linux/include/xen/xen-ops.h

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef INCLUDE_XEN_OPS_H
#define INCLUDE_XEN_OPS_H
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/notifier.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <xen/features.h>
#include <asm/xen/interface.h>
#include <xen/interface/vcpu.h>
DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct vcpu_info *, xen_vcpu);
DECLARE_PER_CPU(uint32_t, xen_vcpu_id);
static inline uint32_t xen_vcpu_nr(int cpu)
{
return per_cpu(xen_vcpu_id, cpu);
}
xen/pvh*: Support > 32 VCPUs at domain restore When Xen restores a PVHVM or PVH guest, its shared_info only holds up to 32 CPUs. The hypercall VCPUOP_register_vcpu_info allows us to setup per-page areas for VCPUs. This means we can boot PVH* guests with more than 32 VCPUs. During restore the per-cpu structure is allocated freshly by the hypervisor (vcpu_info_mfn is set to INVALID_MFN) so that the newly restored guest can make a VCPUOP_register_vcpu_info hypercall. However, we end up triggering this condition in Xen: /* Run this command on yourself or on other offline VCPUS. */ if ( (v != current) && !test_bit(_VPF_down, &v->pause_flags) ) which means we are unable to setup the per-cpu VCPU structures for running VCPUS. The Linux PV code paths makes this work by iterating over cpu_possible in xen_vcpu_restore() with: 1) is target CPU up (VCPUOP_is_up hypercall?) 2) if yes, then VCPUOP_down to pause it 3) VCPUOP_register_vcpu_info 4) if it was down, then VCPUOP_up to bring it back up With Xen commit 192df6f9122d ("xen/x86: allow HVM guests to use hypercalls to bring up vCPUs") this is available for non-PV guests. As such first check if VCPUOP_is_up is actually possible before trying this dance. As most of this dance code is done already in xen_vcpu_restore() let's make it callable on PV, PVH and PVHVM. Based-on-patch-by: Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Ankur Arora <ankur.a.arora@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
2017-06-03 00:05:59 +00:00
#define XEN_VCPU_ID_INVALID U32_MAX
void xen_arch_pre_suspend(void);
void xen_arch_post_suspend(int suspend_cancelled);
void xen_timer_resume(void);
void xen_arch_resume(void);
void xen_arch_suspend(void);
void xen_reboot(int reason);
void xen_resume_notifier_register(struct notifier_block *nb);
void xen_resume_notifier_unregister(struct notifier_block *nb);
bool xen_vcpu_stolen(int vcpu);
void xen_setup_runstate_info(int cpu);
void xen_time_setup_guest(void);
xen/time: do not decrease steal time after live migration on xen After guest live migration on xen, steal time in /proc/stat (cpustat[CPUTIME_STEAL]) might decrease because steal returned by xen_steal_lock() might be less than this_rq()->prev_steal_time which is derived from previous return value of xen_steal_clock(). For instance, steal time of each vcpu is 335 before live migration. cpu 198 0 368 200064 1962 0 0 1340 0 0 cpu0 38 0 81 50063 492 0 0 335 0 0 cpu1 65 0 97 49763 634 0 0 335 0 0 cpu2 38 0 81 50098 462 0 0 335 0 0 cpu3 56 0 107 50138 374 0 0 335 0 0 After live migration, steal time is reduced to 312. cpu 200 0 370 200330 1971 0 0 1248 0 0 cpu0 38 0 82 50123 500 0 0 312 0 0 cpu1 65 0 97 49832 634 0 0 312 0 0 cpu2 39 0 82 50167 462 0 0 312 0 0 cpu3 56 0 107 50207 374 0 0 312 0 0 Since runstate times are cumulative and cleared during xen live migration by xen hypervisor, the idea of this patch is to accumulate runstate times to global percpu variables before live migration suspend. Once guest VM is resumed, xen_get_runstate_snapshot_cpu() would always return the sum of new runstate times and previously accumulated times stored in global percpu variables. Comment above HYPERVISOR_suspend() has been removed as it is inaccurate: the call can return an error code (e.g., possibly -EPERM in the future). Similar and more severe issue would impact prior linux 4.8-4.10 as discussed by Michael Las at https://0xstubs.org/debugging-a-flaky-cpu-steal-time-counter-on-a-paravirtualized-xen-guest, which would overflow steal time and lead to 100% st usage in top command for linux 4.8-4.10. A backport of this patch would fix that issue. [boris: added linux/slab.h to driver/xen/time.c, slightly reformatted commit message] References: https://0xstubs.org/debugging-a-flaky-cpu-steal-time-counter-on-a-paravirtualized-xen-guest Signed-off-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
2017-11-01 01:46:33 +00:00
void xen_manage_runstate_time(int action);
void xen_get_runstate_snapshot(struct vcpu_runstate_info *res);
u64 xen_steal_clock(int cpu);
int xen_setup_shutdown_event(void);
extern unsigned long *xen_contiguous_bitmap;
#if defined(CONFIG_XEN_PV) || defined(CONFIG_ARM) || defined(CONFIG_ARM64)
int xen_create_contiguous_region(phys_addr_t pstart, unsigned int order,
unsigned int address_bits,
dma_addr_t *dma_handle);
void xen_destroy_contiguous_region(phys_addr_t pstart, unsigned int order);
#else
static inline int xen_create_contiguous_region(phys_addr_t pstart,
unsigned int order,
unsigned int address_bits,
dma_addr_t *dma_handle)
{
return 0;
}
static inline void xen_destroy_contiguous_region(phys_addr_t pstart,
unsigned int order) { }
#endif
#if defined(CONFIG_XEN_PV)
int xen_remap_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
xen_pfn_t *pfn, int nr, int *err_ptr, pgprot_t prot,
unsigned int domid, bool no_translate, struct page **pages);
#else
static inline int xen_remap_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
xen_pfn_t *pfn, int nr, int *err_ptr,
pgprot_t prot, unsigned int domid,
bool no_translate, struct page **pages)
{
BUG();
return 0;
}
#endif
struct vm_area_struct;
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_AUTO_XLATE
int xen_xlate_remap_gfn_array(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long addr,
xen_pfn_t *gfn, int nr,
int *err_ptr, pgprot_t prot,
unsigned int domid,
struct page **pages);
int xen_xlate_unmap_gfn_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
int nr, struct page **pages);
#else
/*
* These two functions are called from arch/x86/xen/mmu.c and so stubs
* are needed for a configuration not specifying CONFIG_XEN_AUTO_XLATE.
*/
static inline int xen_xlate_remap_gfn_array(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long addr,
xen_pfn_t *gfn, int nr,
int *err_ptr, pgprot_t prot,
unsigned int domid,
struct page **pages)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static inline int xen_xlate_unmap_gfn_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
int nr, struct page **pages)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
#endif
/*
* xen_remap_domain_gfn_array() - map an array of foreign frames by gfn
* @vma: VMA to map the pages into
* @addr: Address at which to map the pages
* @gfn: Array of GFNs to map
* @nr: Number entries in the GFN array
* @err_ptr: Returns per-GFN error status.
* @prot: page protection mask
* @domid: Domain owning the pages
* @pages: Array of pages if this domain has an auto-translated physmap
*
* @gfn and @err_ptr may point to the same buffer, the GFNs will be
* overwritten by the error codes after they are mapped.
*
* Returns the number of successfully mapped frames, or a -ve error
* code.
*/
static inline int xen_remap_domain_gfn_array(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long addr,
xen_pfn_t *gfn, int nr,
int *err_ptr, pgprot_t prot,
unsigned int domid,
struct page **pages)
{
if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap))
return xen_xlate_remap_gfn_array(vma, addr, gfn, nr, err_ptr,
prot, domid, pages);
/* We BUG_ON because it's a programmer error to pass a NULL err_ptr,
* and the consequences later is quite hard to detect what the actual
* cause of "wrong memory was mapped in".
*/
BUG_ON(err_ptr == NULL);
return xen_remap_pfn(vma, addr, gfn, nr, err_ptr, prot, domid,
false, pages);
}
/*
* xen_remap_domain_mfn_array() - map an array of foreign frames by mfn
* @vma: VMA to map the pages into
* @addr: Address at which to map the pages
* @mfn: Array of MFNs to map
* @nr: Number entries in the MFN array
* @err_ptr: Returns per-MFN error status.
* @prot: page protection mask
* @domid: Domain owning the pages
* @pages: Array of pages if this domain has an auto-translated physmap
*
* @mfn and @err_ptr may point to the same buffer, the MFNs will be
* overwritten by the error codes after they are mapped.
*
* Returns the number of successfully mapped frames, or a -ve error
* code.
*/
static inline int xen_remap_domain_mfn_array(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long addr, xen_pfn_t *mfn,
int nr, int *err_ptr,
pgprot_t prot, unsigned int domid,
struct page **pages)
{
if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return xen_remap_pfn(vma, addr, mfn, nr, err_ptr, prot, domid,
true, pages);
}
/* xen_remap_domain_gfn_range() - map a range of foreign frames
* @vma: VMA to map the pages into
* @addr: Address at which to map the pages
* @gfn: First GFN to map.
* @nr: Number frames to map
* @prot: page protection mask
* @domid: Domain owning the pages
* @pages: Array of pages if this domain has an auto-translated physmap
*
* Returns the number of successfully mapped frames, or a -ve error
* code.
*/
static inline int xen_remap_domain_gfn_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long addr,
xen_pfn_t gfn, int nr,
pgprot_t prot, unsigned int domid,
struct page **pages)
{
if (xen_feature(XENFEAT_auto_translated_physmap))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return xen_remap_pfn(vma, addr, &gfn, nr, NULL, prot, domid, false,
pages);
}
int xen_unmap_domain_gfn_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
int numpgs, struct page **pages);
int xen_xlate_map_ballooned_pages(xen_pfn_t **pfns, void **vaddr,
unsigned long nr_grant_frames);
bool xen_running_on_version_or_later(unsigned int major, unsigned int minor);
efi_status_t xen_efi_get_time(efi_time_t *tm, efi_time_cap_t *tc);
efi_status_t xen_efi_set_time(efi_time_t *tm);
efi_status_t xen_efi_get_wakeup_time(efi_bool_t *enabled, efi_bool_t *pending,
efi_time_t *tm);
efi_status_t xen_efi_set_wakeup_time(efi_bool_t enabled, efi_time_t *tm);
efi_status_t xen_efi_get_variable(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *vendor,
u32 *attr, unsigned long *data_size,
void *data);
efi_status_t xen_efi_get_next_variable(unsigned long *name_size,
efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *vendor);
efi_status_t xen_efi_set_variable(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *vendor,
u32 attr, unsigned long data_size,
void *data);
efi_status_t xen_efi_query_variable_info(u32 attr, u64 *storage_space,
u64 *remaining_space,
u64 *max_variable_size);
efi_status_t xen_efi_get_next_high_mono_count(u32 *count);
efi_status_t xen_efi_update_capsule(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
unsigned long count, unsigned long sg_list);
efi_status_t xen_efi_query_capsule_caps(efi_capsule_header_t **capsules,
unsigned long count, u64 *max_size,
int *reset_type);
xen: Implement EFI reset_system callback When rebooting DOM0 with ACPI on ARM64, the kernel is crashing with the stack trace [1]. This is happening because when EFI runtimes are enabled, the reset code (see machine_restart) will first try to use EFI restart method. However, the EFI restart code is expecting the reset_system callback to be always set. This is not the case for Xen and will lead to crash. The EFI restart helper is used in multiple places and some of them don't not have fallback (see machine_power_off). So implement reset_system callback as a call to xen_reboot when using EFI Xen. [ 36.999270] reboot: Restarting system [ 37.002921] Internal error: Attempting to execute userspace memory: 86000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 37.011460] Modules linked in: [ 37.014598] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00003-g1e248b60a39b-dirty #506 [ 37.023903] Hardware name: (null) (DT) [ 37.027734] task: ffff800902068000 task.stack: ffff800902064000 [ 37.033739] PC is at 0x0 [ 37.036359] LR is at efi_reboot+0x94/0xd0 [ 37.040438] pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffff00000880f2c4>] pstate: 404001c5 [ 37.047920] sp : ffff800902067cf0 [ 37.051314] x29: ffff800902067cf0 x28: ffff800902068000 [ 37.056709] x27: ffff000008992000 x26: 000000000000008e [ 37.062104] x25: 0000000000000123 x24: 0000000000000015 [ 37.067499] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff000008e6e250 [ 37.072894] x21: ffff000008e6e000 x20: 0000000000000000 [ 37.078289] x19: ffff000008e5d4c8 x18: 0000000000000010 [ 37.083684] x17: 0000ffffa7c27470 x16: 00000000deadbeef [ 37.089079] x15: 0000000000000006 x14: ffff000088f42bef [ 37.094474] x13: ffff000008f42bfd x12: ffff000008e706c0 [ 37.099870] x11: ffff000008e70000 x10: 0000000005f5e0ff [ 37.105265] x9 : ffff800902067a50 x8 : 6974726174736552 [ 37.110660] x7 : ffff000008cc6fb8 x6 : ffff000008cc6fb0 [ 37.116055] x5 : ffff000008c97dd8 x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 37.121453] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 [ 37.126845] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 37.132239] [ 37.133808] Process systemd-shutdow (pid: 1, stack limit = 0xffff800902064000) [ 37.141118] Stack: (0xffff800902067cf0 to 0xffff800902068000) [ 37.146949] 7ce0: ffff800902067d40 ffff000008085334 [ 37.154869] 7d00: 0000000000000000 ffff000008f3b000 ffff800902067d40 ffff0000080852e0 [ 37.162787] 7d20: ffff000008cc6fb0 ffff000008cc6fb8 ffff000008c7f580 ffff000008c97dd8 [ 37.170706] 7d40: ffff800902067d60 ffff0000080e2c2c 0000000000000000 0000000001234567 [ 37.178624] 7d60: ffff800902067d80 ffff0000080e2ee8 0000000000000000 ffff0000080e2df4 [ 37.186544] 7d80: 0000000000000000 ffff0000080830f0 0000000000000000 00008008ff1c1000 [ 37.194462] 7da0: ffffffffffffffff 0000ffffa7c4b1cc 0000000000000000 0000000000000024 [ 37.202380] 7dc0: ffff800902067dd0 0000000000000005 0000fffff24743c8 0000000000000004 [ 37.210299] 7de0: 0000fffff2475f03 0000000000000010 0000fffff2474418 0000000000000005 [ 37.218218] 7e00: 0000fffff2474578 000000000000000a 0000aaaad6b722c0 0000000000000001 [ 37.226136] 7e20: 0000000000000123 0000000000000038 ffff800902067e50 ffff0000081e7294 [ 37.234055] 7e40: ffff800902067e60 ffff0000081e935c ffff800902067e60 ffff0000081e9388 [ 37.241973] 7e60: ffff800902067eb0 ffff0000081ea388 0000000000000000 00008008ff1c1000 [ 37.249892] 7e80: ffffffffffffffff 0000ffffa7c4a79c 0000000000000000 ffff000000020000 [ 37.257810] 7ea0: 0000010000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff0000080830f0 [ 37.265729] 7ec0: fffffffffee1dead 0000000028121969 0000000001234567 0000000000000000 [ 37.273651] 7ee0: ffffffffffffffff 8080000000800000 0000800000008080 feffa9a9d4ff2d66 [ 37.281567] 7f00: 000000000000008e feffa9a9d5b60e0f 7f7fffffffff7f7f 0101010101010101 [ 37.289485] 7f20: 0000000000000010 0000000000000008 000000000000003a 0000ffffa7ccf588 [ 37.297404] 7f40: 0000aaaad6b87d00 0000ffffa7c4b1b0 0000fffff2474be0 0000aaaad6b88000 [ 37.305326] 7f60: 0000fffff2474fb0 0000000001234567 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 37.313240] 7f80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000aaaad6b70d4d 0000000000000000 [ 37.321159] 7fa0: 0000000000000001 0000fffff2474ea0 0000aaaad6b5e2e0 0000fffff2474e80 [ 37.329078] 7fc0: 0000ffffa7c4b1cc 0000000000000000 fffffffffee1dead 000000000000008e [ 37.336997] 7fe0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9ce839cffee77eab fafdbf9f7ed57f2f [ 37.344911] Call trace: [ 37.347437] Exception stack(0xffff800902067b20 to 0xffff800902067c50) [ 37.353970] 7b20: ffff000008e5d4c8 0001000000000000 0000000080f82000 0000000000000000 [ 37.361883] 7b40: ffff800902067b60 ffff000008e17000 ffff000008f44c68 00000001081081b4 [ 37.369802] 7b60: ffff800902067bf0 ffff000008108478 0000000000000000 ffff000008c235b0 [ 37.377721] 7b80: ffff800902067ce0 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000015 [ 37.385643] 7ba0: 0000000000000123 000000000000008e ffff000008992000 ffff800902068000 [ 37.393557] 7bc0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 37.401477] 7be0: 0000000000000000 ffff000008c97dd8 ffff000008cc6fb0 ffff000008cc6fb8 [ 37.409396] 7c00: 6974726174736552 ffff800902067a50 0000000005f5e0ff ffff000008e70000 [ 37.417318] 7c20: ffff000008e706c0 ffff000008f42bfd ffff000088f42bef 0000000000000006 [ 37.425234] 7c40: 00000000deadbeef 0000ffffa7c27470 [ 37.430190] [< (null)>] (null) [ 37.434982] [<ffff000008085334>] machine_restart+0x6c/0x70 [ 37.440550] [<ffff0000080e2c2c>] kernel_restart+0x6c/0x78 [ 37.446030] [<ffff0000080e2ee8>] SyS_reboot+0x130/0x228 [ 37.451337] [<ffff0000080830f0>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28 [ 37.456737] Code: bad PC value [ 37.459891] ---[ end trace 76e2fc17e050aecd ]--- Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com> -- Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org The x86 code has theoritically a similar issue, altought EFI does not seem to be the preferred method. I have only built test it on x86. This should also probably be fixed in stable tree. Changes in v2: - Implement xen_efi_reset_system using xen_reboot - Move xen_efi_reset_system in drivers/xen/efi.c Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
2017-04-24 17:58:39 +00:00
void xen_efi_reset_system(int reset_type, efi_status_t status,
unsigned long data_size, efi_char16_t *data);
#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT
static inline void xen_preemptible_hcall_begin(void)
{
}
static inline void xen_preemptible_hcall_end(void)
{
}
#else
DECLARE_PER_CPU(bool, xen_in_preemptible_hcall);
static inline void xen_preemptible_hcall_begin(void)
{
__this_cpu_write(xen_in_preemptible_hcall, true);
}
static inline void xen_preemptible_hcall_end(void)
{
__this_cpu_write(xen_in_preemptible_hcall, false);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PREEMPT */
#endif /* INCLUDE_XEN_OPS_H */