, dev_pagemap pages may be dax mapped. With dax there is no possibility to map in another page dynamically since dax establishes 1:1 physical address to file offset associations. Also dev_pagemap pages associated with NVDIMM / persistent memory devices can internal remap/repair addresses with poison. While memory_failure() assumes that it can discard typical poisoned pages and keep them unmapped indefinitely, dev_pagemap pages may be returned to service after the error is cleared. Teach memory_failure() to detect and handle MEMORY_DEVICE_HOST dev_pagemap pages that have poison consumed by userspace. Mark the memory as UC instead of unmapping it completely to allow ongoing access via the device driver (nd_pmem). Later, nd_pmem will grow support for marking the page back to WB when the error is cleared. Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
2018-07-14 04:50:21 +00:00
/*
* TODO: Handle HMM pages which may need coordination
* with device-side memory.
*/
goto unlock;
}
/*
* Use this flag as an indication that the dax page has been
* remapped UC to prevent speculative consumption of poison.
*/
SetPageHWPoison(page);
/*
* Unlike System-RAM there is no possibility to swap in a
* different physical page at a given virtual address, so all
* userspace consumption of ZONE_DEVICE memory necessitates
* SIGBUS (i.e. MF_MUST_KILL)
*/
flags |= MF_ACTION_REQUIRED | MF_MUST_KILL;
collect_procs(page, &tokill, true);
mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at af34214200 {1}[Hardware Error]: It has been corrected by h/w and requires no further action mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged {1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: corrected Memory failure: 0xaf34214: reserved kernel page still referenced by 1 users [..] Memory failure: 0xaf34214: recovery action for reserved kernel page: Failed mce: Memory error not recovered In contrast to typical memory, dev_pagemap pages may be dax mapped. With dax there is no possibility to map in another page dynamically since dax establishes 1:1 physical address to file offset associations. Also dev_pagemap pages associated with NVDIMM / persistent memory devices can internal remap/repair addresses with poison. While memory_failure() assumes that it can discard typical poisoned pages and keep them unmapped indefinitely, dev_pagemap pages may be returned to service after the error is cleared. Teach memory_failure() to detect and handle MEMORY_DEVICE_HOST dev_pagemap pages that have poison consumed by userspace. Mark the memory as UC instead of unmapping it completely to allow ongoing access via the device driver (nd_pmem). Later, nd_pmem will grow support for marking the page back to WB when the error is cleared. Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
2018-07-14 04:50:21 +00:00
list_for_each_entry(tk, &tokill, nd)
if (tk->size_shift)
size = max(size, 1UL << tk->size_shift);
if (size) {
/*
* Unmap the largest mapping to avoid breaking up
* device-dax mappings which are constant size. The
* actual size of the mapping being torn down is
* communicated in siginfo, see kill_proc()
*/
start = (page->index << PAGE_SHIFT) & ~(size - 1);
unmap_mapping_range(page->mapping, start, size, 0);
mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at af34214200 {1}[Hardware Error]: It has been corrected by h/w and requires no further action mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged {1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: corrected Memory failure: 0xaf34214: reserved kernel page still referenced by 1 users [..] Memory failure: 0xaf34214: recovery action for reserved kernel page: Failed mce: Memory error not recovered In contrast to typical memory, dev_pagemap pages may be dax mapped. With dax there is no possibility to map in another page dynamically since dax establishes 1:1 physical address to file offset associations. Also dev_pagemap pages associated with NVDIMM / persistent memory devices can internal remap/repair addresses with poison. While memory_failure() assumes that it can discard typical poisoned pages and keep them unmapped indefinitely, dev_pagemap pages may be returned to service after the error is cleared. Teach memory_failure() to detect and handle MEMORY_DEVICE_HOST dev_pagemap pages that have poison consumed by userspace. Mark the memory as UC instead of unmapping it completely to allow ongoing access via the device driver (nd_pmem). Later, nd_pmem will grow support for marking the page back to WB when the error is cleared. Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
2018-07-14 04:50:21 +00:00
}
kill_procs(&tokill, true, false, pfn, flags);
mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at af34214200 {1}[Hardware Error]: It has been corrected by h/w and requires no further action mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged {1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: corrected Memory failure: 0xaf34214: reserved kernel page still referenced by 1 users [..] Memory failure: 0xaf34214: recovery action for reserved kernel page: Failed mce: Memory error not recovered In contrast to typical memory, dev_pagemap pages may be dax mapped. With dax there is no possibility to map in another page dynamically since dax establishes 1:1 physical address to file offset associations. Also dev_pagemap pages associated with NVDIMM / persistent memory devices can internal remap/repair addresses with poison. While memory_failure() assumes that it can discard typical poisoned pages and keep them unmapped indefinitely, dev_pagemap pages may be returned to service after the error is cleared. Teach memory_failure() to detect and handle MEMORY_DEVICE_HOST dev_pagemap pages that have poison consumed by userspace. Mark the memory as UC instead of unmapping it completely to allow ongoing access via the device driver (nd_pmem). Later, nd_pmem will grow support for marking the page back to WB when the error is cleared. Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
2018-07-14 04:50:21 +00:00
rc = 0;
unlock:
dax: Fix unlock mismatch with updated API Internal to dax_unlock_mapping_entry(), dax_unlock_entry() is used to store a replacement entry in the Xarray at the given xas-index with the DAX_LOCKED bit clear. When called, dax_unlock_entry() expects the unlocked value of the entry relative to the current Xarray state to be specified. In most contexts dax_unlock_entry() is operating in the same scope as the matched dax_lock_entry(). However, in the dax_unlock_mapping_entry() case the implementation needs to recall the original entry. In the case where the original entry is a 'pmd' entry it is possible that the pfn performed to do the lookup is misaligned to the value retrieved in the Xarray. Change the api to return the unlock cookie from dax_lock_page() and pass it to dax_unlock_page(). This fixes a bug where dax_unlock_page() was assuming that the page was PMD-aligned if the entry was a PMD entry with signatures like: WARNING: CPU: 38 PID: 1396 at fs/dax.c:340 dax_insert_entry+0x2b2/0x2d0 RIP: 0010:dax_insert_entry+0x2b2/0x2d0 [..] Call Trace: dax_iomap_pte_fault.isra.41+0x791/0xde0 ext4_dax_huge_fault+0x16f/0x1f0 ? up_read+0x1c/0xa0 __do_fault+0x1f/0x160 __handle_mm_fault+0x1033/0x1490 handle_mm_fault+0x18b/0x3d0 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181130154902.GL10377@bombadil.infradead.org Fixes: 9f32d221301c ("dax: Convert dax_lock_mapping_entry to XArray") Reported-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Tested-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2018-11-30 16:05:06 +00:00
dax_unlock_page(page, cookie);
mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at af34214200 {1}[Hardware Error]: It has been corrected by h/w and requires no further action mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged {1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: corrected Memory failure: 0xaf34214: reserved kernel page still referenced by 1 users [..] Memory failure: 0xaf34214: recovery action for reserved kernel page: Failed mce: Memory error not recovered In contrast to typical memory, dev_pagemap pages may be dax mapped. With dax there is no possibility to map in another page dynamically since dax establishes 1:1 physical address to file offset associations. Also dev_pagemap pages associated with NVDIMM / persistent memory devices can internal remap/repair addresses with poison. While memory_failure() assumes that it can discard typical poisoned pages and keep them unmapped indefinitely, dev_pagemap pages may be returned to service after the error is cleared. Teach memory_failure() to detect and handle MEMORY_DEVICE_HOST dev_pagemap pages that have poison consumed by userspace. Mark the memory as UC instead of unmapping it completely to allow ongoing access via the device driver (nd_pmem). Later, nd_pmem will grow support for marking the page back to WB when the error is cleared. Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
2018-07-14 04:50:21 +00:00
out:
/* drop pgmap ref acquired in caller */
put_dev_pagemap(pgmap);
action_result(pfn, MF_MSG_DAX, rc ? MF_FAILED : MF_RECOVERED);
return rc;
}
mm/hwpoison: mf_mutex for soft offline and unpoison Patch series "mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()", v4. The main purpose of this series is to sync unpoison code to recent changes around how hwpoison code takes page refcount. Unpoison should work or simply fail (without crash) if impossible. The recent works of keeping hwpoison pages in shmem pagecache introduce a new state of hwpoisoned pages, but unpoison for such pages is not supported yet with this series. It seems that soft-offline and unpoison can be used as general purpose page offline/online mechanism (not in the context of memory error). I think that we need some additional works to realize it because currently soft-offline and unpoison are assumed not to happen so frequently (print out too many messages for aggressive usecases). But anyway this could be another interesting next topic. v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210614021212.223326-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com/ v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211025230503.2650970-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211105055058.3152564-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ This patch (of 3): Originally mf_mutex is introduced to serialize multiple MCE events, but it is not that useful to allow unpoison to run in parallel with memory_failure() and soft offline. So apply mf_mutex to soft offline and unpoison. The memory failure handler and soft offline handler get simpler with this. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:02 +00:00
static DEFINE_MUTEX(mf_mutex);
/**
* memory_failure - Handle memory failure of a page.
* @pfn: Page Number of the corrupted page
* @flags: fine tune action taken
*
* This function is called by the low level machine check code
* of an architecture when it detects hardware memory corruption
* of a page. It tries its best to recover, which includes
* dropping pages, killing processes etc.
*
* The function is primarily of use for corruptions that
* happen outside the current execution context (e.g. when
* detected by a background scrubber)
*
* Must run in process context (e.g. a work queue) with interrupts
* enabled and no spinlocks hold.
*
* Return: 0 for successfully handled the memory error,
* -EOPNOTSUPP for hwpoison_filter() filtered the error event,
* < 0(except -EOPNOTSUPP) on failure.
*/
int memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int flags)
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
{
struct page *p;
struct page *hpage;
mm, memory_failure: Teach memory_failure() about dev_pagemap pages mce: Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at af34214200 {1}[Hardware Error]: It has been corrected by h/w and requires no further action mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged {1}[Hardware Error]: event severity: corrected Memory failure: 0xaf34214: reserved kernel page still referenced by 1 users [..] Memory failure: 0xaf34214: recovery action for reserved kernel page: Failed mce: Memory error not recovered In contrast to typical memory, dev_pagemap pages may be dax mapped. With dax there is no possibility to map in another page dynamically since dax establishes 1:1 physical address to file offset associations. Also dev_pagemap pages associated with NVDIMM / persistent memory devices can internal remap/repair addresses with poison. While memory_failure() assumes that it can discard typical poisoned pages and keep them unmapped indefinitely, dev_pagemap pages may be returned to service after the error is cleared. Teach memory_failure() to detect and handle MEMORY_DEVICE_HOST dev_pagemap pages that have poison consumed by userspace. Mark the memory as UC instead of unmapping it completely to allow ongoing access via the device driver (nd_pmem). Later, nd_pmem will grow support for marking the page back to WB when the error is cleared. Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
2018-07-14 04:50:21 +00:00
struct dev_pagemap *pgmap;
mm/memory-failure: use a mutex to avoid memory_failure() races Patch series "mm,hwpoison: fix sending SIGBUS for Action Required MCE", v5. I wrote this patchset to materialize what I think is the current allowable solution mentioned by the previous discussion [1]. I simply borrowed Tony's mutex patch and Aili's return code patch, then I queued another one to find error virtual address in the best effort manner. I know that this is not a perfect solution, but should work for some typical case. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210331192540.2141052f@alex-virtual-machine/ This patch (of 2): There can be races when multiple CPUs consume poison from the same page. The first into memory_failure() atomically sets the HWPoison page flag and begins hunting for tasks that map this page. Eventually it invalidates those mappings and may send a SIGBUS to the affected tasks. But while all that work is going on, other CPUs see a "success" return code from memory_failure() and so they believe the error has been handled and continue executing. Fix by wrapping most of the internal parts of memory_failure() in a mutex. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make mf_mutex local to memory_failure()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-2-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Aili Yao <yaoaili@kingsoft.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Jue Wang <juew@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-25 01:39:55 +00:00
int res = 0;
unsigned long page_flags;
mm,hwpoison: take free pages off the buddy freelists The crux of the matter is that historically we left poisoned pages in the buddy system because we have some checks in place when allocating a page that are gatekeeper for poisoned pages. Unfortunately, we do have other users (e.g: compaction [1]) that scan buddy freelists and try to get a page from there without checking whether the page is HWPoison. As I stated already, I think it is fundamentally wrong to keep HWPoison pages within the buddy systems, checks in place or not. Let us fix this the same way we did for soft_offline [2], taking the page off the buddy freelist so it is completely unreachable. Note that this is fairly simple to trigger, as we only need to poison free buddy pages (madvise MADV_HWPOISON) and then run some sort of memory stress system. Just for a matter of reference, I put a dump_page() in compaction_alloc() to trigger for HWPoison patches: page:0000000012b2982b refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x1d5db flags: 0xfffffc0800000(hwpoison) raw: 000fffffc0800000 ffffea00007573c8 ffffc90000857de0 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: compaction_alloc CPU: 4 PID: 123 Comm: kcompactd0 Tainted: G E 5.9.0-rc2-mm1-1-default+ #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.2-0-g5f4c7b1-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x6d/0x8b compaction_alloc+0xb2/0xc0 migrate_pages+0x2a6/0x12a0 compact_zone+0x5eb/0x11c0 proactive_compact_node+0x89/0xf0 kcompactd+0x2d0/0x3a0 kthread+0x118/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 After that, if e.g: a process faults in the page, it will get killed unexpectedly. Fix it by containing the page immediatelly. Besides that, two more changes can be noticed: * MF_DELAYED no longer suits as we are fixing the issue by containing the page immediately, so it does no longer rely on the allocation-time checks to stop HWPoison to be handed over. gain unless it is unpoisoned, so we fixed the situation. Because of that, let us use MF_RECOVERED from now on. * The second block that handles PageBuddy pages is no longer needed: We call shake_page and then check whether the page is Buddy because shake_page calls drain_all_pages, which sends pcp-pages back to the buddy freelists, so we could have a chance to handle free pages. Currently, get_hwpoison_page already calls drain_all_pages, and we call get_hwpoison_page right before coming here, so we should be on the safe side. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190826104144.GA7849@linux/T/#u [2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/11792607/ [osalvador@suse.de: take the poisoned subpage off the buddy frelists] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-4-osalvador@suse.de Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-3-osalvador@suse.de Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 03:11:32 +00:00
bool retry = true;
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb() There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page. The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another (more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results like consuming corrupted data. Think about the below race window: CPU 1 CPU 2 memory_failure_hugetlb struct page *head = compound_head(p); hugetlb page might be freed to buddy, or even changed to another compound page. get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now... The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated, so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range. A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-21 23:35:33 +00:00
int hugetlb = 0;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
if (!sysctl_memory_failure_recovery)
panic("Memory failure on page %lx", pfn);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
mutex_lock(&mf_mutex);
mm/memory-failure: disable unpoison once hw error happens Currently unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn) is designed for soft poison(hwpoison-inject) only. Since 17fae1294ad9d, the KPTE gets cleared on a x86 platform once hardware memory corrupts. Unpoisoning a hardware corrupted page puts page back buddy only, the kernel has a chance to access the page with *NOT PRESENT* KPTE. This leads BUG during accessing on the corrupted KPTE. Suggested by David&Naoya, disable unpoison mechanism when a real HW error happens to avoid BUG like this: Unpoison: Software-unpoisoned page 0x61234 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888061234000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 2c01067 P4D 2c01067 PUD 107267063 PMD 10382b063 PTE 800fffff9edcb062 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 4 PID: 26551 Comm: stress Kdump: loaded Tainted: G M OE 5.18.0.bm.1-amd64 #7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) ... RIP: 0010:clear_page_erms+0x7/0x10 Code: ... RSP: 0000:ffffc90001107bc8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000901 RCX: 0000000000001000 RDX: ffffea0001848d00 RSI: ffffea0001848d40 RDI: ffff888061234000 RBP: ffffea0001848d00 R08: 0000000000000901 R09: 0000000000001276 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000140dca R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007fd8b2333740(0000) GS:ffff88813fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff888061234000 CR3: 00000001023d2005 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> prep_new_page+0x151/0x170 get_page_from_freelist+0xca0/0xe20 ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xab/0xc0 ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20 __alloc_pages+0x17e/0x340 __folio_alloc+0x17/0x40 vma_alloc_folio+0x84/0x280 __handle_mm_fault+0x8d4/0xeb0 handle_mm_fault+0xd5/0x2a0 do_user_addr_fault+0x1d0/0x680 ? kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags+0x3b/0x50 exc_page_fault+0x78/0x170 asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220615093209.259374-2-pizhenwei@bytedance.com Fixes: 847ce401df392 ("HWPOISON: Add unpoisoning support") Fixes: 17fae1294ad9d ("x86/{mce,mm}: Unmap the entire page if the whole page is affected and poisoned") Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi <pizhenwei@bytedance.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-06-15 09:32:09 +00:00
if (!(flags & MF_SW_SIMULATED))
hw_memory_failure = true;
p = pfn_to_online_page(pfn);
if (!p) {
res = arch_memory_failure(pfn, flags);
if (res == 0)
goto unlock_mutex;
if (pfn_valid(pfn)) {
pgmap = get_dev_pagemap(pfn, NULL);
if (pgmap) {
res = memory_failure_dev_pagemap(pfn, flags,
pgmap);
goto unlock_mutex;
}
}
pr_err("Memory failure: %#lx: memory outside kernel control\n",
pfn);
res = -ENXIO;
goto unlock_mutex;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
mm,hwpoison: take free pages off the buddy freelists The crux of the matter is that historically we left poisoned pages in the buddy system because we have some checks in place when allocating a page that are gatekeeper for poisoned pages. Unfortunately, we do have other users (e.g: compaction [1]) that scan buddy freelists and try to get a page from there without checking whether the page is HWPoison. As I stated already, I think it is fundamentally wrong to keep HWPoison pages within the buddy systems, checks in place or not. Let us fix this the same way we did for soft_offline [2], taking the page off the buddy freelist so it is completely unreachable. Note that this is fairly simple to trigger, as we only need to poison free buddy pages (madvise MADV_HWPOISON) and then run some sort of memory stress system. Just for a matter of reference, I put a dump_page() in compaction_alloc() to trigger for HWPoison patches: page:0000000012b2982b refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x1d5db flags: 0xfffffc0800000(hwpoison) raw: 000fffffc0800000 ffffea00007573c8 ffffc90000857de0 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: compaction_alloc CPU: 4 PID: 123 Comm: kcompactd0 Tainted: G E 5.9.0-rc2-mm1-1-default+ #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.2-0-g5f4c7b1-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x6d/0x8b compaction_alloc+0xb2/0xc0 migrate_pages+0x2a6/0x12a0 compact_zone+0x5eb/0x11c0 proactive_compact_node+0x89/0xf0 kcompactd+0x2d0/0x3a0 kthread+0x118/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 After that, if e.g: a process faults in the page, it will get killed unexpectedly. Fix it by containing the page immediatelly. Besides that, two more changes can be noticed: * MF_DELAYED no longer suits as we are fixing the issue by containing the page immediately, so it does no longer rely on the allocation-time checks to stop HWPoison to be handed over. gain unless it is unpoisoned, so we fixed the situation. Because of that, let us use MF_RECOVERED from now on. * The second block that handles PageBuddy pages is no longer needed: We call shake_page and then check whether the page is Buddy because shake_page calls drain_all_pages, which sends pcp-pages back to the buddy freelists, so we could have a chance to handle free pages. Currently, get_hwpoison_page already calls drain_all_pages, and we call get_hwpoison_page right before coming here, so we should be on the safe side. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190826104144.GA7849@linux/T/#u [2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/11792607/ [osalvador@suse.de: take the poisoned subpage off the buddy frelists] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-4-osalvador@suse.de Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-3-osalvador@suse.de Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 03:11:32 +00:00
try_again:
mm/hwpoison: fix race between hugetlb free/demotion and memory_failure_hugetlb() There is a race condition between memory_failure_hugetlb() and hugetlb free/demotion, which causes setting PageHWPoison flag on the wrong page. The one simple result is that wrong processes can be killed, but another (more serious) one is that the actual error is left unhandled, so no one prevents later access to it, and that might lead to more serious results like consuming corrupted data. Think about the below race window: CPU 1 CPU 2 memory_failure_hugetlb struct page *head = compound_head(p); hugetlb page might be freed to buddy, or even changed to another compound page. get_hwpoison_page -- page is not what we want now... The current code first does prechecks roughly and then reconfirms after taking refcount, but it's found that it makes code overly complicated, so move the prechecks in a single hugetlb_lock range. A newly introduced function, try_memory_failure_hugetlb(), always takes hugetlb_lock (even for non-hugetlb pages). That can be improved, but memory_failure() is rare in principle, so should not be a big problem. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220408135323.1559401-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Fixes: 761ad8d7c7b5 ("mm: hwpoison: introduce memory_failure_hugetlb()") Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reported-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-21 23:35:33 +00:00
res = try_memory_failure_hugetlb(pfn, flags, &hugetlb);
if (hugetlb)
mm/memory-failure: use a mutex to avoid memory_failure() races Patch series "mm,hwpoison: fix sending SIGBUS for Action Required MCE", v5. I wrote this patchset to materialize what I think is the current allowable solution mentioned by the previous discussion [1]. I simply borrowed Tony's mutex patch and Aili's return code patch, then I queued another one to find error virtual address in the best effort manner. I know that this is not a perfect solution, but should work for some typical case. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210331192540.2141052f@alex-virtual-machine/ This patch (of 2): There can be races when multiple CPUs consume poison from the same page. The first into memory_failure() atomically sets the HWPoison page flag and begins hunting for tasks that map this page. Eventually it invalidates those mappings and may send a SIGBUS to the affected tasks. But while all that work is going on, other CPUs see a "success" return code from memory_failure() and so they believe the error has been handled and continue executing. Fix by wrapping most of the internal parts of memory_failure() in a mutex. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make mf_mutex local to memory_failure()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-2-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Aili Yao <yaoaili@kingsoft.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Jue Wang <juew@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-25 01:39:55 +00:00
goto unlock_mutex;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
if (TestSetPageHWPoison(p)) {
pr_err("Memory failure: %#lx: already hardware poisoned\n",
pfn);
mm,hwpoison: return -EHWPOISON to denote that the page has already been poisoned When memory_failure() is called with MF_ACTION_REQUIRED on the page that has already been hwpoisoned, memory_failure() could fail to send SIGBUS to the affected process, which results in infinite loop of MCEs. Currently memory_failure() returns 0 if it's called for already hwpoisoned page, then the caller, kill_me_maybe(), could return without sending SIGBUS to current process. An action required MCE is raised when the current process accesses to the broken memory, so no SIGBUS means that the current process continues to run and access to the error page again soon, so running into MCE loop. This issue can arise for example in the following scenarios: - Two or more threads access to the poisoned page concurrently. If local MCE is enabled, MCE handler independently handles the MCE events. So there's a race among MCE events, and the second or latter threads fall into the situation in question. - If there was a precedent memory error event and memory_failure() for the event failed to unmap the error page for some reason, the subsequent memory access to the error page triggers the MCE loop situation. To fix the issue, make memory_failure() return an error code when the error page has already been hwpoisoned. This allows memory error handler to control how it sends signals to userspace. And make sure that any process touching a hwpoisoned page should get a SIGBUS even in "already hwpoisoned" path of memory_failure() as is done in page fault path. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-3-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Aili Yao <yaoaili@kingsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Jue Wang <juew@google.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-25 01:39:58 +00:00
res = -EHWPOISON;
if (flags & MF_ACTION_REQUIRED)
res = kill_accessing_process(current, pfn, flags);
if (flags & MF_COUNT_INCREASED)
put_page(p);
mm/memory-failure: use a mutex to avoid memory_failure() races Patch series "mm,hwpoison: fix sending SIGBUS for Action Required MCE", v5. I wrote this patchset to materialize what I think is the current allowable solution mentioned by the previous discussion [1]. I simply borrowed Tony's mutex patch and Aili's return code patch, then I queued another one to find error virtual address in the best effort manner. I know that this is not a perfect solution, but should work for some typical case. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210331192540.2141052f@alex-virtual-machine/ This patch (of 2): There can be races when multiple CPUs consume poison from the same page. The first into memory_failure() atomically sets the HWPoison page flag and begins hunting for tasks that map this page. Eventually it invalidates those mappings and may send a SIGBUS to the affected tasks. But while all that work is going on, other CPUs see a "success" return code from memory_failure() and so they believe the error has been handled and continue executing. Fix by wrapping most of the internal parts of memory_failure() in a mutex. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make mf_mutex local to memory_failure()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-2-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Aili Yao <yaoaili@kingsoft.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Jue Wang <juew@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-25 01:39:55 +00:00
goto unlock_mutex;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
hpage = compound_head(p);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
/*
* We need/can do nothing about count=0 pages.
* 1) it's a free page, and therefore in safe hand:
* prep_new_page() will be the gate keeper.
* 2) it's part of a non-compound high order page.
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
* Implies some kernel user: cannot stop them from
* R/W the page; let's pray that the page has been
* used and will be freed some time later.
* In fact it's dangerous to directly bump up page count from 0,
* that may make page_ref_freeze()/page_ref_unfreeze() mismatch.
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
*/
if (!(flags & MF_COUNT_INCREASED)) {
res = get_hwpoison_page(p, flags);
if (!res) {
if (is_free_buddy_page(p)) {
if (take_page_off_buddy(p)) {
page_ref_inc(p);
res = MF_RECOVERED;
} else {
/* We lost the race, try again */
if (retry) {
ClearPageHWPoison(p);
retry = false;
goto try_again;
}
res = MF_FAILED;
mm,hwpoison: take free pages off the buddy freelists The crux of the matter is that historically we left poisoned pages in the buddy system because we have some checks in place when allocating a page that are gatekeeper for poisoned pages. Unfortunately, we do have other users (e.g: compaction [1]) that scan buddy freelists and try to get a page from there without checking whether the page is HWPoison. As I stated already, I think it is fundamentally wrong to keep HWPoison pages within the buddy systems, checks in place or not. Let us fix this the same way we did for soft_offline [2], taking the page off the buddy freelist so it is completely unreachable. Note that this is fairly simple to trigger, as we only need to poison free buddy pages (madvise MADV_HWPOISON) and then run some sort of memory stress system. Just for a matter of reference, I put a dump_page() in compaction_alloc() to trigger for HWPoison patches: page:0000000012b2982b refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x1d5db flags: 0xfffffc0800000(hwpoison) raw: 000fffffc0800000 ffffea00007573c8 ffffc90000857de0 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: compaction_alloc CPU: 4 PID: 123 Comm: kcompactd0 Tainted: G E 5.9.0-rc2-mm1-1-default+ #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.2-0-g5f4c7b1-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x6d/0x8b compaction_alloc+0xb2/0xc0 migrate_pages+0x2a6/0x12a0 compact_zone+0x5eb/0x11c0 proactive_compact_node+0x89/0xf0 kcompactd+0x2d0/0x3a0 kthread+0x118/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 After that, if e.g: a process faults in the page, it will get killed unexpectedly. Fix it by containing the page immediatelly. Besides that, two more changes can be noticed: * MF_DELAYED no longer suits as we are fixing the issue by containing the page immediately, so it does no longer rely on the allocation-time checks to stop HWPoison to be handed over. gain unless it is unpoisoned, so we fixed the situation. Because of that, let us use MF_RECOVERED from now on. * The second block that handles PageBuddy pages is no longer needed: We call shake_page and then check whether the page is Buddy because shake_page calls drain_all_pages, which sends pcp-pages back to the buddy freelists, so we could have a chance to handle free pages. Currently, get_hwpoison_page already calls drain_all_pages, and we call get_hwpoison_page right before coming here, so we should be on the safe side. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190826104144.GA7849@linux/T/#u [2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/11792607/ [osalvador@suse.de: take the poisoned subpage off the buddy frelists] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-4-osalvador@suse.de Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-3-osalvador@suse.de Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 03:11:32 +00:00
}
action_result(pfn, MF_MSG_BUDDY, res);
res = res == MF_RECOVERED ? 0 : -EBUSY;
} else {
action_result(pfn, MF_MSG_KERNEL_HIGH_ORDER, MF_IGNORED);
res = -EBUSY;
mm,hwpoison: take free pages off the buddy freelists The crux of the matter is that historically we left poisoned pages in the buddy system because we have some checks in place when allocating a page that are gatekeeper for poisoned pages. Unfortunately, we do have other users (e.g: compaction [1]) that scan buddy freelists and try to get a page from there without checking whether the page is HWPoison. As I stated already, I think it is fundamentally wrong to keep HWPoison pages within the buddy systems, checks in place or not. Let us fix this the same way we did for soft_offline [2], taking the page off the buddy freelist so it is completely unreachable. Note that this is fairly simple to trigger, as we only need to poison free buddy pages (madvise MADV_HWPOISON) and then run some sort of memory stress system. Just for a matter of reference, I put a dump_page() in compaction_alloc() to trigger for HWPoison patches: page:0000000012b2982b refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x1d5db flags: 0xfffffc0800000(hwpoison) raw: 000fffffc0800000 ffffea00007573c8 ffffc90000857de0 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: compaction_alloc CPU: 4 PID: 123 Comm: kcompactd0 Tainted: G E 5.9.0-rc2-mm1-1-default+ #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.10.2-0-g5f4c7b1-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x6d/0x8b compaction_alloc+0xb2/0xc0 migrate_pages+0x2a6/0x12a0 compact_zone+0x5eb/0x11c0 proactive_compact_node+0x89/0xf0 kcompactd+0x2d0/0x3a0 kthread+0x118/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 After that, if e.g: a process faults in the page, it will get killed unexpectedly. Fix it by containing the page immediatelly. Besides that, two more changes can be noticed: * MF_DELAYED no longer suits as we are fixing the issue by containing the page immediately, so it does no longer rely on the allocation-time checks to stop HWPoison to be handed over. gain unless it is unpoisoned, so we fixed the situation. Because of that, let us use MF_RECOVERED from now on. * The second block that handles PageBuddy pages is no longer needed: We call shake_page and then check whether the page is Buddy because shake_page calls drain_all_pages, which sends pcp-pages back to the buddy freelists, so we could have a chance to handle free pages. Currently, get_hwpoison_page already calls drain_all_pages, and we call get_hwpoison_page right before coming here, so we should be on the safe side. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190826104144.GA7849@linux/T/#u [2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/11792607/ [osalvador@suse.de: take the poisoned subpage off the buddy frelists] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-4-osalvador@suse.de Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-3-osalvador@suse.de Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 03:11:32 +00:00
}
goto unlock_mutex;
} else if (res < 0) {
action_result(pfn, MF_MSG_UNKNOWN, MF_IGNORED);
mm/memory-failure: use a mutex to avoid memory_failure() races Patch series "mm,hwpoison: fix sending SIGBUS for Action Required MCE", v5. I wrote this patchset to materialize what I think is the current allowable solution mentioned by the previous discussion [1]. I simply borrowed Tony's mutex patch and Aili's return code patch, then I queued another one to find error virtual address in the best effort manner. I know that this is not a perfect solution, but should work for some typical case. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210331192540.2141052f@alex-virtual-machine/ This patch (of 2): There can be races when multiple CPUs consume poison from the same page. The first into memory_failure() atomically sets the HWPoison page flag and begins hunting for tasks that map this page. Eventually it invalidates those mappings and may send a SIGBUS to the affected tasks. But while all that work is going on, other CPUs see a "success" return code from memory_failure() and so they believe the error has been handled and continue executing. Fix by wrapping most of the internal parts of memory_failure() in a mutex. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make mf_mutex local to memory_failure()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-2-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Aili Yao <yaoaili@kingsoft.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Jue Wang <juew@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-25 01:39:55 +00:00
res = -EBUSY;
goto unlock_mutex;
}
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
if (PageTransHuge(hpage)) {
mm: filemap: check if THP has hwpoisoned subpage for PMD page fault When handling shmem page fault the THP with corrupted subpage could be PMD mapped if certain conditions are satisfied. But kernel is supposed to send SIGBUS when trying to map hwpoisoned page. There are two paths which may do PMD map: fault around and regular fault. Before commit f9ce0be71d1f ("mm: Cleanup faultaround and finish_fault() codepaths") the thing was even worse in fault around path. The THP could be PMD mapped as long as the VMA fits regardless what subpage is accessed and corrupted. After this commit as long as head page is not corrupted the THP could be PMD mapped. In the regular fault path the THP could be PMD mapped as long as the corrupted page is not accessed and the VMA fits. This loophole could be fixed by iterating every subpage to check if any of them is hwpoisoned or not, but it is somewhat costly in page fault path. So introduce a new page flag called HasHWPoisoned on the first tail page. It indicates the THP has hwpoisoned subpage(s). It is set if any subpage of THP is found hwpoisoned by memory failure and after the refcount is bumped successfully, then cleared when the THP is freed or split. The soft offline path doesn't need this since soft offline handler just marks a subpage hwpoisoned when the subpage is migrated successfully. But shmem THP didn't get split then migrated at all. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211020210755.23964-3-shy828301@gmail.com Fixes: 800d8c63b2e9 ("shmem: add huge pages support") Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Suggested-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-10-28 21:36:11 +00:00
/*
* The flag must be set after the refcount is bumped
* otherwise it may race with THP split.
* And the flag can't be set in get_hwpoison_page() since
* it is called by soft offline too and it is just called
* for !MF_COUNT_INCREASE. So here seems to be the best
* place.
*
* Don't need care about the above error handling paths for
* get_hwpoison_page() since they handle either free page
* or unhandlable page. The refcount is bumped iff the
* page is a valid handlable page.
*/
SetPageHasHWPoisoned(hpage);
if (try_to_split_thp_page(p, "Memory Failure") < 0) {
action_result(pfn, MF_MSG_UNSPLIT_THP, MF_IGNORED);
mm/memory-failure: use a mutex to avoid memory_failure() races Patch series "mm,hwpoison: fix sending SIGBUS for Action Required MCE", v5. I wrote this patchset to materialize what I think is the current allowable solution mentioned by the previous discussion [1]. I simply borrowed Tony's mutex patch and Aili's return code patch, then I queued another one to find error virtual address in the best effort manner. I know that this is not a perfect solution, but should work for some typical case. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210331192540.2141052f@alex-virtual-machine/ This patch (of 2): There can be races when multiple CPUs consume poison from the same page. The first into memory_failure() atomically sets the HWPoison page flag and begins hunting for tasks that map this page. Eventually it invalidates those mappings and may send a SIGBUS to the affected tasks. But while all that work is going on, other CPUs see a "success" return code from memory_failure() and so they believe the error has been handled and continue executing. Fix by wrapping most of the internal parts of memory_failure() in a mutex. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make mf_mutex local to memory_failure()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-2-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Aili Yao <yaoaili@kingsoft.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Jue Wang <juew@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-25 01:39:55 +00:00
res = -EBUSY;
goto unlock_mutex;
}
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!page_count(p), p);
}
/*
* We ignore non-LRU pages for good reasons.
* - PG_locked is only well defined for LRU pages and a few others
* - to avoid races with __SetPageLocked()
* - to avoid races with __SetPageSlab*() (and more non-atomic ops)
* The check (unnecessarily) ignores LRU pages being isolated and
* walked by the page reclaim code, however that's not a big loss.
*/
mm: hwpoison: don't drop slab caches for offlining non-LRU page In the current implementation of soft offline, if non-LRU page is met, all the slab caches will be dropped to free the page then offline. But if the page is not slab page all the effort is wasted in vain. Even though it is a slab page, it is not guaranteed the page could be freed at all. However the side effect and cost is quite high. It does not only drop the slab caches, but also may drop a significant amount of page caches which are associated with inode caches. It could make the most workingset gone in order to just offline a page. And the offline is not guaranteed to succeed at all, actually I really doubt the success rate for real life workload. Furthermore the worse consequence is the system may be locked up and unusable since the page cache release may incur huge amount of works queued for memcg release. Actually we ran into such unpleasant case in our production environment. Firstly, the workqueue of memory_failure_work_func is locked up as below: BUG: workqueue lockup - pool cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 stuck for 53s! Showing busy workqueues and worker pools: workqueue events: flags=0x0 pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=14/256 refcnt=15 in-flight: 409271:memory_failure_work_func pending: kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_monitor, kfree_rcu_work, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, rht_deferred_worker, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, kfree_rcu_work, drain_local_stock, kfree_rcu_work workqueue mm_percpu_wq: flags=0x8 pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/256 refcnt=2 pending: vmstat_update workqueue cgroup_destroy: flags=0x0 pwq 2: cpus=1 node=0 flags=0x0 nice=0 active=1/1 refcnt=12072 pending: css_release_work_fn There were over 12K css_release_work_fn queued, and this caused a few lockups due to the contention of worker pool lock with IRQ disabled, for example: NMI watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 1 Modules linked in: amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel xt_DSCP iptable_mangle kvm_amd bpfilter vfat fat acpi_ipmi i2c_piix4 usb_storage ipmi_si k10temp i2c_core ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler acpi_cpufreq sch_fq_codel xfs libcrc32c crc32c_intel mlx5_core mlxfw nvme xhci_pci ptp nvme_core pps_core xhci_hcd CPU: 1 PID: 205500 Comm: kworker/1:0 Tainted: G L 5.10.32-t1.el7.twitter.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: TYAN F5AMT /z /S8026GM2NRE-CGN, BIOS V8.030 03/30/2021 Workqueue: events memory_failure_work_func RIP: 0010:queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x41/0x1a0 Code: 41 f0 0f ba 2f 08 0f 92 c0 0f b6 c0 c1 e0 08 89 c2 8b 07 30 e4 09 d0 a9 00 01 ff ff 75 1b 85 c0 74 0e 8b 07 84 c0 74 08 f3 90 <8b> 07 84 c0 75 f8 b8 01 00 00 00 66 89 07 c3 f6 c4 01 75 04 c6 47 RSP: 0018:ffff9b2ac278f900 EFLAGS: 00000002 RAX: 0000000000480101 RBX: ffff8ce98ce71800 RCX: 0000000000000084 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ce98ce6a140 RBP: 00000000000284c8 R08: ffffd7248dcb6808 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffff9b2ac278f9b0 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffff8cb44dab9c00 R14: ffffffffbd1ce6a0 R15: ffff8cacaa37f068 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8ce98ce40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fcf6e8cb000 CR3: 0000000a0c60a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 Call Trace: __queue_work+0xd6/0x3c0 queue_work_on+0x1c/0x30 uncharge_batch+0x10e/0x110 mem_cgroup_uncharge_list+0x6d/0x80 release_pages+0x37f/0x3f0 __pagevec_release+0x1c/0x50 __invalidate_mapping_pages+0x348/0x380 inode_lru_isolate+0x10a/0x160 __list_lru_walk_one+0x7b/0x170 list_lru_walk_one+0x4a/0x60 prune_icache_sb+0x37/0x50 super_cache_scan+0x123/0x1a0 do_shrink_slab+0x10c/0x2c0 shrink_slab+0x1f1/0x290 drop_slab_node+0x4d/0x70 soft_offline_page+0x1ac/0x5b0 memory_failure_work_func+0x6a/0x90 process_one_work+0x19e/0x340 worker_thread+0x30/0x360 kthread+0x116/0x130 The lockup made the machine is quite unusable. And it also made the most workingset gone, the reclaimabled slab caches were reduced from 12G to 300MB, the page caches were decreased from 17G to 4G. But the most disappointing thing is all the effort doesn't make the page offline, it just returns: soft_offline: 0x1469f2: unknown non LRU page type 5ffff0000000000 () It seems the aggressive behavior for non-LRU page didn't pay back, so it doesn't make too much sense to keep it considering the terrible side effect. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210819054116.266126-1-shy828301@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Reported-by: David Mackey <tdmackey@twitter.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-02 21:58:31 +00:00
shake_page(p);
lock_page(p);
/*
* We're only intended to deal with the non-Compound page here.
* However, the page could have changed compound pages due to
* race window. If this happens, we could try again to hopefully
* handle the page next round.
*/
if (PageCompound(p)) {
if (retry) {
ClearPageHWPoison(p);
unlock_page(p);
put_page(p);
flags &= ~MF_COUNT_INCREASED;
retry = false;
goto try_again;
}
action_result(pfn, MF_MSG_DIFFERENT_COMPOUND, MF_IGNORED);
res = -EBUSY;
mm/memory-failure: use a mutex to avoid memory_failure() races Patch series "mm,hwpoison: fix sending SIGBUS for Action Required MCE", v5. I wrote this patchset to materialize what I think is the current allowable solution mentioned by the previous discussion [1]. I simply borrowed Tony's mutex patch and Aili's return code patch, then I queued another one to find error virtual address in the best effort manner. I know that this is not a perfect solution, but should work for some typical case. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210331192540.2141052f@alex-virtual-machine/ This patch (of 2): There can be races when multiple CPUs consume poison from the same page. The first into memory_failure() atomically sets the HWPoison page flag and begins hunting for tasks that map this page. Eventually it invalidates those mappings and may send a SIGBUS to the affected tasks. But while all that work is going on, other CPUs see a "success" return code from memory_failure() and so they believe the error has been handled and continue executing. Fix by wrapping most of the internal parts of memory_failure() in a mutex. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make mf_mutex local to memory_failure()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-2-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Aili Yao <yaoaili@kingsoft.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Jue Wang <juew@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-25 01:39:55 +00:00
goto unlock_page;
}
/*
* We use page flags to determine what action should be taken, but
* the flags can be modified by the error containment action. One
* example is an mlocked page, where PG_mlocked is cleared by
* page_remove_rmap() in try_to_unmap_one(). So to determine page status
* correctly, we save a copy of the page flags at this time.
*/
mm,hwpoison: cleanup unused PageHuge() check Patch series "HWPOISON: soft offline rework", v7. This patchset fixes a couple of issues that the patchset Naoya sent [1] contained due to rebasing problems and a misunterdansting. Main focus of this series is to stabilize soft offline. Historically soft offlined pages have suffered from racy conditions because PageHWPoison is used to a little too aggressively, which (directly or indirectly) invades other mm code which cares little about hwpoison. This results in unexpected behavior or kernel panic, which is very far from soft offline's "do not disturb userspace or other kernel component" policy. An example of this can be found here [2]. Along with several cleanups, this code refactors and changes the way soft offline work. Main point of this change set is to contain target page "via buddy allocator" or in migrating path. For ther former we first free the target page as we do for normal pages, and once it has reached buddy and it has been taken off the freelists, we flag it as HWpoison. For the latter we never get to release the page in unmap_and_move, so the page is under our control and we can handle it in hwpoison code. [1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/cover/11704083/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20190826104144.GA7849@linux/T/#u This patch (of 14): Drop the PageHuge check, which is dead code since memory_failure() forks into memory_failure_hugetlb() for hugetlb pages. memory_failure() and memory_failure_hugetlb() shares some functions like hwpoison_user_mappings() and identify_page_state(), so they should properly handle 4kB page, thp, and hugetlb. Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Dmitry Yakunin <zeil@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@ruivo.org> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200922135650.1634-1-osalvador@suse.de Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200922135650.1634-2-osalvador@suse.de Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-16 03:06:38 +00:00
page_flags = p->flags;
if (hwpoison_filter(p)) {
TestClearPageHWPoison(p);
unlock_page(p);
put_page(p);
res = -EOPNOTSUPP;
mm/memory-failure: use a mutex to avoid memory_failure() races Patch series "mm,hwpoison: fix sending SIGBUS for Action Required MCE", v5. I wrote this patchset to materialize what I think is the current allowable solution mentioned by the previous discussion [1]. I simply borrowed Tony's mutex patch and Aili's return code patch, then I queued another one to find error virtual address in the best effort manner. I know that this is not a perfect solution, but should work for some typical case. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210331192540.2141052f@alex-virtual-machine/ This patch (of 2): There can be races when multiple CPUs consume poison from the same page. The first into memory_failure() atomically sets the HWPoison page flag and begins hunting for tasks that map this page. Eventually it invalidates those mappings and may send a SIGBUS to the affected tasks. But while all that work is going on, other CPUs see a "success" return code from memory_failure() and so they believe the error has been handled and continue executing. Fix by wrapping most of the internal parts of memory_failure() in a mutex. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make mf_mutex local to memory_failure()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-2-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Aili Yao <yaoaili@kingsoft.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Jue Wang <juew@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-25 01:39:55 +00:00
goto unlock_mutex;
}
mm/memory-failure: make sure wait for page writeback in memory_failure Our syzkaller trigger the "BUG_ON(!list_empty(&inode->i_wb_list))" in clear_inode: kernel BUG at fs/inode.c:519! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: Process syz-executor.0 (pid: 249, stack limit = 0x00000000a12409d7) CPU: 1 PID: 249 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.95 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO) pc : clear_inode+0x280/0x2a8 lr : clear_inode+0x280/0x2a8 Call trace: clear_inode+0x280/0x2a8 ext4_clear_inode+0x38/0xe8 ext4_free_inode+0x130/0xc68 ext4_evict_inode+0xb20/0xcb8 evict+0x1a8/0x3c0 iput+0x344/0x460 do_unlinkat+0x260/0x410 __arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x6c/0xc0 el0_svc_common+0xdc/0x3b0 el0_svc_handler+0xf8/0x160 el0_svc+0x10/0x218 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception A crash dump of this problem show that someone called __munlock_pagevec to clear page LRU without lock_page: do_mmap -> mmap_region -> do_munmap -> munlock_vma_pages_range -> __munlock_pagevec. As a result memory_failure will call identify_page_state without wait_on_page_writeback. And after truncate_error_page clear the mapping of this page. end_page_writeback won't call sb_clear_inode_writeback to clear inode->i_wb_list. That will trigger BUG_ON in clear_inode! Fix it by checking PageWriteback too to help determine should we skip wait_on_page_writeback. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210604084705.3729204-1-yangerkun@huawei.com Fixes: 0bc1f8b0682c ("hwpoison: fix the handling path of the victimized page frame that belong to non-LRU") Signed-off-by: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-16 01:23:32 +00:00
/*
* __munlock_pagevec may clear a writeback page's LRU flag without
* page_lock. We need wait writeback completion for this page or it
* may trigger vfs BUG while evict inode.
*/
if (!PageLRU(p) && !PageWriteback(p))
hwpoison: fix the handling path of the victimized page frame that belong to non-LRU Until now, the kernel has the same policy to handle victimized page frames that belong to kernel-space(reserved/slab-subsystem) or non-LRU(unknown page state). In other word, the result of handling either of these victimized page frames is (IGNORED | FAILED), and the return value of memory_failure() is -EBUSY. This patch is to avoid that memory_failure() returns very soon due to the "true" value of (!PageLRU(p)), and it also ensures that action_result() can report more precise information("reserved kernel", "kernel slab", and "unknown page state") instead of "non LRU", especially for memory errors which are detected by memory-scrubbing. Andi said: : While running the mcelog test suite on 3.14 I hit the following VM_BUG_ON: : : soft_offline: 0x56d4: unknown non LRU page type 3ffff800008000 : page:ffffea000015b400 count:3 mapcount:2097169 mapping: (null) index:0xffff8800056d7000 : page flags: 0x3ffff800004081(locked|slab|head) : ------------[ cut here ]------------ : kernel BUG at mm/rmap.c:1495! : : I think what happened is that a LRU page turned into a slab page in : parallel with offlining. memory_failure initially tests for this case, : but doesn't retest later after the page has been locked. : : ... : : I ran this patch in a loop over night with some stress plus : the mcelog test suite running in a loop. I cannot guarantee it hit it, : but it should have given it a good beating. : : The kernel survived with no messages, although the mcelog test suite : got killed at some point because it couldn't fork anymore. Probably : some unrelated problem. : : So the patch is ok for me for .16. Signed-off-by: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reported-by: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-07-02 22:22:37 +00:00
goto identify_page_state;
/*
* It's very difficult to mess with pages currently under IO
* and in many cases impossible, so we just avoid it here.
*/
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
wait_on_page_writeback(p);
/*
* Now take care of user space mappings.
* Abort on fail: __delete_from_page_cache() assumes unmapped page.
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
*/
if (!hwpoison_user_mappings(p, pfn, flags, p)) {
action_result(pfn, MF_MSG_UNMAP_FAILED, MF_IGNORED);
res = -EBUSY;
mm/memory-failure: use a mutex to avoid memory_failure() races Patch series "mm,hwpoison: fix sending SIGBUS for Action Required MCE", v5. I wrote this patchset to materialize what I think is the current allowable solution mentioned by the previous discussion [1]. I simply borrowed Tony's mutex patch and Aili's return code patch, then I queued another one to find error virtual address in the best effort manner. I know that this is not a perfect solution, but should work for some typical case. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210331192540.2141052f@alex-virtual-machine/ This patch (of 2): There can be races when multiple CPUs consume poison from the same page. The first into memory_failure() atomically sets the HWPoison page flag and begins hunting for tasks that map this page. Eventually it invalidates those mappings and may send a SIGBUS to the affected tasks. But while all that work is going on, other CPUs see a "success" return code from memory_failure() and so they believe the error has been handled and continue executing. Fix by wrapping most of the internal parts of memory_failure() in a mutex. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make mf_mutex local to memory_failure()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-2-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Aili Yao <yaoaili@kingsoft.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Jue Wang <juew@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-25 01:39:55 +00:00
goto unlock_page;
}
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
/*
* Torn down by someone else?
*/
if (PageLRU(p) && !PageSwapCache(p) && p->mapping == NULL) {
action_result(pfn, MF_MSG_TRUNCATED_LRU, MF_IGNORED);
res = -EBUSY;
mm/memory-failure: use a mutex to avoid memory_failure() races Patch series "mm,hwpoison: fix sending SIGBUS for Action Required MCE", v5. I wrote this patchset to materialize what I think is the current allowable solution mentioned by the previous discussion [1]. I simply borrowed Tony's mutex patch and Aili's return code patch, then I queued another one to find error virtual address in the best effort manner. I know that this is not a perfect solution, but should work for some typical case. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210331192540.2141052f@alex-virtual-machine/ This patch (of 2): There can be races when multiple CPUs consume poison from the same page. The first into memory_failure() atomically sets the HWPoison page flag and begins hunting for tasks that map this page. Eventually it invalidates those mappings and may send a SIGBUS to the affected tasks. But while all that work is going on, other CPUs see a "success" return code from memory_failure() and so they believe the error has been handled and continue executing. Fix by wrapping most of the internal parts of memory_failure() in a mutex. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make mf_mutex local to memory_failure()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-2-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Aili Yao <yaoaili@kingsoft.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Jue Wang <juew@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-25 01:39:55 +00:00
goto unlock_page;
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
}
hwpoison: fix the handling path of the victimized page frame that belong to non-LRU Until now, the kernel has the same policy to handle victimized page frames that belong to kernel-space(reserved/slab-subsystem) or non-LRU(unknown page state). In other word, the result of handling either of these victimized page frames is (IGNORED | FAILED), and the return value of memory_failure() is -EBUSY. This patch is to avoid that memory_failure() returns very soon due to the "true" value of (!PageLRU(p)), and it also ensures that action_result() can report more precise information("reserved kernel", "kernel slab", and "unknown page state") instead of "non LRU", especially for memory errors which are detected by memory-scrubbing. Andi said: : While running the mcelog test suite on 3.14 I hit the following VM_BUG_ON: : : soft_offline: 0x56d4: unknown non LRU page type 3ffff800008000 : page:ffffea000015b400 count:3 mapcount:2097169 mapping: (null) index:0xffff8800056d7000 : page flags: 0x3ffff800004081(locked|slab|head) : ------------[ cut here ]------------ : kernel BUG at mm/rmap.c:1495! : : I think what happened is that a LRU page turned into a slab page in : parallel with offlining. memory_failure initially tests for this case, : but doesn't retest later after the page has been locked. : : ... : : I ran this patch in a loop over night with some stress plus : the mcelog test suite running in a loop. I cannot guarantee it hit it, : but it should have given it a good beating. : : The kernel survived with no messages, although the mcelog test suite : got killed at some point because it couldn't fork anymore. Probably : some unrelated problem. : : So the patch is ok for me for .16. Signed-off-by: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Reported-by: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-07-02 22:22:37 +00:00
identify_page_state:
res = identify_page_state(pfn, p, page_flags);
mutex_unlock(&mf_mutex);
return res;
mm/memory-failure: use a mutex to avoid memory_failure() races Patch series "mm,hwpoison: fix sending SIGBUS for Action Required MCE", v5. I wrote this patchset to materialize what I think is the current allowable solution mentioned by the previous discussion [1]. I simply borrowed Tony's mutex patch and Aili's return code patch, then I queued another one to find error virtual address in the best effort manner. I know that this is not a perfect solution, but should work for some typical case. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210331192540.2141052f@alex-virtual-machine/ This patch (of 2): There can be races when multiple CPUs consume poison from the same page. The first into memory_failure() atomically sets the HWPoison page flag and begins hunting for tasks that map this page. Eventually it invalidates those mappings and may send a SIGBUS to the affected tasks. But while all that work is going on, other CPUs see a "success" return code from memory_failure() and so they believe the error has been handled and continue executing. Fix by wrapping most of the internal parts of memory_failure() in a mutex. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make mf_mutex local to memory_failure()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-2-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Aili Yao <yaoaili@kingsoft.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Jue Wang <juew@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-25 01:39:55 +00:00
unlock_page:
unlock_page(p);
mm/memory-failure: use a mutex to avoid memory_failure() races Patch series "mm,hwpoison: fix sending SIGBUS for Action Required MCE", v5. I wrote this patchset to materialize what I think is the current allowable solution mentioned by the previous discussion [1]. I simply borrowed Tony's mutex patch and Aili's return code patch, then I queued another one to find error virtual address in the best effort manner. I know that this is not a perfect solution, but should work for some typical case. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210331192540.2141052f@alex-virtual-machine/ This patch (of 2): There can be races when multiple CPUs consume poison from the same page. The first into memory_failure() atomically sets the HWPoison page flag and begins hunting for tasks that map this page. Eventually it invalidates those mappings and may send a SIGBUS to the affected tasks. But while all that work is going on, other CPUs see a "success" return code from memory_failure() and so they believe the error has been handled and continue executing. Fix by wrapping most of the internal parts of memory_failure() in a mutex. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: make mf_mutex local to memory_failure()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210521030156.2612074-2-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Aili Yao <yaoaili@kingsoft.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Jue Wang <juew@google.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-25 01:39:55 +00:00
unlock_mutex:
mutex_unlock(&mf_mutex);
HWPOISON: The high level memory error handler in the VM v7 Add the high level memory handler that poisons pages that got corrupted by hardware (typically by a two bit flip in a DIMM or a cache) on the Linux level. The goal is to prevent everyone from accessing these pages in the future. This done at the VM level by marking a page hwpoisoned and doing the appropriate action based on the type of page it is. The code that does this is portable and lives in mm/memory-failure.c To quote the overview comment: High level machine check handler. Handles pages reported by the hardware as being corrupted usually due to a 2bit ECC memory or cache failure. This focuses on pages detected as corrupted in the background. When the current CPU tries to consume corruption the currently running process can just be killed directly instead. This implies that if the error cannot be handled for some reason it's safe to just ignore it because no corruption has been consumed yet. Instead when that happens another machine check will happen. Handles page cache pages in various states. The tricky part here is that we can access any page asynchronous to other VM users, because memory failures could happen anytime and anywhere, possibly violating some of their assumptions. This is why this code has to be extremely careful. Generally it tries to use normal locking rules, as in get the standard locks, even if that means the error handling takes potentially a long time. Some of the operations here are somewhat inefficient and have non linear algorithmic complexity, because the data structures have not been optimized for this case. This is in particular the case for the mapping from a vma to a process. Since this case is expected to be rare we hope we can get away with this. There are in principle two strategies to kill processes on poison: - just unmap the data and wait for an actual reference before killing - kill as soon as corruption is detected. Both have advantages and disadvantages and should be used in different situations. Right now both are implemented and can be switched with a new sysctl vm.memory_failure_early_kill The default is early kill. The patch does some rmap data structure walking on its own to collect processes to kill. This is unusual because normally all rmap data structure knowledge is in rmap.c only. I put it here for now to keep everything together and rmap knowledge has been seeping out anyways Includes contributions from Johannes Weiner, Chris Mason, Fengguang Wu, Nick Piggin (who did a lot of great work) and others. Cc: npiggin@suse.de Cc: riel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
2009-09-16 09:50:15 +00:00
return res;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(memory_failure);
#define MEMORY_FAILURE_FIFO_ORDER 4
#define MEMORY_FAILURE_FIFO_SIZE (1 << MEMORY_FAILURE_FIFO_ORDER)
struct memory_failure_entry {
unsigned long pfn;
int flags;
};
struct memory_failure_cpu {
DECLARE_KFIFO(fifo, struct memory_failure_entry,
MEMORY_FAILURE_FIFO_SIZE);
spinlock_t lock;
struct work_struct work;
};
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct memory_failure_cpu, memory_failure_cpu);
/**
* memory_failure_queue - Schedule handling memory failure of a page.
* @pfn: Page Number of the corrupted page
* @flags: Flags for memory failure handling
*
* This function is called by the low level hardware error handler
* when it detects hardware memory corruption of a page. It schedules
* the recovering of error page, including dropping pages, killing
* processes etc.
*
* The function is primarily of use for corruptions that
* happen outside the current execution context (e.g. when
* detected by a background scrubber)
*
* Can run in IRQ context.
*/
void memory_failure_queue(unsigned long pfn, int flags)
{
struct memory_failure_cpu *mf_cpu;
unsigned long proc_flags;
struct memory_failure_entry entry = {
.pfn = pfn,
.flags = flags,
};
mf_cpu = &get_cpu_var(memory_failure_cpu);
spin_lock_irqsave(&mf_cpu->lock, proc_flags);
if (kfifo_put(&mf_cpu->fifo, entry))
schedule_work_on(smp_processor_id(), &mf_cpu->work);
else
pr_err("Memory failure: buffer overflow when queuing memory failure at %#lx\n",
pfn);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mf_cpu->lock, proc_flags);
put_cpu_var(memory_failure_cpu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(memory_failure_queue);
static void memory_failure_work_func(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct memory_failure_cpu *mf_cpu;
struct memory_failure_entry entry = { 0, };
unsigned long proc_flags;
int gotten;
mf_cpu = container_of(work, struct memory_failure_cpu, work);
for (;;) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&mf_cpu->lock, proc_flags);
gotten = kfifo_get(&mf_cpu->fifo, &entry);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mf_cpu->lock, proc_flags);
if (!gotten)
break;
if (entry.flags & MF_SOFT_OFFLINE)
soft_offline_page(entry.pfn, entry.flags);
else
memory_failure(entry.pfn, entry.flags);
}
}
/*
* Process memory_failure work queued on the specified CPU.
* Used to avoid return-to-userspace racing with the memory_failure workqueue.
*/
void memory_failure_queue_kick(int cpu)
{
struct memory_failure_cpu *mf_cpu;
mf_cpu = &per_cpu(memory_failure_cpu, cpu);
cancel_work_sync(&mf_cpu->work);
memory_failure_work_func(&mf_cpu->work);
}
static int __init memory_failure_init(void)
{
struct memory_failure_cpu *mf_cpu;
int cpu;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
mf_cpu = &per_cpu(memory_failure_cpu, cpu);
spin_lock_init(&mf_cpu->lock);
INIT_KFIFO(mf_cpu->fifo);
INIT_WORK(&mf_cpu->work, memory_failure_work_func);
}
return 0;
}
core_initcall(memory_failure_init);
#define unpoison_pr_info(fmt, pfn, rs) \
({ \
if (__ratelimit(rs)) \
pr_info(fmt, pfn); \
})
/**
* unpoison_memory - Unpoison a previously poisoned page
* @pfn: Page number of the to be unpoisoned page
*
* Software-unpoison a page that has been poisoned by
* memory_failure() earlier.
*
* This is only done on the software-level, so it only works
* for linux injected failures, not real hardware failures
*
* Returns 0 for success, otherwise -errno.
*/
int unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn)
{
struct page *page;
struct page *p;
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory() After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on __get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY (meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good. To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON(). Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events injected only by madvise() or /sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE injection. [lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:09 +00:00
int ret = -EBUSY;
int freeit = 0;
static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(unpoison_rs, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL,
DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST);
if (!pfn_valid(pfn))
return -ENXIO;
p = pfn_to_page(pfn);
page = compound_head(p);
mm/hwpoison: mf_mutex for soft offline and unpoison Patch series "mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()", v4. The main purpose of this series is to sync unpoison code to recent changes around how hwpoison code takes page refcount. Unpoison should work or simply fail (without crash) if impossible. The recent works of keeping hwpoison pages in shmem pagecache introduce a new state of hwpoisoned pages, but unpoison for such pages is not supported yet with this series. It seems that soft-offline and unpoison can be used as general purpose page offline/online mechanism (not in the context of memory error). I think that we need some additional works to realize it because currently soft-offline and unpoison are assumed not to happen so frequently (print out too many messages for aggressive usecases). But anyway this could be another interesting next topic. v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210614021212.223326-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com/ v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211025230503.2650970-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211105055058.3152564-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ This patch (of 3): Originally mf_mutex is introduced to serialize multiple MCE events, but it is not that useful to allow unpoison to run in parallel with memory_failure() and soft offline. So apply mf_mutex to soft offline and unpoison. The memory failure handler and soft offline handler get simpler with this. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:02 +00:00
mutex_lock(&mf_mutex);
mm/memory-failure: disable unpoison once hw error happens Currently unpoison_memory(unsigned long pfn) is designed for soft poison(hwpoison-inject) only. Since 17fae1294ad9d, the KPTE gets cleared on a x86 platform once hardware memory corrupts. Unpoisoning a hardware corrupted page puts page back buddy only, the kernel has a chance to access the page with *NOT PRESENT* KPTE. This leads BUG during accessing on the corrupted KPTE. Suggested by David&Naoya, disable unpoison mechanism when a real HW error happens to avoid BUG like this: Unpoison: Software-unpoisoned page 0x61234 BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff888061234000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 2c01067 P4D 2c01067 PUD 107267063 PMD 10382b063 PTE 800fffff9edcb062 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 4 PID: 26551 Comm: stress Kdump: loaded Tainted: G M OE 5.18.0.bm.1-amd64 #7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) ... RIP: 0010:clear_page_erms+0x7/0x10 Code: ... RSP: 0000:ffffc90001107bc8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000901 RCX: 0000000000001000 RDX: ffffea0001848d00 RSI: ffffea0001848d40 RDI: ffff888061234000 RBP: ffffea0001848d00 R08: 0000000000000901 R09: 0000000000001276 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000140dca R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007fd8b2333740(0000) GS:ffff88813fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff888061234000 CR3: 00000001023d2005 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> prep_new_page+0x151/0x170 get_page_from_freelist+0xca0/0xe20 ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xab/0xc0 ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20 __alloc_pages+0x17e/0x340 __folio_alloc+0x17/0x40 vma_alloc_folio+0x84/0x280 __handle_mm_fault+0x8d4/0xeb0 handle_mm_fault+0xd5/0x2a0 do_user_addr_fault+0x1d0/0x680 ? kvm_read_and_reset_apf_flags+0x3b/0x50 exc_page_fault+0x78/0x170 asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220615093209.259374-2-pizhenwei@bytedance.com Fixes: 847ce401df392 ("HWPOISON: Add unpoisoning support") Fixes: 17fae1294ad9d ("x86/{mce,mm}: Unmap the entire page if the whole page is affected and poisoned") Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi <pizhenwei@bytedance.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-06-15 09:32:09 +00:00
if (hw_memory_failure) {
unpoison_pr_info("Unpoison: Disabled after HW memory failure %#lx\n",
pfn, &unpoison_rs);
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto unlock_mutex;
}
if (!PageHWPoison(p)) {
unpoison_pr_info("Unpoison: Page was already unpoisoned %#lx\n",
pfn, &unpoison_rs);
mm/hwpoison: mf_mutex for soft offline and unpoison Patch series "mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()", v4. The main purpose of this series is to sync unpoison code to recent changes around how hwpoison code takes page refcount. Unpoison should work or simply fail (without crash) if impossible. The recent works of keeping hwpoison pages in shmem pagecache introduce a new state of hwpoisoned pages, but unpoison for such pages is not supported yet with this series. It seems that soft-offline and unpoison can be used as general purpose page offline/online mechanism (not in the context of memory error). I think that we need some additional works to realize it because currently soft-offline and unpoison are assumed not to happen so frequently (print out too many messages for aggressive usecases). But anyway this could be another interesting next topic. v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210614021212.223326-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com/ v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211025230503.2650970-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211105055058.3152564-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ This patch (of 3): Originally mf_mutex is introduced to serialize multiple MCE events, but it is not that useful to allow unpoison to run in parallel with memory_failure() and soft offline. So apply mf_mutex to soft offline and unpoison. The memory failure handler and soft offline handler get simpler with this. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:02 +00:00
goto unlock_mutex;
}
if (page_count(page) > 1) {
unpoison_pr_info("Unpoison: Someone grabs the hwpoison page %#lx\n",
pfn, &unpoison_rs);
mm/hwpoison: mf_mutex for soft offline and unpoison Patch series "mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()", v4. The main purpose of this series is to sync unpoison code to recent changes around how hwpoison code takes page refcount. Unpoison should work or simply fail (without crash) if impossible. The recent works of keeping hwpoison pages in shmem pagecache introduce a new state of hwpoisoned pages, but unpoison for such pages is not supported yet with this series. It seems that soft-offline and unpoison can be used as general purpose page offline/online mechanism (not in the context of memory error). I think that we need some additional works to realize it because currently soft-offline and unpoison are assumed not to happen so frequently (print out too many messages for aggressive usecases). But anyway this could be another interesting next topic. v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210614021212.223326-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com/ v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211025230503.2650970-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211105055058.3152564-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ This patch (of 3): Originally mf_mutex is introduced to serialize multiple MCE events, but it is not that useful to allow unpoison to run in parallel with memory_failure() and soft offline. So apply mf_mutex to soft offline and unpoison. The memory failure handler and soft offline handler get simpler with this. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:02 +00:00
goto unlock_mutex;
}
if (page_mapped(page)) {
unpoison_pr_info("Unpoison: Someone maps the hwpoison page %#lx\n",
pfn, &unpoison_rs);
mm/hwpoison: mf_mutex for soft offline and unpoison Patch series "mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()", v4. The main purpose of this series is to sync unpoison code to recent changes around how hwpoison code takes page refcount. Unpoison should work or simply fail (without crash) if impossible. The recent works of keeping hwpoison pages in shmem pagecache introduce a new state of hwpoisoned pages, but unpoison for such pages is not supported yet with this series. It seems that soft-offline and unpoison can be used as general purpose page offline/online mechanism (not in the context of memory error). I think that we need some additional works to realize it because currently soft-offline and unpoison are assumed not to happen so frequently (print out too many messages for aggressive usecases). But anyway this could be another interesting next topic. v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210614021212.223326-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com/ v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211025230503.2650970-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211105055058.3152564-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ This patch (of 3): Originally mf_mutex is introduced to serialize multiple MCE events, but it is not that useful to allow unpoison to run in parallel with memory_failure() and soft offline. So apply mf_mutex to soft offline and unpoison. The memory failure handler and soft offline handler get simpler with this. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:02 +00:00
goto unlock_mutex;
}
if (page_mapping(page)) {
unpoison_pr_info("Unpoison: the hwpoison page has non-NULL mapping %#lx\n",
pfn, &unpoison_rs);
mm/hwpoison: mf_mutex for soft offline and unpoison Patch series "mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()", v4. The main purpose of this series is to sync unpoison code to recent changes around how hwpoison code takes page refcount. Unpoison should work or simply fail (without crash) if impossible. The recent works of keeping hwpoison pages in shmem pagecache introduce a new state of hwpoisoned pages, but unpoison for such pages is not supported yet with this series. It seems that soft-offline and unpoison can be used as general purpose page offline/online mechanism (not in the context of memory error). I think that we need some additional works to realize it because currently soft-offline and unpoison are assumed not to happen so frequently (print out too many messages for aggressive usecases). But anyway this could be another interesting next topic. v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210614021212.223326-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com/ v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211025230503.2650970-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211105055058.3152564-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ This patch (of 3): Originally mf_mutex is introduced to serialize multiple MCE events, but it is not that useful to allow unpoison to run in parallel with memory_failure() and soft offline. So apply mf_mutex to soft offline and unpoison. The memory failure handler and soft offline handler get simpler with this. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:02 +00:00
goto unlock_mutex;
2013-09-11 21:22:53 +00:00
}
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory() After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on __get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY (meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good. To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON(). Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events injected only by madvise() or /sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE injection. [lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:09 +00:00
if (PageSlab(page) || PageTable(page))
mm/hwpoison: mf_mutex for soft offline and unpoison Patch series "mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()", v4. The main purpose of this series is to sync unpoison code to recent changes around how hwpoison code takes page refcount. Unpoison should work or simply fail (without crash) if impossible. The recent works of keeping hwpoison pages in shmem pagecache introduce a new state of hwpoisoned pages, but unpoison for such pages is not supported yet with this series. It seems that soft-offline and unpoison can be used as general purpose page offline/online mechanism (not in the context of memory error). I think that we need some additional works to realize it because currently soft-offline and unpoison are assumed not to happen so frequently (print out too many messages for aggressive usecases). But anyway this could be another interesting next topic. v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210614021212.223326-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com/ v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211025230503.2650970-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211105055058.3152564-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ This patch (of 3): Originally mf_mutex is introduced to serialize multiple MCE events, but it is not that useful to allow unpoison to run in parallel with memory_failure() and soft offline. So apply mf_mutex to soft offline and unpoison. The memory failure handler and soft offline handler get simpler with this. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:02 +00:00
goto unlock_mutex;
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory() After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on __get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY (meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good. To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON(). Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events injected only by madvise() or /sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE injection. [lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:09 +00:00
ret = get_hwpoison_page(p, MF_UNPOISON);
if (!ret) {
ret = TestClearPageHWPoison(page) ? 0 : -EBUSY;
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory() After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on __get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY (meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good. To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON(). Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events injected only by madvise() or /sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE injection. [lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:09 +00:00
} else if (ret < 0) {
if (ret == -EHWPOISON) {
ret = put_page_back_buddy(p) ? 0 : -EBUSY;
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory() After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on __get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY (meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good. To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON(). Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events injected only by madvise() or /sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE injection. [lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:09 +00:00
} else
unpoison_pr_info("Unpoison: failed to grab page %#lx\n",
pfn, &unpoison_rs);
} else {
freeit = !!TestClearPageHWPoison(p);
put_page(page);
mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory() After recent soft-offline rework, error pages can be taken off from buddy allocator, but the existing unpoison_memory() does not properly undo the operation. Moreover, due to the recent change on __get_hwpoison_page(), get_page_unless_zero() is hardly called for hwpoisoned pages. So __get_hwpoison_page() highly likely returns -EBUSY (meaning to fail to grab page refcount) and unpoison just clears PG_hwpoison without releasing a refcount. That does not lead to a critical issue like kernel panic, but unpoisoned pages never get back to buddy (leaked permanently), which is not good. To (partially) fix this, we need to identify "taken off" pages from other types of hwpoisoned pages. We can't use refcount or page flags for this purpose, so a pseudo flag is defined by hacking ->private field. Someone might think that put_page() is enough to cancel taken-off pages, but the normal free path contains some operations not suitable for the current purpose, and can fire VM_BUG_ON(). Note that unpoison_memory() is now supposed to be cancel hwpoison events injected only by madvise() or /sys/devices/system/memory/{hard,soft}_offline_page, not by MCE injection, so please don't try to use unpoison when testing with MCE injection. [lkp@intel.com: report build failure for ARCH=i386] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-4-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:09 +00:00
if (freeit && !(pfn == my_zero_pfn(0) && page_count(p) == 1)) {
put_page(page);
ret = 0;
}
}
mm/hwpoison: mf_mutex for soft offline and unpoison Patch series "mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()", v4. The main purpose of this series is to sync unpoison code to recent changes around how hwpoison code takes page refcount. Unpoison should work or simply fail (without crash) if impossible. The recent works of keeping hwpoison pages in shmem pagecache introduce a new state of hwpoisoned pages, but unpoison for such pages is not supported yet with this series. It seems that soft-offline and unpoison can be used as general purpose page offline/online mechanism (not in the context of memory error). I think that we need some additional works to realize it because currently soft-offline and unpoison are assumed not to happen so frequently (print out too many messages for aggressive usecases). But anyway this could be another interesting next topic. v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210614021212.223326-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com/ v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211025230503.2650970-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211105055058.3152564-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ This patch (of 3): Originally mf_mutex is introduced to serialize multiple MCE events, but it is not that useful to allow unpoison to run in parallel with memory_failure() and soft offline. So apply mf_mutex to soft offline and unpoison. The memory failure handler and soft offline handler get simpler with this. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:02 +00:00
unlock_mutex:
mutex_unlock(&mf_mutex);
if (!ret || freeit) {
num_poisoned_pages_dec();
unpoison_pr_info("Unpoison: Software-unpoisoned page %#lx\n",
page_to_pfn(p), &unpoison_rs);
}
mm/hwpoison: mf_mutex for soft offline and unpoison Patch series "mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()", v4. The main purpose of this series is to sync unpoison code to recent changes around how hwpoison code takes page refcount. Unpoison should work or simply fail (without crash) if impossible. The recent works of keeping hwpoison pages in shmem pagecache introduce a new state of hwpoisoned pages, but unpoison for such pages is not supported yet with this series. It seems that soft-offline and unpoison can be used as general purpose page offline/online mechanism (not in the context of memory error). I think that we need some additional works to realize it because currently soft-offline and unpoison are assumed not to happen so frequently (print out too many messages for aggressive usecases). But anyway this could be another interesting next topic. v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210614021212.223326-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com/ v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211025230503.2650970-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211105055058.3152564-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ This patch (of 3): Originally mf_mutex is introduced to serialize multiple MCE events, but it is not that useful to allow unpoison to run in parallel with memory_failure() and soft offline. So apply mf_mutex to soft offline and unpoison. The memory failure handler and soft offline handler get simpler with this. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:02 +00:00
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unpoison_memory);
static bool isolate_page(struct page *page, struct list_head *pagelist)
{
bool isolated = false;
bool lru = PageLRU(page);
if (PageHuge(page)) {
isolated = !isolate_hugetlb(page, pagelist);
} else {
if (lru)
isolated = !isolate_lru_page(page);
else
isolated = !isolate_movable_page(page, ISOLATE_UNEVICTABLE);
if (isolated)
list_add(&page->lru, pagelist);
}
if (isolated && lru)
inc_node_page_state(page, NR_ISOLATED_ANON +
page_is_file_lru(page));
/*
* If we succeed to isolate the page, we grabbed another refcount on
* the page, so we can safely drop the one we got from get_any_pages().
* If we failed to isolate the page, it means that we cannot go further
* and we will return an error, so drop the reference we got from
* get_any_pages() as well.
*/
put_page(page);
return isolated;
}
/*
* __soft_offline_page handles hugetlb-pages and non-hugetlb pages.
* If the page is a non-dirty unmapped page-cache page, it simply invalidates.
* If the page is mapped, it migrates the contents over.
*/
static int __soft_offline_page(struct page *page)
{
long ret = 0;
unsigned long pfn = page_to_pfn(page);
struct page *hpage = compound_head(page);
char const *msg_page[] = {"page", "hugepage"};
bool huge = PageHuge(page);
LIST_HEAD(pagelist);
struct migration_target_control mtc = {
.nid = NUMA_NO_NODE,
.gfp_mask = GFP_USER | __GFP_MOVABLE | __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL,
};
lock_page(page);
if (!PageHuge(page))
wait_on_page_writeback(page);
if (PageHWPoison(page)) {
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
pr_info("soft offline: %#lx page already poisoned\n", pfn);
mm,hwpoison: return 0 if the page is already poisoned in soft-offline Currently, there is an inconsistency when calling soft-offline from different paths on a page that is already poisoned. 1) madvise: madvise_inject_error skips any poisoned page and continues the loop. If that was the only page to madvise, it returns 0. 2) /sys/devices/system/memory/: When calling soft_offline_page_store()->soft_offline_page(), we return -EBUSY in case the page is already poisoned. This is inconsistent with a) the above example and b) memory_failure, where we return 0 if the page was poisoned. Fix this by dropping the PageHWPoison() check in madvise_inject_error, and let soft_offline_page return 0 if it finds the page already poisoned. Please, note that this represents a user-api change, since now the return error when calling soft_offline_page_store()->soft_offline_page() will be different. Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@ruivo.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Yakunin <zeil@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.com> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200922135650.1634-12-osalvador@suse.de Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-16 03:07:17 +00:00
return 0;
}
if (!PageHuge(page) && PageLRU(page) && !PageSwapCache(page))
/*
* Try to invalidate first. This should work for
* non dirty unmapped page cache pages.
*/
ret = invalidate_inode_page(page);
unlock_page(page);
if (ret) {
pr_info("soft_offline: %#lx: invalidated\n", pfn);
page_handle_poison(page, false, true);
return 0;
}
if (isolate_page(hpage, &pagelist)) {
ret = migrate_pages(&pagelist, alloc_migration_target, NULL,
(unsigned long)&mtc, MIGRATE_SYNC, MR_MEMORY_FAILURE, NULL);
mm,hwpoison: rework soft offline for in-use pages This patch changes the way we set and handle in-use poisoned pages. Until now, poisoned pages were released to the buddy allocator, trusting that the checks that take place at allocation time would act as a safe net and would skip that page. This has proved to be wrong, as we got some pfn walkers out there, like compaction, that all they care is the page to be in a buddy freelist. Although this might not be the only user, having poisoned pages in the buddy allocator seems a bad idea as we should only have free pages that are ready and meant to be used as such. Before explaining the taken approach, let us break down the kind of pages we can soft offline. - Anonymous THP (after the split, they end up being 4K pages) - Hugetlb - Order-0 pages (that can be either migrated or invalited) * Normal pages (order-0 and anon-THP) - If they are clean and unmapped page cache pages, we invalidate then by means of invalidate_inode_page(). - If they are mapped/dirty, we do the isolate-and-migrate dance. Either way, do not call put_page directly from those paths. Instead, we keep the page and send it to page_handle_poison to perform the right handling. page_handle_poison sets the HWPoison flag and does the last put_page. Down the chain, we placed a check for HWPoison page in free_pages_prepare, that just skips any poisoned page, so those pages do not end up in any pcplist/freelist. After that, we set the refcount on the page to 1 and we increment the poisoned pages counter. If we see that the check in free_pages_prepare creates trouble, we can always do what we do for free pages: - wait until the page hits buddy's freelists - take it off, and flag it The downside of the above approach is that we could race with an allocation, so by the time we want to take the page off the buddy, the page has been already allocated so we cannot soft offline it. But the user could always retry it. * Hugetlb pages - We isolate-and-migrate them After the migration has been successful, we call dissolve_free_huge_page, and we set HWPoison on the page if we succeed. Hugetlb has a slightly different handling though. While for non-hugetlb pages we cared about closing the race with an allocation, doing so for hugetlb pages requires quite some additional and intrusive code (we would need to hook in free_huge_page and some other places). So I decided to not make the code overly complicated and just fail normally if the page we allocated in the meantime. We can always build on top of this. As a bonus, because of the way we handle now in-use pages, we no longer need the put-as-isolation-migratetype dance, that was guarding for poisoned pages to end up in pcplists. Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@ruivo.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Yakunin <zeil@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.com> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200922135650.1634-10-osalvador@suse.de Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-16 03:07:09 +00:00
if (!ret) {
bool release = !huge;
if (!page_handle_poison(page, huge, release))
ret = -EBUSY;
mm,hwpoison: rework soft offline for in-use pages This patch changes the way we set and handle in-use poisoned pages. Until now, poisoned pages were released to the buddy allocator, trusting that the checks that take place at allocation time would act as a safe net and would skip that page. This has proved to be wrong, as we got some pfn walkers out there, like compaction, that all they care is the page to be in a buddy freelist. Although this might not be the only user, having poisoned pages in the buddy allocator seems a bad idea as we should only have free pages that are ready and meant to be used as such. Before explaining the taken approach, let us break down the kind of pages we can soft offline. - Anonymous THP (after the split, they end up being 4K pages) - Hugetlb - Order-0 pages (that can be either migrated or invalited) * Normal pages (order-0 and anon-THP) - If they are clean and unmapped page cache pages, we invalidate then by means of invalidate_inode_page(). - If they are mapped/dirty, we do the isolate-and-migrate dance. Either way, do not call put_page directly from those paths. Instead, we keep the page and send it to page_handle_poison to perform the right handling. page_handle_poison sets the HWPoison flag and does the last put_page. Down the chain, we placed a check for HWPoison page in free_pages_prepare, that just skips any poisoned page, so those pages do not end up in any pcplist/freelist. After that, we set the refcount on the page to 1 and we increment the poisoned pages counter. If we see that the check in free_pages_prepare creates trouble, we can always do what we do for free pages: - wait until the page hits buddy's freelists - take it off, and flag it The downside of the above approach is that we could race with an allocation, so by the time we want to take the page off the buddy, the page has been already allocated so we cannot soft offline it. But the user could always retry it. * Hugetlb pages - We isolate-and-migrate them After the migration has been successful, we call dissolve_free_huge_page, and we set HWPoison on the page if we succeed. Hugetlb has a slightly different handling though. While for non-hugetlb pages we cared about closing the race with an allocation, doing so for hugetlb pages requires quite some additional and intrusive code (we would need to hook in free_huge_page and some other places). So I decided to not make the code overly complicated and just fail normally if the page we allocated in the meantime. We can always build on top of this. As a bonus, because of the way we handle now in-use pages, we no longer need the put-as-isolation-migratetype dance, that was guarding for poisoned pages to end up in pcplists. Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@ruivo.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Yakunin <zeil@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.com> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200922135650.1634-10-osalvador@suse.de Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-16 03:07:09 +00:00
} else {
if (!list_empty(&pagelist))
putback_movable_pages(&pagelist);
pr_info("soft offline: %#lx: %s migration failed %ld, type %pGp\n",
pfn, msg_page[huge], ret, &page->flags);
if (ret > 0)
ret = -EBUSY;
}
} else {
pr_info("soft offline: %#lx: %s isolation failed, page count %d, type %pGp\n",
pfn, msg_page[huge], page_count(page), &page->flags);
ret = -EBUSY;
}
return ret;
}
static int soft_offline_in_use_page(struct page *page)
{
struct page *hpage = compound_head(page);
if (!PageHuge(page) && PageTransHuge(hpage))
if (try_to_split_thp_page(page, "soft offline") < 0)
return -EBUSY;
return __soft_offline_page(page);
}
static int soft_offline_free_page(struct page *page)
{
int rc = 0;
if (!page_handle_poison(page, true, false))
rc = -EBUSY;
return rc;
}
static void put_ref_page(struct page *page)
{
if (page)
put_page(page);
}
/**
* soft_offline_page - Soft offline a page.
* @pfn: pfn to soft-offline
* @flags: flags. Same as memory_failure().
*
* Returns 0 on success
* -EOPNOTSUPP for hwpoison_filter() filtered the error event
* < 0 otherwise negated errno.
*
* Soft offline a page, by migration or invalidation,
* without killing anything. This is for the case when
* a page is not corrupted yet (so it's still valid to access),
* but has had a number of corrected errors and is better taken
* out.
*
* The actual policy on when to do that is maintained by
* user space.
*
* This should never impact any application or cause data loss,
* however it might take some time.
*
* This is not a 100% solution for all memory, but tries to be
* ``good enough'' for the majority of memory.
*/
int soft_offline_page(unsigned long pfn, int flags)
{
int ret;
bool try_again = true;
struct page *page, *ref_page = NULL;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!pfn_valid(pfn) && (flags & MF_COUNT_INCREASED));
if (!pfn_valid(pfn))
return -ENXIO;
if (flags & MF_COUNT_INCREASED)
ref_page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
/* Only online pages can be soft-offlined (esp., not ZONE_DEVICE). */
page = pfn_to_online_page(pfn);
if (!page) {
put_ref_page(ref_page);
return -EIO;
}
mm/hwpoison: mf_mutex for soft offline and unpoison Patch series "mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()", v4. The main purpose of this series is to sync unpoison code to recent changes around how hwpoison code takes page refcount. Unpoison should work or simply fail (without crash) if impossible. The recent works of keeping hwpoison pages in shmem pagecache introduce a new state of hwpoisoned pages, but unpoison for such pages is not supported yet with this series. It seems that soft-offline and unpoison can be used as general purpose page offline/online mechanism (not in the context of memory error). I think that we need some additional works to realize it because currently soft-offline and unpoison are assumed not to happen so frequently (print out too many messages for aggressive usecases). But anyway this could be another interesting next topic. v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210614021212.223326-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com/ v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211025230503.2650970-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211105055058.3152564-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ This patch (of 3): Originally mf_mutex is introduced to serialize multiple MCE events, but it is not that useful to allow unpoison to run in parallel with memory_failure() and soft offline. So apply mf_mutex to soft offline and unpoison. The memory failure handler and soft offline handler get simpler with this. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:02 +00:00
mutex_lock(&mf_mutex);
if (PageHWPoison(page)) {
pr_info("%s: %#lx page already poisoned\n", __func__, pfn);
put_ref_page(ref_page);
mm/hwpoison: mf_mutex for soft offline and unpoison Patch series "mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()", v4. The main purpose of this series is to sync unpoison code to recent changes around how hwpoison code takes page refcount. Unpoison should work or simply fail (without crash) if impossible. The recent works of keeping hwpoison pages in shmem pagecache introduce a new state of hwpoisoned pages, but unpoison for such pages is not supported yet with this series. It seems that soft-offline and unpoison can be used as general purpose page offline/online mechanism (not in the context of memory error). I think that we need some additional works to realize it because currently soft-offline and unpoison are assumed not to happen so frequently (print out too many messages for aggressive usecases). But anyway this could be another interesting next topic. v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210614021212.223326-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com/ v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211025230503.2650970-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211105055058.3152564-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ This patch (of 3): Originally mf_mutex is introduced to serialize multiple MCE events, but it is not that useful to allow unpoison to run in parallel with memory_failure() and soft offline. So apply mf_mutex to soft offline and unpoison. The memory failure handler and soft offline handler get simpler with this. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:02 +00:00
mutex_unlock(&mf_mutex);
mm,hwpoison: return 0 if the page is already poisoned in soft-offline Currently, there is an inconsistency when calling soft-offline from different paths on a page that is already poisoned. 1) madvise: madvise_inject_error skips any poisoned page and continues the loop. If that was the only page to madvise, it returns 0. 2) /sys/devices/system/memory/: When calling soft_offline_page_store()->soft_offline_page(), we return -EBUSY in case the page is already poisoned. This is inconsistent with a) the above example and b) memory_failure, where we return 0 if the page was poisoned. Fix this by dropping the PageHWPoison() check in madvise_inject_error, and let soft_offline_page return 0 if it finds the page already poisoned. Please, note that this represents a user-api change, since now the return error when calling soft_offline_page_store()->soft_offline_page() will be different. Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@ruivo.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Yakunin <zeil@yandex-team.ru> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.com> Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200922135650.1634-12-osalvador@suse.de Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-16 03:07:17 +00:00
return 0;
}
retry:
mem-hotplug: implement get/put_online_mems kmem_cache_{create,destroy,shrink} need to get a stable value of cpu/node online mask, because they init/destroy/access per-cpu/node kmem_cache parts, which can be allocated or destroyed on cpu/mem hotplug. To protect against cpu hotplug, these functions use {get,put}_online_cpus. However, they do nothing to synchronize with memory hotplug - taking the slab_mutex does not eliminate the possibility of race as described in patch 2. What we need there is something like get_online_cpus, but for memory. We already have lock_memory_hotplug, which serves for the purpose, but it's a bit of a hammer right now, because it's backed by a mutex. As a result, it imposes some limitations to locking order, which are not desirable, and can't be used just like get_online_cpus. That's why in patch 1 I substitute it with get/put_online_mems, which work exactly like get/put_online_cpus except they block not cpu, but memory hotplug. [ v1 can be found at https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/4/6/68. I NAK'ed it by myself, because it used an rw semaphore for get/put_online_mems, making them dead lock prune. ] This patch (of 2): {un}lock_memory_hotplug, which is used to synchronize against memory hotplug, is currently backed by a mutex, which makes it a bit of a hammer - threads that only want to get a stable value of online nodes mask won't be able to proceed concurrently. Also, it imposes some strong locking ordering rules on it, which narrows down the set of its usage scenarios. This patch introduces get/put_online_mems, which are the same as get/put_online_cpus, but for memory hotplug, i.e. executing a code inside a get/put_online_mems section will guarantee a stable value of online nodes, present pages, etc. lock_memory_hotplug()/unlock_memory_hotplug() are removed altogether. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Tang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com> Cc: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-04 23:07:18 +00:00
get_online_mems();
ret = get_hwpoison_page(page, flags | MF_SOFT_OFFLINE);
mem-hotplug: implement get/put_online_mems kmem_cache_{create,destroy,shrink} need to get a stable value of cpu/node online mask, because they init/destroy/access per-cpu/node kmem_cache parts, which can be allocated or destroyed on cpu/mem hotplug. To protect against cpu hotplug, these functions use {get,put}_online_cpus. However, they do nothing to synchronize with memory hotplug - taking the slab_mutex does not eliminate the possibility of race as described in patch 2. What we need there is something like get_online_cpus, but for memory. We already have lock_memory_hotplug, which serves for the purpose, but it's a bit of a hammer right now, because it's backed by a mutex. As a result, it imposes some limitations to locking order, which are not desirable, and can't be used just like get_online_cpus. That's why in patch 1 I substitute it with get/put_online_mems, which work exactly like get/put_online_cpus except they block not cpu, but memory hotplug. [ v1 can be found at https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/4/6/68. I NAK'ed it by myself, because it used an rw semaphore for get/put_online_mems, making them dead lock prune. ] This patch (of 2): {un}lock_memory_hotplug, which is used to synchronize against memory hotplug, is currently backed by a mutex, which makes it a bit of a hammer - threads that only want to get a stable value of online nodes mask won't be able to proceed concurrently. Also, it imposes some strong locking ordering rules on it, which narrows down the set of its usage scenarios. This patch introduces get/put_online_mems, which are the same as get/put_online_cpus, but for memory hotplug, i.e. executing a code inside a get/put_online_mems section will guarantee a stable value of online nodes, present pages, etc. lock_memory_hotplug()/unlock_memory_hotplug() are removed altogether. Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Tang Chen <tangchen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Zhang Yanfei <zhangyanfei@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com> Cc: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Yasuaki Ishimatsu <isimatu.yasuaki@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-06-04 23:07:18 +00:00
put_online_mems();
if (hwpoison_filter(page)) {
if (ret > 0)
put_page(page);
else
put_ref_page(ref_page);
mutex_unlock(&mf_mutex);
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
if (ret > 0) {
ret = soft_offline_in_use_page(page);
} else if (ret == 0) {
if (soft_offline_free_page(page) && try_again) {
try_again = false;
mm/hwpoison: clear MF_COUNT_INCREASED before retrying get_any_page() Hulk Robot reported a panic in put_page_testzero() when testing madvise() with MADV_SOFT_OFFLINE. The BUG() is triggered when retrying get_any_page(). This is because we keep MF_COUNT_INCREASED flag in second try but the refcnt is not increased. page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_ref_count(page) == 0) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:737! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 5 PID: 2135 Comm: sshd Tainted: G B 5.16.0-rc6-dirty #373 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 RIP: release_pages+0x53f/0x840 Call Trace: free_pages_and_swap_cache+0x64/0x80 tlb_flush_mmu+0x6f/0x220 unmap_page_range+0xe6c/0x12c0 unmap_single_vma+0x90/0x170 unmap_vmas+0xc4/0x180 exit_mmap+0xde/0x3a0 mmput+0xa3/0x250 do_exit+0x564/0x1470 do_group_exit+0x3b/0x100 __do_sys_exit_group+0x13/0x20 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x34/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Modules linked in: ---[ end trace e99579b570fe0649 ]--- RIP: 0010:release_pages+0x53f/0x840 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211221074908.3910286-1-liushixin2@huawei.com Fixes: b94e02822deb ("mm,hwpoison: try to narrow window race for free pages") Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com> Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-12-25 05:12:58 +00:00
flags &= ~MF_COUNT_INCREASED;
goto retry;
}
}
mm/hwpoison: mf_mutex for soft offline and unpoison Patch series "mm/hwpoison: fix unpoison_memory()", v4. The main purpose of this series is to sync unpoison code to recent changes around how hwpoison code takes page refcount. Unpoison should work or simply fail (without crash) if impossible. The recent works of keeping hwpoison pages in shmem pagecache introduce a new state of hwpoisoned pages, but unpoison for such pages is not supported yet with this series. It seems that soft-offline and unpoison can be used as general purpose page offline/online mechanism (not in the context of memory error). I think that we need some additional works to realize it because currently soft-offline and unpoison are assumed not to happen so frequently (print out too many messages for aggressive usecases). But anyway this could be another interesting next topic. v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210614021212.223326-1-nao.horiguchi@gmail.com/ v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211025230503.2650970-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20211105055058.3152564-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev/ This patch (of 3): Originally mf_mutex is introduced to serialize multiple MCE events, but it is not that useful to allow unpoison to run in parallel with memory_failure() and soft offline. So apply mf_mutex to soft offline and unpoison. The memory failure handler and soft offline handler get simpler with this. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-1-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211115084006.3728254-2-naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Ding Hui <dinghui@sangfor.com.cn> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-14 22:09:02 +00:00
mutex_unlock(&mf_mutex);
return ret;
}
mm/memory-failure.c: move clear_hwpoisoned_pages Patch series "memory-failure: fix hwpoison_filter", v2. As well known, the memory failure mechanism handles memory corrupted event, and try to send SIGBUS to the user process which uses this corrupted page. For the virtualization case, QEMU catches SIGBUS and tries to inject MCE into the guest, and the guest handles memory failure again. Thus the guest gets the minimal effect from hardware memory corruption. The further step I'm working on: 1, try to modify code to decrease poisoned pages in a single place (mm/memofy-failure.c: simplify num_poisoned_pages_dec in this series). 2, try to use page_handle_poison() to handle SetPageHWPoison() and num_poisoned_pages_inc() together. It would be best to call num_poisoned_pages_inc() in a single place too. 3, introduce memory failure notifier list in memory-failure.c: notify the corrupted PFN to someone who registers this list. If I can complete [1] and [2] part, [3] will be quite easy(just call notifier list after increasing poisoned page). 4, introduce memory recover VQ for memory balloon device, and registers memory failure notifier list. During the guest kernel handles memory failure, balloon device gets notified by memory failure notifier list, and tells the host to recover the corrupted PFN(GPA) by the new VQ. 5, host side remaps the corrupted page(HVA), and tells the guest side to unpoison the PFN(GPA). Then the guest fixes the corrupted page(GPA) dynamically. This patch (of 5): clear_hwpoisoned_pages() clears HWPoison flag and decreases the number of poisoned pages, this actually works as part of memory failure. Move this function from sparse.c to memory-failure.c, finally there is no CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE in sparse.c. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220509105641.491313-1-pizhenwei@bytedance.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220509105641.491313-2-pizhenwei@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi <pizhenwei@bytedance.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-05-13 03:23:09 +00:00
void clear_hwpoisoned_pages(struct page *memmap, int nr_pages)
{
int i;
/*
* A further optimization is to have per section refcounted
* num_poisoned_pages. But that would need more space per memmap, so
* for now just do a quick global check to speed up this routine in the
* absence of bad pages.
*/
if (atomic_long_read(&num_poisoned_pages) == 0)
return;
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
if (PageHWPoison(&memmap[i])) {
num_poisoned_pages_dec();
ClearPageHWPoison(&memmap[i]);
}
}
}