2019-05-19 12:08:20 +00:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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/*
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2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
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* binfmt_misc.c
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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*
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2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
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* Copyright (C) 1997 Richard Günther
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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*
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2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
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* binfmt_misc detects binaries via a magic or filename extension and invokes
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2018-05-08 18:14:57 +00:00
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* a specified wrapper. See Documentation/admin-guide/binfmt-misc.rst for more details.
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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*/
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2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
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#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
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2015-04-16 19:44:56 +00:00
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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2017-02-03 23:16:44 +00:00
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#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
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2012-03-23 22:01:50 +00:00
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#include <linux/magic.h>
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#include <linux/binfmts.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/ctype.h>
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2013-04-30 22:27:33 +00:00
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#include <linux/string_helpers.h>
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#include <linux/file.h>
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#include <linux/pagemap.h>
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#include <linux/namei.h>
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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2019-03-25 16:38:28 +00:00
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#include <linux/fs_context.h>
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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2008-07-24 04:29:15 +00:00
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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2016-02-18 00:51:16 +00:00
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#include "internal.h"
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2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
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#ifdef DEBUG
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# define USE_DEBUG 1
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#else
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# define USE_DEBUG 0
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#endif
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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enum {
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VERBOSE_STATUS = 1 /* make it zero to save 400 bytes kernel memory */
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};
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enum {Enabled, Magic};
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2022-11-02 02:51:23 +00:00
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#define MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0 (1UL << 31)
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#define MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY (1UL << 30)
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#define MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS (1UL << 29)
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#define MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE (1UL << 28)
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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typedef struct {
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struct list_head list;
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unsigned long flags; /* type, status, etc. */
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int offset; /* offset of magic */
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int size; /* size of magic/mask */
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char *magic; /* magic or filename extension */
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char *mask; /* mask, NULL for exact match */
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2017-10-03 23:15:58 +00:00
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const char *interpreter; /* filename of interpreter */
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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char *name;
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struct dentry *dentry;
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2016-02-18 00:51:16 +00:00
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struct file *interp_file;
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2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
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refcount_t users; /* sync removal with load_misc_binary() */
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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} Node;
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2006-06-09 13:34:16 +00:00
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static struct file_system_type bm_fs_type;
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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binfmt_misc: expand the register format limit to 1920 bytes
The current code places a 256 byte limit on the registration format.
This ends up being fairly limited when you try to do matching against a
binary format like ELF:
- the magic & mask formats cannot have any embedded NUL chars
(string_unescape_inplace halts at the first NUL)
- each escape sequence quadruples the size: \x00 is needed for NUL
- trying to match bytes at the start of the file as well as further
on leads to a lot of \x00 sequences in the mask
- magic & mask have to be the same length (when decoded)
- still need bytes for the other fields
- impossible!
Let's look at a concrete (and common) example: using QEMU to run MIPS
ELFs. The name field uses 11 bytes "qemu-mipsel". The interp uses 20
bytes "/usr/bin/qemu-mipsel". The type & flags takes up 4 bytes. We
need 7 bytes for the delimiter (usually ":"). We can skip offset. So
already we're down to 107 bytes to use with the magic/mask instead of
the real limit of 128 (BINPRM_BUF_SIZE). If people use shell code to
register (which they do the majority of the time), they're down to ~26
possible bytes since the escape sequence must be \x##.
The ELF format looks like (both 32 & 64 bit):
e_ident: 16 bytes
e_type: 2 bytes
e_machine: 2 bytes
Those 20 bytes are enough for most architectures because they have so few
formats in the first place, thus they can be uniquely identified. That
also means for shell users, since 20 is smaller than 26, they can sanely
register a handler.
But for some targets (like MIPS), we need to poke further. The ELF fields
continue on:
e_entry: 4 or 8 bytes
e_phoff: 4 or 8 bytes
e_shoff: 4 or 8 bytes
e_flags: 4 bytes
We only care about e_flags here as that includes the bits to identify
whether the ELF is O32/N32/N64. But now we have to consume another 16
bytes (for 32 bit ELFs) or 28 bytes (for 64 bit ELFs) just to match the
flags. If every byte is escaped, we send 288 more bytes to the kernel
((20 {e_ident,e_type,e_machine} + 12 {e_entry,e_phoff,e_shoff} + 4
{e_flags}) * 2 {mask,magic} * 4 {escape}) and we've clearly blown our
budget.
Even if we try to be clever and do the decoding ourselves (rather than
relying on the kernel to process \x##), we still can't hit the mark --
string_unescape_inplace treats mask & magic as C strings so NUL cannot
be embedded. That leaves us with having to pass \x00 for the 12/24
entry/phoff/shoff bytes (as those will be completely random addresses),
and that is a minimum requirement of 48/96 bytes for the mask alone.
Add up the rest and we blow through it (this is for 64 bit ELFs):
magic: 20 {e_ident,e_type,e_machine} + 24 {e_entry,e_phoff,e_shoff} +
4 {e_flags} = 48 # ^^ See note below.
mask: 20 {e_ident,e_type,e_machine} + 96 {e_entry,e_phoff,e_shoff} +
4 {e_flags} = 120
Remember above we had 107 left over, and now we're at 168. This is of
course the *best* case scenario -- you'll also want to have NUL bytes
in the magic & mask too to match literal zeros.
Note: the reason we can use 24 in the magic is that we can work off of the
fact that for bytes the mask would clobber, we can stuff any value into
magic that we want. So when mask is \x00, we don't need the magic to also
be \x00, it can be an unescaped raw byte like '!'. This lets us handle
more formats (barely) under the current 256 limit, but that's a pretty
tall hoop to force people to jump through.
With all that said, let's bump the limit from 256 bytes to 1920. This way
we support escaping every byte of the mask & magic field (which is 1024
bytes by themselves -- 128 * 4 * 2), and we leave plenty of room for other
fields. Like long paths to the interpreter (when you have source in your
/really/long/homedir/qemu/foo). Since the current code stuffs more than
one structure into the same buffer, we leave a bit of space to easily
round up to 2k. 1920 is just as arbitrary as 256 ;).
Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-13 22:52:03 +00:00
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/*
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* Max length of the register string. Determined by:
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* - 7 delimiters
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* - name: ~50 bytes
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* - type: 1 byte
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* - offset: 3 bytes (has to be smaller than BINPRM_BUF_SIZE)
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* - magic: 128 bytes (512 in escaped form)
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* - mask: 128 bytes (512 in escaped form)
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* - interp: ~50 bytes
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* - flags: 5 bytes
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* Round that up a bit, and then back off to hold the internal data
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* (like struct Node).
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*/
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#define MAX_REGISTER_LENGTH 1920
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2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
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/**
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* search_binfmt_handler - search for a binary handler for @bprm
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* @misc: handle to binfmt_misc instance
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* @bprm: binary for which we are looking for a handler
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*
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* Search for a binary type handler for @bprm in the list of registered binary
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* type handlers.
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*
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* Return: binary type list entry on success, NULL on failure
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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*/
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binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
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static Node *search_binfmt_handler(struct binfmt_misc *misc,
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struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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{
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char *p = strrchr(bprm->interp, '.');
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2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
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Node *e;
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
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/* Walk all the registered handlers. */
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binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(e, &misc->entries, list) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
char *s;
|
|
|
|
int j;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Make sure this one is currently enabled. */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!test_bit(Enabled, &e->flags))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Do matching based on extension if applicable. */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!test_bit(Magic, &e->flags)) {
|
|
|
|
if (p && !strcmp(e->magic, p + 1))
|
|
|
|
return e;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Do matching based on magic & mask. */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
s = bprm->buf + e->offset;
|
|
|
|
if (e->mask) {
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < e->size; j++)
|
|
|
|
if ((*s++ ^ e->magic[j]) & e->mask[j])
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < e->size; j++)
|
|
|
|
if ((*s++ ^ e->magic[j]))
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (j == e->size)
|
|
|
|
return e;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* get_binfmt_handler - try to find a binary type handler
|
|
|
|
* @misc: handle to binfmt_misc instance
|
|
|
|
* @bprm: binary for which we are looking for a handler
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Try to find a binfmt handler for the binary type. If one is found take a
|
|
|
|
* reference to protect against removal via bm_{entry,status}_write().
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return: binary type list entry on success, NULL on failure
|
|
|
|
*/
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
static Node *get_binfmt_handler(struct binfmt_misc *misc,
|
|
|
|
struct linux_binprm *bprm)
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Node *e;
|
|
|
|
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
read_lock(&misc->entries_lock);
|
|
|
|
e = search_binfmt_handler(misc, bprm);
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if (e)
|
|
|
|
refcount_inc(&e->users);
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
read_unlock(&misc->entries_lock);
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
return e;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* put_binfmt_handler - put binary handler node
|
|
|
|
* @e: node to put
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Free node syncing with load_misc_binary() and defer final free to
|
|
|
|
* load_misc_binary() in case it is using the binary type handler we were
|
|
|
|
* requested to remove.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void put_binfmt_handler(Node *e)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&e->users)) {
|
|
|
|
if (e->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE)
|
|
|
|
filp_close(e->interp_file, NULL);
|
|
|
|
kfree(e);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* load_binfmt_misc - load the binfmt_misc of the caller's user namespace
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* To be called in load_misc_binary() to load the relevant struct binfmt_misc.
|
|
|
|
* If a user namespace doesn't have its own binfmt_misc mount it can make use
|
|
|
|
* of its ancestor's binfmt_misc handlers. This mimicks the behavior of
|
|
|
|
* pre-namespaced binfmt_misc where all registered binfmt_misc handlers where
|
|
|
|
* available to all user and user namespaces on the system.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return: the binfmt_misc instance of the caller's user namespace
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static struct binfmt_misc *load_binfmt_misc(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const struct user_namespace *user_ns;
|
|
|
|
struct binfmt_misc *misc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
user_ns = current_user_ns();
|
|
|
|
while (user_ns) {
|
|
|
|
/* Pairs with smp_store_release() in bm_fill_super(). */
|
|
|
|
misc = smp_load_acquire(&user_ns->binfmt_misc);
|
|
|
|
if (misc)
|
|
|
|
return misc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
user_ns = user_ns->parent;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return &init_binfmt_misc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* the loader itself
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-10-21 02:00:48 +00:00
|
|
|
static int load_misc_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Node *fmt;
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
struct file *interp_file = NULL;
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
int retval = -ENOEXEC;
|
|
|
|
struct binfmt_misc *misc;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
misc = load_binfmt_misc();
|
|
|
|
if (!misc->enabled)
|
2017-10-03 23:15:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return retval;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
fmt = get_binfmt_handler(misc, bprm);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!fmt)
|
2017-10-03 23:15:55 +00:00
|
|
|
return retval;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
syscalls: implement execveat() system call
This patchset adds execveat(2) for x86, and is derived from Meredydd
Luff's patch from Sept 2012 (https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/11/528).
The primary aim of adding an execveat syscall is to allow an
implementation of fexecve(3) that does not rely on the /proc filesystem,
at least for executables (rather than scripts). The current glibc version
of fexecve(3) is implemented via /proc, which causes problems in sandboxed
or otherwise restricted environments.
Given the desire for a /proc-free fexecve() implementation, HPA suggested
(https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/556) that an execveat(2) syscall would be
an appropriate generalization.
Also, having a new syscall means that it can take a flags argument without
back-compatibility concerns. The current implementation just defines the
AT_EMPTY_PATH and AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flags, but other flags could be
added in future -- for example, flags for new namespaces (as suggested at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/474).
Related history:
- https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/12/27/123 is an example of someone
realizing that fexecve() is likely to fail in a chroot environment.
- http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=514043 covered
documenting the /proc requirement of fexecve(3) in its manpage, to
"prevent other people from wasting their time".
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=241609 described a
problem where a process that did setuid() could not fexecve()
because it no longer had access to /proc/self/fd; this has since
been fixed.
This patch (of 4):
Add a new execveat(2) system call. execveat() is to execve() as openat()
is to open(): it takes a file descriptor that refers to a directory, and
resolves the filename relative to that.
In addition, if the filename is empty and AT_EMPTY_PATH is specified,
execveat() executes the file to which the file descriptor refers. This
replicates the functionality of fexecve(), which is a system call in other
UNIXen, but in Linux glibc it depends on opening "/proc/self/fd/<fd>" (and
so relies on /proc being mounted).
The filename fed to the executed program as argv[0] (or the name of the
script fed to a script interpreter) will be of the form "/dev/fd/<fd>"
(for an empty filename) or "/dev/fd/<fd>/<filename>", effectively
reflecting how the executable was found. This does however mean that
execution of a script in a /proc-less environment won't work; also, script
execution via an O_CLOEXEC file descriptor fails (as the file will not be
accessible after exec).
Based on patches by Meredydd Luff.
Signed-off-by: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Meredydd Luff <meredydd@senatehouse.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah.kh@samsung.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-13 00:57:29 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Need to be able to load the file after exec */
|
2017-10-03 23:15:55 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = -ENOENT;
|
syscalls: implement execveat() system call
This patchset adds execveat(2) for x86, and is derived from Meredydd
Luff's patch from Sept 2012 (https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/11/528).
The primary aim of adding an execveat syscall is to allow an
implementation of fexecve(3) that does not rely on the /proc filesystem,
at least for executables (rather than scripts). The current glibc version
of fexecve(3) is implemented via /proc, which causes problems in sandboxed
or otherwise restricted environments.
Given the desire for a /proc-free fexecve() implementation, HPA suggested
(https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/556) that an execveat(2) syscall would be
an appropriate generalization.
Also, having a new syscall means that it can take a flags argument without
back-compatibility concerns. The current implementation just defines the
AT_EMPTY_PATH and AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flags, but other flags could be
added in future -- for example, flags for new namespaces (as suggested at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/474).
Related history:
- https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/12/27/123 is an example of someone
realizing that fexecve() is likely to fail in a chroot environment.
- http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=514043 covered
documenting the /proc requirement of fexecve(3) in its manpage, to
"prevent other people from wasting their time".
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=241609 described a
problem where a process that did setuid() could not fexecve()
because it no longer had access to /proc/self/fd; this has since
been fixed.
This patch (of 4):
Add a new execveat(2) system call. execveat() is to execve() as openat()
is to open(): it takes a file descriptor that refers to a directory, and
resolves the filename relative to that.
In addition, if the filename is empty and AT_EMPTY_PATH is specified,
execveat() executes the file to which the file descriptor refers. This
replicates the functionality of fexecve(), which is a system call in other
UNIXen, but in Linux glibc it depends on opening "/proc/self/fd/<fd>" (and
so relies on /proc being mounted).
The filename fed to the executed program as argv[0] (or the name of the
script fed to a script interpreter) will be of the form "/dev/fd/<fd>"
(for an empty filename) or "/dev/fd/<fd>/<filename>", effectively
reflecting how the executable was found. This does however mean that
execution of a script in a /proc-less environment won't work; also, script
execution via an O_CLOEXEC file descriptor fails (as the file will not be
accessible after exec).
Based on patches by Meredydd Luff.
Signed-off-by: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Meredydd Luff <meredydd@senatehouse.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah.kh@samsung.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-13 00:57:29 +00:00
|
|
|
if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE)
|
2017-10-03 23:15:55 +00:00
|
|
|
goto ret;
|
syscalls: implement execveat() system call
This patchset adds execveat(2) for x86, and is derived from Meredydd
Luff's patch from Sept 2012 (https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/9/11/528).
The primary aim of adding an execveat syscall is to allow an
implementation of fexecve(3) that does not rely on the /proc filesystem,
at least for executables (rather than scripts). The current glibc version
of fexecve(3) is implemented via /proc, which causes problems in sandboxed
or otherwise restricted environments.
Given the desire for a /proc-free fexecve() implementation, HPA suggested
(https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/556) that an execveat(2) syscall would be
an appropriate generalization.
Also, having a new syscall means that it can take a flags argument without
back-compatibility concerns. The current implementation just defines the
AT_EMPTY_PATH and AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flags, but other flags could be
added in future -- for example, flags for new namespaces (as suggested at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/7/11/474).
Related history:
- https://lkml.org/lkml/2006/12/27/123 is an example of someone
realizing that fexecve() is likely to fail in a chroot environment.
- http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=514043 covered
documenting the /proc requirement of fexecve(3) in its manpage, to
"prevent other people from wasting their time".
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=241609 described a
problem where a process that did setuid() could not fexecve()
because it no longer had access to /proc/self/fd; this has since
been fixed.
This patch (of 4):
Add a new execveat(2) system call. execveat() is to execve() as openat()
is to open(): it takes a file descriptor that refers to a directory, and
resolves the filename relative to that.
In addition, if the filename is empty and AT_EMPTY_PATH is specified,
execveat() executes the file to which the file descriptor refers. This
replicates the functionality of fexecve(), which is a system call in other
UNIXen, but in Linux glibc it depends on opening "/proc/self/fd/<fd>" (and
so relies on /proc being mounted).
The filename fed to the executed program as argv[0] (or the name of the
script fed to a script interpreter) will be of the form "/dev/fd/<fd>"
(for an empty filename) or "/dev/fd/<fd>/<filename>", effectively
reflecting how the executable was found. This does however mean that
execution of a script in a /proc-less environment won't work; also, script
execution via an O_CLOEXEC file descriptor fails (as the file will not be
accessible after exec).
Based on patches by Meredydd Luff.
Signed-off-by: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Meredydd Luff <meredydd@senatehouse.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah.kh@samsung.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-12-13 00:57:29 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-01-28 13:25:39 +00:00
|
|
|
if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0) {
|
|
|
|
bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_PRESERVE_ARGV0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2007-07-19 08:48:16 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = remove_arg_zero(bprm);
|
|
|
|
if (retval)
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
goto ret;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-05-18 23:43:20 +00:00
|
|
|
if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY)
|
2020-05-14 20:17:40 +00:00
|
|
|
bprm->have_execfd = 1;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* make argv[1] be the path to the binary */
|
2020-06-04 23:51:14 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = copy_string_kernel(bprm->interp, bprm);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (retval < 0)
|
2020-05-14 20:17:40 +00:00
|
|
|
goto ret;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
bprm->argc++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* add the interp as argv[0] */
|
2020-06-04 23:51:14 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = copy_string_kernel(fmt->interpreter, bprm);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (retval < 0)
|
2020-05-14 20:17:40 +00:00
|
|
|
goto ret;
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
bprm->argc++;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
exec: do not leave bprm->interp on stack
If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via
unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak
into the command line.
Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively.
However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the
bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching
binfmt modules. Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and
binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted. They leave bprm->interp
pointing to their local stack. This means on restart bprm->interp is
left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the
userspace argv areas.
After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains
the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules. As
such, we need to protect the changes to interp.
This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the
bprm->interp. To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default
value is left as-is. Only when passing through binfmt_script or
binfmt_misc does an allocation take place.
For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from:
http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: halfdog <me@halfdog.net>
Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-20 23:05:16 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Update interp in case binfmt_script needs it. */
|
2017-10-03 23:15:58 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = bprm_change_interp(fmt->interpreter, bprm);
|
exec: do not leave bprm->interp on stack
If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via
unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak
into the command line.
Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively.
However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the
bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching
binfmt modules. Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and
binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted. They leave bprm->interp
pointing to their local stack. This means on restart bprm->interp is
left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the
userspace argv areas.
After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains
the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules. As
such, we need to protect the changes to interp.
This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the
bprm->interp. To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default
value is left as-is. Only when passing through binfmt_script or
binfmt_misc does an allocation take place.
For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from:
http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: halfdog <me@halfdog.net>
Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-12-20 23:05:16 +00:00
|
|
|
if (retval < 0)
|
2020-05-14 20:17:40 +00:00
|
|
|
goto ret;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
fs: don't block i_writecount during exec
Back in 2021 we already discussed removing deny_write_access() for
executables. Back then I was hesistant because I thought that this might
cause issues in userspace. But even back then I had started taking some
notes on what could potentially depend on this and I didn't come up with
a lot so I've changed my mind and I would like to try this.
Here are some of the notes that I took:
(1) The deny_write_access() mechanism is causing really pointless issues
such as [1]. If a thread in a thread-group opens a file writable,
then writes some stuff, then closing the file descriptor and then
calling execve() they can fail the execve() with ETXTBUSY because
another thread in the thread-group could have concurrently called
fork(). Multi-threaded libraries such as go suffer from this.
(2) There are userspace attacks that rely on overwriting the binary of a
running process. These attacks are _mitigated_ but _not at all
prevented_ from ocurring by the deny_write_access() mechanism.
I'll go over some details. The clearest example of such attacks was
the attack against runC in CVE-2019-5736 (cf. [3]).
An attack could compromise the runC host binary from inside a
_privileged_ runC container. The malicious binary could then be used
to take over the host.
(It is crucial to note that this attack is _not_ possible with
unprivileged containers. IOW, the setup here is already insecure.)
The attack can be made when attaching to a running container or when
starting a container running a specially crafted image. For example,
when runC attaches to a container the attacker can trick it into
executing itself.
This could be done by replacing the target binary inside the
container with a custom binary pointing back at the runC binary
itself. As an example, if the target binary was /bin/bash, this
could be replaced with an executable script specifying the
interpreter path #!/proc/self/exe.
As such when /bin/bash is executed inside the container, instead the
target of /proc/self/exe will be executed. That magic link will
point to the runc binary on the host. The attacker can then proceed
to write to the target of /proc/self/exe to try and overwrite the
runC binary on the host.
However, this will not succeed because of deny_write_access(). Now,
one might think that this would prevent the attack but it doesn't.
To overcome this, the attacker has multiple ways:
* Open a file descriptor to /proc/self/exe using the O_PATH flag and
then proceed to reopen the binary as O_WRONLY through
/proc/self/fd/<nr> and try to write to it in a busy loop from a
separate process. Ultimately it will succeed when the runC binary
exits. After this the runC binary is compromised and can be used
to attack other containers or the host itself.
* Use a malicious shared library annotating a function in there with
the constructor attribute making the malicious function run as an
initializor. The malicious library will then open /proc/self/exe
for creating a new entry under /proc/self/fd/<nr>. It'll then call
exec to a) force runC to exit and b) hand the file descriptor off
to a program that then reopens /proc/self/fd/<nr> for writing
(which is now possible because runC has exited) and overwriting
that binary.
To sum up: the deny_write_access() mechanism doesn't prevent such
attacks in insecure setups. It just makes them minimally harder.
That's all.
The only way back then to prevent this is to create a temporary copy
of the calling binary itself when it starts or attaches to
containers. So what I did back then for LXC (and Aleksa for runC)
was to create an anonymous, in-memory file using the memfd_create()
system call and to copy itself into the temporary in-memory file,
which is then sealed to prevent further modifications. This sealed,
in-memory file copy is then executed instead of the original on-disk
binary.
Any compromising write operations from a privileged container to the
host binary will then write to the temporary in-memory binary and
not to the host binary on-disk, preserving the integrity of the host
binary. Also as the temporary, in-memory binary is sealed, writes to
this will also fail.
The point is that deny_write_access() is uselss to prevent these
attacks.
(3) Denying write access to an inode because it's currently used in an
exec path could easily be done on an LSM level. It might need an
additional hook but that should be about it.
(4) The MAP_DENYWRITE flag for mmap() has been deprecated a long time
ago so while we do protect the main executable the bigger portion of
the things you'd think need protecting such as the shared libraries
aren't. IOW, we let anyone happily overwrite shared libraries.
(5) We removed all remaining uses of VM_DENYWRITE in [2]. That means:
(5.1) We removed the legacy uselib() protection for preventing
overwriting of shared libraries. Nobody cared in 3 years.
(5.2) We allow write access to the elf interpreter after exec
completed treating it on a par with shared libraries.
Yes, someone in userspace could potentially be relying on this. It's not
completely out of the realm of possibility but let's find out if that's
actually the case and not guess.
Link: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/22315 [1]
Link: 49624efa65ac ("Merge tag 'denywrite-for-5.15' of git://github.com/davidhildenbrand/linux") [2]
Link: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/breaking-docker-via-runc-explaining-cve-2019-5736 [3]
Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/866493
Link: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/22220
Link: https://github.com/golang/go/blob/5bf8c0cf09ee5c7e5a37ab90afcce154ab716a97/src/cmd/go/internal/work/buildid.go#L724
Link: https://github.com/golang/go/blob/5bf8c0cf09ee5c7e5a37ab90afcce154ab716a97/src/cmd/go/internal/work/exec.go#L1493
Link: https://github.com/golang/go/blob/5bf8c0cf09ee5c7e5a37ab90afcce154ab716a97/src/cmd/go/internal/script/cmds.go#L457
Link: https://github.com/golang/go/blob/5bf8c0cf09ee5c7e5a37ab90afcce154ab716a97/src/cmd/go/internal/test/test.go#L1557
Link: https://github.com/golang/go/blob/5bf8c0cf09ee5c7e5a37ab90afcce154ab716a97/src/os/exec/lp_linux_test.go#L61
Link: https://github.com/buildkite/agent/pull/2736
Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/114554
Link: https://bugs.openjdk.org/browse/JDK-8068370
Link: https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/issues/58964
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240531-vfs-i_writecount-v1-1-a17bea7ee36b@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-05-31 13:01:43 +00:00
|
|
|
if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE)
|
2018-06-08 15:19:32 +00:00
|
|
|
interp_file = file_clone_open(fmt->interp_file);
|
fs: don't block i_writecount during exec
Back in 2021 we already discussed removing deny_write_access() for
executables. Back then I was hesistant because I thought that this might
cause issues in userspace. But even back then I had started taking some
notes on what could potentially depend on this and I didn't come up with
a lot so I've changed my mind and I would like to try this.
Here are some of the notes that I took:
(1) The deny_write_access() mechanism is causing really pointless issues
such as [1]. If a thread in a thread-group opens a file writable,
then writes some stuff, then closing the file descriptor and then
calling execve() they can fail the execve() with ETXTBUSY because
another thread in the thread-group could have concurrently called
fork(). Multi-threaded libraries such as go suffer from this.
(2) There are userspace attacks that rely on overwriting the binary of a
running process. These attacks are _mitigated_ but _not at all
prevented_ from ocurring by the deny_write_access() mechanism.
I'll go over some details. The clearest example of such attacks was
the attack against runC in CVE-2019-5736 (cf. [3]).
An attack could compromise the runC host binary from inside a
_privileged_ runC container. The malicious binary could then be used
to take over the host.
(It is crucial to note that this attack is _not_ possible with
unprivileged containers. IOW, the setup here is already insecure.)
The attack can be made when attaching to a running container or when
starting a container running a specially crafted image. For example,
when runC attaches to a container the attacker can trick it into
executing itself.
This could be done by replacing the target binary inside the
container with a custom binary pointing back at the runC binary
itself. As an example, if the target binary was /bin/bash, this
could be replaced with an executable script specifying the
interpreter path #!/proc/self/exe.
As such when /bin/bash is executed inside the container, instead the
target of /proc/self/exe will be executed. That magic link will
point to the runc binary on the host. The attacker can then proceed
to write to the target of /proc/self/exe to try and overwrite the
runC binary on the host.
However, this will not succeed because of deny_write_access(). Now,
one might think that this would prevent the attack but it doesn't.
To overcome this, the attacker has multiple ways:
* Open a file descriptor to /proc/self/exe using the O_PATH flag and
then proceed to reopen the binary as O_WRONLY through
/proc/self/fd/<nr> and try to write to it in a busy loop from a
separate process. Ultimately it will succeed when the runC binary
exits. After this the runC binary is compromised and can be used
to attack other containers or the host itself.
* Use a malicious shared library annotating a function in there with
the constructor attribute making the malicious function run as an
initializor. The malicious library will then open /proc/self/exe
for creating a new entry under /proc/self/fd/<nr>. It'll then call
exec to a) force runC to exit and b) hand the file descriptor off
to a program that then reopens /proc/self/fd/<nr> for writing
(which is now possible because runC has exited) and overwriting
that binary.
To sum up: the deny_write_access() mechanism doesn't prevent such
attacks in insecure setups. It just makes them minimally harder.
That's all.
The only way back then to prevent this is to create a temporary copy
of the calling binary itself when it starts or attaches to
containers. So what I did back then for LXC (and Aleksa for runC)
was to create an anonymous, in-memory file using the memfd_create()
system call and to copy itself into the temporary in-memory file,
which is then sealed to prevent further modifications. This sealed,
in-memory file copy is then executed instead of the original on-disk
binary.
Any compromising write operations from a privileged container to the
host binary will then write to the temporary in-memory binary and
not to the host binary on-disk, preserving the integrity of the host
binary. Also as the temporary, in-memory binary is sealed, writes to
this will also fail.
The point is that deny_write_access() is uselss to prevent these
attacks.
(3) Denying write access to an inode because it's currently used in an
exec path could easily be done on an LSM level. It might need an
additional hook but that should be about it.
(4) The MAP_DENYWRITE flag for mmap() has been deprecated a long time
ago so while we do protect the main executable the bigger portion of
the things you'd think need protecting such as the shared libraries
aren't. IOW, we let anyone happily overwrite shared libraries.
(5) We removed all remaining uses of VM_DENYWRITE in [2]. That means:
(5.1) We removed the legacy uselib() protection for preventing
overwriting of shared libraries. Nobody cared in 3 years.
(5.2) We allow write access to the elf interpreter after exec
completed treating it on a par with shared libraries.
Yes, someone in userspace could potentially be relying on this. It's not
completely out of the realm of possibility but let's find out if that's
actually the case and not guess.
Link: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/22315 [1]
Link: 49624efa65ac ("Merge tag 'denywrite-for-5.15' of git://github.com/davidhildenbrand/linux") [2]
Link: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/breaking-docker-via-runc-explaining-cve-2019-5736 [3]
Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/866493
Link: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/22220
Link: https://github.com/golang/go/blob/5bf8c0cf09ee5c7e5a37ab90afcce154ab716a97/src/cmd/go/internal/work/buildid.go#L724
Link: https://github.com/golang/go/blob/5bf8c0cf09ee5c7e5a37ab90afcce154ab716a97/src/cmd/go/internal/work/exec.go#L1493
Link: https://github.com/golang/go/blob/5bf8c0cf09ee5c7e5a37ab90afcce154ab716a97/src/cmd/go/internal/script/cmds.go#L457
Link: https://github.com/golang/go/blob/5bf8c0cf09ee5c7e5a37ab90afcce154ab716a97/src/cmd/go/internal/test/test.go#L1557
Link: https://github.com/golang/go/blob/5bf8c0cf09ee5c7e5a37ab90afcce154ab716a97/src/os/exec/lp_linux_test.go#L61
Link: https://github.com/buildkite/agent/pull/2736
Link: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/114554
Link: https://bugs.openjdk.org/browse/JDK-8068370
Link: https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/issues/58964
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240531-vfs-i_writecount-v1-1-a17bea7ee36b@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2024-05-31 13:01:43 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
2017-10-03 23:15:58 +00:00
|
|
|
interp_file = open_exec(fmt->interpreter);
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = PTR_ERR(interp_file);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(interp_file))
|
2020-05-14 20:17:40 +00:00
|
|
|
goto ret;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-05-18 23:43:20 +00:00
|
|
|
bprm->interpreter = interp_file;
|
2020-05-16 11:02:54 +00:00
|
|
|
if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS)
|
2020-05-30 03:00:54 +00:00
|
|
|
bprm->execfd_creds = 1;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-05-18 23:43:20 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = 0;
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
ret:
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If we actually put the node here all concurrent calls to
|
|
|
|
* load_misc_binary() will have finished. We also know
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
* that for the refcount to be zero someone must have concurently
|
|
|
|
* removed the binary type handler from the list and it's our job to
|
|
|
|
* free it.
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
put_binfmt_handler(fmt);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Command parsers */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* parses and copies one argument enclosed in del from *sp to *dp,
|
|
|
|
* recognising the \x special.
|
|
|
|
* returns pointer to the copied argument or NULL in case of an
|
|
|
|
* error (and sets err) or null argument length.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static char *scanarg(char *s, char del)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char c;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while ((c = *s++) != del) {
|
|
|
|
if (c == '\\' && *s == 'x') {
|
|
|
|
s++;
|
|
|
|
if (!isxdigit(*s++))
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!isxdigit(*s++))
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-12-17 10:29:16 +00:00
|
|
|
s[-1] ='\0';
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return s;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
static char *check_special_flags(char *sfs, Node *e)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
char *p = sfs;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
int cont = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* special flags */
|
|
|
|
while (cont) {
|
|
|
|
switch (*p) {
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
case 'P':
|
|
|
|
pr_debug("register: flag: P (preserve argv0)\n");
|
|
|
|
p++;
|
|
|
|
e->flags |= MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 'O':
|
|
|
|
pr_debug("register: flag: O (open binary)\n");
|
|
|
|
p++;
|
|
|
|
e->flags |= MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 'C':
|
|
|
|
pr_debug("register: flag: C (preserve creds)\n");
|
|
|
|
p++;
|
|
|
|
/* this flags also implies the
|
|
|
|
open-binary flag */
|
|
|
|
e->flags |= (MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS |
|
|
|
|
MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2016-02-18 00:51:16 +00:00
|
|
|
case 'F':
|
|
|
|
pr_debug("register: flag: F: open interpreter file now\n");
|
|
|
|
p++;
|
|
|
|
e->flags |= MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
cont = 0;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return p;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This registers a new binary format, it recognises the syntax
|
|
|
|
* ':name:type:offset:magic:mask:interpreter:flags'
|
|
|
|
* where the ':' is the IFS, that can be chosen with the first char
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static Node *create_entry(const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Node *e;
|
|
|
|
int memsize, err;
|
|
|
|
char *buf, *p;
|
|
|
|
char del;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
pr_debug("register: received %zu bytes\n", count);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/* some sanity checks */
|
|
|
|
err = -EINVAL;
|
binfmt_misc: expand the register format limit to 1920 bytes
The current code places a 256 byte limit on the registration format.
This ends up being fairly limited when you try to do matching against a
binary format like ELF:
- the magic & mask formats cannot have any embedded NUL chars
(string_unescape_inplace halts at the first NUL)
- each escape sequence quadruples the size: \x00 is needed for NUL
- trying to match bytes at the start of the file as well as further
on leads to a lot of \x00 sequences in the mask
- magic & mask have to be the same length (when decoded)
- still need bytes for the other fields
- impossible!
Let's look at a concrete (and common) example: using QEMU to run MIPS
ELFs. The name field uses 11 bytes "qemu-mipsel". The interp uses 20
bytes "/usr/bin/qemu-mipsel". The type & flags takes up 4 bytes. We
need 7 bytes for the delimiter (usually ":"). We can skip offset. So
already we're down to 107 bytes to use with the magic/mask instead of
the real limit of 128 (BINPRM_BUF_SIZE). If people use shell code to
register (which they do the majority of the time), they're down to ~26
possible bytes since the escape sequence must be \x##.
The ELF format looks like (both 32 & 64 bit):
e_ident: 16 bytes
e_type: 2 bytes
e_machine: 2 bytes
Those 20 bytes are enough for most architectures because they have so few
formats in the first place, thus they can be uniquely identified. That
also means for shell users, since 20 is smaller than 26, they can sanely
register a handler.
But for some targets (like MIPS), we need to poke further. The ELF fields
continue on:
e_entry: 4 or 8 bytes
e_phoff: 4 or 8 bytes
e_shoff: 4 or 8 bytes
e_flags: 4 bytes
We only care about e_flags here as that includes the bits to identify
whether the ELF is O32/N32/N64. But now we have to consume another 16
bytes (for 32 bit ELFs) or 28 bytes (for 64 bit ELFs) just to match the
flags. If every byte is escaped, we send 288 more bytes to the kernel
((20 {e_ident,e_type,e_machine} + 12 {e_entry,e_phoff,e_shoff} + 4
{e_flags}) * 2 {mask,magic} * 4 {escape}) and we've clearly blown our
budget.
Even if we try to be clever and do the decoding ourselves (rather than
relying on the kernel to process \x##), we still can't hit the mark --
string_unescape_inplace treats mask & magic as C strings so NUL cannot
be embedded. That leaves us with having to pass \x00 for the 12/24
entry/phoff/shoff bytes (as those will be completely random addresses),
and that is a minimum requirement of 48/96 bytes for the mask alone.
Add up the rest and we blow through it (this is for 64 bit ELFs):
magic: 20 {e_ident,e_type,e_machine} + 24 {e_entry,e_phoff,e_shoff} +
4 {e_flags} = 48 # ^^ See note below.
mask: 20 {e_ident,e_type,e_machine} + 96 {e_entry,e_phoff,e_shoff} +
4 {e_flags} = 120
Remember above we had 107 left over, and now we're at 168. This is of
course the *best* case scenario -- you'll also want to have NUL bytes
in the magic & mask too to match literal zeros.
Note: the reason we can use 24 in the magic is that we can work off of the
fact that for bytes the mask would clobber, we can stuff any value into
magic that we want. So when mask is \x00, we don't need the magic to also
be \x00, it can be an unescaped raw byte like '!'. This lets us handle
more formats (barely) under the current 256 limit, but that's a pretty
tall hoop to force people to jump through.
With all that said, let's bump the limit from 256 bytes to 1920. This way
we support escaping every byte of the mask & magic field (which is 1024
bytes by themselves -- 128 * 4 * 2), and we leave plenty of room for other
fields. Like long paths to the interpreter (when you have source in your
/really/long/homedir/qemu/foo). Since the current code stuffs more than
one structure into the same buffer, we leave a bit of space to easily
round up to 2k. 1920 is just as arbitrary as 256 ;).
Signed-off-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-13 22:52:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((count < 11) || (count > MAX_REGISTER_LENGTH))
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
memsize = sizeof(Node) + count + 8;
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
e = kmalloc(memsize, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!e)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p = buf = (char *)e + sizeof(Node);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(e, 0, sizeof(Node));
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(buf, buffer, count))
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
goto efault;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
del = *p++; /* delimeter */
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
pr_debug("register: delim: %#x {%c}\n", del, del);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Pad the buffer with the delim to simplify parsing below. */
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
memset(buf + count, del, 8);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Parse the 'name' field. */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
e->name = p;
|
|
|
|
p = strchr(p, del);
|
|
|
|
if (!p)
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
goto einval;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*p++ = '\0';
|
|
|
|
if (!e->name[0] ||
|
|
|
|
!strcmp(e->name, ".") ||
|
|
|
|
!strcmp(e->name, "..") ||
|
|
|
|
strchr(e->name, '/'))
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
goto einval;
|
2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
pr_debug("register: name: {%s}\n", e->name);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Parse the 'type' field. */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (*p++) {
|
2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
case 'E':
|
|
|
|
pr_debug("register: type: E (extension)\n");
|
|
|
|
e->flags = 1 << Enabled;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 'M':
|
|
|
|
pr_debug("register: type: M (magic)\n");
|
|
|
|
e->flags = (1 << Enabled) | (1 << Magic);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
goto einval;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (*p++ != del)
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
goto einval;
|
2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(Magic, &e->flags)) {
|
2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Handle the 'M' (magic) format. */
|
|
|
|
char *s;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Parse the 'offset' field. */
|
|
|
|
s = strchr(p, del);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!s)
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
goto einval;
|
2018-06-08 00:11:01 +00:00
|
|
|
*s = '\0';
|
|
|
|
if (p != s) {
|
|
|
|
int r = kstrtoint(p, 10, &e->offset);
|
|
|
|
if (r != 0 || e->offset < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto einval;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = s;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (*p++)
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
goto einval;
|
2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
pr_debug("register: offset: %#x\n", e->offset);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Parse the 'magic' field. */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
e->magic = p;
|
|
|
|
p = scanarg(p, del);
|
|
|
|
if (!p)
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
goto einval;
|
2014-12-17 10:29:16 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!e->magic[0])
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
goto einval;
|
2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
if (USE_DEBUG)
|
|
|
|
print_hex_dump_bytes(
|
|
|
|
KBUILD_MODNAME ": register: magic[raw]: ",
|
|
|
|
DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, e->magic, p - e->magic);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Parse the 'mask' field. */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
e->mask = p;
|
|
|
|
p = scanarg(p, del);
|
|
|
|
if (!p)
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
goto einval;
|
2014-12-17 10:29:16 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!e->mask[0]) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
e->mask = NULL;
|
2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
pr_debug("register: mask[raw]: none\n");
|
|
|
|
} else if (USE_DEBUG)
|
|
|
|
print_hex_dump_bytes(
|
|
|
|
KBUILD_MODNAME ": register: mask[raw]: ",
|
|
|
|
DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, e->mask, p - e->mask);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Decode the magic & mask fields.
|
|
|
|
* Note: while we might have accepted embedded NUL bytes from
|
|
|
|
* above, the unescape helpers here will stop at the first one
|
|
|
|
* it encounters.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2013-04-30 22:27:33 +00:00
|
|
|
e->size = string_unescape_inplace(e->magic, UNESCAPE_HEX);
|
|
|
|
if (e->mask &&
|
|
|
|
string_unescape_inplace(e->mask, UNESCAPE_HEX) != e->size)
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
goto einval;
|
2018-06-08 00:11:01 +00:00
|
|
|
if (e->size > BINPRM_BUF_SIZE ||
|
|
|
|
BINPRM_BUF_SIZE - e->size < e->offset)
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
goto einval;
|
2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
pr_debug("register: magic/mask length: %i\n", e->size);
|
|
|
|
if (USE_DEBUG) {
|
|
|
|
print_hex_dump_bytes(
|
|
|
|
KBUILD_MODNAME ": register: magic[decoded]: ",
|
|
|
|
DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, e->magic, e->size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (e->mask) {
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
char *masked = kmalloc(e->size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
|
2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
print_hex_dump_bytes(
|
|
|
|
KBUILD_MODNAME ": register: mask[decoded]: ",
|
|
|
|
DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, e->mask, e->size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (masked) {
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < e->size; ++i)
|
|
|
|
masked[i] = e->magic[i] & e->mask[i];
|
|
|
|
print_hex_dump_bytes(
|
|
|
|
KBUILD_MODNAME ": register: magic[masked]: ",
|
|
|
|
DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, masked, e->size);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kfree(masked);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Handle the 'E' (extension) format. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Skip the 'offset' field. */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
p = strchr(p, del);
|
|
|
|
if (!p)
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
goto einval;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*p++ = '\0';
|
2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Parse the 'magic' field. */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
e->magic = p;
|
|
|
|
p = strchr(p, del);
|
|
|
|
if (!p)
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
goto einval;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*p++ = '\0';
|
|
|
|
if (!e->magic[0] || strchr(e->magic, '/'))
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
goto einval;
|
2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
pr_debug("register: extension: {%s}\n", e->magic);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Skip the 'mask' field. */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
p = strchr(p, del);
|
|
|
|
if (!p)
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
goto einval;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*p++ = '\0';
|
|
|
|
}
|
2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Parse the 'interpreter' field. */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
e->interpreter = p;
|
|
|
|
p = strchr(p, del);
|
|
|
|
if (!p)
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
goto einval;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*p++ = '\0';
|
|
|
|
if (!e->interpreter[0])
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
goto einval;
|
2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
pr_debug("register: interpreter: {%s}\n", e->interpreter);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-12-10 23:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Parse the 'flags' field. */
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
p = check_special_flags(p, e);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (*p == '\n')
|
|
|
|
p++;
|
|
|
|
if (p != buf + count)
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
goto einval;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return e;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(err);
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
efault:
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
kfree(e);
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
einval:
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
kfree(e);
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Set status of entry/binfmt_misc:
|
|
|
|
* '1' enables, '0' disables and '-1' clears entry/binfmt_misc
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int parse_command(const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char s[4];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (count > 3)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(s, buffer, count))
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
binfmt_misc: work around gcc-4.9 warning
gcc-4.9 on ARM gives us a mysterious warning about the binfmt_misc
parse_command function:
fs/binfmt_misc.c: In function 'parse_command.part.3':
fs/binfmt_misc.c:405:7: warning: array subscript is above array bounds [-Warray-bounds]
I've managed to trace this back to the ARM implementation of memset,
which is called from copy_from_user in case of a fault and which does
#define memset(p,v,n) \
({ \
void *__p = (p); size_t __n = n; \
if ((__n) != 0) { \
if (__builtin_constant_p((v)) && (v) == 0) \
__memzero((__p),(__n)); \
else \
memset((__p),(v),(__n)); \
} \
(__p); \
})
Apparently gcc gets confused by the check for "size != 0" and believes
that the size might be zero when it gets to the line that does "if
(s[count-1] == '\n')", so it would access data outside of the array.
gcc is clearly wrong here, since this condition was already checked
earlier in the function and the 'size' value can not change in the
meantime.
Fortunately, we can work around it and get rid of the warning by
rearranging the function to check for zero size after doing the
copy_from_user. It is still safe to pass a zero size into
copy_from_user, so it does not cause any side effects.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-10-13 22:52:08 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!count)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (s[count - 1] == '\n')
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
count--;
|
|
|
|
if (count == 1 && s[0] == '0')
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
if (count == 1 && s[0] == '1')
|
|
|
|
return 2;
|
|
|
|
if (count == 2 && s[0] == '-' && s[1] == '1')
|
|
|
|
return 3;
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* generic stuff */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void entry_status(Node *e, char *page)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2015-04-16 19:44:56 +00:00
|
|
|
char *dp = page;
|
|
|
|
const char *status = "disabled";
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(Enabled, &e->flags))
|
|
|
|
status = "enabled";
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!VERBOSE_STATUS) {
|
|
|
|
sprintf(page, "%s\n", status);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2015-04-16 19:44:56 +00:00
|
|
|
dp += sprintf(dp, "%s\ninterpreter %s\n", status, e->interpreter);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* print the special flags */
|
2015-04-16 19:44:56 +00:00
|
|
|
dp += sprintf(dp, "flags: ");
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (e->flags & MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0)
|
|
|
|
*dp++ = 'P';
|
|
|
|
if (e->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY)
|
|
|
|
*dp++ = 'O';
|
|
|
|
if (e->flags & MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS)
|
|
|
|
*dp++ = 'C';
|
2016-02-18 00:51:16 +00:00
|
|
|
if (e->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE)
|
|
|
|
*dp++ = 'F';
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
*dp++ = '\n';
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!test_bit(Magic, &e->flags)) {
|
|
|
|
sprintf(dp, "extension .%s\n", e->magic);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2015-04-16 19:44:56 +00:00
|
|
|
dp += sprintf(dp, "offset %i\nmagic ", e->offset);
|
|
|
|
dp = bin2hex(dp, e->magic, e->size);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (e->mask) {
|
2015-04-16 19:44:56 +00:00
|
|
|
dp += sprintf(dp, "\nmask ");
|
|
|
|
dp = bin2hex(dp, e->mask, e->size);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*dp++ = '\n';
|
|
|
|
*dp = '\0';
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct inode *bm_get_inode(struct super_block *sb, int mode)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
struct inode *inode = new_inode(sb);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (inode) {
|
2010-10-23 15:19:54 +00:00
|
|
|
inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
inode->i_mode = mode;
|
2023-10-04 18:52:38 +00:00
|
|
|
simple_inode_init_ts(inode);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return inode;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* i_binfmt_misc - retrieve struct binfmt_misc from a binfmt_misc inode
|
|
|
|
* @inode: inode of the relevant binfmt_misc instance
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This helper retrieves struct binfmt_misc from a binfmt_misc inode. This can
|
|
|
|
* be done without any memory barriers because we are guaranteed that
|
|
|
|
* user_ns->binfmt_misc is fully initialized. It was fully initialized when the
|
|
|
|
* binfmt_misc mount was first created.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return: struct binfmt_misc of the relevant binfmt_misc instance
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static struct binfmt_misc *i_binfmt_misc(struct inode *inode)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return inode->i_sb->s_user_ns->binfmt_misc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* bm_evict_inode - cleanup data associated with @inode
|
|
|
|
* @inode: inode to which the data is attached
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Cleanup the binary type handler data associated with @inode if a binary type
|
|
|
|
* entry is removed or the filesystem is unmounted and the super block is
|
|
|
|
* shutdown.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If the ->evict call was not caused by a super block shutdown but by a write
|
|
|
|
* to remove the entry or all entries via bm_{entry,status}_write() the entry
|
|
|
|
* will have already been removed from the list. We keep the list_empty() check
|
|
|
|
* to make that explicit.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2010-06-07 18:34:48 +00:00
|
|
|
static void bm_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-10-03 23:15:48 +00:00
|
|
|
Node *e = inode->i_private;
|
|
|
|
|
2012-05-03 12:48:02 +00:00
|
|
|
clear_inode(inode);
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (e) {
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
struct binfmt_misc *misc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
misc = i_binfmt_misc(inode);
|
|
|
|
write_lock(&misc->entries_lock);
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!list_empty(&e->list))
|
|
|
|
list_del_init(&e->list);
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
write_unlock(&misc->entries_lock);
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
put_binfmt_handler(e);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* unlink_binfmt_dentry - remove the dentry for the binary type handler
|
|
|
|
* @dentry: dentry associated with the binary type handler
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Do the actual filesystem work to remove a dentry for a registered binary
|
|
|
|
* type handler. Since binfmt_misc only allows simple files to be created
|
|
|
|
* directly under the root dentry of the filesystem we ensure that we are
|
|
|
|
* indeed passed a dentry directly beneath the root dentry, that the inode
|
|
|
|
* associated with the root dentry is locked, and that it is a regular file we
|
|
|
|
* are asked to remove.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void unlink_binfmt_dentry(struct dentry *dentry)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct dentry *parent = dentry->d_parent;
|
|
|
|
struct inode *inode, *parent_inode;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
/* All entries are immediate descendants of the root dentry. */
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dentry->d_sb->s_root != parent))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
/* We only expect to be called on regular files. */
|
|
|
|
inode = d_inode(dentry);
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The parent inode must be locked. */
|
|
|
|
parent_inode = d_inode(parent);
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!inode_is_locked(parent_inode)))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (simple_positive(dentry)) {
|
|
|
|
dget(dentry);
|
|
|
|
simple_unlink(parent_inode, dentry);
|
|
|
|
d_delete(dentry);
|
|
|
|
dput(dentry);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* remove_binfmt_handler - remove a binary type handler
|
|
|
|
* @misc: handle to binfmt_misc instance
|
|
|
|
* @e: binary type handler to remove
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Remove a binary type handler from the list of binary type handlers and
|
|
|
|
* remove its associated dentry. This is called from
|
|
|
|
* binfmt_{entry,status}_write(). In the future, we might want to think about
|
|
|
|
* adding a proper ->unlink() method to binfmt_misc instead of forcing caller's
|
|
|
|
* to use writes to files in order to delete binary type handlers. But it has
|
|
|
|
* worked for so long that it's not a pressing issue.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
static void remove_binfmt_handler(struct binfmt_misc *misc, Node *e)
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
write_lock(&misc->entries_lock);
|
2017-10-03 23:15:45 +00:00
|
|
|
list_del_init(&e->list);
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
write_unlock(&misc->entries_lock);
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
unlink_binfmt_dentry(e->dentry);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* /<entry> */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static ssize_t
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
bm_entry_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-01-23 22:07:38 +00:00
|
|
|
Node *e = file_inode(file)->i_private;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
ssize_t res;
|
|
|
|
char *page;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
page = (char *) __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!page)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
entry_status(e, page);
|
|
|
|
|
2008-07-24 04:29:15 +00:00
|
|
|
res = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, nbytes, ppos, page, strlen(page));
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
free_page((unsigned long) page);
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static ssize_t bm_entry_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
|
|
|
|
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
|
|
|
|
Node *e = inode->i_private;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
int res = parse_command(buffer, count);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (res) {
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
case 1:
|
|
|
|
/* Disable this handler. */
|
|
|
|
clear_bit(Enabled, &e->flags);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 2:
|
|
|
|
/* Enable this handler. */
|
|
|
|
set_bit(Enabled, &e->flags);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 3:
|
|
|
|
/* Delete this handler. */
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
inode = d_inode(inode->i_sb->s_root);
|
|
|
|
inode_lock(inode);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* In order to add new element or remove elements from the list
|
|
|
|
* via bm_{entry,register,status}_write() inode_lock() on the
|
|
|
|
* root inode must be held.
|
|
|
|
* The lock is exclusive ensuring that the list can't be
|
|
|
|
* modified. Only load_misc_binary() can access but does so
|
|
|
|
* read-only. So we only need to take the write lock when we
|
|
|
|
* actually remove the entry from the list.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-10-03 23:15:45 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!list_empty(&e->list))
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
remove_binfmt_handler(i_binfmt_misc(inode), e);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
inode_unlock(inode);
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return count;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-03-28 09:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
static const struct file_operations bm_entry_operations = {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
.read = bm_entry_read,
|
|
|
|
.write = bm_entry_write,
|
llseek: automatically add .llseek fop
All file_operations should get a .llseek operation so we can make
nonseekable_open the default for future file operations without a
.llseek pointer.
The three cases that we can automatically detect are no_llseek, seq_lseek
and default_llseek. For cases where we can we can automatically prove that
the file offset is always ignored, we use noop_llseek, which maintains
the current behavior of not returning an error from a seek.
New drivers should normally not use noop_llseek but instead use no_llseek
and call nonseekable_open at open time. Existing drivers can be converted
to do the same when the maintainer knows for certain that no user code
relies on calling seek on the device file.
The generated code is often incorrectly indented and right now contains
comments that clarify for each added line why a specific variant was
chosen. In the version that gets submitted upstream, the comments will
be gone and I will manually fix the indentation, because there does not
seem to be a way to do that using coccinelle.
Some amount of new code is currently sitting in linux-next that should get
the same modifications, which I will do at the end of the merge window.
Many thanks to Julia Lawall for helping me learn to write a semantic
patch that does all this.
===== begin semantic patch =====
// This adds an llseek= method to all file operations,
// as a preparation for making no_llseek the default.
//
// The rules are
// - use no_llseek explicitly if we do nonseekable_open
// - use seq_lseek for sequential files
// - use default_llseek if we know we access f_pos
// - use noop_llseek if we know we don't access f_pos,
// but we still want to allow users to call lseek
//
@ open1 exists @
identifier nested_open;
@@
nested_open(...)
{
<+...
nonseekable_open(...)
...+>
}
@ open exists@
identifier open_f;
identifier i, f;
identifier open1.nested_open;
@@
int open_f(struct inode *i, struct file *f)
{
<+...
(
nonseekable_open(...)
|
nested_open(...)
)
...+>
}
@ read disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
*off = E
|
*off += E
|
func(..., off, ...)
|
E = *off
)
...+>
}
@ read_no_fpos disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}
@ write @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
*off = E
|
*off += E
|
func(..., off, ...)
|
E = *off
)
...+>
}
@ write_no_fpos @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}
@ fops0 @
identifier fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
};
@ has_llseek depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier llseek_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.llseek = llseek_f,
...
};
@ has_read depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.read = read_f,
...
};
@ has_write depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.write = write_f,
...
};
@ has_open depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.open = open_f,
...
};
// use no_llseek if we call nonseekable_open
////////////////////////////////////////////
@ nonseekable1 depends on !has_llseek && has_open @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier nso ~= "nonseekable_open";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .open = nso, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* nonseekable */
};
@ nonseekable2 depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open.open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .open = open_f, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* open uses nonseekable */
};
// use seq_lseek for sequential files
/////////////////////////////////////
@ seq depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier sr ~= "seq_read";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = sr, ...
+.llseek = seq_lseek, /* we have seq_read */
};
// use default_llseek if there is a readdir
///////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops1 depends on !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier readdir_e;
@@
// any other fop is used that changes pos
struct file_operations fops = {
... .readdir = readdir_e, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* readdir is present */
};
// use default_llseek if at least one of read/write touches f_pos
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops2 depends on !fops1 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read.read_f;
@@
// read fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* read accesses f_pos */
};
@ fops3 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+ .llseek = default_llseek, /* write accesses f_pos */
};
// Use noop_llseek if neither read nor write accesses f_pos
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops4 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !fops3 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.write = write_f,
.read = read_f,
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read and write both use no f_pos */
};
@ depends on has_write && !has_read && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* write uses no f_pos */
};
@ depends on has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read uses no f_pos */
};
@ depends on !has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* no read or write fn */
};
===== End semantic patch =====
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
2010-08-15 16:52:59 +00:00
|
|
|
.llseek = default_llseek,
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* /register */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static ssize_t bm_register_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
|
|
|
|
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Node *e;
|
|
|
|
struct inode *inode;
|
2016-05-29 23:14:03 +00:00
|
|
|
struct super_block *sb = file_inode(file)->i_sb;
|
|
|
|
struct dentry *root = sb->s_root, *dentry;
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
struct binfmt_misc *misc;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
int err = 0;
|
binfmt_misc: fix possible deadlock in bm_register_write
There is a deadlock in bm_register_write:
First, in the begining of the function, a lock is taken on the binfmt_misc
root inode with inode_lock(d_inode(root)).
Then, if the user used the MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE flag, the function will call
open_exec on the user-provided interpreter.
open_exec will call a path lookup, and if the path lookup process includes
the root of binfmt_misc, it will try to take a shared lock on its inode
again, but it is already locked, and the code will get stuck in a deadlock
To reproduce the bug:
$ echo ":iiiii:E::ii::/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/bla:F" > /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/register
backtrace of where the lock occurs (#5):
0 schedule () at ./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:15
1 0xffffffff81b51237 in rwsem_down_read_slowpath (sem=0xffff888003b202e0, count=<optimized out>, state=state@entry=2) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:992
2 0xffffffff81b5150a in __down_read_common (state=2, sem=<optimized out>) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1213
3 __down_read (sem=<optimized out>) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1222
4 down_read (sem=<optimized out>) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1355
5 0xffffffff811ee22a in inode_lock_shared (inode=<optimized out>) at ./include/linux/fs.h:783
6 open_last_lookups (op=0xffffc9000022fe34, file=0xffff888004098600, nd=0xffffc9000022fd10) at fs/namei.c:3177
7 path_openat (nd=nd@entry=0xffffc9000022fd10, op=op@entry=0xffffc9000022fe34, flags=flags@entry=65) at fs/namei.c:3366
8 0xffffffff811efe1c in do_filp_open (dfd=<optimized out>, pathname=pathname@entry=0xffff8880031b9000, op=op@entry=0xffffc9000022fe34) at fs/namei.c:3396
9 0xffffffff811e493f in do_open_execat (fd=fd@entry=-100, name=name@entry=0xffff8880031b9000, flags=<optimized out>, flags@entry=0) at fs/exec.c:913
10 0xffffffff811e4a92 in open_exec (name=<optimized out>) at fs/exec.c:948
11 0xffffffff8124aa84 in bm_register_write (file=<optimized out>, buffer=<optimized out>, count=19, ppos=<optimized out>) at fs/binfmt_misc.c:682
12 0xffffffff811decd2 in vfs_write (file=file@entry=0xffff888004098500, buf=buf@entry=0xa758d0 ":iiiii:E::ii::i:CF
", count=count@entry=19, pos=pos@entry=0xffffc9000022ff10) at fs/read_write.c:603
13 0xffffffff811defda in ksys_write (fd=<optimized out>, buf=0xa758d0 ":iiiii:E::ii::i:CF
", count=19) at fs/read_write.c:658
14 0xffffffff81b49813 in do_syscall_64 (nr=<optimized out>, regs=0xffffc9000022ff58) at arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
15 0xffffffff81c0007c in entry_SYSCALL_64 () at arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120
To solve the issue, the open_exec call is moved to before the write
lock is taken by bm_register_write
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210228224414.95962-1-liorribak@gmail.com
Fixes: 948b701a607f1 ("binfmt_misc: add persistent opened binary handler for containers")
Signed-off-by: Lior Ribak <liorribak@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-03-13 05:07:41 +00:00
|
|
|
struct file *f = NULL;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
e = create_entry(buffer, count);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(e))
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(e);
|
|
|
|
|
binfmt_misc: fix possible deadlock in bm_register_write
There is a deadlock in bm_register_write:
First, in the begining of the function, a lock is taken on the binfmt_misc
root inode with inode_lock(d_inode(root)).
Then, if the user used the MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE flag, the function will call
open_exec on the user-provided interpreter.
open_exec will call a path lookup, and if the path lookup process includes
the root of binfmt_misc, it will try to take a shared lock on its inode
again, but it is already locked, and the code will get stuck in a deadlock
To reproduce the bug:
$ echo ":iiiii:E::ii::/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/bla:F" > /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/register
backtrace of where the lock occurs (#5):
0 schedule () at ./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:15
1 0xffffffff81b51237 in rwsem_down_read_slowpath (sem=0xffff888003b202e0, count=<optimized out>, state=state@entry=2) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:992
2 0xffffffff81b5150a in __down_read_common (state=2, sem=<optimized out>) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1213
3 __down_read (sem=<optimized out>) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1222
4 down_read (sem=<optimized out>) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1355
5 0xffffffff811ee22a in inode_lock_shared (inode=<optimized out>) at ./include/linux/fs.h:783
6 open_last_lookups (op=0xffffc9000022fe34, file=0xffff888004098600, nd=0xffffc9000022fd10) at fs/namei.c:3177
7 path_openat (nd=nd@entry=0xffffc9000022fd10, op=op@entry=0xffffc9000022fe34, flags=flags@entry=65) at fs/namei.c:3366
8 0xffffffff811efe1c in do_filp_open (dfd=<optimized out>, pathname=pathname@entry=0xffff8880031b9000, op=op@entry=0xffffc9000022fe34) at fs/namei.c:3396
9 0xffffffff811e493f in do_open_execat (fd=fd@entry=-100, name=name@entry=0xffff8880031b9000, flags=<optimized out>, flags@entry=0) at fs/exec.c:913
10 0xffffffff811e4a92 in open_exec (name=<optimized out>) at fs/exec.c:948
11 0xffffffff8124aa84 in bm_register_write (file=<optimized out>, buffer=<optimized out>, count=19, ppos=<optimized out>) at fs/binfmt_misc.c:682
12 0xffffffff811decd2 in vfs_write (file=file@entry=0xffff888004098500, buf=buf@entry=0xa758d0 ":iiiii:E::ii::i:CF
", count=count@entry=19, pos=pos@entry=0xffffc9000022ff10) at fs/read_write.c:603
13 0xffffffff811defda in ksys_write (fd=<optimized out>, buf=0xa758d0 ":iiiii:E::ii::i:CF
", count=19) at fs/read_write.c:658
14 0xffffffff81b49813 in do_syscall_64 (nr=<optimized out>, regs=0xffffc9000022ff58) at arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
15 0xffffffff81c0007c in entry_SYSCALL_64 () at arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120
To solve the issue, the open_exec call is moved to before the write
lock is taken by bm_register_write
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210228224414.95962-1-liorribak@gmail.com
Fixes: 948b701a607f1 ("binfmt_misc: add persistent opened binary handler for containers")
Signed-off-by: Lior Ribak <liorribak@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-03-13 05:07:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if (e->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE) {
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct cred *old_cred;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Now that we support unprivileged binfmt_misc mounts make
|
|
|
|
* sure we use the credentials that the register @file was
|
|
|
|
* opened with to also open the interpreter. Before that this
|
|
|
|
* didn't matter much as only a privileged process could open
|
|
|
|
* the register file.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
old_cred = override_creds(file->f_cred);
|
binfmt_misc: fix possible deadlock in bm_register_write
There is a deadlock in bm_register_write:
First, in the begining of the function, a lock is taken on the binfmt_misc
root inode with inode_lock(d_inode(root)).
Then, if the user used the MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE flag, the function will call
open_exec on the user-provided interpreter.
open_exec will call a path lookup, and if the path lookup process includes
the root of binfmt_misc, it will try to take a shared lock on its inode
again, but it is already locked, and the code will get stuck in a deadlock
To reproduce the bug:
$ echo ":iiiii:E::ii::/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/bla:F" > /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/register
backtrace of where the lock occurs (#5):
0 schedule () at ./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:15
1 0xffffffff81b51237 in rwsem_down_read_slowpath (sem=0xffff888003b202e0, count=<optimized out>, state=state@entry=2) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:992
2 0xffffffff81b5150a in __down_read_common (state=2, sem=<optimized out>) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1213
3 __down_read (sem=<optimized out>) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1222
4 down_read (sem=<optimized out>) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1355
5 0xffffffff811ee22a in inode_lock_shared (inode=<optimized out>) at ./include/linux/fs.h:783
6 open_last_lookups (op=0xffffc9000022fe34, file=0xffff888004098600, nd=0xffffc9000022fd10) at fs/namei.c:3177
7 path_openat (nd=nd@entry=0xffffc9000022fd10, op=op@entry=0xffffc9000022fe34, flags=flags@entry=65) at fs/namei.c:3366
8 0xffffffff811efe1c in do_filp_open (dfd=<optimized out>, pathname=pathname@entry=0xffff8880031b9000, op=op@entry=0xffffc9000022fe34) at fs/namei.c:3396
9 0xffffffff811e493f in do_open_execat (fd=fd@entry=-100, name=name@entry=0xffff8880031b9000, flags=<optimized out>, flags@entry=0) at fs/exec.c:913
10 0xffffffff811e4a92 in open_exec (name=<optimized out>) at fs/exec.c:948
11 0xffffffff8124aa84 in bm_register_write (file=<optimized out>, buffer=<optimized out>, count=19, ppos=<optimized out>) at fs/binfmt_misc.c:682
12 0xffffffff811decd2 in vfs_write (file=file@entry=0xffff888004098500, buf=buf@entry=0xa758d0 ":iiiii:E::ii::i:CF
", count=count@entry=19, pos=pos@entry=0xffffc9000022ff10) at fs/read_write.c:603
13 0xffffffff811defda in ksys_write (fd=<optimized out>, buf=0xa758d0 ":iiiii:E::ii::i:CF
", count=19) at fs/read_write.c:658
14 0xffffffff81b49813 in do_syscall_64 (nr=<optimized out>, regs=0xffffc9000022ff58) at arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
15 0xffffffff81c0007c in entry_SYSCALL_64 () at arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120
To solve the issue, the open_exec call is moved to before the write
lock is taken by bm_register_write
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210228224414.95962-1-liorribak@gmail.com
Fixes: 948b701a607f1 ("binfmt_misc: add persistent opened binary handler for containers")
Signed-off-by: Lior Ribak <liorribak@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-03-13 05:07:41 +00:00
|
|
|
f = open_exec(e->interpreter);
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
revert_creds(old_cred);
|
binfmt_misc: fix possible deadlock in bm_register_write
There is a deadlock in bm_register_write:
First, in the begining of the function, a lock is taken on the binfmt_misc
root inode with inode_lock(d_inode(root)).
Then, if the user used the MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE flag, the function will call
open_exec on the user-provided interpreter.
open_exec will call a path lookup, and if the path lookup process includes
the root of binfmt_misc, it will try to take a shared lock on its inode
again, but it is already locked, and the code will get stuck in a deadlock
To reproduce the bug:
$ echo ":iiiii:E::ii::/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/bla:F" > /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/register
backtrace of where the lock occurs (#5):
0 schedule () at ./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:15
1 0xffffffff81b51237 in rwsem_down_read_slowpath (sem=0xffff888003b202e0, count=<optimized out>, state=state@entry=2) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:992
2 0xffffffff81b5150a in __down_read_common (state=2, sem=<optimized out>) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1213
3 __down_read (sem=<optimized out>) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1222
4 down_read (sem=<optimized out>) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1355
5 0xffffffff811ee22a in inode_lock_shared (inode=<optimized out>) at ./include/linux/fs.h:783
6 open_last_lookups (op=0xffffc9000022fe34, file=0xffff888004098600, nd=0xffffc9000022fd10) at fs/namei.c:3177
7 path_openat (nd=nd@entry=0xffffc9000022fd10, op=op@entry=0xffffc9000022fe34, flags=flags@entry=65) at fs/namei.c:3366
8 0xffffffff811efe1c in do_filp_open (dfd=<optimized out>, pathname=pathname@entry=0xffff8880031b9000, op=op@entry=0xffffc9000022fe34) at fs/namei.c:3396
9 0xffffffff811e493f in do_open_execat (fd=fd@entry=-100, name=name@entry=0xffff8880031b9000, flags=<optimized out>, flags@entry=0) at fs/exec.c:913
10 0xffffffff811e4a92 in open_exec (name=<optimized out>) at fs/exec.c:948
11 0xffffffff8124aa84 in bm_register_write (file=<optimized out>, buffer=<optimized out>, count=19, ppos=<optimized out>) at fs/binfmt_misc.c:682
12 0xffffffff811decd2 in vfs_write (file=file@entry=0xffff888004098500, buf=buf@entry=0xa758d0 ":iiiii:E::ii::i:CF
", count=count@entry=19, pos=pos@entry=0xffffc9000022ff10) at fs/read_write.c:603
13 0xffffffff811defda in ksys_write (fd=<optimized out>, buf=0xa758d0 ":iiiii:E::ii::i:CF
", count=19) at fs/read_write.c:658
14 0xffffffff81b49813 in do_syscall_64 (nr=<optimized out>, regs=0xffffc9000022ff58) at arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
15 0xffffffff81c0007c in entry_SYSCALL_64 () at arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120
To solve the issue, the open_exec call is moved to before the write
lock is taken by bm_register_write
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210228224414.95962-1-liorribak@gmail.com
Fixes: 948b701a607f1 ("binfmt_misc: add persistent opened binary handler for containers")
Signed-off-by: Lior Ribak <liorribak@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-03-13 05:07:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(f)) {
|
|
|
|
pr_notice("register: failed to install interpreter file %s\n",
|
|
|
|
e->interpreter);
|
|
|
|
kfree(e);
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(f);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
e->interp_file = f;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-22 20:40:57 +00:00
|
|
|
inode_lock(d_inode(root));
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
dentry = lookup_one_len(e->name, root, strlen(e->name));
|
|
|
|
err = PTR_ERR(dentry);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(dentry))
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = -EEXIST;
|
2015-03-17 22:26:12 +00:00
|
|
|
if (d_really_is_positive(dentry))
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
goto out2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
inode = bm_get_inode(sb, S_IFREG | 0644);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
if (!inode)
|
|
|
|
goto out2;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
refcount_set(&e->users, 1);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
e->dentry = dget(dentry);
|
2006-09-27 08:50:46 +00:00
|
|
|
inode->i_private = e;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
inode->i_fop = &bm_entry_operations;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
misc = i_binfmt_misc(inode);
|
|
|
|
write_lock(&misc->entries_lock);
|
|
|
|
list_add(&e->list, &misc->entries);
|
|
|
|
write_unlock(&misc->entries_lock);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
|
|
out2:
|
|
|
|
dput(dentry);
|
|
|
|
out:
|
2016-01-22 20:40:57 +00:00
|
|
|
inode_unlock(d_inode(root));
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
binfmt_misc: fix possible deadlock in bm_register_write
There is a deadlock in bm_register_write:
First, in the begining of the function, a lock is taken on the binfmt_misc
root inode with inode_lock(d_inode(root)).
Then, if the user used the MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE flag, the function will call
open_exec on the user-provided interpreter.
open_exec will call a path lookup, and if the path lookup process includes
the root of binfmt_misc, it will try to take a shared lock on its inode
again, but it is already locked, and the code will get stuck in a deadlock
To reproduce the bug:
$ echo ":iiiii:E::ii::/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/bla:F" > /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/register
backtrace of where the lock occurs (#5):
0 schedule () at ./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:15
1 0xffffffff81b51237 in rwsem_down_read_slowpath (sem=0xffff888003b202e0, count=<optimized out>, state=state@entry=2) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:992
2 0xffffffff81b5150a in __down_read_common (state=2, sem=<optimized out>) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1213
3 __down_read (sem=<optimized out>) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1222
4 down_read (sem=<optimized out>) at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1355
5 0xffffffff811ee22a in inode_lock_shared (inode=<optimized out>) at ./include/linux/fs.h:783
6 open_last_lookups (op=0xffffc9000022fe34, file=0xffff888004098600, nd=0xffffc9000022fd10) at fs/namei.c:3177
7 path_openat (nd=nd@entry=0xffffc9000022fd10, op=op@entry=0xffffc9000022fe34, flags=flags@entry=65) at fs/namei.c:3366
8 0xffffffff811efe1c in do_filp_open (dfd=<optimized out>, pathname=pathname@entry=0xffff8880031b9000, op=op@entry=0xffffc9000022fe34) at fs/namei.c:3396
9 0xffffffff811e493f in do_open_execat (fd=fd@entry=-100, name=name@entry=0xffff8880031b9000, flags=<optimized out>, flags@entry=0) at fs/exec.c:913
10 0xffffffff811e4a92 in open_exec (name=<optimized out>) at fs/exec.c:948
11 0xffffffff8124aa84 in bm_register_write (file=<optimized out>, buffer=<optimized out>, count=19, ppos=<optimized out>) at fs/binfmt_misc.c:682
12 0xffffffff811decd2 in vfs_write (file=file@entry=0xffff888004098500, buf=buf@entry=0xa758d0 ":iiiii:E::ii::i:CF
", count=count@entry=19, pos=pos@entry=0xffffc9000022ff10) at fs/read_write.c:603
13 0xffffffff811defda in ksys_write (fd=<optimized out>, buf=0xa758d0 ":iiiii:E::ii::i:CF
", count=19) at fs/read_write.c:658
14 0xffffffff81b49813 in do_syscall_64 (nr=<optimized out>, regs=0xffffc9000022ff58) at arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
15 0xffffffff81c0007c in entry_SYSCALL_64 () at arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120
To solve the issue, the open_exec call is moved to before the write
lock is taken by bm_register_write
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210228224414.95962-1-liorribak@gmail.com
Fixes: 948b701a607f1 ("binfmt_misc: add persistent opened binary handler for containers")
Signed-off-by: Lior Ribak <liorribak@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-03-13 05:07:41 +00:00
|
|
|
if (f)
|
|
|
|
filp_close(f, NULL);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
kfree(e);
|
2016-02-18 00:51:16 +00:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return count;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-03-28 09:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
static const struct file_operations bm_register_operations = {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
.write = bm_register_write,
|
llseek: automatically add .llseek fop
All file_operations should get a .llseek operation so we can make
nonseekable_open the default for future file operations without a
.llseek pointer.
The three cases that we can automatically detect are no_llseek, seq_lseek
and default_llseek. For cases where we can we can automatically prove that
the file offset is always ignored, we use noop_llseek, which maintains
the current behavior of not returning an error from a seek.
New drivers should normally not use noop_llseek but instead use no_llseek
and call nonseekable_open at open time. Existing drivers can be converted
to do the same when the maintainer knows for certain that no user code
relies on calling seek on the device file.
The generated code is often incorrectly indented and right now contains
comments that clarify for each added line why a specific variant was
chosen. In the version that gets submitted upstream, the comments will
be gone and I will manually fix the indentation, because there does not
seem to be a way to do that using coccinelle.
Some amount of new code is currently sitting in linux-next that should get
the same modifications, which I will do at the end of the merge window.
Many thanks to Julia Lawall for helping me learn to write a semantic
patch that does all this.
===== begin semantic patch =====
// This adds an llseek= method to all file operations,
// as a preparation for making no_llseek the default.
//
// The rules are
// - use no_llseek explicitly if we do nonseekable_open
// - use seq_lseek for sequential files
// - use default_llseek if we know we access f_pos
// - use noop_llseek if we know we don't access f_pos,
// but we still want to allow users to call lseek
//
@ open1 exists @
identifier nested_open;
@@
nested_open(...)
{
<+...
nonseekable_open(...)
...+>
}
@ open exists@
identifier open_f;
identifier i, f;
identifier open1.nested_open;
@@
int open_f(struct inode *i, struct file *f)
{
<+...
(
nonseekable_open(...)
|
nested_open(...)
)
...+>
}
@ read disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
*off = E
|
*off += E
|
func(..., off, ...)
|
E = *off
)
...+>
}
@ read_no_fpos disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}
@ write @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
*off = E
|
*off += E
|
func(..., off, ...)
|
E = *off
)
...+>
}
@ write_no_fpos @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}
@ fops0 @
identifier fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
};
@ has_llseek depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier llseek_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.llseek = llseek_f,
...
};
@ has_read depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.read = read_f,
...
};
@ has_write depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.write = write_f,
...
};
@ has_open depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.open = open_f,
...
};
// use no_llseek if we call nonseekable_open
////////////////////////////////////////////
@ nonseekable1 depends on !has_llseek && has_open @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier nso ~= "nonseekable_open";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .open = nso, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* nonseekable */
};
@ nonseekable2 depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open.open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .open = open_f, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* open uses nonseekable */
};
// use seq_lseek for sequential files
/////////////////////////////////////
@ seq depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier sr ~= "seq_read";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = sr, ...
+.llseek = seq_lseek, /* we have seq_read */
};
// use default_llseek if there is a readdir
///////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops1 depends on !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier readdir_e;
@@
// any other fop is used that changes pos
struct file_operations fops = {
... .readdir = readdir_e, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* readdir is present */
};
// use default_llseek if at least one of read/write touches f_pos
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops2 depends on !fops1 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read.read_f;
@@
// read fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* read accesses f_pos */
};
@ fops3 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+ .llseek = default_llseek, /* write accesses f_pos */
};
// Use noop_llseek if neither read nor write accesses f_pos
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops4 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !fops3 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.write = write_f,
.read = read_f,
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read and write both use no f_pos */
};
@ depends on has_write && !has_read && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* write uses no f_pos */
};
@ depends on has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read uses no f_pos */
};
@ depends on !has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* no read or write fn */
};
===== End semantic patch =====
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
2010-08-15 16:52:59 +00:00
|
|
|
.llseek = noop_llseek,
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* /status */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static ssize_t
|
|
|
|
bm_status_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
struct binfmt_misc *misc;
|
|
|
|
char *s;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
misc = i_binfmt_misc(file_inode(file));
|
|
|
|
s = misc->enabled ? "enabled\n" : "disabled\n";
|
2007-05-09 09:33:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, nbytes, ppos, s, strlen(s));
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
static ssize_t bm_status_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
|
|
|
|
{
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
struct binfmt_misc *misc;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
int res = parse_command(buffer, count);
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
Node *e, *next;
|
|
|
|
struct inode *inode;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
misc = i_binfmt_misc(file_inode(file));
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (res) {
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
case 1:
|
|
|
|
/* Disable all handlers. */
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
misc->enabled = false;
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 2:
|
|
|
|
/* Enable all handlers. */
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
misc->enabled = true;
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 3:
|
|
|
|
/* Delete all handlers. */
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
inode = d_inode(file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_root);
|
|
|
|
inode_lock(inode);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* In order to add new element or remove elements from the list
|
|
|
|
* via bm_{entry,register,status}_write() inode_lock() on the
|
|
|
|
* root inode must be held.
|
|
|
|
* The lock is exclusive ensuring that the list can't be
|
|
|
|
* modified. Only load_misc_binary() can access but does so
|
|
|
|
* read-only. So we only need to take the write lock when we
|
|
|
|
* actually remove the entry from the list.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_safe(e, next, &misc->entries, list)
|
|
|
|
remove_binfmt_handler(misc, e);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-10-28 10:31:13 +00:00
|
|
|
inode_unlock(inode);
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return count;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-03-28 09:56:42 +00:00
|
|
|
static const struct file_operations bm_status_operations = {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
.read = bm_status_read,
|
|
|
|
.write = bm_status_write,
|
llseek: automatically add .llseek fop
All file_operations should get a .llseek operation so we can make
nonseekable_open the default for future file operations without a
.llseek pointer.
The three cases that we can automatically detect are no_llseek, seq_lseek
and default_llseek. For cases where we can we can automatically prove that
the file offset is always ignored, we use noop_llseek, which maintains
the current behavior of not returning an error from a seek.
New drivers should normally not use noop_llseek but instead use no_llseek
and call nonseekable_open at open time. Existing drivers can be converted
to do the same when the maintainer knows for certain that no user code
relies on calling seek on the device file.
The generated code is often incorrectly indented and right now contains
comments that clarify for each added line why a specific variant was
chosen. In the version that gets submitted upstream, the comments will
be gone and I will manually fix the indentation, because there does not
seem to be a way to do that using coccinelle.
Some amount of new code is currently sitting in linux-next that should get
the same modifications, which I will do at the end of the merge window.
Many thanks to Julia Lawall for helping me learn to write a semantic
patch that does all this.
===== begin semantic patch =====
// This adds an llseek= method to all file operations,
// as a preparation for making no_llseek the default.
//
// The rules are
// - use no_llseek explicitly if we do nonseekable_open
// - use seq_lseek for sequential files
// - use default_llseek if we know we access f_pos
// - use noop_llseek if we know we don't access f_pos,
// but we still want to allow users to call lseek
//
@ open1 exists @
identifier nested_open;
@@
nested_open(...)
{
<+...
nonseekable_open(...)
...+>
}
@ open exists@
identifier open_f;
identifier i, f;
identifier open1.nested_open;
@@
int open_f(struct inode *i, struct file *f)
{
<+...
(
nonseekable_open(...)
|
nested_open(...)
)
...+>
}
@ read disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
*off = E
|
*off += E
|
func(..., off, ...)
|
E = *off
)
...+>
}
@ read_no_fpos disable optional_qualifier exists @
identifier read_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t read_f(struct file *f, char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}
@ write @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
expression E;
identifier func;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
<+...
(
*off = E
|
*off += E
|
func(..., off, ...)
|
E = *off
)
...+>
}
@ write_no_fpos @
identifier write_f;
identifier f, p, s, off;
type ssize_t, size_t, loff_t;
@@
ssize_t write_f(struct file *f, const char *p, size_t s, loff_t *off)
{
... when != off
}
@ fops0 @
identifier fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
};
@ has_llseek depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier llseek_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.llseek = llseek_f,
...
};
@ has_read depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.read = read_f,
...
};
@ has_write depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.write = write_f,
...
};
@ has_open depends on fops0 @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.open = open_f,
...
};
// use no_llseek if we call nonseekable_open
////////////////////////////////////////////
@ nonseekable1 depends on !has_llseek && has_open @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier nso ~= "nonseekable_open";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .open = nso, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* nonseekable */
};
@ nonseekable2 depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier open.open_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .open = open_f, ...
+.llseek = no_llseek, /* open uses nonseekable */
};
// use seq_lseek for sequential files
/////////////////////////////////////
@ seq depends on !has_llseek @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier sr ~= "seq_read";
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = sr, ...
+.llseek = seq_lseek, /* we have seq_read */
};
// use default_llseek if there is a readdir
///////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops1 depends on !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier readdir_e;
@@
// any other fop is used that changes pos
struct file_operations fops = {
... .readdir = readdir_e, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* readdir is present */
};
// use default_llseek if at least one of read/write touches f_pos
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops2 depends on !fops1 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read.read_f;
@@
// read fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = default_llseek, /* read accesses f_pos */
};
@ fops3 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+ .llseek = default_llseek, /* write accesses f_pos */
};
// Use noop_llseek if neither read nor write accesses f_pos
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@ fops4 depends on !fops1 && !fops2 && !fops3 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
// write fops use offset
struct file_operations fops = {
...
.write = write_f,
.read = read_f,
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read and write both use no f_pos */
};
@ depends on has_write && !has_read && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier write_no_fpos.write_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .write = write_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* write uses no f_pos */
};
@ depends on has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
identifier read_no_fpos.read_f;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
... .read = read_f, ...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* read uses no f_pos */
};
@ depends on !has_read && !has_write && !fops1 && !fops2 && !has_llseek && !nonseekable1 && !nonseekable2 && !seq @
identifier fops0.fops;
@@
struct file_operations fops = {
...
+.llseek = noop_llseek, /* no read or write fn */
};
===== End semantic patch =====
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
2010-08-15 16:52:59 +00:00
|
|
|
.llseek = default_llseek,
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Superblock handling */
|
|
|
|
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
static void bm_put_super(struct super_block *sb)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct user_namespace *user_ns = sb->s_fs_info;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
|
|
|
|
put_user_ns(user_ns);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-02-12 08:55:41 +00:00
|
|
|
static const struct super_operations s_ops = {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
.statfs = simple_statfs,
|
2010-06-07 18:34:48 +00:00
|
|
|
.evict_inode = bm_evict_inode,
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
.put_super = bm_put_super,
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-25 16:38:28 +00:00
|
|
|
static int bm_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
int err;
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
struct user_namespace *user_ns = sb->s_user_ns;
|
|
|
|
struct binfmt_misc *misc;
|
2017-03-26 04:15:37 +00:00
|
|
|
static const struct tree_descr bm_files[] = {
|
2007-05-08 07:32:31 +00:00
|
|
|
[2] = {"status", &bm_status_operations, S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO},
|
|
|
|
[3] = {"register", &bm_register_operations, S_IWUSR},
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/* last one */ {""}
|
|
|
|
};
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(user_ns != current_user_ns()))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Lazily allocate a new binfmt_misc instance for this namespace, i.e.
|
|
|
|
* do it here during the first mount of binfmt_misc. We don't need to
|
|
|
|
* waste memory for every user namespace allocation. It's likely much
|
|
|
|
* more common to not mount a separate binfmt_misc instance than it is
|
|
|
|
* to mount one.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* While multiple superblocks can exist they are keyed by userns in
|
|
|
|
* s_fs_info for binfmt_misc. Hence, the vfs guarantees that
|
|
|
|
* bm_fill_super() is called exactly once whenever a binfmt_misc
|
|
|
|
* superblock for a userns is created. This in turn lets us conclude
|
|
|
|
* that when a binfmt_misc superblock is created for the first time for
|
|
|
|
* a userns there's no one racing us. Therefore we don't need any
|
|
|
|
* barriers when we dereference binfmt_misc.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
misc = user_ns->binfmt_misc;
|
|
|
|
if (!misc) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If it turns out that most user namespaces actually want to
|
|
|
|
* register their own binary type handler and therefore all
|
|
|
|
* create their own separate binfm_misc mounts we should
|
|
|
|
* consider turning this into a kmem cache.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
misc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct binfmt_misc), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!misc)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&misc->entries);
|
|
|
|
rwlock_init(&misc->entries_lock);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Pairs with smp_load_acquire() in load_binfmt_misc(). */
|
|
|
|
smp_store_release(&user_ns->binfmt_misc, misc);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* When the binfmt_misc superblock for this userns is shutdown
|
|
|
|
* ->enabled might have been set to false and we don't reinitialize
|
|
|
|
* ->enabled again in put_super() as someone might already be mounting
|
|
|
|
* binfmt_misc again. It also would be pointless since by the time
|
|
|
|
* ->put_super() is called we know that the binary type list for this
|
|
|
|
* bintfmt_misc mount is empty making load_misc_binary() return
|
|
|
|
* -ENOEXEC independent of whether ->enabled is true. Instead, if
|
|
|
|
* someone mounts binfmt_misc for the first time or again we simply
|
|
|
|
* reset ->enabled to true.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
misc->enabled = true;
|
|
|
|
|
2014-12-10 23:52:10 +00:00
|
|
|
err = simple_fill_super(sb, BINFMTFS_MAGIC, bm_files);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!err)
|
|
|
|
sb->s_op = &s_ops;
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
static void bm_free(struct fs_context *fc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (fc->s_fs_info)
|
|
|
|
put_user_ns(fc->s_fs_info);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-03-25 16:38:28 +00:00
|
|
|
static int bm_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
return get_tree_keyed(fc, bm_fill_super, get_user_ns(fc->user_ns));
|
2019-03-25 16:38:28 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const struct fs_context_operations bm_context_ops = {
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
.free = bm_free,
|
2019-03-25 16:38:28 +00:00
|
|
|
.get_tree = bm_get_tree,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int bm_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
fc->ops = &bm_context_ops;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct linux_binfmt misc_format = {
|
|
|
|
.module = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
|
|
.load_binary = load_misc_binary,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct file_system_type bm_fs_type = {
|
|
|
|
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
|
|
.name = "binfmt_misc",
|
2019-03-25 16:38:28 +00:00
|
|
|
.init_fs_context = bm_init_fs_context,
|
binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.
While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.
However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).
Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.
Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.
Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.
Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:
root [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000 \_ /sbin/init
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000 \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103 \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104 \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000 \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000 \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107 \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000 \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000 \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
- Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
- Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
- Add more comments that explain what's going on.
- Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
doing to make the code easier to understand.
- In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
guarantees to the user.
2021-10-28 10:31:14 +00:00
|
|
|
.fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
.kill_sb = kill_litter_super,
|
|
|
|
};
|
2013-03-03 03:39:14 +00:00
|
|
|
MODULE_ALIAS_FS("binfmt_misc");
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __init init_misc_binfmt(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int err = register_filesystem(&bm_fs_type);
|
2012-03-17 07:05:16 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!err)
|
|
|
|
insert_binfmt(&misc_format);
|
2022-02-09 07:49:20 +00:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void __exit exit_misc_binfmt(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unregister_binfmt(&misc_format);
|
|
|
|
unregister_filesystem(&bm_fs_type);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
core_initcall(init_misc_binfmt);
|
|
|
|
module_exit(exit_misc_binfmt);
|
2024-05-27 18:57:52 +00:00
|
|
|
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Kernel support for miscellaneous binaries");
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
|