linux/net/ipv6/seg6.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* SR-IPv6 implementation
*
* Author:
* David Lebrun <david.lebrun@uclouvain.be>
*/
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/in6.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/rhashtable.h>
#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include <net/protocol.h>
#include <net/seg6.h>
#include <net/genetlink.h>
#include <linux/seg6.h>
#include <linux/seg6_genl.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_HMAC
#include <net/seg6_hmac.h>
#endif
bool seg6_validate_srh(struct ipv6_sr_hdr *srh, int len, bool reduced)
{
unsigned int tlv_offset;
int max_last_entry;
int trailing;
if (srh->type != IPV6_SRCRT_TYPE_4)
return false;
if (((srh->hdrlen + 1) << 3) != len)
return false;
if (!reduced && srh->segments_left > srh->first_segment) {
return false;
} else {
max_last_entry = (srh->hdrlen / 2) - 1;
if (srh->first_segment > max_last_entry)
return false;
if (srh->segments_left > srh->first_segment + 1)
return false;
}
tlv_offset = sizeof(*srh) + ((srh->first_segment + 1) << 4);
trailing = len - tlv_offset;
if (trailing < 0)
return false;
while (trailing) {
struct sr6_tlv *tlv;
unsigned int tlv_len;
if (trailing < sizeof(*tlv))
return false;
tlv = (struct sr6_tlv *)((unsigned char *)srh + tlv_offset);
tlv_len = sizeof(*tlv) + tlv->len;
trailing -= tlv_len;
if (trailing < 0)
return false;
tlv_offset += tlv_len;
}
return true;
}
struct ipv6_sr_hdr *seg6_get_srh(struct sk_buff *skb, int flags)
{
struct ipv6_sr_hdr *srh;
int len, srhoff = 0;
if (ipv6_find_hdr(skb, &srhoff, IPPROTO_ROUTING, NULL, &flags) < 0)
return NULL;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, srhoff + sizeof(*srh)))
return NULL;
srh = (struct ipv6_sr_hdr *)(skb->data + srhoff);
len = (srh->hdrlen + 1) << 3;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, srhoff + len))
return NULL;
/* note that pskb_may_pull may change pointers in header;
* for this reason it is necessary to reload them when needed.
*/
srh = (struct ipv6_sr_hdr *)(skb->data + srhoff);
if (!seg6_validate_srh(srh, len, true))
return NULL;
return srh;
}
2022-01-03 17:11:31 +00:00
/* Determine if an ICMP invoking packet contains a segment routing
* header. If it does, extract the offset to the true destination
* address, which is in the first segment address.
*/
void seg6_icmp_srh(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt)
{
__u16 network_header = skb->network_header;
struct ipv6_sr_hdr *srh;
/* Update network header to point to the invoking packet
* inside the ICMP packet, so we can use the seg6_get_srh()
* helper.
*/
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
srh = seg6_get_srh(skb, 0);
if (!srh)
goto out;
if (srh->type != IPV6_SRCRT_TYPE_4)
goto out;
opt->flags |= IP6SKB_SEG6;
opt->srhoff = (unsigned char *)srh - skb->data;
out:
/* Restore the network header back to the ICMP packet */
skb->network_header = network_header;
}
static struct genl_family seg6_genl_family;
static const struct nla_policy seg6_genl_policy[SEG6_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
[SEG6_ATTR_DST] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
.len = sizeof(struct in6_addr) },
[SEG6_ATTR_DSTLEN] = { .type = NLA_S32, },
[SEG6_ATTR_HMACKEYID] = { .type = NLA_U32, },
[SEG6_ATTR_SECRET] = { .type = NLA_BINARY, },
[SEG6_ATTR_SECRETLEN] = { .type = NLA_U8, },
[SEG6_ATTR_ALGID] = { .type = NLA_U8, },
[SEG6_ATTR_HMACINFO] = { .type = NLA_NESTED, },
};
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_HMAC
static int seg6_genl_sethmac(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct net *net = genl_info_net(info);
struct seg6_pernet_data *sdata;
struct seg6_hmac_info *hinfo;
u32 hmackeyid;
char *secret;
int err = 0;
u8 algid;
u8 slen;
sdata = seg6_pernet(net);
if (!info->attrs[SEG6_ATTR_HMACKEYID] ||
!info->attrs[SEG6_ATTR_SECRETLEN] ||
!info->attrs[SEG6_ATTR_ALGID])
return -EINVAL;
hmackeyid = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[SEG6_ATTR_HMACKEYID]);
slen = nla_get_u8(info->attrs[SEG6_ATTR_SECRETLEN]);
algid = nla_get_u8(info->attrs[SEG6_ATTR_ALGID]);
if (hmackeyid == 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (slen > SEG6_HMAC_SECRET_LEN)
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&sdata->lock);
hinfo = seg6_hmac_info_lookup(net, hmackeyid);
if (!slen) {
err = seg6_hmac_info_del(net, hmackeyid);
goto out_unlock;
}
if (!info->attrs[SEG6_ATTR_SECRET]) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
ipv6: sr: fix out-of-bounds read when setting HMAC data. The SRv6 layer allows defining HMAC data that can later be used to sign IPv6 Segment Routing Headers. This configuration is realised via netlink through four attributes: SEG6_ATTR_HMACKEYID, SEG6_ATTR_SECRET, SEG6_ATTR_SECRETLEN and SEG6_ATTR_ALGID. Because the SECRETLEN attribute is decoupled from the actual length of the SECRET attribute, it is possible to provide invalid combinations (e.g., secret = "", secretlen = 64). This case is not checked in the code and with an appropriately crafted netlink message, an out-of-bounds read of up to 64 bytes (max secret length) can occur past the skb end pointer and into skb_shared_info: Breakpoint 1, seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208 208 memcpy(hinfo->secret, secret, slen); (gdb) bt #0 seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208 #1 0xffffffff81e012e9 in genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=nlh@entry=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=extack@entry=0xffffc90000ba7af0, ops=ops@entry=0xffffc90000ba7a80, hdrlen=4, net=0xffffffff84237580 <init_net>, family=<optimized out>, family=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:731 #2 0xffffffff81e01435 in genl_family_rcv_msg (extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, family=0xffffffff82fef6c0 <seg6_genl_family>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:775 #3 genl_rcv_msg (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:792 #4 0xffffffff81dfffc3 in netlink_rcv_skb (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, cb=cb@entry=0xffffffff81e01350 <genl_rcv_msg>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501 #5 0xffffffff81e00919 in genl_rcv (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:803 #6 0xffffffff81dff6ae in netlink_unicast_kernel (ssk=0xffff888010eec800, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, sk=0xffff888004aed000) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 #7 netlink_unicast (ssk=ssk@entry=0xffff888010eec800, skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, portid=portid@entry=0, nonblock=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345 #8 0xffffffff81dff9a4 in netlink_sendmsg (sock=<optimized out>, msg=0xffffc90000ba7e48, len=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921 ... (gdb) p/x ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->head + ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->end $1 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0 (gdb) p/x secret $2 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0 (gdb) p slen $3 = 64 '@' The OOB data can then be read back from userspace by dumping HMAC state. This commit fixes this by ensuring SECRETLEN cannot exceed the actual length of SECRET. Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang.tw@gmail.com> Tested: verified that EINVAL is correctly returned when secretlen > len(secret) Fixes: 4f4853dc1c9c1 ("ipv6: sr: implement API to control SR HMAC structure") Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-09-02 09:45:06 +00:00
if (slen > nla_len(info->attrs[SEG6_ATTR_SECRET])) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
if (hinfo) {
err = seg6_hmac_info_del(net, hmackeyid);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
}
secret = (char *)nla_data(info->attrs[SEG6_ATTR_SECRET]);
hinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(*hinfo), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!hinfo) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_unlock;
}
memcpy(hinfo->secret, secret, slen);
hinfo->slen = slen;
hinfo->alg_id = algid;
hinfo->hmackeyid = hmackeyid;
err = seg6_hmac_info_add(net, hmackeyid, hinfo);
if (err)
kfree(hinfo);
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&sdata->lock);
return err;
}
#else
static int seg6_genl_sethmac(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
return -ENOTSUPP;
}
#endif
static int seg6_genl_set_tunsrc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct net *net = genl_info_net(info);
struct in6_addr *val, *t_old, *t_new;
struct seg6_pernet_data *sdata;
sdata = seg6_pernet(net);
if (!info->attrs[SEG6_ATTR_DST])
return -EINVAL;
val = nla_data(info->attrs[SEG6_ATTR_DST]);
t_new = kmemdup(val, sizeof(*val), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!t_new)
return -ENOMEM;
mutex_lock(&sdata->lock);
t_old = sdata->tun_src;
rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->tun_src, t_new);
mutex_unlock(&sdata->lock);
synchronize_net();
kfree(t_old);
return 0;
}
static int seg6_genl_get_tunsrc(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct net *net = genl_info_net(info);
struct in6_addr *tun_src;
struct sk_buff *msg;
void *hdr;
msg = genlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!msg)
return -ENOMEM;
hdr = genlmsg_put(msg, info->snd_portid, info->snd_seq,
&seg6_genl_family, 0, SEG6_CMD_GET_TUNSRC);
if (!hdr)
goto free_msg;
rcu_read_lock();
tun_src = rcu_dereference(seg6_pernet(net)->tun_src);
if (nla_put(msg, SEG6_ATTR_DST, sizeof(struct in6_addr), tun_src))
goto nla_put_failure;
rcu_read_unlock();
genlmsg_end(msg, hdr);
return genlmsg_reply(msg, info);
nla_put_failure:
rcu_read_unlock();
free_msg:
nlmsg_free(msg);
return -ENOMEM;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_HMAC
static int __seg6_hmac_fill_info(struct seg6_hmac_info *hinfo,
struct sk_buff *msg)
{
if (nla_put_u32(msg, SEG6_ATTR_HMACKEYID, hinfo->hmackeyid) ||
nla_put_u8(msg, SEG6_ATTR_SECRETLEN, hinfo->slen) ||
nla_put(msg, SEG6_ATTR_SECRET, hinfo->slen, hinfo->secret) ||
nla_put_u8(msg, SEG6_ATTR_ALGID, hinfo->alg_id))
return -1;
return 0;
}
static int __seg6_genl_dumphmac_element(struct seg6_hmac_info *hinfo,
u32 portid, u32 seq, u32 flags,
struct sk_buff *skb, u8 cmd)
{
void *hdr;
hdr = genlmsg_put(skb, portid, seq, &seg6_genl_family, flags, cmd);
if (!hdr)
return -ENOMEM;
if (__seg6_hmac_fill_info(hinfo, skb) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
genlmsg_end(skb, hdr);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
genlmsg_cancel(skb, hdr);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
static int seg6_genl_dumphmac_start(struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(cb->skb->sk);
struct seg6_pernet_data *sdata;
struct rhashtable_iter *iter;
sdata = seg6_pernet(net);
iter = (struct rhashtable_iter *)cb->args[0];
if (!iter) {
iter = kmalloc(sizeof(*iter), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!iter)
return -ENOMEM;
cb->args[0] = (long)iter;
}
rhashtable_walk_enter(&sdata->hmac_infos, iter);
return 0;
}
static int seg6_genl_dumphmac_done(struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct rhashtable_iter *iter = (struct rhashtable_iter *)cb->args[0];
rhashtable_walk_exit(iter);
kfree(iter);
return 0;
}
static int seg6_genl_dumphmac(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct rhashtable_iter *iter = (struct rhashtable_iter *)cb->args[0];
struct seg6_hmac_info *hinfo;
int ret;
rhashtable_walk_start(iter);
for (;;) {
hinfo = rhashtable_walk_next(iter);
if (IS_ERR(hinfo)) {
if (PTR_ERR(hinfo) == -EAGAIN)
continue;
ret = PTR_ERR(hinfo);
goto done;
} else if (!hinfo) {
break;
}
ret = __seg6_genl_dumphmac_element(hinfo,
NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
NLM_F_MULTI,
skb, SEG6_CMD_DUMPHMAC);
if (ret)
goto done;
}
ret = skb->len;
done:
rhashtable_walk_stop(iter);
return ret;
}
#else
static int seg6_genl_dumphmac_start(struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
return 0;
}
static int seg6_genl_dumphmac_done(struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
return 0;
}
static int seg6_genl_dumphmac(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
return -ENOTSUPP;
}
#endif
static int __net_init seg6_net_init(struct net *net)
{
struct seg6_pernet_data *sdata;
sdata = kzalloc(sizeof(*sdata), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sdata)
return -ENOMEM;
mutex_init(&sdata->lock);
sdata->tun_src = kzalloc(sizeof(*sdata->tun_src), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sdata->tun_src) {
kfree(sdata);
return -ENOMEM;
}
net->ipv6.seg6_data = sdata;
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_HMAC
if (seg6_hmac_net_init(net)) {
kfree(rcu_dereference_raw(sdata->tun_src));
kfree(sdata);
return -ENOMEM;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
static void __net_exit seg6_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
struct seg6_pernet_data *sdata = seg6_pernet(net);
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_HMAC
seg6_hmac_net_exit(net);
#endif
kfree(rcu_dereference_raw(sdata->tun_src));
kfree(sdata);
}
static struct pernet_operations ip6_segments_ops = {
.init = seg6_net_init,
.exit = seg6_net_exit,
};
static const struct genl_ops seg6_genl_ops[] = {
{
.cmd = SEG6_CMD_SETHMAC,
.validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP,
.doit = seg6_genl_sethmac,
.flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM,
},
{
.cmd = SEG6_CMD_DUMPHMAC,
.validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP,
.start = seg6_genl_dumphmac_start,
.dumpit = seg6_genl_dumphmac,
.done = seg6_genl_dumphmac_done,
.flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM,
},
{
.cmd = SEG6_CMD_SET_TUNSRC,
.validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP,
.doit = seg6_genl_set_tunsrc,
.flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM,
},
{
.cmd = SEG6_CMD_GET_TUNSRC,
.validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP,
.doit = seg6_genl_get_tunsrc,
.flags = GENL_ADMIN_PERM,
},
};
static struct genl_family seg6_genl_family __ro_after_init = {
.hdrsize = 0,
.name = SEG6_GENL_NAME,
.version = SEG6_GENL_VERSION,
.maxattr = SEG6_ATTR_MAX,
.policy = seg6_genl_policy,
.netnsok = true,
.parallel_ops = true,
.ops = seg6_genl_ops,
.n_ops = ARRAY_SIZE(seg6_genl_ops),
.resv_start_op = SEG6_CMD_GET_TUNSRC + 1,
.module = THIS_MODULE,
};
int __init seg6_init(void)
{
int err;
err = genl_register_family(&seg6_genl_family);
if (err)
goto out;
err = register_pernet_subsys(&ip6_segments_ops);
if (err)
goto out_unregister_genl;
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_LWTUNNEL
err = seg6_iptunnel_init();
if (err)
goto out_unregister_pernet;
err = seg6_local_init();
if (err)
goto out_unregister_pernet;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_HMAC
err = seg6_hmac_init();
if (err)
goto out_unregister_iptun;
#endif
pr_info("Segment Routing with IPv6\n");
out:
return err;
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_HMAC
out_unregister_iptun:
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_LWTUNNEL
seg6_local_exit();
seg6_iptunnel_exit();
#endif
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_LWTUNNEL
out_unregister_pernet:
unregister_pernet_subsys(&ip6_segments_ops);
#endif
out_unregister_genl:
genl_unregister_family(&seg6_genl_family);
goto out;
}
void seg6_exit(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_HMAC
seg6_hmac_exit();
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_LWTUNNEL
seg6_iptunnel_exit();
#endif
unregister_pernet_subsys(&ip6_segments_ops);
genl_unregister_family(&seg6_genl_family);
}